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1
Capizzi, Clayton Jerrett, Joseph Wilck, and Xueping Li. "Simulating a Contract Closeout Process." International Journal of Service Science, Management, Engineering, and Technology 3, no. 4 (October 2012): 38–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/jssmet.2012100103.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Government defense contractors are burdened by contracts which have ended, but have not been finalized and closed. In order to keep good relations with organizations regulating government contracts, contractors have been forced to devise a strategy to address contract closeouts. Data was collected about a defense contractor’s contract closeout process, and a simulation model of the system was developed to aid in completing the contract closeout process. Using simulation software, the closeout process was successfully modeled under varying resource levels. The simulation model included true worker process times with integrated schedules, including holidays, over the expected period of performance. The simulation produced a realistic model which allows an organization to plan their resources to accomplish their contract closeout process under specified conditions and deadlines. The results are relevant to government (public sector) contracts as well as industrial (private sector) contracts where similar regulations are applicable.
2
Lian, Qi, and Su Ling Jia. "Research and Simulation of Supply Chain Disruption Based on Contract." Applied Mechanics and Materials 380-384 (August 2013): 4815–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.380-384.4815.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In order to research the long-term disruption influence on supply chain and the performance that contracts exert on supply chain when disruption happens, this paper constructs a VMI three-echelon supply chain model based on system dynamics. Through dynamic simulation of the model, the total inventory, total profit and market demand shortage data are respectively collected under conditions of no disruption, manufacture disruption and transport disruption. By descriptive statistical analysis of these data, we find the disruption has secular and hysteretic effect on the supply chain. Furthermore, T test is used to testify the contracts effectiveness on the supply chain under disruption conditions. These analytical results show that quantity discount contract and revenue sharing contract can effectively relieve the negative influence on the supply chain when disruptions happen, since they not only enhance the total profit but also stabilize the fluctuation of the supply chains total inventory, whereas the contracts do not perform well in satisfying the market demand shortage.
3
Yasir Tagelsir Mohamed Osman, Yasir Tagelsir Mohamed Osman. "Mechanisms for resolving international contracts for building and construction disputes: آليات حسم منازعات العقود الدولية للبناء والتشييد". مجلة العلوم الإقتصادية و الإدارية و القانونية 5, № 23 (27 грудня 2021): 162–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.26389/ajsrp.r110221.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Consider of resolving international contracts for building and construction is extremely important for architects and building construction implementers, as international building and construction contracts are complex contracts and countless international parties participate in their implementation. The aim of this research is to show the legal implications of implementing dispute resolution mechanisms, international contracts in construction and construction. The International Building and Construction Contract does not deviate from being a complex, international commercial contract, from private law contracts, even with the presence of the state or a legal person as a party to the contracts, this does not change their legal nature as contracts of law. The private where the results of the following research study showed: 1- The failure of national legislation to address many of the problems arising from international contracts for building and construction, which are of a technical nature due to their rapid development that are unable to keep pace with those national legislations, thus enhancing the role of rapidly developing and modifying model contracts to ensure simulation of the practical reality of these new technical problems and to provide the best means. To solve it, we extracted from the research the following results. 2- Model contracts are not considered contracts in the strict legal sense as they do not include consent between two parties, but rather they are a pre- prepared contract formulation in printed form, so that it is ready for use by the parties to the contract, and it is not evidence except for the persons who agreed to the agreement to refer to it where the search was used The inductive approach to measuring and understanding its archeology, as it relied on reviewing previous literature and studies in explaining the legal implications, and the research recommendations came as follows: 1- Attaching special importance to drafting international contracts for building and construction, and entrusting this task to a team of legal, technical and economic experts who have the scientific and practical qualities that qualify them to do this task in the best way, so that the parties to these contracts can avoid or at least reduce the disputes arising from these contracts. 2- Preparation and drafting of a unified Arab contract as a model for concluding international contracts for building and construction, which is evident in the customs and habits of this industry derived from our contemporary reality and in line with the legal concepts prevailing in our Arab countries, so that they act as the actual guarantee on which every contractor from our Arab society depends.
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Ma, Junhai, Tiantong Xu, Yalan Hong, and Xueli Zhan. "Impact Research on a Nonlinear Cold Chain Evolutionary Game Under Three Various Contracts." International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 29, no. 05 (May 2019): 1950058. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127419500585.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, we establish a cold chain dynamic game model including a milk manufacturer and two downstream oligopoly supermarkets under the wholesale price contract in the real world. The manufacturer is responsible for the production and cold transportation, and the two retailers sell the product. The Nash equilibrium points and the complexity of the system are discussed. The influence of the decision parameters and the stability of the system are studied by using complexity theory. We reveal the stable regions for the dynamic system. In addition, revenue sharing contract and profit sharing contract are two valuable contracts. In order to see how the two contracts would impact on the system’s equilibrium solution and the profits, we establish and analyze two new dynamic models for the cold chain. By the comparison of the analyses under three contracts, we find that the manufacturer’s effort of cold transportation will change under different contracts, and the profit distribution of the whole cold chain will be affected. Chaos control is also studied by the method of delay feedback control, in order to provide some management advice.
5
Li, Chao, and Zhijian Qiu. "Optimal Contracts for Agents with Adverse Selection." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2020 (January 7, 2020): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9317019.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Due to information asymmetry, adverse selection exists largely in the multiagent market. Aiming at these problems, we develop two models: pure adverse selection model and mixed adverse selection and moral hazard model. We make the assumption that a type of agent is discrete and effort level is continuous in the models. With these models, we investigate the characters that make an optimal contract as well as the conditions under which the utility of a principal and agents can be optimized. As a result, we show that, in the pure adverse selection model, the conditions to reach the optimal utility of a principal and individual agents are that a principal needs to design different contracts for different types of agents, and an individual agent chooses the corresponding type of contracts. For the mixed model, we show that incentive constraint for agents plays a very important role. In fact, we find that whether a principal provides high-type contract or a separating equilibrium contract depends on the probability of existence of low-type agents in the market. In general, if a separating equilibrium contract is issued, then information asymmetry will cause the utility of the high-type agents to be less than that of the case in full information.
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Zhu, Yingjun, Zhitong Gao, and Ruihai Li. "Sustainable and Optimal “Uniqueness” Contract in Public-Private Partnership Projects of Transportation Infrastructure." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2020 (December 18, 2020): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/6664405.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
To control the “uniqueness” risk in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects of transportation infrastructure, we design a simplified “uniqueness” contract model by incorporating the impact of the initial investment which is based on the Bertrand model. The nonlinear programming method is adopted to derive the optimal “uniqueness” contracts for incumbent private capital, the public, and the social welfare, respectively. The simulation results show that the achievement of the optimal “uniqueness” contract is essentially the result of a compromise between the private capital, the public, and social welfare. The extent to which such a contract reduces the probability of “uniqueness” risk mainly depends on the equilibrium relation between the interests of private capital and the public. The initial investment is not related to the government default when the contract does not take into account the interests of the private capital. Furthermore, the “uniqueness” contracts between private capital and the government are mainly for anticompetitive purpose in the PPP market of transportation infrastructure. Unless the contract terms focus on the improvement of social welfare, entering a “uniqueness” contract will cause social welfare losses.
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SUMENDRA, GEDE, KOMANG DHARMAWAN, and I. NYOMAN WIDANA. "MENENTUKAN HARGA KONTRAK BERJANGKA NILAI TUKAR RUPIAH TERHADAP DOLLAR AS MENGGUNAKAN DISTRIBUSI LOGNORMAL." E-Jurnal Matematika 4, no. 2 (May 30, 2015): 43. http://dx.doi.org/10.24843/mtk.2015.v04.i02.p087.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The purpose of this study is to determine the fair price of a futures contract for the IDR (Rupiah) against the USD using lognormal distribution simulation. This result is compared with interest rate parity theorem. The first step of this study is to determine the values of the parameters which are optimized using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The parameters obtained in the form of the mean () and variance (). Further, parameters obtained are simulated using lognormal distribution to determine the exchange rate simulation (). Then price of future contract is also calculated using interest rate parity theorem. The price of the futures contracts () is determined by lognormal distribution simulated and price of interest rate futures contracts using parity theorem. The results of this study show that future contract price over the fair use lognormal distribution of 12.215 compared to the interest rate parity theorem which 12.400, with the initial contract price () of 12.185.
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Harrison, R. Wes. "Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Futures and Option Strategies for Hedging Feeder Cattle." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 27, no. 2 (October 1998): 270–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500006596.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Stochastic simulation and generalized stochastic dominance are used to compare the risk-return properties of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange feeder cattle futures contract with those of the feeder cattle put option contract. Cash marketing, futures, and option strategies are analyzed for four backgrounding systems common to the mid-south region of the United States. The results show that at-the-money put option strategies dominate corresponding futures contract strategies according to generalized stochastic dominance. This implies that at-the-money put option contracts are superior to feeder cattle futures contracts for risk-averse backgrounders in the mid-south region of the United States.
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Liao, Changhua, and Qihui Lu. "Coordinating a Three-Level Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain considering Option Contract under Spot Price Uncertainty." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2022 (April 30, 2022): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/2991241.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
We consider a three-level fresh agricultural product supply chain consisting of a producer, a supplier, and a retailer, where the producer plants the initial fresh agricultural products with yield uncertainty, the supplier is the leader of the supply chain and the designer of the contracts, and the retailer sells processed products with random demand and spot price. This paper discusses coordination mechanism of wholesale price contracts or option contracts between the supplier and the retailer and wholesale price contracts between the supplier and the producer. Based on this, we not only explore the conditions for supply chain full coordination and Pareto improvement but also analyze the effect of the retailer’s spot market volatility by comparing two scenarios of the retailer with or without a random spot market. Results show that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain regardless of whether the retailer has a random spot market or not. The supply chain can be simultaneously fully coordinated and achieve Pareto improvement by setting reasonable option contract parameters, but the conditions for coordination are rigorous. When the expected value of reduction from the retailer’s spot market in unit shortage loss cost is greater, the total profit of supply chain will increase. Numerical analysis shows that the option exercise price must be set higher when the retailer has a spot market to achieve Pareto improvement. The loss rate in distribution process and other volatility risks will also affect the coordination of the agricultural supply chain.
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Artama Wiguna, I. Putu, Nadjadji Anwar, and Hanie Teki Tjendani. "Developing the simulation model towards sustainability of implementing performance-based contract." MATEC Web of Conferences 276 (2019): 02025. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201927602025.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Performance-based contracts (PBC), one kind of the delivery system has been conducted in Indonesia starting in 2011. The aim of the implementation of PBC in Indonesia is to solve the premature deterioration of national roads in Indonesia that still occur to date and to achieve the best level of service. Implementation of performance-based contracts is not as easy as imagine since many contractors still don’t understand to control the risk if they are given work with performance-based contracts. In this study used the system dynamic approach, the choice of this method because PBC is a long-term contract, where past events can affect current and future events, as well as future events, can be avoided by evaluating today’s events and events in the past. In this paper will show the interface generated after the base model Stock Flow Diagram (SFD) is verified. After the model has been validated, the model is ready as a simulation tool to get the best performance-based contracting mechanism and implementation in Indonesia. So, it can be used in developing countries.
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Wang, Liang, Tingjia Xu, Longhao Qin, and Xianyan Xiong. "Impact of the Adjustment of Maximum Order Volume on Pricing Efficiency of Stock Index Futures in China." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2020 (June 30, 2020): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7916496.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In April 2017, China Financial Futures Exchange adjusted the maximum order volume of single trading in stock index futures, and this paper conducts research on this event. Firstly, it analyzes the influence of the adjustment of maximum order volume on the characteristics of the limit order book with high-frequency data and the impact of ordering situation on the trading depth and volatility of each contract with panel data. Secondly, it takes high-frequency tick-by-tick data to explore the causal relationship between the ordering situation and the probability of informed trading and analyzes the impact of the event on the probability of informed trading. Finally, the dynamic factor analysis method is used to quantify the pricing efficiency based on the probability of informed trading and the characteristics of limit order book, and the influence of the event on the pricing efficiency of stock index futures market is discussed. The results show that the reduction of maximum order volume has different effects on dominant contracts and nondominant contracts of stock index futures. After the event, the overall trading volume of the market increased, where the trading volume of dominant contracts decreased and that of nondominant contracts increased. For dominant contracts, the depth, slope, and liquidity decrease, the spread increases, and the probability of informed trading decreases so that the pricing efficiency becomes worse, while the results of nondominant contracts are the opposite. For Chinese stock index futures market, the pricing efficiency is greatly reduced and the resource allocation capacity is weakened under the influence of the event. Therefore, the adjustment of maximum order volume is not conducive to the healthy development of the stock index futures market. It is suggested that the reduction of the maximum order volume is only implemented for nondominant contracts.
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Deng, Xiaohui, Barry J. Barnett, Yingzhuo Yu, Gerrit Hoogenboom, and Axel Garcia y. Garcia. "Alternative Crop Insurance Indexes." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 40, no. 1 (April 2008): 223–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800023567.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Three index-based crop insurance contracts are evaluated for representative south Georgia corn farms. The insurance contracts considered are based on indexes of historical county yields, yields predicted from a cooling degree-day production model, and yields predicted from a crop-simulation model. For some of the representative farms, the predicted yield index contracts provide yield risk protection comparable to the contract based on historical county yields, especially at lower levels of risk aversion. The impact of constraints on index insurance choice variables is considered and important interactions among constrained, conditionally optimized, choice variables are analyzed.
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Deng, Xiaohui, Barry J. Barnett, Gerrit Hoogenboom, Yingzhuo Yu, and Axel Garcia y. Garcia. "Alternative Crop Insurance Indexes." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 40, no. 01 (April 2008): 223–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1074070800028078.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Three index-based crop insurance contracts are evaluated for representative south Georgia corn farms. The insurance contracts considered are based on indexes of historical county yields, yields predicted from a cooling degree-day production model, and yields predicted from a crop-simulation model. For some of the representative farms, the predicted yield index contracts provide yield risk protection comparable to the contract based on historical county yields, especially at lower levels of risk aversion. The impact of constraints on index insurance choice variables is considered and important interactions among constrained, conditionally optimized, choice variables are analyzed.
14
Zhu, Yue. "Design and Application of Legally Valid Payment Templates Based on Linking Contracts." Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine 2022 (July 18, 2022): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/1331237.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Smart contracts are widely employed in many industries as a result of the high-quality development of science and economic technology, as well as the introduction of blockchain, which can automatically conduct retrieval, verification, and payment tasks. Smart contracts as an emerging topic, particularly the study of smart legal contracts, must remain forward-looking, and the smart contract sector cannot wait for the legal status of smart contracts to be resolved before advancing. The relative lag of the law becomes unavoidable due to the unassembled and unpredictable character of the law and thus its legislation. In this paper, we explore the incorporation of smart contracts into the scope of legal regulation, the construction of a series of systems for smart contracts, and the prognosis of smart contracts in terms of contract logic, arbitration process, and formal verification from the current law. Furthermore, a smart contract payment template based on semantic-aware graph neural networks is proposed to address the traditional smart contract vulnerability detection payment template method’s low detection accuracy and high false alarm rate, as well as the neural network-based method’s insufficient mining of bytecode-level smart contract features. Experiments comparing the method described in this research to comparable methods reveal that the strategy proposed in this study improves all types of indicators significantly.
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Kanin, Alexander, Anna Kharchenko, Vitalii Tsybulskyi, Natalia Sokolova, and Alona Shpyh. "Construction of a simulation model for substantiating the parameters of long-term road maintenance contracts." Eastern-European Journal of Enterprise Technologies 2, no. 3 (116) (April 28, 2022): 33–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.15587/1729-4061.2022.253652.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper reports a study into the main parameters of long-term contracts for the maintenance of roads. Weaknesses in existing methods and models of substantiation of the initial characteristics of contracts have been identified. It is established that the main reason for the transition to long-term contacts in the road sector is the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of road asset management. This determines the main goal to maintain the operational condition of all components of roads at a level that ensures the satisfaction of user requirements and contributes to the preservation of assets. A simulation model for substantiating the parameters of long-term contracts for road maintenance has been built, which makes it possible to simulate forecast assessments of the characteristics of contracts. Underlying this study is the Monte Carlo method, as well as the triangular law of distribution, models of deterioration and restoration of the condition of road elements. Taking into consideration these models, it was established that the error in justifying the parameters of long-term contracts according to the devised method is up to 10 %. The devised model was tested by applying the developed original LTCsimula program using an example of the section of a motorway with a length of 87.3 km with an average level of requirements. According to the results of the test, the assessment of the laws of distribution of value, as well as the amount of deductions and profits of a long-term contract, was carried out. The calculation results demonstrated the model’s capability to determine the strategies for the maintenance of roads, taking into consideration the risk of implementing a contract with an error of up to 3.9 %. The practical use of the devised simulation model makes it possible to improve the efficiency of operational maintenance of roads, as well as to save from 10 % to 40 % of the cost of road maintenance
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Natividade, Jorge, Carlos Oliveira Cruz, and Cristina Matos Silva. "Improving the Efficiency of Energy Consumption in Buildings: Simulation of Alternative EnPC Models." Sustainability 14, no. 7 (April 2, 2022): 4228. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14074228.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The construction sector and the operation and maintenance of buildings largely contribute to energy consumption and emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the European Union (EU). Therefore, it is of utmost importance to improve the energy performance of buildings. Yet, this frequently involves high short-term investments, which may not be compatible with owners’ budgetary constraints. In this research we analyze the importance of Energy Performance Contracting (EnPC) for the improvement of energy efficiency in buildings. These models allow bypassing budgetary restrictions of owners (public and private ones) and bring private capital to finance energy efficiency measures. The paper analyses different models of contracting Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), from traditional models to alternative models, and exposes the versatility of the new contracting models and the associated risks. Several applications of energy performance contracts implemented in European countries are presented to identify the main characteristics that lead to successful contracts. The paper also includes the discussion of energy performance contracts applied to a public building (a school) that seeks to reduce its annual energy consumption, by testing the use of three types of energy performance contracts. The results show that there is potential in the use of EnPC but it is critical to select the most adequate model, especially when defining the contract duration, to balance both owners’ and companies’ interests.
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Feng, Yangang, Yi Hu, and Lin He. "Research on Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain considering Fresh-Keeping Effort Level under Retailer Risk Avoidance." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2021 (May 22, 2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5527215.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Considering that the demand for fresh agricultural products is affected by product freshness and price, a two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain decision model consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer is constructed. In order to increase consumer demand for fresh agricultural products, the supplier will make appropriate efforts to preserve the freshness of agricultural products. The optimal fresh-keeping effort level of the supplier and the optimal pricing decision of the retailer under the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making modes were studied, respectively; through the design of traditional cost-sharing contracts, traditional cost and revenue-sharing contracts, and cost-sharing and compensation strategies, the supplier was encouraged to improve their fresh-keeping effort. The research shows that the traditional cost-sharing contract and the traditional cost-benefit sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Under the strategy of cost sharing and compensation, when the amount of compensation meets certain conditions, the coordination of supply chain can be realized. Finally, the important parameters of the model are analyzed by numerical simulation.
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Farimani, Fazel M., Xiaoyi Mu, Hamed Sahebhonar, and Ali Taherifard. "An economic analysis of Iranian petroleum contract." Petroleum Science 17, no. 5 (July 31, 2020): 1451–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12182-020-00486-2.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract Following three generations of buyback contracts, the new model of Iranian petroleum contracts (IPC) was introduced by the Iranian cabinet to incentivize investments in the country. This paper analyzes the fiscal terms of the contract with technical information from one of the candidate fields for licensing. The financial simulation shows that, in general, the IPC resembles more a service contract than a production sharing contract as the contractor’s take is relatively low—below 5% across different scenarios of crude oil price. Second, the IPC is progressive in that as the overall profitability of the project improves the government takes an increasing share of the economic rent. The results are confirmed in a sensitivity analysis of each party’s profitability and takes on oil price, CAPEX, OPEX and the fee.
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Han, Ying, Guohong Chen, and Elena Poh. "Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2018 (October 23, 2018): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/5267357.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.
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Krieger, Matthias P., Alexander Knapp, and Burkhart Wolff. "Automatic and efficient simulation of operation contracts." ACM SIGPLAN Notices 46, no. 2 (January 26, 2011): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1942788.1868303.
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Li, Huihui, Congwei Xu, and Huizhen Zheng. "Psychological Contracts and Employee Innovative Behaviours: A Moderated Mediation Effect Model." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2021 (June 30, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6400742.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
According to Bakker and Demerouti’s work demand resource theory, abundant work resources can stimulate an individual’s initiative to the maximum extent and finally achieve ideal work results. However, few scholars have discussed if psychological states could affect work resources. We believe that relationship embeddedness is an important work resource in the context of Chinese human relationship culture. A low degree of embeddedness among employees would affect employees’ recognition of their organizations and reduce their motivation for voluntary innovative behaviours. This study was to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between psychological contracts and employee innovative behaviours as well as the mediating role and moderating role of relational embeddedness and organizational tenure. A descriptive cross-sectional survey design was adopted. Primary data were collected by a structured questionnaire targeting the employees in China. To test the hypotheses, data collected from 402 enterprise employees were used for a regression analysis in AMOS (version 22). We found that there is a significant positive correlation between psychological contract and employee innovation behaviour, while embedding strength and embedding quality mediated the influence of psychological contracts on employee innovative behaviours. Organizational tenure moderated the strength of the relationship between psychological contracts and employee innovative behaviours via embedding strength and embedding quality.
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Cyr, Don, Martin Kusy, and Anthony B. Shaw. "Hedging Adverse Bioclimatic Conditions Employing a Short Condor Position." Journal of Wine Economics 3, no. 2 (2008): 149–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1931436100001188.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractWeather derivatives are a relatively new form of financial security, providing firms with the ability to hedge the impact of weather related risks to their activities. Participants in the energy industry have employed standardized temperature contracts trading on organized exchanges since 1999, and the availability and use of non-standardized contracts designed for specialized weather related risks is growing dramatically. The primary goal of this paper is to consider the potential design and use of a weather contract to hedge the risks faced in viticulture as measured by bioclimatic indices. Specifically we examine the Winkler and Huglin bioclimatic indices over a 43 year period for the Niagara region of Ontario, Canada's largest wine producing region, and identify a mixed jump diffusion stochastic process for cumulative growing season index values. We then employ Monte Carlo simulation to derive a range of benchmark prices for a “short condor” contract employing the Huglin index as the underlying variable. The results show that valuable hedging opportunities can be provided by such contracts. (JEL Classification: G13, G32, Q14, Q51, Q54)
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D’Ambrosio, Joseph, Arun Adiththan, Edwin Ordoukhanian, Prakash Peranandam, S. Ramesh, Azad Madni, and Padma Sundaram. "An MBSE Approach for Development of Resilient Automated Automotive Systems." Systems 7, no. 1 (January 10, 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems7010001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Advanced driver assistance and automated driving systems must operate in complex environments and make safety-critical decisions. Resilient behavior of these systems in their targeted operation design domain is essential. In this paper, we describe developments in our Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to develop resilient safety-critical automated systems. An MBSE approach provides the ability to provide guarantees about system behavior and potentially reduces dependence on in-vehicle testing through the use of rigorous models and extensive simulation. We are applying MBSE methods to two key aspects of developing resilient systems: (1) ensuring resilient behavior through the use of Resilience Contracts for system decision making; and (2) applying simulation-based testing methods to verify the system handles all known scenarios and to validate the system against potential unknown scenarios. Resilience Contracts make use of contract-based design methods and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDP), which allow the system to model potential uncertainty in the sensed environment and thus make more resilient decisions. The simulation-based testing methodology provides a structured approach to evaluate the operation of the target system in a wide variety of operating conditions and thus confirm that the expected resilient behavior has indeed been achieved. This paper provides details on the development of a utility function to support Resilience Contracts and outlines the specific test methods used to evaluate known and unknown operating scenarios.
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Baumann, Florian, Volker Meier, and Martin Werding. "Transferable Ageing Provisions in Individual Health Insurance Contracts." German Economic Review 9, no. 3 (August 1, 2008): 287–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2008.00434.x.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract We consider lifetime health insurance contracts in which ageing provisions are used to smooth the premium profile. The capital stock accumulated for each individual can be decomposed into two parts: a premium insurance and an annuitized life insurance, only the latter being transferable between insurers without triggering premium changes through risk segmentation. In a simulation based on German data, the transferable share declines in age and falls with an increasing age of entry into the contract. In spite of different benefit profiles, it is almost identical for women and men.
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Zhao, Nan, Qixuan Wan, Jinlian Chen, and Minghu Wu. "Dynamic incentive mechanism in mobile crowdsourcing networks by combining reputation and contract theory." International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 18, no. 6 (June 2022): 155013292211043. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/15501329221104352.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
By utilizing the mobile terminals’ sensing and computing capabilities, mobile crowdsourcing network is considered to be a promising technology to support the various large-scale sensing applications. However, considering the limited resources and security issue, mobile users may be unwilling to participate in crowdsourcing without any incentive. In this work, by combining reputation and contract theory, a dynamic long-term incentive mechanism is proposed to attract the mobile users to participate in mobile crowdsourcing networks. A two-period dynamic contract is first investigated to deal with the asymmetric information problem in the crowdsourcing tasks. Reputation strategy is then introduced to further attract the mobile users to complete the long-term crowdsourcing tasks. The optimal contracts are designed to obtain the maximum expected utility of service provider with reputation strategy and without reputation strategy, respectively. Simulation results demonstrate that the long-term crowdsourcing tasks can be guaranteed by combining the contract’s explicit incentive with the reputation’s implicit incentive. The incentive mechanism can gain a higher expected utility, the more implicit reputation effect factor.
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Makovska, Yulia. "Model of determining price of a long-term contract for ongoing maintenance and maintenance of highways." Avtoshliakhovyk Ukrayiny, no. 1 (253) ’ 2018 (March 26, 2018): 30–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.33868/0365-8392-2018-1-253-30-32.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The paper addresses the problem of OPRC. The current state of tools justification prices OPRC: model, based on the concept of discrete state of the road surface, and the model based on the economic theory of agency. This mathematical formulation proposed by the authors simulation model justification prices OPRC based on seasonally expert estimates of probability of defects road surface and the possibility of using a certain probability of different methods of elimination of defects, different resource requirements. Forecast assumptions about the subject of study – apply a simulation model with simulated random events and values of Monte Carlo and optimization based on evolutionary method. Keywords: OPRC, long-term contracts, price contract, simulation model
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Cvitanić, Jakša, Xuhu Wan, and Jianfeng Zhang. "Optimal contracts in continuous-time models." Journal of Applied Mathematics and Stochastic Analysis 2006 (July 12, 2006): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/jamsa/2006/95203.
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We present a unified approach to solving contracting problems with full information in models driven by Brownian motion. We apply the stochastic maximum principle to give necessary and sufficient conditions for contracts that implement the so-called first-best solution. The optimal contract is proportional to the difference between the underlying process controlled by the agent and a stochastic, state-contingent benchmark. Our methodology covers a number of frameworks considered in the existing literature. The main finance applications of this theory are optimal compensation of company executives and of portfolio managers.
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Lano, K., and J. L. Fiadeiro. "Extending UML with coordination contracts." Software & Systems Modeling 5, no. 2 (September 9, 2005): 110–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10270-005-0095-0.
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MIZOKAMI, Shoshi, Toshio FUJIMI, and Yasunori KAJIWARA. "SIMULATION ANALYSIS ON CONTRACTS FOR MAINTAINING BUS TRIGGER SYSTEM." Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser. D3 (Infrastructure Planning and Management) 72, no. 1 (2016): 52–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.2208/jscejipm.72.52.
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Ajmi, Hechem, Hassaneddeen Abd Aziz, Salina Kassim, and Walid Mansour. "Adverse selection analysis for profit and loss sharing contracts." International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 12, no. 4 (September 9, 2019): 532–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imefm-03-2018-0079.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal profit-and-loss sharing (PLS)-based contract when market frictions occur. Design/methodology/approach This paper opts for an adverse selection analysis and Monte Carlo simulation to assess the less risky contract for the principal and the agent when musharakah, mudarabah and venture capital financings are used in imperfect markets. Furthermore, this framework enables us to capture the level of market frictions that the principal can bear and the level of audit that he/she may undertake to mitigate bankruptcy. Findings The simulation results reveal that Musharakah is the less risky contract for the principal compared to Mudarabah and venture capital when the shock is low and high. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the increase of market frictions engender higher audit cost and profit-sharing ratios. The increase of the safety index in the case of high shock is most likely attributed to the increase of the audit parameter for all contracts to mitigate the selfish behavior of the agent. Accordingly, the principal tends to require a higher profit-sharing ratio to compensate for the severer information asymmetry. Research limitations/implications This paper has two main limits. First, the results were not compared to real data because the latter are not available. Second, this paper is a general framework to determine the less risky contract for the principal and does not consider the firm and sectoral characteristics. However, it can be extended in various ways where stress can be put on conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent with the aim to determine the contract that aligns their interests. In addition, the examination of firm dynamics in the case of equity and debt financing can provide further arguments for economic agents regarding the value of the firm, the growth rate and the lifetime of the project when information is asymmetrically distributed. Practical implications The findings shed some light on the necessity of the Islamic finance experts to re-think of the promotion of Musharakah because it dominates the two other contracts when market frictions occur. Social implications Although Maghrabi and Mirakhor (2015), Alanzi and Lone (2015) and Lone and Ahmad (2017) among others showed that profit and loss sharing can ensure economic growth, findings may motivate economic players to consider Musharakah financing with the aim to reach financial inclusion and social, which is in line with Shari’ah requirements and Islamic values. Originality/value Although several papers highlighted the financial contracting theory from Shari’ah perspective, they ignored the financial issues that are associated to adverse selection. This paper provides theoretical evidence regarding the selection of the less risky financing mode in case of equity financing using Monte Carlo simulation.
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Tao, Biao, Gangcheng Cao, and Tianxu Sun. "Direct Sourcing from Renewable Energy under Cost Uncertainty: A Bargaining Approach." International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems 2022 (April 9, 2022): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/3588929.
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Sourcing electricity from renewable energy suppliers becomes critical to improving renewable energy penetration. However, the common problem of bilateral bargaining between an electricity retailer and renewable energy supplier has rarely been studied in the literature. Considering the uncertainty of renewable generation cost, we introduce the incentive contract theory and signalling game to examine how the electricity procurement contract is designed in a Rubinstein bargaining framework. We derive the corresponding equilibrium outcomes depending on the renewable supplier’s generation cost uncertainty. The results show that if the possibility of a high generation cost is large, the retailer provides contracts for the renewable supplier of both high and low generation costs to achieve the simultaneous separating equilibrium; otherwise, he only proposes the contract for supplier with a low generation cost to achieve the sequential separating bargaining. Our work demonstrates that the proposed incentive contracts urge the renewable supplier to reveal the private information of generation cost and prevent the retailer’s profit deviation due to the adverse selection.
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Zhao, G., H. B. Shi, and J. F. Wang. "The influence of artificial intelligence technology judicial decision reasoning on contract performance in manufacturing supply chain: A simulation analysis using Evolutionary Game approach." Advances in Production Engineering & Management 17, no. 1 (March 15, 2022): 108–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.14743/apem2022.1.424.
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Today's world revolves around technology, which has a total impact not only on human life but also on manufacturing companies. Many companies have embraced artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of powerful computers, applications, or software that can screen job applicants, alert when a machine is about to break down, and read legal contracts. However, the rapid expansion of AI and its use in legal settings, such as contract performance, in a company is a major challenge on the judicial side. This article, thus, establishes an evolutionary game model of whether manufacturing suppliers are performing contracts or not when the court chooses to use artificial intelligence (AI) technology. Considering the complexity of choosing manufacturers' AI strategy, the method constructs a simulation analysis model of manufacturers' contract enforcement behaviour with the participation of several subjects. We can simulate the influence of the factors selected on the strategy chosen by both parties (manufacturers and court) by changing the different influence factors and studying the evolutionary law of different court guidance and regulation strategies on the production behaviour of green products. The results show that the choice of the court and manufacturers to use the AI technology strategy or not is based on the rate of error reduction, through the computational implementation of multi-subject modelling.
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Xiong, Huachun, Bintong Chen, and Jinxing Xie. "A composite contract based on buy back and quantity flexibility contracts." European Journal of Operational Research 210, no. 3 (May 2011): 559–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.10.010.
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Tabernero, Carmen, M. José Chambel, Luis Curral, and José M. Arana. "The Role of Task-Oriented Versus Relationship-Oriented Leadership on Normative Contract and Group Performance." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 37, no. 10 (November 1, 2009): 1391–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2009.37.10.1391.
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In this paper we examine how groups develop normative contracts based on beliefs about the obligations other members of the group must fulfil in order to achieve group goals. The role played by perceived leadership – task- or relationship-oriented – was analyzed in relation to the development of relational normative contract and group performance. The study sample comprised 72 participants (24 groups of 3 members). A member of each team received training to be a group leader (task- or relationship-oriented leader). All groups worked on a simulation program: a complex decision-making managerial task. Group regulatory variables and group processes were evaluated during the simulation. Results showed that task-oriented leaders effected higher group efficacy and positivism among members of the group. In contrast, relationship-oriented leaders effected greater cohesion between the group's members. The final group performance is explained from the perspective of group efficacy and the relational normative contract.
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Zuo, Yanjun. "Towards a Learner-Managed Education Credentialing System Based on Blockchain." Information Resources Management Journal 35, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/irmj.309983.
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Traditionally, a learner's education credentials are maintained by each educational institution. When individuals need to prove their education, they rely on their educational institutions to certify their education and learning records. This paper proposes a decentralized, learner-managed education credentialing system based on blockchain, where the learners' credentials are issued once, stored in a distributed system, and the learners have full control over how and who can access their credentials. The authors present the procedures for credential issuance, selective disclosure of an individual's credentials chosen by each learner, and credential verification by a third party. A proof-of-concept smart contract system has been developed to demonstrate the functionality of the proposed framework. The smart contracts are programmed using the Solidity programming language and tested on the Remix IDE. The authors present this simulation of smart contracts to handle entity registration, credential information storage, credential verification, and educational financial transactions.
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Wilks, Daniel S., and Kenneth A. Horowitz. "A Novel Financial Market for Mitigating Hurricane Risk. Part I: Market Structure and Model Results." Weather, Climate, and Society 6, no. 3 (July 1, 2014): 307–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/wcas-d-13-00032.1.
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Abstract A novel financial market for hedging the effects of landfalling hurricanes is described and illustrated. The structure of the market is one sided and parimutuel, so that participants buy contracts pertaining to hurricane landfall locations from an exchange rather than from other market participants, and settlements for contracts associated with the landfall location are funded by purchases in all other outcomes. Contract prices are updated automatically and objectively using a recently developed adaptive control algorithm that responds to inferred aggregate probability assessments of the market participants. The market is intended to supplement insurance by providing a mechanism to shift risk for costs not covered under existing windstorm insurance. Operation of the market mechanism is illustrated in an idealized setting and in a spatially explicit historical simulation for Hurricane Charley (2004). A companion paper in this issue describes empirical validation of this market mechanism in an experimental market setting.
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Gan, Guojun, and Emiliano A. Valdez. "Valuation of large variable annuity portfolios: Monte Carlo simulation and synthetic datasets." Dependence Modeling 5, no. 1 (December 20, 2017): 354–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/demo-2017-0021.
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AbstractMetamodeling techniques have recently been proposed to address the computational issues related to the valuation of large portfolios of variable annuity contracts. However, it is extremely diffcult, if not impossible, for researchers to obtain real datasets frominsurance companies in order to test their metamodeling techniques on such real datasets and publish the results in academic journals. To facilitate the development and dissemination of research related to the effcient valuation of large variable annuity portfolios, this paper creates a large synthetic portfolio of variable annuity contracts based on the properties of real portfolios of variable annuities and implements a simple Monte Carlo simulation engine for valuing the synthetic portfolio. In addition, this paper presents fair market values and Greeks for the synthetic portfolio of variable annuity contracts that are important quantities for managing the financial risks associated with variable annuities. The resulting datasets can be used by researchers to test and compare the performance of various metamodeling techniques.
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Dong, Fang, Chengdong Shi, and Weitong Yu. "Coordinated Decision-Making in Embedded Supply Chain from a Sustainable Development Perspective." Sustainability 15, no. 1 (December 27, 2022): 443. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15010443.
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Government carbon policies and consumers’ preferences are forcing companies to reduce their carbon emissions. Due to financial and technical constraints, carbon-dependent manufacturers are seeking embedded services from energy service companies. By considering these government carbon policies and consumer preferences, this paper constructs a revenue-sharing contract and a two-part contract model for an embedded low-carbon service supply chain using the Stackelberg game to investigate the contractual coordination between the manufacturer and energy service company and their optimal decision making. The equilibrium decisions and the selection of contracts in the supply chain with different parameter levels were obtained. The model’s validity was verified through numerical simulation analysis, and the impacts of the main parameters on the equilibrium decisions and expected utility for the supply chain were analyzed. The results showed that both contracts would enable manufacturers and low-carbon service providers to achieve profit maximization goals when the parameters meet certain constraints. Changes in consumers’ low-carbon and low-price preferences can cause manufacturers to change their business strategies. In addition, the level of technology of ESCOs affects the selection of the type of contract between manufacturers and energy service companies. The findings described in this paper can provide management insights for manufacturers regarding carbon reduction in practice.
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Kanin, Alexander P., Anna N. Kharchenko, and Natalia M. Sokolova. "SUBMISSION OF LEVELS OF SERVICE AT GENERAL ROAD ROUTINE MAINTENANCE." Automobile Roads and Road Construction, no. 109 (2021): 11–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.33744/0365-8171-2021-109-011-025.
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The article deals with the problems of substantiation of service levels in long-term maintenance contracts of public roads. It has been established that the requirements for the operating condition of road elements in existing regulatory documents are rather complete, but they are unsystematized, which complicates the process of their processing in order to conclude a long-term contract for maintenance of roads. It has been determined that according to the world experience, the problem of substantiation of service levels should be considered with detail at the level of the individual defect. The research object is a long-term contract based on end-of-life performance (service levels) of public roads. The subject of research - levels of service - requirements for the operational state of general roads. The purpose of the study is to substantiate the levels of service in long-term contracts for the maintenance of public roads. Research methods - analysis and theoretical generalization of the world experience in substantiating service levels when implementing long-term maintenance contracts of roads. The conducted studies have shown that simulation modeling, in particular, the Monte Carlo method, should be used to solve the problem of substantiation of service levels. In this case, the indicators of the level of maintenance of the elements of roads should be set better than the maximum permissible in terms of ensuring safety, speed and comfort of motion and the requirements for the preservation of elements of roads.
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Martiniello, Laura, Donato Morea, Francesco Paolone, and Riccardo Tiscini. "Energy Performance Contracting and Public-Private Partnership: How to Share Risks and Balance Benefits." Energies 13, no. 14 (July 14, 2020): 3625. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en13143625.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Public private partnerships (PPPs) are a well-known instrument used worldwide by public administration (PA) to build public infrastructure using private knowhow and financial resources, and sharing risks. In recent years, PPPs have been widely adopted to develop energy efficiency projects between public and private sectors. In this context, a successful project requires a contractual arrangement based on energy performance contracting (EPC) that balances the interests of the two parties. This paper aims to answer two questions: how to share the benefits between the contractual parties and reach an optimal long-term contractual agreement; and which type of contract ensures a consistent risk transfer to the private partner, allowing the PA an “off balance” accounting treatment. The research questions are answered through the development of a mathematical equation able to calculate the optimal percentage of benefits sharing between partners in a long-term contractual agreement. The results are tested with a simulation based on a case study about the energy efficiency project of an Italian hospital. The paper is innovative because it provides suggestions to improve the EPC-PPP contractual structure and realize a balanced agreement between the public and private partners. Moreover, it analyzes the different allocation of risks in EPC contracts to identify the implication for the PA in terms of on-off balance accounting treatment in energy efficiency investment. We show how a successful long-term EPC-PPP can benefit from a mixed contractual structure in which profit-sharing percentage changes during the contract’s life to ensure the same net present value (NPV) to both public and private partners. This paper supports public decision making in order to choose contracts that are able to transfer energy and management risks. Moreover, it helps to understand the balance between public and private interests in a long-term EPC-PPP contract.
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Hinkel, Jennifer M., Arka Ray, Sirtaj Brar, and Rahul Lalmalani. "Modeling an oncology outcomes-based contract using a blockchain database approach: Cost and technology considerations." Journal of Clinical Oncology 37, no. 15_suppl (May 20, 2019): e18360-e18360. http://dx.doi.org/10.1200/jco.2019.37.15_suppl.e18360.
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e18360 Background: Cost of care is an ongoing concern for all oncology stakeholders. Outcomes Based or Risk Sharing contracts are increasingly discussed, but difficult and costly to implement. The literature notes barriers of outcomes definition, reliable data sources, and technology enablement. The authors sought to design and test software that could enable faster, lower-cost, and auditable administration of such contracts. Methods: The authors developed software using blockchain databases and transactional proof of work to simulate such a contract and to compare the financial result to usual fee-for-service reimbursement (FFSR). The software processed a synthesized Medicare claims dataset and Average Sales Price (ASP) data from 2008-2010, looking for use of the Bevacizumab(BV)/Carboplatin/Paclitaxel(CP) regimen in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC). The contract hypothesized a scenario that offered payers a discount for “underperforming” BV doses (defined as doses given to a patient with < 9 mo. BV duration) and required a bonus payment for “overperforming” BV doses (defined as doses given to a patient with > 14 mo. BV duration). These parameters were selected based on survival data supporting the 2007 FDA approval of BV/CP in 1L tx of advanced nonsquamous NSCLC. Results: The software successfully processed the claims dataset and projected financial results (additional/saved cost) to the payer in this hypothetical contract compared to FFSR. The software also enabled comparison of different hypothetical contracts, inclusion/exclusion rules for claims, and discount structures. The software accurately categorized doses according to the defined logic. Conclusions: Outcomes based contracts have potential for better aligning oncology reimbursement with meaningful results, particularly for costly therapeutics and where patient response or outcome is difficult to predict. While such agreements are recognized as difficult to implement, a software platform that facilitates efficient and scalable design, simulation, and implementation of such agreements, under constraints of real world data availability and sharing, may advance their adoption.
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Rahimi, Ali, Mikael Rönnqvist, Luc LeBel, and Jean‐François Audy. "Evaluation of sourcing contracts in wood supply procurement using simulation." International Transactions in Operational Research 29, no. 1 (January 26, 2021): 396–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/itor.12940.
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Willigers, Bart J. A., Steve Begg, and Reidar Bratvold. "Valuation of Swing Contracts by Least-Squares Monte Carlo Simulation." SPE Economics & Management 3, no. 04 (October 1, 2011): 215–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/133044-pa.
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Nassar, Khaled. "Construction contracts in a competitive market: C3M, a simulation game." Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 10, no. 3 (June 2003): 172–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09699980310478421.
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Stoykova, Boyka, Georgi Kuzmanov, and Robin Dowie. "Putting National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence guidance into practice: A cost minimization model of a national roll-out of liquid based cytology in England." International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 24, no. 04 (October 2008): 391–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266462308080513.
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Objectives:In 2003, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) advised that liquid based cytology (LBC) should be adopted for cervical screening in England. The aim of this study was to explore the cost implications of implementing the NICE guidance in cytology laboratories. The ThinPrep® technology was used as the case study.Methods:An optimization model was developed to analyze options for leasing alternative LBC processing machines with different capacities. Variables entered in the model included: the cost of the contract with the supplier, the laboratory labor cost, and inter-laboratory transport costs. All costs referred to the 2005–06 financial year. A simulation program calculated mileages within laboratory networks. Alternative strategies for contracting by laboratories acting independently and by Quality Assessment Regional Centres (QARC) were analyzed.Results:Centralizing the processing of specimens in “hub and spoke” laboratory networks was the least costly strategy. Total annual costs for England using existing transport links were £14,807,000 for 5-year contracts. If all laboratories installed processors, the annual cost for 5-year contracts placed by QARCs was £14,941,000 compared with £16,359,000 if the laboratories placed their own contracts. Three-year contracts averaged an additional £1 million: £15,912,000 for networks and £17,304,000 for independent laboratory contracts.Conclusions:Deciding on the mode of implementation of a NICE guidance can be challenging for decision makers. These cost minimization appraisal techniques are equally applicable to national screening programs in general and to other health technologies for which there are significant cost implications associated with innovative policy directives.
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Alobaidi, G., and R. Mallier. "Installment options close to expiry." Journal of Applied Mathematics and Stochastic Analysis 2006 (September 27, 2006): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/jamsa/2006/60824.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
We use an asymptotic expansion to study the behavior of installment options close to expiry. Installment options are contracts where the price is paid over the life of the option rather than as a lump sum at the time of purchase, and where the contract can be allowed to lapse at any time. Series solutions are obtained for the location of the free boundary and the price of the option.
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El Fakir, Adil, and Mohamed Tkiouat. "Profit and loss sharing contracts as a prisoners dilemma: An agent based simulation with game theory application to participative finance." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 4 (2016): 520–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i4c3p10.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
PLS contracts, Like Musharakah in participative finance, represent a practice of profit and loss sharing contracts. It is claimed to be a fair economic mode of investment as it entails the sharing, by the participants, of profits and risks. This mode of financing, however, suffers from asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection and moral hazards. In this Agent based simulation we managed to apply a repeated game theoretical approach to PLS financing using an agent based simulation tool called Net- logo. The purpose is to test whether PLS contracts are representative of a prisoner’s dilemma game. We have identified different parameters which are used to calculate the payoffs of the bank and the enterprise which seeks financing. Each agent in this simu- lation has some strategies that he/she can use through the game. We have managed to run the simulation1000 times for different model parameters under each combination of the agent’s strategies. We have found evidence that PLS contracts are not represen- tatives of a a prisoner dilemma game as mutual cooperation does not lead to a better payoff to the corporation than mutual defection. Over a repeated process, however, we found simulation evidence that the threat by the bank to apply an unforgiving strat- egy towards defection, leads to a cooperative behavior by the corporation through the strategy Tit-for-Tats.
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Luo, Jiarong, Xiaolin Zhang, and Chong Wang. "Using put option contracts in supply chains to manage demand and supply uncertainty." Industrial Management & Data Systems 118, no. 7 (August 13, 2018): 1477–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imds-09-2017-0393.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to value put option contracts in hedging the risks in a supply chain consisting of a component supplier with random yield and a manufacturer facing stochastic demand for end products. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts stochastic inventory theory, game theory, optimization theory and algorithm and MATLAB numerical simulation to investigate the manufacturer’s ordering and the supplier’s production strategies, and to study the coordination and optimization strategies in the context of random yield and demand. Findings The authors find that put options can not only facilitate the manufacturer’s order but also the supplier’s production, that is, the manufacturer and the supplier can effectively manage their involved risks and earn more expected profits by adopting put options. Further, the authors find that the single put option contract fails to coordinate such a supply chain. However, when combined with a protocol, it is able to coordinate the supply chain. Originality/value This paper is the first effort to study the intersection of put option contracts and random yield in the presence of a spot market. From a new perspective, the authors explore the supply chain coordination. The authors propose a mechanism to coordinate the supply chain under put option contracts.
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Bâra, Adela. "Mix-generation optimization for electricity market simulation." Scientific Bulletin of Naval Academy XXIII, no. 1 (July 15, 2020): 180–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.21279/1454-864x-20-i1-023.
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Owning several types of generating units requires an optimized schedule to cover the negotiated bilateral contracts. This approach will lead to a better electricity market strategy and benefits for an electricity producer. In this paper, we will simulate the operation of five different generators including generators based on Renewable Energy Sources (such as wind turbines and photovoltaic panels) that belong to an electricity producer. The five generators are modelled considering the specificity of their type and primary energy source. For instance, for renewable energy sources, we will consider the 24-hour generation forecast. The objective function of the optimization process is to obtain an optimal loading of generators, while the constraints are related to the capacity and performance of the generators. The output consisting in a generating unit optimized operation schedule will be further used for day-ahead or balancing market bidding process. Hence, the producer will be able to adequately bid on the future electricity markets knowing the commitment of generators for negotiated bilateral contracts market. The simulations are tested for more than five generators considering the connection to a relational database where more data for generators is stored.
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Zhou, Xuan, Dan Liu, and Chuanbin Yin. "Research on Public Rental Housing PPP Project Launching Dilemmas with Dynamic Evolutionary Game." Advances in Civil Engineering 2021 (December 14, 2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/1805874.
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The public housing PPP projects have encountered a cold reception from the government, which constrained solving the urban housing problem. This paper builds a dynamic game model under incomplete contract conditions, analyzes the key factors affecting the signing of PPP contracts by dynamic evolutionary game analysis, and verifies these factors by simulation. The results show that fiscal spending smoothing, risk transfer, and government performance can promote government to adopt cooperation strategy. Expected project benefits and government performance incentives can promote private capital to adopt cooperation strategy. Changes in transaction cost have a significant impact on the decision of cooperation strategy.