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Статті в журналах з теми "Computational Social Choice Theory"
Nipkow, Tobias. "Social Choice Theory in HOL." Journal of Automated Reasoning 43, no. 3 (August 1, 2009): 289–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10817-009-9147-4.
Повний текст джерелаENDRISS, ULLE. "The 1st international workshop on computational social choice." Knowledge Engineering Review 23, no. 2 (June 2008): 213–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0269888908001343.
Повний текст джерелаChatterjee, Siddharth, and Arunava Sen. "Automated Reasoning in Social Choice Theory: Some Remarks." Mathematics in Computer Science 8, no. 1 (March 2014): 5–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11786-014-0177-x.
Повний текст джерелаSerrano, Roberto. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules." SIAM Review 46, no. 3 (January 2004): 377–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/s0036144503435945.
Повний текст джерелаMikhailov, I. F. "Computational approach to social knowledge." Philosophy of Science and Technology 26, no. 2 (2021): 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-1-23-37.
Повний текст джерелаManzo, Gianluca. "Is rational choice theory still a rational choice of theory? A response to Opp." Social Science Information 52, no. 3 (August 5, 2013): 361–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018413488477.
Повний текст джерелаChevaleyre, Yann, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, and Nicolas Maudet. "Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to Social Choice." AI Magazine 29, no. 4 (December 28, 2008): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v29i4.2201.
Повний текст джерелаTanaka, Yasuhito. "A topological proof of Eliaz’s unified theorem of social choice theory." Applied Mathematics and Computation 176, no. 1 (May 2006): 83–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2005.09.055.
Повний текст джерелаNeath, Andrew A., Joseph E. Cavanaugh, and Adam G. Weyhaupt. "Model evaluation, discrepancy function estimation, and social choice theory." Computational Statistics 30, no. 1 (September 27, 2014): 231–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00180-014-0532-z.
Повний текст джерелаNURMI, HANNU, and JANUSZ KACPRZYK. "POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: PERSPECTIVE FROM FUZZY SYSTEMS THEORY." New Mathematics and Natural Computation 03, no. 02 (July 2007): 153–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793005707000690.
Повний текст джерелаДисертації з теми "Computational Social Choice Theory"
Brill, Markus [Verfasser], Felix [Akademischer Betreuer] Brandt, and Jérôme [Akademischer Betreuer] Lang. "Set-Valued Solution Concepts in Social Choice and Game Theory : Axiomatic and Computational Aspects / Markus Brill. Gutachter: Felix Brandt ; Jérôme Lang. Betreuer: Felix Brandt." München : Universitätsbibliothek der TU München, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1031512683/34.
Повний текст джерелаLoreggia, Andrea. "Iterative Voting, Control and Sentiment Analysis." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3424803.
Повний текст джерелаNei sistemi multi agente spesso nasce la necessità di prendere decisioni collettive basate sulle preferenze dei singoli individui. A tal fine può essere utilizzata una regola di voto che, aggregando le preferenze dei singoli agenti, trovi una soluzione che rappresenti la collettività. In questi scenari la possibilità di agire in modo strategico può essere vista da due diversi e opposti punti di vista. Da una parte può essere desiderabile che gli agenti non abbiano alcun incentivo ad agire strategicamente, ovvero che gli agenti non abbiano incentivi a riportare in modo scorretto le proprie preferenze per influenzare il risultato dell'elezione a proprio favore, oppure che non agiscano sulla struttura del sistema elettorale stesso per cambiarne il risultato finale. D'altra parte l'azione strategica può essere utilizzata per migliorare la qualità del risultato o per incrementare il consenso del vincitore. Questi due diversi scenari sono studiati ed analizzati nella tesi. Il primo modellando e descrivendo una forma naturale di controllo chiamato "replacement control" descrivendo la complessità computazione di tale azione strategica per diverse regole di voto. Il secondo scenario è studiato nella forma dei sistemi di voto iterativi nei quali i singoli individui hanno la possibilità di cambiare le proprie preferenze al fine di influenzare il risultato dell'elezione. Le tecniche di Computational Social Choice inoltre possono essere usate in diverse situazioni. Il lavoro di tesi riporta un primo tentativo di introdurre l'uso di sistemi elettorali nel campo dell'analisi del sentimento. In questo contesto i ricercatori estraggono le opinioni della comunità riguardanti un particolare elemento di interesse. L'opinione collettiva è estratta aggregando le opinioni espresse dai singoli individui che discutono o parlano dell'elemento di interesse attraverso testi pubblicati in blog o social network. Il lavoro di tesi studia una nuova procedura di aggregazione proponendo una nuova variante di una regola di voto ben conosciuta qual è Borda. Tale nuova procedura di aggregazione migliora le performance dell'analisi del sentimento classica.
Dennig, Francis. "On the welfare economics of climate change." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:aefca5e4-147e-428b-b7a1-176b7daa0f85.
Повний текст джерелаWilczynski, Anaëlle. "Interaction entre agents modélisée par un réseau social dans des problématiques de choix social computationnel Strategic Voting in a Social Context: Considerate Equilibria Object Allocation via Swaps along a Social Network Local Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems Constrained Swap Dynamics over a Social Network in Distributed Resource Reallocation Poll-Confident Voters in Iterative Voting." Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PSLED073.
Повний текст джерелаSocial choice is the study of collective decision making, where a set of agents must make a decision over a set of alternatives, according to their preferences. The question relies on how aggregating the preferences of the agents in order to end up with a decision that is commonly acceptable for the group. Typically, agents can interact by collaborating, or exchanging some information. It is usually assumed in computational social choice that every agent is able to interact with any other agent. However, this assumption looks unrealistic in many concrete situations. We propose to relax this assumption by considering that the possibility of interaction is given by a social network, represented by a graph over the agents.In this context, we study two particular problems of computational social choice: strategic voting and resource allocation of indivisible goods. The focus is on two types of interaction: collaboration and information gathering. We explore how the social network,modelingapossibilityofcollaboration or a visibility relation among the agents, can impact the resolution and the solution of voting and resource allocation problems. These questions are addressed via computational social choice by using tools from algorithmic game theory and computational complexity
Liu, Xudong. "MODELING, LEARNING AND REASONING ABOUT PREFERENCE TREES OVER COMBINATORIAL DOMAINS." UKnowledge, 2016. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cs_etds/43.
Повний текст джерелаRiquelme, Csori Fabián. "Structural and computational aspects of simple and influence games." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/283144.
Повний текст джерелаLos juegos simples son una clase fundamental de juegos cooperativos, que tiene una enorme relevancia en diversas áreas de ciencias de la computación, ciencias sociales y matemáticas discretas aplicadas. En los últimos años, los distintos aspectos algorítmicos y de complejidad computacional de los juegos simples ha ido ganando notoriedad. En esta tesis revisamos los distintos problemas computacionales relacionados con propiedades, parámetros y conceptos de solución de juegos simples. Primero consideramos distintas formas de representación de juegos simples, juegos regulares y juegos de mayoría ponderada, y estudiamos la complejidad computacional requerida para transformar un juego desde una representación a otra. También analizamos la complejidad de varios problemas abiertos bajo diferentes formas de representación. En este sentido, demostramos que el problema de decidir si un juego simple en forma ganadora minimal es decisivo (un problema asociado al problema de dualidad de hipergrafos y funciones booleanas monótonas) puede resolverse en tiempo cuasi-polinomial, y que este problema puede reducirse polinomialmente al mismo problema pero restringido a juegos regulares en forma ganadora shift-minimal. También demostramos que el problema de decidir si un juego regular en forma ganadora shift-minimal es fuerte (strong) es coNP-completo. Adicionalmente, para juegos simples en forma ganadora minimal demostramos que el parámetro de anchura (width) puede computarse en tiempo polinomial. Independientemente de la forma de representación, también estudiamos problemas de enumeración y conteo para varias subfamilias de juegos simples. Luego introducimos los juegos de influencia, un nuevo enfoque para estudiar juegos simples basado en un modelo de dispersión de influencia en redes sociales, donde la influencia se dispersa de acuerdo con el modelo de umbral lineal (linear threshold model). Demostramos que los juegos de influencia abarcan la totalidad de la clase de los juegos simples. Para estos juegos también estudiamos la complejidad de los problemas relacionados con parámetros, propiedades y conceptos de solución considerados para los juegos simples. Además consideramos casos extremos con respecto a la demanda de influencia, y probamos que para ciertas subfamilias, varios de estos problemas se vuelven polinomiales. Finalmente estudiamos algunas aplicaciones inspiradas en los juegos de influencia. El primer conjunto de estos resultados tiene que ver con la definición de modelos de decisión colectiva. Para sistemas de mediación, varios de los problemas de propiedades mencionados anteriormente son polinomialmente resolubles. Para los sistemas de influencia, demostramos que computar la satisfacción (una medida equivalente al índice de Rae y similar al valor de Banzhaf) es difícil a menos que consideremos algunas restricciones en el modelo. Para los sistemas OLFM, una generalización de los sistemas OLF (van den Brink et al. 2011, 2012) proporcionamos una axiomatización para la medida de satisfacción. El segundo conjunto de resultados se refiere al análisis de redes sociales, y en particular con la definición de nuevas medidas de centralidad de redes sociales, que comparamos en redes reales con otras medidas de centralidad clásicas
GALBIATI, Marco. "Three essays on game theory and social choice." Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7005.
Повний текст джерелаExamining Board: Antonio Cabrales, (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Pascal Courty, (European University Institute); Karl Schlag, (European University Institute); Antonio Villar, (Universidad de Alicante)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
Baigent, N. "Papers in social choice and welfare economics." Thesis, University of Essex, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371893.
Повний текст джерелаIsacsson, Marcus. "Topics in hardness of approximation and social choice theory /." Göteborg : Chalmers University of Technology, 2010. http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/cpl/record/index.xsql?pubid=120378.
Повний текст джерелаSprumont, Yves. "Three essays in collective choice theory." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40872.
Повний текст джерелаКниги з теми "Computational Social Choice Theory"
Kelly, Jerry S. Social Choice Theory. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4.
Повний текст джерелаJain, Satish Kumar. Social Choice Theory. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9661-9.
Повний текст джерелаKershaw, Rowley Charles, ed. Social choice theory. Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar Pub. Ltd., 1993.
Знайти повний текст джерелаKershaw, Rowley Charles, ed. Public choice theory. Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar Pub., 1993.
Знайти повний текст джерелаB. Gibilisco, Michael, Annie M. Gowen, Karen E. Albert, John N. Mordeson, Mark J. Wierman, and Terry D. Clark. Fuzzy Social Choice Theory. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5.
Повний текст джерелаMoulin, Herve. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Edited by Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984.
Повний текст джерелаRothe, Jörg, Dorothea Baumeister, Claudia Lindner, and Irene Rothe. Einführung in Computational Social Choice. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3.
Повний текст джерелаHandbook of computational social choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Знайти повний текст джерелаAizerman, M. A. Theory of choice. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.
Знайти повний текст джерелаT, Aleskerov F., ed. Theory of choice. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.
Знайти повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "Computational Social Choice Theory"
Basti, Gianfranco, Antonio Capolupo, and Giuseppe Vitiello. "The Computational Challenge of Amartya Sen’s Social Choice Theory in Formal Philosophy." In Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 87–119. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37305-4_7.
Повний текст джерелаde Jonge, Jan. "Social Choice." In Rethinking Rational Choice Theory, 90–100. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230355545_7.
Повний текст джерелаHwang, Ching-Lai, and Ming-Jeng Lin. "Social Choice Theory." In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 10–144. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61580-1_2.
Повний текст джерелаBarberà, Salvador. "Social Choice Theory." In Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 1–19. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_666-1.
Повний текст джерелаBarberà, Salvador. "Social Choice Theory." In Complex Social and Behavioral Systems, 511–28. New York, NY: Springer US, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_666.
Повний текст джерелаKelly, Jerry S. "Social Choice Rules." In Social Choice Theory, 57–79. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_7.
Повний текст джерелаGibilisco, Michael B., Annie M. Gowen, Karen E. Albert, John N. Mordeson, Mark J. Wierman, and Terry D. Clark. "Fuzzy Social Choice." In Fuzzy Social Choice Theory, 1–9. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05176-5_1.
Повний текст джерелаBlair, Douglas H., and Robert A. Pollak. "Rationality and Social Choice." In Microeconomic Theory, 79–98. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4219-6_4.
Повний текст джерелаKelly, Jerry S. "What is Social Choice Theory?" In Social Choice Theory, 1–3. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_1.
Повний текст джерелаKelly, Jerry S. "Rights." In Social Choice Theory, 93–100. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09925-4_10.
Повний текст джерелаТези доповідей конференцій з теми "Computational Social Choice Theory"
Grigoryan, Aram, and Markus Möller. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms." In EC '23: 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597708.
Повний текст джерелаAllouche, Tahar, Bruno Escoffier, Stefano Moretti, and Meltem Öztürk. "Social Ranking Manipulability for the CP-Majority, Banzhaf and Lexicographic Excellence Solutions." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/3.
Повний текст джерелаNovaro, Arianna, Umberto Grandi, Dominique Longin, and Emiliano Lorini. "Goal-Based Collective Decisions: Axiomatics and Computational Complexity." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/65.
Повний текст джерелаJunior, Newton Antonio Galindo, Vânia Paula de Almeida Neris, and Kamila Rios da Hora Rodrigues. "Guidelines for the Evaluation of Sustainability in Computational Solutions." In Workshop sobre Aspectos da Interação Humano-Computador na Web Social. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação (SBC), 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/waihcws.2018.3902.
Повний текст джерелаWalsh, Toby. "Fair Division: The Computer Scientist’s Perspective." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/691.
Повний текст джерелаFaliszewski, Piotr, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Krzysztof Sornat, Stanisław Szufa, and Tomasz Wąs. "Diversity, Agreement, and Polarization in Elections." In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/299.
Повний текст джерелаArrighi, Emmanuel, Henning Fernau, Daniel Lokshtanov, Mateus de Oliveira Oliveira, and Petra Wolf. "Diversity in Kemeny Rank Aggregation: A Parameterized Approach." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/2.
Повний текст джерелаBoudou, Joseph, Rachael Colley, and Umberto Grandi. "Itero: An Online Iterative Voting Application." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/848.
Повний текст джерелаLakhani, Foram, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. "Correlating Preferences and Attributes: Nearly Single-Crossing Profiles." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/59.
Повний текст джерелаKimelfeld, Benny, Phokion G. Kolaitis, and Julia Stoyanovich. "Computational Social Choice Meets Databases." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/44.
Повний текст джерелаЗвіти організацій з теми "Computational Social Choice Theory"
Brock, William, and Steven Durlauf. Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5291.
Повний текст джерелаJia, Ruixue, and Torsten Persson. Individual vs. Social Motives in Identity Choice: Theory and Evidence from China. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26008.
Повний текст джерелаRheinberger, Christoph, and Nicolas Treich. Catastrophe aversion: social attitudes towards common fates. Fondation pour une culture de sécurité industrielle, June 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.57071/882rpq.
Повний текст джерелаBurstein, Jill, Geoffrey LaFlair, Antony Kunnan, and Alina von Davier. A Theoretical Assessment Ecosystem for a Digital-First Assessment - The Duolingo English Test. Duolingo, March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.46999/kiqf4328.
Повний текст джерелаCOMPLETE SET ROTATION-LIFTING CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY FOR FREE-FORM SURFACE ROOF STRUCTURES WITH LARGE ELEVATION DIFFERENCE. The Hong Kong Institute of Steel Construction, August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18057/icass2020.p.618.
Повний текст джерела