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1
Smith, M. Burdick. "“[P]lain and passive fortitude”: Stoicism and Spaces of Dissent in Sejanus." Ben Jonson Journal 25, no. 1 (May 2018): 32–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/bjj.2018.0209.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In Ben Jonson's Sejanus, performed at court in the first year of King James’ reign in 1603, Arruntius seemingly figures as “Jonson's spokesperson.” While lauding the moral responsibility of Arruntius, some critics have portrayed the Senator as a passive Stoic whose “only outlet is speech.” For a poet who emphasizes the moral and didactic responsibility of authorship, why, then, does his spokesman inhabit a peripheral space in criticism? Critical interpretation of Arruntius depends on the editorial decision to render many of Arruntius’ lines as asides or as public critique, and this editorial crux is examined vis-à-vis early modern attitudes toward public engagement. I argue that the play negotiates the tensions between the patient Neostoicism of Justus Lipsius and politically active Senecan Stoicism. Arruntius navigates those tensions through Ciceronian ideals of friendship, which provide an alternative to the rampant flattery and tyranny at Tiberius’ court. I show that the play responds to larger political anxieties concerning James I's recent ascension to the throne, and that interpreting early modern Stoicism as entirely passive disregards the complex discourse of friendship that permeates the period.
2
Gellera, Giovanni. "Pride Aside: James Dundas as a Stoic Christian." Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17, no. 2 (June 2019): 157–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2019.0234.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the manuscript Idea philosophiae moralis (1679), James Dundas (c.1620−1679), first Lord Arniston, a Presbyterian, a judge and a philosopher, makes extensive use of Stoic themes and authors. About one third of the manuscript is a close reading of Seneca. Dundas judges Stoicism from the perspective of Calvinism: the decisive complaint is that the Stoics are ‘prideful’ when they consider happiness to be within the grasp of fallen human reason. However, pride aside, Dundas is willing to recover some Stoic insights for his Calvinist faith. In what ways? The promise of the practical rewards of Stoicism (control of the passions, tranquillity of the mind, strength of character) drives Dundas's interest in arguing that Stoicism can play a crucial psychological and moral contribution to a Christian's life. The investigation of Stoicism in the Idea philosophiae moralis sheds new light on the backdrop of the Scottish Enlightenment's relationship with Stoicism, commonly characterised as ‘Christian Stoicism’, as well as on the variety of the early modern Christian-Stoic syntheses, such as the Religio Stoici (1663) by George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, a friend of Dundas's.
3
Turpin, William. "Tacitus, Stoic exempla, and the praecipuum munus annalium." Classical Antiquity 27, no. 2 (October 1, 2008): 359–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ca.2008.27.2.359.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Tacitus' claim that history should inspire good deeds and deter bad ones (Annals 3.65) should be taken seriously: his exempla are supposed to help his readers think through their own moral difficulties. This approach to history is found in historians with clear connections to Stoicism, and in Stoic philosophers like Seneca. It is no coincidence that Tacitus is particularly interested in the behavior of Stoics like Thrasea Paetus, Barea Soranus, and Seneca himself. They, and even non-Stoic characters like Epicharis and Petronius, exemplify the behavior necessary if Roman freedom was to survive the monarchy.
4
Stephens, William O. "Stoicism and Food Ethics." Symposion 9, no. 1 (2022): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion2022917.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The norms of simplicity, convenience, unfussiness, and self-control guide Diogenes the Cynic, Zeno of Citium, Chrysippus, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius in approaching food. These norms generate the precept that meat and dainties are luxuries, so Stoics should eschew them. Considerations of justice, environmental harm, anthropogenic global climate change, sustainability, food security, feminism, harm to animals, personal health, and public health lead contemporary Stoics to condemn the meat industrial complex, debunk carnism, and select low input, plant-based foods.
5
Currie, Michelle. "Seneca on the Death of M. Livius Drusus (De brevitate vitae 6.1-2)." Mnemosyne 73, no. 5 (March 18, 2020): 775–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1568525x-12342754.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract The account of M. Livius Drusus in Seneca’s dialogue De brevitate vitae significantly departs from other versions by suggesting that Drusus’ death may have been a suicide rather than an assassination. The inspiration for Seneca’s reworking of the scene lies with Stoicism’s expectations for choosing and implementing suicide. Drusus’ role in the dialogue is to provide a cautionary illustration of the problems of neglecting true otium and the philosophical pursuits it entails. Seneca portrays Drusus disregarding Stoic conventions for suicide in order to reinforce his broader philosophical failings. The author therefore significantly breaks with historiographical tradition in order to make a more effective philosophical argument.
6
Sanzhenakov, Alexander A. "Can Senecan Theater of Passions Educate a Virtuous Person?" Siberian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2019): 245–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/2541-7517-2019-17-3-245-257.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article is devoted to the consideration of the pedagogical content of Seneca’s tragedy. The article provides a solution for the problem, which is contained in the controversy – on the one hand, Seneca as other Stoics believes that the passions negatively affect the soul of human being, on the other hand, his tragedies portray plots overrun with passions involving murder, perfidy, betrayal and other crimes. The author suggests that this feature of the plot of dramatic works of Seneca cannot be explained by simple respect of the tradition, according to which the passion is the main driving force of both the ancient Greek and ancient Roman tragedies. The author shows that Seneca intentionally uses certain artistic techniques to achieve the pedagogical effect.
7
HARTFORD, G. F. "T.S. ELIOT ON THE STOICISM OF SENECA." English Studies in Africa 33, no. 1 (January 1990): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00138399008690865.
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8
Łapiński, Krzysztof. "Between medicine and rhetoric: therapeutic arguments in Roman Stoicism." Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 9, no. 1 (June 30, 2019): 11–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.24917/20841043.9.1.1.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, I intend to focus on some rhetorical strategies of argumentation which play
crucial role in the therapeutic discourse of Roman Stoicism, namely in Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Reference is made to Chaim Perelman’s view of ancient
rhetoric as an art of inventing arguments. Moreover, it is pointed out that in rhetorical education (cf. Cicero, Ad Herennium, Quintilian, etc.) as well as in therapeutic discourse the concept
of “exercise” and constant practice play a crucial role.
9
Sanzhenakov, Alexander. "Institutionalization of a philosophical school: the origins of Justus Lipsius’ neostoicism." RL. 2020. vol.1. no. 2 1, RL. 2020. vol.1. no. 2 (December 10, 2020): 95–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.47850/rl.2020.1.2.95-101.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article is devoted to the consideration of the neostoicism of Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) in order to show that there is a set of reasons for the renovation and institutionalization of any philosophical school: the historical context, education, community, personality and biography of its leader. As for Justus Lipsius, a philologist and publisher of ancient texts (Tacitus, Seneca), the following factors influenced. Since Lipsius lived in turbulent times (the 16th century was marked by the Reformation and religious wars), he could not help but pay attention to Stoic philosophy, designed to give peace of mind in an unsettled world. Lipsius received an excellent education at a Jesuit college and at two universities – Cologne and Louvain. He was instilled in a love of ancient literature during his education, which predetermined his work. He was an outstanding person by nature and was formed in the university environment and in the intellectual circles of his time. He was, for instance, a member of the Familists, whose founder taught, among other things, the permissibility of changing denominations. Lipsius’s interpretation of the Stoic doctrine suggests that the Stoics came closest to Christianity, unlike other ancient philosophers. All these factors determined the revival of Stoicism in the 16th century.
10
Salmon, J. H. M. "Stoicism and Roman Example: Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England." Journal of the History of Ideas 50, no. 2 (April 1989): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2709732.
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11
AIKIN, SCOTT. "Seneca on Surpassing God." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3, no. 1 (2017): 22–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.6.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT:Seneca twice argues that the wise person (sapiens) outstrips or surpasses (antecedat) God. On its face, this claim seems both starkly impossible and rankly impious, the kind of thought antithetical to Stoic wisdom. However, a case may be made that the thought is a natural outgrowth of Stoicism's value theory and is part of the broader Stoic aspirational ethical program.
12
Montgomery, Robert W. "The Ancient Origins of Cognitive Therapy: The Reemergence of Stoicism." Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy 7, no. 1 (January 1993): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0889-8391.7.1.5.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this article, I will discuss some of the similarities between modern cognitive therapy and the Stoic philosophies of ancient Rome. Although a one-to-one correspondence is not asserted, a number of fundamental similarities between the two schools of thought are drawn upon in making a comparison between stoicism and modern cognitive therapy. This comparison provided a historical perspective on the evolution of the philosophical foundations and assumptions of cognitive therapy. The Stoic concepts (including those of Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and Chrysippus) of emotion and those of leading cognitive therapists (primarily Beck and Ellis) were compared. The fundamental Stoic belief that the emotions arise from an interaction between reason and the world was shown to anticipate both Beck and Ellis
13
Graver, Margaret. "Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Πρoπαειαι". Phronesis 44, № 4 (1999): 300–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685289960464610.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractThe concept of πρoπαειαι or "pre-emotions" is known not only to the Roman Stoics and Christian exegetes but also to Philo of Alexandria. Philo also supplies the term πρoπαεια at QGen 1.79. As Philo cannot have derived what he knows from Seneca (despite his visit to Rome in 39), nor from Cicero, who also mentions the point, he must have found it in older Stoic writings. The πρoπαεια concept, rich in implications for the voluntariness and phenomenology of the passions proper, is thus confirmed for the Hellenistic period. It is not to be expected that Philo's handling of this or any concept will necessarily conform to the usage of his Stoic sources. His evidence is nonetheless of great value where it coincides with that of other witnesses. In QGen 4.73 the emphasis falls upon involuntariness and the mechanisms of impression and assent as in Epictetus fr. 9. The πρoπαεια saves the virtuous person's insusceptibility to emotion exactly as it does for the Stoic spokesman in Gellius NA 19.1; this point is of some interest in view of the Christological use of this concept in Origen and Didymus. QGen 1.55 and 3.56 indicate that the occurrence of the πρoπαειαι is dependent upon uncertainty, and further, that for Philo, as for Seneca in Ira 2.3.4, a thought not acted upon can count as a πρoπαεια. In QGen 4.15-17 and 1.79, Philo indicates that hope and perhaps laughter may be related to joy as πρoπαεια to παoς; these assertions are not paralleled in extant Stoic texts. Further, in QGen 2.57, he names "biting and contraction" as the ευπαεια corresponding to grief, supplying a helpful parallel for Cic. Tusc. 3.83 and Plut. Virt. Mor. 449a. The topic may well have been discussed by Posidonius, as suggested by Cooper and others, but Posidonius' attested innovations are rather different in character from the points which have caught the attention of Philo. Taking together the indirect evidence of Philo, Seneca, and Cicero, we may reasonably infer that the πρoπαεια concept belonged already to an earlier period of Stoicism.
14
Felipe, Cleber, and Frederico Silva. "Sêneca e as figurações da hospitalidade." Revista Portuguesa de Humanidades 26, no. 1 (December 30, 2022): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rph/2022_26_1_035.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article analyzes the way in which hospitable reception or deliberate hostility were figured in three works by Seneca, a Roman Stoic philosopher of the 1st century AD. It is an important topic, capable of revealing social elements and political orientations expected of a good princeps. We propose the study of a Menippean satire against Emperor Claudius; a philosophical treatise on the virtue of clemency; and a mythological tragedy involving Thyestes and Atreus, descendants of Tantalus. Regardless of the discursive genre, there is an orderly appeal according to the precepts of Stoicism, so that the absence of hospitality can represent the insanity of a tyrant; the impropriety of an apotheosis; a reproach against vice.
15
Jurkowska, Elżbieta A. "Inspiracje neostoickie w „Sylorecie” Wacława Potockiego." Bibliotekarz Podlaski Ogólnopolskie Naukowe Pismo Bibliotekoznawcze i Bibliologiczne 52, no. 3 (December 13, 2021): 259–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.36770/bp.633.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Classified among the short story-romance stream of Wacław Potocki’s works, Syloret occupies an important place in the poet’s epic legacy. Throughout the extensive digressive parts of this work, Lusatia-based writer spins erudite reflections on the nature of the world, the human condition, the essence of human fate, and explicates the thoughts of ancient philosophers (e.g. Seneca). Potocki turns to philosophical theories – above all to Christianised stoicism (neostoicism), which becomes the proper subject of his literary discourse. In the article the author undertakes research on the most important concepts of Stoic ethics (fortune, nature, virtue), to which the poet refers in his romance poem. An attempt is also made to answer the question of the seventeenth-century author’s use of an extensive characterisation of the principles of this philosophy.
16
Biricheva, Ekaterina V. "ROMAN STOICS AND JAPANESE SAMURAI ON THE EXISTENTIALS OF HUMAN BEING." Вестник Пермского университета. Философия. Психология. Социология, no. 4 (2021): 550–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2021-4-550-560.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article represents a comparative study of the positions of the ancient Stoics and medieval samurai on the question «how to be?» in the conditions of blurred landmarks. Such conditions may arise within di-verse socio-cultural contexts and seem to be the features of the contemporary globalization. The experi-ence of comprehending the issue of human self-realization at the turning points of history undoubtedly took place not only in the Western European tradition of the 1st-2nd centuries and in the East Asian tradi-tion of the 16th-17th centuries. Nevertheless, the unite grounds of human being found in these seemingly disparate cultural and historical localities are again relevant today. The purpose of the article is to analyze the conditions of the conceptualization of these ideas by the Roman Stoics and Japanese samurai, and to demonstrate the similarities and differences in their interpretation of fate, freedom, death, struggle, reali-ty, and time. Methodologically, the research is based on the material of the historical-philosophical and existential-hermeneutic analysis of the treatises of Lucius Annei Seneca, Marcus Aurelius Antonin, Yu-zan Daidodzi, Yamamoto Tsunetomo, and Miyamoto Musashi. The main conceptual result may be given in the following idea. Under the conditions of pluralism and groundlessness, a disoriented person seeks for support in him-/herself and realizes the «courage to be» through the ultimate determination to accept reality in its entirety and paradoxicality, including death, unpredictability of fate, and uncertainty of the further development path. The practice of «inner struggle» and non-choice between opposite positions and values appears to provide an escape to the golden mean of «the own», which allows self-realization to the maximum extent possible and gaining of a reliable ground in one’s own way of being for genuine par-ticipation in the «fluid» reality by a free act. The study is novel not only in that it is the first to reveal sim-ilarity of the existential grounds of stoicism and bushido, but also in that it pays attention to the turning periods in history during which, regardless of cultural affiliation, similar life-meaning questions arise. The answers found appear to be essential for a contemporary person, who finds themselves in the same situation of groundlessness, pluralism, and ambiguity of the transformations taking place around.
17
Сергей Иванович, Некрасов,. "REVIVAL OF STOICISM AS A LIFE PHILOSOPHY." Вестник Тверского государственного университета. Серия: Философия, no. 3(61) (December 1, 2022): 126–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.26456/vtphilos/2022.3.126.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Целью статьи является анализ философских учений стоиков, основные установки которых сегодня плодотворно используются в методиках когнитивно-поведенческой терапии. Основной метод исследования - анализ практически ориентированной философии стоиков, учение которых обладает терапевтической ценностью, являясь средством воздействия не столько на диагностику психологических нарушений, сколько на тех, кто хочет научиться управлять своими умственными представлениями, целенаправленно изменяя своё поведение в течение всей жизни. Результатами исследования являются сравнительный анализ основных положений учения стоиков и методов современной когнитивно-сравнительной терапии. Заслуга автора статьи состоит в доказательстве, что когнитивно-поведенческая терапия фокусируется на кратковременных целях, которые определяются диагнозом и ограничены во времени, в то время как жизненная философия стоицизма способна вносить глубины и безвременные изменения в образ жизни и мировоззрение человека. Теоретическая и практическая значимость статьи заключается в доказательстве, что философия стоиков, которую сегодня рассматривают в качестве западной разновидности буддизма и альтернативы современной академической философии, это философия, которая направлена на практическое применение мудрости этического идеала в жизни каждого человека; способность сформировать личную жизненную установку справиться с любой жизненной ситуацией средствами своего разума и управления эмоциями. Автору удалось углубить предложенную проблематику, что может быть использовано для дальнейшего теоретического анализа и применено для практической работы. The purpose of the article is to analyze the philosophical teachings of the Stoics, the main principles of which are now fruitfully used in the methods of cognitive-behavioral therapy. The main method of research is the analysis of the practically oriented philosophy of the Stoics, whose teaching has therapeutic value, being a means of influencing not so much the diagnosis of psychologicaldisorders, but those who constantly want to learn how to control their mental representations, purposefully changing their behavior throughout their lives. The results of the study are a comparative analysis of the main provisions of the teachings of the Stoics and the methods of modern cognitive-comparative therapy. The merit of the authors of the article lies in proving that cognitive behavioral therapy focuses on short-term goals that are determined by the diagnosis and limited in time, while the philosophy of life of stoicism is able to make profound and timeless changes in the way of life, decision and worldview. sight of an aged person. The theoretical and practical significance of which the articles wrote lies in Seneca's proof, each of which philosophy appeals to the Stoics, therefore which third philosophers today consider each as a free western version of its own kind of therapy of Buddhism ways and alternatives within the limits of modern to leave the academic life of philosophy, - this is the Stoic philosophy, which can be directed to the state of practical opinion, the application of the solution of wisdom, the therapy of ethical people, the ideal, the fruits in the life of the philosophy of each, to see a person's difficulties, the ability to change, to form a guiltily personal age, the life of the third attitude, the conviction to cope with any theory requires life, therefore, the situation is called means schools of their own when the mind means and control the opinion of emotions. Therefore, the authors succeeded in the intention to deepen the problems proposed by each, today that the concept can be used by the spiritual for the therapy of further personal theoretical development of the analysis lies and is applied to the age for diseases of the practical situation of work.
18
Plecas, Tamara, and Ivan Nisavic. "Roman stoics Seneca and Epictetus on epicurean hedonism and the social roles of philosophers." Theoria, Beograd 65, no. 3 (2022): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2203005p.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Epicureans and Roman Stoics interpreted pleasure (?????) differently from each other: for the Epicureans, pleasure was the ultimate good, while most Stoics perceived pleasure as something indifferent. This difference in understanding of pleasure is the crucial point of a disagreement between these two Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in particular if we consider their ethics. This paper examines this difference and highlights the significant similarities between the Roman Stoic and the Epicurean positions. Further, it briefly explores the Epicurean and the Roman Stoic understanding of social relations and philosophers? role in politics and society.
19
Burton, Simon J. G. "Reading the Psalms with Athanasius and Seneca: Stoicism and providence in the Earl of Clarendon's Contemplations." Renaissance Studies 25, no. 2 (March 16, 2011): 298–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-4658.2010.00668.x.
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20
Neill, Edward. "What We Talk about When We Talk about Hardy's Poetry, or How They Brought the Bad News from Essex to Wessex." Victorian Literature and Culture 26, no. 2 (1998): 489–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1060150300002540.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
One of the most influential of recent efforts to take Hardy's strange poetic reputation in hand has been that of Donald Davie, himself a poet, who in Thomas Hardy and British Poetry saluted Hardy's “scientific humanism” and noted his poetic “engineering” as that of a poetically “self-made man.” Thus Davie re-made Hardy, creating a combination of a poetic Samuel Smiles and a poetic Isambard Kingdom Brunei conducting himself with technical assurance and brio — but with limited and “mechanical” poetic aims (13, 40). Perhaps it's the “visibly ideological” nature of Davie's performance here which makes it still so arresting, and “smaller and clearer as the years go by.” In a once-famous essay, “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca,” T. S. Eliot complained (or at least explained) that the many writers about him re-made Shakespeare in their own images. Coleridge's “smack of Hamlet,” which read off a Hamlet invested with his own qualities as he construed them, perhaps also indicates how common this sort of thing may be.
21
Plecas, Tamara. "Relying on Seneca in moments of crisis: The case of princess Elizabeth of Bohemia." Theoria, Beograd 65, no. 4 (2022): 159–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2204159p.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper looks at the correspondence between Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) and the French philosopher Ren? Descartes (1596-1650). Analyzing specific segments of the letters they addressed to each other, it emerges that Descartes, advising Elizabeth and recommending her to read Seneca, was also following an ancient, or more precisely, Stoic therapeutic technique. Namely, it seems that he, like the Stoics, believed that philosophy could provide a kind of consolation or support in moments of crisis, that is, during specific turbulent moments in life.
22
Maso, Stefano. "Seneca e la passione come esperienza fisica." Elenchos 39, no. 2 (November 30, 2018): 377–401. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2018-0021.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract If the ancient Stoics conceived passion as a judgment or the consequence of a judgment referring to external reality, it is correct to define their conception of the psyche as ‘monistic’; it is very different if we consider that passion is due to another faculty independent of reason. In this second case, a scenario opens up in which a realistic and ‘reified’ conception of passion emerges. With reference to this, in the Letter 113 Seneca discusses the paradoxical thesis of the ancient Stoic scholars according to whom “the soul is an animal”, just as virtues and passions are. Through a series of close logical arguments, he shows the absurdities that can be reached in this way. By comparing this letter with the De ira we can define the position of Seneca as a type of practical/operational imaginary dualism: the development of an original coherent form of monism. Not to give in to passion (for example to anger or libido) will not be just or not so much a psychological exercise of reason and will, but certainly a physical experience of resistance.
23
Castagnoli, Luca. "Philosophy." Greece and Rome 62, no. 2 (September 10, 2015): 244–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017383515000182.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
I start this review, which focuses for the most part on publications on Hellenistic philosophy, with a survey of some recent studies on Stoicism. René Brouwer's The Stoic Sage introduces itself as ‘an attempt to bring the early Stoic notions of the sage and wisdom to the fore again’ (1). ‘Again’ alludes to the fact that those notions, which attracted considerable philosophical and scholarly interest at various stages since antiquity, have not received sufficient attention in recent times (specialists in the area will judge the merits of this assessment). The book is divided into four chapters, dealing respectively with the Stoic definitions of wisdom; the ancient puzzles surrounding the nature and very possibility of the change from ‘folly’ to ‘wisdom’; the controversial question of whether the Stoics themselves believed they had achieved the ideal of perfect wisdom; and the intellectual, Socratic background against which the Stoics developed their notion of wisdom. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain, in expanded and revised form, material published by Brouwer in self-contained essays between 2002 and 2008. Chapter 1, with its analysis of the Stoic definitions of wisdom as ‘knowledge of human and divine matters’ and ‘fitting expertise’, is fundamental to set the stage for the more focused inquiries of the rest of the book. From this point of view, it succeeds only partially. It helpfully covers a reasonable amount of ground, but because of Brouwer's choice to focus exclusively on the Stoic definitions of wisdom (sophia) at this stage, and not, say, on the descriptions of the Stoic wise man (sophos: Brouwer's preferred translation ‘sage’ hides the etymological connection), it also problematically leaves some fundamental aspects untouched. I was especially surprised not to see the key notion of infallibility discussed at all in this context, despite the fact that Brouwer correctly clarifies that Stoic wisdom is not to be interpreted as a form of omniscience (33–4). This ultimately springs from an insufficiently detailed analysis of the Stoics’ notions of katalēpsis (which Brouwer translates as ‘cognition’, without ever explaining its distinctive status), and then, in turn, of epistēmē and technē, and their Stoic definitions (see also the puzzling reference to ‘weak cognitions’ on p. 62). (I only note here that Paolo Togni's 2010 monograph Conoscenza e virtù nella dialettica stoica examines much more extensively and systematically the psychological and epistemological ground which needs to be covered by a discussion of Stoic sophia.) The attempt to map exhaustively the three key terms of the first definition – knowledge, human and divine – into the three parts of Stoic philosophy, respectively logic, ethics, and physics, is ingenious but too crude and ultimately unconvincing, since logic had for the Stoics its own separate subject matter (not to be identified with ‘human and divine matters’, and not even with knowledge itself, pace Brouwer), and ethics and physics can themselves be described as forms of knowledge. The interconnected nature of Stoic philosophy, which is helpfully emphasized throughout the book, need not be mirrored in the very definition of wisdom. From a broader methodological point of view, the attempt to reconstruct an early Stoic theory of wisdom constantly clashes with the nature of our evidence, and although in several cases Brouwer does carefully justify why a certain late source can be taken to bear witness to such an early theory, in other cases the reader is left to wonder whether such a justification could be given (for example, in the case of some passages from Seneca). There is still much worth pondering in Brouwer's insightful analyses in Chapters 2–4, although one is left to wonder how much added value has been generated by integrating this previously published material into a single monograph.
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Moiteiro, Carlos Renato. "Nature and politics in the roman stoicism: about the Viuere naturae and the constitution of cosmopolis in Seneca's thought." Revista Archai, no. 1 (2008): 19–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/1984-249x_1_2.
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Oliveira, Luizir De. "Aprender a cuidar de si: Sêneca e o ócio criativo." Cadernos do PET Filosofia 2, no. 3 (July 28, 2011): 12–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.26694/cadpetfil.v2i3.610.
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Resumo: O modo como os homens conduzem suas vidas em meio s atribulaes cotidianas, deixando-se levar por um sem-nmero de atividades que, em vez de lhes trazerem satisfao, acabam por torn-los ainda mais afastados de si mesmos segue sendo uma preocupao no mundo "ps-moderno". Contrariamente ao fast living, refora-se uma atitude slow down, no como um mero afastamento sistemtico dos afazeres cotidianos, mas como um modo de vida que procure ressaltar a importncia de se dedicar ao otium: uma vida quantitativamente menos atribulada, mas sobretudo qualitativamente mais gratificante. Ocupar-se consigo mesmo constitui a base mesma do cura sui, porque cuidar de si requer um distanciamento dos apelos da exterioridade, como bem nos mostra Sneca em De otio. Resgat-lo pode nos mostrar que o dilogo com o pensamento antigo segue sendo muito proveitoso: ensina-nos como nos conduzir atravs das dificuldades cotidianas a fim de alcanarmos um autodomnio que possibilite um estado de conscincia tranqilo.Summary: The way men lead their lives finding their path through everyday hundle and bundle, involved in countless activities which bring more discomfort than satisfaction remains a serious issue for post-modern thinkers. There is a marked trend in reinforcing a slow down attitude, not one that merely pulls us away from the systematic reproduction of day-by-day tasks, but rather a way of living that emphasizes the importance of the otium: quality of life in place of quantity of empty worries. Self-concern is in the foreground of cura sui, because caring for the self demands us to keep away from the calls of the surrounding world as is pointed out by Seneca in De otio. By inviting the Roman philosopher for a "conversation" we reinstate the fruitful presence of the ancient thought in contemporary thinking since we can learn with him how to make our way through everyday difficulties so as to reach an inner state characterized by self-contentment. Keywords: care for the self, stoicism, Seneca, ethics, happy life.
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Hahmann, Andree. "Der glückliche Tod des Stoikers." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 13 (December 31, 2008): 87–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.13.05hah.
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The happy death of the Stoic. Wisdom and finitude in Stoic philosophy. This paper attempts to furnish a Stoic reply to an accusation addressing the Stoics’ ideal of the wise man according to which it is impossible to realize their ideal and therefore their whole system has to face a paradox: How is wisdom possible when all people are fools and it is impossible for them to become good? In addition to this question there is another important problem connected with the ideal of wisdom. The Stoic philosophers deny transcendental ideas. Instead they are well known for their thorough-going materialism. Therefore, even their idea of the wise man must be based on experience. How would it otherwise be possible to form the idea of wisdom by a method of analogy if experience did not provide any example of truthful virtue to us? A possible answer to this problem can be found in the writings of Seneca, a Stoic of the first century A.D. Seneca emphasizes the close relation between wisdom and human mortality owing to which it is at least possible for the philosopher who has made sufficiently progress in his efforts to gain wisdom to find lasting happiness in death.
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Vega Guardia, Angel. "The presence of the stoicism of Seneca The Younger in the spanish literature during the middle ages and its subsequent projection until the 17th century." Annales Neophilologiarum 12 (2018): 137–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/an.2018.12-11.
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Siwicka, Małgorzata. "Starość – szansa czy zagrożenie dla rozwoju moralnego człowieka w ocenie stoików." Vox Patrum 56 (December 15, 2011): 147–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/vp.4213.
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The old age in the ancient culture of Greece and Rome, in contrast to popular opinion, appears not to be held in high esteem by everyone. This observation can be illustrated by a lot of sources in the Greek and Roman literature. The old age has been considered as difficult and troublesome both for persons, whose were afflicted by this age, and for their family, friends and all attendants. This period of human life has been exposed to illness and the other afflictions – weakness of body and mind, less intense clarity and precision of thought. Consequently, the old people would take active part in the social and political life only in this case, when they were in good health, in good physical and mental condition. Because of this in Greek and Roman literature can be found a lot of lamentations and complaints of the old age. Only Plato and representatives of new stoic school – Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius formulated opposite theories about the old age. According to Stoics’ perceiving of the world and the time and cyclical changes of them, the man’s nature and condition from his birth directs inevitably to his death. The whole world is ruled by God and nothing in it happens without his will. So the good and wise man will accept everything, as well the old age, and all its disadvantages. This acceptance off all that happens will bring man peace of mind and protection against whatever he may suffer. The old age – for a lover of wisdom is an occasion to develop and grow up his moral virtues and to improve his character. This intellectual and ethical process issues from human reason, which is a part of divine reason, pervasive all things in the world and all men. The Stoics warn against a danger of a moral decline and in the old age. This corruption would be caused by direction of man’s attention to the shortness of life instead of the improving his character. The number of years of human life appears not to be important for Stoics. They condemn an aim for long life, if it not connected with an aspiration for wisdom.
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Caytas, Joanna Diane. "Parallels in Search of an Intersection: The Manifold Marcus Aurelius Resonances in Walt Whitman’s “Song of Myself”." English Language and Literature Studies 6, no. 2 (April 28, 2016): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ells.v6n2p1.
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<p>While Whitman’s knowledge of and affinity to Epictetus are well-known, the profound roots of <em>Song of Myself</em> in Marcus Aurelius’ <em>To Myself</em> (better known as <em>Meditations</em>) were not researched to date even though it is known that Stoicism was a powerful influence upon the autodidact poet. Through classical hermeneutical methodology, this paper shows how stoic practice and training in daily reflection, cosmopolitanism, pantheism, religious skepticism, public service, but most importantly its Platonic legacy of “doing one’s own thing” through fluxes and flows reach far beyond coincidences in Whitman’s work and may be traced through scores of sometimes verbatim parallels in Whitman’s <em>magnum opus</em>. Even if one leaves use of paradigms, vignettes, examples and transcendentalism aside, the study still shows that these parallels extend to a shared platform of individualism and higher-level virtue that cannot be reduced to the poet’s early love of classical motives and Greek culture. Epicurean materialistic atomism and its doctrine of interchangeability of all matter in metamorphosis came to him through the influence of German chemist Justus von Liebig in the perception of Fanny Wright’s novel <em>Ten Days in Athens</em>. This research traces Whitman’s stance opposed to slavery directly to Seneca and points out multiple parallels between the reflections of Marcus Aurelius on Rome and the words Whitman found for New York—each the metropolis of its day, slightly past its apex of historical power, yet peerlessly vibrant as a melting pot, engaged in cultural wars on multiple levels with forces labeled “barbaric.”</p>
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Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. "The Stoics on the Mental Mechanism of Emotions: Is There a “Pathetic Syllogism”?" Elenchos 39, no. 2 (November 30, 2018): 349–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2018-0020.
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Abstract The mechanism of emotions in Stoicism has been presented by Graver a decade ago as relying on a “pathetic syllogism” having as its premises a judgment about the goodness of a certain type of object and a judgment that it is proper to have a certain emotional response to that object. It is true that each emotion is an irrational impulse resulting not only from the opinion that something is good but also from the opinion that it is appropriate to have a certain type of emotional response to that object, as shown by Graver. However, the present paper intends to present an alternative to Graver’s view by reducing the mechanism of emotion to the mechanism of all impulses: each impulse is an assent given to the impression that it is befitting for me to accomplish certain actions, and what Cicero and Stobaeus describe is not the combination of two premises resulting in an emotion as a conclusion, but the idea that it is necessary to give one’s assent to the impulsive impression to produce an emotion. Likewise, in Seneca, it is in such a way that a preliminary form of impulse is transformed into an emotion. A universal judgment about an object being good or a reaction being appropriate is certainly involved in certain emotions, but not in all of them, since many emotions depend on a fresh impression that overwhelms the general rational judgments of someone due to one’s insufficient mental preparation and to the weakness of one’s mind. In those cases, an emotion may involve the impression that a behaviour or a feeling is appropriate without endorsing the idea that it is universally good or appropriate, since the mechanism of the emotion relies on the vividness of one particular impression even against one’s system of beliefs.
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Călin, Mariana Floricica, and Tănase Tasențe. "Self-acceptance in today's young people." Technium Social Sciences Journal 38 (December 9, 2022): 367–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.47577/tssj.v38i1.7984.
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Acceptance of the self, others and the environment is a force for personal change that has its origins in many eastern and western cultures. The benefits of accepting are described by many cultures through religious literatures (New Testament, Tao Te Ching, Buddhist Scriptures, Bhagavad Gita or "The Divine Song", Yoga Sutras of Patañjali), philosophical (Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Keirkegaard, Krishnamurti, Lao Tzu, Watts), as well as in other various literary forms such as romance (Austen), modernism (Nabok), realism (Tolstoy), poetry or theater (Shakespeare). Acceptance requires a person to tolerate experiences as given; otherwise, simply someone will only pursue pleasure, run away from pain and be prone to judge experiences. The Stoics (Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Seneca) appreciated the ability to tolerate or willingly resist experiences, because it increases the degree of self-control, of detachment without emotion and develops indifference to pleasure and pain. Since acceptance involves contact with reality as it is at a certain moment, it is necessary to be able to remain present and aware even when the available stimuli are less desirable. Consequently, tolerance can be considered a skill through which we can remain present and experience anything that happens completely.
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Strijdom, Johan M. "A Jesus To Think With and Live By: Story and Ideology in Crossan's Jesus Research." Religion and Theology 10, no. 3-4 (2003): 267–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157430103x00088.
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AbstractThe aim of this article is to challenge Crossan in two related fronts. First, concerning 'story': did ancient authors consciously reflect on the distinction between fact and fiction, history and myth, literal and metaphorical? Could they view myths as made-up tales about divine intervention ? Further, could they question the reality of divine intervention as such, or were these questions introduced only much later by the Enlightenment and then illegitimately projected onto antiquity, as Crossan holds? My answer refers to the evidence in Thucydides, the Hippocratic corpus and the Gnostics, but focuses especially on Plato's conscious manipulation of the myths of Atlantis and the metals. I also respond to Crossan's understanding of the Platonist Celsus. Secondly, concerning 'ideology': if jesus'message and program were about systemic justice as distributive egalitarianism, about non-violent but provocative protest against violent and oppressive imperialism, how do his vision and life then relate to ancient and modern views on and practices of social justice? My objection is that whereas Crossan correctly emphasizes the concern for a just society in the Jewish and Near Eastern traditions, he underestimates the contribution of Greco-Roman paganism (except for the Cynics) in this regard. By means of a cursory discussion of Hesiod, Solon, and Socrates, and a more elaborate treatment of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (eg, Musonius Rufus and Seneca) I indicate just how important such a nuanced comparison is.
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Savynska, Inna. "IN SEARCH OF LITERARY SOURCES OF DIALOGUE «DE CONSOLATIONE PHILOSOPHIAE» BY SEVERIN BOETHIUS." Doxa, no. 1(35) (December 22, 2021): 152–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.18524/2410-2601.2021.1(35).246736.
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The paper examines the literature basic of Severin Boethius work «The Consolation of Philosophy». The author starts with the historical context of the appearance of the text and then goes to consider its variety of literary genres and forms. Main of them are satura Menippea, consolation, protreptic, soliloquy and dialogue. Textual and conceptual analyses have relieved the connection between Boethius’s «The Consolation» and the works of other famous authors of Antiquity among them there are Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, Cicero, and St. Augustine. As a connoisseur of Antiquity, Boethius uses literature to explain his philosophical ideas. In addition, the author of the article suggests an analytical review of the image of the Lade Philosophy in «Consolation». The genealogy of this literary character refers to the Greek mythology, Plato’s «Symposium» and «Crito» dialogues, Martianus Capella’s work «On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury» and Augustine’s the literary image of St. Monika. The article reconstructs an epistemological methodology of Boethius’s Neoplatonic dialogue that consists of five stages and describes a therapeutic role of philosophy in the traditions of Plato and Stoics. The essence of this role is a mind therapy. Philosophy teaches us to see the world as a whole, to describe it in clear notions and judgments. According to the text of «Consolation», Boethius takes us to make an intellectual Neoplatonic climbing from practical (ethic) to theoretical (metaphysic) philosophy – from vita activa to vita speculativa. The main aim or the top of this Neoplatonic meditation is a contemplative life or reminding own Ego. The great ideas of this work have the significant influence on Medieval and Renaissance philosophy and literature.
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Lévy, Carlos. "Philosophie romaine : à propos de deux ouvrages récents. [G. Reydams Schils, The Roman Stoics. Self, Responsibility and Affection ; Brad Inwood, Reading Seneca : Stoic Philosophy at Rome]." Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé 1, no. 2 (2007): 174–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/bude.2007.2268.
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Stawoska-Jundziłł, Bożena. "Małe dzieci w chrześcijańskiej epigrafice miasta Rzymu i w nauczaniu Jana Chryzostoma." Vox Patrum 53 (December 15, 2009): 233–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/vp.4467.
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The paper presents the results of studies of epitaphs for children up to almost eight years of age from the city of Rome (3rd-4th c. – B. Stawoska-Jundziłł, Vixit cum parentibus. Children aged under seven in Christian families from Rome of 3rd-4th c., Bydgoszcz 2008) in comparison with the views of John Chrysostom on the upbringing of small children. The content of over 2000 children from Rome demonstrates a high status of even the youngest offspring in the Christian families from this city. The founders cared for their religious „endowment”, bestowed their love on them and tried to remember them as members of the family even if they had died after a few days or months. It was unquestionably believed that small children are immediately saved, go to God and commune with the saints. Thanks to this the family could hope for their support and prayers. Whereas, John Chrysostom only casually mentions small children and, what is more, ambivalently: on one hand presenting them on the basis of thorough observations of their behavior and looking after them and on the other hand as mindless creatures, a harbinger of valuable person following the Stoics e.g. Seneca. As far as the most important for me question of the death of small children is concerned he takes a stand similar to that of the Romans. The children are really without sins (they did not commit them consciously) so God shall accept them only through the hardships of illness and death. Now they are asleep (unlike in the studied epitaphs) but they will rise from the dead and join their parents. Thus, the despair after their death is pointless; God decided the best for them. The difference lies in the fact that the founders of epitaphs more decidedly see the perfection of posthumous existence of even the smallest children who there reach their full maturity whereas John does not seem to be interested in this issue since he directs his teaching mostly to maturing and mature Christians in the earthly life and not in the beyond.
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Ure, Michael V. "Senecan Moods: Foucault and Nietzsche on the Art of the Self." Foucault Studies, February 1, 2007, 19–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i4.893.
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This paper examines Foucault's history of the ancient practices of the self. It suggests that his historical reconstruction usefully distinguishes quite different models of self-cultivation in antiquity, and in doing so helps us to identify and understand the parameters and ambitions of much nineteenth-century German philosophy, especially the ethics of self-cultivation Nietzsche formulates in his middle works. However, it also shows how FoucaultÕs casual formulation of an 'aesthetic of existence' is seriously misleading as a guide to the ancient practices of the self, most notably the Stoic tradition. This paper argues that Foucault does not properly take into account how Stoicism conceives the desire to flee from or break with oneself, which Foucault places at the centre of his own askesis, as a pathological agitation that requires therapy. From the Stoic perspective, in other words, Foucault's askesis of constantly losing oneself is symptomatic of a failure to care for oneself.
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Lovascio, Domenico. "Daniel Cadman,Sovereigns and Subjects in Early Modern Neo-Senecan Drama: Republicanism, Stoicism and Authority." Notes and Queries, October 7, 2016, gjw179. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/notesj/gjw179.
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Kristian Holm, Bo. "God’s Caring Vice-Regent: The Lutheran Transformation of the Senecan Ideal of the Benevolent Monarch as the Basis of Both Absolutism and Social Responsibility." Toronto Journal of Theology, April 30, 2021, e20210016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/tjt-2021-0016.
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This article centres on the role of the Lutheran confession in societal development in the Nordic countries, especially Denmark. Using the concept of social imaginaries, it argues that the Lutheran Reformation refined a monarchical ideology already existent in ancient Roman stoicism that both moved society toward absolutism and emphasized the government’s responsibility for social welfare. This thesis is documented by examples of royal ideology from material in the Danish national archives. The use of Denmark as a case exemplifies how confession can play a formative role for society and, at the same time, offers new material for the correct interpretation of Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine as an ontology and a world view.
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Toda, Kit. "Postures of Dying: Eliot, Seneca and the Elizabethans." Review of English Studies, December 25, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/res/hgaa085.
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Abstract This article analyses the substantial intertextual relations between Eliot’s ‘Gerontion’, Seneca’s tragedies, and Elizabethan and Jacobean drama, particularly in the depictions of dying speeches. It demonstrates, too, that ‘Gerontion’ is a prominent example of how Eliot’s poetry anticipates the issues explored in his critical prose—in this case, notably ‘Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca’ and ‘Seneca in Elizabethan Translation’. Further, the article relates the use of what Eliot called ‘saturated’ images in early modern drama and his own poetry with his theories of poetic creation and originality. In so doing, it argues that, contrary to the accepted critical narrative, the famous description of a ‘profound kinship’ with an unnamed ‘dead author’ that Eliot describes in ‘Reflections on Contemporary Poetry’, may not primarily and exclusively refer to Jules Laforgue.
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Santos, Cláudia Valéria Fortes de Oliveira dos. "Prover-se para a morte:." Revista Primordium, February 4, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.14393/reprim-v6n12a2021-64227.
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Resumo: O presente artigo aspira promover reflexões sobre o entendimento estoico de Lúcio Aneu Sêneca, escritor, filósofo e político romano do século I da era cristã, no que diz respeito à morte, seja esta ocasionada de forma natural ou disposta por suicídio, exibida pelo pensador supracitado como parte constituinte de extrema relevância para a concepção de Sêneca do homem ideal. Para tanto serão utilizadas algumas Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium e De Breitate Vitae. A compreensão senequiana denota a preocupação com a formação do homem que careceria ser preparado tanto para a vida como para a morte. Sêneca expõe que a morte é um dos pilares da existência, ou seja, um feito natural e previsto, cabendo ao homem ideal ser consciente dessa condição e, por conseguinte, desprender-se do medo da morte suscitado e, quando preciso, valer-se do suicídio a fim de resguardar a dignidade do ser humano. Assim, compete ao homem confrontar o temor e a angústia diante da morte, edificando-se, valorosamente, para essa realidade inevitável. Palavras-chave: Estoicismo; Morte; Sêneca. Providing yourself for death: senequian reflections Abstract: This article aspires to promote reflections on Lucius Anneus Seneca’s stoic understanding, writer, philosopher and roman politician of the 1st century of the christian era, with regard to death, whether caused naturally or willingly by suicide, being exhibited by the aforementioned philosopher as a constituent part of extreme relevance for the conception of the ideal man. In order to do so some, Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium and De Brevitate Vitae, will be consulted. Seneca's understanding presents a concern with the formation of the man who would need to be prepared for life and death. Seneca asserts that death is one of the necessities of existence, that is, a natural and foreseen condition, it being up to the ideal man to be aware of this condition and, therefore, to let go of the fear it arouses and, when necessary, to embrace suicide in order to protect the dignity of the human being. Then, it is up to man to face fear and anguish in the face of death, growing valiantly for this inevitable reality. Keywords: Stoicism; Death; Seneca. Data de registro: 21/04/2021 Data de aceite: 25/11/2021
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Long, Alex. "Seneca on Human Rights in De Beneficiis 3." Apeiron, August 21, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2019-0019.
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Abstract The paper discusses Seneca’s phrase ‘human rights’ (ius humanum) in On Benefits 3 and relates the passage to recent debates about human rights in Stoicism and ancient philosophy. I argue that the Latin phrase refers either to rights or to a law conferring rights. The difference between the passage and a common expectation for human rights lies in the kind of relation between right and duty. In Seneca’s passage the right does not in itself have a correlative duty on the part of other people, and yet it does, if exercised through benefactions, create a duty in others. By contrast, the relation between right and duty is usually expected to be unconditional.
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"Existential dimension of contemporary ukrainian cultural studies: review of recent works by M. V. Diachenko." Journal of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Series "The Theory of Culture and Philosophy of Science", no. 59 (2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.26565/2306-6687-2019-59-10.
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The article is devoted to the review of the philosophical essays of Doctor of Philosophy, Professor of Kharkov State Academy of Culture Mykola Vasilovich Diachenko, who published recently last two books “Roman Stoics: Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius. Experience of reading” and “Just to live (philosophical essays and outlines)”. The authors of the paper explore the main philosophical themes and ethical discourses of Diachenko’s miniatures. On the basis of the original interpretation of the philosophy of stoicism, his own life experience, autobiographical facts, analysis of a wide philosophical and literary material in his works M. V. Diachenko examines the complex existential problems of contemporary man – loneliness, suffering, anxiety, love, death. Much attention is paid to the relationship of man with nature, the role of animals in human life and in his spiritual development. In the article, the authors emphasize that one of the main issues that arises in the works of V. Diachenko is the question of tolerant and careful attitude of a person to animals and nature. In the context of the philosophical and literary tradition of the 19th–20th centuries V. Diachenko emphasizes the need for a person to be aware of his responsibility to the living nature. His miniatures are imbued with existential perception of life, reflections on the values of life and the value of life itself, as well as the art to experience tragic events and processes of one's life. In the context of the philosophy of stoicism, the philosophy of the East, European philosophy of the 19–20th centuries, the author teaches the reader an optimistic view of the complex, ageless problems of a modern man – love, moral choice, guilt, loneliness. In the philosophical miniatures of M. V. Diachenko, the philosophy of suffering is closely intertwined with the philosophy of charity and rebirth, and this makes it a new turn in ethical philosophy. The article analyzes the ideas and principles of formation of man’s spiritual existence, which according to M. V. Diachenko, contribute to understanding how to live for a person who constantly overcomes life crises. The paper demonstrates that the ideas of M. V. Diachenko occupy a prominent place in the Kharkov university philosophy and correspond to the moods of the modern readers. The authors emphasize that Diachenko’ essays propose the new directions in the Ukrainian philosophy of the recent years.
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Schwab, Gerson Luis, Simone Tetu Moysés, Beatriz Helena Sottile França, Renata Iani Werneck, and Samuel Jorge Moysés. "O enfrentamento às condições crônicas sob a ótica do estoicismo: lições de Sêneca e Epicteto / Coping with Chronic Conditions from the Perspective of Stoicism: Lessons from Seneca and Epictetus." Revista Internacional de Humanidades Médicas 3, no. 2 (March 5, 2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.37467/gka-revmedica.v3.1173.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACTThis research has a theoretical approach based on the stoic principle that happiness and self-fulfillment are natural consequences of right attitudes. It is possible to change the will to suit the world and live sick and happy, in peril and yet happy, stating an individual desire completely autonomous and deterministic. This presupposes not an apathetic fatalism, but a moral resistance to better face the hardships of life. When faced with setbacks of destiny a stoic believes in an extreme personal freedom to ally with this almost absolute determinism. These are congruent principles to health care models for strengthening and supporting people in chronic conditions. A literature review of three important works of the Stoic School (Encheiridion and The Discourses, by Epictetus, and Moral Letters to Lucilius, by Seneca) was performed. The search words "health, disease, choice, discipline," with its English correspondents, were utilized for the selection of texts, interpreted by discourse analysis. It was sought a contribution to Public Health towards the management of chronic conditions, the silent epidemic of XXI century. As results some principles are presented converging to notions of selfcare and shared care for chronic conditions, primarily focused on the autonomy and discipline of users to manage their health. It is proposed the application of these principles to treatment planning in programs for chronic conditions, whether for ill patients or in special conditions of health, such as adolescence, disabilities, pregnancy, etc. Under this point of view these principles could be extended to health professionals because their work routine also features a chronic condition. That could benefit individuals, healthcare systems and society as a whole.RESUMOEsta pesquisa tem um enfoque teórico, baseada no princípio estoico de que felicidade e realização pessoal são consequências naturais de atitudes corretas. É possível alterar a vontade para se adequar ao mundo e viver doente e feliz, em perigo e ainda assim feliz, afirmando um desejo individual completamente autônomo e determinista. Isto não pressupõe um fatalismo apático, mas sim uma resistência moral para melhor enfrentar as agruras da vida. Ao deparar-se com os revezes do destino um estoico acredita em sua extrema liberdade pessoal para aliar-se a esse determinismo quase absoluto. Tais princípios são coerentes com modelos de atenção à saúde para o fortalecimento e apoio às pesso-as em condições crônicas. Foi realizada uma revisão bibliográfica de três importantes obras da Escola Estoica (En-cheiridion e The Discourses, de Epicteto, e Moral Letters to Lucilius, de Sêneca). Foram utilizadas as palavras de busca “saúde, doença, escolha, disciplina”, com suas correspondentes em inglês, para a seleção dos textos, interpreta-dos por análise do discurso. Buscou-se uma contribuição para a Saúde Coletiva, direcionada para o manejo das condi-ções crônicas, a epidemia silenciosa do século XXI. Como resultados são apresentados alguns princípios convergentes com noções de autocuidado e cuidado compartilhado, focados principalmente na autonomia e disciplina da pessoa usuária para monitorar a sua saúde. Propõe-se a aplicação desses princípios aos programas de atenção às condições crônicas, seja para portadores de doenças ou pessoas em condições especias de saúde, tais como adolescência, inca-pacidades, gravidez, etc. Sob este ponto de vista esses princípios poderiam ser estendidos aos profissionais de saúde, pois sua rotina de trabalho também caracteriza uma condição crônica. Disso poderiam beneficiar-se indivíduos, siste-mas de saúde e a sociedade como um todo.