Добірка наукової літератури з теми "International Monetary Theory"

<p>This paper presents the recent debate on modern monetary theory (MMT) and contributes to a critical view on its application to peripheral countries. MMT has been centered on both demystifying postulates of the ‘New Macroeconomic Consensus’ and offering an alternative theory to reach full employment with price stability. However, it has been criticized for assuming that constraints on domestic policies are generally self-imposed, not arising from international markets. Using the “international currency hierarchy” approach, this paper argues that peripheral countries, in the context of financial globalization, are not fully sovereign in determining its own macroeconomic policy. Our main argument is that currencies issued by peripheral countries do not fulfill money classical functions at the international level. Being hence illiquid at the international scenario, these peripheral currencies (and assets) are demanded by the international investors only in the quest for high returns; moreover, this demand depends on the “international liquidity preference” and the markets’ confidence in this country. Consequently, interest rates in peripheral countries tend to be higher and volatile. Additionally, the exchange rate is potentially under the pressure of this capital flows movements. Finally, monetary, fiscal and exchange policies in peripheral countries have constrains that are not considered by MMT.</p>

PurposeThe most prominent and persistent problems of our global monetary system are instability and imbalances. We propose an international monetary model to solve these problems while at the same time move the model closer to Maqāṣid Sharīʿah (objectives of Sharīʿah). We name this an organic global monetary model or abbreviated as OGM. OGM is an international monetary model directly built on the national monetary system of each member country so that the two can co-exist.Design/methodology/approachModel design, theory and literature.FindingsThe model can eliminate interest rates at the central bank level, create non-tradable international money, and make a more stable international monetary system.Originality/valueOriginal.

The systemic and functional analysis of economic nature of Crypto currency within the modern theory of money is a necessary essential component of the study that allowed the authors to formulate a vision of social and economic model of future international monetary system. The authors consider the substance of money in a dialectic unity of the transformation of forms and spheres of its being. The forms of being of money are: material, monetary, paper, electronic. The spheres of being of money are: social, - the "symbol money"; economic, - the "bank notes"; political and legal, - "monetary units". In this paper we show that money is a financial instrument. Money is a market form of universal claim to a share in the wealth of society. The uncovering of internal intrinsic structure of money allows the authors to show convincingly that a currency, especially a "Crypto currency", cannot have and does not have an "economic nature". In considering the process of historical transformation of international monetary systems, taking into account the real achievements of financial, information, program and social engineering for the creation of a digital "gold" the authors believe that the social and economic model of future international monetary system has received its real approbation.

Abstract This article reexamines the theory of monetary power to explain the role of the Bundesbank (and Germany) in the emergence of the rules-based low-inflation regime in the late1980s and early 1990s. Our theory of monetary power draws on the notion of institutional power and the concept of monetary leadership, understood as the capacity to attract foreign investment, and thereby explains how domestic institutional features and contingent historical events affect countries’ external monetary power. This theory is employed to trace how the Bundesbank go-it-alone strategy in 1989 triggered a cross-national sequence of events that changed the international monetary order in a way that was consistent with the German interests. The transition was marked by a shift from the US-led pragmatist approach of international macroeconomic coordination to a rules-based approach founded on the principle of low-inflation–targeting. The article argues that this change took place despite the opposition of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the US Treasury. The article contributes to the literature on the decline of US hegemonic power as well as the literature on the mechanism of institutional change at the international level. It also sheds new light on current debates about the putative decline of the rules-based world order.

Existing explanations of European monetary integration, emphasizing economic interdependence, issue linkage, institutions, and domestic politics, take a predominantly regional approach. In the international monetary thesis developed here, I argue that U.S. policy disturbances, transmitted through the international monetary system, created compelling incentives for European states to cooperate on exchange-rate and monetary policy. I develop a general theory of macroeconomic power, based on open economy macroeconomics, and show how the exercise of such influence can drive regional monetary integration. This article then tests the international thesis with reference to monetary integration within the European Union by examining four periods in which the United States acted to stabilize the international monetary system and seven episodes in which it disrupted the system. European governments and central banks reduced regional monetary cooperation when the United States supported system stability and strengthened it after each episode of disruption. The evidence thus strongly supports the inference that the link is causal.

Except for some minor issues, previous reviews of the book (Dorobat 2017; Cutsinger 2017/18) have been overwhelmingly positive and for good reason. The book under review is the fruit of several decades of economic thinking, professional research, writing and teaching of its author Emeritus Prof. Pascal Salin of the Université Paris-Dauphine and past president of the Mont Pèlerin Society.

Chapter 2 of this thesis employs a dynamic general equilibrium with Taylor wage contracts to show that the use of strict inflation targeting as a disinflation policy may result in a slump in production and a considerable increase in macroeconomic volatility. Important determinants of the magnitude of the macroeconomic oscillations in the post-disinflation state of the economy turn out to be the size of the reduction in the inflation rate and the degree of returns to labor in the production function. In the special case of constant returns, the oscillations are large and permanent. Chapter 3 of this thesis extends the above analysis to an open-economy setting demonstrating that the exchange rate can act as a stabilizer by effectively relieving wages from part of the burden of reducing the inflation rate. The more the economy is open, the smaller the magnitude of the macroeconomic oscillations will be after the disinflation policy is applied. The policy is shown to be infeasible for all practical purposes in a closed economy with constant returns to scale when the full nonlinear model is considered. Chapter 4 of this thesis employs a Markov switching framework to allow for an interesting alternative characterization of macroeconomic news effects on the foreign exchange market. The chapter finds strong evidence for the presence of nonlinear regime switching between a high-volatility and a low volatility state driven by monetary policy announcements that come as a surprise to the market. It also uncovers significant market positioning prior to the announcements, indicating a limiting of risk exposure by market participants who are unsure about the precise outcome of the policy decisions. Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates the impact of monetary shocks on the direction and the composition of international capital flows. It identifies monetary policy shocks in a structural VAR via the pure sign restrictions approach. There are two key findings. First, a US monetary easing causes net capital inflows and a worsening of the US trade balance. Second, monetary policy shocks induce a negative conditional correlation between capital flows in bonds and equity securities. Intriguingly, they cause a negative conditional correlation between equity flows and equity returns but a positive conditional correlation between bond flows and bond returns.

Cette thèse comprend quatre essais en macroéconomie internationale et théorie monétaire. Elle est constituée de deux parties. Les deux premiers chapitres, coécrits avec François Geerolf, étudient les conséquences macroéconomiques des cycles immobiliers sur les comptes courants (chapitre 1) et sur les dynamiques de l'emploi (chapitre 2). La seconde partie de cette thèse s'intéresse aux conséquences des récentes transformations intervenues dans les systèmes bancaires sur les mécanismes de la création monétaire. Ces transformations semblent en effet conduire à une privatisation de la monnaie. Le chapitre 3 étudie empiriquement la réalité d'une telle privatisation. Je développe dans le chapitre 4 un modèle pour analyser les conséquences de ces transformations sur la création monétaire et sur les mécanismes de propagation du risque
This thesis includes four essays in international macroeconomics and monetary theory. It is divided into two parts. The two first chapters, coauthored with François Geerolf, investigate the macroeconomic consequences of housing cycles on current accounts (chapter 1) and employment dynamics (chapter 2). The second part of this thesis studies the consequences of modern banking features on money creation mechanisms, notably with the development of private payment arrangements and the globalization of banking. Chapter 3 looks at the issue empirically. In chapter 4, I develop a model to investigate the consequences of these modern banking features for the provision of money and for risk propagation mechanisms

This thesis is comprised of six Chapters on US Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy and their interaction with fiscal policy, both domestically and internationally. Chapter 1 introduces the main themes of the thesis. Chapter 2 studies the theoretical background of the thesis. After setting out key themes and the theoretical background in the introductory Chapters, the first core Chapter, i.e. thesis Chapter 3, examines the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Price puzzles are a repeated feature of empirical VAR models studying the effect of monetary policy. These price puzzles are often believed to appear due to the lack of information. However, we show that whether monetary and fiscal policy are active or passive influences the appearance of the price puzzle. This is because an active fiscal policy and a passive monetary policy can encourage private expenditure through a positive wealth channel. An active fiscal policy means fiscal authorities set expenditure regardless of tax revenues, while a passive monetary policy refers to a weak response of the policy interest rate to inflation. Finally, we find evidence in this Chapter that fiscal policy stimulates economic activity, i.e. it is non-Ricardian. Chapter 4 examines the effect of monetary and fiscal policy interactions in an international context. In particular, it considers the international spillovers of US monetary policy, whilst account for fiscal policy. This Chapter shows that US government debt influences the duration of the responses to a monetary contraction. Furthermore, it is shown that an increase in US government debt influences both the short and long-term interest rates, inflation, and output in the Euro Area and UK. This is through a positive wealth effect. In addition, the results of Persistence Profiles test, i.e. how fast we converge upon equilibrium following a shock, suggest that accounting for US government debt delays the return to equilibrium following monetary policy shocks. This may be due to the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and its persistence. Chapter 5 studies Unconventional Monetary Policy (UMP). It is shown that UMP increases output and inflation in the US, and generates spillovers to the Euro Area and UK. Furthermore, we present evidence that the portfolio balance is the transmission channel of UMP. That is UMP contributes to lowering the bound yields while it increases the price of assets. Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes the thesis, and provides a discussion of policy implications.

This thesis examines the multi-lateral considerations that, in our view, underlay the formulation of monetary policy in India in the period between the two world wars. During and after the First World War, Britain faced a severe liquidity crisis. We argue that monetary policy in India was formulated to take account of this crisis. Traditionally, India was a large absorber of gold on the non-monetary account. The persistent aim of British monetary policy in the Indian context during the entire interwar period was that of not allowing India to set up a monetary demand for gold in addition to her non-monetary demand for it and secondly, through deflationary policies (including exchange rate adjustments), to limit India's non-monetary gold demands to the minimum. Indian gold exports during the depression, which gave room for manoeuvre in the management of the sterling after September 1931, were a logical sequel to this policy. The British liquidity crisis in this period took the form of her current account surpluses being inadequate to support a high level of overseas lending. Besides, in an uncertain financial environment, Britain was a large short-term debtor as the British bank rate acted as much to increase her short-term liabilities as it did by calling in her short-term assets. The British desire to return to gold at the pre-1914 parity required domestic deflation which itself was a matter of severe political contention. In the circumstances, Britain hoped her return to gold would be accomplished by a US inflation and US export of capital. Compounding this situation was the thinly veiled fear, in Britain, of the erosion of the key currency role of the sterling and the loss of its global financial leadership to the USA. Control over Indian monetary policy and its outcome proved valuable to Britain in this environment.

Monetary funding to developing countries is today accompanied by so called “Structural Adjustment Programs” (SAPs) imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, consisting of economical policy reforms that the countries have to undergo in order to be eligible for loans. The impact of these adjustment loans is widely criticized due to the negative effects observed. Our purpose is to investigate in depth why these adjustment programs have not delivered the expected results. We’ve found that there exist some undesirable consequences following SAP implementation that has a hindering effect on growth. These, combined with the complicate context in which the IMF and World Bank operates can be seen as the explanation for the adversity experienced.

ABSTRACT THE DOMINANCE OF THE DOLLAR AND ITS SUSTAINABILITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM Kö
se, Tekin M.S., Department of Economics Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin Ege June 2008, 121 pages The aim of this thesis is to analyze and evaluate the dominance of the dollar and its sustainability in the international monetary system in the light of recent literature and relevant statistical data. Considering the determinants of an international currency, this thesis focuses on the linkages of the dominance of the dollar with the challenge of the euro as an alternative international currency, the current account deficit of the U.S. and foreign exchange reserve accumulation and reserve diversification decision of foreign central banks. The analysis on these determinants indicates that the U.S. dollar is facing many challenges and may face further challenges in sustaining its dominance as an international currency. Given the significance of the U.S. economy and dominance of the dollar as an international currency, the findings of this study indicate that although the euro has not much potential to surpass the dollar as an international currency in the short-term, it is more likely for the international monetary system to witness the existence of multiple international currencies and decline in the degree of the dominance of the dollar in the 21st century.

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, Division of Economic and Financial Studies, Dept. of Economics, 1999.
Bibliography: p. 232-255.
Introduction -- Cheap money and Ottawa -- The World Economic Conference -- F.L. McDougall -- The beginnings of the 'employment approach' -- Coombs and consolidation -- Bretton Woods -- An international employment agreement -- The 'employment approach' reconsidered -- The Keynesian 'revolution' in Australia -- Conclusion.
Between 1925 and 1950, Australian economists embarked on a series of campaigns to influence international policy-making. The three distinct episodes of these campaigns were unified by the conviction that 'expansionary' economic policies by all countries could solve the world's economic problems. As well as being driven by self-interest (given Australia's dependence on commodity exports), the campaigns were motivated by the desire to promote economic and social reform on the world stage. They also demonstrated the theoretical skills of Australian economists during a period in which the conceptual instruments of economic analysis came under increasing pressure. -- The purpose of this study is to document these campaigns, to analyse their theoretical and policy implications, and to relate them to current issues. Beginning with the efforts of Australian economists to persuade creditor nations to enact 'cheap money' policies in the early 1930s, the study then explores the advocacy of F.L. McDougall to reconstruct agricultural trade on the basis of nutrition. Finally, it examines the efforts of Australian economists to promote an international agreement binding the major economic powers to the pursuit of full employment. -- The main theses advanced in the dissertation are as follows: Firstly, it is argued that these campaigns are important, neglected indicators of the theoretical positions of Australian economists in the period. Hitherto, the evolution of Australian economic thought has been interpreted almost entirely on the basis of domestic policy advocacy, which gave rise to the view that Australian economists before 1939 were predominantly orthodox in theoretical outlook and policy prescriptions. However, when their international policy advocacy is included, a quite different picture emerges. Their efforts to achieve an expansion in global demand were aimed at alleviating Australia's position as a small open economy with perennial external sector problems, but until such international policies were in place, they were forced by existing circumstances to confine their domestic policy advice to orthodox, deflationary measures. -- Secondly, the campaigns make much more explicable the arrival and dissemination of the Keynesian revolution in Australian economic thought. A predilection for expansionary and proto-Keynesian policies, present within the profession for some time, provided fertile ground for the Keynesian revolution when it finally arrived. Thirdly, by supplying evidence of expansionary international policies, the study provides a corrective to the view that Australia's economic interaction with the rest of the world has largely been one of excessive defensiveness. -- Originality is claimed for the study in several areas. It provides the first comprehensive study of all three campaigns and their unifying themes. It demonstrates the importance to an adequate account of the period of the large amount of unpublished material available in Australian archives. It advances ideas and policy initiatives that have hitherto been ignored, or only partially examined, in the existing literature. And it provides a new perspective on Australian economic thought and policy in the inter-war years.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
255 p

Abstract This chapter discusses the theory of comparative advantage, specialization, and trade in surpluses. A two-country and two-commodity model of the gains from specialization and trade is presented, which is then extended to include many countries and many commodities. Also discussed are: transactions involving currencies; arguments put in support of trade restrictions; balance of payments; monetary matters; and government manipulation of the trade balance and exchange rates.

In this article, we will cover the main anti-Keynesian views and macroeconomic systems that arose in the post Keynes period as well as their fiscal and monetary policy guidelines. As is known, the early Classical economists introduced a macroeconomic system based on the Quantity Theory and Say’s Law resulting in automatic full-employment equilibrium; and finally after 1929-1934 Great World Depression, the Keynesian System was introduced as a “revolution” (Keynesian Revolution) in theory and practice. As a result of the Keynesian policies implemented, European countries and the United States not only got over the Great World Depression but also in the years following the World War II, they have observed a fast and stable growth for a long time. Moreover, cyclical fluctuations have been controlled to a great extent. Even so, at the stage when the Keynesian System was introduced, anti-Keynesian views and macroeconomic systems were immediately introduced. Intense academic discussions between advocates of these views and the Keynesian economists have continued up until today. Meanwhile, many economists such as J.R. Hicks, R.F. Harrod, N. Kaldor, M. Kalesci, A.W. Philips, A. Hansen, P.A. Samuelson, E. Domar, J. Tobin, R. Solow, A.M. Okun, W. Helier, G. Ackler, F. Modigliani, and R. Musgrave and many others have developed and defended the Keynesian System from different aspects. We can characterize significant anti-Keynesian views and macroeconomic systems as the “Counter-Revolution”.

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with monetary and fiscal policy and analyze the interaction of these policies in Hungary. In the paper we present the model in a log-linearized form. We combine both calibration and Bayesian estimation to obtain parameter values of the model. We find that the model is suitable for impulse response analysis, so we estimate the impulse response functions of the model. We examine how five endogenous variables – namely output, inflation, the nominal interest rate, government spending and government revenue – react to non-systematic shocks to the nominal interest rate, government spending and government revenue. The plotted impulse response functions allow us to study how monetary and fiscal policy interacts in a small open economy. In some cases we find that restrictive fiscal policy is accompanied by expansive monetary policy, while in other cases the policy responses to shocks are coordinated. We conclude that our results are in accordance with economic theory.

How does the expansion of domestic banks in international markets affect the bank lending channel of monetary policy? Using bank-firm loan-level data, we find that loan growth and loan rates from international banks respond less to monetary policy changes than domestic banks and that internationalization partially mitigates the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Banks with a large international presence tend to tolerate more their credit risk exposition relative to domestic banks. Moreover, international banks tend to rely more on foreign funding when policy rates change, allowing them to insulate better the monetary policy changes from their credit supply than domestic banks. This result is consistent with the predictions of the internal capital markets hypothesis. We also show that macroprudential FX regulation reduces banks with high FX exposition access to foreign funding, ultimately contributing to monetary policy transmission. Overall, our results suggest that the internationalization of banks lowers the potency of the bank lending channel. Furthermore, it diminishes the risk-taking channel of monetary policy within the limit established by macroprudential FX regulations.

Between 2009 and 2010, in response to the global financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund created a number of lending tools to pre-empt and insure against crises. These pre-emptive facilities were intended for countries with sound economic fundamentals and policies, but with exposure to financial contagion risks. The use of these instruments (in terms of number of countries) was limited during the first ten years of their existence, but with the outbreak of the pandemic three Latin American countries applied to use them. An assessment of these lines suggests they have performed the insurance function for which they were conceived. In anticipation of the forthcoming review of these credit lines, and in the light of recent experience, possible reasons for the limited demand are analysed and relevant factors are suggested for the design of “exit strategies”, the aspect of their use that has attracted most attention.

There is a vast international literature exploring the consequences of low interest rates for various banking sectors. In this paper, I explore how this international literature relates to the Australian banking sector, which operates differently to other jurisdictions. In the face of low rates, the profitability of Australian banks has likely been less adversely affected than what the international literature would predict, but the flip side to this is that the pass-through of monetary policy to lending rates may have been more muted. I then use a recent advance in macrofinancial modelling to explore whether pass-through in Australia could turn negative – the so called 'reversal rate' – and find that the features of the Australian banking system mean a reversal rate is highly unlikely to exist in Australia.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

Sustainable Development Goal 2: Zero Hunger (SDG2) remains out of reach. SDG2 progress has slowed over the last few years, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to exacerbate the problem. Improving the leadership, governance and coordination of the three UN Rome-based agencies (RBAs) – the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Food Programme (WFP) – is crucial to achieving this objective. Lessons from comparable institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group and the World Health Organization may prove vital in realizing SDG2. While there are many actors that will influence progress towards this goal, the RBAs are best placed to lead on this initiative through improved transparency and leadership selection processes; the consolidation of RBA meetings and higher-level dialogue at those events; and enhanced collaboration at the regional, country and global levels.

The COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a huge blow to every country, and many governments have struggled to meet their populations’ urgent needs during the crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stepped in to offer extra support to a large number of countries during the pandemic. However, Oxfam’s analysis shows that as of 15 March 2021, 85% of the 107 COVID-19 loans negotiated between the IMF and 85 governments indicate plans to undertake austerity once the health crisis abates. The findings in this briefing paper show that the IMF is systematically encouraging countries to adopt austerity measures once the pandemic subsides, risking a severe spike in already increased inequality levels. A variety of studies have revealed the uneven distribution of the burden of austerity, which is more likely to be shouldered by women, low-income households and vulnerable groups, while the wealth of the richest people increases. Oxfam joins global institutions and civil society in urging governments worldwide and the IMF to focus their energies instead on a people-centred, just and equal recovery that will fight inequality and not fuel it. Austerity will not ‘build back better’.

Worldwide, interventions and policies to improve gender equality or close gender gaps often struggle to reach their targets. For example, women lag considerably behind in use of even simple digital technologies such as mobile phones or the internet. In 2020, the gap in mobile internet use in low- and middle-income countries was at 15%, while in South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries, it remained as high as 36% and 37% respectively (GSMA, 2021). Use of the internet for more complex activities shows an even wider gap. In Cairo, in 2018, only 21% of female internet users gained economically, and only 7% were able to voice their opinions online (with similar statistics for India, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Colombia, Sambuli et al., 2018). This is despite the fact that empowering women through digital technologies is central to global gender equality strategies (e.g. Sustainable Development Goals, United Nations, 2015), and is believed to facilitate economic growth and industry-level transformation (International Monetary Fund, 2020). Progress is slow because behaviours are gendered: there are stark dissociations between what women and men do – or are expected to do. These dissociations are deeply entrenched by social norms, to the extent that interventions to change them face resistance or can even backfire. Increasingly, governments are using behavioural change interventions in a bid to improve public policy outcomes, while development or gender organisations are using behavioural change programmes to shift gender norms. However, very little is known about how gendered social norms impact the digital divide, or how to use behavioural interventions to shift these norms. Drawing on several research papers that look at the gender digital gap, this brief examines why behavioural change is difficult, and how it could be implemented more effectively. This brief is addressed to policymakers, programme co-ordinators in development organisations, and strategy planners in gender equality interventions who are interested in ways to accelerate progress on gender equality, and close the gender digital gap. The brief offers a set of principles on which to base interventions, programmes and strategies to change gendered behaviours. The principles in this brief were developed as part of a programme of research into ways to close the gender digital gap.

Macroeconomic summary Economic activity has recovered faster than projected, and output is now expected to return to pre-pandemic levels earlier than anticipated. Economic growth projections for 2021 and 2022 have been revised upward, though significant downward bias remains. (Graph 1.1). Colombia’s economy returned to recovery in the third quarter after significant supply shocks and a third wave of COVID-19 in the second. Negative shocks affecting mobility and output were absent in the third quarter, and some indicators of economic activity suggest that the rate of recovery in demand, primarily in consumption, outpaced estimates from the July Monetary Policy Report (MPR) in the context of widely expansive monetary policy. Several factors are expected to continue to contribute to output recovery for the rest of the year and into 2022, including the persistence of favorable international financial conditions, an expected improvement in external demand, and an increase in terms of trade. Increasing vaccination rates, the expectation of higher levels of employment and the consequent effect on household income, improved investment performance (which has not yet returned to pre-pandemic levels), and the expected stimulus from monetary policy that would continue to be expansive should also drive economic activity. As a result, output is estimated to have returned to its pre-pandemic level in the third quarter (previously expected in the fourth quarter). Growth is expected to decelerate in 2022, with excess productive capacity projected to close faster than anticipated in the previous report. Given the above, GDP growth projections have been revised upward for 2021 (9.8%, range between 8.4% and 11.2%) and 2022 (4.7%, range between 0.7% and 6.5%). If these estimates are confirmed, output would have grown by 2.3% on average between 2020 and 2022. This figure would be below long-term sustainable growth levels projected prior to the pandemic. The revised growth forecast for 2022 continues to account for a low basis of comparison from this year (reflecting the negative effects of COVID-19 and roadblocks in some parts of the country), and now supposes that estimated consumption levels for the end of 2021 will remain relatively stable in 2022. Investment and net exports are expected to recover at a faster pace than estimated in the previous report. Nevertheless, the downward risks to these estimates remain unusually significant, for several reasons. First, they do not suppose significant negative effects on the economy from possible new waves of COVID-19. Second, because private consumption, which has already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by a large margin, could perform less favorably than estimated in this forecast should it reflect a temporary phenomenon related to suppressed demand as service sectors re-open (e.g. tourism) and private savings accumulated during the pandemic are spent. Third, disruptions to supply chains could be more persistent than contemplated in this report and could continue to affect production costs, with a negative impact on the economy. Finally, the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances could translate to increased vulnerability to changes in international financial conditions or in international and domestic economic agents’ perception of risk in the Colombian economy, representing a downward risk to growth. A higher-than-expected increase in inflation, the persistence of supply shocks, and reduced excess productive capacity have led to an increase in inflation projections above the target on the forecast horizon (Graph 1.2). Inflation increased above expectations to 4.51% in the third quarter, due in large part to the price behavior of foods and regulated items, and to a lesser extent to core inflation. Increased international prices and costs continue to generate upward pressure on various sub-baskets of the consumer price index (CPI), as has the partial reversion of some price relief measures implemented in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary In September, headline inflation (11.4% annually) and the average of core inflation indicators (8.6% annually) continued on a rising trend, and higher increases than expected were recorded. Forecasts increased again, and inflation expectations remained above 3%. Inflationary surprises in the third quarter were significant and widespread, and they are the result of several shocks. On the one hand, international cost and price shocks, which have mainly affected goods and foods, continue to exert upwards pressure on national inflation. In addition to these external supply shocks, domestic supply shocks have also affected foods. On the other hand, the strong recovery of aggregate demand, especially for private consumption and for machinery and equipment, as well as a higher accumulated depreciation of the Colombian peso and its pass-through to domestic prices also explain the rise in inflation. Indexation also contributes, both through the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and through the Producer Price Index (PPI), which continues to have a significant impact on electricity prices and, to a lesser degree, on other public utilities and rent. In comparison with July’s report, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items) is higher in the forecast horizon, mainly due to exchange rate pressures, higher excess demand, and indexation at higher inflation rates, but it maintains a trend of convergence towards the target. In the case of food, a good domestic supply of perishable foods and some moderation in international processed food prices are still expected. However, the technical staff estimates higher pressures on this group’s prices from labor costs, raw material prices, and exchange rates. In terms of the CPI for regulated items, the new forecast supposes reductions in electricity prices at the end of the year, but the effects of indexation at higher inflation rates and the expected rises in fuel prices would continue to push this CPI group. Therefore, the new projection suggests that, in December, inflation would reach 11.3% and would decrease throughout 2023 and 2024, closing the year at 7.1% and 3.5%, respectively. These forecasts have a high level of uncertainty, due especially to the future behavior of international financial conditions, external price and cost shocks, the persistence of depreciation of the Colombian peso, the pace of adjustment of domestic demand, the indexation degree of nominal contracts, and the decisions that would be made regarding domestic fuel and electricity prices. Economic activity continues to surprise on the upside, and the projection of growth for 2022 rose from 6.9% to 7.9% but lowered for 2023 from 1.1% to 0.5%. Thus, excess demand is higher than estimated in the previous report, and it would diminish in 2023. Economic growth in the second quarterwas higher than estimated in July due to stronger domestic demand, mainly because of private consumption. Economic activity indicators for the third quarter suggest that the GDP would stay at a high level, above its potential, with an annual change of 6.4%, and 0.6% higher than observed in the second quarter. Nevertheless, these numbers reflect deceleration in its quarterly and annual growth. Domestic demand would show similar behavior, with a high value, higher than that of output. This can be explained partly by the strong behavior of private consumption and investment in machinery and equipment. In the third quarter, investment in construction would have continued with mediocre performance, which would still place it at levels lower than those observed before the pandemic. The trade deficit would have widened due to high imports with a stronger trend than that for exports. It is expected that, in the forecast horizon, consumption would decrease from its current high levels, partly as a consequence of tighter domestic financial conditions, lower repressed demand, higher exchange rate pressures on imported goods prices, and the deterioration of actual income due to the rise in inflation. Investment would continue to lag behind, without reaching the levels observed before the pandemic, in a context of high financing costs and high uncertainty. A lower projected behavior in domestic demand and the high levels of prices for oil and other basic goods that the country exports would be reflected in a reduction in the trade deficit. Due to all of this, economic growth for all of 2022, 2023, and 2024 would be 7.9%, 0.5%, and 1.3%, respectively. Expected excess demand (measured via the output gap) is estimated to be higher than contemplated in the previous report; it would diminish in 2023 and could turn negative in 2024. These estimates remain subject to a high degree of uncertainty related to global political tension, a rise in international interest rates, and the effects of this rise on demand and financial conditions abroad. In the domestic context, the evolution of fiscal policy as well as future measures regarding economic policy and their possible effects on macroeconomic imbalances in the country, among others, are factors that generate uncertainty and affect risk premia, the exchange rate, investment, and the country’s economic activity. Interest rates at several of the world’s main central banks continue to rise, some at a pace higher than expected by the market. This is in response to the high levels of inflation and their inflation expectations, which continue to exceed the targets. Thus, global growth projections are still being moderated, risk premia have risen, and the dollar continues to gain strength against other main currencies. International pressures on global inflation have heightened. In the United States, core inflation has not receded, pressured by the behavior of the CPI for services and a tight labor market. Consequently, the U.S. Federal Reserve continued to increase the policy interest rate at a strong pace. This rate is expected to now reach higher levels than projected in the previous quarter. Other developed and emerging economies have also increased their policy interest rates. Thus, international financial conditions have tightened significantly, which reflects in a widespread strengthening of the dollar, increases in worldwide risk premia, and the devaluation of risky assets. Recently, these effects have been stronger in Colombia than in the majority of its peers in the region. Considering all of the aforementioned, the technical staff of the bank increased its assumption regarding the U.S. Federal Reserve’s interest rate, reduced the country’s external demand growth forecast, and raised the projected trajectory for the risk premium. The latter remains elevated at higher levels than its historical average, within a context of high local uncertainty and of extensive financing needs from the foreign sector and the public sector. All of this results in higher inflationary pressures associated to the depreciation of the Colombian peso. The uncertainty regarding external forecasts and its impact on the country remain elevated, given the unforeseeable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, of geopolitical tensions, and of the tightening of external financial conditions, among others. A macroeconomic context of high inflation, inflation expectations and forecasts above 3%, and a positive output gap suggests the need for contractionary monetary policy, compatible with the macroeconomic adjustment necessary to eliminate excess demand, mitigate the risk of unanchoring in inflation expectations, and guarantee convergence of inflation at the target. In comparison with the July report forecasts, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed output level that surpasses the economy’s productive capacity. Headline and core inflation have registered surprising rises, associated with the effects of domestic and external price shocks that were more persistent than anticipated, with excess demand and indexation processes in some CPI groups. The country’s risk premium and the observed and expected international interest rates increased. As a consequence of this, inflationary pressures from the exchange rate rose, and in this report, the probability of the neutral real interest rate being higher than estimated increased. In general, inflation expectations for all terms and the bank’s technical staff inflation forecast for 2023 increased again and continue to stray from 3%. All of the aforementioned elevated the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could heighten widespread indexation processes that push inflation away from the target for a longer time. In this context, it is necessary to consolidate a contractionary monetary policy that tends towards convergence of inflation at the target in the forecast horizon and towards the reduction of excess demand in order to guarantee a sustainable output level trajectory. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its September and October of 2022 meetings, Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR) decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. In September, the BDBR decided by a majority vote to raise the monetary policy interest rate by 100 basis points (bps), and in its October meeting, unanimously, by 100bps. Therefore, the rate is at 11.0%. Boxes 1 Food inflation: a comparison with other countries

Macroeconomic summary Several factors contributed to an increase in projected inflation on the forecast horizon, keeping it above the target rate. These included inflation in December that surpassed expectations (5.62%), indexation to higher inflation rates for various baskets in the consumer price index (CPI), a significant real increase in the legal minimum wage, persistent external and domestic inflationary supply shocks, and heightened exchange rate pressures. The CPI for foods was affected by the persistence of external and domestic supply shocks and was the most significant contributor to unexpectedly high inflation in the fourth quarter. Price adjustments for fuels and certain utilities can explain the acceleration in inflation for regulated items, which was more significant than anticipated. Prices in the CPI for goods excluding food and regulated items also rose more than expected. This was partly due to a smaller effect on prices from the national government’s VAT-free day than anticipated by the technical staff and more persistent external pressures, including via peso depreciation. By contrast, the CPI for services excluding food and regulated items accelerated less than expected, partly reflecting strong competition in the communications sector. This was the only major CPI basket for which prices increased below the target inflation rate. The technical staff revised its inflation forecast upward in response to certain external shocks (prices, costs, and depreciation) and domestic shocks (e.g., on meat products) that were stronger and more persistent than anticipated in the previous report. Observed inflation and a real increase in the legal minimum wage also exceeded expectations, which would boost inflation by affecting price indexation, labor costs, and inflation expectations. The technical staff now expects year-end headline inflation of 4.3% in 2022 and 3.4% in 2023; core inflation is projected to be 4.5% and 3.6%, respectively. These forecasts consider the lapse of certain price relief measures associated with the COVID-19 health emergency, which would contribute to temporarily keeping inflation above the target on the forecast horizon. It is important to note that these estimates continue to contain a significant degree of uncertainty, mainly related to the development of external and domestic supply shocks and their ultimate effects on prices. Other contributing factors include high price volatility and measurement uncertainty related to the extension of Colombia’s health emergency and tax relief measures (such as the VAT-free days) associated with the Social Investment Law (Ley de Inversión Social). The as-yet uncertain magnitude of the effects of a recent real increase in the legal minimum wage (that was high by historical standards) and high observed and expected inflation, are additional factors weighing on the overall uncertainty of the estimates in this report. The size of excess productive capacity remaining in the economy and the degree to which it is closing are also uncertain, as the evolution of the pandemic continues to represent a significant forecast risk. margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. The technical staff revised its GDP growth projection for 2022 from 4.7% to 4.3% (Graph 1.3). This revision accounts for the likelihood that a larger portion of the recent positive dynamic in private consumption would be transitory than previously expected. This estimate also contemplates less dynamic investment behavior than forecast in the previous report amid less favorable financial conditions and a highly uncertain investment environment. Third-quarter GDP growth (12.9%), which was similar to projections from the October report, and the fourth-quarter growth forecast (8.7%) reflect a positive consumption trend, which has been revised upward. This dynamic has been driven by both public and private spending. Investment growth, meanwhile, has been weaker than forecast. Available fourth-quarter data suggest that consumption spending for the period would have exceeded estimates from October, thanks to three consecutive months that included VAT-free days, a relatively low COVID-19 caseload, and mobility indicators similar to their pre-pandemic levels. By contrast, the most recently available figures on new housing developments and machinery and equipment imports suggest that investment, while continuing to rise, is growing at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. The trade deficit is expected to have widened, as imports would have grown at a high level and outpaced exports. Given the above, the technical staff now expects fourth-quarter economic growth of 8.7%, with overall growth for 2021 of 9.9%. Several factors should continue to contribute to output recovery in 2022, though some of these may be less significant than previously forecast. International financial conditions are expected to be less favorable, though external demand should continue to recover and terms of trade continue to increase amid higher projected oil prices. Lower unemployment rates and subsequent positive effects on household income, despite increased inflation, would also boost output recovery, as would progress in the national vaccination campaign. The technical staff expects that the conditions that have favored recent high levels of consumption would be, in large part, transitory. Consumption spending is expected to grow at a slower rate in 2022. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) would continue to recover, approaching its pre-pandemic level, though at a slower rate than anticipated in the previous report. This would be due to lower observed GFCF levels and the potential impact of political and fiscal uncertainty. Meanwhile, the policy interest rate would be less expansionary as the process of monetary policy normalization continues. Given the above, growth in 2022 is forecast to decelerate to 4.3% (previously 4.7%). In 2023, that figure (3.1%) is projected to converge to levels closer to the potential growth rate. In this case, excess productive capacity would be expected to tighten at a similar rate as projected in the previous report. The trade deficit would tighten more than previously projected on the forecast horizon, due to expectations of an improved export dynamic and moderation in imports. The growth forecast for 2022 considers a low basis of comparison from the first half of 2021. However, there remain significant downside risks to this forecast. The current projection does not, for example, account for any additional effects on economic activity resulting from further waves of COVID-19. High private consumption levels, which have already surpassed pre-pandemic levels by a large margin, could be less dynamic than expected. And the normalization of monetary policy in the United States could come more quickly than projected in this report, which could negatively affect international financing costs. Finally, there remains a significant degree of uncertainty related to the duration of supply chocks and the degree to which macroeconomic and political conditions could negatively affect the recovery in investment. External demand for Colombian goods and services should continue to recover amid significant global inflation pressures, high oil prices, and less favorable international financial conditions than those estimated in October. Economic activity among Colombia’s major trade partners recovered in 2021 amid countries reopening and ample international liquidity. However, that growth has been somewhat restricted by global supply chain disruptions and new outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff has revised its growth forecast for Colombia’s main trade partners from 6.3% to 6.9% for 2021, and from 3.4% to 3.3% for 2022; trade partner economies are expected to grow 2.6% in 2023. Colombia’s annual terms of trade increased in 2021, largely on higher oil, coffee, and coal prices. This improvement came despite increased prices for goods and services imports. The expected oil price trajectory has been revised upward, partly to supply restrictions and lagging investment in the sector that would offset reduced growth forecasts in some major economies. Elevated freight and raw materials costs and supply chain disruptions continue to affect global goods production, and have led to increases in global prices. Coupled with the recovery in global demand, this has put upward pressure on external inflation. Several emerging market economies have continued to normalize monetary policy in this context. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Federal Reserve has anticipated an end to its asset buying program. U.S. inflation in December (7.0%) was again surprisingly high and market average inflation forecasts for 2022 have increased. The Fed is expected to increase its policy rate during the first quarter of 2022, with quarterly increases anticipated over the rest of the year. For its part, Colombia’s sovereign risk premium has increased and is forecast to remain on a higher path, to levels above the 15-year-average, on the forecast horizon. This would be partly due to the effects of a less expansionary monetary policy in the United States and the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia. Given the above, international financial conditions are projected to be less favorable than anticipated in the October report. The increase in Colombia’s external financing costs could be more significant if upward pressures on inflation in the United States persist and monetary policy is normalized more quickly than contemplated in this report. As detailed in Section 2.3, uncertainty surrounding international financial conditions continues to be unusually high. Along with other considerations, recent concerns over the potential effects of new COVID-19 variants, the persistence of global supply chain disruptions, energy crises in certain countries, growing geopolitical tensions, and a more significant deceleration in China are all factors underlying this uncertainty. The changing macroeconomic environment toward greater inflation and unanchoring risks on inflation expectations imply a reduction in the space available for monetary policy stimulus. Recovery in domestic demand and a reduction in excess productive capacity have come in line with the technical staff’s expectations from the October report. Some upside risks to inflation have materialized, while medium-term inflation expectations have increased and are above the 3% target. Monetary policy remains expansionary. Significant global inflationary pressures and the unexpected increase in the CPI in December point to more persistent effects from recent supply shocks. Core inflation is trending upward, but remains below the 3% target. Headline and core inflation projections have increased on the forecast horizon and are above the target rate through the end of 2023. Meanwhile, the expected dynamism of domestic demand would be in line with low levels of excess productive capacity. An accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances in Colombia and the increased likelihood of a faster normalization of monetary policy in the United States would put upward pressure on sovereign risk perceptions in a more persistent manner, with implications for the exchange rate and the natural rate of interest. Persistent disruptions to international supply chains, a high real increase in the legal minimum wage, and the indexation of various baskets in the CPI to higher inflation rates could affect price expectations and push inflation above the target more persistently. These factors suggest that the space to maintain monetary stimulus has continued to diminish, though monetary policy remains expansionary. 1.2 Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s board of directors (BDBR) in its meetings in December 2021 and January 2022 voted to continue normalizing monetary policy. The BDBR voted by a majority in these two meetings to increase the benchmark interest rate by 50 and 100 basis points, respectively, bringing the policy rate to 4.0%.