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Статті в журналах з теми "Hume, David, 1711-1776 Philosophy"
1
Craig, Edward. "David Hume." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004041.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
2
Waldmann, Felix. "David Hume in Chicago: A Twentieth-Century Hoax." Journal of British Studies 59, no. 4 (October 2020): 793–820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2020.127.
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AbstractThis article alleges that two letters attributed to the philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) were forged in the twentieth century. The letters were first published in 1972 and 1973 by Michael Morrisroe, an assistant professor of English in the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, after which they became monuments of conventional scholarship on Hume's life and writings. Both letters are cited without qualification by scholars of Hume's thought in dozens of publications, including Ernest Campbell Mossner's celebrated Life of David Hume (1980), and John Robertson's entry for Hume in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). This article reconstructs the history and transmission of Hume's extant letters and attempts to account for why the forgeries published by Morrisroe were accepted as genuine. It makes a systematic case against the authenticity of the letters, and focuses in particular on the question of whether Hume met the Jansenist homme de lettres Noël-Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) and had access to his library, in Reims, in 1734. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the exposé for modern editorial scholarship and intellectual history.
3
King, Peter, and Nathan Ballantyne. "Augustine on Testimony." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 2 (June 2009): 195–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0045.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Philosophical work on testimony has flourished in recent years. Testimony roughly involves a source affirming or stating something in an attempt to transfer information to one or more persons. It is often said that the topic of testimony has been neglected throughout most of the history of philosophy, aside from contributions by David Hume (1711-1776) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796). True as this may be, Hume and Reid aren't the only ones who deserve a tip of the hat for recognizing the importance of testimony: Augustine of Hippo (354-430) affirms the place of testimony in human cognition, at least in his later writings.In what follows, we consider three questions raised by Augustine's thinking about testimony: the analytical question of what sources count as testimony (Section I); the epistemological question about the status of testimony-based belief (Section II); and the doxastic question about the circumstances in which it is appropriate to believe on the basis of testimony (Section III).
4
Schabas, Margaret, and Carl Wennerlind. "Retrospectives: Hume on Money, Commerce, and the Science of Economics." Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 3 (August 1, 2011): 217–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.217.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
David Hume (1711–1776) is arguably the most esteemed philosopher to have written in the English language. During his lifetime, however, Hume was as well if not better known for his contributions to political economy, particularly for the essays published as the Political Discourses (1752). Hume left his mark on the economic thought of the physiocrats, the classical economists, and the American Federalists. Adam Smith, who met Hume circa 1750, was his closest friend and interlocutor for some 25 years. Among modern economists, Hume's essays on money and trade have informed theorists of both Keynesian and Monetarist persuasions. In this essay, we begin by discussing Hume's monetary economics, and then spell out his theory of economic development, noting his qualified enthusiasm for the modern commercial system. We end with an assessment of his views on the scientific standing of economics, specifically his counterintuitive argument that economics could be epistemologically superior to physics.
5
Orsi, Cosma. "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCLUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORKHOUSE SYSTEM." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 39, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 453–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837216000249.
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The aim of this article is to describe the rise and fall of the workhouse system in connection with the developments that took place in economic thought in the transition from mercantilism to the Classical tradition. By examining the economic debate about wages, efficiency, labor market, workers’ mobility, and unemployment, we discuss whether the social policy shift epitomized by institutional reforms like the Gilbert Act (1782), the Rose Act (1793), and the Speenhamland system (1795) was accompanied and eventually inspired by a change in the perception of major political economy issues. In doing so, we review the writings of Jacob Vanderlint (d. 1740), George Berkeley (1685–1753), Malachy Postlethwayt (1707?–1767), Josiah Tucker (1713–1799), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam Smith (1723-1790), among others. Although a direct influence by these writers cannot be proven, the originality of the present work rests on the effort to put into perspective the arguments elaborated by economic thinkers and the proposals made by social reformers so as to identify possible connections between economic theorizing and social legislation.
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Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004069.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
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Vesey, Godfrey. "Hume on Liberty and Necessity." Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (March 1986): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004065.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
David Hume (1711–1776) described the question of liberty and necessity as ‘the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science’ (Hume [1748] 1975, p. 95). He was right about it being contentious. Whether it is metaphysical is another matter. I think that what is genuinely metaphysical is an assumption that Hume, and a good many other philosophers, make in their treatment of the question. The assumption is about language and reality. I call it ‘the conformity assumption’. But more about that shortly. Let us begin at the obvious beginning, by considering what the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘necessity’ mean in the expression ‘liberty and necessity’.
8
Emerson, Roger L. "The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh 1768–1783." British Journal for the History of Science 18, no. 3 (November 1985): 255–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007087400022391.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The Philosophical Society of Edinburgh Throughout the years 1768–1783 looked to the outside world like a flourishing and important body. By 1771 it had sponsored the publication of five volumes of papers which had gone through several printings and translations. It had a distinguished foreign membership which assured its recognition abroad as one of the important academic bodies in the cosmopolitan Republic of Letters. From its foundation in 1737 until his death in 1768, its President had been the Earl of Morton, better known as the President of the Royal Society of London and as an astronomer who had been active in the practical work of the London society. Another member, Sir John Pringle, became President of the Royal Society in 1772. It was also known abroad that among the Edinburgh philosophers were to be found the most important professors of the town's university, not only those of its distinguished medical faculty but also men like William Robertson, Adam Ferguson and later John Robison. David Hume had been at one time a Secretary of the Society and probably remained a member to the end of his life in 1776. In the British colonies, the Society could point to members in Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Jamaica and other West Indian islands and it had contacts in a far-flung network reaching from China and Siberia in the east to places less remote in Europe and America. Within Britain, the Society had members in London and in provincial towns of whom William Brownrigg was the most important. From these men and from others scattered in Scotland, the Society drew information and projected its image as a successful learned society. These appearances, however, are far clearer than the Society's record of accomplishment during its last years. It is not accidental that so little pertaining to its work survives. The Society in reality had a career far from brilliant and by 1778 hardly deserved the reputation it had acquired. During its last five years it revived but even then it probably did not reach the level of activity seen in the early and mid 1750s.
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Reis, Nilo Henrique Neves dos. "Maquiavel na Inglaterra: O leitor David Hume." Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 10, no. 21 (January 24, 2020): 79. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/.v10i21.8953.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Os escritos de Nicolau Maquiavel foram lidos por várias pessoas de modo não confessional desde a sua divulgação. Indícios apontam que os ingleses tiveram acesso as suas obras já no reinado de Henrique VIII, ainda que de forma restrita à elite inglesa, que tinha familiaridade com o idioma italiano. Decerto que as obras do florentino ofereceram uma sólida contribuição ao pensamento político inglês, o que, por sua vez, estimulou uma reflexão crítica ao fenômeno político, bem como aos valores vigentes, pois, como se sabe, suas ideias serviram de inspiração para muitos escritores. A bem da verdade, cotejando as produções inglesas, principalmente após a guerra civil, sente-se a influência de Maquiavel. David Hume, que viveu entre 1711 a 1776, dois séculos depois da circulação dos escritos na Inglaterra, quando o florentino já era um referencial ali, não tinha como desconhecer as contribuições dos escritos políticos de Maquiavel, já que uma série de autores faziam referência diretas a ele, muitos dos quais, comentados pelo escocês. Em uma época em que era pernicioso fazer menções louváveis ao pensamento do florentino, há vestígios de que Hume usou estratégias para colocar suas posições próximas, e dado aos indícios encontrados neste escrito, defende-se a posição de que a familiaridade do escocês com os textos de Maquiavel era grande, visto que ele conhecia bem o “corpus machiavellicus”.
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Botero Camacho, Manuel. "To dream or not to dream: incursión en la lógica de la canción de S. T. Coleridge." Razón Crítica, no. 1 (August 29, 2016): 122–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21789/25007807.1139.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p align="justify">A lo largo de este artículo se expone una serie de posibilidades que puede ofrecer la lectura del poema de Samuel Taylor Coleridge titulado “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” (1798). Los argumentos aquí expuestos carecen de intención distinta de aquella que consiste en señalar elementos que acaso no sean accidentales dentro del texto. David Hume (1711-1776) será quien proporcione las relaciones que deban examinarse. En este escrito se ofrecen tres posibilidades interpretativas y, al menos, dos de ellas pueden verse como contaminadas por las teorías de Hume. Aunque la tercera no está directamente tratada en la filosofía que aquí se maneja, es fácil hacer la inferencia del origen de tal relación. El objetivo es presentar el poema de Coleridge como una objeción a la teoría de la causalidad enunciada por Hume.</p>
Дисертації з теми "Hume, David, 1711-1776 Philosophy"
1
Rowan, Michael. "Hume, probability and induction." Title page, contents and abstract only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phr877.pdf.
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2
Cruz, Fernão de Oliveira Salles dos Santos. "As condições de possibilidade da ciência da natureza humana: crítica da metafísica e ciência do homem." Universidade de São Paulo, 2007. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-26112007-141351/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber.Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.
3
Jenkins, Joan (Joan Elizabeth). "The Enlightenment Legacy of David Hume." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1989. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc332061/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age.
The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume.
This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era.
In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.
4
Déragon, Sonia. "Identité personnelle chez David Hume : Imagonation et passions." Aix-Marseille 1, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001AIX10104.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
L'idée que nous défendons est celle suivant laquelle les discussions au sujet de l'identité personnelle développées dans les Livre I et II du Traité de la Nature Humaine sont consistantes l'une avec l'autre. Afin de démontrer cette thèse, nous discutons les propos tenus par Hume dans ces Livres et montrons que les discussions répondent à différentes questions et qu'elles se complètent bien théoriquement. Cette thèse se divise en trois parties. Nous expliquons, tout d'abord,"L'existence des substances matérielles". Nous montrons que nous trouvons chez Hume une première formulation de la thèse de la collection ainsi qu'une précision importante quant à la nature du lien entre les perceptions. Nous expliquons les croyances au sujet des corps extérieurs et soutenons que c'est grâce à la conception chez Hume de l'imagination que ces croyances "naturelles" peuvent être expliquées et justifiées. Nous distinguons, finalement, la croyance et la fiction et montrons l'importance de cette différenciation pour suivre correctement le propos humien. Dans la deuxième partie, nous discutons de "L'existence des substances spirituelles". Nous distinguons l'idée du moi et le moi des passions et montrons que l'idée "vraie" du moi ou de l'esprit est une idée complexe [. . . . ] Nous présentons ce que soutient Hume dans l'Appendice concernant l'identité et défendons les thèses suivant lesquelles 1) il n'y a pas de deuxième circularité théorique dans son traitement de l'identité et que 2) Hume est insatisfait de son explication de l'unité réelle de l'esprit humain. Dans la dernière partie, nous discutons de l'identité en tant qu'elle concerne les passions. Nous défendons l'idée suivant laquelle les passions contribuent grandement à la formation du moi et que, par conséquent, nous pouvons le différencier des fictions établies dans le Livre I. Nous expliquons le rôle essentiel que joue l'idée du moi dans les passions indirectes ainsi que dans les mécanismes de la sympathie et de la comparaison. Nous montrons, dans nos conclusions, la relation étroite entre le moi et l'autre ainsi que le rôle privilégié du corps humain dans la conception humienne de l'identité personnelle.
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Le, Jallé Éléonore. "L'autorégulation chez Hume." Paris 10, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001PA100165.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
La nature humaine telle que Hume nous la présente peut être envisagée comme un système autorégulé. Telle serait la signification de ce que Hume nomme « l'inventivité » de la nature humaine, une inventivité qui n'est pas seulement le propre du vivant mais la marque d'une espèce douée d'une puissance d'artifice. De nombreux principes de la nature humaine s'avèrent, en effet, capables de se réorienter spontanément à chaque fois que leur direction primitive menace l'équilibre ou la survie du système. Au cceur du système « de l'entendement », l'imagination agit comme un pivot régulateur. A l'origine d'emportements parfois intempestifs, elle est aussi une source de régularisation et de stabilisation. Cette faculté est surtout le sujet d'une remarquable logique vitale, seule capable de préserver la vivacité du jugement lorsque l'excès de régularité de la logique stricte menace de le suspendre ou de l'exténuer. Le système des passions quant à lui engendre, grâce au changement de direction spontané de « l'amour du gain » (passion inventive s'il en est), un système de conventions et d'artifices lui aussi caractérisé par l'autorégulation. Etant donné que Hume, notamment grâce à son analyse de la convention, donne à voir une harmonisation concertée des intérêts qui ne se confond pas selon nous avec une pure « harmonie involontaire », sa pensée politique peut se caractériser comme un constructivisme autorégulé. L'autorégulation est aussi le propre de la science de la nature humaine. Puisque la science de l'homme est Nature humaine, la même autorégulation qui caractérise cette dernière doit aussi caractériser le « vrai système », dont les principes s'identifient ainsi aux principes mêmes de son objet. L'écriture philosophique n'est pas, dès lors, autre chose qu'une tendance capable, comme toute propension, de changer de direction lorsque sa meilleure satisfaction l'exigeHuman Nature, as described by Hume, may be characterized as a self-organized system. Such is the meaning of the « inventivity » of this species. Many principles of human nature are able to change their own direction whenever this change is required by the sability or the preservation of the whole. Within the system « of the Understanding », the imagination is a kind of regulating faculty, which is able to control and to correct its own disordered propensities. This faculty maintains a vital logics which preserves judgment whenever formal logics threatens to suspend or to destroy it. Thanks to the spontaneous change of direction of a particularly inventive passion, i. E. « the love of gain », the natural system of the passions gives rise to an artificial system of institutions ; also a self-organized system. Self-organization may be applied to the science of Human Nature. Since Human Nature is the science of Man, the principles of the science are equal to the principles ot the object of the science, and self-organization characterizes both of them. Thus, the philosophical writing process turns out to be nothing but a propensity, which is able to change its own direction, while increasing its own satisfaction
6
Luquet, Laurent. "Le problème des relations chez Hume." Caen, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003CAEN1384.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Ce travail tente de renouveler la lecture du thème de l'association chez Hume. Loin de comprendre l'associationnisme du seul point de vue des idées, on peut montrer que l'originalité de Hume consiste à mettre l'accent sur des renforcements entre divers niveaux de l'association. Chaque niveau a son régime propre et correspond lui-même à la fois à un point de vue sur l'esprit et à un point de vue sur l'homme. Ainsi, de même que l'homme est compris comme être spéculatif, affectif et social, de même y a-t-il une association des idées, une association des impressions et une association sociale. Afin de préparer l'étude de ces associations, nous commençons par un retour sur les perceptions humiennes. Dans un second temps, nous essayons de dégager la spécificité de chaque niveau de l'association. Ce travail se clôt par l'étude des effets des associations pour montrer le passage de la réalité mentale, spéculative et affective, à la réalité sociale des relations.
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Etchegaray, Claire. "La croyance naturelle chez David Hume et Thomas Reid : scepticisme et réalisme." Clermont-Ferrand 2, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008CLF20010.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Cette étude se propose d'examiner la façon dont les philosophies de David Hume et Thomas Reid ont promu le concept de croyance afin de repenser la logique qu'ils tenaient pour traditionnelle, et la métaphysique entendue comme réflexion sur la fiabilité de nos facultés naturelles. L'opposition philosophique entre ces deux auteurs invite d'une part à reconstruire le sens respectif de la "croyance naturelle" chez chacun d'eux sans y projeter les connotations que les débats ultérieurs du XIXe siècle ont pu donner à ce concept. D'autre part il faut comprendre si et comment une philosophie qui assume la distanciation critique, telle celle de Hume, peut rendre compte de notre réalisme naturel ; et inversement si et comment la croyance naturelle peut avoir un sens au sein d'une philosophie réaliste par principe, telle celle de Reid. Cette croyance étant considérée comme un fait de nature, comment est-il possible d'en rendre raison et d'en être responsable : à quelles épistémologies et quelles éthiques de la croyance, les décisions naturalistes de Hume et de Reid pourraient-elles donc donner lieu ? Une première partie est donc consacrée à l'élucidation du concept de croyance dont le rôle premier semble être de promouvoir une logique de l'existant, en repensant le jugement comme comportement mental. Une seconde partie cherche à évaluer la consistance de leurs psychologies ainsi promues à l'aune de leurs options respectives en métaphysique. On en vient alors à considérer le rapport entre scepticisme et naturalisme chez Hume, entre théisme et naturalisme chez Reid, et ce faisant les linéaments respectifs d'une éthique de la croyanceThe aim of this study is to examine how David Hume's and Thomas Reid's philosophies promoted the concept of belief in order to be able to rethink the so-called "traditional logic", and the metaphysical reflection on the reliability of our natural faculties. Fisrtly, the philosophical opposition between the two thinkers requires that we redefine the respective meanings that they have given to the notion of "natural belief", without taking into account the subsequent connotations that arose from the debates of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the goal is to understand if and how a philosophy such as Hume's, which takes on a critical distance, is able to account for our natural realism ; but also to understand what meaning a philosophy such as Reid's, which is realistic by principle, might give to the notion of natural belief. Since belief is regarded as a fact of nature, how can it be epistemologically justified and imputable to our responsability ? What epistemologies and what ethics of belief do Hume's and Reid's naturalistic decisions imply ? The first part is devoted to the elucidation of the concept of belief whose role is prima facie to promote a logic of the existing by redefining judgment as mental behaviour. The second part aims at evaluating the consistency of the promoted psychologies, considering their respective options in metaphysics. Henceforth the link between scepticism and naturalism for Hume, and between theism and naturalism for Reid can be drawn, and their respective athics of belief outlined
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Perinetti, Dario. "Hume, history and the science of human nature." Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38509.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc.Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."
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Bonicco, Céline. "Sympathie et interaction : une lecture croisée de David Hume et Erving Goffman." Paris 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008PA010614.
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Cette étude se propose de montrer comment le concept humien de sympathie constitue le principe d'explication de l'unité d'analyse minutieusement explorée par Erving Goffman : l'interaction. Elle se donne pour tache d'explorer une pensée du social en germe dans la philosophie de Hume et qui s'épanouit dans la sociologie de Goffman. Il ne s'agit pas simplement de retracer la généalogie d'une certaine sociologie de l'action mais d'en mettre au jour les prémisses conceptuelles et les implications théoriques, grâce à la redécouverte de la radicalité philosophique du concept humien. Dans une première partie, nous établissons la filiation entre la sympathie et l'interaction telle qu'elle est introduite par Robert Ezra Park dans la sociologie américaine, et nous pointons son oubli par ses héritiers, notamment par Goffman. Dans une seconde partie. Nous montrons que l'intervention dans une explication sociologique d'un principe psychologique comme la sympathie ne conduit nullement à nier la spécificité du social mais révèle au contraire le caractère non exclusivement individuel d'une partie du psychisme. Dans une troisième partie, nous étudions comment l'évolution de l’œuvre de Goffman rend compte de l'insuffisance d'un concept d'interaction uniquement descriptif, et comment le recours à la sympathie humienne permet d'expliquer son fonctionnement. Enfin, nous analysons comment la sociologie de I'interaction éclairée par son origine philosophique contribue à résoudre un problème crucial pour la théorie sociale : comment penser le changement social ?
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Oliveira, Roberto Carlos de. "Sociedade e artÃficio na teoria politica de Hume." [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278704.
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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida MarquesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: A análise de David Hume (1711-1776) vincula a epistemologia, a moral e a política de forma tal que a sociedade é apresentada como resultado da interação entre as faculdades naturais dos homens e os recursos artificiais decorrentes da reflexão. O artifício denota as invenções refletidas e voluntárias que ampliam as perspectivas da natureza humana, ou seja, os mecanismos de sociabilização do homem que promovem seu desenvolvimento social, situando-o no universo da moral e da política e adaptando seus interesses particulares ao interesse público. A essência do artifício reside na capacidade humana de dominar seus impulsos mediante a sublimação, que direciona os desejos para uma perspectiva estável de satisfação. Nesse sentido, ele amplia as possibilidades de realização do homem, além de cooperar na manutenção da sociedade. Este estudo pretende mostrar como Hume compõe uma filosofia que analisa a sociedade a partir das implicações e desdobramentos de princípios naturais e mostrar como o artifício estabelece um vínculo entre a moral e a política, entre os interesses particulares dos indivíduos e os interesses gerais da sociedade, contribuindo para o estabelecimento das instituições sociais e da autoridade
Abstract: The analysis of David Hume (1711-1776) entail the epistemology, the morals and the politics so that the society is presented like the result of interaction between the natural faculties of men and the artificial recourses current from reflexion. The artifice connotes the reflected and voluntary inventions that ampliflies the perspectives of human nature, that is, the mechanisms of sociabilization of man which promote their social development, placing them in the universe of morals and politics and adapting their particular interests to the public interest. The essence of the artifice resides in the human capability to dominate their impulses through sublimation, which directionates the desires to an estable perspective of satisfaction. In this sense, it amplifies the possibilities of man's realization, yonder to collaborate with the maintenance of society. This study intends to display how Hume composes a philosophy which analyses the society from the implications and unfoldments of natural principles and to indicate how the artifice establishes an entailment between moral and politics, between the particular interests of individuals and the general interests of society, contributing to the establishment of social instituitions and the authority
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Книги з теми "Hume, David, 1711-1776 Philosophy"
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Theory and practice in the philosophy of David Hume. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
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Fideism and Hume's philosophy: Knowledge, religion, and metaphysics. New York: P. Lang, 1993.
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Kopf, Peter. David Hume: Philosoph und Wirtschaftstheoretiker, 1711-1776. Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Steiner, 1987.
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Historical dictionary of Hume's philosophy. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2008.
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Baier, Annette. The pursuits of philosophy: An introduction to the life and thought of David Hume. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011.
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Kail, P. J. E. Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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Philosophical melancholy and delirium: Hume's pathology of philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
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Spencer, Mark G. David Hume and eighteenth-century America. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2004.
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P, Wright John. Hume's "Treatise of human nature": An introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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Inc, ebrary, ed. Deleuze's Hume: Philosophy, culture and the Scottish Enlightenment. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
Знайти повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "Hume, David, 1711-1776 Philosophy"
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Howard, Alex. "David Hume (1711–1776)." In Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 172–81. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04644-4_18.
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Demeter, Tamás. "Hume, David (1711–1776)." In Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences, 1–7. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20791-9_440-1.
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Clack, Beverley. "David Hume 1711–1776." In Misogyny in the Western Philosophical Tradition, 135–44. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230212800_11.
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Rotwein, Eugene. "Hume, David (1711–1776)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 6027–33. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_751.
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Milgate, Murray, and Shannon C. Stimson. "Hume, David (1711–1776)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 908–15. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_173.
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Rotwein, Eugene. "Hume, David (1711–1776)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–7. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_751-1.
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Rotwein, Eugene. "Hume, David (1711–1776)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–8. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_751-2.
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Salter, John. "Hume (1711–1776)." In Interpreting Modern Political Philosophy, 81–98. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-0725-7_5.
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Morrissey, Lee. "David Hume (1711–1776) from “Of the Standard of Taste,” Essays (1757)." In Debating the Canon: A Reader from Addison to Nafisi, 17–20. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04916-2_3.
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Beckwith, Christopher I. "Greek Enlightenment." In Greek Buddha. Princeton University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691176321.003.0005.
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The argument known in Antiquity as the Problem of the Criterion was introduced to Western thought by Pyrrho of Elis, who learned it in Central Asia and India from Early Buddhism. The problem revolutionized ancient European thought, such that from Pyrrho's time onward ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy was focused on the epistemological question, “Can we really know anything?” With the ascendancy of Christianity and its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic apologetics, the problem was sidelined and practically forgotten during the Middle Ages. When Pyrrhonism was reintroduced to Western Europe in the late Renaissance, the problem once again revolutionized Western thought and shifted the central focus of philosophy to epistemology. Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) is responsible for what may be called the problem's modern incarnation, known today as the “Problem of Induction.” This chapter analyzes the issues fundamental to understanding not only Hume but also Pyrrho, and in turn the Buddha.