Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Legislators – Fiction"

Brain death is different from the traditional, biological conception of death. Although there is no possibility of a meaningful recovery, considerable scientific evidence shows that neurological and other functions persist in patients accurately diagnosed as brain dead. Elsewhere with others, I have argued that brain death should be understood as an unacknowledged status legal fiction. A legal fiction arises when the law treats something as true, though it is known to be false or not known to be true, for a particular legal purpose (like the fiction that corporations are persons). Moving towards greater transparency, it is legally and ethically justifiable to use this fiction to determine when to permit treatment withdrawal and organ transplantation. However, persistent controversy and recent conflicts between hospitals and families over the treatment of brain-dead patients demonstrate the need for clearer limits on the legal fiction of brain death. This Article argues that more people should recognize that brain death is a legal fiction and further contends that existing scholarship has inadequately addressed the appropriate use of the legal fiction of brain death in legal conflicts. For instance, as in Jahi McMath’s case (in which a mother wanted to keep her daughter on a ventilator after she was determined brain dead), families may distrust physicians and hospitals who fail to acknowledge that brain death is a legal fiction. Legislators in most states have ignored the need to permit statutory exceptions for individuals with strong sanctity of life views. When hospitals treat braindead pregnant women, as in Marlise Mu˜ noz’s case, courts have failed to weigh the fundamental constitutional rights of pregnant women against the state’s interests. Finally, judges and legislators should sometimes “pierce the veil” of brain death and should not use the legal fiction in cases involving: (1) religious and moral objections, (2) insurance reimbursement for extended care of brain-dead patients, (3) maintenance of pregnant, brain-dead women, and (4) biomedical research. The Article concludes with general guidance for judges, legislators, and other legal actors to use regarding legal fictions.

V. S. Naipaul is an eminent literary figure in the field of modern fiction, non-fiction, and travelogue writing in English literature. He earned a number of literary awards and accolades, including the covetous Nobel Prize and Booker Prize. His non-fiction e.g., An Area of Darkness, India: A Wounded Civilization, The Loss of El Dorado, India: A Million Mutinies Now and Beyond Belief are a realistic portrayal of the various types of religion, culture, customs, and people of India. As an author, the main purpose of V. S. Naipaul is to deliver the truth; because poets are the unacknowledged legislators of mankind. The fact that V. S. Naipaul has presented in his non-fiction is more authentic and realistic than that of his fiction. Nonetheless, it is fictional work that is elaborately explored, discussed, and analyzed in abundance. On the other hand, his non-fiction, by and far, remains aloof. In the last few decades, non-fictions are also taking the ground strongly. Now non-fiction writings are being analyzed, elucidated, and explored based on various theoretical principles of literary criticism. V. S. Naipaul carried the new genre to new heights and achievements. He is of Indian descent and known for his pessimistic works set in developing countries. He visited India several times, like Pearl S. Buck and E. M. Forster. So, his presentation of Indian religion, society, culture, and politics are very realistic. His vision and ideas are very close to the modern thoughts and visions of both the east and the west.

Studying fictional depictions of robots and artificial intelligence in cinematographic science fiction narratives acquires a new level of relevance as legislators' approaches to the subject seem to be strongly influenced by popular culture. This panel of Science in Public 2017 presented various on-going investigations of this kind, showing that the critical mass in this area of research is growing

The need to study the possibilities of development of legal thought in copyright is caused by the fact that imposed on the legislator since the 90s, and more actively since the 2000s, the illusion that all relations of intellectual property in general are related to trade, is not true, and regulatory approval would lead to the destruction of significant and truly human traditional institutions of the Russian system of law such as copyright. No one can argue that it is one of a kind that allows a person to get acquainted with his inner content, and hence his potentials in the scale of participation in the social order. Drawing attention to the fact that intangible benefits creative works of science, literature, art require appropriate legal protection, which, first of all, is based on respect for the personality of its author, the article refers to the fact that the material objective forms of expression of these results of human creative activity are carefully protected by national rules of law, which establish the need for gentle treatment, constant monitoring, updating, repair of cultural objects: paintings, sculptures, architectural monuments, etc. The article attempts to draw the legislators attention to the protection of creative results, which is built, at least, in two plans: at the level of protection of cultural values, carried out on the basis of generally recognized principles of international law, such as: the non-use of force and threat of force, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs; and at the level of institutions that ensure the replenishment of the material and spiritual Fund of the Russian Federation, the main of which is copyright. And with this view of improving the norms of legislation, the state needs personnel who are rich in potential, able to actively act in their creative force aimed at creating and asserting the enduring (constant) values of humanity. The direction of improvement of legal norms on copyright is the purification of the normative body from pseudo-legal fictions that do not create consequences that favorably affect the development of creative potential of people. It is possible to think in this case when looking for ways to improve the legal technique of copyright law on the content of the concepts of creative life and personality of the author.

A Lecture delivered for the Stout Centre's "Eminent Victorians" Centennial Series in the Council Chamber, Hunter Building at Victoria University on 31 March 1999. The author pays tribute to the late Sir John Salmond by discussing the role of "fiction" in law and in the thought of Sir John. The author notes the nature of fiction as a formidable force, as it facilitates provisional escape from the tyranny of apparent fact and forget about the suspensory nature of fiction. There are three types of "fictions" in the legal world: legislative fictions, whereby the world is refashioned in accordance with the legislator's desires; constitutional fictions, which places fictional boundaries on government rule; and corporate fiction, which creates a fictional corporate personality for companies. The author concludes that it is purpose that keeps fiction honest, and that the relationship between fiction and purpose is just as important as that between hypothesis and fact.

Joint possession and settlement needed revival in 2011, yet the Legislator did not do much about it. It took from jurisprudence the regulations regarding joint possession (in the broad sense) and simply built a legal regime that in no way can satisfy the economic and social needs of joint holders. And the possibility to enter a management agreement remains in a very theoretical level that is far from practical reality, where such an agreement between joint owners does not exist. Settlement – the place where joint owners end their joint possession – was the second item that required modifications. In 1864, the Legislator took the declarative effect of settlement from French law without an analysis of its consequences on the economic level. Families were protected, but third parties, holders of real rights on the joint goods were sacrificed. This made settlement unattractive and unwanted. In 2011 the Legislator correctly identified the problem and offered the solution – that had been adopted by the French legislator since 2006, even under the rule of the declarative effect – a real subrogation with a particular title: resettlement of the guarantee on the assigned goods. This is sufficient for the rights of guaranteed creditors to be maintained in all cases. With this, the right of each joint owner to fully and efficiently use his joint ownership right was insured. Was another change in this area needed? Apparently not. Nevertheless the Legislator unexpectedly decided in 2011 to renounce the fiction of the declarative effect. What did it replace it with? The translative effect of Roman law? No! It imagined a new effect of settlement: the constitutive effect. The shock of the change was mainly felt psychologically. At that time, the fiction of the declarative effect corresponded to a psychological perception according to which the heir held the goods directly from the decreased, perception that was well grounded after more than 140 years of existence. Just as the fiction of the declarative effect – in fact a rule born out of conjunction –generated numerous debates over centuries, the new constitutive effect of settlement was had to accept in notary practice. The cause? The fear that the new consequences of the constitutive effect will conflict with the imperative rules of the community of goods in the case of settlement parties who were married on the settlement date. Indeed, any community matrimony regime is able to absorb in the settlement estate any goods purchased or obtained with onerous title by any of the spouses. But, the joint ownership right of settlement was that of an own goods. Moreover, the whole settlement was disputing own rights of the married settlement party. The doctrine limited itself to announcing the introduction of the constitutive effect without building a detailed analysis of its effects on the matrimony regimens. On our part, we suggested, at first an exhaustive analysis of the consequences of the translative and declarative effect of settlement. The purpose was to identify a ‛natural’ legal side of settlement that is its constants. Then we proved that the constitutive effect should be unitarily interpreted and applied. First of all, settlement produces a replacing effect. The share is replaced with an exclusive ownership right. It is natural that the exclusive ownership right obtained by each settlement party has the legal nature of the share it replaces. In the marital community field, this is an own goods of the married settlement party. Then, in case of settlement with allowance – that is expected to generate even more controversies – we have shown that is division does not degenerate settlement in two legal acts: settlement and sale. The settlement party who paid the allowance does not purchase anything; the settlement party receiving the allowance does not sell anything. The Legislators does not authorize such an idea, especially now that we are on the realm of the constitutive effect, where the idea of an exchange between settlement parties is excluded. The constitutive effect of settlement with allowance should be unitarily applied. For the married settlement party, the payment of the allowance represents an obligation to give that has the legal nature of an own obligation. Only its execution is carried out by using common funds of the spouses. And the increase acquiring of the goods is not a purchase in itself as it is made in the same spirit of the replacement effect of the share.

This article is devoted to defining the role of legal fictions in modern law enforcement practice. To do this, the author reveals the content of this category, paying attention to the absence of the need to consider fiction as something false and contrary to objective reality. Further, the author defines the meaning of legal fictions, conducting a detailed analysis of their main functions on the example of the civil legislation of the Russian Federation and the corresponding law enforcement practice. At the same time, its practical aspect is mainly studied. The main attention is paid to the protective function of legal fiction, the essence of which, as the author shows, is to restore violated rights and establish a balance of interests of the parties to the legal relationship, as well as to protect the rights of third parties. The features of this function are considered on the examples of the following fictions: fiction of the occurrence of a condition or non-occurrence of a condition; fiction of the presence of powers; fiction of non-conclusion of a contract. The author comes to the conclusion that fiction as a method of legal technique is used not only by the legislator, but also finds independent application in practice, which is reflected in the explanations of higher courts considered in this article.

The article considers the legal symbol and legal fiction as special legal categories. The correctness of anarrow approach to their essence was established according to which the notion of «legal fiction» does notinclude fictitious phenomena, and the notion of «legal symbol» does not cover symbols prohibited by law,and symbols which represent certain values. It was revealed that both considered categories have a certaindegree of conventionality, in a specific way according to the scheme established by the legislator, thereforethey are sometimes mixed in the literature. Legal symbols, unlike legal fictions, are more fundamental, buthave an auxiliary character, since they reflect an existing legal precept, and are not part of a new legal norm,contain an encrypted meaning, but do not distort the legal reality.Legal symbols and legal fictions play a very important role in legal regulation, since they optimize it andmake it more quality, and also provide legal and linguistic economy.

The article examines the essence of legal fiction. Based on an analysis of the current legislation of the Russian Federation, the author has established ways of using legal fiction in civil law. It has been substantiated that legal fiction finds expression in the construction of a legal entity and the institution of fictitious transactions. Legal fiction is used to extend the legal regime of one object to another object, as well as the legal status of one subject to another subject. Legal fiction is used when it is necessary to overcome a situation of legal uncertainty, to recognize as real non-existent circumstances to restore the violated rights of persons who have suffered as a result of the actions of unscrupulous participants in civil-law transactions. Finally, the method of legal fiction is widely used by the legislator the legal economy. As a result of the study, a conclusion was made about the importance of legal fiction for the process of lawmaking.

In the article, the author researches the problematic aspects of silence in law, in particular, the definition of silence is provided, its meaning at various stages of historical development is outlined, the types of silence are described, the legal consequences of silence are discussed, and the place of silence in the sphere of legal conventions (legal presumptions, fictions, substitution). The author provides the following definition of silence: silence is a legitimate or unlawful inaction of the subject of legal relations, from which the conditional content of the subject’s will on a legal issue follows and (or) with which a positive law (transaction) directly connects the occurrence of legal consequences. Since silence can be interpreted as a sign of agreement or disagreement, it can be argued that it creates uncertainty. Given the fact that legal certainty in modern life is a constitutional value, positive law should exclude or mitigate this uncertainty, or the content of the will arising from silence should be predetermined by positive law or transaction. The result arising from the silence falls within the realm of legal conventions and in order to find out whether silence is a legal presumption, legal fiction or substitution, the article compares these categories. The author concludes that the legislator can formulate the same provision regarding silence both with the help of legal fiction (fictitious consent) and with the help of a legal presumption (presumed consent). At the same time, the article provides a justification for the impossibility of considering tacit consent as a legal substitution, in view of the fact that in objective reality there is no conditional silence, which is an essential reason for excluding the basis of legal substitution.

By locating the reader uncomfortably within its circumscribed fictional world, Home highlights the confining cultural and narrative structures through which the everyday dynamics of family are often experienced and represented. In its refusal to provide mechanisms of imaginative transcendence that would transport the reader out of the Boughtons’ oppressive dwelling or make it more hospitable, the novel renders domestic and narrative space equally uncomfortable. Using narrative theory, cultural studies explorations of family and memory, and feminist theories of gender and space, this chapter explores how Home unsettles the culturally sanctioned idea of home as an escape from the contesting ideologies of the larger world even as it reveals the force of our investment in a domestic ideal that legislates, sanctions, and naturalizes scripted performances of the ordinary.

The importance Wollstonecraft ascribes to philanthropy, or love of humankind, is embodied in her semi-autobiographical personae, whom she constructs to invest her life experiences with ideological value. This chapter focuses on Mrs Mason, the accomplished pedagogue of Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories from real life (1788), and the eponymous heroine of her first novel, Mary, a Fiction (1788), arguing that both personae reflect Wollstonecraft’s close engagement with Francophone literature. Mrs Mason shares significant characteristics with the Legislator of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762), a figure of supreme authority, while Mary takes her DNA from the sensitive maverick of his life writing. In Original Stories, Rousseau’s influence is both augmented and offset by that of Stéphanie-Félicité Genlis, a bestselling author in French and English. Read intertextually, Wollstonecraft’s personae articulate complementary aspects of an argument for refusing convention in favour of personal authenticity. By adhering to their divinely implanted internal monitors, they retain the innate benevolence that makes philanthropy possible.

In discussing the divine figure of Bharatmata (Mother India), it is impossible to overlook her human prototype, Bharatiya Nari—the ‘new’ Indian woman. This latter figure did not come into existence overnight. Instead, its emergence by the end of the nineteenth century was the culmination of innumerable social reform debates, discussions, and legislations on women’s issues like sati, widow rehabilitation, child marriage, and female education over the past few decades. Women writers often used their fiction to draw attention to the diverse problems that their fellow women faced, and in doing so, these authors consciously participated in the ongoing social discussion that moulded the ‘new’ woman ideal. Consequently, it is often in their writings that the evolution and sculpting of the Bharatiya Nari are best documented. This chapter discusses works by Ramabai Trikannad, Nalini Turkhud, and K.S. (full name unknown).

Regal legislation is reported by tradition and attached to some very unlikely characters, as Romulus or Numa Pompilius. On the other hand, tradition makes the creators of the Twelve Tables a group of felons that also seems implausible. While royal legislation is attached to mythical or semi-mythical characters, in comparison, the decemvirs appear as quite mundane, while their leader, Appius Claudius, is simply vile, and his own evilness makes the second decemvirate stand as fictional. In fact, his attempt to rape Verginia seems to mirror the crimes of Tarquin the Proud’s relatives. The change in the status of the lawgivers is quite evident, when the eldest legislation is accounted as the work of a demigod, while the latter is the result of a criminal mind. The main focus of this paper will be to explain this difference and offer a hypothesis on the relation between statutes and legislators. Our main question is: why did the early Romans need to make their lawgivers divine characters, while during the early Republic they were not only men, but felons?

Abstract Conceptions of motherhood are at the center of acrimonious public controversies raging today around such issues as abortion, surrogate motherhood, child custody, maternity and paternity leave, foster care, and the rights of divorced fathers. These disputes are seldom openly acknowledged as debates over the imperatives of proper mothering; everyone “knows” what a mother is. As a practical achievement for a woman, a job in the material world, a set of relationships, motherhood continues to be hidden behind veils of desire and fantasy. What is needed to penetrate these veils is public recognition and a discussion of motherhood as a varying series of specific practices (carried out today by women, men, biological and fictive parents, heterosexuals and homo sexuals, couples and single people) that are both demanding and socially important. Inserting into public discourse what it really is, concretely, to be a mother to children can clarify some of the hotly contested issues which come up routinely in households, courtrooms, and legislatures.