Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Citizens’ assembly"

In this article, we offer a contribution to the emerging debate on the role of citizen participation in food system policy making. A key driver is a recognition that solutions to complex challenges in the food system need the active participation of citizens to drive positive change. To achieve this, it is crucial to give citizens the agency in processes of designing policy interventions. This requires authentic and reflective engagement with citizens who are affected by collective decisions. One such participatory approach is citizen assemblies, which have been used to deliberate a number of key issues, including climate change by the UK Parliament’s House of Commons (House of Commons., 2019). Here, we have undertaken analysis of a citizen food assembly organized in the City of York (United Kingdom). This assembly was a way of hearing about a range of local food initiatives in Yorkshire, whose aim is to both relocalise food supply and production, and tackle food waste. These innovative community-based business models, known as ‘food hubs’, are increasing the diversity of food supply, particularly in disadvantaged communities. Among other things, the assembly found that the process of design and sortation of the assembly is aided by the involvement of local stakeholders in the planning of the assembly. It also identified the potential for public procurement at the city level, to drive a more sustainable sourcing of food provision in the region. Furthermore, this citizen assembly has resulted in a galvanizing of individual agency with participants proactively seeking opportunities to create prosocial and environmental change in the food system.

Most democracies disenfranchise persons with cognitive disabilities. Several democratic theorists have, for a range of reasons, recently argued that such restrictions ought to be abolished. I agree with such arguments. Some, however, have also expressed the hope that enfranchising such persons might give politicians more powerful incentives to attend to such persons’ interests. I argue that such hopes are likely to be disappointed. If we wish to ensure that such persons’ interests are taken seriously in the political process, we must consider reforms of other kinds. After considering several alternatives, I argue for a deliberative solution—a Citizens’ Assembly for the Cognitively Disabled, modeled upon the 2004 British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on electoral reform.

A prerequisite for the development of the local community are different forms of citizen participation in achieving goals of interest to the local community and meeting their personal needs at the local level. Citizens can participate in the local community activities directly or indirectly. The direct participation in local life is exercised on the basis of strictly formal legal framework, including civic initiative, referendum, and citizens' assembly. The quality of the relationship between the local community and the citizens largely determines the degree of citizens’ indirect participation in political life. This paper will address the mechanisms of citizen participation at the local level, with specific reference to public debate and public hearings as mechanisms enabling citizens to participate in local decision-making processes, draw attention to problems and difficulties, and insist on the obligation of local self-government bodies to transparently implement some procedures envisaged in the 2018 amendments to the Local Self-Government Act. The paper also elaborates on other forms of citizen participation, such as consultations, information requests, petitions, surveys, and other available forms of citizen participation in public life.

Based on data from two Citizens’ Assemblies and a year-long participatory action-research process, this article describes on-going attempts to shift the political culture towards collaborative governance in Gipuzkoa (Basque Country), Spain. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation data from a Citizens’ Assembly in 2022 suggest that such representative-deliberative processes might be transformative under some circumstances, increasing action confidence, building capacity and co-creating a shared vision of the future. Could it be that the increase in confidence is a side-result of the co-creation of a shared vision? The growing literature on the impact of standard Citizens' Assembly models is used to explore and refine this hypothesis. Research has uncovered some barriers to such an impact, such as outcome-contingency and difficulties to scale because limited resources. To tackle those problems, and help institutionalize existing Citizens’ Assemblies, a prototype for an Extended Citizens’ Assembly is presented. This model contributes to collaborative governance by facilitating online-onsite deliberation in a frugal way and further extending those transformative and visionary capacities that Citizens’ Assemblies and other experiments in democratic inquiry help to cultivate in cities and regions.

The amount of global greenhouse gas emissions needs to be significantly reduced in order to reach the Paris agreement target of 1.5°C by 2050. Contemporary representative political systems have failed so far in adequately addressing the complex problem of climate change. This study looks at potential alternative or complementary decision-making and knowledge producing methods, more specifically the deliberative democratic method of citizens’ assemblies. The three core concepts discussed in this thesis are citizens assemblies, wicked problems and sustainable transformation. By critically discussing and combining these three concepts, this thesis sets out to analyze a specific Citizens’ Assembly, namely the one held in Ireland 2016-2018. The thesis analyzes both the Irish Citizens’ Assembly model proper and its recommendations. The model is analyzed through the theoretical lens of wicked problems, in order to determine to what extent the salient characteristics of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly model address complexity. In addition, the theoretical concept of sustainable transformation is used to analyze the Assembly’s recommendations, in order to determine how strong or weak they are in relation to this theory. A directed content analysis was used to help categorize the recommendations. The result of the study shows that the Irish Citizens’ Assembly model exhibited positive aspects in relation to appropriately addressing complexity. The transdisciplinary approach to knowledge production and the deliberative aspect of the Assembly process enhanced the reliability of the knowledge produced. The Assembly’s recommendations are, however, concluded to be weak as seen from a sustainable transformation perspective. The limited amount of time given to the topic of climate change by the Irish Citizens’ Assembly as well as the narrow focus of the information provided to the Assembly members are important factors in influencing this finding. Additional research is needed on the link between citizens’ assemblies, wicked problems and sustainable transformation. On the basis of the research presented in this thesis it is argued that the citizens assembly model might play a crucial part in how people and communities can deal with complex problems in the future

Democratic innovations focusing on increased citizen engagement is believed to be important since they have the potential to revitalize representative democracy. However, criticism has also been raised claiming that democratic innovations only have a facade of deepening democracy. This study seeks to investigate the preparatory phase of the implementation of the Citizens’ Assembly in Knivsta municipality. Focusing on the intentions and aims of the politicians and public officials behind the implementation to investigate if previously recognized problems and criticism raised by the deliberative systems approach can be identified and answered to. In order to realise this, semi-structured interviews were conducted and complemented with documents from the public administration. The criticism raised by the deliberative systems approach acts a backbone to the study, whilst also serving a function to identify the problems and understand the intentions. The study finds that the intention and aims of the implementation is for the Citizens’ Assembly to be a genuine tool to deepen democracy. In addition, one of the problems found in previous research could clearly not be identified. The extent to which the other two problems can be identified is discussionable. Further studies are recommended to increase the understanding of how the intentions behind an initiative influences its outcome.

Elected multi-party assemblies have existed in Africa on average for no more than two decades. Consolidating democracy and improving the lives of ordinary citizens demands guardian parliaments. Parliaments are comprised predominantly of politicians and, interconnected with citizens and executives, are perceived as core institutions of representative democracies. This dissertation seeks to contribute to a better understanding of African multiparty parliaments and their role in consolidating democracy. The study seeks to comprehend the links between citizens and their elected parliaments in 18 African countries, in the process attempting to predict the prospects of these new democracies. It also focuses on the Assembly of Mozambique to attempt an understanding of the evolution, capacity and functioning of an emerging parliament. The study investigates the perceptions of Mozambican civil leaders toward their parliament, and it looks at the perceptions of Mozambican parliamentarians concerning their roles and their relations with the electorate, and concerning the Assembly’s capacity and powers. This is critical to understanding how democracy has been and will be exercised, since parliamentarians are at the forefront of the process. Each parliament has distinctive characteristics. However, there are common features based on their age and origin. The development of the Mozambican Assembly since the monoparty regime illustrates the challenges and achievements that African parliaments have undergone in the transition to democracy. The findings reveal that African citizens distinguish between presidents and parliaments, which is important given the legacy in Africa of strong executives led by dominant presidents. They also reveal that citizens value the gains made by the multiparty regimes and that parliaments as lawmakers are preferred to presidents. In most countries surveyed, citizens, on average, gave positive evaluations of their parliaments, especially concerning their trustworthiness. Political characteristics outweigh socio-economic status in influencing how citizens perceived parliaments. Party allegiance and perception of electoral fairness are the factors that most influenced how citizens perceived their parliaments. Interviews with Mozambican MPs revealed their frustration over the influence of the Assembly over the national budget. In the MPs’ opinions, direct foreign aid to the budget reduced parliament’s role to that of a rubber stamp, weakening the role of MPs. Mozambican civic leaders saw parliament as an indispensable and critical institution, and they expressed frustration with the extreme party-centricity of MPs, which is perceived as normal by MPs. Distrust between these groups reinforces the sentiment among ruling party members that the party deserves protection. In democracies, MPs from different parties are political opponents and not enemies. In Mozambique, the transition from enemy to adversary is not yet complete. While fragile, parliament has been the only space in Mozambican society where political parties can interact.

Le retour du tirage au sort en politique est désormais un phénomène social mondial, alimenté par de nombreux travaux académiques, revendications militantes et expérimentations démocratiques. Les mini-publics délibératifs regroupent des citoyens tirés au sort qui auditionnent des experts et débattent pour faire des recommandations de politiques publiques. Pourquoi le tirage au sort est-il mis en avant à la fois par des élites modérées pro-élection et par des activistes souhaitant une démocratie radicale ? Quelle dynamique politique les usages contemporains du tirage au sort favorisent-ils, un renforcement oligarchique ou bien démocratique ? Cette thèse réalise une analyse comparative basée sur des enquêtes qualitatives portant sur : les assemblées citoyennes irlandaises (Irlande), la Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat, le Grand Débat National, et le groupe citoyen du CESE (France). Quatre axes sont étudiés : la genèse des mini-publics, leurs fonctionnements, leurs effets et légitimités, ainsi que leurs institutionnalisations. Un nouvel esprit du tirage au sort reposant sur la « légitimité-humilité » pourrait expliquer les soutiens paradoxaux dont la sortition bénéficie. Les critiques de l’élection soutiennent le tirage au sort car la légitimité-humilité peut contribuer à la non-domination des représentés. Cependant, les partisans du gouvernement représentatif voient dans la légitimité faible des mini-publics consultatifs le moyen d’intégrer la critique sans menacer les fondements du système élitiste. Toutefois, la légitimité-humilité est potentiellement menacée par une revendication klérocratique affirmant la souveraineté de l’assemblée tirée au sort
The return of sortition to politics is now a global social phenomenon, fueled by numerous academic studies, activist claims and democratic experiments. Deliberative mini-publics bring together randomly selected citizens to hear experts and debate to make public policy recommendations. Why is sortition being promoted by both moderate pro-election elites and activists seeking radical democracy? What political dynamics do contemporary uses of the civic lottery promote, oligarchic or democratic reinforcement? This thesis conducts a comparative analysis based on qualitative fieldwork case studies of: the Irish Citizens’ Assemblies (Ireland), the Citizen Convention for Climate, the Great National Debate, and the CESE’s citizen group (France). Four axes are studied: the genesis of the mini-publics, their operation, their effects and legitimacies, and their institutionalizations. A new spirit of sortition based on “humility-legitimacy” might explain in part the paradoxical support that drawing lots enjoys. Critics of election support sortition because humility-legitimacy can contribute to the non-domination of the represented. However, proponents of representative government see the weak legitimacy of consultative mini-publics as a way to incorporate criticism without threatening the foundations of the elitist system. However, humility-legitimacy is potentially threatened by a klerocratic claim to the sovereignty of the randomly selected assembly

AbstractIn the last five years, the Italian Ministry of Education has focused on digital skills, recognizing them as fundamental and indispensable for the growth of the future citizens of the information age. Numerous requests have come from the European Commission, the Italian Ministry of Education and the employment world regarding the introduction of new technologies in schools, whether or not this is part of curricular activities. National guidelines for kindergarten and primary school curricula promote the introduction of new tools and new multimedia languages as fundamental for all disciplines. The idea of the National Operational Programme (PON) and the National Plan for Digital Education (PNSD) is to boost digital knowledge and participation in STEM subjects. The project presented in this article was launched in this context and was a collaboration with the Nintendo company to evaluate the “Nintendo Labo” product at educational level. This trial was conducted in a third-grade class at the “Allegretto di Nuzio” primary school in Fabriano (AN). The kit, an evolution of the Nintendo Switch console, was initially created for recreational purposes. The advantages and limitations of the product came to light during the few months of the experiment. The “Nintendo Labo: assembly—play—discover” educational project allowed students to merge theoretical and practical aspects of their knowledge, and understand complex systems through design and simulation.

AbstractThis chapter discusses the challenges that the war against Ukraine has brought for the EU, putting particular emphasis on the question as to what extent these are linked to a conflict between liberal democracy and autocracy. The EU and its Member States are having to reposition themselves in a changing world order that is no longer liberal, but at least multipolar. There are new political realities, not only in political and economic, but also in ideational terms. Adjusting to this new setting is difficult for manifold good reasons: China is trying to gain (geo)political and economic power and influence; several big states abstained from voting on condemnation of the Russian invasion in the UN General Assembly; and a presidential election is coming up in the USA in 2024. With regard to the EU itself, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova want to become EU members, while the EU already faces rule-of-law issues with Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In all this, the war is often discussed as a conflict between an autocratic regime on the one hand and the liberal democracies of Europe and the EU, to which Ukraine wants to belong, on the other. However, liberal democracy is also under threat in the EU itself and not only from outside the EU. Authoritarian tendencies and right-wing populist parties are on the rise in several EU states; there is visible democratic deconsolidation, i.e. citizens losing trust in representative democracy, and democratic backsliding. Consequently, for the EU to defend its values and liberal democracy is a challenge not only externally, but also internally. The war only amplifies these multiple tensions.

Abstract The modern incarnation of the ‘constitutional right to assemble peaceably’ has displaced, in important respects, ‘the democratic politics that animates the freedom to assemble, to deliberate and to act collectively’ as equal citizens. While the modifier ‘peaceful’ must protect the bodily integrity or precarity of participants and non-participants in any given assembly, it ought not to be read in a manner that prevents (1) second-class citizens from challenging the overt and the covert structural barriers that prevent them from participating as equals in the assemblies that determine the contours of their lives and (2) the most minimal despoiling of private property during assemblies. Property rights too often serve to maintain the status quo and act as a break on assembly’s democratic and egalitarian desiderata. This construction of freedom of assembly stays true to the views of a broad array of theorists who vehemently condemn the use of force to bring about political change, but who, given the logic of their own work, are compelled to countenance a commitment to the occasional use of force by second-class citizens who have been effectively excluded from a state’s most important decision-making fora. The occasional use of force, whilst not prescriptively desirable, secures its legitimacy when outgroups are subsequently able to participate in the self-governance of the polity and to secure the same opportunities for self-actualization that more privileged citizens enjoy. This reappraisal of the freedom of assembly moves the right to assemble from the margins back to the centre of contemporary democratic thought.

This chapter examines the constitutional debates that went on from December 1945 to September 1946. This legislative drama concerning the new constitution took place in three stages: in the Commission de la France d'Outre-mer (Committee on Overseas France), the Ministère de la France d'Outre-mer (Overseas Ministry), and the Commission Constitutionnelle (Constitutional Committee). The assembly—the Assemblée Nationale Constituante (ANC)—as a whole debated and voted on each article as well as on the whole text. Wording of articles was sometimes bounced back and forth among these three bodies, and behind these fora was both the “government”—that is the ministers and their cabinets, responsible to the Assembly as a whole—and networks among the deputies, including an important grouping of overseas deputies.

This chapter presents an institutional proposal for how citizens could be enabled—in the dual role of European and national citizens—to exercise constituent power in the EU. To explain in abstract terms what an institutional solution would have to involve, it draws on the notion of a sluice system, according to which the particular value of representative bodies consists in their capacity to provide both transmission and filter functions for democratic processes. On this basis, the chapter critically discusses the proposal that the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) should transform itself into an inter-parliamentary constitutional assembly. As this model allows constituted powers to continue to operate as the EU’s de facto constituent powers, it cannot be expected to deliver the functions of a sluice system. The chapter goes on to argue that a more convincing solution would be to turn the Convention of Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union into a permanent constitutional assembly composed of two chambers, one elected by EU citizens and the other by member state citizens. The chapter outlines the desirable features of such an assembly and defends the model against a number of possible objections.

Abstract An assembly of citizens was normally the body with final decision-making power in a state, at any rate on major issues (subject perhaps, as at Athens, to the right of a law-court to rule that a decision was illegal). Almost all Greek states had such a body—but perhaps not quite all.

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, adopted on June 28, 1921, established a certain framework of rights and freedoms of citizens in the new state, in a different way than it had been until then. The constitution did not recognize nobility, titles, "or any advantages by birth," except for the King and his family. It guaranteed personal freedom and freedom of religion - again within the limits allowed by law; freedom of conscience and the press, the right of association, assembly and agreement. He forbade greenery, abolished feudal relations, and on the day of liberation from foreign rule, the peons became, without compensation, the owners of the state land on which they had worked until then. This Constitution also provided for freedom from the death penalty and the principles of talion,except in cases of attacks on the King and members of the Royal House. The paper outlines the picture of life in the new community, as conceived by this constitution. The results of this constitution from the moment of its adoption to its repeal and onwards are analyzed. Since this constitution was the foundation of a new state and a new society, the analysis with previous acts is not possible, because there are no parameters of the same name for comparison. Therefore, this act can be considered only pro futuro, even after its repeal, because the echoes of this act still exist today.

The paper is devoted to the current issue of 2020 on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism industry in general, Azerbaijan in particular, and overcoming this crisis, taking into account the main aspects and goals of sustainable development. The primary purpose of the article is to form recommendations for compliance with the goals of sustainable development in the tourism industry of Azerbaijan with the levelling of events caused by the influence of COVID-19. A review of the scientific literature concluded that the issue of tourism marketing in crisis conditions is always complicated and multifaceted. The development of the tourism sector is a positive change for the host countries, which helps to solve problems in other areas of the economy. During the preparation of the material, a marketing survey of Azerbaijani citizens was conducted to study the potential impact of COVID-19 on the tourism industry. The analytical method of the article analyzes the goals of sustainable development, announced following the Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 25, and which become most relevant in the context of 2020 and are a challenge for modern society and Azerbaijan in particular. As a result of this study, recommendations were made to restart the tourism sector in Azerbaijan, given compliance with and implementation of sustainable development goals. The results of this study can be useful for the governing institutions of Azerbaijan and other countries in which the tourism industry has developed dynamically and rapidly over the past few years.

Even before the formal negotiation process of the Republic of North Macedonia (RNM) for membership in the European Union began, the important role that the Parliament should play in this process was highlighted. The main contribution of the Parliament to the European integration process should be ensuring the sustainability of the reforms. The Assembly is the key place for organizing a dialogue between the government, the opposition, and civil society about the far-reaching goals of the reforms that will be made in the rapprochement process. And the European Commission further emphasized that it sees the national parliaments of the countries of the Western Balkans as a link between the citizens and Brussels. Without a stable, functional, effective representative body, these challenges will not be met. In every developed democracy, the problem of the relationship between the government and the political parties represented in the parliament has always been an actual issue. The increase in the number of political forces in the parliament leads to the need to form coalitions and, accordingly, the greater the fragmentation of political interests, the more difficult it is to build consensus, which should imply an agreement between influential MPs, regardless of whether they are in the majority or the opposition. Hence, the aim of this paper is an analysis of the representation of political forces in the Macedonian parliament in the last ten election cycles through the “index of the effective number of parties” as a tool, designed to consider the problem of balance between the representation and effectiveness of the elected bodies and their dependence from the electoral mechanisms. For this purpose, first, in a theoretical sense, the typologies of party systems and the index for the effective number of parties (developed by Estonian political scientists Laakso and Taagepera) will be reviewed. Then, with the help of this index, will be determined the number of effective parliamentary parties in the past ten parliamentary compositions in RNM. The RNM is very convenient for such an analysis because in the country’s three-decade plural history different electoral models were applied – in the parliamentary elections in 1990 and 1994, the majority, in 1998, there was a mixed (parallel) model, and since 2002, a proportional model has been applied.

In the Mexican capital, the adoption of the neoliberal model has led to important changes that involve the complex of social actors. This context is posing for the local society the double challenge: developing a shared vision of the metropolis and agreeing on the rules to guide its future. The foregoing has resulted in a diffuse conflict that reflects the diversity of interests and visions of citizen groups, which reveals the power relations that run through the metropolis, where groups of citizens are deprived of the right to decide on the future of their territories and their forms to inhabit them. In the presentation, based on a group interview, participant observation sessions and analysis of documentary material, we will analyze the conflict around the Aztecas 215 project (in the Coyoacán Municipality, Mexico City) from the perspective of the production of space and inhabiting, to account for the citizen proposal promoted by the neighborhood assembly. En la capital mexicana, la adopción del modelo neoliberal, ha desembocado en importantes cambios que involucran el complejo de los actores sociales, lo que plantea para la sociedad local el doble desafío de elaborar una visión compartida del devenir urban, y acordar las nuevas reglas del juego.Asistimos así a un complicado pasaje desde la planeación a la planeación estratégica, con la implementación, a menudo bajo la modalidad público-privada, de instrumentos puntuales de intervención; un proceso que, mientras pone de evidencia el desajuste entre el andamiaje de la planeación y ordenación urbana y la implementación de instrumentos ad hoc; y que hoy en día se entrelaza con la conflictiva elección del titular del Instituto de Planeación, previsto en la Constitución de la Ciudad de México.Sin embargo, la introducción paulatina de estos instrumentos, aunque permite implementar legalmente obras y proyectos, no prevé la adopción de procedimientos de información, consulta y participación ciudadana; lo que implica una gran contradicción ya que, mientras abona a operar al margen de las indicaciones presentes en los instrumentos de ordenación territorial, merma la legitimidad de las instituciones gubernamentales.Lo anterior ha derivado en una difusa conflictividad que refleja, a la vez que pone de relieve, la diversidad de intereses y visiones de los grupos ciudadanos: en particular la contraposición entre el sector empresarial e inmobiliario y los vecinos que, excluidos de la futura configuración de sus territorios, se organizan bajos diversas modalidades.En este trabajo analizaremos el conflicto en torno al proyecto de Aztecas 215 (Alcaldía Coyoacán) a la luz de las aportaciones de Lefebvre en torno a la producción del espacio y el habitar; porque ello nos permite dar cuenta de la tensión entre habitar los contextos populares, y la aplicación de políticas y visiones implementadas al margen del consenso. La modalidad de producción del espacio, desde la perspectiva del habitar, en tanto proceso histórico, social y cultural, lleva a reconocer esta misma pluralidad del accionar; y con ello, a valorar el proceso experimentado por los vecinos, gracias al cual, construyen una lectura de su realidad, perfilan el futuro de sus territorios y problematizan un marco de derechos.Proponemos que en contextos populares como el de los Pedregales del sur de la ciudad, donde los vecinos han protagonizado la producción del espacio habitable, y la dimensión del espacio vivido prima por sobre el espacio concebido, abstracto y objetivado, la imposición vertical de proyectos inmobiliarios al margen de procesos de consulta y participación ciudadana, tiene como efecto un fortalecimiento de las exigencias de la población. En particular, en el marco de este ejercicio ciudadano de corte popular, vemos emerger la reivindicación a las diferentes formas de habitar la metrópolis mexicana; lo que nos parece importante pues se trata de una expresión que, en tanto representa una propuesta ciudadana constituye un plano desde el cual poner a dialogar las diversas visiones y utopías ciudadanas.En el caso de Aztecas 215 el conflicto se desenvuelve en torno al destino del manantial somero, puesto en riesgo por la construcción de tres torres con 377 departamentos. Es cuando los vecinos se enteran que la ora se está realizando en correspondencia con el acuífero, que surge la Asamblea de Pueblos, Barrios, Colonias y Pedregales de Coyoacán, como asamblea de vecinos organizados en torno al objetivo inicial de defender el acuífero.De acuerdo con lo anterior nuestro objetivo es contrastar el ejercicio ciudadano de los vecinos de la Asamblea General de Pueblos, barrios, colonias y pedregales de Coyoacán (Asamblea) con los planteamientos contenidos en la Carta de la Ciudad de México para el Derecho a la Ciudad, en orden a averiguar qué tanto ésta última, puede constituir un recurso para fundamentar y fortalecer la visión de los vecinos.Para ello analizaremos los discursos y prácticas de los agentes involucrados, con particular atención a la Asamblea: apoyándonos en la revisión de información documental, en la observación participante en los eventos y reuniones, además de una entrevista grupal y entrevistas semiestructuradas.

<p>The city of Madrid is making efforts to make the most of the river Manzanares, improving the quality of life of the citizens and increasing the biodiversity. Madrid Rio is the most central and visible side of this work. But there is also a will to extend this enhancement beyond the city center, taking advantage to the fullest extent of the opportunities that a river brings to enhance the urban sustainability of such a big metropolis. The Manzanares Linear Park extends this intervention south along the river. The bridge presented in this work belongs to that linear system; its objective is not just crossing the waterway, since it is a sparsely populated area with other bridges nearby, but rather bringing the trail and the users closer to the river. Limited time was available for design, fabrication and installation of the bridge. This fact had a deep effect on the solution. It is a simple design that consists of three different pieces of similar weight that are manufactured in the workshop and separately brought to the final location where they are quickly assembled by means of pinned connections and without any additional welding on site. Then the whole bridge is craned to its final position.</p>

The situation in Montenegro after the adaptation of the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Religious Communities has been defined by massive protests, civil unrest and tense political situation. The main stakeholders are not just the biggest religious institutions in Montenegro – the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC- Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva) but also the major political parties and citizens who were coming out in the streets of all major cities of Montenegro in consecutive weeks after the law was adopted on 27th December 2019. Major protests in Montenegro went on for three months until restrictions on public gatherings were introduced in March as a measure to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Law was published in Montenegro’s Official Gazette (No. 74/2019) on 30th December and came into force on 8th January 2020. Evidently, the legislative procedure in the Parliament of Montenegro (Narodna Skupština) purposely took place during the festive season, as Cristian Orthodox believers of the SPC celebrated Christmas on 7th January. However, the plan of Montenegro’s ruling elite assembled within the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS - Demokratska partija socijalista Crne Gore) to pass the Law beyond the radar of the wider public, failed dramatically. DPS is the legal successor of the Communist party of Montenegro in former Yugoslavia, its president Milo Đukanović is also the President of Montenegro, and DPS along with its collation partners had the power in the country since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, including the incumbent government 146 (2016-2020) until the general elections on August 30th this year. The sheer scale of civil protests in Montenegro is unprecedented not just in the modern Montenegrin state after it gained independence in 2006, but has never been recorded in its history.

"This work includes talking about the crime of Camp Speicher, in which 1,700 students of the Iraqi army of the Sheea creed were killed by the gangs of the terrorist organization ISIS, with the aim of eliminating the members of this sect because of the misleading ideology carried by those gangs. On 6-12-2014, Iraqi soldiers at Camp Speicher (Speicher Air Base) in Tikrit were subjected to murder and enforced disappearance by terrorist organizations because of their affiliation to the Sheea creed. This crime was among a series of brutal crimes for the genocide of Sheeas in Iraq. This is similar to what happened in the Badoush prison crime in the province of Mosul, which the Iraqi Parliament considered it as a crime of genocide, in which these gangs executed about (400) members of the prison inmates of the Sheea component. After ISIS took control of the city of Tikrit in Iraq, and one day after they took control of the city of Mosul, they captured (2000-2200) soldiers and led them to the presidential palaces in Tikrit, and they shot them there and in other areas and buried some of them alive. This disaster had a negative impact on the families of the victims of the Speicher where they went out in demonstrations demanded that the leaders who handed over the victims of Speicher to ISIS must be prosecuted, and in one of the demonstrations they managed to enter Parliament and demanded that the leaders who handed over Speicher to ISIS be held accountable. After that, many demonstrations took place by the families of the victims, some of which led to the closure of a bridge in Baghdad a few times Protesting the government's delay in clarifying the fate of their children or taking quick measures. The Iraqi parliament and government recently considered the Speicher incident “genocide” in reference to the premeditated murder of Badoush Prison inmates in Nineveh Governorate and the unarmed Speicher military base, the premeditated murder of members of the Albu Nimr, Jabour, al-Lahib, and al-Ubaid tribes, and the killing and displacement of civilians from Kurds, Christians, Yazidis and Shabaks in Sahel Nineveh, Sinjar, deliberate killing and displacement of Turkmens in Tal Afar and Bashir. This decision paves the way for obtaining international recognition from it as a ""genocide"" as stipulated in the Contract of the United Nations in 1948, and Iraq signed it in the fifties of the last century. This study attempts to explain the Al-Ikhnasas Court in looking into the crimes of genocide committed by ISIS against the bereaved students of the Air Force Base (Speicher) due to what this issue raised from the national and international public opinion, especially after the involvement of the Iraqi army leaders in this massacre, according to what witnesses reported in that area and what was reported by soldiers who survived the incident, in addition to the involvement of some members of the Sunni tribes in these crimes with the terrorist organization ISIS. The importance of this study lies in the following aspects: - That ISIS elements were tried according to Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005, and from our point of view that the aforementioned law is vague and broader than it should be, and it applies to serious and simple crimes from murder to crimes of sabotage, and the list of crimes punishable by the death penalty according to the aforementioned law is a long list and spacious. - The Iraqi government has embarked on an attempt to develop a legal framework to prosecute ISIS elements, and its mission focused on understanding the procedures and results drawn from those judicial efforts, and its mission also focused on showing the efforts taken by the Iraqi government to address violations in the field of the right to life, including those committed by affiliated forces government as well as other international and domestic actors. The International Criminal Court is specialized in considering specific crimes under Article (5) of its Statute, which are war crimes, aggression and crimes against humanity, which necessitates the adaptation of Speicher's crime within any of the mentioned types of crimes. The assumption of the International Criminal Court in relation to the Speicher crime, includes several positive matters and results at the same time a set of negatives, which must be presented to those positives and negatives in order to give preference between them and the choice of authorizing the court to consider the crime or not. The terrorist organization ISIS has committed serious systematic violations, including war crimes and others, and perhaps those that are not under its control, and that none of these crimes can be addressed within the anti-terrorism law, which cannot address human rights violations. The international community has recognized the heinous violations committed by ISIS against the citizens of Iraq by adopting Resolution (2370) in September of 2017, issued by the Security Council, which authorizes the Security Council to appoint an investigation team to support local efforts to hold ISIS elements accountable by collecting and preserving evidence in Iraq, which can rise to a high level, and it was committed by the elements of the organization. It considers that the decision constitutes a burden and an obligation on Iraq to investigate all allegations of violations committed by government forces for the purpose of holding them accountable, as well as requiring the establishment of special courts and trained judges in relation to ISIS crimes to deal with them. Terrorism is a global curse that has recently spread horizontally to all countries of the world and its effects have been concentrated vertically in some countries, and no one denies that the parties to this phenomenon are increasing (perpetrators and victims) and the United Nations in particular and the international community in general has not succeeded in reducing it despite the fact that the resolutions of the UN Security Council It is increasing, but the proportionality is absent between these decisions and the practical reality. The phenomenon of terrorism is spreading rapidly, and the perpetrators of terrorist acts are on the rise, corresponding to an increase in the victims of terrorism. Also, the circumstances and events that Iraq is going through, especially after 2003, put it at the forefront of countries which suffers from terrorism that has killed the people, using methods and forms that were not previously known and brutal and bloody cruel. ) for the year 2005, and since terrorism was not limited to Iraq, but included many countries, and was not specific to a place or time, nor was it recent in terms of composition. In addition, the aforementioned law cannot be aware of all violations of international and humanitarian law, as we mentioned previously, which requires the necessity of referring the criminals to a competent court. The Court conducts its rule under Article (13) of its Statute when referred to it by a state party to the same system or by the Security Council or when the Public Prosecutor conducts the investigation on his own, and then how does the Court take its measures regarding the aforementioned crime if we take a look Considering that the State of Iraq is not a member of the Statute of the Court. The rule of the court is free from the death penalty, which makes the idea of authorizing the court to consider the crime rejected by most Iraqis, especially the families of the victims. What are the negative aspects of the Iraqi national judiciary’s view of the Speicher crime, and how can it be avoided if the International Criminal Court plays this role? What are the guarantees provided by the court in the event that it proceeds with its procedures regarding this crime? The research on this subject is according to the appropriate method, which is the analytical and comparative method, which works on studying and comparing topics by analyzing ideas and jurisprudential rulings, and the positions of the governments of countries and the United Nations, as well as the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and comparing arbitration between Iraqi courts. And the international courts regarding the trial of the perpetrators of the Speicher base crime, and then come up with a set of conclusions and recommendations."

Following World War II, as America grappled with the cultural revolution of the 1950s and 60s and defining its identity domestically and on the world stage, a core tenet of American life bubbled to the surface of political, social, and aesthetic discourse: privacy. Once the revelry of the Allies’ win in the World War cooled into the precarity of the Cold War, American democracy and the culture it afforded its citizens were positioned and advertised, first and foremost, in opposition to the totalitarian government and culture of the Soviet Union. In her book Pursuing Privacy in Cold War America (2002), American literature scholar Deborah Nelson attributes the eulogizing of privacy that emerged in Cold War America to heightened national security discourse and the accompanying fear of the Eastern Bloc.1 The trajectory of American life would be forever shaped by this discourse, and nowhere is its lasting influence more evident than in two layers of American infrastructure: law and the built environment. Conceptually, privacy presents a straightforward notion, so much so that it’s often defined and understood in a binary condition: that which is not public. However, the public versus private dichotomy quickly dissolves when presented in legal and architectural contexts. Perhaps surprisingly, the word privacy does not appear in the United States Constitution and, thus, has not always been a guar-anteed, fundamental right. Privacy was first acknowledged as a right bestowed in America’s founding documents in the U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) case of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). This case granted married couples the right to use contraception on the grounds that this was within the confines of their private lives and not to be meddled with by the government. Justice William Douglas wrote for the Court’s majority: “Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy.”2 Exceedingly spatial in this description, these shadowy zones of implied privacy rights can be located in the First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments, or some combination therein, depending on constitutional interpretation. In the discipline of architecture, where we construct and delineate private and public spaces, it’s worth mapping the evolution of legal privacy with the evolution of private space. Where do these zones of privacy exist spatially, and how are they occupied? How can we begin to characterize the role of architecture, past and present, as good or bad, antagonistic or protective, and as an active player in this discourse? Using digital modeling and imaging tools, Corpus Comunis assembles and excavates material from a lineage of seven Supreme Court cases from 1965 to 2022 to establish a cohesive visual language through which we can speculate on how law and architecture together have, and may continue to, define the extents of our private, interior lives.

This paper examines how the adoption of the Australian ballot (AB), and ipso facto, the transition from the nominal to effective secret vote, shaped the nature of party politics in Brazil. Engaging the literature on political clientelism, the impact of the AB on three outcomes is studied: 1) the ideological leanings of voters at the ballot box; 2) the degree of electoral control enjoyed by local vote brokers; and 3) the capacity of citizens to effectively participate in the electoral process. In order to get leverage on these issues, the paper utilizes an original dataset -painstakingly assembled from regional electoral archives- which contains municipal-level vote returns for federal deputy and senate contests during the period before and after the AB's introduction in Brazil (1958-1962). The dataset exploits the fact that the AB was introduced at different times in different states and for different offices in the country, thereby creating an unprecedented opportunity to assess the impact of this institution. Using a triple difference-in-difference procedure, the study finds that the AB: 1) shifted the ideological balance of power from Right to Left; 2) did not greatly weaken the hand of vote brokers; and 3) greatly increased the proportion of wasted votes cast in elections.

Banco de la República is celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2023. This is a very significant anniversary and one that provides an opportunity to highlight the contribution the Bank has made to the country’s development. Its track record as guarantor of monetary stability has established it as the one independent state institution that generates the greatest confidence among Colombians due to its transparency, management capabilities, and effective compliance with the central banking and cultural responsibilities entrusted to it by the Constitution and the Law. On a date as important as this, the Board of Directors of Banco de la República (BDBR) pays tribute to the generations of governors and officers whose commitment and dedication have contributed to the growth of this institution.1 Banco de la República’s mandate was confirmed in the National Constitutional Assembly of 1991 where the citizens had the opportunity to elect the seventy people who would have the task of drafting a new constitution. The leaders of the three political movements with the most votes were elected as chairs to the Assembly, and this tripartite presidency reflected the plurality and the need for consensus among the different political groups to move the reform forward. Among the issues considered, the National Constitutional Assembly gave special importance to monetary stability. That is why they decided to include central banking and to provide Banco de la República with the necessary autonomy to use the instruments for which they are responsible without interference from other authorities. The constituent members understood that ensuring price stability is a state duty and that the entity responsible for this task must be enshrined in the Constitution and have the technical capability and institutional autonomy necessary to adopt the decisions they deem appropriate to achieve this fundamental objective in coordination with the general economic policy. In particular, Article 373 established that “the State, through Banco de la República, shall ensure the maintenance of the purchasing power of the currency,” a provision that coincided with the central banking system adopted by countries that have been successful in controlling inflation. In 1999, in Ruling 481, the Constitutional Court stated that “the duty to maintain the purchasing power of the currency applies to not only the monetary, credit, and exchange authority, i.e., the Board of Banco de la República, but also those who have responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of the general economic policy of the country” and that “the basic constitutional purpose of Banco de la República is the protection of a sound currency. However, this authority must take the other economic objectives of state intervention such as full employment into consideration in their decisions since these functions must be coordinated with the general economic policy.” The reforms to Banco de la República agreed upon in the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 and in Act 31/1992 can be summarized in the following aspects: i) the Bank was assigned a specific mandate: to maintain the purchasing power of the currency in coordination with the general economic policy; ii) the BDBR was designatedas the monetary, foreign exchange, and credit authority; iii) the Bank and its Board of Directors were granted a significant degree of independence from the government; iv) the Bank was prohibited from granting credit to the private sector except in the case of the financial sector; v) established that in order to grant credit to the government, the unanimous vote of its Board of Directors was required except in the case of open market transactions; vi) determined that the legislature may, in no case, order credit quotas in favor of the State or individuals; vii) Congress was appointed, on behalf of society, as the main addressee of the Bank’s reporting exercise; and viii) the responsibility for inspection, surveillance, and control over Banco de la República was delegated to the President of the Republic. The members of the National Constitutional Assembly clearly understood that the benefits of low and stable inflation extend to the whole of society and contribute mto the smooth functioning of the economic system. Among the most important of these is that low inflation promotes the efficient use of productive resources by allowing relative prices to better guide the allocation of resources since this promotes economic growth and increases the welfare of the population. Likewise, low inflation reduces uncertainty about the expected return on investment and future asset prices. This increases the confidence of economic agents, facilitates long-term financing, and stimulates investment. Since the low-income population is unable to protect itself from inflation by diversifying its assets, and a high proportion of its income is concentrated in the purchase of food and other basic goods that are generally the most affected by inflationary shocks, low inflation avoids arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth.2 Moreover, low inflation facilitates wage negotiations, creates a good labor climate, and reduces the volatility of employment levels. Finally, low inflation helps to make the tax system more transparent and equitable by avoiding the distortions that inflation introduces into the value of assets and income that make up the tax base. From the monetary authority’s point of view, one of the most relevant benefits of low inflation is the credibility that economic agents acquire in inflation targeting, which turns it into an effective nominal anchor on price levels. Upon receiving its mandate, and using its autonomy, Banco de la República began to announce specific annual inflation targets as of 1992. Although the proposed inflation targets were not met precisely during this first stage, a downward trend in inflation was achieved that took it from 32.4% in 1990 to 16.7% in 1998. At that time, the exchange rate was kept within a band. This limited the effectiveness of monetary policy, which simultaneously sought to meet an inflation target and an exchange rate target. The Asian crisis spread to emerging economies and significantly affected the Colombian economy. The exchange rate came under strong pressure to depreciate as access to foreign financing was cut off under conditions of a high foreign imbalance. This, together with the lack of exchange rate flexibility, prevented a countercyclical monetary policy and led to a 4.2% contraction in GDP that year. In this context of economic slowdown, annual inflation fell to 9.2% at the end of 1999, thus falling below the 15% target set for that year. This episode fully revealed how costly it could be, in terms of economic activity, to have inflation and exchange rate targets simultaneously. Towards the end of 1999, Banco de la República announced the adoption of a new monetary policy regime called the Inflation Targeting Plan. This regime, known internationally as ‘Inflation Targeting,’ has been gaining increasing acceptance in developed countries, having been adopted in 1991 by New Zealand, Canada, and England, among others, and has achieved significant advances in the management of inflation without incurring costs in terms of economic activity. In Latin America, Brazil and Chile also adopted it in 1999. In the case of Colombia, the last remaining requirement to be fulfilled in order to adopt said policy was exchange rate flexibility. This was realized around September 1999, when the BDBR decided to abandon the exchange-rate bands to allow the exchange rate to be freely determined in the market.Consistent with the constitutional mandate, the fundamental objective of this new policy approach was “the achievement of an inflation target that contributes to maintaining output growth around its potential.”3 This potential capacity was understood as the GDP growth that the economy can obtain if it fully utilizes its productive resources. To meet this objective, monetary policy must of necessity play a countercyclical role in the economy. This is because when economic activity is below its potential and there are idle resources, the monetary authority can reduce the interest rate in the absence of inflationary pressure to stimulate the economy and, when output exceeds its potential capacity, raise it. This policy principle, which is immersed in the models for guiding the monetary policy stance, makes the following two objectives fully compatible in the medium term: meeting the inflation target and achieving a level of economic activity that is consistent with its productive capacity. To achieve this purpose, the inflation targeting system uses the money market interest rate (at which the central bank supplies primary liquidity to commercial banks) as the primary policy instrument. This replaced the quantity of money as an intermediate monetary policy target that Banco de la República, like several other central banks, had used for a long time. In the case of Colombia, the objective of the new monetary policy approach implied, in practical terms, that the recovery of the economy after the 1999 contraction should be achieved while complying with the decreasing inflation targets established by the BDBR. The accomplishment of this purpose was remarkable. In the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, economic activity recovered significantly and reached a growth rate of 6.8% in 2006. Meanwhile, inflation gradually declined in line with inflation targets. That was how the inflation rate went from 9.2% in 1999 to 4.5% in 2006, thus meeting the inflation target established for that year while GDP reached its potential level. After this balance was achieved in 2006, inflation rebounded to 5.7% in 2007, above the 4.0% target for that year due to the fact that the 7.5% GDP growth exceeded the potential capacity of the economy.4 After proving the effectiveness of the inflation targeting system in its first years of operation, this policy regime continued to consolidate as the BDBR and the technical staff gained experience in its management and state-of-the-art economic models were incorporated to diagnose the present and future state of the economy and to assess the persistence of inflation deviations and expectations with respect to the inflation target. Beginning in 2010, the BDBR established the long-term 3.0% annual inflation target, which remains in effect today. Lower inflation has contributed to making the macroeconomic environment more stable, and this has favored sustained economic growth, financial stability, capital market development, and the functioning of payment systems. As a result, reductions in the inflationary risk premia and lower TES and credit interest rates were achieved. At the same time, the duration of public domestic debt increased significantly going from 2.27 years in December 2002 to 5.86 years in December 2022, and financial deepening, measured as the level of the portfolio as a percentage of GDP, went from around 20% in the mid-1990s to values above 45% in recent years in a healthy context for credit institutions.Having been granted autonomy by the Constitution to fulfill the mandate of preserving the purchasing power of the currency, the tangible achievements made by Banco de la República in managing inflation together with the significant benefits derived from the process of bringing inflation to its long-term target, make the BDBR’s current challenge to return inflation to the 3.0% target even more demanding and pressing. As is well known, starting in 2021, and especially in 2022, inflation in Colombia once again became a serious economic problem with high welfare costs. The inflationary phenomenon has not been exclusive to Colombia and many other developed and emerging countries have seen their inflation rates move away from the targets proposed by their central banks.5 The reasons for this phenomenon have been analyzed in recent Reports to Congress, and this new edition delves deeper into the subject with updated information. The solid institutional and technical base that supports the inflation targeting approach under which the monetary policy strategy operates gives the BDBR the necessary elements to face this difficult challenge with confidence. In this regard, the BDBR reiterated its commitment to the 3.0% inflation target in its November 25 communiqué and expects it to be reached by the end of 2024.6 Monetary policy will continue to focus on meeting this objective while ensuring the sustainability of economic activity, as mandated by the Constitution. Analyst surveys done in March showed a significant increase (from 32.3% in January to 48.5% in March) in the percentage of responses placing inflation expectations two years or more ahead in a range between 3.0% and 4.0%. This is a clear indication of the recovery of credibility in the medium-term inflation target and is consistent with the BDBR’s announcement made in November 2022. The moderation of the upward trend in inflation seen in January, and especially in February, will help to reinforce this revision of inflation expectations and will help to meet the proposed targets. After reaching 5.6% at the end of 2021, inflation maintained an upward trend throughout 2022 due to inflationary pressures from both external sources, associated with the aftermath of the pandemic and the consequences of the war in Ukraine, and domestic sources, resulting from: strengthening of local demand; price indexation processes stimulated by the increase in inflation expectations; the impact on food production caused by the mid-2021 strike; and the pass-through of depreciation to prices. The 10% increase in the minimum wage in 2021 and the 16% increase in 2022, both of which exceeded the actual inflation and the increase in productivity, accentuated the indexation processes by establishing a high nominal adjustment benchmark. Thus, total inflation went to 13.1% by the end of 2022. The annual change in food prices, which went from 17.2% to 27.8% between those two years, was the most influential factor in the surge in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Another segment that contributed significantly to price increases was regulated products, which saw the annual change go from 7.1% in December 2021 to 11.8% by the end of 2022. The measure of core inflation excluding food and regulated items, in turn, went from 2.5% to 9.5% between the end of 2021 and the end of 2022. The substantial increase in core inflation shows that inflationary pressure has spread to most of the items in the household basket, which is characteristic of inflationary processes with generalized price indexation as is the case in Colombia. Monetary policy began to react early to this inflationary pressure. Thus, starting with its September 2021 session, the BDBR began a progressive change in the monetary policy stance moving away from the historical low of a 1.75% policy rate that had intended to stimulate the recovery of the economy. This adjustment process continued without interruption throughout 2022 and into the beginning of 2023 when the monetary policy rate reached 12.75% last January, thus accumulating an increase of 11 percentage points (pp). The public and the markets have been surprised that inflation continued to rise despite significant interest rate increases. However, as the BDBR has explained in its various communiqués, monetary policy works with a lag. Just as in 2022 economic activity recovered to a level above the pre-pandemic level, driven, along with other factors, by the monetary stimulus granted during the pandemic period and subsequent months, so too the effects of the current restrictive monetary policy will gradually take effect. This will allow us to expect the inflation rate to converge to 3.0% by the end of 2024 as is the BDBR’s purpose.Inflation results for January and February of this year showed declining marginal increases (13 bp and 3 bp respectively) compared to the change seen in December (59 bp). This suggests that a turning point in the inflation trend is approaching. In other Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, Perú, and Mexico, inflation has peaked and has begun to decline slowly, albeit with some ups and downs. It is to be expected that a similar process will take place in Colombia in the coming months. The expected decline in inflation in 2023 will be due, along with other factors, to lower cost pressure from abroad as a result of the gradual normalization of supply chains, the overcoming of supply shocks caused by the weather, and road blockades in previous years. This will be reflected in lower adjustments in food prices, as has already been seen in the first two months of the year and, of course, the lagged effect of monetary policy. The process of inflation convergence to the target will be gradual and will extend beyond 2023. This process will be facilitated if devaluation pressure is reversed. To this end, it is essential to continue consolidating fiscal sustainability and avoid messages on different public policy fronts that generate uncertainty and distrust. 1 This Report to Congress includes Box 1, which summarizes the trajectory of Banco de la República over the past 100 years. In addition, under the Bank’s auspices, several books that delve into various aspects of the history of this institution have been published in recent years. See, for example: Historia del Banco de la República 1923-2015; Tres banqueros centrales; Junta Directiva del Banco de la República: grandes episodios en 30 años de historia; Banco de la República: 90 años de la banca central en Colombia. 2 This is why lower inflation has been reflected in a reduction of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient that went from 58.7 in 1998 to 51.3 in the year prior to the pandemic. 3 See Gómez Javier, Uribe José Darío, Vargas Hernando (2002). “The Implementation of Inflation Targeting in Colombia”. Borradores de Economía, No. 202, March, available at: https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5220 4 See López-Enciso Enrique A.; Vargas-Herrera Hernando and Rodríguez-Niño Norberto (2016). “The inflation targeting strategy in Colombia. An historical view.” Borradores de Economía, No. 952. https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6263 5 According to the IMF, the percentage change in consumer prices between 2021 and 2022 went from 3.1% to 7.3% for advanced economies, and from 5.9% to 9.9% for emerging market and developing economies. 6 https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/noticias/junta-directiva-banco-republica-reitera-meta-inflacion-3

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.