Статті в журналах: "Static game"

1

Brumand, Younes, and Masoomeh Salary. "A Game Theoretic Model of Iranian Labor Market." ISSUE SIX 4, no. 6 (June 30, 2020): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.25079/ukhjss.v4n1y2020.pp1-20.

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In this paper, we analyze the interactions among workers, employers, and the government in the Iranian labor market using game theory. For this purpose, different games among the factors affecting the labor market are analyzed in both static and dynamic situations. In each case, intervention and non-intervention of the government are also examined. Thus, four different types of games are studied, including a static game between worker and employer, without government intervention; a static game among workers, employers, and the government; a dynamic game between worker and employer, without government intervention; and a dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government. In the first three games, Nash equilibrium implies low productivity of worker, low employer’s profits, and high unemployment rate in which players want to maintain the status quo. However, in the dynamic game among workers, employers, and the government, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game can provide some conditions in which the labor market gets away from the low productivity situation

2

Wang, Kaihong, Li Cheng, and Chuan Ding. "Infinity Period Dynamic Control of a Kind of Channel’s Price and Brand Investment: A Differential Game Method." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2015 (2015): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/721970.

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The infinity period dynamic control problem of distribution channel was studied with differential game approach. Four differential dynamic control models of coordinated channel game, uncoordinated static game, Stackelberg game with manufacture controlled, and Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled were constructed. Some results applied dynamic optimization theory made with Hamilton function. The conclusions are as follows. (1) Optimization brand investment controlled by manufacture has nothing to do with time. (2) Retail price was the most minimum when channel was integrated. (3) Manufacture’s profits of uncoordinated static game and Stackelberg game with manufacture controlled were more than Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled. (4) Retailer’s profits of Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled were less than Stackelberg game with manufacture controlled. (5) Channel’s total profits of Stackelberg game withnretailers controlled were the most minimum.

3

Ping Man, Samuel Choi. "On Constructing Static Evaluation Function using Temporal Difference Learning." Computer Engineering and Applications Journal 2, no. 1 (March 18, 2013): 175–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.18495/comengapp.v2i1.18.

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Programming computers to play board games against human players has long been used as a measure for the development of artificial intelligence. The standard approach for computer game playing is to search for the best move from a given game state by using minimax search with static evaluation function. The static evaluation function is critical to the game playing performance but its design often relies on human expert players. This paper discusses how temporal differences (TD) learning can be used to construct a static evaluation function through self-playing and evaluates the effects for various parameter settings. The game of Kalah, a non-chance game of moderate complexity, is chosen as a testbed. The empirical result shows that TD learning is particularly promising for constructing a good evaluation function for the end games and can substantially improve the overall game playing performance in learning the entire game.DOI:Â 10.18495/comengapp.21.175184

4

Xie, Yuhang, Yihong Chen, Ziyi Wang, and Yangjun Ou. "AI intelligent wayfinding based on Unreal Engine 4 static map." Journal of Physics: Conference Series 2253, no. 1 (April 1, 2022): 012016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2253/1/012016.

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Abstract The development of games is closely related to the development of game engines. Unreal Engine is a mainstream game development engine. Unreal Engine has a powerful lighting rendering function and blueprint programming system.Therefore, using Unreal Engine for game development will better meet the requirements of modern game users for game quality and game content. In games, the AI path-finding system is often the core of a game. However, the path-finding component of the unreal engine is usually only applies to three-dimensional game and is used for intelligent path-finding in dynamic environment. Howerve, the 2D game usually finds the way in static environment. At present, there are a lareg number of path-finding algorithms and theoretical studies based on static environment, but there is no simulation experiment and detailed explanation of intelligent path-finding in static environment based on the Unreal Engine platform. This article firstly explains the principle of path-finding algorithms that are several commonly used in static environment. Then it compares the performance of different algorithms, and selects the optimal solution among several schemes by summarizing the experimental results. Then based on the optimal path-finding algorithm, using blueprint programming to implement AI path-finding in the Unreal engine. Finally, this article sort out and summarize the overall work process and indicate direction for future optimization.

5

Glazik, Christian, Gerold Jäger, Jan Schiemann, and Anand Srivastav. "Bounds for the Static Permutation Mastermind game." Discrete Mathematics 344, no. 3 (March 2021): 112253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.disc.2020.112253.

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6

Salsabila, N. H., and W. Setyaningrum. "Game “STATIC”: Is It Interesting for Students?" Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1097 (September 2018): 012105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1097/1/012105.

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7

Lv, Youqing, Guojian Ma, and Juan Ding. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Medical Waste Disposal in China under Different Reward and Penalty Models." Sustainability 14, no. 8 (April 13, 2022): 4658. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14084658.

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Although local governments have issued relevant reward and penalty policies, there are still problems of medical waste disposal in China, particularly in light of the special situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, these problems are generated in the game between local governments and disposal enterprises. Accordingly, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes and analyzes the game system between local governments and disposal enterprises under four modes: static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, and dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The theoretical analysis is verified through numerical simulation of a medical waste disposal case in China. The results showed that when local governments choose the static reward and static penalty mode, the game system hardly always has an evolutionary stable state, and the dynamic reward or dynamic penalty mode can make up for the shortcomings of the static reward and static penalty mode. The static reward and dynamic penalty mode is considerably better than the other two dynamic reward and penalty modes, which has the best effect on improving the quality of medical waste disposal. Additionally, if the reward or penalty increases dynamically, local governments tend to implement a “relaxed supervision” strategy, and disposal enterprises will still improve the disposal quality of medical waste. The suggestions proposed based on the research conclusions offer some enlightenment for policymakers to formulate reasonable reward and penalty measures.

8

Gibbons, Robert. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 1 (February 1, 1997): 127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.1.127.

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This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

9

Penmatsa, Satish, and Anthony T. Chronopoulos. "Game-theoretic static load balancing for distributed systems." Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing 71, no. 4 (April 2011): 537–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpdc.2010.11.016.

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10

Skoulakis, Stratis, Tanner Fiez, Ryann Sim, Georgios Piliouras, and Lillian Ratliff. "Evolutionary Game Theory Squared: Evolving Agents in Endogenously Evolving Zero-Sum Games." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, no. 13 (May 18, 2021): 11343–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i13.17352.

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The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away from the artificial divide between dynamic agents and static games, to introduce and analyze a large class of competitive settings where both the agents and the games they play evolve strategically over time. We focus on arguably the most archetypal game-theoretic setting---zero-sum games (as well as network generalizations)---and the most studied evolutionary learning dynamic---replicator, the continuous-time analogue of multiplicative weights. Populations of agents compete against each other in a zero-sum competition that itself evolves adversarially to the current population mixture. Remarkably, despite the chaotic coevolution of agents and games, we prove that the system exhibits a number of regularities. First, the system has conservation laws of an information-theoretic flavor that couple the behavior of all agents and games. Secondly, the system is Poincare recurrent, with effectively all possible initializations of agents and games lying on recurrent orbits that come arbitrarily close to their initial conditions infinitely often. Thirdly, the time-average agent behavior and utility converge to the Nash equilibrium values of the time-average game. Finally, we provide a polynomial time algorithm to efficiently predict this time-average behavior for any such coevolving network game.

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Hoetama, D. J. Owen, Farica Perdana Putri, and P. M. Winarno. "Algoritma Fisher-Yates Shuffle dan Flood Fill sebagai Maze Generator pada Game Labirin." ULTIMA Computing 10, no. 2 (March 19, 2019): 59–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.31937/sk.v10i2.1064.

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Maze game is an interesting game and used to spend time. However, in the maze game, the level used forthis game still uses static levels. Static levels make the maze shape stay the same if we play the same level. Thus, players will quickly feel bored because it finds the same complexity. Maze generator is a static level problem solution on the maze game. This research uses Fisher-Yates Shuffle algorithm and Flood Fill algorithm to make maze generator. Fisher-Yates Shuffle algorithm is used for wall position randomization and Flood Fill algorithm to keep the maze results to remain resolved. The results of the application implementation yielded 30 mazes and were tested using the Hamming Distance algorithm, yielding that the result of the maze formed is always different. The average percentage rate difference produced 48% each time the maze was formed. The results of the maze that was formed performed perfect maze checking with the result of 83.33% percentage. Index Terms— Fisher-Yates Shuffle, Flood Fill, MazeGenerator, Hamming Distance

12

Lei, He, Si-xuan Zhou, Yin-xiang Wang, Yun-fei Zheng, Lin Jing, Reng-cun Fang, Dong-jun Yang, and Zi-xia Sang. "Coordinated Development Based Grid-Source-load Collaborative Planning Method of Uncertainty and Multi-agent Game." E3S Web of Conferences 233 (2021): 01115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202123301115.

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When planning the power grid, it is necessary to obtain the optimal decision scheme according to the market behavior of different stakeholders. In this paper, the virtual game player "nature" is introduced to realize the deep integration of game theory and robust optimization, and a source network load collaborative planning method considering uncertainty and multi-agent game is proposed. Firstly, the planning decision-making models of different stakeholders of DG investment operators, power grid investment operators and power users are constructed respectively; then, the static game behavior between distributed generation (DG) investment operators and power grid investment operators is analyzed according to the transmission relationship of the three; at the same time, robust optimization is used to deal with DG. In this paper, we introduce the virtual game player "nature" to study the dynamic game behavior between the virtual game player and the power grid investment operator. On this basis, the dynamic static joint game planning model is proposed.

13

Yao, Lan, Fu Xiang Gao, and Lin Cong. "Research on Static Game Theory Based Secure Routing Algorithm in WSN." Applied Mechanics and Materials 571-572 (June 2014): 1030–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.571-572.1030.

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In deep research and analysis on WSN security routing protocols and according to the rational development trend of the sensor nodes, this paper proposes a new WSN security routing protocol based on the theory of the static game—GBR. GBR describes the interactions in a static game model using rational characteristics of nodes. When selecting the forwarding node, neighboring nodes decide whether to participate in forwarding data through game, and prevent the destruction of malicious nodes by calculating the utility function. They control and adjust the game process and results through incentive mechanism. GBR (Game theory Based Routing algorithm) reduces packet loss rate by the above mechanisms and strategies and effectively controls the self-ish behavior of nodes. In addition, GBR pursues security routing and makes design and improvement in the energy conservation, which considers node security and regards the energy of the nodes as an importing reference index, in order to balance the network energy consumption.

14

Lu, Gong Shu, Cun Bin Li, and Xian Li. "New Nash Equilibrium Based on Generic Risk Element Transmission Theory." Advanced Materials Research 424-425 (January 2012): 410–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.424-425.410.

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Nash equilibrium is the foundation of traditional game theory, while the benefits of game players under the Nash equilibrium are constant, so the core idea of generic risk transmission was applied to traditional static game. Accordingly a risk static game model, in which the benefits of players were subject to triangular distribution, was constructed. Then we obtained different equilibrium states under the different risk types of players. Furthermore, the classic Prisoners’ Dilemma was used to demonstrate the practice value of risk game. Through analyzing and solving the risk Prisoners’ Dilemma model which changed from the classic Prisoner's Dilemma model according to actual situation, the Pareto improvement strategy combination could be achieved. The new equilibrium result can give an appropriate explanation why there is always some prisoners conceal the corpus delicti in adventure

15

De Giovanni, Pietro. "Digital Supply Chain through Dynamic Inventory and Smart Contracts." Mathematics 7, no. 12 (December 13, 2019): 1235. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math7121235.

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This paper develops a digital supply chain game, modeling marketing and operation interactions between members. The main novelty of the paper concerns a comparison between static and dynamic solutions of the supply chain game achieved when moving from traditional to digital platforms. Therefore, this study proposes centralized and decentralized versions of the game, comparing their solutions under static and dynamic settings. Moreover, it investigates the decentralized supply chain by evaluating two smart contracts: Revenue sharing and wholesale price contracts. In both cases, the firms use an artificial intelligence system to determine the optimal contract parameters. Numerical and qualitative analyses are used for comparing configurations (centralized, decentralized), settings (static, dynamic), and contract schemes (revenue sharing contract, wholesale price contract). The findings identify the conditions under which smart revenue sharing mechanisms are worth applying.

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Yuniati, Trihastuti, Aris Rafael Tambunan, and Yoso Adi Setyoko. "Implementasi Static Analysis Dan Background Process Untuk Mendeteksi Malware Pada Aplikasi Android Dengan Mobile Security Framework." LEDGER : Journal Informatic and Information Technology 1, no. 2 (October 18, 2022): 24–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.20895/ledger.v1i2.848.

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Android menjadi sistem operasi yang paling banyak digunakan di antara sekian banyak pilihan sistem operasi untuk perangkat mobile dengan dukungan oleh aplikasi yang beragam guna memudahkan kehidupan manusia dalam beraktifitas Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) adalah framework pengujian otomatis bersifat open-source, yang mampu melakukan uji penetrasi, analisis malware, penilaian keamanan aplikasi seluler dengan analisis statis dan dinamis dalam melakukan proses analisis akan menampilkan hasil berupa laporan mengenai aplikasi android tersebut. Tujuan Penelitian ini adalaha bagaimana menggunakan Mobile Security Framwork (MobSF) sebagai analisis static malware pada aplikasi android. Sample malware akan diambil melalui internet dan menganalisis malware tersebut menggunakan metode analisis statik yang membaca informasi malware lalu dikombinasikan dengan background process android dengan menginstal live pada device android. Peneliti menggunakan Mobile security framework (MobSF) untuk menganalisis statik keamanan dengan parameter dangerous permissions, weak crypto, root detection, SSL bypass dan domain malware check pada aplikasi X8Speeder. Hasil dari analisis, terdeteksi Malware dan memiliki perizinan yang tidak sewajarnya. Seperti yang terlihat, aplikasi game tidak memerlukan izin untuk memodifikasi penyimpanan eksternal smartphone. Maka dari itu, diperlukannya ketelitian pengguna agar tidak sembarangan mengunduh atau mengklik sesuatu ketika berinternet. Kata Kunci: Mobile Security Framework, Static Analysis, Backgrund Proces Android. Android

17

Lozovanu, Dmitrii, and Stefan Pickl. "On the Existence and Determining Stationary Nash Equilibria for Switching Controller Stochastic Games." Contributions to Game Theory and Management 14 (2021): 290–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.21.

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In this paper we consider the problem of the existence and determining stationary Nash equilibria for switching controller stochastic games with discounted and average payoffs. The set of states and the set of actions in the considered games are assumed to be finite. For a switching controller stochastic game with discounted payoffs we show that all stationary equilibria can be found by using an auxiliary continuous noncooperative static game in normal form in which the payoffs are quasi-monotonic (quasi-convex and quasi-concave) with respect to the corresponding strategies of the players. Based on this we propose an approach for determining the optimal stationary strategies of the players. In the case of average payoffs for a switching controller stochastic game we also formulate an auxiliary noncooperative static game in normal form with quasi-monotonic payoffs and show that such a game possesses a Nash equilibrium if the corresponding switching controller stochastic game has a stationary Nash equilibrium.

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Wang, Mingbao, Zhiping Du, and Hong Duan. "Study on Participant Behavior Game of Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain Based on ECP." Journal of Systems Science and Information 5, no. 5 (October 30, 2017): 411–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.21078/jssi-2017-411-24.

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Abstract In this paper, a game model composed of three subjects — government, manufacturer and consumer has been built by using Evolutionary Game Theory on the basis of analyzing the trilateral game strategy of waste mobile reverse supply chain based on ECP; an evolutionary equilibrium model is to be sought for by utilizing the replication dynamic differential equation method; and the trilateral game strategy’s revolutionary trend and consistency have been analyzed by means of SD simulation method when government implements the static or dynamic reward and punishment strategy. The finding results reveal that, under the static reward and punishment strategy, the revolutionary process of trilateral game strategy is always unstable whether the initial behavior strategy is unitary or mixed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for the government to adopt the strategy of dynamic reward and punishment, and it is also stable and reciprocal for all the stakeholders when implementing this strategy.

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Lei Zhao, and Sheng Zhong. "Static and Dynamic Game of The Inventory Transshipment Problem." International Journal of Digital Content Technology and its Applications 7, no. 3 (February 15, 2013): 795–804. http://dx.doi.org/10.4156/jdcta.vol7.issue3.95.

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Zhao, Hua, Jiang Li, and Xinyu Jiang. "Static uncertain behavioral game with application to investment problem." Soft Computing 24, no. 4 (February 21, 2019): 2479–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00500-018-03737-y.

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Salsabila, N. H., and W. Setyaningrum. "Game “STATIC”: Is it effective for students’ conceptual understanding?" Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1581 (July 2020): 012065. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1581/1/012065.

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22

Clempner, Julio B. "On Lyapunov Game Theory Equilibrium: Static and Dynamic Approaches." International Game Theory Review 20, no. 02 (June 2018): 1750033. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500335.

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This paper suggests a game theory problem in which any feasible solution is based on the Lyapunov theory. The problem is analyzed in the static and dynamic cases. Some properties of Nash equilibria such as existence and stability are derived naturally from the Lyapunov theory. Remarkable is that every asymptotically stable equilibrium point (Nash equilibrium point) admits a Lyapunov-like function and if a Lyapunov-like function exists it converges to a Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium point. We define a Lyapunov-like function as an Lp-norm from the multiplayer objective function to the utopia minimum as a cost function. We propose multiple metrics to find the Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium and the strong Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium. Finding a Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium is reduced to the minimization problem of the Lyapunov-like function. We prove that the equilibrium point properties of Nash and Lyapunov meet in game theory. In order to validate the contributions of the paper, we present a numerical example.

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Yang, Pengxi, Fei Gao, and Hua Zhang. "Multi-Player Evolutionary Game of Network Attack and Defense Based on System Dynamics." Mathematics 9, no. 23 (November 24, 2021): 3014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9233014.

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We formalize the adversarial process between defender and attackers as a game and study the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism under bounded rationality. We analyze the long-term dynamic process between the attacking and defending parties using the evolutionary stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of a defender and multiple attackers, formally describe the strategies, and construct a three-player game payoff matrix. Then, we propose two punishment schemes, i.e., static and dynamic ones. Moreover, through the combination of mathematical derivation with simulation, we obtain the evolutionary stable strategies of each player. Different from previous work, in this paper, we consider the influence of strategies among different attackers. The simulation shows that (1) in the static punishment scheme, increasing the penalty can quickly control the occurrence of network attacks in the short term; (2) in the dynamic punishment scheme, the game can be stabilized effectively, and the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the change of the initial values.

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Liu, Wan Lin, and Lin Xiu Cai. "Study on the Engineering Project Tender Offer Game Type." Advanced Materials Research 860-863 (December 2013): 3049–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.860-863.3049.

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The article analyzed three game types in the process of the project tender offer, such as the static Bayesian game, the construction market entry and the cooperative game, which based on the game theory. And it determined what the methods and measures of tender offer should be taken according to the different kind of game types of bidders, and the research of achievement can provide a reference to enterprises decision-making on tender offer, which have strong operability.

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Elshafei, Mervat. "A Parametric Approach for Solving Interval–Valued fractional Continuous Static Games." JOURNAL OF ADVANCES IN MATHEMATICS 17 (September 16, 2019): 155–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24297/jam.v17i0.8419.

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The aim of this paper is to show that a parametric approach can be used to solve fractional continuous static games with interval-valued in the objective function and in the constraints. In this game, cooperation among all the players is possible, and each player helps the others up to the point of disadvantage to himself, so we use the Pareto-minimal solution concept to solve this type of game. The Dinkelbach method is used to transform fractional continuous static games into non- fractional continuous static games. Moreover, an algorithm with the corresponding flowchart to explain the suggested approach is introduced. Finally, a numerical example to illustrate the algorithm’s steps is given.

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Niu, Gen Yi. "A Game Theory Based Analysis of the Tacit Knowledge Sharing and Incentive Mechanism." Advanced Materials Research 601 (December 2012): 564–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.601.564.

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Tacit knowledge sharing is the basis and prerequisite of knowledge innovation. In this paper the incentive mechanism of tacit knowledge sharing is proposed to improve tacit knowledge sharing. Firstly, game theory is introduced, and then we analyze the knowledge sharing and mechanism. Finally, Static and repeated game models of knowledge sharing are constructed. The results indicate that infinite repeated game can solve “Prisoner's dilemma” of knowledge sharing in the one-time game.

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Wang, Zongxian, Xiao Li, Weihua Liang, and Junhai Ma. "Does a New Electric Vehicle Manufacturer Have the Incentive for Battery Life Investment? A Study Based on the Game Framework." Mathematics 11, no. 16 (August 17, 2023): 3551. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math11163551.

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Motivated by the electric vehicle battery life performance, we studied the optimal investment decision-making behaviour of duopoly automakers. Based on the framework of game theory, this paper explores the influence of various parameters in the static game and dynamic game on the results, in combination with consumers’ preference for the battery life of electric vehicles. In the static game, a smaller investment coefficient is more beneficial to a firm that adopts an investment strategy rather than a firm that does not. When the investment coefficient increases, the difference between the two manufacturers will become smaller. The change of parameters in the dynamic game system may lead to complex dynamic phenomena, and the system will experience period-doubling bifurcation and N-S bifurcation from a stable state into a chaotic state. It will also significantly impact the basins of attraction, which affect the decision-makers’ initial choice. Consequently, we can use the control method to return the unstable system to stability. Based on these findings, some management insights and suggestions are presented.

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Aboelnaga, Yousria A., and Mai Zidan. "MIN-MAX SOLUTIONS FOR PARAMETRIC CONTINUOUS STATIC GAME UNDER ROUGHNESS (PARAMETERS IN THE COST FUNCTION AND FEASIBLE REGION IS A ROUGH SET)." Ural Mathematical Journal 6, no. 2 (December 26, 2020): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/umj.2020.2.001.

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Any simple perturbation in a part of the game whether in the cost function and/or conditions is a big problem because it will require a game re-solution to obtain the perturbed optimal solution. This is a waste of time because there are methods required several steps to obtain the optimal solution, then at the end we may find that there is no solution. Therefore, it was necessary to find a method to ensure that the game optimal solution exists in the case of a change in the game data. This is the aim of this paper. We first provided a continuous static game rough treatment with Min-Max solutions, then a parametric study for the processing game and called a parametric rough continuous static game (PRCSG). In a Parametric study, a solution approach is provided based on the parameter existence in the cost function that reflects the perturbation that may occur to it to determine the parameter range in which the optimal solution point keeps in the surely region that is called the stability set of the \(1^{st}\) kind. Also the sets of possible upper and lower stability to which the optimal solution belongs are characterized. Finally, numerical examples are given to clarify the solution algorithm.

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Aradillas-López, Andrés. "The Econometrics of Static Games." Annual Review of Economics 12, no. 1 (August 2, 2020): 135–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-081919-113720.

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This article reviews the econometrics of static games, with a focus on discrete-choice cases. These models have been used to study a rich variety of empirical problems, ranging from labor force participation to entry decisions. We outline the components of a general game and describe the problem of doing robust inference in the presence of multiple solutions, as well as the different econometric approaches that have been applied to tackle this problem. We then describe the specific challenges that arise in different variations of these models depending on whether players are assumed to have complete or incomplete information, as well as whether or not nonequilibrium play is allowed. We describe the results in 2 × 2 games (the most widely studied games in econometrics), and we present extensions and recent results in games with richer action spaces. Areas for future research are also discussed.

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ZHOU, LIHUA, WEIYI LIU, and LIZHEN WANG. "STATIC STRATEGIC GAME APPROACH FOR MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTE DECISION MAKING PROBLEMS WITHOUT WEIGHT INFORMATION." International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools 20, no. 03 (June 2011): 577–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218213011000292.

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In multiple attribute decision making (MADM) problems, it is usual that no single alternative works best for all performance attributes, so it is difficult to select the best from among multiple available alternatives, especially in the situation that the attribute weights are completely unknown. This research propose a game theory-based approach (GMADM) which incorporates static strategic game theory into MADM problems to derive the attribute weights, and then utilize the weight arithmetic average (WAA) operator to aggregate the attribute values corresponding to each alternative and rank alternatives by means of aggregated information. In GMADM, each attribute is regarded as a player taking part in the game, and the player's strategy is to select a value from interval [0,1] to assign corresponding attribute weight, and the player's utility is defined as the agreement between the ranking of alternatives determined by the aggregated information and the one determined by the attribute values. When the game is in equilibrium status, the strategy profile is the best attribute weights which make each player have good utilities. Moreover, the equilibrium solution of game and the resolution method for the MADM problem without weight information have also been developed. Finally, the result of proposed approach for a practical MADM problem and its comparisons with one of other methods are given.

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Sanchis-Cano, Angel, Luis Guijarro, and Massimo Condoluci. "Dynamic capacity provision for wireless sensors’ connectivity: A profit optimization approach." International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 14, no. 4 (April 2018): 155014771877254. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1550147718772544.

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We model a wireless sensors’ connectivity scenario mathematically and analyze it using capacity provision mechanisms, with the objective of maximizing the profits of a network operator. The scenario has several sensors’ clusters with each one having one sink node, which uploads the sensing data gathered in the cluster through the wireless connectivity of a network operator. The scenario is analyzed both as a static game and as a dynamic game, each one with two stages, using game theory. The sinks’ behavior is characterized with a utility function related to the mean service time and the price paid to the operator for the service. The objective of the operator is to maximize its profits by optimizing the network capacity. In the static game, the sinks’ subscription decision is modeled using a population game. In the dynamic game, the sinks’ behavior is modeled using an evolutionary game and the replicator dynamic, while the operator optimal capacity is obtained solving an optimal control problem. The scenario is shown feasible from an economic point of view. In addition, the dynamic capacity provision optimization is shown as a valid mechanism for maximizing the operator profits, as well as a useful tool to analyze evolving scenarios. Finally, the dynamic analysis opens the possibility to study more complex scenarios using the differential game extension.

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Li, Sheng, Huifang Feng, and Yu Huang. "Pricing for Products in Website-Dominant Static Group-buying." Business and Management Research 6, no. 3 (September 23, 2017): 94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/bmr.v6n3p94.

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We develop a game model to describe the game between a seller and a group-buying website in order to study the operating mode of Chinese static group-buying(GB). A seller sells products by a website and allocates a proportion of revenue to it. Based on this mode we establish the profit function of the seller and that of the GB website. The website decides its allocation proportion and the sale price of its products according to the profit maximization principle and the revenue sharing proportion in the contract. We then analyze the relationship among different parameters and find that the products’ price decreasing with the increasing of the revenue sharing proportion. In addition, there also exists an optimal GB period to maximize the seller’s profit in a GB.

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Zhao, Xiao Hong, and Jun Xin Cao. "A Study on Feasibility of Upstream and Downstream Ecological Cooperation - An Example of Game Among Upstream and Downstream Villages." Advanced Materials Research 524-527 (May 2012): 3589–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.524-527.3589.

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The feasibility of area ecological cooperation without government interaction, and the possibility of building up effective ecological cooperation mechanism are the main questions need to be studied for ecological construction and area harmonious development. This article used the game among upstream and downstream villages as an example, analyzed upstream and downstream village under static game of complete information, single stage game and repeated game model, and stated that the sanction among upstream and downstream ecological cooperation is very low without government interaction, however, this result can be remodeled at certain degree through changing the rules of the game and payoff matrix of both game side.

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Liu, Xi, Jun Liu, and Chun Yan Zhu. "P2P Incentive Mechanism Based on Static Game of Incomplete Information." Applied Mechanics and Materials 138-139 (November 2011): 1234–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.138-139.1234.

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P2P network is autonomous of sharing file quickly and easily. In recent years, a large number of free-riding nodes and malicious nodes emerge in P2P network, which can’t provide services and have malicious damage to the network system, the result is significant declines of system performance and user satisfaction. In order to solve the problems, a P2P incentive mechanism based on static game of incomplete information is proposed in this paper. The new proposed mechanism has been analyzed and simulated with a series of tests. Experimental results show that the proposed P2P incentive mechanism can solve problem simply and effectively.

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Wang, Qinan, and Mahmut Parlar. "Static game theory models and their applications in management science." European Journal of Operational Research 42, no. 1 (September 1989): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(89)90055-6.

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Ma, Lin, and Hai Ying Gu. "A Game Analysis between GM Food Production Enterprises and Regulators in Information Asymmetry." Advanced Materials Research 403-408 (November 2011): 1960–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.403-408.1960.

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Information asymmetry exists in a game relation between GM food Production enterprises and Regulators. Thus the market equilibrium depends on the strategy of GM food Production enterprises and Regulators.This paper argues that the probability of GM food Production enterprises paying attention to the propaganda and labeling GM food Consciously increase along with the probability of Regulation whether in Dynamic Game or Static Game. For the sake of Consumers,the Regulation of GM food is Essential.

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Chen, Yuqing, Zhen Li, Jiaying Xu, Yingying Liu, and Qingfeng Meng. "How Does the Government Policy Combination Prevents Greenwashing in Green Building Projects? An Evolutionary Game Perspective." Buildings 13, no. 4 (March 30, 2023): 917. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/buildings13040917.

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Green buildings (GBs) can effectively reduce building energy consumption and alleviate energy problems. However, as green building projects swell, the development process of GBs in China has gradually exposed many problems, among which the greenwashing behavior of construction enterprises is the more serious. The government needs to adopt some appropriate policies to prevent problems in GBs. This paper uses the evolutionary game theory to construct models and proposes four policy combinations: static reward and static punishment, static reward and dynamic punishment, dynamic reward and static punishment, dynamic reward and dynamic punishment. We compare the impact of four combinations on construction strategy and analyze the inner mechanisms of the behavior evolution of government departments and construction enterprises. Our results revealed no evolutionary stabilization strategy in the game system under the static reward and punishment policy. Under the combination of dynamic subsidies and static penalty policy, the green construction effect of construction enterprises is the best. Furthermore, dynamic reward policy has a more obvious restraining effect on construction enterprises. The government should dynamically adjust rewards and punishments according to the construction quality and determine the appropriate upper limit of rewards and punishments to improve the policies’ applicability and effectiveness. This study provides theoretical support for the healthy development of green buildings.

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Martens, Chris, Adam Summerville, Michael Mateas, Joseph Osborn, Sarah Harmon, Noah Wardrip-Fruin, and Arnav Jhala. "Proceduralist Readings, Procedurally." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Interactive Digital Entertainment 12, no. 2 (June 25, 2021): 53–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aiide.v12i2.12892.

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While generative approaches to game design offer great promise, systems can only reliably generate what they can “understand,” often limited to what can be handencoded by system authors. Proceduralist readings, a way of deriving meaning for games based on their underlying processes and interactions in conjunction with aesthetic and cultural cues, offer a novel, systematic approach to game understanding. We formalize proceduralist argumentation as a logic program that performs static reasoning over game specifications to derive higher-level meanings (e.g., deriving dynamics from mechanics), opening the door to broader and more culturally-situated game generation.

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Prieto, Jaime, Miguel-Ángel Gómez, and Jaime Sampaio. "From a Static to a Dynamic Perspective in Handball Match Analysis: a Systematic Review." Open Sports Sciences Journal 8, no. 1 (December 29, 2015): 25–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/1875399x01508010025.

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The aim of this study was to perform a systematic review of the scientific literature on handball match analysis and to identify potential research areas for future work. Data were collected from Web of Science, MEDLINE, SPORTDiscus, Scopus, EBSCO, and ProQuest databases. The initial search found 148 journal articles. Only the papers focused on handball match analysis regarding tactical and technical aspects were considered, for a final list of 25 publications. The complexity approach under which each considered publication was conducted was taken into account (i.e., static vs. dynamic). Therein, authors, main analysis, number of performance indicators under study, considered situational variables, statistics and/or analysis methods, type of competition, number of matches, and sex of participants were distinguished for classification purposes. Research on handball match analysis has evolved over the years, mainly due to the great technological advances. Studies conducted under the classical static complexity approach are the most extended. Studies performed under the relatively new dynamic complexity approach are growing. The present review identified the following main guidelines for future work on handball match analysis: conducting more studies focused on the defensive profile; analyzing handball national leagues and international club competitions; performing more studies in female handball; including game situational variables into the analysis (i.e., game type, match status, game location, quality of opposition, game period); incorporating critical events of the game into the analysis (e.g., team timeouts, exclusions); and, conducting further research from the promising dynamic complexity perspective.

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Jiang, Yanqing, Jian Yuan, and Mengmeng Zeng. "A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR." Business and Management Studies 2, no. 2 (May 9, 2016): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/bms.v2i2.1552.

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There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

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Pang, Sulin, Junkun Yang, Rongzhou Li, and Jun Cao. "Static Game Models and Applications Based on Market Supervision and Compliance Management of P2P Platform." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020 (October 26, 2020): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8869132.

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This article focuses on the two-party static game between market supervisory organization and peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform. Considering 4 game modes with both “strong supervision” and “weak supervision” of market supervisory organization and “compliance management” and “noncompliance management” of P2P lending platform, the paper establishes a static game model between P2P lending platform and market supervisory organization and solves the market equilibrium solutions. Based on income, cost, disguised cost, and fine of P2P lending platform and income, cost, and reward of market supervisory organization, it discusses conditional strategies that P2P lending platform selects “compliance management” or “noncompliance management” and that market supervisory organization selects “strong supervision” or “weak supervision,” respectively. Furthermore, the relevant influencing factors are analyzed which come from 18 P2P lending platforms in Guangdong Province of China, and the conclusions were in good agreement with the actual market. The research has scientific guiding significance.

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Irhas, Asrowi, and Djono. "GAME EDUKASI WAYANG." Jurnal Utilitas 8, no. 1 (February 21, 2022): 27–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.22236/utilitas.v8i1.8588.

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This paper aims to describe the importance of internalizing character education through media that is appropriate to the development of ICT and student characteristics. Considering several facts revealing that the achievement of the internalization of character education in schools is still relatively low, given the low interest in student learning and the use of learning media that tends to be static, whereas in learning in the digital era where students are familiar with the use of technology, of course, it must receive attention given the great potential if opportunities for using ICT in the learning process can be optimized. This paper uses a descriptive qualitative design approach with a literature review method, data is collected from the results of reading orientation of authentic sources namely books, journals and relevant literature and analyzed through reduction, display and verification as conclusions. Internalization of character education in the digital era requires the integration and synergy of ICT, the existence of ICT packaged in the form of educational games will be able to create greater opportunities in optimizing the internalization of character education based on local wisdom, such as Wayang.

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Hu, Jun, Yulian Fei, and Ertian Hua. "Research of Supply Quality Control and Optimization Under Multi-Period Dynamic Game." International Journal of Applied Logistics 2, no. 1 (January 2011): 85–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jal.2011010106.

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To control quality in supply chain, this paper presents multi-period, dynamic game models in principal-agent theory, which are opposite to static, single period game models. The research comes from industrial practice and the conclusions are more operational and feasible in theory. Finally, the research is applied into two famous companies in different industries and shows good effectiveness.

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Guzdial, Matthew, Nathan Sturtevant, and Boyang Li. "Deep Static and Dynamic Level Analysis: A Study on Infinite Mario." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Interactive Digital Entertainment 12, no. 2 (June 25, 2021): 31–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aiide.v12i2.12894.

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Automatic analysis of game levels can provide as- sistance to game designers and procedural content generation. We introduce a static-dynamic scale to categorize level analysis strategies, which captures the extent that the analysis depends on player simulation. Due to its ability to automatically learn intermediate representations for the task, a convolutional neural network (CNN) provides a general tool for both types of analysis. In this paper, we explore the use of CNN to analyze 1,437 Infinite Mario levels. We further propose a deep reinforcement learning technique for dynamic analysis, which allows the simulated player to pay a penalty to reduce error in its control. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques and complementarity of dynamic and static analysis.

45

Huang, Qiu Sheng, and Sheng Wang. "The Game Analysis on Moral Hazard in the Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power." Advanced Materials Research 518-523 (May 2012): 1014–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.518-523.1014.

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The development of nuclear power has become an important way to solve the problems of environment and energy in many countries, also it is an important policy to solve the problems of e energy structure in China. But moral hazard in the safety supervision of nuclear power has happened. By adopting the game analysis method and establishing the game model of moral hazard in the safety supervision of nuclear power, the paper analysis the model with static mixed game and finite iterations of dynamic game. As a result, it can lower the moral hazard if the governments strengthen the punishment in violation of safety rules and reduce the supervision cost.

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Xu, Xiang, Xing Chen Zhang, and Bin Xu. "Research of Railway Capacity Strengthening Scheme Decision Method Based on Game Theory." Applied Mechanics and Materials 505-506 (January 2014): 571–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.505-506.571.

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Firstly, established the optimization model based on complete information static game theory, which see evaluation index as the participants of a game, capacity strengthening strategies as the strategies of participants, and the strategies contained in the Nash equilibrium of the game as the first step optimization results. Then structure an algorithm to secondary selection, which makes there is only one strategy in the final result. At last given a case study combined with Baoshen railway capacity strengthening scheme decision. The result indicated that the model has good applicability, and can reduce the subjective error effectively.

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Fan, Ruguo, Yibo Wang, and Jinchai Lin. "Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 16 (August 5, 2021): 8278. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18168278.

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In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.

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Liu Hong, Ji Yan, and GU Mingchong. "The Static Game Analysis of Travel Agency Service Supply Chain Optimization." INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON Advances in Information Sciences and Service Sciences 5, no. 8 (April 30, 2013): 480–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.4156/aiss.vol5.issue8.58.

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Chen, K. "Static analysis of life and death in the game of Go." Information Sciences 121, no. 1-2 (December 1, 1999): 113–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0020-0255(99)00083-3.

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Siar, Hajar, Kourosh Kiani, and Anthony T. Chronopoulos. "An effective game theoretic static load balancing applied to distributed computing." Cluster Computing 18, no. 4 (September 19, 2015): 1609–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10586-015-0486-0.

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