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Статті в журналах з теми "Rational economic agents"
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Caniglia, Alan S. "George Eliot and Rational Economic Agents." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 8, no. 2 (April 1997): 127–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02601079x9700800203.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Conventional economists analyze human behavior by assuming a “rational economic agent” who is motivated solely by material self interest. This assumption has come to permeate our analyses of economic situations and policies, yet it is clearly limited, simplifying, and not capable of explaining the full range of human behavior. In this essay the writings of George Eliot are discussed as commentaries on this assumption and the implicit deductive methodology underlying it, and as explorations toward the possibility of a broader conceptual framework for analyzing economic issues. The paper argues that Eliot was knowledgeable about economic discourse and was consciously wrestling with the rational agent assumption and possible alternatives in her fictional as well as nonfictional work. Her writings suggest ambivalence toward the deductive/maximizing framework and the search for broader conceptualizations of human behavior.
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Carrera, Edgar J. Sanchez, and Jose Ma Gonzalez Lara. "Economic Rationality and Rational Credence." International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics 8, no. 1 (January 2019): 49–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijabe.2019010103.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The aim of this article is to show that rational maximizer agents, i.e. economic rationality, do not parsimoniously with rational credence, i.e. agents preferences driven by beliefs, traditions, idiosyncrasy, culture and/or customs depending on the social state representing a possible credence. The authors formulate a model on rational behavior, where either an economic and/or credence rationality results in the expected referential payoff of a rational preference driven by beliefs is not necessarily the optimal one in terms of having the largest payoff. Hence, the authors show the relationship between the expected payoff and instrumental or credence payoffs of choices, and what justifies choosing the latter when, ultimately, it is the former that maximizes your payoff. Finally, the authors conclude that agents' ordinary decisions may consider together both to the economic rationality and credence rationality, given their certain constraints on information, beliefs, and resources.
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Malkov, Leonid P. "How Rational is the Behavior of Economic Agents in Russia?" Comparative Economic Studies 34, no. 1 (April 1992): 26–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ces.1992.3.
Повний текст джерела
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Mazhara, Glib, and Volodymyr Kapustian. "BEHAVIORAL COMPONENTS IN RELATIONSHIPS OF ECONOMIC AGENTS (EXAMPLE OF THE UKRAINIAN CAR MARKET)." EUREKA: Social and Humanities 2 (March 31, 2020): 8–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.21303/2504-5571.2020.001184.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In neoclassical economics a concept of individual is seen as a logical thinking machine, which accurately analyzes all information received and, based on it, makes decisions that maximize his/her personal gain and minimize risks while achieving his/her goals. Such behavior of a person is called rational. Such concept serves as a source of neoclassicism for the construction of supply and demand models, operation of tax systems, business cycles, inflation etc. It was not accepted to pay attention to the psychology of decision-making, it was believed, that these transient, random factors pale against the grandeur of economic incentives. Psychologists are interested in solutions that are emotional, casual, pursued by some sort of cultural ideas, norms, rules, and may even be phobias, conversely economics is the science of rational behavior. The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the behavioral components and their influence on the interaction of economic agents in the commodity market. The study used methods of constructing a multivariate regression model, OLS, Student and Fisher criteria, statistical research, sociological surveys and expert opinion. Authors will analyze the behavioral aspects of market relationships on the example of used car market in Ukraine This paper provides several different situations and tested them with real market data to demonstrate that both buyers and sellers may not act rationally on the market, set prices, based on their personal beliefs, subjective and psychological factors and that must be considered when building economical models.
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Valsan, Calin. "B is for Bias." International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics 3, no. 2 (April 2014): 35–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijabe.2014040103.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Standard economic theory assumes rational agents. Individuals are expected to have rational expectations and constantly optimize their choices. Modern economic and financial theory is build under the assumption of rationality. There is plenty of evidence from psychology, however, that individuals are biased and rely heavily on heuristics in order to make decisions. Yet, this is not a mere fluke, a behavioral oddity. Because the social and economic environment in which individuals evolve is complex, behavioral biases represent evolutionary adaptations allowing economic agents to deal with undecidability and computational irreducibility.
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Chibale, Kelly. "Economic drug discovery and rational medicinal chemistry for tropical diseases." Pure and Applied Chemistry 77, no. 11 (January 1, 2005): 1957–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1351/pac200577111957.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In order to fulfill research objectives around target-based drug discovery in the field of anti-infective agents that are prevalent mainly in poor Third World countries, selection of biological and chemical targets is guided by economic drug discovery and rational medicinal chemistry. Selection of biological targets of therapeutic relevance in multiple disease-causing organisms, as well as the use of natural products and existing drugs as chemical scaffolds for the discovery and design of novel therapeutics should be viable strategies underpinning drug discovery research in poor Third World countries. In this regard, biological targets of interest to our program include disulfide reductases and cysteine proteases (CPs), while chemical scaffolds include existing antimalarial agents and natural products.
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Pavlov, I. "Ambiguity Aversion Phenomenon and Rational Choice Theory." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 10 (October 20, 2011): 16–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-10-16-34.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The paper analyzes ambiguity aversion that is one of the main anomalies characteristic for the individual behaviour of economic agents making choice in the face of uncertainty. It shows that this phenomenon plays a major role in the contemporary rational choice theory and hence is widely discussed both by economic theorists and experimental economists. The article further elaborates on the nature of this phenomenon and considers its main causes.
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Jandoc, Karl, and Ruben Juarez. "An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions." Games 10, no. 3 (August 1, 2019): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030031.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents.
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Shults, D. N. "Behavioral economics and DSGE-modeling." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 8, 2020): 47–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2020-1-47-65.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article considers the “behavioral” modification of the standard DSGE model proposed by X. Gabaix. In his model, agents behave in a boundedly rational manner, showing incomplete attention to macroeconomic statistics. Moreover, unlike other attempts to abandon the hypothesis of rational expectations in favor of a model of adaptive and/or static expectations, the Gabaix model is initially constructed taking into account the inattention of economic agents to macro variables. The consequence of bounded rationality is that monetary policy is less effective (compared to the model of rational expectations) and, conversely, fiscal policy is effective due to the fact that Ricardo equivalence is not fulfilled. If the inertia of inflation expectations is taken into account in the Gabaix model, it demonstrates that the interest rate has a positive effect on inflation in the long run. Bayesian estimates for the rationality coefficient in the Russian economy are presented. Moreover, attention to inflation is much lower than attention to the variable of economic activity.
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Lipovská, Hana, Lucie Coufalová, and Libor Žídek. "Homo Economicus in the Shortage Economy." Danube 9, no. 4 (December 1, 2018): 207–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.
Дисертації з теми "Rational economic agents"
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Allaberdyev, Maksat. "Risky Business : Are economic agents (ir)rational?" Thesis, Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-161060.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study tests whether if heuristics affect the decisions of an economic agent. Through different sets of lottery games conducted on students, the participants made choices between an uncertain asset and a risk-free asset. Instead of the classical approach, I chose to relate the uncertain asset to a financial asset and the risk-free asset to a cash payment placed in a savings account. The game contained a total of six rounds, where the participants made choices on different level of risk for the first three rounds. In the remaining three rounds the participants made choices on the same level of risk do distinguish if past experience affected their risk preference. The experimental results show that when the risk environment change, participants in the low risk environment became more risk averse, as oppose to participants in the high risk environment. The results also show that when exposed to avolatile environment, participants tend to switch to the safe option earlier compared to when stakes are low. However, when the participants made choices on the same level of risk, the switch from the lottery to the safe option did not differ between the participants. In other words, past experience did not seem to aect the valuation of the asset. In this experiment, women tend to be more risk averse than men. On average, women switched to the safe option earlier than the men.
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Tolar, Martin, of Western Sydney Macarthur University, and Faculty of Business and Technology. "Satisficing versus optimising behaviour in the non-durable consumption expenditure decision making process." THESIS_FBT_XXX_Tolar_M.xml, 1995. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/108.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The new classical school's dominance of mainstream economic thought in recent years has brought with it the associated adoption of rational economic agents ( in the Muthian sense) by mainstream economists. This thesis challenges this underlying assumption of human behaviour in the context of the non-durable consumption expenditure decision making process. In doing so, our attention will be placed upon the weak or more general form of the hypothesis, which has come to be known as optimisation. We employ a behavioural methodology in an attempt to ascertain if individuals adhere to the optimising or satisficing model of human behaviour. In doing so time will be spent examining the bounded rationality hypothesis. We also employ a behavioural methodology in producing a non-durable consumption function that is econometrically comparable with an optimising model of non-durable consumption expenditure (namely the permanent income rational expectations hypothesis). The micro results produced in this thesis suggest that the respondents surveyed from non-durable consumption expenditure decisions that are sub-optimal in nature. The formation of these sub-tropical expenditure decisions appear to be a consequence of the cognitive constraints faced by our respondents, which in turn provides empirical support for the bounded rationality hypothesis. On a macro level, our behavioural consumption function generates results that are comparable with those produced by the optimising model employed in this thesis. Our results also question the rational expectations permanent income hypothesis (as it is usually applied), despite making adjustments to the model which remove the underlying assumption of known, constant real interest useMaster of Commerce (Hons)
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Tolar, Martin. "Satisficing versus optimising behaviour in the non-durable consumption expenditure decision making process." Thesis, [Campbelltown, N.S.W. : The Author], 1995. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/108.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The new classical school's dominance of mainstream economic thought in recent years has brought with it the associated adoption of rational economic agents ( in the Muthian sense) by mainstream economists. This thesis challenges this underlying assumption of human behaviour in the context of the non-durable consumption expenditure decision making process. In doing so, our attention will be placed upon the weak or more general form of the hypothesis, which has come to be known as optimisation. We employ a behavioural methodology in an attempt to ascertain if individuals adhere to the optimising or satisficing model of human behaviour. In doing so time will be spent examining the bounded rationality hypothesis. We also employ a behavioural methodology in producing a non-durable consumption function that is econometrically comparable with an optimising model of non-durable consumption expenditure (namely the permanent income rational expectations hypothesis). The micro results produced in this thesis suggest that the respondents surveyed from non-durable consumption expenditure decisions that are sub-optimal in nature. The formation of these sub-tropical expenditure decisions appear to be a consequence of the cognitive constraints faced by our respondents, which in turn provides empirical support for the bounded rationality hypothesis. On a macro level, our behavioural consumption function generates results that are comparable with those produced by the optimising model employed in this thesis. Our results also question the rational expectations permanent income hypothesis (as it is usually applied), despite making adjustments to the model which remove the underlying assumption of known, constant real interest use
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Carroll, Gabriel D. (Gabriel Drew). "Approaches to mechanism design with boundedly rational agents." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72829.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2012.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This dissertation ties together three papers on mechanism design with boundedly rational agents. These papers explore theoretically whether, and to what extent, limitations on agents' ability to strategically misrepresent their preferences can help a mechanism designer achieve outcomes that she could not achieve with perfectly rational agents. The first chapter investigates whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to logically imply full incentive-compatibility, in a variety of mechanism design settings. This can be motivated by a boundedly rational model in which agents cannot contemplate all possible misrepresentations, but can consider those that are close to their true preferences. This chapter offers a unified approach that covers both continuous and discrete type spaces, showing that in many commonly studied cases, local incentive-compatibility (suitably defined) implies full incentive-compatibility. The second chapter advances the methodology of looking quantitatively at incentives for strategic behavior, motivated by the premise that agents will be truthful if the incentive to be strategic is small enough. This chapter defines a mechanism's susceptibility to manipulation as the maximum amount of expected utility any agent can ever gain from strategic misrepresntation. This measure of susceptibility is then applied to anonymous voting rules. One set of results estimates the susceptibility of specific voting rules; an important finding is that several voting systems previously identified as resistant to manipulation are actually more susceptible than simple plurality rule, by the measure proposed here. A second set of results gives asymptotic lower bounds on susceptibility for any possible voting rule, under various combinations of efficiency, regularity, and informational conditions. These results illustrate how one can quantitatively explore the tradeoffs between susceptibility and other properties of the voting rule. The third chapter carries the methodology of the second chapter to a market environment: unit-demand, private-value double auction markets. This chapter quantitatively studies the tradeoff between inefficiency and susceptibility to manipulation, among all possible mechanisms for such markets. The main result approximately locates the possibility frontier, pinning it down within a factor that is logarithmic in the size of the market.
by Gabriel D. Carroll.
Ph.D.
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Olsson, Gustavo André. "Ciência econômica e direito penal sob a perspectiva sistêmica." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2013. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/3247.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
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CNPQ – Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Este trabalho investiga a pretensão da Análise Econômica do Direito Penal em contribuir na maneira pela qual o Direito se relaciona com a sociedade contemporânea. Aquela se sustenta na utilização de instrumentos de análise da Ciência Econômica a respeito do comportamento dos seres humanos em sociedade. Investiga o efeito dos incentivos (em um sentido amplo), mensurando as respostas dos "agentes racionais" (mesmo com racionalidade limitada). Nesse contexto, a intenção das análises econômicas consiste em complexificar a perspectiva jurídica a respeito do comportamento humano, no sentido de encontrar melhor responsividade social em relação ao ordenamento jurídico, sobretudo fazendo uso de pesquisas empíricas. Assim, partindo de uma reconstrução da Análise Econômica do Direito Penal, desde o texto seminal de Gary Becker (1968), a pesquisa discute os avanços internos daquela perspectiva, assim como os aportes provenientes da Economia Comportamental. Esse enfoque é assumido em razão de, por si só, a Economia Comportamental (da mesma maneira que as análises empíricas) ser capaz de auxiliar na construção/evolução da dogmática do Direito. Por fim, investiga-se, com fundamentação da Teoria dos Sistemas, a possibilidade de acomplamentos entre os aportes da Ciência Econômica (como comunicação do Sistema da Ciência ou da Economia) em relação ao Sistema do Direito, especialmente considerando as dificuldades de racionalidades consequencialistas, como as propostas ligadas ao agente racional (que reage aos incentivos - ainda que limitadamente, com viéses e com heurísticas de decisão). O resultado considera a possibilidade de ganhos para o Direito, especialmente na maneira de como as normas jurídicas podem ser planejadas e terem sua eficiência e efetividade mensuradas; de outro lado, sugere-se atenção às pesquisas (e a realização de novas) a respeito da percepção e da responsividade dos destinatários das normas jurídicas. Da mesma forma, verificou-se dificuldades para que o Direito alcance objetivos sociais diante da contingência e dos riscos nas sociedades contemporâneas, segundo a perspectiva da Teoria dos Sistemas Sociais.
This research studies the role of the Economic Analysis of Criminal Law in order to verify how it might contributes with the Law in contemporary society. Economic analysis is based on the use of analytical tools of Economic Science with the aim to investigate the way in which humans beings behave in society. Actually, it investigates the effect of incentives (in a broad sense) in human behavior. In this context, the intention of the Law and Economics analysis is to complexify the legal perspective regarding human behavior to find better social responsiveness, in relation to changes in the legal system. Thus, based on a reconstruction of the Economic Analysis of Criminal Law, from the Gary Becker’s seminal text (1968), this research discusses the internal progress of that perspective, and especially the criticism added on it from Behavioral Economics. This approach was chosen because Behavioral Economics, by itself, could be able to assist in the construction of the dogmatic view of Law. Finally, it was investigate, based on System Theory, the theoretical relationship between the contributions of Economic Science (as communications of System Science or Economics) in relation to the System of Law, especially considering the difficulties of “consequentialist rationalities”, as related to the “rational agent” (that reacts to incentives, even with bounded rationality, biases and heuristics of decision). The result suggests the possibility of gains for the Law, especially in the way of how legal rules can be planned and might have measured their efficiency and effectiveness, considering the way of how recipients perceive (and react) to rules changing. In the same perspective, it might be difficult to Law reach social goals in a social contingent and risky society, from the perspective of the Theory of Social Systems.
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Castillo, Valencia María del Pilar. "Economics theory of political kidnapping : theory and evidency for the case of the FARC in Colombia." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/132922.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
O objetivo desta tese é explicar a redução nas taxas de sequestros políticos na Colômbia nos últimos anos a partir da análise do comportamento estratégico dos criminosos. Pontos de vista convencionais explicam a diminuição dos sequestros como o resultado exitoso da política de segurança democrática do presidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez. No entanto, até agora, tem sido desconsiderada a busca de explicações alternativas à já existente, que bem poderiam ser encontradas a partir da perspectiva de análise dos dilemas organizacionais produzidos pelos sequestros nas FARC – Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia –, da sua interação estratégica com o governo e, em particular, de seus efeitos sobre sua atividade global e na decisão de pôr fim a essa ação criminosa. O interesse dos três ensaios que compõem esta tese é estudar as motivações deste grupo rebelde, sob o enfoque da teoria da agência, dividindo sua estrutura organizativa entre líderes (principal), que tomam as decisões estratégicas, e os combatentes (agentes), que as realizam, em um contexto de informação assimétrica, para tomar decisões racionais. Cada ensaio desenvolve a partir de diferentes perspectivas, mas tendo como base o enfoque racional de principal-agente, as razões que levaram a organização a renunciar a uma de suas atividades criminosas, considerada no princípio como uma ação estratégica eficiente que obrigaria o governo colombiano a negociar. O primeiro ensaio está focado em mostrar os custos de transação que gerou essa estratégia para os agentes e o principal. Esta análise faz uso dos mesmos instrumentos analíticos empregados para analisar os custos de qualquer transação econômica que leva a cabo uma organização legal. Mostrando que os custos dessa atividade foram altos, expressados, primeiro, em um conflito de interesses entre o líder, encarregado de esquematizar e designar tarefas, e os agentes, responsáveis por sua execução. A divergência entre estas duas partes teve origem em uma mudança nas expectativas dos agentes, que preferiam mais atividades de combate às relacionadas com o sequestro, em um contexto de perseguição constante do exército colombiano. O segundo ensaio estuda como essa mesma estratégia afetou o contexto no qual os agentes definem suas preferências. Através do uso de três enfoques diferentes da teoria econômica se expõem três interpretações diversas da mudança nas preferências dos agentes: a) uma mudança no risco; b) uma divergência entre as preferências subjacentes e induzidas; c) a presença de dimensões motivacionalmente salientes. E o terceiro ensaio apresenta um modelo formal para estabelecer um sistema de compensações eficiente que o principal oferece ao agente para atenuar o que sobre seu comportamento gerou o sequestro. Os resultados mostram que, considerando que os recursos das organizações armadas ilegais são escassos, quanto maiores são os incentivos oferecidos aos agentes para evitar que desertem, menor é a capacidade da organização para penalizar os desertores e menor a utilidade do principal. Simulando o modelo para um conjunto específico de parâmetros se conclui que a incorporação do mecanismo de autocumprimento (self-enforcing) dentro da função de utilidade do principal aumenta seus custos e propicia o baixo esforço do agente e seu comportamento oportunista.The objective of this thesis is to explain the reduction in the rate of political kidnapping in Colombia in recent years by means of analyzing the strategic behavior of its perpetrators. This is the basic question addressed in this thesis. Conventional views interpret the fall in the kidnapping rate as an outcome of President Álvaro Uribe’s democratic security policy. I will argue, however, that this is not the whole story, since political kidnapping led Farc [for its acronym in Spanish, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia] into an unprecedented strategic situation that induced a breach between leader (principal) and combatant (agent) concerns with strong effects on its overall activity and its decision to stop that criminal action. The focus of three essays making up this thesis is on studying FARC’s motivations from the perspective of agency theory, by splitting its organizational structure into principals and agents who are acting on a setting of asymmetrical information. Each essay develops, from different perspectives, the reasons that led the organization to give up that criminal activity due to the substantial political and organizational risks involved. The first essay is focused on the transactions costs generated by the kidnapping strategy both for agents and principals. This analysis is based on the same theoretical tools used to study the costs held by any legal organization. I found that the costs of kidnapping were high, expressed first in a conflict of interest between the leader –responsible for designing and assigning tasks—and the agents in charge of its implementation. The divergence was due to a shift in the expectations of agents who preferred combat activities over the menial tasks associated with kidnapping, in a context of heavy pressure by the Colombian Army. In contradistinction to legal organizations in which such type of divergence can be solved, in part, by paying higher wages to agents in order to extract their best effort, this alternative is not feasible for FARC, for those who joined the organization are supposed to have an ideological and political commitment. The second essay studies how the kidnapping strategy affected the preferences of agents and their behavior by means of using three different approaches from economic theory: (a) a change in risk, (b) a divergence between underlying and induced preferences and, (c) the presence of salient motivational dimensions. The third essay examines, through a principal-agent model, the nature of the trade-off between incentives and enforcing mechanisms that the leadership of an Armed illegal organization offers to its agents. Using a MATLAB’s optimization tool-box, I computed the optimal transfer system for a given parameterization of the model, and analyzed its properties. The numerical analysis shows that the inclusion of a self-enforcing mechanism on the leader’s objective function increases the costs for the principal and could lead agents to choose low efforts and engage in opportunistic behavior.
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Lambert, Aude. "La diversité des structures de rationalité en microéconomie." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016AIXM3047.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
La microéconomie conventionnelle présente le concept de rationalité de manière univoque et étroite comme maximisation de l'utilité espérée. On sait les critiques qui ont été adressées à ce concept tant du point de vue de l'économie comportementale que de celui de la sociologie. Notre objectif est de proposer une lecture de certaines de ces critiques afin de montrer que, pour l'essentiel, elles mettent en évidence la diversité des modes de rationalité. Le problème est, dès lors, de savoir si le constat de cette diversité conduit nécessairement à la récusation du modèle standard. Cette thèse s'inscrit dans la double perspective de la théorie du choix rationnel et de la théorie des jeux. À partir des critiques de l'économie comportementale, nous soutenons que le principe de maximisation constitue un mode de raisonnement local et évaluable au regard du contexte d'action. Mais une telle régionalisation implique une profonde révision de la théorie des jeux standard. La récusation de l'équilibre général, fondé sur le présupposé de la maximisation de l'utilité espérée, comme modèle univoque appelle un nouveau type de formalisation. En ce sens, nous montrons que la modélisation multi-agents permet de penser, de manière contrefactuelle, des interactions entre agents économiques rationnels et situés. Cette méthode nous autorise ainsi à élaborer des scénarios rationalisants qui dessinent des mondes possibles sans trancher entre ces mondesStandard microeconomics displays the concept of rationality as the maximisation of expected utility i.e. in a narrow and unequivocal sense. The criticisms against this concept made by behavioural economics or sociology are well known. I aim at providing an analysis of some of them in order to emphasise the fact that they mainly highlight the diversity of reasoning modes. But the issue is to know whether the diversity of reasoning modes necessarily leads to reject the standard model. My intention falls into two fields : the theory of Rational Choice and the Game Theory. From the point of view of behavioural economics, I assume that the maximisation is nothing more than a local reasoning mode that can be assessed in relation to the context of action. But this assumption implies correcting the standard Game Theory as well. The fact that the general equilibrium, based on the maximisation of expected utility, cannot be used anymore as an unique model calls a new kind of formalisation. So, I point out that agent-based modelling allows us to conceive, in a counterfactual way, interactions between rational economic agents in their context. Therefore, in this respect, rational patterns of actions and interactions design possible worlds without having to choose between them
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Belmont, Daniele Ferreira de Sousa. "Teoria das ondas de elliott: uma aplicação ao mercado de ações da bm&fbovespa." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2010. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5048.
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The prices of securities traded on stock exchanges, as well as any other commodity in the financial market fluctuate naturally with the demand for these products. These oscillations, along with the asymmetry of information about the prices of these products generate volatility processes. Charles Dow in the early twentieth century created sector indexes, in which papers met the same area of activity, according to him, several indicators point to the same direction would be a sign that this really would be a tendency to drive the market, thus characterizing the Dow Theory. Ralph Nelson Elliott (1871-1948) studied the average prices of the Dow Jones Industrial and realized repetitions in the market changes, their observations were summarized in what became known as "The Wave Principle." Elliott developed his theory based on so-called Fibonacci sequence, discovered by Leonardo Pizza (Fibonacci) around 1200. In addition to the Dow Theory and the Theory of waves in this work was done using the Theory of Rationality of the agents as a complementary way to explain the decision process of investors, as happens in situations of uncertainty. A rational decision involves selecting the choice which has the largest expected return for a given level of risk.
Os preços dos ativos negociados em bolsas de valores, assim como qualquer outro tipo de commodity do mercado financeiro, oscilam naturalmente com a procura por esses produtos. Essas oscilações, juntamente com a assimetria das informações acerca dos preços desses produtos geram processos de volatilidade. Charles Dow, no início do século XX criou índices setoriais, nos quais reunia papéis da mesma área de atividade, segundo ele, se vários índices apontassem para a mesma direção seria um sinal de que realmente essa seria uma tendência de movimentação do mercado, caracterizando assim a Teoria de Dow. Ralph Nelson Elliott (1871-1948) estudou as cotações médias dos índices Dow Jones Industrial e percebeu repetições nas alterações do mercado, suas observações foram resumidas no que ficou conhecido como O Princípio da Onda . Elliott desenvolveu a sua teoria com base na denominada Sequência de Fibonacci, descoberta por Leonardo de Pizza (Fibonacci) por volta de 1200. Além da Teoria de Dow e da Teoria das Ondas, nesse trabalho, fez-se uso da Teoria da Racionalidade dos agentes como uma forma complementar para se explicar o processo de decisão dos investidores, dado que acontecem em situações de incerteza. Uma decisão racional implica em selecionar a escolha que apresente o maior retorno esperado para um dado nível de risco.
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Lindahl, Ida, and Elisabeth Wendel. "Revisorns oberoende vid fristående rådgivning : det ständiga dilemmat." Thesis, Högskolan i Borås, Institutionen Handels- och IT-högskolan, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hb:diva-17853.
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Revisorn anlitas för att ge ett oberoende yttrande som ska säkerställa pålitligheten i företagensfinansiella rapporter. Denna tilltrosskapandande effekt kan endast uppnås om revisorn görsina bedömningar och fattar beslut utan att låta sig påverkas av andra personers viljor ellerönskningar. Att revisorn är oberoende är särskilt viktigt i de fall revisorernas arbete påverkarintressenters beslutsfattande. Diskussionen kring revisorns oberoende i samband medtillhandahållandet av fristående rådgivning har debatterats flitigt. Vissa menar att denfristående rådgivningen medför positiva effekter på revisionen, medan andra anser att denborde förbjudas då den utgör ett hot mot revisorns oberoende och påverkar förtroendet förbranschen. Genom införandet av revisionspaketet står revisionsbranschen inför nyaregleringar av oberoendet och den fristående rådgivningen. Denna uppsats ämnar fördjupadiskussionen och undersöka varför det kan upplevas som ett problem när en revisionsbyrå, irollen som oberoende kontrollorgan, erbjuder både fristående rådgivning och revision.Frågeställningen besvaras med hjälp av relevanta teorier, modeller och intervjuer medrevisorer, intressenter samt normgivande organ. Den fristående rådgivningen kan medföra attrevisorn inte uppfattas som oberoende och kan utmana förtroendet hos allmänheten. Vidarekan det upplevas som ett problem när den fristående rådgivningen sker på revisionsklienter.Medias skildring av debatten, att det verkar föreligga ett förväntningsgap samt en bristandetransparens kan även det vara bidragande orsaker till problematiken. Revisionspaketet kankomma att öka transparensen, minska förväntningsgapet samt stärka förtroendet för branschenoch kan således komma att minska problematiken med att ett oberoende kontrollorganerbjuder både fristående rådgivning och revision.Program: Civilekonomprogrammet
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Holm, Cyril. "F. A. Hayek's Critique of Legislation." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-236890.
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The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection.
Книги з теми "Rational economic agents"
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Santa Fe Institute (Santa Fe, N.M.), ed. Agent-based modeling: The Santa Fe Institute artificial stock market model revisited. Berlin: Springer, 2008.
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Babina, Ol'ga. Theory, methodology and practice of regional strategic planning. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1738755.
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In the monograph, the region is presented as a complex, multilevel socio-economic system consisting of many heterogeneous, interacting economic entities of different levels (economic agents and markets, management, resources and economic processes), jointly organizing reproduction processes embedded in the economic space of the national economy on the local territory. Currently, the role of rational management of the socio-economic development of the region is increasing. In such conditions, it is advisable to use strategic planning, which, in turn, has increasingly been carried out using a simulation model. The simulation model in regional strategic planning allows government agencies to predict their activities in the presence of various controlled and uncontrolled factors of the external and internal environment. In this study, the list of principles of strategic planning focused on the processes of strategic planning of the region using the method of simulation modeling is supplemented. A methodology for organizing strategic planning processes at the meso-level using simulation modeling technology is proposed.
For a wide range of readers interested in the problems of regional strategic planning.
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Benigno, Pierpaolo. Portfolio choices with near rational agents: A solution to some international-finance puzzles. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
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Benigno, Pierpaolo. Portfolio choices with near rational agents: A solution to some international-finance puzzles. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
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Carroll, Chris. The epidemiology of macroeconomic expectations. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.
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SAVEL'EVA, Ekaterina, Anna Fedchenko, and Ol'ga Gegechkori. Fundamentals of labor organization in digital ecosystems. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1063619.
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The textbook comprehensively presents the regularities of the formation of the theory and practice of labor organization in digital ecosystems. The key issues of digital labor organization are considered: development and implementation of project-network forms of division and cooperation of labor; design of optimal labor processes based on modern information and communication technologies; formation of rational labor mobility and labor flows; development and implementation of sound norms and rules in the field of digital labor; training of labor agents to work in the digital space; creation of balanced remuneration systems, recruitment and retention of labor agents, etc. Methodological principles of digital labor organization are highlighted, as well as approaches for studying and solving theoretical and practical issues of modern labor organization.
Meets the requirements of the federal state educational standards of higher education of the latest generation.
For students studying in the areas of training 38.03.03 "Personnel Management", 38.03.02 "Management", 38.03.01 "Economics", studying labor organization issues, as well as project managers, HR specialists, labor organization engineers, ergonomists, production coordinators in distributed communities, community development program coordinators, course students, graduate students, teachers.
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Ghaleigh, Navraj Singh. Economics and International Climate Change Law. Edited by Kevin R. Gray, Richard Tarasofsky, and Cinnamon Carlarne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780199684601.003.0004.
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This chapter presents an economic analysis of climate change and international climate change law. From an economic perspective, the environment becomes a scarce resource which must be allocated between competing ends. The economics of climate change draws mainly on the two foundational insights of economics. The first is that the free exchange of goods tends to move resources to their highest valued use, in which case the allocation of resources is said to be ‘Pareto-efficient’. The second is that economic agents respond to incentives. Economic agents are rational utility maximizers, meaning that they will undertake those actions which raise their level of utility. The chapter examines economist Ronald Coase’s article The Problem of Social Cost, which deals with externalities, the cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit, and applies it to pollution and emissions trading.
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Sugden, Robert. The Inner Rational Agent. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825142.003.0004.
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Chapter 4 reviews ‘behavioural welfare economics’—the approach to normative analysis that is favoured by most behavioural economists. This approach assumes that people have context-independent ‘true’ or ‘latent’ preferences which, because of psychologically-induced errors, are not always revealed in actual choices. Behavioural welfare economics aims to reconstruct latent preferences by identifying and removing the effects of error on decisions, and to design policies to satisfy those preferences. Its implicit model of human agency is of an ‘inner rational agent’ that interacts with the world through an imperfect psychological ‘shell’. I argue that there is no satisfactory evidence to support this model, and no credible psychological foundation for it. Since the concept of true preference has no empirical content, the idea that such preferences can be reconstructed is a mirage. Normative economics needs to be more radical in giving up rationality assumptions.
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Giocoli, Nicola. Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory. Elgar Publishing Limited, Edward, 2003.
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Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
Знайти повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "Rational economic agents"
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Yildiz, Kemal. "Implementation with Boundedly Rational Agents." In The Future of Economic Design, 359–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_50.
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Fiaschi, D., and P. M. Pacini. "Coalition Formation with Boundedly Rational Agents." In The Complex Dynamics of Economic Interaction, 319–35. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17045-4_19.
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Shiozawa, Yoshinori, Masashi Morioka, and Kazuhisa Taniguchi. "A Large Economic System with Minimally Rational Agents." In Microfoundations of Evolutionary Economics, 53–138. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55267-3_2.
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Shahi, Chander, and Shashi Kant. "Are Forest User Groups Rational Economic or Social Agents? Experimental Evidence from India." In Post-Faustmann Forest Resource Economics, 23–39. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5778-3_2.
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Alkemade, F., and J. A. La Poutré. "Heterogeneous, Boundedly Rational Agents in the Cournot Duopoly." In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 3–17. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55651-7_1.
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Liu, Jiqun. "From Rational Agent to Human with Bounded Rationality." In A Behavioral Economics Approach to Interactive Information Retrieval, 65–89. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23229-9_3.
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Blakely, Jason. "How Economics Becomes Ideology: The Uses and Abuses of Rational Choice Theory." In Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics, 37–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26114-6_3.
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Gouri Suresh, Shyam. "Rational Versus Adaptive Expectations in an Agent-Based Model of a Barter Economy." In Complex Systems Modeling and Simulation in Economics and Finance, 141–60. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99624-0_7.
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Storrie, Donald. "Temporary Agency Work in the European Union — Economic Rationale and Equal Treatment." In Flexibility and Stability in Working Life, 103–22. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230235380_7.
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Mabera, Faith. "China’s Evolving Approach to the African Peace and Security Agenda: Rationale, Trends and Implications." In International Political Economy Series, 135–61. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53039-6_7.
Повний текст джерелаТези доповідей конференцій з теми "Rational economic agents"
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McGeary, Foster, and Keith Decker. "Simulation of economic actors using limitedly rational autonomous agents." In the second international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/860575.860799.
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Tepecik, Filiz. "Economic and Legal Aspects of Trafficking in Human Beings." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00780.
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In the next decade, trafficking in human beings is expected to be the largest part of the illegal markets such as drug and arms trafficking. Trafficking in human beings can be done in many different purposes which includes the sexual exploitation, the practices similar to slavery or servitude. The problem is becoming visible both for the Eurasian countries and for Turkey. Despite being an inhuman trade, all parties of the trafficking in human beings are rational economic agents and they are acting according to the rules of supply and demand. Therefore in this paper, this economic structure that nourish the illegal market is primarily be discussed. It is focused on the push and pull factors to this market members and this is tried to shown in a quantitative dimension of the market. Secondly, in order to combat trafficking in human beings, legal and social measures are being taken. These regulations generally aim to find and punish perpetrators, and /or protect victims of trafficking. But these regulations always cause a change of the benefits and the costs of the parties involved in trafficking in human beings. Thus the economic perspective are convenient to analyze these results. Finally, with this paper it is aimed to produce a common ground for people who want to work in this academic field.
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Sha, Zhenghui, and Jitesh H. Panchal. "Estimating the Node-Level Behaviors in Complex Networks From Structural Datasets." In ASME 2013 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2013-12063.
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There is an emerging class of networks that evolve endogenously based on the local characteristics and behaviors of nodes. Examples of such networks include social, economic, and peer-to-peer communication networks. The node-level behaviors determine the overall structure and performance of these networks. This is in contrast to exogenously designed networks whose structures are directly determined by network designers. To influence the performance of endogenous networks, it is crucial to understand a) what kinds of local behaviors result in the observed network structures and b) how these local behaviors influence the overall performance. The focus in this paper is on the first aspect, where information about the structure of networks is available at different points in time and the goal is to estimate the behavior of nodes that resulted in the observed structures. We use three different approaches to estimate the node-level behaviors. The first approach is based on the generalized preferential attachment model of network evolution. In the second approach, statistical regression-based models are used to estimate the node-level behaviors from consecutive snapshots of the network structure. In the third approach, the nodes are modeled as rational decision-making agents who make linking decisions based on the maximization of their payoffs. Within the decision-making framework, the multinomial logit choice model is adopted to estimate the preferences of decision-making nodes. The autonomous system (AS) level Internet is used as an illustrative example to illustrate and compare the three approaches.
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Abgaldaev, Vladimir Y. "Influence Of Modelling Consistently Rational Agents On Neoclassic Economics." In Conference on Land Economy and Rural Studies Essentials. European Publisher, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2021.07.96.
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House, Richard, and Jessica Livingston. "Fast and slow: Technical communicators, rational agents, and behavioral economics." In 2013 IEEE International Professional Communication Conference (IPCC 2013). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ipcc.2013.6623916.
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Kuznetsov, S. V., and E. A. Gorin. "Proper environmental management and new energy – opportunities for development." In REGIONAL ECONOMY AND TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT. INSTITUTE OF PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL ECONOMICS OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.52897/978-5-7310-5861-2-2022-16-1-98-106.
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The rational use of natural resources and a balanced environmental policy as a platform for the formation of an effective economy of the future are discussed. The interrelations ensuring progressive socio-economic devel-opment in Russia and in the world, the role of the current energy agenda in the formation and implementation of economic policy are considered. The possibilities of new energy, including the optimization of hydrocarbon gen-eration and the use of renewable energy sources, are evaluated. Information on the potential use of solar, wind and hydrogen energy for electric generation is provided.
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Bretto, Alain, and Joel Priolon. "A new approach to asset pricing with rational agents behaving strategically." In 2012 IEEE Conference on Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering & Economics (CIFEr). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cifer.2012.6327773.
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Ibn Awal, Zobair, and Kazuhiko Hasegawa. "A New Approach to Accident Analysis: Multiple Agent Perception-Action." In SNAME 5th World Maritime Technology Conference. SNAME, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.5957/wmtc-2015-131.
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The economic and social impact of maritime accidents are enormous and devastating. In recent times the world experienced some grievous accidents which put serious challenges to the existing methods of safety evaluation. Over the years many research has been conducted on risk analysis and improvement of safety standards. Yet accidents are taking place and human elements are the major contributing factors. This paper proposes a new technique based on logic programming (e.g. Prolog) method. It is considered that an accident is an unwanted event which initiates from hidden causes (e.g. various action(s)/perception(s) of ship crew). It is, therefore, discussed that using intelligent agents for evaluation of the actions/perceptions of ship crew may result in uncovering of the hidden root causes behind an accident. Intelligent agents are essentially computer programs which acts or behaves rationally according their percepts. The perception and action sequence of an intelligent agent depends on the given environment and knowledge base. Study reveals that such a technique may assist ship crew in evaluating their decisions for making a safe voyage. The merits and demerits of the method are discussed briefly and future recommendations are made.
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Acet, Hakan, Zeynep Karaçor, and Özlem Alkan. "Macroeconomic Models: Assessment of the 2008 Financial Crisis in the Framework of Dynamic Stockastic General Equilibrium and Agent Based Modeling." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c10.02137.
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As a result of economic crisis occurred in the mid-1970s, the macroeconomic models that were exist at that time had been criticized about their validity, and then the dynamic Stochastic general equilibrium analysis had been developed accordingly. Dynamic Stochastic general equilibrium models, which combine microeconomic foundations by assuming that households or firms are behaving optimally with rational expectations against scarce resources, have been also criticized for their adequacy with the onset of the 2008 crisis. After this crisis, agent-based modeling attracted attention and started to be adopted more in the literature. In this study, 2008 crisis will be evaluated by comparing both models.
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Yılmazcan, Dilek, and Cansu Dağ. "Financial Regulations in the Field of Energy Policies." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c10.02036.
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Goals set by governments in energy field can be various. However, financial regulations can also vary depending on geopolitical location, sources, economical structure and other prioritized policies of the countries. Modern energy policies basically prioritize energy safety, efficiency, diversity and their environment-friendly features. In this study, financial regulations in the field of energy at world will be analyzed and the impact of financial regulations will be ascertained.
Energy end-user price is calculated by taking taxes, CO2 emission pricing and subsidies into account. CO2 emission pricing resulting from emission top level and trade or carbon taxes affects investment decisions in energy industry by changing the costs of other competitive sources. In addition to this, major types of energy subsidies are fossil source subsidies and renewable energy subsidies. Financial policy tools in EU can be listed as energy taxation, EU emission trade system and incentives for renewable energy. Legal regulations affecting energy field in Turkey can be examined in three categories; energy taxation, tax expenditures and support mechanisms. Tax expenditures and support mechanisms covering tax exemption, exception, reduction and similar practices in energy field are provided to both producers and consumers.
As a result, activating energy policies depends on decisions of many industries and individuals especially in transportation, industry and residence. These regulations mentioned in this study will be the most important tool in guiding rational preferences of the agents on generation, distribution, consumption and savings, if they are planned according to energy policies.
Звіти організацій з теми "Rational economic agents"
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Dosi, Giovanni, Mauro Napoletano, Andrea Roventini, Joseph Stiglitz, and Tania Treibich. Rational Heuristics? Expectations and Behaviors in Evolving Economies with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26922.
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Munoz, Laura, Giulia Mascagni, Wilson Prichard, and Fabrizio Santoro. Should Governments Tax Digital Financial Services? A Research Agenda to Understand Sector-Specific Taxes on DFS. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ictd.2022.002.
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Digital financial services (DFS) have rapidly expanded across Africa and other low-income countries. At the same time, low-income countries face strong pressures to increase domestic resource mobilisation, and major challenges in taxing the digital economy. A growing number are therefore advancing or considering new taxes on DFS. These have generated much debate and there are significant disagreements over the rationale for the taxes and their likely impacts. This paper examines three key questions that could help governments and other stakeholders to better understand the rationale for, and impacts of, different decisions around taxing DFS – and to arrive at policies that best meet competing needs. First, what is the rationale for imposing specific taxes on money transfers or mobile money in particular? Second, and most importantly, what is the likely impact of DFS taxes? Third, how do the policy processes through which taxes on DFS and money transfers are introduced function in practice? The paper looks at the core principles of good taxation and presents the existing debate around whether taxes on DFS observe them. It explains why understanding the landscape of financial services is essential to designing suitable tax policies and lays out a framework for developing the necessary analysis of the impacts of taxes on DFS. It also highlights the importance of better understanding the processes that give rise to these taxes.
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Gillison, Fiona, Gemma Lannon, Bas Verplanken, Julie Barnett, and Elisabeth Grey. A rapid review of the evidence on the factors underpinning the consumption of meat and dairy among the general public. Food Standards Agency, March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.46756/sci.fsa.bmk523.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Willingness to reduce meat and dairy consumption across the population is relatively low (12.8%-25.5%), albeit increasing. While women and higher socio-economic groups tend to show greater awareness of an environmental rationale and subsequent willingness for change, this difference does not emerge strongly in studies reporting behavioural outcomes. A broad set of search terms was used to identify literature in this area, but focused on: Evidence of the potential for behaviour change in response to sustainability, environmental and climate change agendas. The reduction of meat or dairy consumption, rather than stopping altogether. Motives and barriers to reduction rather than stopping could differ considerably. Research was also specifically searched to explore the impact of socio-demographic characteristics on willingness to reduce meat and dairy consumption. This study was used to inform the primary research on Psychologies of Food Choice: Public views and experiences around meat and dairy consumption.
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Gu, Jing, Danielle Green, and Jiadan Yu. Building Back Better: Sustainable Development Diplomacy in the Pandemic Era. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), December 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2021.065.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This report critically examines the nature of the distinction between traditional inter-state diplomacy and sustainable development diplomacy. It then sets out the institutional changes which are necessary for the achievement of sustainable development diplomacy. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have been identified as a key means of implementation for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Given the increasing centrality of the United States (US)–China relationship in global development cooperation, understanding the modalities of their engagement may provide useful insights into how partnerships may be cultivated and deepened to realise the SDGs. The Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have demonstrated the interconnection of the world, as well as the interconnection of challenges of the world. Sustainable development diplomacy is needed now more than ever to prioritise development strategies of different states and work on common shared challenges. Sustainable development diplomacy can only work when different actors recognise the value of the common goals and are willing to make an effort to accomplish them. Global sustainable development diplomacy requires a stronger policy agenda and greater cohesion. This report explores the idea of sustainable development diplomacy and, through two sectoral case studies, explores the nature, function, and rationale for interactive engagement. The form and structure of multi-actor relationships are a response to complex, trans-border political, social, economic, and environmental challenges which require a more nuanced and varied management approach than narrowly defined state-led development. However, the power dynamics, the modalities, and experiences of engagement that underpin these dynamic relationships, remain understudied, especially with regard to their impact on sustainable development.