Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Vertical fiscal imbalance"
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Статті в журналах з теми "Vertical fiscal imbalance"
Zhang, Simin, and Zhikai Wang. "Effects of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance on Fiscal Health Expenditure Efficiency—Evidence from China." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 20, no. 3 (January 23, 2023): 2060. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20032060.
Повний текст джерелаMeloni, Osvaldo. "Electoral Opportunism and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance." Journal of Applied Economics 19, no. 1 (May 2016): 145–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1514-0326(16)30006-x.
Повний текст джерелаBouton, Laurent, Marjorie Gassner, and Vincenzo Verardi. "Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance." European Journal of Political Economy 24, no. 2 (June 2008): 317–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.01.003.
Повний текст джерелаQin, Fengqin. "Fiscal Expenditure Structure, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Environmental Pollution." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 13 (July 1, 2022): 8106. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19138106.
Повний текст джерелаAlekhin, B. I. "Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and Regional Economic Growth." Financial Journal 12, no. 6 (2020): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.31107/2075-1990-2020-6-39-53.
Повний текст джерелаKowalik, Paweł. "Measurement of vertical fiscal imbalance in Germany." Argumenta Oeconomica 2, no. 37 (2016): 131–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.15611/aoe.2016.2.05.
Повний текст джерелаSavchenko, Y. M. "The Fiscal Imbalances and Methodological Approaches to Their Assessment." Business Inform 6, no. 521 (2021): 219–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2021-6-219-228.
Повний текст джерелаKowalik, Paweł. "Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance In The United States." Folia Oeconomica Stetinensia 14, no. 2 (December 1, 2014): 140–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/foli-2015-0013.
Повний текст джерелаGuo, Gang. "Vertical Imbalance and Local Fiscal Discipline in China." Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 1 (April 2008): 61–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800005099.
Повний текст джерелаMikhaylova, A. A., and E. N. Timushev. "Concept of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in the Analysis of Fiscal Sustainability at the Regional Level." Financial Journal 13, no. 6 (2021): 98–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.31107/2075-1990-2021-6-98-116.
Повний текст джерелаДисертації з теми "Vertical fiscal imbalance"
Bouton, Laurent. "Essays in game theory applied to political and market institutions." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210325.
Повний текст джерела(i) One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation (joint with Micael Castanheira)
In elections, majority divisions pave the way to focal manipulations and coordination failures, which can lead to the victory of the wrong candidate. This paper shows how this flaw can be addressed if voter preferences over candidates are sensitive to information. We consider two potential sources of divisions: majority voters may have similar preferences but opposite information about the candidates, or opposite preferences. We show that when information is the source of majority divisions, Approval Voting features a unique equilibrium with full information and coordination equivalence. That is, it produces the same outcome as if both information and coordination problems could be resolved. Other electoral systems, such as Plurality and Two-Round elections, do not satisfy this equivalence. The second source of division is opposite preferences. Whenever the fraction of voters with such preferences is not too large, Approval Voting still satisfies full information and coordination equivalence.
(ii) Runoff Elections and the Condorcet Loser
A crucial component of Runoff electoral systems is the threshold fraction of votes above which a candidate wins outright in the first round. I analyze the influence of this threshold on the voting equilibria in three-candidate Runoff elections. I demonstrate the existence of an Ortega Effect which may unduly favor dominated candidates and thus lead to the election of the Condorcet Loser in equilibrium. The reason is that, contrarily to commonly held beliefs, lowering the threshold for first-round victory may actually induce voters to express their preferences excessively. I also extend Duverger's Law to Runoff elections with any threshold below, equal or above 50%. Therefore, Runoff elections are plagued with inferior equilibria that induce either too high or too low expression of preferences.
(iii) On the Influence of Rankings when Product Quality Depends on Buyer Characteristics
Information on product quality is crucial for buyers to make sound choices. For "experience products", this information is not available at the time of the purchase: it is only acquired through consumption. For much experience products, there exist institutions that provide buyers with information about quality. It is commonly believed that such institutions help consumers to make better choices and are thus welfare improving.
The quality of various experience products depends on the characteristics of buyers. For instance, conversely to the quality of cars, business school quality depends on buyers (i.e. students) characteristics. Indeed, one of the main inputs of a business school is enrolled students. The choice of buyers for such products has then some features of a coordination problem: ceteris paribus, a buyer prefers to buy a product consumed by buyers with "good" characteristics. This coordination dimension leads to inefficiencies when buyers coordinate on products of lower "intrinsic" quality. When the quality of products depends on buyer characteristics, information about product quality can reinforce such a coordination problem. Indeed, even though information of high quality need not mean high intrinsic quality, rational buyers pay attention to this information because they prefer high quality products, no matter the reason of the high quality. Information about product quality may then induce buyers to coordinate on products of low intrinsic quality.
In this paper, I show that, for experience products which quality depends on the characteristics of buyers, more information is not necessarily better. More precisely, I prove that more information about product quality may lead to a Pareto deterioration, i.e. all buyers may be worse off due.
(iv) Redistributing Income under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance (joint with Marjorie Gassner and Vincenzo Verardi)
From the literature on decentralization, it appears that the fiscal vertical imbalance (i.e. the dependence of subnational governments on national government revenues to support their expenditures) is somehow inherent to multi-level governments. Using a stylized model we show that this leads to a reduction of the extent of redistributive fiscal policies if the maximal size of government has been reached. To test for this empirically, we use some high quality data from the LIS dataset on individual incomes. The results are highly significant and point in the direction of our theoretical predictions.
Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
Fadliya, Fadliya. "Fiscal aspects of decentralisation in Indonesia." Phd thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/104304.
Повний текст джерелаPelton, Nicole Sheree. "Challenges for Integrated Coastal Management in the Australian Federation: Understanding Intergovernmental Tension: A Case Study of South Australia." Thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/119189.
Повний текст джерелаThesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Social Sciences, 2017
DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Zdeňka. "Intraregionální rozdíly ve fiskální pozici obcí." Master's thesis, 2007. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-79936.
Повний текст джерелаКниги з теми "Vertical fiscal imbalance"
McLure, Charles E. Vertical fiscal imbalance and the assignment of taxing powers in Australia. Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1993.
Знайти повний текст джерелаCanada, Conference Board of. Vertical fiscal imbalance July 2002: Fiscal prospects for the federal and provincial/territorial governments : economic performance and trends. Ottawa, Ont: The Board, 2002.
Знайти повний текст джерелаK, Srivastava D., and Madras School of Economics, eds. Reforming India's fiscal transfer system: Resolving vertical and horizontal imbalances. Chennai: Madras School of Economics, 2008.
Знайти повний текст джерелаRangarajan, C. Reforming India's fiscal transfer system: Resolving vertical and horizontal imbalances. Chennai: Madras School of Economics, 2008.
Знайти повний текст джерелаKops, Manfred. Local revenues in Malaysia: The correction of its vertical and horizontal imbalances by intergovernmental transfers. Köln: Finanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut an der Universität zu Köln, 1989.
Знайти повний текст джерелаCanada, Conference Board of, ed. Vertical fiscal imbalance July 2000: Fiscal prospects for the federal and provincial/territorial governments. Ottawa, Ont: Conference Board of Canada, 2002.
Знайти повний текст джерелаMcClure, Charles E. Jr. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance and the Assignment of Taxing Powers in Australia (Essays in public policy). Hoover Inst Pr, 1993.
Знайти повний текст джерелаKarpowicz, Izabela. Narrowing Vertical Fiscal Imbalances in Four European Countries. International Monetary Fund, 2012.
Знайти повний текст джерелаCevik, Serhan. Fragmentation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalances Lessons from Moldova. International Monetary Fund, 2014.
Знайти повний текст джерелаCevik, Serhan. Fragmentation and Vertical Fiscal Imbalances Lessons from Moldova. International Monetary Fund, 2014.
Знайти повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "Vertical fiscal imbalance"
Brezovnik, Boštjan, Mateja Finžgar, and Žan Jan Oplotnik. "Slovenia: Vertical Imbalance in Local Government Financing." In Fiscal Decentralisation, Local Government and Policy Reversals in Southeastern Europe, 21–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96092-0_2.
Повний текст джерелаKoley, Madhurima, and Kumarjit Mandal. "Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and Its Impact on Fiscal Performance: A Case for Indian States." In Opportunities and Challenges in Development, 243–82. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9981-7_12.
Повний текст джерела"Vertical Imbalance and Fiscal Behavior in a Welfare State." In Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints. The MIT Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3021.003.0008.
Повний текст джерелаWoźniakowski, Tomasz P. "Comparative Analysis and Implications for the EU." In Fiscal Unions, 135–54. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192858436.003.0006.
Повний текст джерелаMekonnen, Getachew Alebachew, and Walelign Awoke Kassie. "Fiscal Decentralization at Local Government of Ethiopia." In Civic Engagement Frameworks and Strategic Leadership Practices for Organization Development, 171–97. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-2372-8.ch008.
Повний текст джерелаSpahn, Paul B. "The German model of addressing vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances." In Intergovernmental Transfers in Federations, 64–85. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781789900859.00013.
Повний текст джерелаRao, M. Govinda. "Intergovernmental Transfers in India." In Studies in Indian Public Finance, 175–220. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192849601.003.0008.
Повний текст джерелаЗвіти організацій з теми "Vertical fiscal imbalance"
Ter-Minassian, Teresa, and Andrés Muñoz Miranda. Options for a Reform of the Mexican Intergovernmental Transfer System in Light of International Experiences. Inter-American Development Bank, April 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004217.
Повний текст джерела