Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Korean War, 1950-1953 – Canada – Biography"

Historians remain divided over the nature of Canadian diplomacy during the Korean conflict of 1950-1953. Some favour traditional interpretations that stress Canadian-American differences over Western strategy in Cold War Asia, differences which encouraged Ottawa to pursue a “diplomacy of constraint.” Others minimize the gap between Ottawa and Washington, insisting that similar worldviews and shared Cold War interests severely limited Ottawa’s inclination and capacity to constrain the much more powerful United States. Canada’s experience with the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), created in the fall of 1950 to help rebuild shattered South Korea, provides an opportunity to test these two interpretations against the still untapped documentary record. This paper explores the competing set of motives, goals, and preoccupations that shaped Canada’s approach to this UN agency. Humanitarianism and the allure of Asian trade were doubtless considerations. But politics trumped all. Support for the UN agency helped Ottawa sustain domestic backing, particularly among liberals and progressives, for the brutal Asian conflict. Canadian officials, like their UN and American counterparts, embraced UNKRA as a “pioneering” effort to showcase capitalist development in the context of the Asian Cold War. Most important, UNKRA was yet another multilateral mechanism available to Ottawa to offset, or constrain, the American tendency “to go it alone.”

Canadian ground troops took an active part in United Nations operations during the Korean War. Although the Army's contribution of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was small by First and Second World War standards, only the Republic of Korea, the United States and Great Britain fielded larger contingents. The core of the 25th Brigade consisted of three infantry battalions. They contained most of the Brigade's effective manpower, and bore the brunt of the fighting. Despite the infantry's pre-eminent role in Korea, their experiences up to now remain forgotten. This thesis examines the ordeal of Canadian combat soldiers in the Far East and shows how they suffered horrendous, often unnecessary, hardships at the hands of an indifferent high command. From the outset, Canadian infantrymen were neither properly trained nor equipped for the combat conditions they encountered. Battlefield performance and combat motivation suffered accordingly. The infantry's problems extended into other areas. Insufficient indoctrination left soldiers poorly prepared for the non-combat aspects of service in the Far East, leading some to question the purpose of Canadian involvement in Korea. Medical preparations were also inadequate, making soldiers susceptible to a variety of infectious diseases. In the combat zone, little regard was shown for soldiers' welfare. Infantrymen lived like beggars without even the most basic comforts and amenities, relying on alcohol to assuage the discomforts of life in the field. Clearly, the Canadian infantry was plagued by problems in Korea. These problems shaped the experiences of Canadian combat soldiers, making their Far Eastern tours far more difficult and dangerous than they need have been.
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