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Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Belief-disagreement"

Автор: Grafiati

Опубліковано: 10 грудня 2022

Оновлено: 28 січня 2023

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Статті в журналах з теми "Belief-disagreement"

Kelly, Thomas. "Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization." Journal of Philosophy 105, no. 10 (2008): 611–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20081051024.

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Palmira, Michele. "Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief." Ratio 31, no. 2 (March 22, 2017): 179–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12163.

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RIEPPEL, MICHAEL. "STOIC DISAGREEMENT AND BELIEF RETENTION." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92, no. 2 (May 11, 2011): 243–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01396.x.

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Verdejo, Víctor M. "Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24, no. 2 (January 11, 2016): 183–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2015.1126339.

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Dreier, Jamie. "Truth and Disagreement in Impassioned Belief." Analysis 75, no. 3 (July 2015): 450–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv025.

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Skipper, Mattias, and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. "Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective." Synthese 196, no. 10 (November 27, 2017): 4033–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1636-0.

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Moore, Michael S., and Heidi M. Hurd. "Moral Combat: Disagreement in Action, Not Belief." Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 1, no. 14 (August 5, 2020): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2020.14.14903.

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Cuando los filósofos discuten los desacuerdos morales, normalmente tienen en mente desacuerdos entre creencias, actitudes o emociones de diferentes personas. Aquí reexaminamos la posibilidad de que existan desacuerdos entre lo que para una persona es correcto hacer y lo que para otra es correcto impedir que se haga, lo que denominamos “combate moral”.

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Thune, Michael. "Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement." Philosophy Compass 5, no. 8 (July 20, 2010): 712–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00314.x.

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Chen, Jia, and Tianqun Pan. "Logics for Moderate Belief-Disagreement Between Agents." Studia Logica 107, no. 3 (March 17, 2018): 559–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9790-z.

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Cevolani, Gustavo. "Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement." Synthese 191, no. 11 (May 20, 2014): 2383–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0486-2.

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Дисертації з теми "Belief-disagreement"

Scott, Kyle Irwin Andrew. "Disagreement and the rationality of religious belief." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/15785.

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Concerning religious matters there are a wide variety of views held that are often contradictory. This observation creates a problem when it comes to thinking about the rationality of religious belief. Can religious belief be rational for those who are aware of this widespread disagreement? This is a problem for a view in religious epistemology known as reformed epistemology. Alvin Plantinga, one of the leading defenders of this view, has argued that there is no successful argument to show that religious belief is irrational or in any other way epistemically unacceptable – he calls these arguments de jure arguments. I respond to this claim by seeking to develop two new versions of de jure argument that Plantinga has not dealt with. The first of these I call the return of the Great Pumpkin; and the second, the problem of religious disagreement. The return of the Great Pumpkin is an objection that develops an earlier objection that Plantinga has considered called, simply, the Great Pumpkin objection. This objection is that Plantinga’s methodology for defending the rationality of religious belief could be adopted by anyone, no matter how strange their beliefs – even someone who believed in the Great Pumpkin could use it. I develop this objection further by showing that it would be possible for a person with clearly absurd beliefs to find themselves in the same situation as the hypothetical Christian whom Plantinga is seeking to defend. There is, however, a response available to Plantinga, which involves showing how the historical and sociological context in which the person finds themselves makes a difference to the rationality of some of the beliefs that they hold. This discussion naturally leads into the second version of the de jure argument which asks whether knowledge of several religious communities who hold incompatible beliefs undermines the rationality of religious belief. This discussion engages with work in religious epistemology, but also more widely with the literature on the epistemology of disagreement. I consider whether, and in what circumstances, finding out that others disagree with you could ever rationally require you to give up one or more of your beliefs. This issue involves discussion of epistemic peers and defeaters. One of the arguments I consider is that if a religious believer continues to hold on to her religious beliefs in the face of disagreement then that will give her a reason to think that she is epistemically superior, which will lead to dogmatism, and a sort of epistemic arrogance. I respond to such an argument by showing that there is a problem with the inference involved in this argument.

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Kindermann, Dirk. "Perspective in context : relative truth, knowledge, and the first person." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3164.

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This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective' evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group. In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective' evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form 'S knows that p.' Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors. In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective' thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred' on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.

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Книги з теми "Belief-disagreement"

Sethi, Rajiv. Public disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2009.

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The epistemology of religious disagreement: A better understanding. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

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Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press, 2018.

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Challenges To Moral And Religious Belief Disagreement And Evolution. Oxford University Press, 2014.

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Pittard, John. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190051815.001.0001.

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The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This book contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement. Part I argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing highly sanguine approaches to disagreement that allow for an unproblematic privileging of one’s first-person perspective. According to the position defended in part I, justified confidence in the face of religious disagreement is likely to require that one have rational insight into reasons that favor one’s outlook. It is argued that many of the rational insights that are crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning but only through having the right sort of emotional experiences. Part II considers the implications for religious commitment of accepting the impartiality requirement favored by “disagreement skeptics.” Challenges are raised to the assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality rules out confident religious belief. But it is further argued that such a commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one’s favored form of religious life and might lead to normative uncertainty that would prevent rational engagement in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever.

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Benton, Matthew A., and Jonathan L. Kvanvig, eds. Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849865.001.0001.

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Анотація:

This volume explores many issues at the intersection of the epistemology of disagreement and religious epistemology. Epistemological questions about the significance of disagreement have advanced in concert with broader developments in social epistemology concerning testimony, the nature of expertise and epistemic authority, the role of institutions, group belief, and epistemic injustice, among others. During this period, related issues in the epistemology of religion have re-emerged as worthy of new consideration, and available to be situated with new conceptual tools. Does disagreement between, and within, religions, challenge the rationality of religious commitment? How should religious adherents think about exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist frameworks as applied to religious truth, or to matters of salvation or redemption? This volume engages in careful reflection on religious diversity and disagreement, offering ways to balance epistemic humility with personal conviction. Recognizing the place of religious differences in our social lives, it provides renewed efforts at how best to think about truths concerning religion.

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Moss, Sarah. Knowledge and belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0008.

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This chapter uses probabilistic knowledge to defend compelling positions in contemporary epistemological debates. The chapter starts by developing a knowledge norm for probabilistic belief and applying this norm to debates about what you should believe when you find out that you disagree with an epistemic peer. By contrast with existing views of peer disagreement, the knowledge norm defended in this chapter can yield the intuitive verdict that disagreeing epistemic peers should adopt imprecise credences, thereby suspending judgment about probabilistic contents that they disagree about. Probabilistic knowledge is also used in this chapter to give a theory of knowledge by statistical inference, as well as to defend dogmatism about perceptual knowledge from a wide range of recent objections.

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Alexander, Joshua. Making Sense of Disagreement. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2018.

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Alexander, Joshua. Making Sense of Disagreement. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2018.

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Frances, Bryan. Disagreement. Polity Press, 2014.

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Частини книг з теми "Belief-disagreement"

Pan, Tian-Qun. "On Logic of Belief-Disagreement among Agents." In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 392–93. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_33.

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Roquel, Arnaud, Sylvie Le Hégarat-Mascle, Isabelle Bloch, and Bastien Vincke. "A New Local Measure of Disagreement between Belief Functions – Application to Localization." In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 335–42. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29461-7_39.

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Kraft, James. "Justified True Belief?" In The Epistemology of Religious Disagreement, 9–35. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137015105_2.

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Unwin, Nicholas. "Belief, Truth and Radical Disagreement." In Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, edited by Martin Grajner and Pedro Schmechtig. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110496765-007.

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Lackey, Jennifer. "Disagreement and Belief Dependence Why Numbers Matter." In The Epistemology of Disagreement, 243–68. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.003.0012.

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"Disagreement Skepticism and the Rationality of Religious Belief." In The Mystery of Skepticism, 83–104. BRILL, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004393530_007.

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Singh, Robert. "Sincerity and Philosophical Commitment." In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 2, 85–113. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192856685.003.0004.

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Анотація:

On one plausible view, philosophical belief is impermissible because of widespread philosophical disagreement. If that’s right, it might be epistemically valuable to reconstrue philosophical belief as some other form of commitment, one which (a) captures some of the ways in which philosophical belief is valuable while (b) avoiding the problems caused by widespread disagreement. This chapter argues that any such commitment must be sincere, and that since certain candidates for non-doxastic philosophical commitment turn out to be insincere they should be rejected. In the course of doing this, an account of sincerity suitable for non-doxastic commitment is presented. Finally, the chapter proposes a non-belief candidate for philosophical commitment which is both sincere and can plausibly satisfy (b), drawing on the thought that we can be excused rather than justified for commitment held in the face of disagreement.

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Weatherson, Brian. "Disagreement." In Normative Externalism, 203–23. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0012.

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The following, broadly conciliatory, line on peer disagreement is very popular in current philosophy. In the face of disagreement, we should aggregate everyone’s judgments, and defer to this aggregation. I argue for a new approach. We should aggregate everyone’s reasons, and then form the belief that is rational given those reasons. In short, we should aggregate inputs, i.e. evidence, not outputs. The new approach and the popular approach often agree in practice, but they are very different in theory, and offer very different explanations of why conciliation gets the right results when it does. The chapter starts with some theoretical arguments for conciliatory approaches, and reviews familiar reasons why they fail. It then looks at some examples that are alleged to motivate conciliationism. The evidence aggregation approach can explain these examples, and also explains other examples that conciliationism cannot explain.

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Pittard, John. "Introduction." In Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, 1–8. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190051815.003.0001.

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This introduction begins by providing an initial sketch of the argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism that will be assessed in this book. According to this argument, facts about religious disagreement give you good reason to think that any beliefs you may have on controversial religious questions are the product of processes that do not reliably lead to true belief. And if you have good reason to think that some belief of yours is the product of such unreliable processes, then it is not reasonable for you to confidently persist in that belief. After sketching this skeptical position, a preview is given of the argument that unfolds over the following chapters. The introduction then concludes with reading plans for readers with different interests.

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Pittard, John. "Partisan Justification and Religious Belief." In Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, 141–81. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190051815.003.0005.

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Weak conciliationism affirms that many of one’s epistemic starting points enjoy “partisan justification,” justified confidence that exceeds the degree of confidence that is supportable on impartial grounds. But weak conciliationism does not itself supply an account that says when such partisan justification is and is not available. This chapter begins by identifying the options for an account of partisan justification. It then argues for an exclusively rationalist account according to which partisan justification is grounded in rational insight and is not available in disagreements with acknowledged internal rational parity. This argument presents a challenge for “reformed epistemologists,” like Alston and Plantinga, who deemphasize the role of rational insight in religious belief and who defend religious belief by emphasizing similarities between religious belief formation and the formation of perceptual beliefs. It is argued that the religious epistemologies of Alston and Plantinga cannot successfully meet the higher-order challenge posed by religious disagreement.

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Звіти організацій з теми "Belief-disagreement"

Meeuwis, Maarten, Jonathan Parker, Antoinette Schoar, and Duncan Simester. Belief Disagreement and Portfolio Choice. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25108.

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