Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Uruguay Round"

O texto discute a evolução do esforço do setor privado do agronegócio brasileiro na defesa de sua agenda de abertura de mercados externos. O foco é em especial no período entre a Rodada Uruguai (1986-1994) do Acordo Geral de Tarifas e Comércio (Gatt) e na Rodada Doha (desde 2001) da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). O objetivo é analisar de que forma o aumento da competitividade internacional desse setor, nas últimas décadas, contribuiu para o interesse dos empresários em elaborar uma agenda de demandas ofensivas. Busca-se ainda indicar como esse interesse se traduziu em ações coletivas. A ação coletiva pode ser entendida como a ação de indivíduos, ou de apenas um, interessados em obter um bem coletivo. Esse bem tem caráter primordialmente de partilhabilidade (seu uso por um indivíduo não diminui a quantidade para outros indivíduos) e de não exclusão, com todos do grupo tendo direito de usufruir dele. O caminho para se obter o bem é basicamente por meio de organizações. Entidades que representam empresas da agroindústria são aqui objetos de estudo. A análise ocorre sobre dois tipos de entidades: as de caráter geral, que representam diferentes segmentos do agronegócio, e as de caráter específico, que defendem interesses de um segmento. Devido à forte competitividade do agronegócio brasileiro, é sobre a ação de atores ofensivos que se concentra a discussão. A pesquisa indica que após a reestruturação do agronegócio no final dos anos 80 e nos anos 90, com o fim do pesado intervencionismo estatal e com a liberalização comercial do país, parte da agroindústria enfrentou o desafio de se modernizar e de abrir mercados externos. O que se assistiu foi a diversificação da pauta de exportação e o crescimento contínuo das vendas ao exterior. Tal aumento de vendas e diversificação adicionou atores ao grupo de interessados na abertura de mercados internacionais, inclusive por meio de redução de barreiras protecionistas aos produtos brasileiros. O país envolveu-se nos últimos anos em negociações internacionais com a meta de redução dessas barreiras. De uma participação incipiente e pouco organizada para a negociação da Rodada Uruguai, o setor privado caminhou em direção a um preparo técnico maior de conhecimento das barreiras enfrentadas e das soluções possíveis para eliminá-las, de forma a atuar com mais organização nas negociações dos anos 90 e das deste século, como a Rodada Doha. Este estudo aponta que essa atuação se deu por meio de ações coletivas organizadas pelas associações de segmentos da agroindústria, as quais, na percepção dos empresários, têm sido o principal canal de articulação de interesses, quando comparadas a entidades de caráter geral, como a Confederação da Agricultura e Pecuária do Brasil (CNA), órgão oficial de representação. Isso indica que grupos menores têm maior capacidade de mobilização do que grupos grandes. Mas há uma heterogeneidade dentro dessas associações de segmentos, com sócios de diferentes tamanhos, interesses e recursos. Os membros mais interessados no bem coletivo e com mais recursos formam uma massa crítica que parece ajudar a compreender a atuação desses grupos menores<br>This research discusses the evolution of the efforts made by the private sector of the Brazilian agribusiness to defend its agenda of liberalization of international markets. It is especially focused on the period between the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (Gatt) and on the Doha Round (since 2001) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The aim of this research is to analyse how the increase in the international competitiveness of the Brazilian agribusiness in the last few decades has affected the private sector interest in elaborating an offensive agenda. In addition, it is our purpose to indicate how this interest has generated collective actions by the private sector. Collective action can be understood as the action by a group of individuals, or just one individual, who are interested in reaching a collective good. The characteristics of this collective good are primarily the jointness of supply, meaning that an individual who has access to that good will not diminish the amount available to another individual, and non-excludibility, meaning that all the individuals of the group will have access to that good. Organizations are the mainly way to reach the collective goods. Associations that represent agribusiness firms are the objects of study in this research. The analysis will be made on two types of associations: those that represent different segments of the agribusiness and those that represent one segment of the agribusiness. Due to the strong competitiveness of the Brazilian agribusiness, the discussion will be concentrated on the actions taken by the players with an agenda demanding higher trade liberalization. This study indicates that after the restructure of the agribusiness in the late 80s and in the 90s, with the end of the heavy state intervention in the sector and the trade liberalization of the country, part of the agribusiness faced the challenge of modernisation and looked for new markets abroad. The result was a diversification of the products exported and the continuous expansion of the exports. Such diversification and increase in the exports added new players to the group formed by those interested in the liberalization of international markets, including the reduction of protectionist barriers against Brazilian products. In the last few years Brazil has participated in a number of international trade negotiations with the aim to put pressure on the reduction of those barriers. From an incipient organization to participate in the Uruguay Round, the private sector headed for a higher technical understanding of the international obstacles to its products and the possible solutions to open more markets. This resulted in it being also better organized to defend its agenda in the negotiations occurred during the 90s and the beginning of this century, such as the Doha Round. One of the conclusions of this study is that the private sector movement was made by collective actions organized by those associations representative of specific segments of the agribusiness, which are seen by the private sector as the main channel to articulate their interests, when compared to associations that represent different segments of the agribusiness, such as the Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock of Brasil (CNA), the official representative of the sector. This indicates that small groups are more successful in mobilizing a collective action than large groups. However, there is an heterogeneity inside those associations that represent one specific segment, with members of different sizes, different interests and different resources. The members more interested in the collective good and with more resources to provide it form a critical mass that seems to better explain the movements of the small groups

In this dissertation I examine the reasons why the U.S. film industry lost the GATT-Uruguay Round negotiations on audiovisual services and intellectual property rights (IPRs) related to copyright. I revisit the political economy approach to communication and implement Mosco's (1996) suggestions on the approach's renewal. Mosco notes that political economists of communication thematically view the state as supporting transnational business (1996, p. 94). However, Jarvie's (1992) analysis of the relationship between the U.S. government and film industry between 1920 and 1950 suggests that this 'support' theme does not adequately capture the often antagonistic and unproductive relationship between the two parties. I extend Jarvie's (1992) work by developing themes from his scholarship and applying them to a case study on the Uruguay Round. I review the literature on the media-cultural imperialism thesis and focus on Herbert Schiller's (1969 [1992], 1976, 1989) scholarship. Schiller's thesis implies that outcomes in international relations are dictated by domestic determinants such as the influence of corporate lobbyists. However, I argue that the reasons why Hollywood lost lie not in domestic determinants alone, but in a broader perspective (derived from the discipline of international relations) that focuses on the interaction between domestic trade politics and international relations (Putnam, 1988 [1993]). Putnam characterises international negotiations as an interactive process involving the bargaining between negotiators and the separate discussions each delegation has with constituents in its domestic market on the ratification of the agreement. I assess themes from Jarvie's work and propositions from Schiller's thesis using Putnam's (1988 [1993]) two-level analysis and empirical evidence from primary documents and thirty-five interviews conducted over a three-year period (1994 to 1997) with U.S. and European negotiators and film executives. I argue that U.S. domestic trade politics hampered efforts by U.S. negotiators to reach a bilateral accord on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright because of linkages forged by EU Member States between progress in those talks and progress in talks on agriculture, maritime transport services, geographic indications related to wines and anti-dumping. A second obstacle to a bilateral accord was an influential hawkish minority of the Hollywood lobby, who set an aggressive agenda for U.S. negotiators and set off a chain reaction in the final moments of the Round that led to Hollywood's defeat. Finally, I present an alternative scenario to the argument (cf. Waregne, 1994; Dehousse and Havelange, 1994; Joachimowicz and Berenboom, 1994) that the French government dictated the outcome of the audiovisual services and IPRs negotiations. My scenario emphasises the preeminent status of the General Affairs Council, the role of EU Member States other than France, and Commission efforts to forge a bilateral deal. In the end, the hawks dictated the outcome of the audiovisual services talks, while a majority of EU Member States dictated the outcome of the talks on IPRs related to copyright.

La proliferation des blocs commerciaux regionaux constitue aujourd'hui, un des faits majeurs de l'economie internationale. Peut-on dire que ce phenomene conduira a l'eclatement du cadre mondial des echanges commerciaux a moyen ou long terme. Presque trois ans ; apres la conclusion des accords de l'uruguay round, tout dependra de la maniere dont evolueront l'environnement international en general et le systeme multilateral en particulier. Compte-tenu de cette mutation, doit-on voir une opposition entre l'approche multilaterale et les approches regionales, ou doit-on inventer une gestion de commerce entre ces deux systemes.

La procédure de règlement des différends instaure dans le cadre du GATT 1947 a permis, depuis sa création, de régler plusieurs litiges commerciaux. Toutefois, au fil du temps son application est apparue insuffisamment juridictionnelle pour pouvoir s'imposer aux parties contractantes et plusieurs dysfonctionnements ont permis aux parties en litige de bloquer la procédure a différents stades. Les négociations de l'Uruguay round ont remédier à ces faiblesses de la procédure en établissant dans le mémorandum d'accord sur les règles et les procédures régissant le règlement des différends un système plus légaliste, plus automatique, et plus contraignant qui entend avec la création de l'organe d'appel permanent faire respecter la règle de droit dans les relations commerciales internationales. Ce nouveau système fonctionnera dans une véritable organisation internationale : l'OMC, dont les membres, notamment les plus importants, se sont engagés, du moins officiellement, à respecter les décisions de l'organe de règlement des différends et à favoriser le multilatéralisme dans les échanges commerciaux mondiaux à l'aube du XXIème siècle<br>The disputes settlement system established in the 1947 GATT agreement has permitted, since its creation, to resolve many commercial disputes. However, its application appeared not enough judicial to be binding upon the contracting parties and many deficiencies allowed the parties to the dispute to paralyze the procedure at different levels. Uruguay round's negotiations have remedied to these weaknesses in establishing in the dispute settlement understanding a more legalistic, automatic and binding system, which will with the creation of appellate body bring respect towards the rule of law in commercial international relations. This new system will work in a genuine international organization : the WTO, in which the members, specially the more important ones, officially engaged themselves to respect the dispute settlement body's decisions and to favour multilateralism in world commercial exchange at the beginning of the 21st century