Готові списки джерел за темами / Secure microarchitecture

Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Secure microarchitecture"

Автор: Grafiati
Опубліковано: 6 вересня 2023

Оформте джерело за APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard та іншими стилями

Оберіть тип джерела:

Зміст

Ознайомтеся зі списками актуальних статей, книг, дисертацій, тез та інших наукових джерел на тему "Secure microarchitecture".

Біля кожної праці в переліку літератури доступна кнопка «Додати до бібліографії». Скористайтеся нею – і ми автоматично оформимо бібліографічне посилання на обрану працю в потрібному вам стилі цитування: APA, MLA, «Гарвард», «Чикаго», «Ванкувер» тощо.

Також ви можете завантажити повний текст наукової публікації у форматі «.pdf» та прочитати онлайн анотацію до роботи, якщо відповідні параметри наявні в метаданих.

Статті в журналах з теми "Secure microarchitecture"

1

Li, Xinyao, and Akhilesh Tyagi. "Cross-World Covert Channel on ARM Trustzone through PMU." Sensors 22, no. 19 (September 28, 2022): 7354. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s22197354.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
The TrustZone technology is incorporated in a majority of recent ARM Cortex A and Cortex M processors widely deployed in the IoT world. Security critical code execution inside a so-called secure world is isolated from the rest of the application execution within a normal world. It provides hardware-isolated area called a trusted execution environment (TEE) in the processor for sensitive data and code. This paper demonstrates a vulnerability in the secure world in the form of a cross-world, secure world to normal world, covert channel. Performance counters or Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) events are used to convey the information from the secure world to the normal world. An encoding program generates appropriate PMU event footprint given a secret S. A corresponding decoding program reads the PMU footprint and infers S using machine learning (ML). The machine learning model can be trained entirely from the data collected from the PMU in user space. Lack of synchronization between PMU start and PMU read adds noise to the encoding/decoding ML models. In order to account for this noise, this study proposes three different synchronization capabilities between the client and trusted applications in the covert channel. These are synchronous, semi-synchronous, and asynchronous. Previously proposed PMU based covert channels deploy L1 and LLC cache PMU events. The latency of these events tends to be 100–1000 cycles limiting the bandwidth of these covert channels. We propose to use microarchitecture level events with latency of 10–100 cycles captured through PMU for covert channel encoding leading to a potential 100× higher bandwidth. This study conducts a series of experiments to evaluate the proposed covert channels under various synchronization models on a TrustZone supported Cortex-A processor using OP-TEE framework. As stated earlier, switch from signaling based on PMU cache events to PMU microarchitectural events leads to approximately 15× higher covert channel bandwidth. This proposed finer-grained microarchitecture event encoding covert channel can achieve throughput of the order of 11 Kbits/s as opposed to previous work’s throughput of the order of 760 bits/s.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
2

Gnanavel, S., K. E. Narayana, K. Jayashree, P. Nancy, and Dawit Mamiru Teressa. "Implementation of Block-Level Double Encryption Based on Machine Learning Techniques for Attack Detection and Prevention." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2022 (July 9, 2022): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/4255220.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
Cloud computing is one of the most important business models of modern information technology. It provides a minimum of various services to the user interaction and low cost (hardware and software). Cloud services are based on the newline architectures on virtualization by using the multitenancy for better resource management and newline strong isolation between several virtual machines (VMs). The spying on a victim VM is challenging, particularly when one wants to use per-core microarchitectural features as a side channel. For example, the cache contains the most potential for damaging side channels, but shared information across different cores affects the cloud information. To overcome this problem, propose the Secure Block-Level Double Encryption (SBLDE) algorithm for user signature verification in the cloud server. It uses identity-based detection techniques to monitor the colocated VMs to identify abnormal cache data and channel behaviors typically during VM data transformation. The identity-based linear classification (IBLC) method is used for classifying the attacker channel when the data is transferred/retrieved from the VM cloud server. This cloud controller finds the channel misbehavior to block the port or channel, changing other available ports’ communication. The service verification provides strong user access permission on the cloud server when the unknown request to the cloud server suddenly executes the key authentication to verify the user permission. This linear classification trains the existing side-channel attack datasets to the classifier and identifies the VM cloud’s attack channel. The study focused on preventing attacks from interrupting the system and serves as an effective means for cross-VM side-channel attacks. This proposed method protects the cloud data and prevents cross-VM channel attack detection efficiently, compared to other existing methods. In this overall proposed method, SBLDE’s performance is to be evaluated and then compared with the existing method.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
3

Stolz, Florian, Jan Philipp Thoma, Pascal Sasdrich, and Tim Güneysu. "Risky Translations: Securing TLBs against Timing Side Channels." IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, November 29, 2022, 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2023.i1.1-31.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
Microarchitectural side-channel vulnerabilities in modern processors are known to be a powerful attack vector that can be utilized to bypass common security boundaries like memory isolation. As shown by recent variants of transient execution attacks related to Spectre and Meltdown, those side channels allow to leak data from the microarchitecture to the observable architectural state. The vast majority of attacks currently build on the cache-timing side channel, since it is easy to exploit and provides a reliable, fine-grained communication channel. Therefore, many proposals for side-channel secure cache architectures have been made. However, caches are not the only source of side-channel leakage in modern processors and mitigating the cache side channel will inevitably lead to attacks exploiting other side channels. In this work, we focus on defeating side-channel attacks based on page translations.It has been shown that the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) can be exploited in a very similar fashion to caches. Since the main caches and the TLB share many features in their architectural design, the question arises whether existing countermeasures against cache-timing attacks can be used to secure the TLB. We analyze state-ofthe-art proposals for side-channel secure cache architectures and investigate their applicability to TLB side channels. We find that those cache countermeasures are notdirectly applicable to TLBs, and propose TLBcoat, a new side-channel secure TLB architecture. We provide evidence of TLB side-channel leakage on RISC-V-based Linux systems, and demonstrate that TLBcoat prevents this leakage. We implement TLBcoat using the gem5 simulator and evaluate its performance using the PARSEC benchmark suite.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
4

Sahni, Abdul Rasheed, Hamza Omar, Usman Ali, and Omer Khan. "ASM: An Adaptive Secure Multicore for Co-located Mutually Distrusting Processes." ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization, March 17, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3587480.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
With the ever-increasing virtualization of software and hardware, the privacy of user-sensitive data is a fundamental concern in computation outsourcing. Secure processors enable a trusted execution environment to guarantee security properties based on the principles of isolation, sealing, and integrity. However, the shared hardware resources within the microarchitecture are increasingly being used by co-located adversarial software to create timing-based side-channel attacks. State-of-the-art secure processors implement the strong isolation primitive to enable non-interference for shared hardware, but suffer from frequent state purging and resource utilization overheads, leading to degraded performance. This paper proposes ASM , an adaptive secure multicore architecture that enables a reconfigurable, yet strongly isolated execution environment. For outsourced security-critical processes, the proposed security kernel and hardware extensions allow either a given process to execute using all available cores, or co-execute multiple processes on strongly isolated clusters of cores. This spatio-temporal execution environment is configured based on resource demands of processes, such that the secure processor mitigates state purging overheads and maximizes hardware resource utilization.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
5

Cabrera Aldaya, Alejandro, and Billy Bob Brumley. "Online Template Attacks: Revisited." IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, July 9, 2021, 28–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i3.28-59.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
An online template attack (OTA) is a powerful technique previously used to attack elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms. This attack has only been analyzed in the realm of power consumption and EM side channels, where the signals leak related to the value being processed. However, microarchitecture signals have no such feature, invalidating some assumptions from previous OTA works.In this paper, we revisit previous OTA descriptions, proposing a generic framework and evaluation metrics for any side-channel signal. Our analysis reveals OTA features not previously considered, increasing its application scenarios and requiring a fresh countermeasure analysis to prevent it.In this regard, we demonstrate that OTAs can work in the backward direction, allowing to mount an augmented projective coordinates attack with respect to the proposal by Naccache, Smart and Stern (Eurocrypt 2004). This demonstrates that randomizing the initial targeted algorithm state does not prevent the attack as believed in previous works.We analyze three libraries libgcrypt, mbedTLS, and wolfSSL using two microarchitecture side channels. For the libgcrypt case, we target its EdDSA implementation using Curve25519 twist curve. We obtain similar results for mbedTLS and wolfSSL with curve secp256r1. For each library, we execute extensive attack instances that are able to recover the complete scalar in all cases using a single trace.This work demonstrates that microarchitecture online template attacks are also very powerful in this scenario, recovering secret information without knowing a leakage model. This highlights the importance of developing secure-by-default implementations, instead of fix-on-demand ones.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
6

Narayan, Akhilesh S., Ashish J, Noor Afreen, Lithesh V S, and Sandeep R. "RTL Design, Verification and Synthesis of Secure Hash Algorithm to implement on an ASIC Processor." International Journal of Scientific Research in Science, Engineering and Technology, May 1, 2019, 70–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.32628/ijsrset196318.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
In this project we are comparing different architectures and adding the features that increases the efficiency of our architecture. Few of them are including multiplexers in the message digester, using different adder architectures in the required places, reducing the critical path by breaking the longest path and making them to operate parallelly. Use of multiplexers reduces the number of registers required in the message expander. It simply transfers the output of expander to compressor block in every clock cycle. Whenever the number of cycle is greater than 16, the multiplexer switches the select line so that the computed message digest to send as output to the compressor. Using of a carry save adder and adder array takes lesser time to perform addition than a pair of adders array. Finally we all know that reducing the critical path reduces the overall operation time and hence increases the efficiency. Considering all these factors in the design we are designing the microarchitecture for SHA-256 algorithm and obtain the RTL code for that architecture. We have also verified the design by designing a test-bench, and finally synthesized the design.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
7

Yu, Jiyong, Lucas Hsiung, Mohamad El Hajj, and Christopher Fletcher. "Creating Foundations for Secure Microarchitectures with Data-Oblivious ISA Extensions." IEEE Micro, 2020, 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mm.2020.2985366.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
8

Sakalis, Christos, Stefanos Kaxiras, and Magnus Själander. "Delay-on-Squash: Stopping Microarchitectural Replay Attacks in Their Tracks." ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization, September 19, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3563695.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
MicroScope and other similar microarchitectural replay attacks take advantage of the characteristics of speculative execution to trap the execution of the victim application in a loop, enabling the attacker to amplify a side-channel attack by executing it indefinitely. Due to the nature of the replay, it can be used to effectively attack software that are shielded against replay, even under conditions where a side-channel attack would not be possible (e.g., in secure enclaves). At the same time, unlike speculative side-channel attacks, microarchitectural replay attacks can be used to amplify the correct path of execution, rendering many existing speculative side-channel defenses ineffective. In this work, we generalize microarchitectural replay attacks beyond MicroScope and present an efficient defense against them. We make the observation that such attacks rely on repeated squashes of so-called “replay handles” and that the instructions causing the side-channel must reside in the same reorder buffer window as the handles. We propose Delay-on-Squash, a hardware-only technique for tracking squashed instructions and preventing them from being replayed by speculative replay handles. Our evaluation shows that it is possible to achieve full security against microarchitectural replay attacks with very modest hardware requirements, while still maintaining 97% of the insecure baseline performance.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
9

Naghibijouybari, Hoda, Esmaeil Mohammadian Koruyeh, and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. "Microarchitectural Attacks in Heterogeneous Systems: A Survey." ACM Computing Surveys, June 15, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3544102.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
With the increasing proliferation of hardware accelerators and the predicted continued increase in the heterogeneity of future computing systems, it is necessary to understand the security properties of such systems. In this survey article, we consider the security of heterogeneous systems against microarchitectural attacks, with a focus on covert- and side-channel attacks, as well as fault injection attacks. We review works that have explored the vulnerability of the individual accelerators (such as Graphical Processing Units, GPUs and Field Programmable Gate Arrays, FPGAs) against these attacks, as well as efforts to mitigate them. We also consider the vulnerability of other components within a heterogeneous system such as the interconnect and memory component. We believe that this survey is especially timely, as new accelerators and heterogeneous systems are being designed such that these designs understand the security threats and develop systems that are not only performant but also secure.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.

Дисертації з теми "Secure microarchitecture"

1

Zabel, Martin, Thomas B. Preußer, Peter Reichel, and Rainer G. Spallek. "SHAP-Secure Hardware Agent Platform." Universitätsbibliothek Chemnitz, 2007. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:swb:ch1-200701011.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
This paper presents a novel implementation of an embedded Java microarchitecture for secure, realtime, and multi-threaded applications. Together with the support of modern features of object-oriented languages, such as exception handling, automatic garbage collection and interface types, a general-purpose platform is established which also fits for the agent concept. Especially, considering real-time issues, new techniques have been implemented in our Java microarchitecture, such as an integrated stack and thread management for fast context switching, concurrent garbage collection for real-time threads and autonomous control flows through preemptive round-robin scheduling.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
2

Jain, Rajat. "Achieving practical secure non-volatile memory system with in-Memory Integrity Verification (iMIV)." Thesis, 2022. https://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/5867.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
Recent commercialization of Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) technology in the form of Intel Optane enables programmers to write recoverable programs. However, the data on NVM is susceptible to a plethora of data remanence attacks, which makes confidentiality and integrity protection of data essential for a secure NVM system. However, that requires computing and maintaining a large amount of security metadata (encryption counters, message authentication code (MAC), and integrity tree nodes (BMT)). Furthermore, crash consistency guarantees require the system to persist the security metadata and data atomically back to NVM, incurring high overheads. So there is a trade-off between providing complete security guarantees, the performance and recovery time of an NVM system. Our work explores the resilience of the NVM system to system crashes and malicious attacks. To ensure the confidentiality and integrity of data, a substantial quantity of security metadata is required. Of these, persisting Bonsai Merkel Tree (BMT) nodes, which are essential for fine-grain integrity verification, add substantial cost owing to the massive amount of data that must be moved off-chip to the bandwidth-constrained NVM. Thus, prior works often make a trade-off between performance and fine-grain verifiability, or forego it entirely in favour of performance. The goal of this work is to maintain the strongest security and verifiability guarantees while limiting the cost of BMT updates. We accomplish this by leveraging the in-memory integrity verification. We make the fine-grain integrity verifiability realizable with a radically different approach of using in-memory computing for integrity verification. Our proposal, iMIV draws inspiration from the fact that today's commercial Optane NVM performs encryption onboard the DIMM. We argue that memory-intensive integrity verification operation should be performed near the (non-volatile) memory to avoid off-chip data movement. In this thesis, we propose a novel and practical hardware-managed security solution called iMIV, which leverages in-memory integrity verification operations to reduce the overheads associated with integrity protection (BMT nodes computation and persistence), which is a key performance bottleneck. iMIV persists the complete security metadata (encryption counter, MAC, BMT nodes) with each data persist, providing it the ability to detect and locate the tampered data block and tampered counter block. Hence, ensuring no single point of failure due to any malicious attack. The work targets to minimize the off-chip memory transfer and mitigate the effect of the bandwidth wall. The proposed iMIV also scales to larger NVM capacity in future systems with per-DIMM BMT. Experiments are carried out on a trace-driven cycle-accurate simulator VANS, which mimics the internal micro-architecture of Intel Optane memory DIMMs. Experimental results show that in comparison to the Baseline scheme with write-through caches and strict persistency model, which also provides complete security guarantees, iMIV reduces system runtime by 1.8x for NVM-aware workloads and 3.4x for NVM-agnostic workloads. iMIV's recovery time on system crashes is microsecond-scale without compromising on detecting tampering and fast pin-point of the unverifiable region. iMIV brings down the performance overheads of fine-grain integrity verification on secure NVMs for NVM-aware workloads from 205% (baseline with all security operations performed at memory controller) to 55% (integrity verification operation offloaded to near the NVM).
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.

Частини книг з теми "Secure microarchitecture"

1

Grimsdal, Gunnar, Patrik Lundgren, Christian Vestlund, Felipe Boeira, and Mikael Asplund. "Can Microkernels Mitigate Microarchitectural Attacks?" In Secure IT Systems, 238–53. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35055-0_15.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
2

Sepúlveda, Johanna. "Secure Cryptography Integration: NoC-Based Microarchitectural Attacks and Countermeasures." In Network-on-Chip Security and Privacy, 153–79. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69131-8_7.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
3

Liu, Chen, Xiaobin Li, Shaoshan Liu, and Jean-Luc Gaudiot. "Simultaneous MultiThreading Microarchitecture." In Handbook of Research on Scalable Computing Technologies, 552–82. IGI Global, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-661-7.ch024.

Повний текст джерела
Анотація:
Due to the conventional sequential programming model, the Instruction-Level Parallelism (ILP) that modern superscalar processors can explore is inherently limited. Hence, multithreading architectures have been proposed to exploit Thread-Level Parallelism (TLP) in addition to conventional ILP. By issuing and executing instructions from multiple threads at each clock cycle, Simultaneous MultiThreading (SMT) achieves some of the best possible system resource utilization and accordingly higher instruction throughput. In this chapter, the authors describe the origin of SMT microarchitecture, comparing it with other multithreading microarchitectures. They identify several key aspects for high-performance SMT design: fetch policy, handling long-latency instructions, resource sharing control, synchronization and communication. They also describe some potential benefits of SMT microarchitecture: SMT for faulttolerance and SMT for secure communications. Given the need to support sequential legacy code and emerge of new parallel programming model, we believe SMT microarchitecture will play a vital role as we enter the multi-thread multi/many-core processor design era.
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.

Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "Secure microarchitecture"

1

Kanuparthi, Arun K., Ramesh Karri, Gaston Ormazabal, and Sateesh K. Addepalli. "A high-performance, low-overhead microarchitecture for secure program execution." In 2012 IEEE 30th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD 2012). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccd.2012.6378624.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
2

Miao, Chenlu, Kai Bu, Mengming Li, Shaowu Mao, and Jianwei Jia. "SwiftDir: Secure Cache Coherence without Overprotection." In 2022 55th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/micro56248.2022.00052.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
3

Lehman, Tamara Silbergleit, Andrew D. Hilton, and Benjamin C. Lee. "PoisonIvy: Safe speculation for secure memory." In 2016 49th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/micro.2016.7783741.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
4

Zabel, Martin, T. B. Preusser, Peter Reichel, and Rainer G. Spallek. "Secure, Real-Time and Multi-Threaded General-Purpose Embedded Java Microarchitecture." In 2007 10th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design: Architectures, Methods and Tools. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/dsd.2007.4341450.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
5

Shi, Weidong, and Hsien-Hsin S. Lee. "Authentication Control Point and Its Implications For Secure Processor Design." In 2006 39th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/micro.2006.11.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
6

Wang, Xin, Daulet Talapkaliyev, Matthew Hicks, and Xun Jian. "Self-Reinforcing Memoization for Cryptography Calculations in Secure Memory Systems." In 2022 55th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/micro56248.2022.00055.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
7

Omar, Hamza, and Omer Khan. "IRONHIDE: A Secure Multicore that Efficiently Mitigates Microarchitecture State Attacks for Interactive Applications." In 2020 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hpca47549.2020.00019.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
8

He, Zecheng, and Ruby B. Lee. "How secure is your cache against side-channel attacks?" In MICRO-50: The 50th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3123939.3124546.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
9

Freij, Alexander, Huiyang Zhou, and Yan Solihin. "Bonsai Merkle Forests: Efficiently Achieving Crash Consistency in Secure Persistent Memory." In MICRO '21: 54th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3466752.3480067.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
10

Saileshwar, Gururaj, Prashant J. Nair, Prakash Ramrakhyani, Wendy Elsasser, Jose A. Joao, and Moinuddin K. Qureshi. "Morphable Counters: Enabling Compact Integrity Trees For Low-Overhead Secure Memories." In 2018 51st Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/micro.2018.00041.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Ми пропонуємо знижки на всі преміум-плани для авторів, чиї праці увійшли до тематичних добірок літератури. Зв'яжіться з нами, щоб отримати унікальний промокод!

До бібліографії