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Статті в журналах з теми "Information contracts"
Brunjes, Benjamin M. "Reducing risk and leveraging markets: The impact of financial structure on federal contractor performance." Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation 4, no. 1-2 (March 2018): 6–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2055563619858613.
Повний текст джерелаCarmichael, David G., and John P. Karantonis. "Construction contracts with conversion capability: a way forward." Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction 20, no. 2 (August 3, 2015): 132–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfmpc-10-2014-0022.
Повний текст джерелаTauqeer, Amar, Anelia Kurteva, Tek Raj Chhetri, Albin Ahmeti, and Anna Fensel. "Automated GDPR Contract Compliance Verification Using Knowledge Graphs." Information 13, no. 10 (September 24, 2022): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info13100447.
Повний текст джерелаSigalov, Katharina, Xuling Ye, Markus König, Philipp Hagedorn, Florian Blum, Benedikt Severin, Michael Hettmer, Philipp Hückinghaus, Jens Wölkerling, and Dominik Groß. "Automated Payment and Contract Management in the Construction Industry by Integrating Building Information Modeling and Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts." Applied Sciences 11, no. 16 (August 20, 2021): 7653. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/app11167653.
Повний текст джерелаXiong, Wei, and Yangcheng Hu. "Delegate contract signing mechanism based on smart contract." PLOS ONE 17, no. 8 (August 19, 2022): e0273424. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0273424.
Повний текст джерелаFilatova, Nataliia. "Smart contracts from the contract law perspective: outlining new regulative strategies." International Journal of Law and Information Technology 28, no. 3 (2020): 217–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaaa015.
Повний текст джерелаCorbett, Charles J., Deming Zhou, and Christopher S. Tang. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry." Management Science 50, no. 4 (April 2004): 550–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0173.
Повний текст джерелаTang, Chunhua, Huiyuan Zhang, and Jiamuyan Xie. "Optimal Contract Design in Contract Farming under Asymmetric Effort Information." Sustainability 14, no. 22 (November 13, 2022): 15000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su142215000.
Повний текст джерелаWu, Yong, Giri Kumar Tayi, Genzhong Feng, and Richard Y. K. Fung. "Managing Information Security Outsourcing in a Dynamic Cooperation Environment." Journal of the Association for Information Systems 22, no. 3 (2021): 827–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17705/1jais.00681.
Повний текст джерелаBenamraoui, Abdelhafid, and Yousef Alwardat. "Asymmetric Information and Islamic Financial Contracts." International Journal of Economics and Finance 11, no. 1 (December 15, 2018): 96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v11n1p96.
Повний текст джерелаДисертації з теми "Information contracts"
Zeng, Shuo. "Topics of Principal-Agent Contracts: Contract Analysis and Pooling Principals." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577498.
Повний текст джерелаReiche, Sonje. "Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information : on the foundations of incomplete contracts." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2001. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1634/.
Повний текст джерелаLevin, Jonathan David 1972. "Relational contracts, incentives and information." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9520.
Повний текст джерелаIncludes bibliographical references.
Chapter 1: I study the design and functioning of self-enforcing incentive contracts under imperfect observability, using a model of repeated agency that allows for both common and private performance monitoring. When performance measures are mutually observed, optimal relational agreements always keep the parties on the Pareto frontier. When performance measures are privately observed, self-enforcing agreements involve the possibility of separation on the equilibrium path, but optimal contracts still take a basic "termination" form. Using these results, one can view optimal long-term contracts as the solution to a static optimization problem. I use this static program to describe the shape of optimal contracts and the nature of second-best inefficiencies. Under standard conditions, optimal moral hazard contracts are "one-step" - a fixed discretionary transfer is made to the agent any time performance is above some cut-off. Hidden information contracts are also characterized and it is shown that optimal contracts call for effort distortion by all types. Chapter 2: This chapter considers self-enforcing relational contracts between a firm and many agents. Even when contracting opportunities are technologically independent, firms will benefit from reaching multilateral contracts that link their transactional arrangements. Optimal multilateral contracts equalize the shadow cost of incentive constraints on each relationship, something bilateral contracts will generally fail to do. I derive some novel implications for asset ownership and ex ante investment, and consider ways in which firms might be able to use existing relationships as "leverage" in reaching new agreements. I also investigate conditions under which firms might want to refrain from multilateral contracting and conduct relationships separately - this may be the case if firm is concerned about a breakdown in one relationship acting as a catalyst that brings down others. The results are applied to discuss two-tier workforce arrangements, supplier associations and the prevalence of diversified business groups in developing countries. Chapter 3: A seminal theorem due to Blackwell (1951) shows that every Bayesian decision-maker prefers an informative signal Y to another signal X if and only if Y is statistically sufficient for X. Sufficiency is an unduly strong requirement in most economic!'problems because it does not incorporate any structure the model might impose. This chapter develops a general theory of information that allows a characterization of the information preferences of decision-makers based on how their marginal returns to acting vary with the underlying (unknown) state of the world. The analysis focuses on "monotone decision problems," in which all decision-makers in the relevant class choose higher actions when higher values of the signal are realized. This restriction allows a characterization of information preferences in terms of stochastic dominance orders over distributions of posterior beliefs. Conditions are also given under which one decision-maker has a higher marginal value of information than another decision-maker, and thus will acquire more information. The results are applied to oligopoly models, labor markets with adverse selection, hiring problems, and a coordination game. (This chapter is co-authored with Susan Athey.) Chapter 4: This chapter revisits Akerlof's classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Greater asymmetries worsen the "buyer's curse," thus lowering the demand curve, but may shift the supply curve as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on where the information impacts the market. A characterization is given for the case of partition information and then for the general case using a definition of information formulated in the previous chapter.
by Jonathan David Levin.
Ph.D.
Cuthbert, Rachel Catherine. "The information requirements for complex engineering service contracts." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648305.
Повний текст джерелаKhalil, Fahad Ahmed. "Essays on information gathering in principal-agent contracts." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37236.
Повний текст джерелаPh. D.
Isabar, Diyala, and Hansson Björn Aurell. "Preventing Interference in Smart Contracts." Thesis, KTH, Skolan för elektroteknik och datavetenskap (EECS), 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-255159.
Повний текст джерелаSmarta kontrakt är en ny form av kontrakt som används för att utfärda ekonomiska transaktioner utan någon mellanman eftersom att transaktionernas integritet säkerställs med hjälp av Blockchain-teknologi. Detta säkerställer dock inte alltid säkra transaktioner eftersom det kan vara svårt att skriva säkra smarta kontrakt. Säkerhetsproblem i smarta kontrakt kan utnyttjas och orsaka stora ekonomiska förluster för kontraktanvändarna. I denna rapport undersöker vi hur störningar kan motverkas i transaktioner som involverar sådana smarta kontrakt. Detta för säkerställa att tillgångar av ekonomiskt värde inte riskerar att försvinna och att informationsflödet mellan smarta kontrakt förblir sanningsenligt. Termen störningdefinieras precist i förhållande till smarta kontrakt. Därefter undersöks två olika lösningar till de olika störningsproblemen, som huvudsakligen involverar att låsa tillgången till vissa funktioner för vissa kontrakt så att ingen modifikation av tillstånd kan ske tills dess att transaktionerna avslutats. Metoderna för att motverka störningar i transaktionerna fungerar men dessa lösningar är anpassade till de specifika prob emen och fungerade inte som en allmän lösning på störningsproblematiken.
Banerjee, Anindya. "Information and contracts : a study of principal-agent relationships." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62b32d23-b43f-4a1a-a4e0-8185e3104ecd.
Повний текст джерелаLitterscheid, Sina [Verfasser]. "Essays on Contracts, Mechanisms and Information Revelation / Sina Litterscheid." Bonn : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1077266731/34.
Повний текст джерелаOzcan, Fatma Rana. "Category-Based Analysis of Smart Contracts." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1563872670303612.
Повний текст джерелаBergquist, Jonatan. "Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts: Privacy-preserving Tools." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-323826.
Повний текст джерелаSyftet med detta examensarbete är att utforska blockkedje teknologi och s.k. smarta kontrakt för att bygga applikationer där känslig information hanteras. Huvudsakligen ligger fokus på att utveckla en struktur baserad på blockkedje teknologi och smarta kontrakt för en medikationsplan. Detta är ett typ-exempel för att visa hur en sådan applikation kan byggas, men resultaten kan överföras till andra områden där känslig data delas mellan parter, eller där ett bevis för korrekthet krävs. Först presenteras problemet, varför medikationsplaner behöver digitaliseras och varför blockkedje teknologi är väl anpassat för att implementera en sådan applikation. Sedan förklaras blockkedje teknologi något djupare i detalj, eftersom det är ett relativt nytt koncept. Därefter föreslås en design för att lösa problemet. Ett system av smarta kontrakt är byggt för att visa hur en medikationsplan kan byggas, och riktlinjer ges för hur ett blockkedje system bör se ut för att stödja systemet av smarta kontrakt. Till slut hålls en kortare diskussion om hur olika blockkedje-designer kan användas för att appliceras på problemet med känslig information.
Presentation held externally at Technical University Munich on the 29-5-2017 10.50.
Книги з теми "Information contracts"
Feltham, Gerald A., Amin H. Amershi, and William T. Ziemba, eds. Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2667-7.
Повний текст джерелаNl̲deke, Georg. Unverifiable information, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992.
Знайти повний текст джерелаSchmitz, Patrick. Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts. Aachen: Shaker, 1999.
Знайти повний текст джерелаHalvey, John K. Information technology outsourcing transactions: Process, strategies, and contracts. New York: Wiley, 1996.
Знайти повний текст джерелаNational Institutes of Health (U.S.). Division of Research Grants. Grants Inquiries Office. Information from the NIH on grants and contracts. Bethesda, Md.?]: Division of Research Grants ... Grants Inquiries, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, 1986.
Знайти повний текст джерелаPemberton, James. Efficient contracts and incentive compatibility with asymmetric information. Reading: University of Reading.Department of Economics, 1988.
Знайти повний текст джерелаHalvey, John K. Information technology outsourcing transaction: Process, strategies, and contracts. 2nd ed. Somerset, NJ: J. Wiley, 2006.
Знайти повний текст джерелаUnited States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.
Знайти повний текст джерелаUnited States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.
Знайти повний текст джерелаUnited States. General Accounting Office. Health, Education, and Human Services Division. Information on the Davis-Bacon Act. Washington, D.C: The Office, 1996.
Знайти повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "Information contracts"
Dawson, R. L. "Contracts." In Teacher Information Pack 5: Techniques and Information, 14–21. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09005-1_2.
Повний текст джерелаSuurmond, Coen. "Business, Contracts, Information." In Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 3–17. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94214-8_1.
Повний текст джерелаAzariadis, Costas. "Implicit Contracts." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 132–40. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_14.
Повний текст джерелаLazear, Edward P. "Incentive Contracts." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 152–62. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_16.
Повний текст джерелаHart, Oliver. "Incomplete Contracts." In Allocation, Information and Markets, 163–79. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20215-7_17.
Повний текст джерелаShaik, Khader. "Derivatives and Information Technology." In Managing Derivatives Contracts, 355–68. Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-6275-6_17.
Повний текст джерелаBeulen, Erik, and Pieter M. Ribbers. "Transitions and contracts." In Managing Information Technology Outsourcing, 110–42. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003223788-7.
Повний текст джерелаCorbett, Charles J., and Christopher S. Tang. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry." In International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 269–97. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9_9.
Повний текст джерелаCallea, M., L. Campagna, M. G. Fugini, and P. Plebani. "Contracts for Defining QoS Levels." In Mobile Information Systems, 1–14. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/0-387-22874-8_1.
Повний текст джерелаEschenbruch, Klaus, and Jörg L. Bodden. "Integrating BIM in Construction Contracts." In Building Information Modeling, 303–14. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92862-3_17.
Повний текст джерелаТези доповідей конференцій з теми "Information contracts"
Athamena, Belkacem, Zina Houhamdi, and Ghaleb El Refae. "Retention Contracts under Hidden Information." In 2021 22nd International Arab Conference on Information Technology (ACIT). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acit53391.2021.9677284.
Повний текст джерелаMa, Zhonghua. "Trade Credit Contracts under Asymmetric Information." In 2009 International Conference on Wireless Networks and Information Systems (WNIS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wnis.2009.85.
Повний текст джерелаLi, Jianing, and Houcai Shen. "Procurement Contracts Under Asymmetric Yield Information." In 2018 15th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2018.8465060.
Повний текст джерелаKobayashi, Shinji, and Shigemi Ohba. "Technology licensing contracts and private information." In Technology. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/picmet.2009.5261801.
Повний текст джерелаIizuka, Kayo, and Chihiro Suematsu. "Psychological Contracts in Business Process Transformation Effect: Structure of Psychological Contracts." In 23rd International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0010526304290435.
Повний текст джерелаXinhui Wang and Xianyu Wang. "Supply chain contracts with endogenous information structure." In 2010 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Engineering (ICISE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icise.2010.5689509.
Повний текст джерелаAlon, Tal, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. "Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency." In EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467608.
Повний текст джерелаDounas, Theodoros, Wassim Jabi, and Davide Lombardi. "Smart Contracts for Decentralised Building Information Modelling." In eCAADe 2020: Anthropologic : Architecture and Fabrication in the cognitive age. eCAADe, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.52842/conf.ecaade.2020.2.565.
Повний текст джерелаPapireddygari, Maneesha, and Bo Waggoner. "Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules." In EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538261.
Повний текст джерелаZhang, Hao, Mahesh Nagarajan, and Greys Sošić. "Dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information." In the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807446.
Повний текст джерелаЗвіти організацій з теми "Information contracts"
Allen, Julia, Lisa Cunningham, Gary Ford, Barbara Fraser, and John Kochmar. Security for Information Technology Service Contracts. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada336329.
Повний текст джерелаDoD Office of Inspector General. Summary Report: DoD Information Technology Contracts Awarded Without Competition Were Generally Justified. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1001815.
Повний текст джерелаFinkelshtain, Israel, and Tigran Melkonyan. The economics of contracts in the US and Israel agricultures. United States Department of Agriculture, February 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2008.7695590.bard.
Повний текст джерелаSeverud, K. J. Project management plan for Contract Management Information System (CONTRACT). Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), January 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10118756.
Повний текст джерелаShah, Ayesha, Jan Olek, and Rebecca S. McDaniel. Real Life Experience with Major Pavement Types. Purdue University, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284317371.
Повний текст джерелаCrabtree, Donald J. Contract Pricing Handbook PMO Tactical Management Information Systems. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada156174.
Повний текст джерелаSchembri, Philip, and Jillian O'Neel. MDMi contract discussion and preliminary information for planning. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), October 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1893656.
Повний текст джерелаFlandreau, Marc, Stefano Pietrosanti, and Carlotta Schuster. Why do Sovereign Borrowers Post Collateral? Evidence from the 19th Century. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, October 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.36687/inetwp167.
Повний текст джерелаCao, Shoufeng, Uwe Dulleck, Warwick Powell, Charles Turner-Morris, Valeri Natanelov, and Marcus Foth. BeefLedger blockchain-credentialed beef exports to China: Early consumer insights. Queensland University of Technology, May 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/rep.eprints.200267.
Повний текст джерелаDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC. Military Standard: Contractor Integrated Technical Information Service (CITIS). Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada289778.
Повний текст джерела