Статті в журналах: "SHAREHOLDER'S"

1

Miyake, Masatoshi, Mei Yu, and Hiroshi Inoue. "Mitigating risk incentives by issuing convertible bonds: A refinement to the Black–Scholes evaluation model." Journal of Financial Engineering 01, no. 03 (September 2014): 1450024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s234576861450024x.

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This study employs option pricing theory to analyze the risk incentive conflict between shareholders and creditors. It evaluates the volatility of investment projects funded by borrowed money and compares their gains for the shareholder and creditor. Our analysis is based on the recognition that shareholders' and creditors' objectives may differ. We identify the shareholder's risk incentive as a source of agency cost originating with the shareholder and find that issuing a convertible bond avoids agency cost without diluting existing shareholders' ownership. Numerical examples are shown to examine it.

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2

Gratham, Ross. "The Unanimous Consent Rule in Company Law." Cambridge Law Journal 52, no. 2 (July 1993): 245–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300095155.

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In the history of the modern company the shareholder has held a privileged position, for although the company's separate identity is the fundamental tenet of company law the shareholder's place as proprietor has only recently been questioned. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that for nearly a century the unanimous assent of shareholders has held the status of an overriding authority, able to cure procedural defects, overcome statutory requirements and validate almost any act within the capacity of the company. In its most recent application in Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd. v. Occidental Life Nominees Pty. Ltd., where the consent of shareholders was held to bind the company to a guarantee, we have a striking example of the authority accorded to the wishes of shareholders.

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3

Young, Christopher, and James Janos. "Incongruent Court Advice: Examining Fair Value and Fair Market Value Standards in Commercial Damage Cases Pursuant to Minority Claims." Journal of Forensic Economics 28, no. 1-2 (September 1, 2019): 197–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.5085/jfe-425.

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Abstract The standard of value in shareholder oppression and dissolution cases for a valuation of a minority shareholder's interest in a business in most U.S. states is fair value. The fair value standard in most U.S. states excludes discounts for control and lack of marketability. However, the three valuation approaches commonly used (income, market, and asset) all yield different levels of value. Consequently, this can unfairly negatively or positively impact minority and oppressed shareholders. In this paper we examine these inconsistencies and offer a solution to arriving at a level of value the trier of fact is seeking to obtain.

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4

de Jong, Abe, Philip Fliers, and Henry van Beusichem. "Catering and dividend policy: evidence from the Netherlands over the twentieth century." Financial History Review 26, no. 3 (December 2019): 321–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0968565019000209.

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This article investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the twentieth century. We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first episode, prior to World War II, was characterised by dividends that were fixed contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterised by dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of shareholder's preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in dividends with a lag. Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by shareholder wealth maximisation, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.

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5

Lepetic, Jelena. "Shareholder's personal action." Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 62, no. 1 (2014): 187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/analipfb1401187l.

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6

Radulovic, Vuk. "Democracy and shareholder's participation." Skola biznisa, no. 2 (2014): 203–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/skolbiz2-7099.

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7

Drury, R. R. "The Relative Nature of a Shareholder's Right to Enforce the Company Contract." Cambridge Law Journal 45, no. 2 (July 1986): 219–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000819730012094x.

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It has been suggested in this article that every shareholder does have a right to have all the provisions of the company contract enforced, but that this right is not an absolute one, and cannot be considered in isolation. For a more complete appreciation of the picture this right must be viewed in a context where the company contract constitutes the framework of a long-term relationship between the contracting parties. Thus we need to take into account the equally valid rights of the other shareholders to enforce conflicting provisions of this contract, to change those provisions, and to condone or regularise breaches of those provisions relating, inter alia, to the rules of internal procedure. We need also to consider the machinery provided by company law for the resolution of disputes concerning these conflicting rights, machinery which includes reference of the dispute to the decision of the majority, where it is appropriate to do so. Finally, it must be borne in mind that one of the aims of providing such machinery is the preservation of the long-term relationship between the participants in the company. It is only be considering such factors as these that the relative, rather than absolute, nature of any one shareholder's right to enforce the company contract can be truly understood.

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8

ATESOGLU COSKUN, Sevda, and Hakan ARACI. "THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE: A STUDY ON BORSA ISTANBUL." Muhasebe ve Vergi Uygulamaları Dergisi 15, no. 2 (July 1, 2022): 281–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.29067/muvu.1031968.

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The study examines the effects of ownership structure on capital structure. Results of this research provide useful information for managers to align their capital structure and ownership structure decisions. The research covered the period of 2012-2017 for twenty companies selected from three sub-sectors with the largest numbers of companies in Borsa İstanbul Manufacturing Industry. (1) Metal products, equipment and machinery; (2) Chemical, rubber, petroleum and plastic products; (3) Non-metallic mineral products sectors are included in the sample. According to the results of the panel data analysis, foreign ownership reduces financial leverage. Firms with high corporate ownership or high free-float rate use have higher leverage. When the stakes of the second and third largest shareholders get closer to the largest shareholder's level, the debt ratio decreases. However, there is no evidence about a significant effect of the largest shareholder’s stake on capital structure. The findings obtained in the study support that the ownership structure has some influence on the capital structure either directly or indirectly.

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9

Bao, Yuyun. "Does the controlling shareholder's share pledging increases the financial risk of the company." BCP Business & Management 38 (March 2, 2023): 2435–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v38i.4117.

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Equity pledging, the practice of pledge shares in exchange for liquidity from lenders, has become a popular approach to financing, especially in Chinese capital market. However, although there are many attractive benefits, share pledging also brings uncertainty and risks to the companies and the market. This study examines the effect of controlling shareholder’s equity pledging activities on corporate financial risk using a sample of public A-share listed companies in China. After processing the sample and eliminating some observations, a multiple regression model is used to examine the relationship of the share pledging, and ownership structure to the corporate financial risk. It is found that the effect of controlling shareholders' equity pledging can increase a company’s financial risk, but this effect is subject to the balanced level of the ownership structure of major shareholders, as more shares are held by other major shareholders, the negative impact that controlling shareholders’ share pledging on financial risks can be decreased.

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10

Wang, Rongxuan, Yankai Huang, and Teng Feng. "The influence of non-controlling major shareholder's exit threat on firm's idiosyncratic risk." Highlights in Business, Economics and Management 8 (April 11, 2023): 41–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v8i.7163.

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Non-controlling major shareholders can effectively restrain controlling shareholders and management by exit threat, so as to participate in corporate governance. Traditional research holds that the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders can make the company have a more stable development prospect, but it has not paid enough attention to the hidden dangers. Based on 23,243 samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2021, this paper analyzes the influence of non-controlling major shareholder's exit threat on idiosyncratic risk of enterprises. It is found that the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders will significantly increase the idiosyncratic risk of enterprises. Overall, exit threat lead to increased idiosyncratic risk. This conclusion is still robust after controlling for endogenous problems. The reason why the exit threat amplifies the idiosyncratic risk is that the idiosyncratic volatility is the market's response to the increased uncertainty of the future return rate of individual stocks, while the high exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders of a company exposes the future uncertainty of the company to investors more. This paper reveals that the threat of exit is the key factor affecting the idiosyncratic risk of firms, which has important reference value for regulators and investors.

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11

Sablowski, Thomas. "Bilanz(en) des Wertpapierkapitalismus." PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 33, no. 131 (June 1, 2003): 201–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v33i131.666.

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In the public discussion, the series of accounting scandals and bankruptcies which has taken place in the last years is primarily attributed to the greed of managers and institutional lacks in securing shareholder's interests. However, this article argues that it is precisely the proliferation of shareholder value concepts and the growing dominance of "fictitious capital" associated with the development of financial markets which increases the necessity and the possibilities to inflate profits, sales and share prices by all means, including "creative" accounting

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12

Dhaoui, Abderrazak. "R&D DIVERSIFICATION IN MNCS: BETWEEN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND SHAREHOLDERS INCREASING WEALTH." Journal of Business Economics and Management 9, no. 3 (September 30, 2008): 199–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/1611-1699.2008.9.199-205.

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This paper examines the impact of the R&D geographic diversification on the shareholders’ wealth (as measured appreciatively by the firm's market value) and on the earnings management as a mechanism of manager's entrainment. Using a sample of 460 firm‐year observations for multinational firms over the 2002–2006 period, we find that the R&D decentralization may enhance the shareholders’ wealth and increase the managers’ one. The results show that the R&D geographic diversification increases the informational asymmetry and support the emergence of the favourable conditions for the earnings management and the managers’ entrainment. It may increase the managers’ autonomy which likely allows them to manage the result in order to increase their own wealth and destruct the shareholder's one.

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13

Becchetti, Leonardo, Rocco Ciciretti, Iftekhar Hasan, and Nada Kobeissi. "Corporate social responsibility and shareholder's value." Journal of Business Research 65, no. 11 (November 2012): 1628–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.10.022.

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14

Kim, Yon-Mi. "Major Shareholder's Soundness and Minority Shareholder's Rights under the Act on Corporate Governance of Financial Companies." Korea Financial Law Association 13, no. 3 (December 31, 2016): 37–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.15692/kjfl.13.3.2.

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15

Madlela, Vela. "The Appointment of a Proxy "At Any Time" in Terms of Section 58 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Richard Du Plessis Barry v Clearwater Estates NPC [2017] ZASCA 11." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 22 (January 31, 2019): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2019/v22i0a4401.

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Section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 gives a shareholder the right to appoint a proxy "at any time" for the purpose of participating in, speaking and voting on behalf of that shareholder at a shareholders′ meeting, or providing or withholding written consent on behalf of the shareholder in terms of section 60. One important issue that arises in regard to the appointment of a proxy relates to the proper interpretation of section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, namely whether this section, as read with section 58(3)(c), constitutes an unalterable provision giving a shareholder an unlimited right to appoint a proxy "at any time" before the proxy exercises the shareholder's rights at the shareholders meeting, or whether the time period within which the instrument of a proxy′s appointment must be delivered to the company may be restricted by the MOI. This issue was considered by the SCA in the Richard Du Plessis Barry case in view of the appellant′s contention that the provisions of the MOI that limited the time period within which the instrument appointing a proxy must be delivered to the company, or other person on behalf of the company, were valid. In this note, I examine the Richard Du Plessis Barry case with a focus on the proper interpretation of the right of a shareholder to appoint a proxy "at any time" as conferred by section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. I provide some critical comments on the main issues that this judgement raises, including the interpretation of section 58(1) in the context of "alterable" and "unalterable" provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a purposive interpretation of section 58(1), the interaction between section 58(1) and section 58(3)(c), the significance of the difference in the wording of section 58(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and section 189 of the previous Companies Act 61 of 1973, as well as the practical implications of the court's decision in this matter. This is followed by a brief comparative analysis with selected international jurisdictions and some concluding remarks.

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16

Rai, Arun Kumar, Kumari Preeti Yadav, Altaf Mallik, and Piyush Gupta. "Impacts of bank mergers on shareholder's wealth." International Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 8–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.55429/ijabf.v1i1.16.

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We examine the effect of the news about merger of six banks into four major banks, employing the standard event study method with the market model on a sample of four bidders and six target banks. We find significant impact of merger announcement on the bidder and target banks. While the bidder banks are negatively impacted, the target banks experience positive impacts on the event day and day after, followed by negative results later on. No previous study is found to have addressed this question on how the merger announcements impact the bidder and target bank's stock returns in India.

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17

Vutt, Andres, and Margit Vutt. "Shareholder's Individual Information Right: Prerequisites and Boundaries." Juridica International 23 (November 29, 2015): 60. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/ji.2015.23.07.

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18

Shamshin, Viktor Nikolaevich. "CALCULATION OF MANAGER'S BONUSES AND SHAREHOLDER'S DIVIDENDS." European Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, no. 5-6 (2022): 35–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.29013/ejems-22-5.6-35-41.

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19

Gabov, Andrey V. "Exemption of a joint stock company from the obligation to provide information to a shareholder." Law Enforcement Review 4, no. 3 (October 5, 2020): 103–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.24147/2542-1514.2020.4(3).103-122.

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The subject of research. Issues concerning the exercise of the right of shareholders to receive information are analyzed. The focus is on the issues of exemption of a joint-stock company from providing information. The development of the institute of the information provision to shareholders by joint stock companies are consistently analyzed. The main trends in the development of this institute are shown: gradually narrowing the ability of shareholders to exercise their right to receive information through such means as restriction, differentiation and exemption from providing information. Special emphasis is placed on the institute of exemption from providing information. The purpose of the article is to show the main drawbacks of the existing model of exemption of a joint-stock company from the obligation to provide information to shareholders and to formulate directions for the development of legislation. The author's main scientific hypothesis can be summarized as follows. The Federal law «On joint-stock companies» contained an initial defect in the description of information exchange between a shareholder and a joint-stock company. The shareholder's right to information was not described, in fact, it was «embedded» in the obligation of the joint-stock company to provide information. The subsequent changes to the law resulted in a narrowing of the rights of the shareholder, practically depriving the minority shareholder of the right to information. This defect has led to significant legal uncertainty when the joint-stock company exercises its right to be exempt from providing information. This uncertainty should be eliminated, because the regulatory goals for granting joint-stock companies an exemption from the obligation to provide information to shareholders (article 92.2 of the Federal law «On joint-stock companies» that counters sanctions pressure) are absolutely correct. At the same time, some of the grounds for exemption from the obligation to provide information to shareholders (article 92.1 of the Federal law «On joint-stock companies») must either be excluded or reformulated. The author notes the complete «break» between the current regulation and the ideas about information exchange between a shareholder and a joint-stock company, that initially inspired the creation of the law on joint-stock companies. The inclusion of sanctions in the law on joint - stock companies as a factor affecting the performance by a joint-stock company of its obligation to provide information to shareholders should be fully welcomed. However, the legal and technical design of the corresponding political and legal idea cannot be considered optimal. In this part, the legislation requires a complete renovation based on the principle of balancing constitutional values and the interests of the state, majority and minority shareholders. Description of research methodology. The research is based on a systematic analysis, as well as the interpretation of Russian legislation and doctrine. Information about the main scientific results. The development of legislation on joint-stock companies in terms of providing information is shown. It is shown that if legislator taking into account sanctions when regulating the obligation of a joint-stock company to provide information, the goals of legislative regulation fully comply with constitutional principles, but specific legal decisions cannot be considered optimal. Conclusions. It is concluded that development of legislation on joint-stock companies has led to a significant restriction of the ability of shareholders to receive information. The author formulated the priority of regulatory goals in countering sanctions pressure and offered specific directions for improving legal regulation.

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20

Gounder, Chitra Gunshekhar, and M. Venkateshwarlu. "Shareholder Value Creation: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector." Accounting and Finance Research 6, no. 1 (February 14, 2017): 148. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/afr.v6n1p148.

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This study investigates the importance of economic value added for the shareholders’ value maximization. Economic value added (EVA) is a value based performance measurement tool that helps to settle down the management decision regarding creation of shareholders value. Very few literatures are found regarding creation of shareholder values in banks. Sample of 40 Indian commercial listed Banks and panel data are used for the period of 2001 to 2015, the empirical findings for Public limited banks and overall Indian banks revealed that there is a positive and significant relationship between shareholder’s value maximization and EVA but in case of Private limited banks, DPS was found to have significant relationship with shareholder value. The Higher the value of EVA, higher shareholders value .The finding shows significant support for EVA and DPS, but it was found that EVA is not efficiently used for Analysis and decision making regarding creation of value. Thus it is suggested to focus on criteria of EVA for analyzing shareholder’s value of banks.

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21

YoungshinYoon. "Legal Issues Concerning Shareholder's Meeting and Preliminary Injunction." Journal of hongik law review 10, no. 2 (June 2009): 395–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.16960/jhlr.10.2.200906.395.

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22

PERRY, TOD, and URS PEYER. "Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective." Journal of Finance 60, no. 4 (August 2005): 2083–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x.

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23

Chen, Yehning, and Shing-Yang Hu. "The controlling shareholder's personal leverage and firm performance." Applied Economics 39, no. 8 (May 2007): 1059–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840500462004.

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24

Bunn, David, and Mark Dumalski. "International Tax Planning: Subsection 15(2) and Partnerships in the Foreign Affiliate Context: Interpretive Arguments in the Absence of Legislative Amendments." Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne 69, no. 1 (April 2021): 253–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.1.itp.

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The purpose of subsection 15(2) is to include in a shareholder's income amounts received from a corporation, either by the shareholder directly or by certain non-arm's-length persons and partnerships, in the guise of loans or other indebtedness. Specific exceptions exist for amounts owing by certain foreign affiliates, as well as for indebtedness between non-resident persons. Unfortunately, the broad language used in the relevant provisions can lead to anomalous results if those provisions are read and applied literally, without appropriate consideration being given to context and purpose. In particular, the manner in which partnerships have been incorporated into the shareholder loan rule can bring into question the potential application of subsection 15(2) in the foreign affiliate context. This article explores three examples of situations involving partnerships and foreign affiliates where a literal interpretation of the shareholder loan rule could lead to anomalous results. The article then outlines why it is reasonable to conclude, when considering the text, context, and purpose of subsection 15(2) and its related provisions, along with their legislative history, that the shareholder loan rule does not apply in the circumstances described in the examples.

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25

Omondi Osiga, Kevin, and Dr Caroline Kimutai. "Board Characteristics and Shareholder's Value Creation of Insurance Companies Listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange, Kenya." International Journal of Economics, Business and Management Research 07, no. 06 (2023): 228–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.51505/ijebmr.2023.7615.

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The corporate board ensures desirable shareholder value creation because of its immense role in strategic oversight, performance evaluations and governance. The board is at the center, as evidenced by the accelerated growth of private insurance companies worldwide. However, insurance companies in Kenya have experienced slow growth over the last decade. To get a clear understanding of the effects of the board on a corporation’s financial performance, it is vital to assess the association between the characteristics of the board characteristics and its creation of shareholder value. The study examined the impact of board characteristics on the shareholder’s value creation for Insurance companies listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). The study aimed to establish the effect of board characteristics (size, diversity, independence, and expertise) on shareholder value creation in listed insurance companies. The shareholder, resource dependency, stewardship, and agency theories underpin the study. The study used a descriptive research design to analyze five insurance corporations listed on Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) for ten years from December 2010 to 2020. The study utilized data published in audited annual reviews and reports for the five selected insurance corporations listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. A correlational analysis was employed to test the degree and strength of the relationship between the variables understudy, and a regression model was developed. The study established that board expertise had the most significant impact on shareholder value creation, followed by board size, board diversity and board independence. The study recommended the prioritization of the board expertise to boost shareholder value creation, the optimization of board sizes depending on company needs and the inclusion of more women on boards.

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26

Smitiukh, Andrii. "The grounds of the shareholder’s withdrawal from the limited liability companies and legal entities of the similar corporate forms: the comparative legal aspect." Law Review of Kyiv University of Law, no. 1 (April 15, 2020): 188–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.36695/2219-5521.1.2020.38.

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The article presents the result of comparative legal studies of the grounds of the shareholder’s withdrawal from the limited liability companies as well as legal entities of the similar corporate forms provided by the laws of some countries (namely Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom). It is concluded that in most legal systems the ground of the withdrawal is a set of facts composed of the main element – the declaration of will of the shareholder to terminate the corporate relationship of participation and an additional element of a subjective or objective nature. The aforesaid additional element of the objective nature in turn may be expressed by law in evaluation category or not. The additional elements of the set of facts composimng the ground of the withdrawal has been classified in the article. So, an additional element of the set of facts of the subjective nature is a declaration of will of the rest of shareholders to allow the shareholder’s withdrawal. An additional element of the set of facts of the subjective nature may be provided by law in a «simple» way as a circumstances established by the company’s articles of association or as an important decision of the general shareholders meeting objected by the minor shareholder or as a cause expressed by law in evaluation categories as a material breach of rights and interests of the shareholders by the company or other shareholders («just cause», «good cause», «justes motif», «the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of shareholders» etc.). The correlation between the nature of additional elements of the ground of the shareholder’s withdrawal and the mode of the withdrawal has been investigated. The court mode of the shareholder’s withdrawal is always provided if an additional element of the set of facts composing the ground of the withdrawal is expressed in evaluation categories as a material breach of rights and interests of the shareholder by the company or other shareholders. The different additional elements of the set of facts composing the ground of the shareholder’s withdrawal may be provided by the law of the same legal system for judicial and non-judicial modes of the withdrawal.

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27

Marcella, Marcella, and Mungniyati Mungniyati. "Faktor-Faktor mempengaruhi Nilai Perusahaan non-Keuangan yang tedaftar di Bursa Efek Indoensia." Media Bisnis 13, no. 2 (September 30, 2021): 185–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.34208/mb.v13i2.1690.

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The purpose of this research is to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of independent variables on firm value. This study uses a variable performance ratio, leverage ratio, profit sustainability ratio, shareholder's equity ratio, profitability, dividend payout ratio, firm size, firm productivity and firm age. The population used in this study were non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2015 to 2017. There were 118 non-financial companies selected to be used as the final sample and the hypothesis tested using multiple regression analysis This study shows that the performance ratio, dividend payout ratio, firm productivity and firm age have an influence on firm value, while the leverage ratio, profit sustainability ratio, shareholder's equity ratio, profitability, and firm size do not affect the firm's value.

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28

곽종민 and 조문기. "Differential Earnings Informativeness according to the Largest Shareholder's Ownership." Global Business Administration Review 7, no. 1 (March 2010): 121–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.17092/jibr.2010.7.1.121.

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29

Lara, Juan Manuel García, and Araceli Mora Enguídanos. "On the Persistent Understatement of Shareholder's Equity Around Europe." Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad 32, no. 115 (January 2003): 44–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2003.10779475.

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30

Dandapani, Krishnan, Ann Marie Hibbert, and Edward R. Lawrence. "The Shareholder's response to a firm's first international acquisition." Journal of Banking & Finance 118 (September 2020): 105852. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105852.

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31

Kahan, Marcel, and Edward Rock. "Corporate Governance Welfarism." Journal of Legal Analysis 15, no. 1 (August 23, 2023): 108–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jla/laad007.

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Abstract Corporate governance is on the verge of entering a new stage. After the managerialism that dominated the view of the corporation into the 1970s and the shareholderism that supplanted it, we are witnessing the emergence of a new paradigm: corporate governance welfarism. Welfarism rejects the faith that market forces will promote general welfare and lacks confidence in the government’s ability to set proper boundary constraints. By looking to corporations to internalize externalities directly, welfarism thus offers an alternative way to deal with social problems that the political system has failed to address. Welfarism comes in three strands—portfolio welfarism, shareholder welfarism, and direct social welfarism—two of which are consistent with shareholder primacy. The important distinction between welfarism and shareholderism, rather, is that welfarism, by embracing goals that are much broader than shareholder value as a means to promote overall welfare, reflects a departure from the classical liberal economic theory that underpins shareholderism. Welfarism, in turn, departs from managerialism in looking beyond the single firm, in relying on shareholder and stakeholder pressure rather than on managerial discretion to balance firm value maximization and broader objectives, and in embracing a wider set of potential stakeholders. Welfarism is on the rise ideologically. While it is unclear how much welfarism has already affected operations at individual firms, the underlying drivers of welfarism are likely to remain or grow. There are, therefore, good reasons to believe that the push towards welfarism will take hold, grow, and, over time, generate a welfarist turn in corporate governance. Welfarism, however, is subject to two inherent limitations. First, welfarism has its greatest traction for publicly traded companies with dispersed shareholders. By contrast, for companies with a single shareholder, a controlling shareholder, or a small group of shareholders, the welfarist prescriptions will have only a limited impact. Second, the very lack of consensus that impedes political solutions reemerges under and constrains welfarism by generating disagreements among shareholders, impugning its legitimacy, and imposing political barriers to its implementation.

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32

Halim, Akmal Hidayah, Wan Noraini Mohd Salim, Halyani Hassan, Nor Azlina Mohd Noor, and Azhani Arshad. "Dealing with Shares on a Shareholder's Death: The Plight of the Deceased's Personal Representative." GATR Global Journal of Business Social Sciences Review 1, no. 1 (February 24, 2013): 25–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gjbssr.2013.1.1(4).

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Objective This paper aims to examine the extent of the personal representative's duties and liabilities in dealing with shares on the death of a shareholder. The paper also analyses the procedure to administer the shares and the available options to the estate beneficiaries with regard to their entitlements to the shares. Methodology/Technique The discussion adopts the doctrinal analysis by examining the existing primary and secondary materials, including statutory provisions as provided by the Probate and Administration Act 1959 and the Companies Act 1965, case law and other legal and non-legal literatures relating to the duties and liabilities of the personal representative in dealing with the deceased's shares. Findings The discussion adopts the doctrinal analysis by examining the existing primary and secondary materials, including statutory provisions as provided by the Probate and Administration Act 1959 and the Companies Act 1965, case law and other legal and non-legal literatures relating to the duties and liabilities of the personal representative in dealing with the deceased's shares. Type of Paper: Review Keywords: Shareholder's Death, Shares, Estate Distribution, Personal Representative, Malaysian Law.

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33

Fegyveresi, Zsolt. "Shareholders' Right to Information − A Comparative Analysis of Hungarian and Romanian Company Law." Acta Universitatis Sapientiae Legal Studies 9, no. 1 (December 2, 2020): 39–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.47745/ausleg.2020.9.1.03.

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"This study examines one of the basic rights of shareholders, the right to information in Hungarian and Romanian company law. The right to information is a non-property, organizational right originating from the shareholder’s membership right, which is related to the convening of the general meeting of the company limited by shares and the voting right that can be exercised there. The right to information is the individual right of the shareholder and the individual obligation of the company. The right to information belongs to all shareholders, regardless of the extent of their fi nancial contribution. The exercise of the right to information is a fundamental principle and serves the protection of the shareholder, but, in addition to its protective nature, it stands at the basis of the preparation of the decisions of the company’s shareholders."

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34

Guo, Ruining, and Ziyang Li. "CSR Initiatives of Controlling Shareholder in Share Pledge Firms: Sustainable Orientation or Interim Plan?" E3S Web of Conferences 409 (2023): 04001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202340904001.

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This paper investigates the effects of share pledge by controlling shareholder on corporate social responsibility and the mechanism through which stock pledge affects CSR. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2008 to 2020, we find that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to invest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) than other firms. Their CSR also perform better even when all pledge funds are invested to shareholders themselves rather than to the company’s operation. We then provide evidence to show that the motivating effect of stock pledge by controlling shareholder on CSR is related to controlling shareholder’s incentives to improve corporate value to prevent loss of corporate control and reduce the risk of stock price crash. These results consistently suggest that controlling shareholders employ corporate social responsibility as an effective way to reduce the risk of controlling right transfer.

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35

Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value: EVA Concept." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (January 19, 2016): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/.v3i1.173.

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In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.

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36

Panigrahi, Shrikant Krupasindhu, Yuserrie Bin Zainuddin, and Noor Azlinna Binti Azizan. "Linkage of Management Decisions to Shareholder’s Value." International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486) 3, no. 1 (July 21, 2014): 114–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.20525/ijfbs.v3i1.173.

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In this paper, the author investigated the influence of management decisions like capital structure, dividend policies, remunerations, credit policy decisions and investment decisions on shareholder wealth maximization. The main objective of this paper is to increase awareness and relationship between management and shareholders of the companies. To achieve the objective, portfolio theory, capital asset pricing model and modern financial theory providing evidence on the linkage between management decisions to shareholder’s value. Shareholders are only concerned about the value of shares of the company and the amount of return in the form of dividend paid. Thus in order to meet the demands of the shareholders of the company, managers needs to increase their abilities and skills to overcome the organizational goals. Thus the main goal of this paper is to discuss on the role of management decisions towards increasing shareholder’s wealth and meet organizational goals.

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37

Chuan, Lin, and Zhai Haomiao. "Major Shareholders’ Reduction and the Risk of Stock Price Crash." Journal of Asian Research 7, no. 3 (July 20, 2023): p11. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jar.v7n3p11.

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This paper takes China Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as samples to empirically test the impact of major shareholder reduction on the risk of stock price crash. This paper finds that the reduction of major shareholders promotes the risk of stock price crash of listed companies, that is, compared with listed companies without major shareholders’ reduction, the risk of stock price crash of listed companies with major shareholders’ reduction is higher, and this conclusion still holds after controlling the conservative factors. Further examination shows that the major shareholder’s manipulation of information has an impact on the risk of stock price crash, and the impact of major shareholder’s reduction on the risk of stock price crash is more obvious in China state-owned enterprises, non-high-tech enterprises, enterprises in the bull market period and enterprises in areas with low market investors.

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38

Vutt, Andres, and Margit Vutt. "Shareholder Exit in Estonian Private Limited Companies: Proposals of the Company Law Revision Working Group." Juridica International 30 (October 13, 2021): 140–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/ji.2021.30.16.

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Private limited companies are small, closed companies in which, as a rule, there are few shareholders. Regrettably, conflicts arise between shareholders that cannot be resolved in such a way that the persons in dispute remain shareholders, since protracted litigation reduces the value of the company and may lead to the closing of the business. For resolving such situations, several countries have made provisions in their laws for the possibility of shareholder exit. Current Estonian law does not provide for shareholder exit. The law regulates only a shareholder’s expulsion, but this remedy is not widely used in practice, since its scope is so limited. This mechanism cannot be used for solving the problems in most cases. There are some other possibilities for shareholder exit, but they are merely theoretical and have not been proved in case law. A review of Estonia’s company law commenced in 2016, and the working group presented its proposals for amending the relevant laws in 2019. One proposal made by the revision working group was to bring into the law provisions governing shareholder exit. Under the proposals made, shareholder exit would be possible only for a valid reason and as ultima ratio. The right to claim for exclusion of a shareholder is held by any shareholder(s) having at least 50% of the votes. If a shareholder is excluded from the company, the court has to determine the compensation to be paid to the departing shareholder, taking into account the rules on capital maintenance.

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Hapsari, Puspita Ika, Sihabudin Sihabudin, and Budi Santoso. "PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM PARA PEMEGANG SAHAM DALAM PROSES PERMOHONAN PEMBUBARAN PERSEROAN TERBATAS KEPADA PENGADILAN: Studi Putusan Nomor: 534 K/Pdt/2014." JURISDICTIE 10, no. 2 (January 14, 2020): 232. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/j.v10i2.7363.

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Pembubaran adalah tindakan yang mengakibatkan Perseroan berhenti eksistensinya dan tidak lagi menjalankan kegiatan bisnis untuk selama-lamanya. Kemudian, diikuti dengan proses administrasi berupa pemberitahuan, pengumuman, dan pemutusan hubungan kerja dengan karyawannya. Permohonan pembubaran Perseroan Terbatas kepada Pengadilan diatur dalam Pasal 146 ayat(1) huruf c Undang-undang Nomor 40 Tahun 2007 tentang Perseroan Terbatas (selanjutnya disebut dengan UUPT). Permohonan pembubaran Perseroan Terbatas kepada Pengadilan adalah cara yang dapat ditempuh oleh pemegang saham jika terdapat perimbangan kepemilikan saham pada Perseroan masing-masing sebesar 50% (lima puluh persen) dimana Rapat Umum Pemegang Saham (RUPS) tidak dapat mengambil keputusan yang sah karena perimbangan kepemilikan saham tersebut. Oleh karena itu, tujuan penulisan ini adalah untuk menganalisis perlindungan hukum para pemegang saham dalam proses pembubaran Perseroan Terbatas kepada Pengadilan. Metode yang digunakan dalam penulisan ini adalah yuridis normatif, metode penelitian ini digunakan oleh penulis untuk menganalisis perlindungan hukum pemegang saham dalam permohonan pembubaran Perseroan Terbatas (Studi Putusan Nomor: 534 K/Pdt/2014) dikaitkan dengan Pasal 146 ayat (1) huruf c UUPT.The dissolution is an act which causing company has no existence and unable to continue its business activities forever. Then, followed by an administration process such as notification, announcement, and downsizing with the employees. The dissolution application of Limited Liability Company to court is regulated in Article 146 Clause (1) Part c Law Number 40 the year 2007 about Limited Liability Company. The dissolution of Limited Liability Company to the court is an option which can be done by shareholders if there is a 50% (fifty percents) balance where Annual Shareholders Meeting unable to take a decision because of its shareholder's balance. Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyze the law protection of shareholders in Limited Liability Company’s dissolution application to the court. The method used in this paper is normative juridical, which used by the researcher to analyze the law protection for a shareholder in dissolution application of Limited Liability Company (Final Judgement Number: 534 K/Pdt/2014) related to Article 146 Clause (1) Part c Law of Limited Liability Company.

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40

SHAPSUGOVA, MARIETTA. "DEPENDENCE OF THE COMPANY'S LEGAL PERSONALITY FROM THE PERSONALITY OF ITS SHAREHOLDER AS A TREND OF LEGISLATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE." Gaps in Russian Legislation 14, no. 2 (March 30, 2021): 52–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2072-3164-2021-14-2-052-058.

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The concept of a legal entity as an independent legal entity, independent distinctiveness of its participants was formed gradually. In the Fatherland Law, it reached its climax in the Soviet era. It was then that such classical features of a legal entity were formulated as organizational unity, property isolation, and independent responsibility. The economic system drove this approach. In a planned socialist economy, an individual could not be the owner of the means of production, and therefore the legal personality of an enterprise was maximally alienated from a person's personality, which was reflected in its characteristics. For a long time, by inertia in Russian law and legislation, this alienation of the shareholder's personality from the legal entity's personality was preserved. The reason for the revision of this approach was the abuse by limited liability participants of legal entities controlled by them, using such a person as a "mask" for their activities and leading to a violation of creditors' interests. In this regard, with Russia's transition to market relations, an interest arose in the foreign theory of corporate law, which developed mechanisms to combat such abuses, studies of corporate forms of a legal entity, and mechanisms for bringing controllers and beneficial owners to justice were updated. The article examines the dynamics of the transformation of a legal entity's theory from dependence to independence and again to its dependence. It is argued that the shareholder's connection with the legal entity is preserved, and complete separation of the legal personality from the shareholder's personality is impossible, which is confirmed by the doctrine, law enforcement practice, and trends in the development of legislation on legal entities.

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41

Koh, Pearlie M. C. "A Reconsideration of the Shareholder's Remedy for Oppression in Singapore." Common Law World Review 42, no. 1 (March 2013): 61–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/clwr.2013.42.1.0247.

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42

Madaus, Stephan. "Reconsidering the Shareholder's Role in Corporate Reorganisations under Insolvency Law." International Insolvency Review 22, no. 2 (June 2013): 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/iir.1209.

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43

Duncan, William A., and Robert W. Jamison. "Contributions of S Corporation Debased Debt to Charity: Opportunities, Problems, and Policy Questions Abound with Double Dipping." ATA Journal of Legal Tax Research 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 66–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jltr.2005.3.1.66.

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S corporation losses may be utilized even though they exceed the shareholder's stock basis if the shareholder has made loans directly to the corporation. The basis of debt is reduced in the same way that stock basis is reduced by the flow-through of losses. The contribution of such reduced or zero basis debt obligations to a charity will result in a charitable contribution deduction equal to the fair market value of the debt if the debt is a capital asset held for more than a year. The contribution of zero basis debt may result in the double deduction of basis; first to absorb pass through losses and secondly as a charitable contribution deduction. This strategy may prove advantageous in special circumstances but there are numerous timing and other issues that the tax advisor must recognize or risk unexpected tax consequences and professional embarrassment. Congressional intent and tax policy issues encouraging charitable contributions are examined in the context of S corporation debt.

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44

Li, Weian, and Jianbo Niu. "Private interest and social interest of shareholders: empirical evidence from China." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 1 (2007): 254–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i1c2p1.

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We try to explore the relation among three factors: the private benefits that main shareholders can obtain from the firm, the social benefits derived from a certain ownership structure and the ownership concentration costs. Different corporations have different optimal governance mechanism. Noticing the substitute relation between the level of the management-and-shareholder-conflicts and the different governance mechanism, we take use of the data from China’ stock market and conduct an empirical analysis on the influence both of the different shareholder’s participating in governance and the ownership structure over corporate performance, and have reached two conclusions. First, in the companies with a higher level of conflicts between the management and the shareholders, the shareholder will be more active in participating in governance because the benefits earned here is much more than the company with a lower level of conflicts. Second, when the other governance mechanisms in one company perform poorly, the shareholder is less active in participating in governance because the extra benefits earned here cannot offset their costs. So only in these companies with poor governance mechanisms, the shareholders’ active monitoring can produce benefits. These conclusions can help our further research on the relationship among the shareholder supervision, ownership structure and corporate value, and we should also re-evaluate some traditional theoretical viewpoints

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45

Hatem, Ben Said. "How Can We Increase Shareholder' Wealth? An Empirical Validation from European Countries." Business and Economic Research 7, no. 1 (May 20, 2017): 323. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ber.v7i1.9738.

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This paper tests the determinants of shareholder's wealth. Our study examined three countries: Russia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The samples contains 69 firms for every country observed over a period of 4 years from 2007 to 2010. Firm value is measured by two ratios: Tobin's Q ratio obtained as the sum of market capitalisation, long term debt and short term capital structure divided by total assets, and market to book ratio measured as market value equity over shareholder's equity. The descriptive statistics manipulate that firms in Sweden and the United Kingdom have higher Tobin's Q and market to book ratios, respectively. We found evidence about the hypothesis of tax savings on firm value. Firms with higher values of performance have higher market equity values. We manipulated to a significant relationship between firm value and size when we consider, only Tobin's Q ratio, as dependant variable. More cash means high stocks prices for firms in Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the British and Swedish markets, older firms have less value.

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46

Hu, Chenguang. "Controlling Shareholder's Tunneling Behavior and CEO Turnover in a Weak Institution." Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, no. 1 (January 2016): 14459. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.14459abstract.

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47

Lee, Seo-yeon. "Improvements for Controlling Shareholder's Right of Squeeze Out - Focusing on recent precedent theory and review of Controlling Shareholder's Right of Squeeze Out under Japanese Corporation Act -." commercial cases review 35, no. 2 (June 30, 2022): 33–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.36894/kcca.2022.35.2.033.

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48

Papp, Tekla, and János Dúl. "Sustainable finance: The relating actual Hungarian legislation in EU frame." Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta, Novi Sad 56, no. 4 (2022): 1145–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrpfns56-38980.

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In this paper, after a systematic presentation of the theoretical background of the European Union regulation, we examine the Hungarian regulation and legal practice (using the websites of five listed Hungarian companies and the Budapest Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Recommendations) in connection with the identification of shareholders by the company, the verifiability of the exercise of shareholder's rights, the remuneration policy and reporting of the public company limited by shares and the approval of legal transactions concluded with related party. We also focus on financial governance and certain viewpoints of product governance, with special attention to product approval process and the issue of greenwashing. We chose to emphasize these issues since one cannot find verbatim, translations of legal acts of European Union on these fields with respect to Hungarian legislation. The other reason is that there are available practical experiences in connection with them, therefore we reflect on different anomalies. Our aim is to highlight the need to transpose and implement a legal instrument with such wide-ranging implications as sustainable finance into a thoughtful and coherent set of rules that permeate the legal system.

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49

Xie, Yue, Tianhui Wang, Jinhua Zhang, and Na Wang. "Does controlling shareholders’ share pledge exacerbate excessive financialization of enterprises?—Evidence from performance pressure perspective." PLOS ONE 18, no. 7 (July 19, 2023): e0288705. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0288705.

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Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.

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50

Rahmani, Ataollah. "No reflective loss: The English approach reconsidered." Journal of Corporate and Commercial Law & Practice, The 6, no. 2 (2020): 1–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.47348/jccl/v6/i2a1.

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A company shareholder should have no difficulty in commencing a claim to recover the loss suffered due to a wrong done to their personal property. The right to the protection of property is a fundamental human right in English law. A wronged person whose property right is infringed will have the right to commence legal proceedings against wrongdoers. However, in the company context, the exercise of a shareholder’s right of action may conflict with the company’s right of action where the loss sought is reflective. The English company law’s arrangement has been that a shareholder’s action is exceptional beyond which it will routinely be barred through the principle of the ‘no reflective loss’. Where company’s loss and the shareholders’ loss are reflectively linked, then the company’s action prevails against the shareholder action. This paper argues that the two actions should swap places in law. Shareholder action should be recognised as a general principle of law while it is barred exceptionally in circumstances where stronger policy considerations such as the observation of the corporate autonomy are to be prioritised. This article refers to company law in the UK.

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