Готові списки джерел за темами / Coalition war

Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Coalition war"

Автор: Grafiati
Опубліковано: 7 липня 2024
Оновлено: 7 липня 2024

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Статті в журналах з теми "Coalition war":

1

Phillips, Julianne, and Scott Wolford. "Collective Deterrence in the Shadow of Shifting Power." International Studies Quarterly 65, no. 1 (January 21, 2021): 136–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa095.

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AbstractTwelve of twenty-six war-winning coalitions since 1815 have seen at least two members go to war against one another after victory. What separates durable and fragile war-winning coalitions? To answer this question, we analyze a game-theoretic model of shifting intra-coalition power and collective deterrence. We show that (1) shifting power within war-winning coalitions can undermine commitments to the postwar settlement, but (2) revisionist threats from a powerful defeated side can enhance the credibility of commitments within the winning coalition, securing peace when intra-coalition war would otherwise be inevitable. We also recover these patterns in empirical models of the outbreak of war between former coalition partners: shifting power within a coalition is associated with increased probabilities of intra-coalition war, but only when the defeated side is not too powerful. A common enemy can thus preserve peace between former partners who would otherwise go to war over the terms of shared victory.
2

Ahn, Jeongeun. "Formation and Prospects of the Coalition of North Korea, China, and Russia: Is It an Inevitable Consequence of the New Cold War? Is It a Temporary Adhesion?" East and West Studies 36, no. 1 (March 20, 2024): 147–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.29274/ews.2024.36.1.147.

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This study analyzes the North Korea, China, and Russia coalition amidst complex global crises like the US-China strategic competition, the US-Russia crisis, and the North Korean nuclear issue, using coordination games and problems as analytical tools. In the ‘New Cold War’ context, they identify a focal point, form coalitions, and coordinate strategies based on reactive anti-US policies and confrontations with coalitions involving ROK, the US, and Japan. However, differing perspectives on the ‘New Cold War’ and external factors leading to divergent focal points resulted in strategic uncertainty. Forming a stable grand coalition as an institution is challenging, and there is a risk of abandonment when forming a specific coalition based on interests. Moreover, the emergence of spoilers within the coalition breeds apprehension among other nations, rendering the coalition unsustainable. Consequently, the sustainability of the North Korea-China-Russia coalition diminishes, fostering ongoing non-cooperative behavior amidst a temporary phase of adhesion.
3

Morey, Daniel S. "Centralized command and coalition victory." Conflict Management and Peace Science 37, no. 6 (July 15, 2020): 716–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894220934884.

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Building upon research that found that coalitions are more likely to win wars, recent work has sought to differentiate effective from ineffective coalitions. Much of this work focuses on characteristics of member states and not the coalition itself. This paper takes a first step in exploring how the structure of a coalition contributes to its performance. Specifically, coalitions vary in how much control members must transfer to the coalition. Some coalitions form weak command structures with states maintaining primary control while other coalitions form a strong centralized command. The impact of command structure on coalition performance is vital to understanding the success and failure of coalitions. Highly centralized command structures allow states to overcome the problems associated with coalition warfare and achieve victory. Empirical evidence supports this claim; the odds of victory increase as states surrender more control to the coalition. These findings provide direct advice to policy makers considering forming a coalition. The implications of this research extend to the alliance literature and the war bargaining literature, which tend to assume either that wars are dyadic or that states can seamlessly aggregate military capabilities.
4

Graham, Benjamin A. T., Erik Gartzke, and Christopher J. Fariss. "The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict: Regime Type, Coalition Size, and Victory." Political Science Research and Methods 5, no. 4 (October 1, 2015): 613–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.52.

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Studies of regime type and war show that democracies tend to win the wars they fight, but questions remain about why this is the case. A simple, if underappreciated, explanation for democratic success is that democracies fight alongside larger and more powerful coalitions. Coalition partners bring additional material capabilities and may also provide intangible benefits to the war effort, such as increased legitimacy or confidence. Democracies may also find it less costly to join coalitions, as democratic war aims may be easier to apportion among the victors without diluting the spoils. Evaluating our hypotheses in a sample of all wars (or all militarized disputes) during the period 1816–2000, we find that democracies fight alongside larger coalitions and that states fighting alongside larger coalitions are more likely to win major contests. Coalition size subsumes most (and in some specifications all) of the direct effect of regime type on victory.
5

Cappella Zielinski, Rosella, and Ryan Grauer. "Organizing for performance: coalition effectiveness on the battlefield." European Journal of International Relations 26, no. 4 (February 10, 2020): 953–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066120903369.

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States often fight side-by-side on the battlefield. As detailed in our new dataset, Belligerents in Battle, 178 of the 480 major land battles fought during interstate wars waged between 1900 and 2003 involved at least one multinational coalition. Though coalition partners fight battles together to increase their odds of securing specific objectives, they vary significantly in their capacity to do so. Why? Drawing on organization theory insights, we argue that coalitions’ variable battlefield effectiveness is a function of interactions between their command structures and the resources each partner brings to the fight. Coalitions adopting command structures tailored to simultaneously facilitate the efficient use of partners’ variably sized resource contributions and discourage free-riding, shirking, and other counterproductive actions will fight effectively; those that employ inappropriate command structures will not. Evidence from Anglo-French operations during World War I and Axis operations during World War II strongly supports our claim. For scholars, our argument and findings about the importance of military organizational dynamics for the operation and performance of coalitions raise important new questions and provide potential insights about coalition formation, duration, and termination. For practitioners, it is significant that, since 1990, 36 of 49 of major battles in interstate wars have involved at least one coalition and the majority of those coalitions have been, like the cases we study, ad hoc in nature. Understanding how command arrangements affect performance and getting organization right at the outset of wars is increasingly important.
6

Henke, Marina E. "Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building." International Security 43, no. 4 (April 2019): 128–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00345.

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Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are “paid” to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.
7

Kegler, Michelle C., Ana Dekanosidze, Arevik Torosyan, Lilit Grigoryan, Shaheen Rana, Varduhi Hayrumyan, Zhanna Sargsyan, and Carla J. Berg. "Community coalitions for smoke-free environments in Armenia and Georgia: A mixed methods analysis of coalition formation, implementation and perceived effectiveness." PLOS ONE 18, no. 8 (August 3, 2023): e0289149. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289149.

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Effective models for aligning public health and civil society at the local level have the potential to impact various global health issues, including tobacco. Georgia and Armenia Teams for Healthy Environments and Research (GATHER) is a collaboration between Armenia, Georgia and U.S. researchers involving a community randomized trial testing the impact of community coalitions to promote smoke-free policy adoption and compliance in various settings. Community Coalition Action Theory (CCAT) was used to guide and describe coalition formation, implementation and effectiveness. Mixed methods were used to evaluate 14 municipality-based coalitions in Georgia and Armenia, including semi-structured interviews (n = 42) with coalition leaders and active members, coalition member surveys at two timepoints (n = 85 and n = 83), and review of action plans and progress reports. Results indicated successful creation of 14 multi-sectoral coalitions, most commonly representing education, public health, health care, and municipal administration. Half of the coalitions created at least one smoke-free policy in specific settings (e.g., factories, parks), and all 14 promoted compliance with existing policies through no-smoking signage and stickers. The majority also conducted awareness events in school, health care, and community settings, in addition to educating the public about COVID and the dangers of tobacco use. Consistent with CCAT, coalition processes (e.g., communication) were associated with member engagement and collaborative synergy which, in turn, correlated with perceived community impact, skills gained by coalition members, and interest in sustainability. Findings suggest that community coalitions can be formed in varied sociopolitical contexts and facilitate locally-driven, multi-sectoral collaborations to promote health. Despite major contextual challenges (e.g., national legislation, global pandemic, war), coalitions were resilient, nimble and remained active. Additionally, CCAT propositions appear to be generalizable, suggesting that coalition-building guidance may be relevant for local public health in at least some global contexts.
8

Stanley, Elizabeth A. "Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace." International Security 34, no. 1 (July 2009): 42–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.1.42.

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Bargaining models of war suggest that war ends after two sides develop an overlapping bargaining space. Domestic mechanisms—domestic governing coalitions, a state's elite foreign policy decisionmaking group, and their role in ending interstate war—are critical in explaining how, when, and why that bargaining space develops. Through preference, information, and entrapment obstacles, wars can become “stuck” and require a change in expectations to produce a war-terminating bargaining space. A major source of such change is a shift in belligerents' governing coalitions. Events in the United States, China, and the Soviet Union during the Korean War illustrate the dynamics of these obstacles and the need for domestic coalition shifts in overcoming them before the conflict could be brought to an end.
9

Saylor, Ryan, and Nicholas C. Wheeler. "Paying for War and Building States." World Politics 69, no. 2 (March 6, 2017): 366–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887116000319.

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Many scholars believe that intense warfare propelled state formation in early modern Europe because rulers built tax institutions to pay for wars. Scholars likewise cite milder geopolitical pressures to explain the lackluster state building in the developing world. The authors analyze episodes of ferocious warfare in and beyond Europe and find that despite similar fiscal strains, not all governments built strong tax institutions to service wartime debt. When net creditors in a country's credit market were part of the ruling political coalition, they pressed governments to diversify taxes and strengthen fiscal institutions to ensure debt service. But when net debtors held political sway, governments were indifferent to debt servicing and fiscal invigoration. Coalitional politics can help to explain why mounting debt-service obligations led to fiscal institution building in some cases, but not others. The analysis highlights how the private economic interests of ruling coalition members can affect state building.
10

Schweizer, Karl. "The Perils of Coalition War." European Legacy 17, no. 7 (September 10, 2012): 940–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2012.724010.

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Також вас можуть зацікавити розширені добірки на тему "Coalition war" для конкретних типів джерел:
Статті в журналах Дисертації Книги

Дисертації з теми "Coalition war":

1

Grieco, Kelly Ann. "War by coalition : the effects of coalition military institutionalization on coalition battlefield effectiveness." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104572.

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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2016.
Page 381 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
What accounts for variation in the military performance of coalitions and alliances on the battlefield? This dissertation presents and tests a realist-institutionalist theory of coalition military effectiveness, which accounts for both the process of capability aggregation within military coalitions and its implications for coalition fighting effectiveness. It posits that variation in the design of coalition institutions for political-military planning, command relationships and information exchanges significantly affects the ability of member nations to fight alongside each other on the battlefield. According to the theory, coalition military institutions provide the key mechanisms through which coalition members manage intra-alliance uncertainties and fears, thereby allowing for closer coordination of their war effort. The most effective military coalitions adopt joint political-military coalition planning, unity of command with an integrated command staff, and the fluid exchange of information among coalition nations. The study tests this theory through a mixed-methods approach, complimenting a medium-n statistical analysis with two detailed case studies of coalition wars fought under conditions chosen to provide maximum theoretical leverage. The medium-n statistical analysis examines all interstate coalition wars waged between 1816 and 2007 using the Correlates of War Inter-state War Data (version 4). Using primary documents, memoirs and battle histories, the study tests realist-institutionalist theory in two empirical cases: France and Britain in the First World War (1914-1918) and France and Britain in the Battle of France (May-June 1940). The main finding is that variation in the design of coalition military institutions accounts for differences in coalition battlefield effectiveness both across and within coalitions over time. The study makes three principal contributions. First, it offers the first serious treatment of coalition military effectiveness in the academic literature. Unlike other research, it expands beyond national military effectiveness to consider the coalition dimension. Second, the study contributes to a growing body of research suggesting the importance of non-material variables to explanations of military effectiveness, drawing attention to the critical importance of coalition military institutions for combat power. Finally, the study informs the public policy debate, suggesting whether the US and other allies could achieve battlefield success more quickly, with fewer casualties and at lower costs if it acted through ad-hoc military coalitions or institutionalized alliances.
by Kelly Ann Grieco.
Ph. D.
2

Brooke, Stephen James. "Labour's war : party, coalition and reconstruction 1939-45." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.291291.

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3

Nelson, Jeffrey C. "ABDACOM: America’s first coalition experience in World War II." Thesis, Kansas State University, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/13618.

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Master of Arts
Department of History
David A. Graff
On December 7, 1941 the Japanese Empire launched a surprise attack on the United States at the Pearl Harbor naval base in the territory of Hawaii. The following day President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on Japan, and America was suddenly an active participant in a global war that had already been underway for over five years. World War II pitted the Axis (Japan, Germany, and Italy) against a coalition of allied nations that were united primarily by fear of Axis totalitarianism. Typically referred to as the Allies, the alliance’s most powerful participants included the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. However, many other nations were involved on the Allied side. Smaller European countries such as Holland, Belgium, and Poland fought with armed forces and governments in exile located in London after their homelands had been overrun by the Germans in 1939 and 1940. China had been at war with Japan since 1937. After the United States entered the war, allied action resulted in the creation of different, localized military coalitions between 1941 and 1945. These coalitions presented Allied leaders with unique problems created by the political, geographic, military and logistical issues of fighting war on a global scale. The earliest coalition in which the United States was involved was known by the acronym ABDACOM, short for the American, British, Dutch, Australian Command. ABDACOM’s mission was the defense of the Malay Barrier, which stretched from the Malay Peninsula through the Dutch East Indies to New Guinea, and the protection of the Southwest Pacific Area from Japanese invasion. In its brief two-month existence the ADBA coalition in the Southwest Pacific Area failed to prevent the Japanese from taking the Malay Barrier, Singapore, Burma and the islands between Java and the Philippines. This was due not to one overriding problem, but to a combination of planning, command, and logistical problems, compounded by the distance of Allied production and training centers from the front lines. These problems can be traced from the late 1930s to the dissolution of ABDACOM at the end of February 1942. Historians have often overlooked the underlying causes of the United States’ first foray into coalition warfare in World War II. To better understand why the Allied forces succumbed to the Japanese onslaught so quickly, one must look at political, military and economic relations between the United States and its allies prior to the onset of hostilities in 1941. Domestic political realities combined with international diplomatic differences kept the United States from openly preparing for coalition action until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The ensuing military coalition suffered from numerous deficiencies in command structure and logistics. Though pre-war planning existed within each of the Allied governments, the lack of cooperative action gave the Japanese military an insurmountable military advantage over the members of the ABDA coalition. Given the limited scope of this paper the focus will be on American participation in ABDACOM. The other countries involved will be included insomuch as they help to fill out the story of the United States and its first coalition effort in World War II. The story of the ABDACOM coalition is one of perseverance, creative planning, and deep stoicism in the face of overwhelming odds. The short life of the coalition gave planners in Washington, D.C. and London time to sort out potential conflicts between the Allies.
4

Pierce, James A. "Coalition war and burden-sharing: the President vs the Congress." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26412.

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
this thesis examines past U.S. approached to coalitions and efforts to forge alliances in peace and war in the 20th century. Specifically, it analyses the conflict between the executive and legislative branches with respect to coalition building and burden-sharing The thesis suggests that the amount of Congressional activism depends on the perception of an external threat among members of the legislative branch. Likewise, thesis highlights the tension between Congressional desires to impose the burden upon allies while retaining control over coalition policy and forces. The thesis concludes with a case study of Operation Desert Storm and burden-sharing. Finally, the author warns of dangerous precedent established by the shift in burden-sharing responsibilities in the recent past between the executive and legislative bodies.
5

Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. "Friends indeed? coalition burden sharing and the war in Iraq /." Connect to Electronic Thesis (ProQuest) Connect to Electronic Thesis (CONTENTdm), 2008. http://worldcat.org/oclc/436264265/viewonline.

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6

Sakul, Kahraman. "An Ottoman global moment War of Second Coalition in the Levant /." Connect to Electronic Thesis (CONTENTdm), 2009. http://worldcat.org/oclc/489046550/viewonline.

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7

Messman, Daniel M. "The Austrian Army in the War of the Sixth Coalition: A Reassessment." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2020. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1752349/.

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The Austrian army played a crucial role in Napoleon's decisive defeat during the War of the Sixth Coalition. Often considered a staid, hidebound institution, the army showed considerable adaptation in a time that witnessed a revolution in the art of war. In particular, changes made after defeat in the War of the Fifth Coalition demonstrate the modernity of the army. It embraced the key features of the new revolutionary way of war, including mass mobilization, a strategy of annihilation, and tactics based on deep echelonment, mobility, and the flexible use of varied formations. While the Austrians did not achieve the compromise peace they desired in 1814, this represented a political failing rather than a military one. Nevertheless, the Austrian army was critical in securing the century of general European peace that lasted until the dawn of the Great War.
8

Millar, Russell W. "The development of Anglo-American Naval strategy in the period of the second world war,1938-1941." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.558406.

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9

Baker, William Casey. "Between Coalition and Unilateralism: The British War Machine in the Mediterranean, 1793-1796." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2020. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1752351/.

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In 1793, the British government embarked on a war against Revolutionary France that few expected would last twenty-five years and engulf all of Europe. Radical French policies provided an opportunity for William Pitt, the British prime minister, to endeavor to cobble a European alliance, including a number of Mediterranean states. These efforts never progressed beyond theory and negotiations because of conflicted policy and tension between the British diplomatic corps and Royal Navy over the strategic goals in the region. With diplomats focused on coalition building and military commanders focused on national objectives, British efforts never congealed into a unified effort to defeat Revolutionary France.
10

Fritz, Alarik M. "How superpowers go to war and why other states help them the impact of asymmetric security interdependence on war coalition formation /." Connect to Electronic Thesis (ProQuest) Connect to Electronic Thesis (CONTENTdm), 2008. http://worldcat.org/oclc/453941583/viewonline.

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Книги з теми "Coalition war":

1

Bowers, Ian. Coalition Navies during the Korean War. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032626574.

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2

Matloff, Maurice. Strategic planning for coalition warfare. Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1999.

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3

Kober, Avi. Coalition defection: The dissolution of the Arab anti-Israeli coalitions in war and peace. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002.

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4

Wallach, Jehuda Lothar. Uneasy coalition: The entente experience in World War I. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1993.

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5

Matloff, Maurice. Strategic planning for coalition warfare, 1941-1942. Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1999.

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6

Stanley, Elizabeth A. Paths to peace: Domestic coalition shifts, war termination and the Korean War. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009.

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7

Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. Coalition politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of choice. Boulder, Colo: FirstForumPress, 2009.

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8

Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. Coalition politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of choice. Boulder, Colo: FirstForumPress, 2009.

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9

Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. Coalition politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of choice. Boulder, Colo: FirstForumPress, 2010.

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10

Authority, Coalition Provisional. Sulṭat al-Iʼtilāf al-Muʼaqqatah: Coalition Provisional Authority. Bagdad: Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003.

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Частини книг з теми "Coalition war":

1

Oliver, Timothy J. "The Coalition and War." In The Cameron-Clegg Coalition and Britain’s Role in the World, 69–107. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80995-9_3.

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2

DiNardo, Richard L. "Axis Coalition Building." In A Companion to World War II, 403–14. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118325018.ch24.

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3

Arnot, R. Page. "Under the Coalition Government." In The Miners in Crisis and War, 102–44. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003402305-3.

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4

Sanders, Deborah. "Small Navies in Naval Coalition Operations." In Coalition Navies during the Korean War, 14–26. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032626574-2.

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5

Dimitrov, Vesselin. "Wartime Coalition: Unity and Conflict (September 1944–April 1945)." In Stalin's Cold War, 69–103. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230591066_4.

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Paget, Steven. "A Small but Significant Contribution." In Coalition Navies during the Korean War, 84–98. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032626574-7.

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7

Williamson, Corbin. "The U.S. Navy and Combined Naval Operations during the Korean War." In Coalition Navies during the Korean War, 27–39. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032626574-3.

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Choi, Timothy Hiu-Tung. "The Royal Canadian Navy." In Coalition Navies during the Korean War, 99–111. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032626574-8.

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Yu, Jihoon, and Erik French. "The ROKN and Coalition Naval Operations in the Korean War." In Coalition Navies during the Korean War, 40–56. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032626574-4.

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Benbow, Tim. "Between Following and Leading." In Coalition Navies during the Korean War, 57–71. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781032626574-5.

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Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "Coalition war":

1

Sukhobokova, O. О. "Formation of an international military-technical coalition support for Ukraine: the British factor." In THE WAR IN UKRAINE – A CHALLENGE TO EURO-ATLANTIC CIVILIZATIONAL VALUES. Baltija Publishing, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.30525/978-9934-26-451-1-16.

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2

Nguyen, Hoang Nga, and Abdur Rakib. "A Probabilistic Logic for Resource-Bounded Multi-Agent Systems." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/74.

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Resource-bounded alternating-time temporal logic (RB-ATL), an extension of Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), allows reasoning about resource requirements of coalitions in concurrent systems. However, many real-world systems are inherently probabilistic as well as resource-bounded, and there is no straightforward way of reasoning about their unpredictable behaviours. In this paper, we propose a logic for reasoning about coalitional power under resource constraints in the probabilistic setting. We extend RB-ATL with probabilistic reasoning and provide a standard algorithm for the model-checking problem of the resulting logic Probabilistic Resource-Bounded ATL (pRB-ATL).
3

Blokhin, Ivan O., and Vitaly А. Epshteyn. "THE POLITICS OF HISTORICAL MEMORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN SERBIA ON THE EXAMPLE OF SPEECHES BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RULING COALITION ON THE OCCASION OF VICTORY DAY OVER FASCISM." In Социальные и гуманитарные науки в условиях вызовов современности. Комсомольск-на-Амуре: Комсомольский-на-Амуре государственный университет, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.17084/978-5-7765-1527-9-2022-325.

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4

Zick, Yair, Kobi Gal, Yoram Bachrach, and Moshe Mash. "How to Form Winning Coalitions in Mixed Human-Computer Settings." In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/66.

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Despite the prevalence of weighted voting in the real world, there has been relatively little work studying real people's behavior in such settings. This paper proposes a new negotiation game, based on the weighted voting paradigm in cooperative games, where players need to form coalitions and agree on how to share the gains. We show that solution concepts from cooperative game theory (in particular, an extension of the Deegan-Packel Index) provide a good prediction of people's decisions to join a given coalition. With this insight in mind, we design an agent that combines predictive analytics with decision theory to make offers to people in the game. We show that the agent was able to obtain higher shares from coalitions than did people playing other people, without reducing the acceptance rate of its offers. These results demonstrate the potential of incorporating concepts from cooperative game theory in the design of negotiating agents.
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THOMPSON, MARIAN KAY. "BUILDING ENVIRONMENTAL COALITIONS AND THE BLACK SEA ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVE." In International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies 25th Session. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812797001_0020.

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6

Kuba, Ondřej, and Jan Stejskal. "The Analysis of Coalition Parties´ Election Programme Fulfillment: Czech Case Study." In 2nd International Conference on Business, Management and Finance. Acavent, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/2nd.icbmf.2019.11.776.

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In multi-party democratic systems, where there is no absolute majority, the political parties are forced to cooperate. The cooperation is built on negotiations that result in several side effects including also concessions and compromises in the program. This analysis focused on the fulfillment of the coalition party promises in the Czech Republic, specifically on Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka´s government. The input data of the research consisted of a prepared set of testable political promises from the pre-election programs of selected political parties. The promises were compared with the contents of the coalition agreement, the government’s policy statement. It was found that coalition political parties selected by the government within the framework of coalition cooperation managed to enforce approximately 36 % of their election promises. At the program level, 24 % of promises were enforced. In areas that increase the personal budget of voters, government political parties have pushed 76 % of promises. Regardless of their cooperation, they made approx. 52 % of the election promises during the parliamentary term. The dominant party of the government was the CSSD.
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YEŞİLBURSA, Behçet Kemal. "THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY (1908-1980)." In 9. Uluslararası Atatürk Kongresi. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.51824/978-975-17-4794-5.08.

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Political parties started to be established in Turkey in the second half of the 19th century with the formation of societies aiming at the reform of the Ottoman Empire. They reaped the fruits of their labour in 1908 when the Young Turk Revolution replaced the Sultan with the Committee of Union and Progress, which disbanded itself on the defeat of the Empire in 1918. Following the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, new parties started to be formed, but experiments with a multi-party system were soon abandoned in favour of a one-party system. From 1930 until the end of the Second World War, the People’s Republican Party (PRP) was the only political party. It was not until after the Second World War that Turkey reverted to a multiparty system. The most significant new parties were the Democrat Party (DP), formed on 7 January 1946, and the Nation Party (NP) formed on 20 July 1948, after a spilt in the DP. However, as a result of the coup of 27 May 1960, the military Government, the Committee of National Union (CNU), declared its intentions of seizing power, restoring rights and privileges infringed by the Democrats, and drawing up a new Constitution, to be brought into being by a free election. In January 1961, the CNU relaxed its initial ban on all political activities, and within a month eleven new parties were formed, in addition to the already established parties. The most important of the new parties were the Justice Party (JP) and New Turkey Party (NTP), which competed with each other for the DP’s electoral support. In the general election of October 1961, the PRP’s failure to win an absolute majority resulted in four coalition Governments, until the elections in October 1965. The General Election of October 1965 returned the JP to power with a clear, overall majority. The poor performance of almost all the minor parties led to the virtual establishment of a two-party system. Neither the JP nor the PRP were, however, completely united. With the General Election of October 1969, the JP was returned to office, although with a reduced share of the vote. The position of the minor parties declined still further. Demirel resigned on 12 March 1971 after receiving a memorandum from the Armed Forces Commanders threatening to take direct control of the country. Thus, an “above-party” Government was formed to restore law and order and carry out reforms in keeping with the policies and ideals of Atatürk. In March 1973, the “above-party” Melen Government resigned, partly because Parliament rejected the military candidate, General Gürler, whom it had supported in the Presidential Elections of March-April 1973. This rejection represented the determination of Parliament not to accept the dictates of the Armed Forces. On 15 April, a new “above party” government was formed by Naim Talu. The fundamental dilemma of Turkish politics was that democracy impeded reform. The democratic process tended to return conservative parties (such as the Democrat and Justice Parties) to power, with the support of the traditional Islamic sectors of Turkish society, which in turn resulted in the frustration of the demands for reform of a powerful minority, including the intellectuals, the Armed Forces and the newly purged PRP. In the last half of the 20th century, this conflict resulted in two periods of military intervention, two direct and one indirect, to secure reform and to quell the disorder resulting from the lack of it. This paper examines the historical development of the Turkish party system, and the factors which have contributed to breakdowns in multiparty democracy.
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Lang, Jérôme. "Collective Decision Making under Incomplete Knowledge: Possible and Necessary Solutions." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/680.

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Most solution concepts in collective decision making are defined assuming complete knowledge of individuals' preferences and of the mechanism used for aggregating them. This is often unpractical or unrealistic. Under incomplete knowledge, a solution advocated by many consists in quanrtifying over all completions of the incomplete preference profile (or all instantiations of the incompletely specified mechanism). Voting rules can be `modalized' this way (leading to the notions of possible and necessary winners), and also efficiency and fairness notions in fair division, stability concepts in coalition formation, and more. I give here a survey of works along this line.
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Güvenek, Burcu, Zeynep Karaçor, and Abdul Qahar Khatir. "CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE COALITION FORCES’ SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT." In 12th International Scientific Conference „Business and Management 2022“. Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/bm.2022.805.

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The goal of this study is to look into the challenges and opportunities for investing in Afghanistan while coalition forces are present in the country. The World Bank (WB) enterprise survey was used for this, with dependent dummy variables being access to finance, land, electricity, being in a stable political environment, taxes, and security, and dependent variables being age, small, medium, and large enterprises, experience of top level managers, and firm ages. The most significant and significant impediments for investors and enterprises are access to land, access to electricity, access to a secure environment, and taxes.
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Bennike, Kathrine Bjerg, Poul Meier Melchiorsen, and Gunnar Sivertsen. "An institutional implementation of the new European reform of research assessment." In 27th International Conference on Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (STI 2023). International Conference on Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.55835/64426bdc67b1730895c01156.

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The Agreement on Reforming Research Assessment (Coalition for Advancing Research Assessment, 2022) addresses the assessment of researchers, research proposals, and research performing organizations and units. Our contribution is relevant for the assessment of units within organizations. We describe how the main principles and requirements of the Agreement have inspired a new institutional-level framework at Aalborg University (DK) with the aim to deliver data, statistics, and indicators to support internal strategic development, research assessment and resource allocation. The framework was designed on request from the rectorate and in collaboration with the deans of the four faculties with feedback from their project steering group and the university’s representative bodies.

Звіти організацій з теми "Coalition war":

1

Conway, John L. CADRE Quick-Look: Homeland Security-NORTHCOM's Coalition War. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada432513.

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Sterling, Jr, and Robert R. Desert Storm. The War The Coalition Almost Lost. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada264430.

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Hoeing, Jr, and Joseph B. War with Iran: Considerations for the Next Coalition Campaign. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, June 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada265374.

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Martin, Hollie J. Coalition Logistics: The Way to Win the Peace, The Way to Win the War. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, June 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada479146.

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Murphy, John D. An Analysis of the United States-Led Coalition Air Campaign Conducted During the 1991 War with IRAQ: Desert Storm. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, January 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada401042.

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Biancalana, Cecilia. Italy’s multiple populisms facing the Russo-Ukrainian war. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), March 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/rp0022.

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Italy has been defined as a laboratory for populism and a “populist paradise.” Indeed, multiple forms of populism coexist in Italy, covering the entire political spectrum. From the “left-wing” Movimento 5 Stelle to the right-wing coalition composed of Fratelli d’Italia, Forza Italia and the Lega, we can be sure that populism is very popular in Italy. We can be equally sure that, over the last few years, all these parties have had links to the Putin regime. Suffice it to mention the decades-long friendship between Silvio Berlusconi and Vladimir Putin or the admiration Matteo Salvini, the head of the Lega, has demonstrated for the president of the Russian Federation. However, the Russian invasion and the extensive popular and institutional support evinced for Ukraine in its wake changed everything, leaving populist parties scrambling to review their positions and modify their discourse. In the report, I will examine the ties between the main Italian populist parties (Fratelli d’Italia, Forza Italia, Lega, Movimento 5 Stelle) and Russia and the shifts in their positions towards President Putin in the aftermath of the invasion. Against this backdrop, the September 2022 elections in Italy can be considered as a “test case” to measure the success of the populist parties’ strategies to negotiate the crisis and to shed light on the changing balance of power within the broad populist field.
7

Auers, Daunis. The Russia-Ukraine War and Right-Wing Populism in Latvia. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), March 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.55271/rp0023.

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has profoundly impacted Latvia’s politics, economy and society. It also moved Latvia’s political centre to the right and mainstreamed many of the core policy positions of the dominant Radical Right National Alliance (NA), such as squeezing the Russian language from the public sphere, dismantling the publicly-funded Russian-language school system, and demolishing Soviet-era monuments. This policy shift has been made possible by the NA’s gradual political mainstreaming over the last decade (it has been in a governing coalition since 2011) and long-standing opposition to Putin’s regime, as well as existing contacts and support for Ukrainian nationalist groups. As a result, there is a public perception that the NA was “right” about Russia. As the NA has mainstreamed and abandoned its populist rhetoric, new populist parties have emerged in Latvia. Parliamentary elections in October 2022 saw new “Latvian” (the Latvia First Party, LPV) and “Russian” (Stability! or S!) populist parties elected to parliament. The LPV largely refused to engage with the war, focusing on domestic economic issues, while S! has capitalized on the “we are for peace” niche left open by other parties’ denunciation of Russia’s invasion.
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Muller, Paul L. MPAT: A Coalition Warm Starter. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, November 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada476632.

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Ciuca, Nicolae I. Roles of Alliances and Coalitions in the War on Terrorism. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada449424.

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Chokheli, Salome. Geneva International Discussions: Russian Occupation and Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia. Eurasia Institutes, April 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.47669/eea-1-2023.

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Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 has forever changed the security environment for Tbilisi. Borderization, Russian military and semi-military bases on Georgian territory, and Moscow’s unofficial annexation policy in two regions of Georgia are among the issues Tbilisi faces due to the Kremlin’s five-day war against Georgia. Moreover, more than 200 000 thousand people remain Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia, waiting to exercise their right of dignified return to occupied regions currently remaining under illegal Russian control. This paper analysis ongoing Geneva International Discussions involving Georgia and Russia and the prospects of reaching a consensus on a dignified return of Internally Displaced Persons to their homes. The paper concludes that currently, the Georgian Government does not hold leverage against Russia to alter the course of the negotiations process. Official Tbilisi should concentrate on the long-term objective – building trust with the representatives of Georgia's occupied regions to consider coalition-building in negotiations in case favorable changes affect power asymmetry between Georgia and Russia and the opportunity window for Georgia to affect occupied regions' decisions without Russian interference appears.

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