Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Spanish Communist Party (PCE)"

The Spanish Communist Party (PCE), under the leadership of Santiago Carrillo (1960–1982), developed the path of Eurocommunism. This was in part a rethinking of communism's approach to Western parliamentary systems, as well as an indigenous strategy for adapting the party to the transition in Spain from dictatorship to democracy. However, the influence of Eastern European developments was clear not only in the development of the party's struggle against the dictatorship but also in its reaction to Eastern European dissidents and to Solidarność, when the PCE called for an aggiornamiento to align themselves to these new tendencies. This failed, and in the end more orthodox communists came to dominate the party. But the debates about the transformation in Eastern European communism played a major part in developing the new line of the Spanish communists, and in shaping their central role during the Spanish transition to democracy.

1956 was an important date for Spanish communism. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was being held in Moscow, and the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) adopted the policy of 'National Reconciliation'. This became the starting point for Maoist dissidence and clashes with the party leadership, whom they accused of 'revisionism'. In 1964 the first Maoist party was formed, the PCE (marxist-leninist), made up of radicalised youth as well as some communist veterans. The influence of Maoism then slowly increased and it started to infiltrate other social sectors: workers, students and even Catholic groups. As a result of this influence, further organisations were created, such as the PCE (international), the Communist Movement, the Revolutionary Organisation of Workers, the Organisation of Spanish Marxist-Leninists and the Communist Organisation (Red Flag). During the final years of the Franco dictatorship a number of Maoist groups committed themselves to armed struggle. The first to take this type of action were the militants of the Revolutionary and Patriotic Antifascist Front (FRAP), a short-lived group created by the PCE (m-l), which lasted from 1973 to 1976. In response to the execution of several FRAP militants on 27 September 1975, the First October Revolutionary Antifascist Groups (GRAPO) were created. This organisation sought to overcome demoralisation in post-transition Spain through intensifying actions based on armed struggle, but it eventually became a marginal force, as a result of persecution by the police. This article reviews the history of the Maoist political subculture in Spain over two decades from a social and cultural perspective, and analyses multiple aspects of this communist current, including its transnational networks, collective memory and identity.

This article analyzes how the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) interpreted the Republican period from a double point of view. The PCE fought against the Republic because considered a bourgeois republic that had to be destroyed by a workers' revolution that culminated in a proletariat dictatorship. The sectarianism and scarce social support began to be overcome from 1934 and, especially, from 1935 with the Popular Front tactics from the Communist International. In addition to this, the PCE was included in the electoral coalition of the Popular Front in February 1936: the PCE was presented as a popular party more than a worker party. The Civil War facilitated its social and political penetration as a popular front party. The exile times created a myth in the Republican period, focused on the years of the war. The PCE interpreted the Republican period from the interests of the foreign policy of the URSS. For this reason, it was interpreted as a national and international struggle against fascism aggression, except in the period between the German-Soviet Pact and the Nazi attack on the USSR.

The article analyzes the conflict between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España, PCE) in the 1970s through the prism of Soviet-American relations during the era of Detente. Since the late 1960s, the Communist Party of Spain, headed by General Secretary S. Carrillo, began to distance itself from the CPSU, the leader of the International Communist Movement (ICM). In the conditions of the ongoing Cold War, the growing conflict between the parties meant the threat of a split within the ICM, which could not but attract the attention of the United States. The purpose of the article is to determine how the conflict between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Spain was perceived by American and Soviet state leaders, diplomats and the expert community during the 1970s, in order to establish how the assessments of this conflict in the United States and the USSR influenced the adjustment of the foreign policy strategies of these powers. The article examines the key stages of the development of relations between the leadership of the Soviet and Spanish Communist parties – "shadow" and public – as well as the perception of this conflict by Soviet and American diplomats, their assessments and reactions. The research is based on the sources of the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), available documents of the US State Department and the CIA.

Abstract This paper explores differences in the party system development of two former Yugoslav republics: Slovenia and Montenegro. Despite sharing a communist institutional system, after that disintegrated Slovenia had a much faster pace of democratic consolidation and economic development than Montenegro. Similarly, the nature of the party competition and party system structure are also quite different. Using a quantitative and descriptive approach applied to the period between 1990 and 2018, we outline patterns of party competition and party system development and explore how they complement the stages of democratisation. We investigate how the comparatively faster democratisation in Slovenia is reflected in the competitive party system with a focus on the ideological divide as the chief source of electoral competition. In contrast, we look at how the prolonged transition in Montenegro is reflected in the closed party system with party competition occurring mainly along ethnic lines.

AbstractThis paper explores differences in the party system development of two former Yugoslav republics: Slovenia and Montenegro. Despite sharing a communist institutional system, after that disintegrated Slovenia had a much faster pace of democratic consolidation and economic development than Montenegro. Similarly, the nature of the party competition and party system structure are also quite different. Using a quantitative and descriptive approach applied to the period between 1990 and 2018, we outline patterns of party competition and party system development and explore how they complement the stages of democratisation. We investigate how the comparatively faster democratisation in Slovenia is reflected in the competitive party system with a focus on the ideological divide as the chief source of electoral competition. In contrast, we look at how the prolonged transition in Montenegro is reflected in the closed party system with party competition occurring mainly along ethnic lines.

Drawing from Earl Browder’s papers, this essay examines the Communist-sponsored, New York Spanish-language newspaper Pueblos Hispanos (1943–44), arguing that the publication staged an uneasy alliance between the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party and the US Communist Party by positioning Puerto Rican independence as central to a wider decolonial Caribbean and postwar world order. By analyzing Pueblos Hispanos’s practice of “inter-nationalism”—a term the author proposes to denote the flexible strategy used to mediate between competing political interests and which can serve as a model for understanding the compromised collaborations between Communist and nationalist leaders in the Caribbean—this essay expands our understanding of Communist influence in Caribbean liberation movements and begins to reinsert the contributions of early-and mid-twentieth-century Puerto Ricans, and more widely, Spanish caribeños, within a Marxist-inflected Caribbean radical tradition.

La presente tesi analizza le dinamiche sviluppate dall'antifranchismo, e i loro effetti sul sistema socio-politico complessivo, usando come lente di lettura la relazione instaurata dal Partido Comunista de España (PCE) con il movimento operaio e, in particolare, con la sua componente di maggior rilevanza: le Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). L'obiettivo di questo lavoro consiste sia nel comprendere gli apporti mutui che hanno permesso al PCE e alle CCOO di assumere una posizione di primo piano nel quadro dell'opposizione alla dittatura, sia nell'evidenziare gli importanti contributi forniti dai frutti della loro interazione all'affermazione della democrazia in Spagna. L'analisi, quindi, oltre al partito e alle Comisiones prende in esame anche una macro-dimensione costituita da una molteplicità di soggetti estremamente eterogenei, che spaziano dalle altre forze dell'antifranchismo al Governo passando per la società civile.

Thesis (Honors)--Ohio State University, 2007.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2000.
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Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1993.
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Tese dout., English Culture, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2006
I sought to analyse the ways in which, within the context of the tensions and antagonisms that characterised British democracy in the interwar period, Communist discourse evolved from 1920 onwards and how it succeeded, thanks to the People’s Front line, in overcoming some of the resistance it had met in its earlier stages. After years of insistence on the centrality of the working class in the revolutionary process, by the mid-thirties the discourse of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) began seeking to expand the number of possible articulations so as to construct a new political identity—the ‘people’—encompassing groups or classes that had hitherto been excluded from the political equations of the Communist leadership. Since its inception, the party attempted to retain its strictly proletarian character. But now the new hegemonic tasks that the People’s Front entailed were incompatible with the notion of one single natural class agent or of one single class identity. The party had to learn how to reach out to more subject positions (the intellectuals, the petty bourgeoisie, etc.) and had to do so by means of establishing an equivalential chain (usually under the guise of ‘all democratic forces’) whose cohesion was believed to be guaranteed by the existence of an antagonistic frontier separating the ‘democratic’ camp from the ‘Fascist’ one. In the course of the construction of such a broad identity, Spain soon became one of the nodal points that permitted the consolidation of this equivalential chain. In this study I also tried to demonstrate that discourse is to be regarded neither as a flat surface of tightly knit signifiers nor as an impenetrable monolith of meaning systems. It is, above all, an inherently dynamic phenomenon, with its own condensations and dispersions along the historical continuum. Yet this does not mean that discourse is wholly inconstant. Actually, although it can grow to accommodate further signifiers and to cover a larger variety of practices by different subject positions in the context of a hegemonic project, it neither loses its internal stability nor dissolves into nothingness. It has its own mechanisms of self regulation and compensation, and therefore keeps tending towards equilibrium. I tried to show how signifiers were passed down the chain of command, all the way from Comintern officials in Moscow to the International Brigaders on the front, and how they were negotiated at the level of the different practices, demands and interests—which varied from one subject position to the next—without substantial entropic losses. But this did not operate in one direction only. I also sought to demonstrate how discursive practices at the local branches of the CPGB and on the Spanish battlefields had a determining effect on the definition of the discursive strategies of the party’s hegemonic project. Despite significant differences in context and variations in the constitution of the identity of each individual involved, communist discourse retained a remarkable degree of consistency, which also accounts for the vitality and cohesion of the party in this difficult period in the history of Europe. This is not to say that it was devoid of contradictions or lacunae (think of, for example, the party’s positions towards parliamentarism, the Labour Party, the issues of nationhood and the problem of war). Although it is usually defined as a relational totality that establishes the parameters of each meaningful action (both linguistic and non linguistic), discourse is in fact characterised by a structural incompleteness which derives, on the one hand, from the dislocations the social is continuously being subjected to and, on the other, from the very impossibility of encompassing the infinite play of differences. The discourse of the CPGB sought to suture those lacks by investing, from the outset, in a closed symbolic order, but the minute it started to make concessions in order to dilate its political space, older systems of meanings had to be discarded (the theory of Social Fascism, for example), that closure (the dictatorship of the proletariat) deferred sine die, and a new set of signifiers adopted—which also led to a whole series of new practices. The People’s Front represented such a challenge and the war in Spain constituted the ground where that challenge would be met.

This groundbreaking biography of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia presents many startling new revelations, among them his role as an international revolutionary leader and his relationship with Winston Churchill. It highlights his early years as a Comintern operative, the context for his later politics as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The authors argue that in the 1940s, between the dissolution of the Comintern and the rise of NAM, Tito's influence and ambition were far wider than has been understood, extending to Italy, France, Greece and Spain via the international communist networks established during the Spanish Civil War. The book discloses for the first time the connection between Tito's expulsion from the Cominform and the Rome assassination attempt on the Italian Communist Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti — the man who had plotted to overthrow Tito. The book offers a pivotal contribution to our understanding of Tito as a figure of real, rather than imagined, global significance. The book will reward those who are interested in the history of international Communism, the Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement, or in Tito the man — one of the most significant leaders of the twentieth century.

In the (often left-wing) writings on the Spanish Civil War, the idea of sacrifice (both transitive and intransitive) is intertwined with theories and practices of class conflict. The secular bent to much left-wing thinking did not preclude using associations with religious sacrifice to characterize the war’s fatalities; the bombing of Guernica and Madrid, for example, were both described as ‘martyrdoms’. Even in those views of the war that emphasized the importance of dialectical materialism, there is often an inherent logic of self-sacrifice—particularly for those middle-class and intellectual members of the Communist left whose commitment to revolution included a commitment to the supersession of their own individuality in the name of the party. This chapter examines how such ideological figurings of sacrifice are presented in lyrical and elegiac poems by poets such as W. H. Auden, Stephen Spender, Clive Branson, George Barker, Margot Heinemann, and Cecil Day Lewis.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

Realidad was a cultural and political magazine of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) which, to escape Franco’s censorship, was published abroad, under the aegis of brother parties: from 1963 to 1967 in Rome, at the Gramsci Institute, and after that in Paris until 1973. The direction at first was entrusted to the Federico Sánchez [Jorge Semprún], a militant and writer, who was soon replaced by a more orthodox party member, Manuel Azcárate. Although the magazine leaned into prolixity and initiatory language, it also offered significant articles on art and literature, written by famous intellectuals in exile, and followed with the participation of students’ and workers’ linked to the opposition movements in Spain.