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Автор: Grafiati
Опубліковано: 10 грудня 2022
Оновлено: 28 січня 2023

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Статті в журналах з теми "Neoclassical and the economics of property rights"

1

Misiński, Wojciech. "Why does mainstream economy not explain the causes of contemporary negative socio-economic phenomena?" WSB Journal of Business and Finance 53, no. 1 (February 1, 2019): 92–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/wsbjbf-2019-0010.

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Abstract This article is a continuation and extension of the lecture ‘Causes and effects of incompleteness and non-inclusion of ownership structures of contemporary capital companies’ delivered at the conference in Wrocław in 2017 and published in the Scientific Notebooks of the University of Economics (No. 493). The aim of the article is to answer the question: why the Neoclassical Theory of Markets (Main Current Economics) does not explain the causes of a number of contemporary socio-economic phenomena, in particular, huge price fluctuations, breakdowns of individual markets and as a consequence of economic crises on a global scale? This required a new, different from the neoclassical view of the series of processes and market phenomena occurring in contemporary economies as well as the verification of the Neoclassical Market Theory paradigm constituting the main core of the Mainstream Economics. These include, in particular: 1) theoretical (classical) and real ‘object (s)’ analysis of market transactions; 2) rejection of one-dimensional, neoclassical analysis of exchange processes (transactions), accepting two or even three-dimensional analysis of the exchange process (transaction); 3) analysis of exchange processes (transactions), the ‘subject’ of which are complete, incomplete or partial (and their bundles) property rights; 4) analysis of exchange processes (transactions) by complete and exclusive and incomplete and non-exclusive decision-makers; 5) analysis of exchange processes (transactions), whose ‘subject’ are partial (and their bundles) property rights in relation to virtual (non-material) ‘goods’. Taking into account that the above verification (acceptance of a different from the neoclassical paradigm of market theory) allows to break out of the circle of elegant and logical neoclassical analysis of theoretical, never and nowhere existing markets (exchange processes), and more importantly, the explanatory reasons for a series of negative, contemporary socio-economic phenomena.
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2

Jankovic, Ivan, and Walter Block. "Private Property Rights, Government Interventionism and Welfare Economics." Review of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 365–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2019-0019.

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Abstract We develop a critique of government interventionism based on the Misesian calculation argument against socialism. If private property rights and relative prices based on supply and demand are necessary for successful economic coordination, then conventional market failure theories cannot be sustained. Government interventionism based on the idea of correcting “market failures” is analytically just a milder form of socialist central planning. Between the two, there are only differences in degree, not in kind. We criticize several public choice and law and economics scholars for disregarding this Misesian angle in their market failure theories. In our view they are reducible to arguments based on a fallacious political economy while perpetuating false neoclassical economic analysis of market failure theorists. We claim that government interventionism is just a milder form of socialist central planning. Therefore, the traditional arguments against the efficiency of central planning also apply to government interventions aiming at fixing market failures. In particular, we maintain that governments face the “knowledge problem”, which means that they cannot determine the optimal allocation of resources. In section two of this paper we discuss market failure and economic calculation. Section three is given over to our claim that the “Nirvana fallacy” is itself fallacious. The burden of section four is to address Coase and consequences. We conclude in section five.
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Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn. "The Politics of Property Rights." American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (December 1995): 867–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082514.

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The study of land tenure polarizes the field of development. Neoclassical scholars lobby for a move toward private property rights, while other economists and historians defend the maintenance of customary land tenure. I argue that the development scholars' focus on the structure of property rights obscures a more fundamental problem of land reform—that of enforcement. Property rights will not inspire individual investment and economic growth unless political institutions give the ruler of a local community or nation-state sufficient coercive authority to silence those who advocate an alternative, more distributionally favorable property rights system. At the same time, political institutions must force the ruler to establish a credible commitment to that property rights system. I illustrate this theoretical argument through an analysis of property rights institutions in Akyem Abuakwa, a traditional state in colonial Ghana.
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Riker, William H., and David L. Weimer. "The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights." Social Philosophy and Policy 10, no. 2 (1993): 79–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004155.

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All our previous political experience, and especially, of course, the experience of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offers little hope that democracy can coexist with the centralized allocation of economic resources. Indeed, simple observation suggests that a market economy with private property rights is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the existence of a democratic political regime. And this accords fully with the political theory of liberalism, which emphasizes that private rights, both civil and economic, be protected and secure. At the same time, our previous experience also indicates that market economies are more successful than centrally planned economies not only in producing, but also in distributing, both private and collective goods. This economic experienee is supported by neoclassical economic theory, which treats clearly defined and secure rights to private property as essential to a market economy.
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Mukhin, А. А. "THE USE OF COBB-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION FUNCTION IN MODELING PRODUCTION PROCESSES." Bulletin of Udmurt University. Series Economics and Law 30, no. 6 (December 28, 2020): 822–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.35634/2412-9593-2020-30-6-822-829.

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Several alternative economic approaches to the study of organization are discussed in the literature: the neoclassical theory, the theory of transaction costs (the theory of specific assets), the theory of incomplete contracts (the theory of property rights), and the Agency theory (the theory of incentives). Recently, there have been approaches at the intersection of Economics and management: resource theory, knowledge theory, strategic theory, entrepreneurial theory; in the framework of sociology: network theory, the theory of resource dependence, the theory of institutional isomorphism, the theory of situational choice, the theory of strategic choice. The article deals with the basic model of neoclassical theory. The advantage of the neoclassical theory is that it emphasizes the role of technology in General and economies of scale in particular as factors that influence the size of production, turnover of organizations. Within the framework of the considered approach, a certain macrostructure is determined that carries out the costs of economic resources: fixed assets, the number of employees that affect the turnover of organizations. The task of rational economic management, which meets the Udmurt Republic, is to determine the forecast of turnover of organizations with the given resources and to calculate the necessary for its value of fixed assets, the number of employees.
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6

Heijdra, Ben J., and Anton D. Lowenberg. "Towards A Theory of Colonial Growth: The Case of the Dutch in Southern Africa." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 1, no. 4 (January 1987): 249–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02601079x8700100405.

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This paper develops an economic explanation of the Dutch colonization of southern Africa. The changing attitudes of the Dutch to colonial growth are seen as a rational response to shifting economic constraints rather than as a function of changing tastes. The model emphasizes the importance of defence and administration costs to the structure of property rights and the determination of the optimal size of the colony. This neoclassical approach may be applied to other historical instances of European colonization. A formalization of the model is provided in an Appendix.
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7

Lueck, Dean. "The Comparative Institutions Approach to Wildlife Governance." Texas A&M Law Review 6, no. 1 (October 2018): 147–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/lr.v6.i1.6.

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This Article develops a comparative institutions approach to wildlife governance by examining the property rights to the habitat and the stocks of wild populations. The approach is based on the transaction cost and property rights approach and lies primarily in the traditions of Coase, Barzel, Ostrom, and Williamson. The approach recognizes the often-extreme costs of delineation and enforcement of property rights to wild populations and their habitats; thus, all systems are notably imperfect compared to the typical neoclassical economics approach. These costs arise because wildlife habitat and wildlife populations are part of the land which has many attributes and uses—most notably, residential and agricultural uses. In turn, the optimal ownership sizes (and shapes) vary across land uses (e.g., farming, urban, ranching, wildlife, parks). The organizations that govern wildlife tend to be ridden with transaction costs and imperfect property rights, and the most efficient system is one that maximizes the total value of the package less the enforcement and administrative costs. This Article develops a framework for considering different governance regimes for both the wild stocks and the habitats they require. A series of cases—focused especially on bison and caribou—show the range of governance regimes that have been used and how those governance regimes depend on history and on law.
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8

Pantić, Rade. "Robni fetišizam, pravni fetišizam, preobraženi oblici i estetski fetišizam." Život umjetnosti, no. 104 (July 2019): 52–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.31664/10.31664/zu.2019.104.03.

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In this paper, we analyse two recent contributions to the Marxist critique of the political economy of art: the article “Artistic Labor and the Production of Value: An Attempt at a Marxist Interpretation” by José María Durán and the book Art and Value: Art’s Economic Exceptionalism in Classical, Neoclassical and Marxist Economics by Dave Beech. While Durán emphasizes the emergence of the legal category of intellectual property rights as crucial for value production in art, Beech has reached the contrary conclusion that artistic labour does not produce value and that artistic production is therefore excepted from capitalist commodity production. In our paper, we criticize both conclusions. While agreeing with Beech that artistic labour does not produce value and is thus excepted from the ideology of commodity fetishism, we believe that through the ideology of converted forms it nevertheless becomes part of capitalist commodity production. We would argue that the sector of artistic production, through the converted form of monopoly rent, establishes a production relation with other, competitive, sectors of capitalist economy. This production relation is enabled by the ideology of aesthetic fetishism, supported by the ideology of legal fetishism through the category of intellectual property rights. Contrary to Durán, we thus conclude that intellectual property rights allow for a hidden transfer of surplus value produced by the workers in the competitive sectors of the capitalist economy.
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Pantić, Rade. "Robni fetišizam, pravni fetišizam, preobraženi oblici i estetski fetišizam." Život umjetnosti, no. 104 (July 2019): 52–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.31664/zu.2019.104.03.

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In this paper, we analyse two recent contributions to the Marxist critique of the political economy of art: the article “Artistic Labor and the Production of Value: An Attempt at a Marxist Interpretation” by José María Durán and the book Art and Value: Art’s Economic Exceptionalism in Classical, Neoclassical and Marxist Economics by Dave Beech. While Durán emphasizes the emergence of the legal category of intellectual property rights as crucial for value production in art, Beech has reached the contrary conclusion that artistic labour does not produce value and that artistic production is therefore excepted from capitalist commodity production. In our paper, we criticize both conclusions. While agreeing with Beech that artistic labour does not produce value and is thus excepted from the ideology of commodity fetishism, we believe that through the ideology of converted forms it nevertheless becomes part of capitalist commodity production. We would argue that the sector of artistic production, through the converted form of monopoly rent, establishes a production relation with other, competitive, sectors of capitalist economy. This production relation is enabled by the ideology of aesthetic fetishism, supported by the ideology of legal fetishism through the category of intellectual property rights. Contrary to Durán, we thus conclude that intellectual property rights allow for a hidden transfer of surplus value produced by the workers in the competitive sectors of the capitalist economy.
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Seidl, Irmi, Clement A. Tisdell, and Steve Harrison. "Environmental Regulation of Land Use and Public Compensation: Principles, and Swiss and Australian Examples." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 20, no. 5 (October 2002): 699–716. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c01103s.

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The authors discuss the regulation of rural land use and compensation for property-rights restrictions, both of which appear to have become more commonplace in recent years but also more contested. The implications of contemporary theories in relation to this matter are examined, including: the applicability of new welfare economics; the relevance of the neoclassical theory of politics; and the implications of contemporary theories of social conflict resolution and communication. Examination of examples of Swiss and Australian regulation of the use of rural properties, and the ensuing conflicts, reveals that many decisions reflect a mixture of these elements. Rarely, if ever, are social decisions in this area made solely on the basis of welfare economics, for instance social cost-benefit analysis. Only some aspects of such decisions can be explained by the neoclassical theory of politics. Theories of social conflict resolution suggest why, and in what way, approaches of discourse and participation may resolve conflicts regarding regulation and compensation. These theories and their practical application seem to gain in importance as opposition to government decisions increases. The high degree of complexity of most conflicts concerning regulation and compensation cannot be tackled with narrow economic theories. Moreover, the Swiss and Australian examples show that approaches involving conflict resolution may favour environmental standards.
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Дисертації з теми "Neoclassical and the economics of property rights"

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Velev, Ivan Mitev. "Property rights and market institutions: The case of Russian property reform." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.

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Harison, Elad. "Software intellectual property rights : economics and policy analysis /." Maastricht : UPM, Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2005. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/511861311.pdf.

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Kiema, Ilkka. "Essays on the economics of intellectual property rights /." [Helsinki] : University of Helsinki, 2008. https://oa.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/42546/essayson.pdf?sequence=1.

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Hackett, Petal Jean. "Essays on intellectual property rights policy." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7934.

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This dissertation will take a theoretical approach to analyzing certain challenges in the design of intellectual property rights (`IPR') policy. The first essay looks the advisability of introducing IPR into a market which is currently only very lightly protected - the US fashion industry. The proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act is intended to introduce EU standards into the US. Using a sequential, 2-firm, vertical differentiation framework, I analyze the effects of protection on investment in innovative designs by high-quality (`designer') and lower-quality (`mass-market') firms when the mass-marketer may opt to imitate, consumers prefer trendsetting designs and firms compete in prices. I show that design protection, by transforming mass-marketers from imitators to innovators, may reduce both designer pro ts and welfare. The model provides possible explanations for the dearth of EU case law and the increase in designer/mass-marketer collaborations. The second essay contributes to the literature on patent design and fee shifting, contrasting the effects of the American (or `each party pays') rule and English (or `losing party pays') rule of legal cost allocation on optimal patent breadth when innovation is sequential and firms are differentiated duopolists. I show that if litigation spending is endogenous, the American rule may induce broader patents and a higher probability of infringement than the English rule if R&D costs are sufficiently low. If, however, R&D costs are moderate, the ranking is reversed and it is the English rule that leads to broader patents. Neither rule supports lower patent breadth than the other over the entire parameter space. As such, any attempts to reform the US patent system by narrowing patents must carefully weigh the impact on firms' legal spending decisions if policymakers do not wish to adversely affect investment incentives. The third and final essay analyzes the effects of corporate structure on licensing behaviour. Policymakers and legal scholars are concerned about the potential for an Anticommons, an underuse of early stage research tools to produce complex final products, typically arising from either blocking or stacking. I use a simple, one-period differentiated duopoly model to show that if patentees have flexibility in corporate structure, Anticommons problems are greatly reduced. The model suggests that if the patentee owns the single (or single set) of essential IPR and goods are of symmetric quality, Anticommons issues may be entirely eliminated, as the patentee will always license, simply shifting its corporate structure depending on the identity of the downstream competitor. If the rival produces a more valuable good, Anticommons problems are reduced. Further, if the patentee holds 1 of 2 essential patents, the ability to shift its corporate structure may reduce total licensing costs to rival firms. However the analysis offers a cautionary note: while spin-offs by the patentee help to sustain downstream competition, they may restrict market output, and therefore welfare. Thus the inefficiency in the patent system may be in the opposite direction than is currently thought - there may be too much technology transfer, rather than too little.
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謝建煌 and Kin-wong Che. "On the formation of property rights." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1991. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31976487.

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Weikard, Hans-Peter. "Property rights and resource allocation in an overlapping generations model." Universität Potsdam, 1997. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2006/854/.

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The paper is an enquiry into dynamic social contract theory. The social contract defines the rules of resource use. An intergenerational social contract in an economy with a single exhaustible resource is examined within a framework of an overlapping generations model. It is assumed that new generations do not accept the old social contract, and access to resources will be renegotiated between any incumbent generation and their successors. It turns out that later generations will be in an unfortunate position regardless of their bargaining power.
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7

Yin, Nina. "Essays on the economics of innovation and intellectual property rights." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013TOU10025/document.

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L'innovation a reçu beaucoup d'attention de la part des économistes. En conséquence, les droits de propriété intellectuelle (DPI), qui permettent à l'innovateur, pour récupérer son coût de R&D, de pratiquer un prix de monopole, ont obtenu une large acceptation. Équilibrer l'efficacité dynamique et statique de la propriété intellectuelle est une préoccupation majeure pour les décideurs politiques. De nombreuses études ont abordé cette question, mais ne sont pas parvenues à un consensus. Dans le premier chapitre, je tente de répondre à la question suivante: Faut-il accorder une exclusivité commerciale supplémentaire pour les nouveaux innovateurs dans l'industrie pharmaceutique? Mes résultats montrent que la valeur acquise par une nouvelle innovation l’emporte sur la perte d'exclusivité sur le marché, mais avec un bénéfice mineur. Dans le chapitre deux (avec Roberta Dessi), nous tournons notre attention vers les aspects financiers des activités innovantes. Nous passons en revue les données empiriques sur l'impact du capital-risque sur l'innovation. Nous proposons un modèle théorique simplifié pour éclairer les signaux potentiels d'endogénéité afin d’identifier comment le capital-risque influence l'innovation. Dans le chapitre trois (avec Margaret K. Kyle), nous explorons les effets potentiels des droits de propriété intellectuelle et des exemptions de recherche sur les avancées cumulées dans le développement de médicaments. Nos résultats montrent que la protection des brevets tend à promouvoir les activités innovantes et faciliter les essais cliniques menés sur les médicaments après lancement. Les exemptions de recherche se révèlent être associées à une diminution des activités d'innovation de suivi. Chacun de ces trois chapitres est autonome. Les chapitres un et trois enquêtent sur le bien-fondé de l'octroi de droits de propriété intellectuelle à l'innovateur. Le deuxième chapitre examine les dispositions financières des activités d'innovation
Innovation has received much attention from economists. As a result, intellectual property rights (IPR), which allow the innovator to recover their R&D cost from monopoly pricing, have obtained wide acceptance. Balancing the dynamic and static efficiency of IPR is a primary concern for the policy makers. Many studies have addressed this question but reached no consensus. In chapter one, I try to answer the following question: Should we grant additional market exclusivity to incremental innovators in the pharmaceutical industry? My results show that the value gained from incremental innovation outweighs the loss from market exclusivity, but with minor benefit. In chapter two (with Roberta Dessi), we turn our attention to the financial aspects of the innovative activities. We review the empirical evidence on the impact of venture capital on innovation. We propose a simplified theoretical model to illuminate the potential endogeneity caveats in identifying the causal effects of venture capital on innovation. In chapter three (with Margaret K. Kyle), we explore the potential effects of intellectual property rights and research exemptions on cumulative advances in drug development. Our results show that the overall effect of patent protection tends to promote innovative activities; post-launch drugs facilitate the clinical trials conducted on them. Research exemptions turn out to be associated with a lower level of follow-up innovation activities. Each of these three chapters is self-contained. Chapters one and three investigate the rationale of granting the innovator intellectual property rights by exploring the pros and cons of intellectual property rights. Chapter two investigates the financial provisions of innovation activities
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Birdyshaw, Edward Leon. "Property rights and the environmental Kuznets' curve /." view abstract or download file of text, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3147814.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2004.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-96). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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9

Granath, Magdalena, and Maren Sluiter. "Do property rights matter to FDI? : A cross-sectional study of property rights, institutions and FDI in middle income countries." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Nationalekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-40187.

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Property rights are an important subject of economic theory and as a product of institutional qualities an essential determinant of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The purpose of this study is to examine how middle income countries with, on average, weak property rights can attract investments from abroad, given their (formal) institutions, and if differences in institutional qualities have an effect on FDI inflows. Using a panel approach to observe a sample of 20 countries over ten years, we find that there is mixed evidence supporting this theory. Whilst the theoretical background suggests that institutional qualities do affect a country’s ability to attract or deter investments, we cannot conclude a significant effect in our results. Furthermore, the study concludes that certain products of institutional qualities (democracy, corruption) can lead to mixed effects on the net inflows of FDI, but that an important determinant is the market-size of the country.
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Harison, Elad. "Intellectual property rights, innovation and software technologies : the economics of monopoly rights and knowledge disclosure /." Cheltenham : E. Elgar, 2008. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9781847205827.

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Книги з теми "Neoclassical and the economics of property rights"

1

Fried, Barbara. The progressive assault on laissez faire: Robert Hale and the first law and economics movement. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998.

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K, Benjamin Daniel, ed. Property rights and economic behavior. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2006.

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3

Colombatto, Enrico. The Elgar companion to the economics of property rights. Cheltenham, UK: E. Elgar Pub., 2004.

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4

Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. Intellectual Property Rights in China. Berlin, Heidelberg: Asia Briefing Media Ltd., 2011.

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5

Liew, Leong H. The economics of regional property rights in China. Parkville, Vic: Dept. of Economics, University of Melbourne, 1991.

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6

Liegsalz, Johannes. The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights in China. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8865-2.

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Andersson, David E. Property rights, consumption and the market process. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008.

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8

Dabla-Norris, Era. The enforcement of property rights and underdevelopment. [Washington, D.C.]: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, 1999.

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9

Institutions, property rights, and economic growth: The legacy of Douglass North. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

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Needs, rights, and the market. Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner, 1988.

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Частини книг з теми "Neoclassical and the economics of property rights"

1

Alchian, Armen A. "Property Rights." In The World of Economics, 584–90. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_78.

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Pejovich, Svetozar. "Property Rights." In International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 57–70. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4848-1_5.

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Alchian, Armen A. "Property Rights." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1814-1.

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Alchian, Armen A. "Property Rights." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1814-2.

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5

Pejovich, Svetozar. "Property Rights." In International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 65–76. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-6483-2_5.

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6

Alchian, Armen A. "Property Rights." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 10892–97. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1814.

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7

Cheung, Steven N. S. "Common Property Rights." In The World of Economics, 83–86. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_12.

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8

Demsetz, Harold. "Property Rights." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 1544–55. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_295.

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9

Segal, Ilya, and Michael D. Whinston. "3. Property Rights." In The Handbook of Organizational Economics, edited by Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, 100–158. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400845354-005.

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Alessi, Louis, and Robert J. Staaf. "Property Rights and Choice." In Law and Economics, 175–200. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1079-9_6.

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Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "Neoclassical and the economics of property rights"

1

Yendi, Irem. "Effects of Institutional Factors on Economic Growth in Eurasian Countries." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c02.00255.

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Анотація:
Economic growth is a complicated process which is affected by several factors. Standard neoclassical economic approach didn’t address the effects of institutional factors on economic growth but such effects are started to be considered in economic growth literature together with the new institutional economy. According to the new institutional economic approach institutions decrease the uncertainty are effective on the cost of transaction and conversion and also impact economic performance by directing economic activities towards productive or non- productive fields. Within this framework, effects of institutional factors on economic growth in Eurasian Countries between 1996 and 2008 are searched via panel data analysis method by use of World Bank’s, Heritage Foundation and Freedom House data sets. According to the findings collected, guaranteeing property rights, increasing quality of regulation and civil liberties affect positively economic growth on Eurasian Countries.
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2

Prasetyadji, Kuncoroadi, Witri Aulia Maudy, and Supandi. "Defense Economics Viewpoint of Intellectual Property Rights." In International Conference on Law, Economics and Health (ICLEH 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200513.030.

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3

Karakaya, Aykut, Seymur Ağazade, and Selçuk Perçin. "The Relationship between Performance, Innovation and Competition in Turkish Manufacturing Industry." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c06.01407.

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The relationship between performance and innovation is covered most extensively in neoclassical economic theory and Schumpeterian approach. These two approaches explain the relationship between innovation and performance in different ways. The neoclassical theory predicts that innovation emerges in competitive markets while Schumpeterian approach predicts it will emerge in imperfect competitive markets. Using data for the period 2008-2013, this study investigates the relationship between innovation and competition level in the Turkish Manufacturing Industry. Data analyzing method is Two-Step System Generalized Moments of Method. Performance variables of the study are net profit margin, return on assets and return on equity. R&D intensity is innovation indicator. Industrial competition level is measured by Herfindahl-Hirsckman Index. The results of Two-Step System Generalized Method of Moments analysis show that R&D intensity affects positively performance variables in contrast one lag of R&D effects negatively. Furthermore, competition intensity also improves performance. Positive coefficient of R&D variable supports the view of innovation has the characteristics of providing competitive advantage. The negative coefficient of R&D lag indicates the problems related to the protection of intellectual property right. This finding can be interpreted that innovation operations are imitated approximately after a period. The positive effect of competition intensity supports the prediction of Schumpeterian approach.
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4

Mihus, Iryna. "USING BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT SHAREHOLDERS' PROPERTY RIGHTS." In 2nd International conference on economics, accounting and finance. Scientific Center of Innovative Researches OÜ, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36690/iceaf-2021-86.

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5

Ismuhadi, Joko, and Zudan Fakrulloh. "Intellectual Property Rights on Traditional Knowledge." In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Law, Social Science, Economics, and Education, ICLSSEE 2022, 16 April 2022, Semarang, Indonesia. EAI, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/eai.16-4-2022.2320119.

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6

Rassâa, Emna, and Hafedh Ben Abdennebi. "INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A PANEL ANALYSIS." In 10th Economics & Finance Conference, Rome. International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.20472/efc.2018.010.028.

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7

Lukinović, Mario, Larisa Jovanović, and Vladimir Šašo. "CHALLENGES IN MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DURING CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC." In Fourth International Scientific Conference ITEMA Recent Advances in Information Technology, Tourism, Economics, Management and Agriculture. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/itema.2020.239.

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Анотація:
The socio-economic impact of the pandemic on all social spheres is huge, but like any crisis, for some it is an opportunity to create, develop and promote solutions. The coronavirus pandemic has brought many changes. It has forced us all to find new ways of working, interacting and living. The field of intellectual property is particularly affected by the coronavirus pandemic, its strong influence has affected all branches of intellectual property, especially the field of copyright and patents. During the COVID-19 Pandemic, numerous anomalies in the consumption of copyrights were observed, which coincided with the isolation measures, from drastically increased consumption of illegal pirated content via the Internet, especially in countries with lockdown, through a sharp increase of Disney+ and Netflix streaming platform users. The identification of products that have the word Corona in their name – in their trademark, with the virus has led to a sharp drop in consumption of some products, but also to increased sales of others. The pharmaceutical industry has invested huge funds in the fight against this global challenge, especially in the field of treatment of viruses, new drugs for the prevention, as well as finding a vaccine against COVID-19. This paper discusses the challenges faced by the management of intellectual property rights and potential response measures.
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8

Tang, Jing. "On Necessity of Property Rights Transformation of Traditional Clothing." In 2017 3rd International Conference on Economics, Social Science, Arts, Education and Management Engineering (ESSAEME 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/essaeme-17.2017.329.

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Elena, Rudakova, Dmitrieva Olga, Morkovkin Dmitry, Kuleshova Lidiya, and Kosolapov Yury. "Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the Eurasian Economic Union." In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economics, Management, Law and Education (EMLE 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/emle-18.2018.2.

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10

Gopal, R., and A. Gupta. "Intellectual property rights in the digital economy: issues, economics, law and ethics." In 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of the. IEEE, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2003.1174452.

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