Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Federal Country Party"

This article has a twin mission: examining the impact of party merger on the federal arrangement and its association with the current conflicts in Ethiopia. The 1995 federal constitution of Ethiopia devolves powers to regional states. Since then, each regional state was fused with its distinct ruling party that created a coalition at the federal level. This state-party fused federal arrangement faced serious challenges with the rise of intra coalition disagreements since 2016 following the protest movements in the country, which further plunged Ethiopia into a devastating civil war since November 2020. This article asks what caused the conflicts. While recognizing the multidimensional roots of the conflicts, this article uses a political party-driven theory of federalism in order to identify the political processes that led to the conflicts. It argues that in a multiethnic federation such as Ethiopia where there is state-party fusion, a ruling party’s metamorphosis from a coalition to a union may not only centralize power but could also result in both de facto merger of that fragile federation and conflicts. Delinking the state from the party through inclusive national negotiations and democratic elections within a federal arrangement might help transition Ethiopia to a stable country. Keywords: Civil war, conflicts, political parties, Ethiopian federalism, Prosperity Party, power centralization, Abiy Ahmed.

The present research considers the problem of insti-tutionalization of the Green Party in Germany for the period of 40 years, which was determined by a multi-stage process of the party formation, as well as the innovative approach of “The Greens” in the devel-opment of the party's political course. “The Greens” began their activities by creating small local envi-ronmental groups, which by the 1980s had formed a single political party and began to actively partici-pate in the political life of the country, which had marked the beginning of “The Greens” institutional-ization process. Initially, the party positioned itself as an “alternative” to existing traditional political forces, which was clearly reflected in their proposed initiatives. However, over time, during the institu-tionalization process, “The Greens” began to move towards a “systemic” integration into the political life of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the status of “marginal opposition” disappeared. During its existence, the party put forward hundreds of var-ious initiatives aimed at improving the environmen-tal situation and the socio-economic system of Germany. These initiatives found receptive audience among the country’s population, which in recent years has had a positive impact on the dynamics of the party's popularity and made it one of the main socio-political forces in the country, finally complet-ing the process of institutionalizing “The Greens”.

Abstract A high level of income inequality has marked Brazilian society for many decades. In the period of transition to democracy, still in the 1980s, there was the expectation that the new regime would be able to solve some of the countrys major problems, one of the most important being inequality. This article aims to verify whether there was a reduction of income inequalities between classes in Brazil between 1995 and 2013, when two of the largest and most important political parties operating in the country, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and Workers Party (PT), headed the federal government. To this end, National Household Sample (PNAD-IBGE) data will be used for the period under study.

Abstract Since Nigeria’s return to electoral rule in 1999, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) ruled the country as the majority party at both levels of its federal system until 2015. However, despite this dominance, the relationship between presidents and governors was often so divisive that the instability within the party threatened the stability of not only the ruling governments, but also the federation as a whole and undermined its productivity. This article examines this anomaly against the background of scholarship emphasizing the crucial role of federation-wide parties in fostering smooth intergovernmental bargains and in facilitating federal stability. It argues that Nigeria’s recent experience provides counterevidence of this theory and discusses the mutually reinforcing contextual factors that might have influenced this development, focusing on the PDP’s norms and the country’s intergovernmental fiscal structure.

Abstract The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the government party in Ethiopia from 1991 to 2019, was Africa's biggest party in terms of membership base and considered to be the most powerful incumbent on the continent. The factors behind its rapid fall from grace and eventual collapse in 2019 will be put under scrutiny in this article. Comparative political research has pointed to both endogamous and exogamous factors contributing to party instability. Party-specific concerns such as differences in local constituencies, variations in ethnopolitical identities, differences of ideological outlook, and policy preferences are all factors that may lead to a withering of party consensus. Furthermore, the governance structure of the country may also impinge on party stability, because federal models may be more divisive in nature than unitary states. The argument pursued in this article will be to investigate how the origin of the EPRDF's component parties and their ethnopolitical base under the federal system were made relevant in the internal power struggle to claim control of the coalition and hence the government of the land. The article concludes by identifying four key factors contributing to the internal power struggle that led to the demise of the EPRDF: disagreements over ideology; disputes over party bylaws, procedures, and practices; contestation over the federal state model; and finally, the surge of ethnonationalism with intrinsic territorial ambitions.

In this article the authors develop a new approach to the study of policy dynamics in a quasi-federal system of government. The goal is to contribute to previous research on comparative federalism by analyzing the variations of issue attention between levels of government and across four regional governments—Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country. To do so the authors follow the policy dynamics approach, developing a comparative and empirical analysis about issue attention across time, territories, and policy subsystems. The analysis relies on an extensive database, created following the methodology of the Comparative Agendas Project, which includes all laws passed from the early 1980s to present. The results indicate that legislative agendas have become increasingly diverse since the 1990s, and this is partly explained by party preferences and the type of government.

With its 5 percent electoral threshold, constitutional goal of creating a “wehrhafte Demokratie,” (defensive democracy) and the Christian Democrats’ goal of never allowing a party to their right, the Federal Republic has long seemed immune to the rise of a national-level, populist far-right party. In September 2017, however, Germany joined most European countries when the Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered the Bundestag with over 12 percent of the popular vote. By 2020, the party was represented in all state legislatures in the country and its votes briefly helped elect a state level chief executive in Thuringia.

According to Jürgen Habermas, the federal election in 1998 finally“sealed” the democratic foundation of Germany and confirmed thatthis country belonged to the “west.”1 Until then, the day of judgmenthad left the “judges” in Germany—that is, the voters—with only limitedinfluence in coalition building and the formation of each government.2 Between 1949 and 1998 no federal government has totallybeen unsettled by elections. Changes in government were due tochanges in coalitions, thus based on decisions by the parties ratherthan on the electorate. Insofar as the landslide victory of the SocialDemocratic Party and the Alliance ‘90/Greens in the 1998 electionnot only reflected important changes in the party system, but it alsocould mean that the German electorate is going to play a more influentialrole in the future.

The political parties of Nepal have never been able to move as an engine of social transformation process, much like their inability to give a stable government. After replacing the Party-less regimes, with them multiparty system the country has mainly witnessed drawbacks of parliamentary system. The political parties have failed to promote democracy and they have hammered on the root of constitution. However, a new constitution was demanded through a Constituent Assembly (CA) and after nearly a decade long exercise, the constitution of Nepal, 2015, was promulgated on September20, 2015. Since that period Nepal has formally entered into a Federal Republican Nation. The new constitution has covered all the achievements of Second People's Movement (SPM).Since then the federal republican constitution has been completely setup in Nepal. This constitution has institutionalized the federal democratic republican setup and it has opened the rooms for amendment, where as the constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 was not amended even a single article for the last many years. Writing the constitution through the CA was a great achievement of Nepal. During the constitution declaration period major political forces like Big-3 NC, CPNUML and UCPNM showed their highest degree of Unity. The new constitution was passed by more than two thirds majority in the CA. But the Conflict about the number of States (Pradesh) is hampering the stability of the present new constitution. The dissolved CA-2 has not been able to settle all the political conflicts. The on going Madhes agitation deepen into the another constitutional crisis. Tarai based parties like Samyukta LoktantrikMadhesi Morcha (SLMM), an alliance of four parties has joined the parliamentary process. Earlier SLMM has obstructed and paralyzed border area with an unseen support of southern neighbor. Daily general strike of SLMM and closure of industries at border points has led to soft state syndrome in Nepal.

The subject of this research is the struggle of political elites in Montenegro, which was a constituent federated state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the late 1990s. In 1997, as a result of split between the ruling in Montenegro Democratic Party of Socialists, the political life of the country faced a severe crisis. The opposition wing within Democratic Party of Socialists, headed by the young politician Milo Đukanović won the confrontation. The result of this conflict became a drastic change in the country's political orientation in its relations with Serbia and the federal center in Belgrade. The author examines the factors that caused crisis situation and proliferation in the republic. The article determines the key stages of political confrontation in the republic and their fundamental characteristics. The first stage marks the internal struggle of the elites, juxtaposition of reformist wing of the ruling party, which criticized the allied authorities in Belgrade, and its conservative parliamentary group that supported alliance with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its leader Slobodan Milošević. At the second stage, the confrontation extends beyond the republic and shifts onto the federal level, becoming an inter-republican conflict. The scientific novelty of this work consists in the original approach towards studying the topic at hand, using the new sources and literature.

The tutorial discusses the finances of organizations (enterprises), which are an independent part of financial system that supports the production of goods and services. It is in this part of financial system accounts for a significant part of national income of the country, carried out the distribution of income within organizations and partial redistribution through the budget system and the system of extra-budgetary funds. Meets the requirements of Federal state educational standards of higher education of the last generation. Structure of the study was developed based on the requirements to level of preparation of graduates in accordance with the competence model of higher education. For students enrolled in fields of study 38.03.01 "Economics" and 38.03.02 "Management". May be of interest to graduate students, teachers of economic universities, as well as for employees of financial services of commercial organizations.

Mississippi is the only state in the country to have a proposal for an exchange rejected by the federal government. This was a fascinating outcome considering how badly the Obama administration wanted Republican-led states to run their own exchanges. The debate in Mississippi was unique because an independently elected Republican insurance commissioner believed he could establish an exchange without his governor’s support. It seemed he would be able to—until the Tea Party joined the fight, with the support of national and state-level conservative think tanks. They made their presence felt at obscure meetings in highly technical parts of the process. Fellow-Republican Governor Phil Bryant then put his foot down and said no exchange would be created in Mississippi without his support. The Obama administration may have been tempted to approve the exchange anyway, but decided to stay out of the intrastate fight.

Chapter 6 discusses trends in mass electoral behavior in Mexico from the 1980s to 2012. Mexico’s authoritarian regime held elections for municipal, state, and federal races from 1930 onward without interruption and the PRI’s candidates won almost every one of these elections through the end of the 1980s. From 1988, with the upswing in competition, voters opted for other options and their choices were respected. Once the PRI lost the 2000 election, however, its support did not collapse because the PRI’s brand name continued to offer Mexican voters the assurance of a certain type of pragmatic governing style. This proved a strong impetus toward party unity. In the decade after the transition, the PRI continued to be Mexico’s only “national” party that is able to win elections in all regions of the country: it is usually in first or second place in voters’ preferences from Baja California to Yucatán.

This book contains the doctoral dissertation as a requirement to obtain the degree of Doctor of International Education from the Autonomous University of Tamaulipas, Mexico. The first part presents the research context and its strategy. Chapter I contains the historical background of the National Technological Institute of Mexico and its current characteristics which, grouped by the size of its enrollment. The heterogeneity of the origin of the National Technological Institute of Mexico and the extent of its presence and influence in all corners of the country is unavoidable, which allows us to understand its importance within the national educational system. Chapter II analyzes the concept of internationalization of higher education, its different historical aspects and those that have had preeminence in Mexico and Latin America, detailing the organizational base that they have raised and experienced, and from which reference has been taken. Of all of them, some policies and strategies developed in the largest universities in our country that are described there have been recovered.

This report on the broadcast media in Nigeria finds that liberalisation efforts in the broadcasting sector have only been partially achieved. More than a decade after military rule, the nation still has not managed to enact media legislation that is in line with continental standards, particularly the Declaration on Freedom of Expression in Africa. The report, part of an 11-country survey of broadcast media in Africa, strongly recommends the transformation of the two state broadcasters into a genuine public broadcaster as an independent legal entity with editorial independence and strong safeguards against any interference from the federal government, state governments and other interests.

It is widely believed that the news media have a strong influence on defining what are the most important problems facing the country during election campaigns. Yet, recent research has pointed to several factors that may limit the mass media’s agenda-setting power. Linking news media content to rolling cross-section survey data, the chapter examines the role of three such limiting factors in the context of the 2009 and the 2013 German federal elections: (1) rapid memory decay on the part of voters, (2) advertising by the political parties, and (3) the fragmentation of the media landscape. The results show that the mass media may serve as a powerful agenda setter, but also demonstrate that the media’s influence is strictly limited by voters’ cognitive capacities and the structure of the campaign information environment.

The People’s Republic of China is one of the biggest economies in the world and home to about a sixth of the world population. This large country has rapidly developed into one of the leading high-tech nations while large parts of it have remained rural. Many of the global challenges are especially visible on the Chinese landscape. Despite this considerable importance, China has been little represented as a research subject in economic and social sciences; evidence-based research on many questions regarding interaction with China is rare. Since 2017, the University of Hohenheim has been working on increasing and fostering China competence with funding by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. This book represents selected results. With contributions by Dr. Sigrun Abels, Dr. Tania Becker, Dr. Philipp Böing, Dr. Martin Braml, Dennis Hammerschmidt, Prof. Dr. Benjamin Jung, Dr. Johannes Klenk, Leonid Kovachich, Dr. Oliver Krebs, Cosima Meyer, Prof. Dr. Ylva Monschein, Dr. Ágota Révész, Franziska Waschek, David Weyrauch and Dr. Thomas Winzen.

AbstractThis chapter describes the variety and levels of local self-government bodies in Germany. It portrays that local authorities (municipalities, cities and counties) are responsible for performing both their own tasks and large parts of federal and Land laws (the communal administrations and especially their so-called double head function: local self-government and lowest level of state administration). The local authorities mainly differentiate themselves from federal and regional authorities by the mandates of their elected representative bodies (municipal council, city council and county council). The head of a local administration (mayor or county commissioner) is also usually directly elected by the citizens.

AbstractIn this chapter, we will try to retrace the development of inter- and multicultural approaches in Canada, including Quebec. As our analysis progresses, we will reveal the need to distinguish between these two geographical and political entities. First, we deal with the whole country, which will be approached by examining the emergence of the federal policy on multiculturalism. Then, the second part of the chapter is devoted to the history and evolution of schooling for indigenous children. The third part tackles the way multiculturalism has been incorporated into curricula and educational policies. Finally, the fourth part explores the specific features concerning multiculturalism in the Province of Quebec.

AbstractBudget speeches are an overview of public economic initiatives and can anticipate revenues, expenditures, policies, and activities. These speeches enable a government to discursively legitimize economic competence. While legitimation can be achieved by the representation and evaluation of economic initiatives, intertextuality should also be analyzed because the use of voices helps or hinders legitimation. The chapter explores how the Barisan Nasional (BN) government legitimized its economic competence through intertextual voicing. It outlines the source and engagement of voices and operationalizes a method that involves five sequential stages. The chapter analyzes an archive of Malaysian federal budget speeches from 2010 to 2018. The analysis discloses various instances of intertextual voicing because the speeches articulate voices in economics, politics, and religion. The choice of voices is shaped by the Malaysian context. Intertextual voicing legitimizes BN through moralization and authorization. The voices can be considered as voices of economic competence because economic, political, and religious voices discursively legitimize actions and decisions for the economy. Intertextual voicing serves ideological purposes because it perpetuates government economic agency. In budget speeches, BN promotes itself as indispensable to Malaysian development, and it should consequently continue to govern the country. These speeches then become part of the genres that validate BN.

AbstractThe chapter examines the difficult conditions under which states, and municipalities had to struggle to ensure learning continued during the social isolation demanded by the COVID-19 crisis in the country. Although it seemed reasonable to expect that the Federal government would respect the constitution and coordinate the educational response to the pandemic, that simply did not happen. The Minister of Education did not consider that such a responsibility should be carried out at the federal level. In the absence of leadership from the central government, the two organizations that congregate subnational secretaries decided to support their members and promote the exchange of practices, with some support from civil society organizations. Through the think tank established by the senior author of this chapter at a private university, CEIPE- Center for Excellence and Innovation in Education Policies, at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, she participated in this effort, mentoring state and municipal level secretaries in their efforts to provide distance learning through a combination of media, such as TV, radio, and digital platforms. The chapter includes her own anecdotal observations of this national effort, drawing on interviews with secretaries and their teams as well as documents related to the experience as the evidence basis of the chapter. Unfortunately, this is not a story of triumph, since Brazil has been one of the countries with more months of schools being completely or partially closed. In addition to the ineffective approach to fighting the disease, which made Brazil’s rate of infection and deaths much worse than many countries in Latin America, the fact that mayoral elections coincided with COVID-19, introduced political reasons for schools to remain closed. The final part of the chapter draws lessons learned and discusses future possibilities for the future of education in Brazil.

This chapter describes the ways that executive-centered partisanship has transformed the Republican Party since the 1960s. While Democrats may have been the first to throw the country “off-center,” Republicans and the conservative movements that have captured the party have had a particularly divisive effect on the political system. Beginning in 1968, with the election of Richard Nixon, the Republican Party came to embrace national administrative power and put it to work on behalf of impassioned causes that mobilized against the anti-war movement and federal civil rights enforcement. Conservatives are often portrayed as resisting federal power, but this chapter shows that the Republican Party and Republican presidents have deployed national administrative powers at least as ardently as liberals. This has further raised the stakes of party politics and weakened the party system’s ability to temper populist unrest.

Modern Russian culture is very different from Soviet culture, but they have many similarities, too. In essence, this is the same country, only without national margins and the former allied national republics. But within the country, multinationality remains since Russia is a federal state with many peoples of diverse cultures. Russian culture is the culture of a multinational country. Modern Russian culture has lost the features of ideological and party (communist) dependence, but retains the influence of the state, like any other culture of any country in the world. True, the influence of the state on the culture in each country goes to a greater or lesser extent. In Russia, this state influence on culture is very large up to the present day, and it has a pronounced dualistic character. On one hand, Russian culture is provided with financial assistance “from above”, and on the other hand, some kind of framework is created that cannot be crossed, almost as it was in Soviet times, when the state order in the cultural sphere dominated.

This chapter describes how Fannie Lou Hamer, Victoria Jackson Gray, and Annie Devine became the first Black women in American history to be seated on the floor of the United States House of Representatives. Some Freedom Party members, including Hamer, were now seriously considering making the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) a separate political party rather than continuing to work with the national Democratic Party. However, this drew widespread criticism from Black and white progressives across the country, and strong pushback from mainstream Democratic politicians as well as more moderate and conservative Freedom Party members. The chapter then considers how the Voting Rights Act gave the federal government, and activists, the legal tools to dismantle those old Jim Crow laws. The expansion of the Freedom Party then created more work for Hamer and she developed key relationships with white and Black leaders in the growing Feminist Movement. By the mid-1970s, often sick and unable to work, Hamer faded from public view. She later died on March 14, 1977, at the age of fifty-nine.

This concluding chapter discusses the theoretical and methodological implications of the civil rights case, with a focus on party theory and on the challenges of systematically studying major political transformations. The civil rights case underscores important features of party politics that are in tension with the assumption that parties are coherent entities reflecting stable coalitional bargains. Most important, American parties are federal in structure, with the result that politicians in different states and congressional districts answer to different core constituent groups. There is no guarantee that these constituencies will view one another as allies when it comes to the major policy challenges facing the country. Indeed, at times, politicians with one kind of electoral base and those with a very different base may view weakening the other party faction as essential to their own political future. The chapter then explores the civil rights realignment's implications for today's politics.

After the 2016 election, Americans formed thousands of anti-Trump grassroots resistance groups across the country. This chapter draws from in-depth interviews and other evidence to explore the electoral activities and impact of such groups in six pivotal Pennsylvania swing counties around Philadelphia and Lehigh Valley. Formed in suburban and rural areas without historically strong Democratic Parties, these resistance groups revitalized local Democratic Party organizations and elected like-minded candidates to political office. Their members registered new Democratic voters and recruited, trained, and deployed volunteers to canvass door-to-door during crucial campaign moments. These groups, predominantly led by women, also supported many women candidates at both the federal and state level. Despite their broad support of Democratic candidates, resistance groups retained varying degrees of independence from party organizations and navigated occasional friction with incumbent party leadership. Resistance efforts helped Pennsylvania Democrats in 2018 and improved their future prospects, though questions remain about the extent to which they will remain independent of the Democratic Party in 2020 and beyond.

This chapter examines Canadian perspectives on the Hague Principles. Canada is a federal state, with legislative competence over constitutionally designated fields divided between the federal and provincial level. Although private international law is not a listed field of competence, all three areas of private international law—jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement of foreign judgments—fall within the provincial competences over civil procedure or private law. The general provincial competence over choice of law means that each of the ten Canadian provinces could, theoretically, develop distinct regimes. In reality, however, the division is apparent only between Quebec and the other nine provinces. Indeed, Quebec is the only province within Canada to have a comprehensive codification of its private international law, which was adopted as part of the new Civil Code of Quebec in 1991. There is, therefore, a sharp contrast regarding the level of detail associated with the applicable regime in Quebec versus the rest of the country. Despite this, it remains accurate to say that, throughout Canada, the rules governing choice of law in contract, in particular party autonomy, are largely congruent with the Hague Principles.

Рассматриваются проекты транспортного развития северных прибрежных районов Тихоокеанской России. Предложены направления развития опорной транспортной системы и сопутствующей инфраструктуры в отдельных приморских муниципальных образованиях Дальневосточного федерального округа с учётом специфики его экономико-географического положения, удалённости от центральных регионов страны, а также природно-ресурсного потенциала и социально-демографических особенностей. The transport development projects of the northern coastal regions of Pacific Russia are considered. The development directions of the supporting transport system and associated infrastructure in certain coastal municipal districts of the Far Eastern Federal District are proposed, taking into account the specifics of its economic and geographical location, distance from the central regions of the country, as well as natural resource potential and socio-demographic features.

The FIFA 2018 World Cup is a significant event for Russian society. Ministries carry out various actions to promote football in the country. The Russian society of sociologists conducted a survey (4703 respondents) to understand the attitude to the Championship. Further, the teachers of the Ural Federal University conducted a survey of the attitude to football fans. Scientists have found that over the past 7 years, citizens have become more positive about fanaticism, but there is a problem of lack of objective information. To solve this problem, teachers at the Institute of physical culture of the Ural Federal University have developed a special course "Basics of working with the fans". The course is designed for students, postgraduates and teachers of physical education departments of universities, as well as stewards and volunteers. Since September 2017, 118 students have been trained in this course. The course consists of two parts: theoretical – describing the types of fans, information about the differences between fans from different countries; practical – reviewing the real situations of interaction with fans, communicating with Russian and foreign fans. Classes are conducted by a sports psychologist who studies football fans for 8 years.

The object of the study is the regions of Transbaikalia joined the Far Eastern Federal District, through which the main connecting infrastructure of the macroregion with the main territory of the country passes. The purpose of the paper is to show the position of Transbaikalia in the system of the emerging economic corridor China-Mongolia-Russia as a part of China's foreign policy initiative "One Belt - One Road" by analyzing the impact of foreign investment on its current economic situation. This corridor will facilitate the access of Chinese companies to the resources of Siberia and the Far East, enhancing the resource specialization of the area. At the same time, the geostrategic functions of the Trans-Baikal territory, given to it by the new Spatial Strategy of the Russian Federation, require strengthening its own economic potential through the development and diversification of the local economy and horizontal ties between the subjects of the macroregion.

In 2001, as directed by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued public health and environmental radiation protection standards for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Several parties sued the Agency on numerous aspects of the rule. A Federal Court upheld EPA on all counts except for the compliance period associated with the individual-protection standard, which the Agency had limited to 10,000 years for a number of technical and policy reasons. However, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) had recommended that the standard be set for the time of peak risk, within the limits imposed by the long-term stability of the geologic environment, which NAS estimated at 1 million years. EPA’s standards required that the Department of Energy (DOE) project doses to the time of peak dose but did not apply a compliance standard to these longer term projections. The Court ruled that EPA’s 10,000-year compliance period was inconsistent with the NAS recommendation. This aspect of the rule was vacated and remanded to the Agency for revision. In 2005, EPA proposed amendments to the standards. Following public hearings and a public review period, the final amendments were issued in September 2008. This paper discusses the new requirements.

The two national technical universities in Switzerland, viz. the Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology at Lausanne (EPFL) and at Zurich (ETHZ) have a rich and long tradition in nuclear education. Student research in nuclear engineering, particularly at the doctoral level, has usually been conducted in collaboration with the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) at Villigen, the national research centre where most of the country’s fission-related R&D is carried out. A significant part of this R&D is carried out in close collaboration with the Swiss Nuclear Utilities (swissnuclear). The four above, key national players in nuclear teaching and research in Switzerland — EPFL, ETHZ, PSI and swissnuclear — have recently pooled resources in implementing a new Master of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering (NE). The present paper describes the main features and experience acquired to date in the running of this, first-ever, common degree offered jointly by the two Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology. The program, although naturally addressing Switzerland’s needs, is clearly to be viewed in an international context, e.g. that of the Bologna Agreement. This is reflected in the composition of the first two batches, with about 70% of the students having obtained their Bachelor degrees from universities outside Switzerland. Starting September 2010, the curriculum of the EPFL-ETHZ NE Master will be upgraded, from its current 90 ECTS credit points (3 semesters) to a 120 ECTS (4 semesters) program. An overview is provided of the current 90-ECTS curriculum, as also a sketch of the changes foreseen in going to 120 ECTS.

The pandemic caused by Covid-19 has had a significant impact on all areas of people’s lives, including education. The aim of this study was to identify the impact of social and gender factors on the psychological state of students facing a situation of uncertainty, changing conditions of activity and communication caused by the quarantine regime. The article includes a theoretical review and the results of a study conducted during the period of social exclusion introduced in the country to contain the spread of Covid-19 in April 2020. The data collection took the form of an online survey in which students from the Ural Federal University and the Ural Technological College in Yekaterinburg participated. A total of 81 students (38 females and 43 males) took part in the study. The methods used were a sociodemographic questionnaire (Aurelio Olmedilla, 2020) and an adapted Russian-language version of the Profile of Psychological States (McNair, Lorr, Droppleman, 1971). Mathematical processing of the results was carried out with use of the Student’s t-criterion. The results of the study revealed a slight increase in negative states in most students, above all an increase in the state of tension. At the same time, the obtained results revealed statistically significant differences in the psychological states of students depending on the extent of their involvement in sport, gender and the number of people living together. Further research could focus on the role of personal determinants in influencing students’ psychological states.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Transit Authority (FTA) and Coast Guard instituted or recently proposed an increase in the average passenger weight used to calculate load and conduct safety analysis and tests in multiple modes of transportation. The increased passenger weight requirements were created in response to the Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) documented rise in weight among the country’s citizens and followed crash or failure incidents in which a cause was overweight equipment. The current certification requirements under CFR 49, Part 567 state that Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of a motor vehicle shall not be less than the sum of the unloaded vehicle weight, rated cargo weight and 150 pounds times the number of designated seating positions. Actual occupant weight distributions versus certified weight per occupant seat causes a potential conflict between a vehicle’s in-use weight versus its certified GVWR. This paper is distinct in its contrasting of the 150 pound occupant standard in relation to documented actual occupant weight, clothing, personal items and baggage. A midsized bus example was used to explore the statistical probability that adult passengers and rated cargo would result in weight distributions that exceeded tire load capability, Gross Axle Weight Rating (GAWR), or GVWR. The unreliability of the 150 pounds per designated seat position in producing loaded weight under gross weight ratings was demonstrated for a midsized bus. Results demonstrated that load conditions and usage restrictions are identifiable and decrease the probability of operating in a condition that exceeds a weight rating. Weight assumptions that take into consideration well documented transportation industries baggage weight were identified as potentially confounding additional weight that may contribute to overload of midsized buses.

The past and/or current approach to cycle count is a deviation from the current license basis (CLB)/design stress report, CENC-1150 Analytical Report, as applied in the fatigue evaluations for pressure and thermal cycles. These departures are relative to design projection versus actual operating experience in relation to “Cyclic Life” and the intent of ASME III, Section N-415 component suitability requirements for power operations of 40 years and subsequent life extension beyond to 60 years. In general, the practice of counting scram events does not accurately represent the “Cyclic Life” and is overly conservative, resulting in inaccurate projections of component reliability. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires licensees to keep an account of the number of transient occurrences to ensure that design assumptions used in the fatigue evaluation required by ASME Section III are not exceeded. In the mid 1970s, typical plant technical specifications required “the number of the transients which are comparable to or more severe than the transients evaluated in the stress report Code fatigue usage calculations will be recorded in a log book.” In the mid 1980s this transitioned into counting of transients, “this program provides controls to track the Final Safety Analysis Report, Section III-3.5, cyclic and transient occurrences to ensure that components are maintained within the design limits” (NUREG-1434, Section 5.5.5). In addition, the evaluation of Time-Limiting Age Analysis per Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 54, Section 54.21(c). Cycle counting is used to summarize lengthy, irregular load-versus-time histories by providing the number of times cycles of various amplitudes occur. The definition of a cycle varies with the method of cycle counting. In fatigue analysis, a cycle is the load variation from valley-to-peak-to-valley. Cycle counts can be made for time histories of force, stress, strain, torque, acceleration, deflection or other loading parameters of interest. In general, the operational transients plants experience do not approach the magnitude or severity of the bounding events used in these analysis. Thus counting every transient as equal to a design event is unnecessarily conservative. However, no clear specific guidance for Owners on how to perform cycle counting has been promulgated. This paper provides guidance for formulating a fatigue management program that takes advantage of the original analytical design stress reports.

Abstract As part of the project funded under the Carbon Utilization and Storage Partnership (CUSP) of the Western United States, this paper demonstrates a workflow including site characterization and numerical simulation efforts of proposing a Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) plan to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for approval according to 40 CFR 98.440 (c)(1), Subpart RR of the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) to qualify for the tax credit in section 45Q of the federal Internal Revenue Services (IRS) Code. In this project, the injectors and treated acid gas (TAG) plant are located at the northern margin of the Delaware Basin, a highly productive hydrocarbon basin in southeastern New Mexico. The target injection zones are the Permian-aged Cherry Canyon Formation for the acid gas injection (AGI) #1 well and Siluro-Devonian formations for the AGI #2 well, storage zones above and beneath active hydrocarbon pay zones respectively. The storage zones and caprocks are characterized through well log examinations, formation fluid chemistry evaluation, faults identification and interpretation. Reservoir models were constructed and simulation performed to predict the extent of the TAG plume after 30 years of injection with 5 years of post-injection site care monitoring. The reservoir mapping and cross sections interpreted from well logs indicate that the area around AGI #1 does not contain visible faulting or offsets that might influence fluid migration, suggesting that injected fluid would spread radially from the point of injection with a small elliptical component to the south. In the Siluro-Devonian formation, where AGI #2 is planned to be completed. The induced-seismicity risk assessment shows that the operation of the proposed injection combined with the historic volume contributions of the regional saltwater disposal (SWD) wells is not anticipated to contribute significantly to injection-induced fault slip. This result demonstrates that acid gas can be injected as proposed while maintaining the minimal risk of induced seismicity. The water sample collected from a nearby well indicates that the formation waters are highly saline (180,000 ppm NaCl) and compatible with the proposed injection. The reservoir simulation results indicate that the TAG plume is predicted to extend a maximum of 1.2 km from the injector wellbore when the identified faults are treated as non-transmissive and 0.90 km when they are treated as transmissive. The pressure profiles demonstrate the strong potential for safe injection into both target formations. In December 2021, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved the Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) plan, permitting Lucid Energy to sequester acid gas from its Red Hills gas processing complex in Lea County, New Mexico. This paper provides the industry with a critical roadmap for converting existing injectors into CO2 or TAG sequestration wells that may qualify for 45Q tax certification to comply with the current administrative regulations. As part of the project funded by Carbon Utilization and Storage Partnership (CUSP) of the Western United States, published data from this project is invaluable.

Abstract The production of oil and gas in the offshore waters of the United States continues to be a major part of US energy extraction activities amounting to just less than a third of total US oil and gas production. However, this industry has been marked by occasional safety and environmental disasters including most famously the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill that resulted in the deaths of 11 workers and the release of more than 130 million gallons of oil in to the Gulf of Mexico. In response, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) was created in 2011 to separate enforcement activities from federal lease management activities and reduce the possibility for conflicts of interests and regulatory capture. This paper presents an analysis of the safety and environmental performance of the US offshore oil and gas industry in the years before and after the creation of the BSEE to quantify the changes in the industry record and the level of risk that remains. Recorded events including fires and explosions, spills, and gas releases, collisions, and injuries and fatalities are included in the analysis. The overall level of exposure is estimated based on rig counts and oil and gas production quantities since detailed employment records by facility are not available. Data is sourced from the BSEE, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the Energy Information Agency (EIA). In addition to linear regression analysis of trends, this paper presents the results of a random forest-based machine learning investigation of the characteristics of safety and environmental incidents to evaluate the most significant contributors that remain, especially those amenable to control through engineering system design. Facility type, water depth, distance to shore, and time of day or year in the relevant incident reports were included in the input dataset for the random forest model. Results indicate that the overall oil and gas industry has become safer in recent years, though significant risks remain. It is yet unclear whether the BSEE approach bears any responsibility for this change as the data are not yet sufficient to declare the post-2011 period as statistically significantly improved from prior years, though additional data in line with 2016–2017 level of performance would satisfy this condition. The random forest model indicates that increased risk is associated with time of day, quarter of the year, water depth, and distance to shore. Data quality concerns remain present as minor incidents and injuries may be under-reported. BSEE enforcement does not appear to be a direct cause of the noted improvements.

Germany is a parliamentary democracy (The Federal Government, 2021) with two politically independent levels of 1) Federal (Bund) and 2) State (Länder or Bundesländer), and has a highly differentiated decentralized system of Government and administration (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2021). The 16 states in Germany have their own government and legislations which means the federal authority has the responsibility of formulating policy, and the states are responsible for implementation (Franzke, 2020). The Federal Government supports the states in dealing with extraordinary danger and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) supports the states' operations with technology, expertise and other services (Federal Ministry of Interior, Building and Community, 2020). Due to the decentralized system of government, the Federal Government does not have the power to impose pandemic emergency measures. In the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to slowdown the spread of coronavirus, on 16 March 2020 the federal and state governments attempted to harmonize joint guidelines, however one month later State governments started to act more independently (Franzke & Kuhlmann, 2021). In Germany, health insurance is compulsory and more than 11% of Germany’s GDP goes into healthcare spending (Federal Statistical Office, 2021). Health related policy at the federal level is the primary responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Health. This ministry supervises institutions dealing with higher level of public health including the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM), the Paul-Ehrlich-Institute (PEI), the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) and the Federal Centre for Health Education (Federal Ministry of Health, 2020). The first German National Pandemic Plan (NPP), published in 2005, comprises two parts. Part one, updated in 2017, provides a framework for the pandemic plans of the states and the implementation plans of the municipalities, and part two, updated in 2016, is the scientific part of the National Pandemic Plan (Robert Koch Institut, 2017). The joint Federal-State working group on pandemic planning was established in 2005. A pandemic plan for German citizens abroad was published by the German Foreign Office on its website in 2005 (Robert Koch Institut, 2017). In 2007, the federal and state Governments, under the joint leadership of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Health, simulated influenza pandemic exercise called LÜKEX 07, and trained cross-states and cross-department crisis management (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, 2007b). In 2017, within the context of the G20, Germany ran a health emergency simulation exercise with representatives from WHO and the World Bank to prepare for future pandemic events (Federal Ministry of Health et al., 2017). By the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, on 27 February 2020, a joint crisis team of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) was established (Die Bundesregierung, 2020a). On 4 March 2020 RKI published a Supplement to the National Pandemic Plan for COVID-19 (Robert Koch Institut, 2020d), and on 28 March 2020, a law for the protection of the population in an epidemic situation of national scope (Infektionsschutzgesetz) came into force (Bundesgesundheitsministerium, 2020b). In the first early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Germany managed to slow down the speed of the outbreak but was less successful in dealing with the second phase. Coronavirus-related information and measures were communicated through various platforms including TV, radio, press conferences, federal and state government official homepages, social media and applications. In mid-March 2020, the federal and state governments implemented extensive measures nationwide for pandemic containment. Step by step, social distancing and shutdowns were enforced by all Federal States, involving closing schools, day-cares and kindergartens, pubs, restaurants, shops, prayer services, borders, and imposing a curfew. To support those affected financially by the pandemic, the German Government provided large economic packages (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2020). These measures have adopted to the COVID-19 situation and changed over the pandemic. On 22 April 2020, the clinical trial of the corona vaccine was approved by Paul Ehrlich Institute, and in late December 2020, the distribution of vaccination in Germany and all other EU countries

Albury-Wodonga, situated in Wiradjuri country, sits astride the Murray River and has benefitted in many ways from its almost equidistance from Sydney and Melbourne. It has found strength in the earlier push for decentralisation begun in early 1970s. A number of State and Federal agencies have ensured middle class professionals now call this region home. Light industry is a feature of Wodonga while Albury maintains the traditions and culture of its former life as part of the agricultural squattocracy. Both Local Councils are keen to work cooperatively to ensure the region is an attractive place to live signing an historical partnership agreement. The region’s road, rail, increasing air links and now digital infrastructure, keep it closely connected to events elsewhere. At the same time its distance from the metropolitan centres has meant it has had to ensure that its creative and cultural life has been taken into its own hands. The establishment of the sophisticated Murray Art Museum Albury (MAMA) as well as the presence of the LibraryMuseum, Hothouse Theatre, Fruit Fly Circus, The Cube, Arts Space and the development of Gateway Island on the Murray River as a cultural hub, as well as the high profile activities of its energetic, entrepreneurial and internationally savvy locals running many small businesses, events and festivals, ensures Albury Wodonga has a creative heart to add to its rural and regional activities.

The COVID-19 pandemic affected everyone in the United States, and essential workers across industries like health care, agriculture, retail, transportation and food supply were key to our survival. Immigrants, overrepresented in essential industries but largely invisible in the public eye, were critical to our ability to weather the pandemic and recover from it. But who are they? How did they do the riskiest of jobs in the riskiest of times? And how were both U.S.-born and foreign-born residents affected? This report explores the crucial contributions of immigrant essential workers, their impact on the lives of those around them, and how they were affected by the pandemic, public sentiment and policies. It further explores the contradiction of immigrants being essential to all of our well-being yet denied benefits, protections and rights given to most others. The pandemic revealed the significant value of immigrant essential workers to the health of all Americans. This report places renewed emphasis on their importance to national well-being. The report first provides a demographic picture of foreign-born workers in key industries during the pandemic using U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey (ACS) data. Part I then gives a detailed narrative of immigrants’ experiences and contributions to the country’s perseverance during the pandemic based on interviews with immigrant essential workers in California, Minnesota and Texas, as well as with policy experts and community organizers from across the country. Interviewees include: ■ A food packing worker from Mexico who saw posters thanking doctors and grocery workers but not those like her working in the fields. ■ A retail worker from Argentina who refused the vaccine due to mistrust of the government. ■ A worker in a check cashing store from Eritrea who felt a “responsibility to be able to take care of people” lining up to pay their bills. Part II examines how federal and state policies, as well as increased public recognition of the value of essential workers, failed to address the needs and concerns of immigrants and their families. Both foreign-born and U.S.-born people felt the consequences. Policies kept foreign-trained health care workers out of hospitals when intensive care units were full. They created food and household supply shortages resulting in empty grocery shelves. They denied workplace protections to those doing the riskiest jobs during a crisis. While legislation and programs made some COVID-19 relief money available, much of it failed to reach the immigrant essential workers most in need. Part II also offers several examples of local and state initiatives that stepped in to remedy this. By looking more deeply at the crucial role of immigrant essential workers and the policies that affect them, this report offers insight into how the nation can better respond to the next public health crisis.

Poliomyelitis (polio) remains a vital global public health challenge, particularly in countries where eradication efforts are ongoing. For almost three decades, polio programme and frontline workers in Pakistan have suffered human and financial losses due to complex political and bureaucratic management, local resistance to programme efforts, and the context of cross-border insurgency and insecurity.1 Many stakeholders in Pakistan continue to have low confidence in frontline workers and polio vaccination campaigns. In this environment, it is essential that vaccination programmes localise – by taking careful account of the local context, improving local ownership of the programmes, understanding and mitigating the issues at a grassroots level, and tailoring efforts to achieve polio eradication goals. This brief draws on evidence from academic and grey literature, data on polio vaccine uptake, consultations with partners working on polio eradication in Pakistan, and the authors’ own programme implementation experience in the country. The brief reviews the social, cultural, and contextual considerations relevant to increasing polio vaccine uptake amongst vulnerable groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas. It focuses on the current country context, in the aftermath of the 2018 merger of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK). This brief is part of a series authored by participants from the SSHAP Fellowship, and was written by Luqman Hakeem and Riaz Hussain from Cohort 2. Contributions were provided by response partners in Pakistan including health communication and delivery staff and local administrative authorities. This brief was reviewed by Muhammad Sufyan (University of Swabi) and Ilyas Sharif (Quaid-e-Azam College of Commerce, University of Peshawar). The brief was supported by Megan Schmidt-Sane and Santiago Ripoll at the Institute of Development Studies and is the responsibility of SSHAP.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary In September, headline inflation (11.4% annually) and the average of core inflation indicators (8.6% annually) continued on a rising trend, and higher increases than expected were recorded. Forecasts increased again, and inflation expectations remained above 3%. Inflationary surprises in the third quarter were significant and widespread, and they are the result of several shocks. On the one hand, international cost and price shocks, which have mainly affected goods and foods, continue to exert upwards pressure on national inflation. In addition to these external supply shocks, domestic supply shocks have also affected foods. On the other hand, the strong recovery of aggregate demand, especially for private consumption and for machinery and equipment, as well as a higher accumulated depreciation of the Colombian peso and its pass-through to domestic prices also explain the rise in inflation. Indexation also contributes, both through the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and through the Producer Price Index (PPI), which continues to have a significant impact on electricity prices and, to a lesser degree, on other public utilities and rent. In comparison with July’s report, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items) is higher in the forecast horizon, mainly due to exchange rate pressures, higher excess demand, and indexation at higher inflation rates, but it maintains a trend of convergence towards the target. In the case of food, a good domestic supply of perishable foods and some moderation in international processed food prices are still expected. However, the technical staff estimates higher pressures on this group’s prices from labor costs, raw material prices, and exchange rates. In terms of the CPI for regulated items, the new forecast supposes reductions in electricity prices at the end of the year, but the effects of indexation at higher inflation rates and the expected rises in fuel prices would continue to push this CPI group. Therefore, the new projection suggests that, in December, inflation would reach 11.3% and would decrease throughout 2023 and 2024, closing the year at 7.1% and 3.5%, respectively. These forecasts have a high level of uncertainty, due especially to the future behavior of international financial conditions, external price and cost shocks, the persistence of depreciation of the Colombian peso, the pace of adjustment of domestic demand, the indexation degree of nominal contracts, and the decisions that would be made regarding domestic fuel and electricity prices. Economic activity continues to surprise on the upside, and the projection of growth for 2022 rose from 6.9% to 7.9% but lowered for 2023 from 1.1% to 0.5%. Thus, excess demand is higher than estimated in the previous report, and it would diminish in 2023. Economic growth in the second quarterwas higher than estimated in July due to stronger domestic demand, mainly because of private consumption. Economic activity indicators for the third quarter suggest that the GDP would stay at a high level, above its potential, with an annual change of 6.4%, and 0.6% higher than observed in the second quarter. Nevertheless, these numbers reflect deceleration in its quarterly and annual growth. Domestic demand would show similar behavior, with a high value, higher than that of output. This can be explained partly by the strong behavior of private consumption and investment in machinery and equipment. In the third quarter, investment in construction would have continued with mediocre performance, which would still place it at levels lower than those observed before the pandemic. The trade deficit would have widened due to high imports with a stronger trend than that for exports. It is expected that, in the forecast horizon, consumption would decrease from its current high levels, partly as a consequence of tighter domestic financial conditions, lower repressed demand, higher exchange rate pressures on imported goods prices, and the deterioration of actual income due to the rise in inflation. Investment would continue to lag behind, without reaching the levels observed before the pandemic, in a context of high financing costs and high uncertainty. A lower projected behavior in domestic demand and the high levels of prices for oil and other basic goods that the country exports would be reflected in a reduction in the trade deficit. Due to all of this, economic growth for all of 2022, 2023, and 2024 would be 7.9%, 0.5%, and 1.3%, respectively. Expected excess demand (measured via the output gap) is estimated to be higher than contemplated in the previous report; it would diminish in 2023 and could turn negative in 2024. These estimates remain subject to a high degree of uncertainty related to global political tension, a rise in international interest rates, and the effects of this rise on demand and financial conditions abroad. In the domestic context, the evolution of fiscal policy as well as future measures regarding economic policy and their possible effects on macroeconomic imbalances in the country, among others, are factors that generate uncertainty and affect risk premia, the exchange rate, investment, and the country’s economic activity. Interest rates at several of the world’s main central banks continue to rise, some at a pace higher than expected by the market. This is in response to the high levels of inflation and their inflation expectations, which continue to exceed the targets. Thus, global growth projections are still being moderated, risk premia have risen, and the dollar continues to gain strength against other main currencies. International pressures on global inflation have heightened. In the United States, core inflation has not receded, pressured by the behavior of the CPI for services and a tight labor market. Consequently, the U.S. Federal Reserve continued to increase the policy interest rate at a strong pace. This rate is expected to now reach higher levels than projected in the previous quarter. Other developed and emerging economies have also increased their policy interest rates. Thus, international financial conditions have tightened significantly, which reflects in a widespread strengthening of the dollar, increases in worldwide risk premia, and the devaluation of risky assets. Recently, these effects have been stronger in Colombia than in the majority of its peers in the region. Considering all of the aforementioned, the technical staff of the bank increased its assumption regarding the U.S. Federal Reserve’s interest rate, reduced the country’s external demand growth forecast, and raised the projected trajectory for the risk premium. The latter remains elevated at higher levels than its historical average, within a context of high local uncertainty and of extensive financing needs from the foreign sector and the public sector. All of this results in higher inflationary pressures associated to the depreciation of the Colombian peso. The uncertainty regarding external forecasts and its impact on the country remain elevated, given the unforeseeable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, of geopolitical tensions, and of the tightening of external financial conditions, among others. A macroeconomic context of high inflation, inflation expectations and forecasts above 3%, and a positive output gap suggests the need for contractionary monetary policy, compatible with the macroeconomic adjustment necessary to eliminate excess demand, mitigate the risk of unanchoring in inflation expectations, and guarantee convergence of inflation at the target. In comparison with the July report forecasts, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed output level that surpasses the economy’s productive capacity. Headline and core inflation have registered surprising rises, associated with the effects of domestic and external price shocks that were more persistent than anticipated, with excess demand and indexation processes in some CPI groups. The country’s risk premium and the observed and expected international interest rates increased. As a consequence of this, inflationary pressures from the exchange rate rose, and in this report, the probability of the neutral real interest rate being higher than estimated increased. In general, inflation expectations for all terms and the bank’s technical staff inflation forecast for 2023 increased again and continue to stray from 3%. All of the aforementioned elevated the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could heighten widespread indexation processes that push inflation away from the target for a longer time. In this context, it is necessary to consolidate a contractionary monetary policy that tends towards convergence of inflation at the target in the forecast horizon and towards the reduction of excess demand in order to guarantee a sustainable output level trajectory. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its September and October of 2022 meetings, Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR) decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. In September, the BDBR decided by a majority vote to raise the monetary policy interest rate by 100 basis points (bps), and in its October meeting, unanimously, by 100bps. Therefore, the rate is at 11.0%. Boxes 1 Food inflation: a comparison with other countries

In the second quarter, annual inflation (9.67%), the technical staff’s projections and its expectations continued to increase, remaining above the target. International cost shocks, accentuated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more persistent than projected, thus contributing to higher inflation. The effects of indexation, higher than estimated excess demand, a tighter labor market, inflation expectations that continue to rise and currently exceed 3%, and the exchange rate pressures add to those described above. High core inflation measures as well as in the producer price index (PPI) across all baskets confirm a significant spread in price increases. Compared to estimates presented in April, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation increased. This was partly the result of greater exchange rate pressure on prices, and a larger output gap, which is expected to remain positive for the remainder of 2022 and which is estimated to close towards yearend 2023. In addition, these trends take into account higher inflation rate indexation, more persistent above-target inflation expectations, a quickening of domestic fuel price increases due to the correction of lags versus the parity price and higher international oil price forecasts. The forecast supposes a good domestic supply of perishable foods, although it also considers that international prices of processed foods will remain high. In terms of the goods sub-basket, the end of the national health emergency implies a reversal of the value-added tax (VAT) refund applied to health and personal hygiene products, resulting in increases in the prices of these goods. Alternatively, the monetary policy adjustment process and the moderation of external shocks would help inflation and its expectations to begin to decrease over time and resume their alignment with the target. Thus, the new projection suggests that inflation could remain high for the second half of 2022, closing at 9.7%. However, it would begin to fall during 2023, closing the year at 5.7%. These forecasts are subject to significant uncertainty, especially regarding the future behavior of external cost shocks, the degree of indexation of nominal contracts and decisions made regarding the domestic price of fuels. Economic activity continues to outperform expectations, and the technical staff’s growth projections for 2022 have been revised upwards from 5% to 6.9%. The new forecasts suggest higher output levels that would continue to exceed the economy’s productive capacity for the remainder of 2022. Economic growth during the first quarter was above that estimated in April, while economic activity indicators for the second quarter suggest that the GDP could be expected to remain high, potentially above that of the first quarter. Domestic demand is expected to maintain a positive dynamic, in particular, due to the household consumption quarterly growth, as suggested by vehicle registrations, retail sales, credit card purchases and consumer loan disbursement figures. A slowdown in the machinery and equipment imports from the levels observed in March contrasts with the positive performance of sales and housing construction licenses, which indicates an investment level similar to that registered for the first three months of the year. International trade data suggests the trade deficit would be reduced as a consequence of import levels that would be lesser than those observed in the first quarter, and stable export levels. For the remainder of the year and 2023, a deceleration in consumption is expected from the high levels seen during the first half of the year, partially as a result of lower repressed demand, tighter domestic financial conditions and household available income deterioration due to increased inflation. Investment is expected to continue its slow recovery while remaining below pre-pandemic levels. The trade deficit is expected to tighten due to projected lower domestic demand dynamics, and high prices of oil and other basic goods exported by the country. Given the above, economic growth in the second quarter of 2022 would be 11.5%, and for 2022 and 2023 an annual growth of 6.9% and 1.1% is expected, respectively. Currently, and for the remainder of 2022, the output gap would be positive and greater than that estimated in April, and prices would be affected by demand pressures. These projections continue to be affected by significant uncertainty associated with global political tensions, the expected adjustment of monetary policy in developed countries, external demand behavior, changes in country risk outlook, and the future developments in domestic fiscal policy, among others. The high inflation levels and respective expectations, which exceed the target of the world's main central banks, largely explain the observed and anticipated increase in their monetary policy interest rates. This environment has tempered the growth forecast for external demand. Disruptions in value chains, rising international food and energy prices, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have contributed to the rise in inflation and above-target expectations seen by several of Colombia’s main trading partners. These cost and price shocks, heightened by the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more prevalent than expected and have taken place within a set of output and employment recovery, variables that in some countries currently equal or exceed their projected long-term levels. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve accelerated the pace of the benchmark interest rate increase and rapidly reduced liquidity levels in the money market. Financial market actors expect this behavior to continue and, consequently, significantly increase their expectations of the average path of the Fed's benchmark interest rate. In this setting, the U.S. dollar appreciated versus the peso in the second quarter and emerging market risk measures increased, a behavior that intensified for Colombia. Given the aforementioned, for the remainder of 2022 and 2023, the Bank's technical staff increased the forecast trajectory for the Fed's interest rate and reduced the country's external demand growth forecast. The projected oil price was revised upward over the forecast horizon, specifically due to greater supply restrictions and the interruption of hydrocarbon trade between the European Union and Russia. Global geopolitical tensions, a tightening of monetary policy in developed economies, the increase in risk perception for emerging markets and the macroeconomic imbalances in the country explain the increase in the projected trajectory of the risk premium, its trend level and the neutral real interest rate1. Uncertainty about external forecasts and their consequent impact on the country's macroeconomic scenario remains high, given the unpredictable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, the degree of the global economic slowdown and the effect the response to recent outbreaks of the pandemic in some Asian countries may have on the world economy. This macroeconomic scenario that includes high inflation, inflation forecasts, and expectations above 3% and a positive output gap suggests the need for a contractionary monetary policy that mitigates the risk of the persistent unanchoring of inflation expectations. In contrast to the forecasts of the April report, the increase in the risk premium trend implies a higher neutral real interest rate and a greater prevailing monetary stimulus than previously estimated. For its part, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed and expected output level that exceeds the economy’s productive capacity. The surprising accelerations in the headline and core inflation reflect stronger and more persistent external shocks, which, in combination with the strength of aggregate demand, indexation, higher inflation expectations and exchange rate pressures, explain the upward projected inflation trajectory at levels that exceed the target over the next two years. This is corroborated by the inflation expectations of economic analysts and those derived from the public debt market, which continued to climb and currently exceed 3%. All of the above increase the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could generate widespread indexation processes that may push inflation away from the target for longer. This new macroeconomic scenario suggests that the interest rate adjustment should continue towards a contractionary monetary policy landscape. 1.2. Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR), at its meetings in June and July 2022, decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. At its June meeting, the BDBR decided to increase the monetary policy rate by 150 basis points (b.p.) and its July meeting by majority vote, on a 150 b.p. increase thereof at its July meeting. Consequently, the monetary policy interest rate currently stands at 9.0% . 1 The neutral real interest rate refers to the real interest rate level that is neither stimulative nor contractionary for aggregate demand and, therefore, does not generate pressures that lead to the close of the output gap. In a small, open economy like Colombia, this rate depends on the external neutral real interest rate, medium-term components of the country risk premium, and expected depreciation. Box 1: A Weekly Indicator of Economic Activity for Colombia Juan Pablo Cote Carlos Daniel Rojas Nicol Rodriguez Box 2: Common Inflationary Trends in Colombia Carlos D. Rojas-Martínez Nicolás Martínez-Cortés Franky Juliano Galeano-Ramírez Box 3: Shock Decomposition of 2021 Forecast Errors Nicolás Moreno Arias