Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Agriculture and state – China; Agriculture – China"

China's state sector reform process is examined through the key sector of agriculture. A preview of aggregate statistics and broader reform measures indicate the declining role of the state. However, a systematic analysis of administrative, service and enterprise structures reveal the nuances of how the state has retained strong capacity to guide development of the agricultural sector. State and Party policy makers aim not only to support the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of farmers, but also to pursue agricultural modernization in the context of rapid industrialization. These goals are unlikely to be achieved through a wholesale transfer of functions to the private sector, so the state has maintained or developed new mechanisms of influence, particularly in the areas of service provision and enterprise development.

The agro-industrial complex is one of the most important sectors in the economy of any country, and the Russian Federation is no exception. The modern development of the state’s economy largely depends on the level of development of the agro-industrial sector and the efficiency of management activities of its management. For more than 25 years, Russia has been in the process of reforming and transforming the agricultural sector. The level of agricultural development remains quite ambiguous. Stimulating the agricultural sector at the state level is a priority for advanced countries in economic policy, because agriculture is the most important branch of the national economy, which actively involves a diverse set of measures for state support (subsidies, benefits, trade protection, etc.). The existing system of state regulation and support of agriculture in China is based on standard methods used in most countries of the world. The article is devoted to the study of the mechanisms of state support for the agro-industrial complex in China, because it is important to study which structure and organization of agricultural production contributes to the most intensive and balanced development. It is necessary to realize that it is not possible to improve the efficiency of the agro-industrial complex in the short term, so long-term forecasts and programs should be developed. This is especially important in today’s volatile economy. Possible methods of stimulating domestic agricultural producers based on the experience of the country under consideration are considered. As a result of the analysis, positive and negative factors of influence of certain measures for state support of agriculture in General on the country’s economy were identified. The article discusses the main methods of state support for agriculture used in the PRC and the possibility of their application in the Russian Federation. This article is intended for those who work in the field of Finance of the agro-industrial complex.

Information on the history, legislative background, and current five levels (national, provincial, county, municipal, and township level) of the agricultural extension system in China are presented herein. In addition to the five levels, there are also six administrative agencies involved: Ministry of Agriculture, State Forestry Administration, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Education, National Agriculture Leadership Working Group, and National Development and Reform Commission. An example (Zhongfang Township, City of Luoyuan, Fuzhou County, Fujian Province) is given to illustrate the intricate network of the agricultural extension system. Major problems of the Chinese extension system include a complex and inefficient extension network, disconnection between the extension service and stakeholders’ needs, and a “two-boss” dilemma for most extension agencies. However, some current success stories in Chinese agricultural extension may be applicable or provide useful tips to other countries including the United States.

Abstract. The purpose of this study is to clarify the place of Sino-Russian agricultural cooperation for the PRC in the context of Sino-American trade frictions, to identify the main factors that have a positive and negative impact on cooperation in the field of agriculture between the PRC and the Russian Federation. To achieve the goal, the following goals have been established: 1) analyze the state of agricultural cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation; 2) explore the problems in agricultural cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation at this stage; 3) evaluate the impact of Sino-US trade frictions on Sino-Russian agricultural cooperation. Statistical, analytical and graphical methods were used. Correlation-regression analysis was used to identify the impact of Sino-American trade frictions on agricultural cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation. Results. Agricultural cooperation with the United States and the Russian Federation is an important part of international cooperation in the field of agriculture for China. Sino-American trade tensions have, to some extent, indirectly contributed to agricultural cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation. The volume of trade in agricultural products between China and Russia in 2020 amounted to 5.544 billion US dollars, of which the import of agricultural products of China from the Russian Federation reached 4.087 billion US dollars, and China became the largest exporter of Russian agricultural products. The main reason is that under the influence of Sino-American trade frictions, China and Russia actively reacted and adjusted the direction of agricultural cooperation between the two countries. First, China expanded the types and volume of agricultural products imported from Russia and created a favorable environment for its trade. Second, China and Russia will seize the opportunity of “cooperation in the entire agricultural industry chain” to create a mutually beneficial investment environment. Third, to promote the creation of innovative platforms and mechanisms for scientific research and technology in the field of agriculture. The scientific novelty consists in assessing the impact of Sino-American trade frictions on agricultural interaction between the PRC and the Russian Federation and its trends in the future.

To evaluate the ecological niche of photovoltaic agriculture in China, an evaluation index system was constructed. Based on the presentation form of interval numbers, we used the interval entropy weight method and interval cloud model to measure the niche state value and niche role value of photovoltaic agriculture. In this way, we determined the development trend of the ecological niche of photovoltaic agriculture. The results show that Chinese photovoltaic agriculture is in a good state and plays a good, but weak, role. The ecological niche of China’s photovoltaic agriculture will undergo a four-stage evolution process: positioning, integration, leap, and symbiosis. China has completed the positioning stage and entered the integration stage. Hence, it is important to constantly improve the level of industrial integration technology and to form a new photovoltaic agriculture recycling economic ecosystem.

Although the existing scholarship on the capitalist transformation of Chinese agriculture uses the concepts of the Marxist political economy to analyze class differentiation, it has not systematically analyzed the role of the Chinese state (as manifested in the current semi-private land system) in this transformation with reference to Marx’s theory of agricultural rent. Capitalist transformation of Chinese agriculture in the context of continuing strong government control over farmland provides a unique opportunity to assess the validity of Marx’s hypothesis that private landownership is a barrier to capitalist development in agriculture and that state ownership of land is a possible way to overcome it. Analysis highlights two advantages of the current system for the capitalist transformation of Chinese agriculture. First, by enabling local governments to transfer large and consolidated tracts of farmland to agribusiness companies and large farmers and relieving them from the burden of dealing with each and every private owner for land access, the semi-private landownership system minimizes the transaction costs incurred by agrarian capital. Second, farm workers are guaranteed access to small plots of land and this subsidizes agrarian capital by reducing the costs of the reproduction of labor power, thereby putting downward pressure on wages. JEL Classification: P32, P1

To explore the law of coupling coordination development of China’s photovoltaic (PV) agriculture system, this study measured the comprehensive development level of the agriculture and PV industries from 2007 to 2016 using China’s agricultural and photovoltaic industry statistics. Once this was achieved, the coupling coordination degree of the PV agricultural system was measured and a development mode of this system was determined. Finally, we explored the development trend of the coupled and coordinated evolution of the system. The main research results show that: (1) Although the development level of the agriculture and PV industries are both in an upward trend, the rising rate of development by the PV industry far exceeds the agriculture industry. (2) As agricultural and PV industries expand, they both show stock resource-led characteristics, but the incremental resources of the PV industry are gradually taking the lead. (3) The coupling coordination degree of the agriculture and PV industries fluctuates as it rises, but the coupling is low. It has not yet evolved to a higher level of coupling, and the speed of upgrading and evolution is slow. (4) In the next 10 years, the evolution speed of the two industries will be significantly improved, and the coupling between them will enter the coordination stage. PV agriculture will further develop in a sustainable direction.

The development of new technology and the Internet has provided opportunities for the development of smart agriculture, but at present, the development of smart agriculture is still in the primary stage and faces many urgent technical problems, so most companies enhance their technological innovation capabilities through cooperation with other companies. This paper analyzes the characteristics of cooperation networks of smart agriculture technology companies and the differences in different stages by collecting companies with which smart agriculture technology companies have cooperation relationships and applying social network analysis. The results show that there are few cooperative relationships between smart agriculture technology companies, mostly with large information technology companies (e.g., Huawei and Alibaba), research institutes, and other non-agricultural companies. In the cooperation network, large information technology companies such as Huawei and Alibaba, China Agricultural University, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences occupy important positions. However, the overall network density is low, and the cooperation is not tight enough, indicating that the development of smart agriculture technology companies needs to be improved. The findings of the study can provide suggestions for the development of smart agricultural technology companies.

<p>Agricultural informatization is of great significance to the development of rural areas and agriculture, and is closely related to farmers. The state council, in some opinions on promoting the construction of a new socialist countryside, mainly proposes to build a diversified information channel, so that agricultural personnel can obtain agricultural information more quickly and efficiently. This paper mainly analyzes the problems of industry gap, personnel technology, financing and promotion in the agricultural informatization industry of smart agriculture in China. The corresponding solutions to these problems are put forward and the prospect of the future development of the industry is forecasted.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 1999.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 303-318). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p9948031.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007.
The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on April 15, 2008) Includes bibliographical references.

AbstractDue to the continuous need to attain food security for the growing population, resource exploitation in the agriculture sector is evident. Hence, both production growth and sustainability have become key policy dilemmas. This paper examines the prospective roles of regional cooperation in attaining sustainable green growth in the agricultural production process. To formulate the Green Growth Index for Agriculture (GGIA), 16 South-through-East Asian countries were considered. The result implies that if the countries could work under a regional cooperation bloc, on average, they can exploit the untapped potential production of 33.8% without deploying any additional resources. Analysis for emission-management reveals that if the countries could work under a regional cooperation bloc, on average, its agriculture emission-management efficiency would be 45%. According to the GGIA, China, Japan, and South Korea have the highest overall efficiency, while Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Thailand have the lowest in this region.

AbstractTasked with feeding 1.4 billion people, China often promotes its success in food security in relation to its self-sufficient grain production. In the post-socialist context, the reformist state has been pursuing a capital-based vertical model to integrate millions of smallholding producers into the market. Yet, the introduction of high-yield hybrid rice to increase production has resulted in a set of related crises, including widespread environmental pollution, food-safety issues and adverse impacts on rural life. However, agrarian communities are challenging these state-imposed practices of food production. This chapter explores an endogenous form of regenerative agriculture that has emerged in South China since the early 2000s, a Chinese form of food and farming activism for reviving community agrarianism. I argue that the revitalization of “traditional” farming practices as a form of xaingtu (rural) knowledge has evolved with and through local peasants’ experience and struggle over the decades. One example that combines diverse aspects of such knowledge is the “fish-duck-rice paddy”, a well-known symbiotic method of pest control that also works with native varieties, organic manure and cooperative labour. This method revives peasants’ experience of the Mao era as a cultural reference for community agrarianism. The revival of community agrarianism allows farming to be narrated as an evolving social and historical practice, not “wasting” peasants’ knowledge, in contrast to the capitalist agrarian transformation.

AbstractIn the livestock sector in India, poultry farming holds a prominent position owing to its impressive growth led by the private sector. Poultry sector has shown rapid growth, with chicken meat growing at an average annual growth rate of 9% and eggs growing at 6% from 2000–01 to 2018–19 (DAHD DAHD (2020) Basic animal husbandry statistics 2020. Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries. Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare. Government of India). The recent steady growth in domestic demand for chicken meat has made it possible to increase production with a ready market putting India among the top poultry producers in the world. India was the third-largest egg producer after China and the USA with a production of 88 billion eggs and fifth-largest chicken meat producer with a production of 3.5 million tonnes during 2017–18 (FAOSTAT (2018) Food and Agriculture data. Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data). This transformation in the poultry sector was led by the commercial poultry industry which contributes about 80% of the total poultry production. The other 20% is produced by the traditional backyard poultry. The broiler industry is concentrated in the southern and western states and accounts for a major share of total output. Similarly, the layer industry is dominated by well-developed states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, accounting for nearly 60% of the production (DAHDF (2017) National Action Plan for Egg & Poultry-2022 for Doubling Farmers’ Income by 2022. Department of Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare Government of India.). Commercial poultry farming is yet to make a dent in more populous states like Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh.

Since the outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia virus, China has been in a state of home consumption, and Pinduoduo's games have become a popular target for many audiences. Among them, the click-through rate of Happy Orchard and Happy Ranch has increased sharply. However, as the time spent in closed homes increases, Consumers have a sense of burnout, and there is also a certain sense of distortion for game development. In order to make the consumer's home more interesting, the software developed by game developers is more meaningful. It is proposed that Pinduoduo is happy in the context of the “home economy” of the epidemic. Development strategies for farming (forestry, animal husbandry, sideline, fishing grounds) games.

100 years since the Establishment of the State Meadow Institute the Federal Williams Research Center of Forage Production & Agroecology celebrates in June 2022. The State Meadow Institute creation was event of the most important state significance. This event is extremely important for rational nature management, increasing soil fertility, obtaining high and sustainable crop yields, and preserving the productive longevity of our lands. In 1922 the Station for the study of forage plants and forage area was transformed into the State Meadow Institute (SMI). 1930 – SMI was transformed into the All-Union Williams Fodder Research Institute. 1992 – transformation into the All-Russian Williams Fodder Research Institute. 2018 transformation into the Federal Williams Research Center of Forage Production & Agroecology. Throughout its history, the Institute has proudly borne the name of its founder – W. R. Williams. Such famous scientists as V. R. Williams, A. M. Dmitriev, L. G. Ramensky, I. V. Larin, S. P. Smelov, T. A. Rabotnov, A. A. Zubrilin and many others worked at the Institute. The Institute's works (books, articles) have been published in England, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, USA, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Switzerland, Sweden, and Japan. Scientific and practical achievements of the Institute were awarded 7 times with State prizes of the USSR and the Russian Federation in the field of science and technology, as well as Prizes of the government of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of agriculture of the Russian Federation, diplomas of Exhibitions and other awards. For services to the country, the Institute was awarded the order of Labor Red Banner.

Being over-dependent on imports, China has been faced with the problem of food insufficiency in recent years.This paper, with the adoption of the indicators of agricultural development and relevant models, aims to explore factors affecting food security in China, in particular, technological elements. The findings demonstrate that technology plays a vital role in improving food production. It is recommended to increase the input of science and technology and improve agricultural mechanization.

Just over a decade ago, several forest agency leaders from around the world met in Beijing, China at a conference convened by the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI), the State Forestry Administration (SFA) of China and the Chinese Center for Agriculture Policy (CCAP). As leaders—from Brazil, China, Mexico and the USA—we reflected on how few opportunities existed to learn from one another to discuss forest issues in an informal atmosphere outside of the protocol-laden, jurisdictionally-defined sessions we commonly attended. We wondered whether there was a better way—whether it was possible to have safe conversations where difficult issues, struggles and mistakes could be raised, acknowledged and learned from. From this first conversation, MegaFlorestais was created: a self-governing group of public forest agency leaders with RRI serving as the Secretariat and main funder. The period of 2005-2015 brought changes in forest governance, the status of forest ownership, the health of the world’s forests and the global context within which forestry decisions are made. But much has remained the same. Was MegaFlorestais a factor? What can be learned from reflecting on these changes in a decade?

This report examines the various dimensions of global water-related research over the 2012-2017 period, using extensive bibliographic data. The review covers trends in water-related publications and citations, the relative importance of water-related research in the overall body of scientific research, flows of water-related knowledge between countries and the dynamics of water research publishing opportunities. In summary, it shows that: less than 50% of all countries are publishing water-related research, that China and USA are the two top publishers, and that China’s publishing rate has been growing steadily over the study period. More than 70% of water related publications originating in USA are being cited globally, while China’s water research output appears to be primarily internally cited at present. Analysis of the global water knowledge flows suggests that research is hardly addressing a range of regional water challenges. Countries with protracted water problems – for example in infrastructure, environment, agriculture, energy solutions – do not seem to be at the forefront of water research production or knowledge transfer. Instead, global water research is reliant on Western, particularly US-produced, scientific outputs. A disconnect is also observed between the percentage increase in the publication and the number of citations, suggesting low quality or a narrow focus of many publications. Among other factors, this may reflect the pressure on researchers to contribute a certain number of publications per year, or of the progressively increasing role of grey literature in scientific discourse that ‘diverts’ some citation flow. Analysis of the number of research publications per million people suggests that water research does not necessarily emerge as a reaction to water scarcity in a specific country, but may be driven by the traditional economic value of water supply, geopolitical location, a focus on regional development - including cross-border water management - or development aid spending, or globally applicable research in water management. The proportion of water research in the overall research output of a country is small, including for some of the top-publishing countries. The number of water-related journals that create opportunities for publishing water research, has grown dramatically in absolute terms since 2000, and is now close 2100 journals. The metrics used in this report are based on readily available bibliographic data. They can be further focused to better understand a specific thematic domain, geographical region or country, or to analyze a different period. To help accelerate solutions to global and national water challenges that many of these research papers are highlighting, the water research community needs to look beyond the research ‘box’ and identify ways to measure development impact of water research programmes, rather ‘impact’ based solely on academic impact measured in citations. The research findings, learning and knowledge in these research publications needs to be conveyed in a practical way to the real users of this knowledge – stakeholders who are beyond research circles.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.