Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Rupert Hamer"

Beyond text? Critical practices and sensory anthropology [«¿Más allá del texto? Prácticas críticas y antropología sensorial»] supone la contribución más reciente de la antropología visual anglosajona por reconsiderar la preeminencia del texto en la elaboración de conocimiento antropológico. Editado por los antropólogos Andrew Irving y Rupert Cox (Granada Centre for Visual Anthropology, Universidad de Mánchester), y Christopher Wright (Goldsmiths, Universidad de Londres), sus diecinueve capítulos ofrecen cada uno diversas metodologías visuales, sonoras y artísticas desarrolladas por investigadores de referencia en antropologi?a cultural, visual y sensorial, estudios visuales y sonoros del entorno, o diseño y urbanismo. Además, en la introducción y en tres de los capítulos se abordan de forma explícita las implicaciones epistemológicas, éticas y ontológicas que estas formas sensoriales de hacer etnografía tienen para la antropología. Por tanto, los argumentos esgrimidos no solo buscan situar de forma ineludible el cuerpo y los sentidos en el centro de la investigación antropológica, sino que pretenden reafirmar la antropología visual y sensorial como (sub)disciplina de pleno derecho. Se adjunta además un DVD en el que distintos productos visuales, sonoros y fílmicos derivados de estas prácticas etnográficas exhiben todo su potencial estético.

The paper has studied the economic viability of improved technology (Introduced under NAIP component-3) for extraction of cashew kernel from cashew nut in Bastar region of Chhattisgarh, India. Cost concept has been used to calculate economics of cashew kernel. The technology (Boiling, steaming, cutting, drying, and peeling) has been found viable over conventional practices (Traditional manual separation by stone or hammer) on account of higher recovery of 40 percent and cost reduction by 29.71 percent. Overall net profit per unit (One unit includes one boiler, one steamer, two cutter, one dryer, six peelers and cost of land, depreciation and interest on working capital) in the case of improved technology has been estimated to be Rs 7.32 lakh. Cost of production in machine extraction practices was 202.80 Rupees per kilogram of cashew in spite of traditionally practiced 288.56 Rupees per kilogram. The cost benefit ratio was found higher in machine extraction (1.57) as compare to traditionally practiced (0.169). The mechanical decortications and separation could not only save time and money, also reduced women drudgery (due to manual breaking by stone or hammer to separate kernel). The technology has been found suitable for promotion of entrepreneurship on the processing of cashew kernel from cashew nut in the production catchments which otherwise is not properly utilized. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/bjar.v39i1.20166 Bangladesh J. Agril. Res. 39(1): 165-172, March 2014

Background:Belimumab (BEL) is the first treatment approved in children ≥5 years of age with cSLE. This recent approval was based on favourable results of the PLUTO trial, evaluating efficacy and safety of intravenous (IV) BEL, plus standard SLE therapy (SST), vs placebo (PBO), in children with cSLE.1Objectives:To evaluate the SLE Responder Index 4 (SRI4) sensitivity of response for the comparison of BEL vs PBO at Week (Wk) 52.Methods:In PLUTO (NCT01649765; GSK study BEL114055), an ongoing Phase 2, randomised, PBO-controlled, double-blind study, patients (pts) 5–17 years of age with active cSLE were randomised to monthly BEL 10 mg/kg IV, or PBO, plus SST, for 52 weeks. The primary efficacy endpoint was the SRI4 response rate at Wk 52. Pre-specified sensitivity analyses supporting the primary efficacy endpoint for the intention-to-treat (ITT) population included unadjusted, last observation carried forward (LOCF), completer responses, and response using SLE Disease Activity Index (SLEDAI) 2K proteinuria scoring rule (4-point score for proteinuria >0.5 g/24 h), all at Wk 52. Completers were pts who completed 52 weeks of treatment. Any pts who withdrew or received protocol-prohibited medication or a dose of allowable medication that resulted in treatment failure prior to the Wk 52 visit had missing data handled using LOCF (missing values imputed using the last previous non-missing value). Statistics are descriptive.Results:Overall, 93 pts were randomised (BEL, n=53; PBO, n=40). Majority (94.6%) of pts were female, mean (standard deviation [SD]) age was 14.0 (2.49) years and mean (SD) disease duration was 2.4 (1.93) years. By Wk 52, numerically more BEL (52.8%) than PBO (43.6%) pts were SRI4 responders; difference vs PBO 9.24; odds ratio (OR; 95% confidence interval [CI]) vs PBO 1.49 (0.64, 3.46). For each sensitivity analysis (unadjusted, LOCF, completer, and SLEDAI 2K responses) the odds of being a responder at Wk 52 were higher for pts receiving BEL vs PBO (Table).Table.Sensitivity analyses: SRI4 response at Wk 52PBO(n=40)BEL(n=53)Unadjusted response (ITT), n*3953 n (%)17 (43.6)28 (52.8) Observed difference vs PBO9.24 OR (95% CI)†vs PBO1.45 (0.63, 3.33)LOCF response (ITT), n*3953 n (%)18 (46.2)30 (56.6) Observed difference vs PBO10.45 OR (95% CI)‡vs PBO1.51 (0.65, 3.52)Completer response (completers), n*3045 n (%)17 (56.7)27 (60.0) Observed difference vs PBO3.33 OR (95% CI)‡vs PBO1.16 (0.44, 3.09)Response using SLEDAI 2K (ITT), n*3953 n (%)17 (43.6)28 (52.8) Observed difference vs PBO9.24 OR (95% CI)‡vs PBO1.49 (0.64, 3.46)*One pt was excluded because they did not have a baseline Safety of Estrogens in Lupus National Assessment (SELENA)-SLEDAI assessment;†calculated from a logistic regression model for the comparison between BEL and PBO without adjustment for any covariates;‡calculated from a logistic regression model for the comparison between BEL and PBO with covariates treatment group, baseline age (5–11 years vs 12–17 years), and baseline SELENA-SLEDAI score (≤12 vs ≥13)Conclusion:The results of the SRI4 primary efficacy endpoint sensitivity analyses further support a favourable effect for BEL vs PBO.References:[1]Brunner HI,et al.Arthritis Rheumatol.2018;70(59): 3224–5, Abst. 2867Acknowledgments:We acknowledge all PLUTO investigators (PRINTO, PRCSG and otherwise affiliated). Study funding: GSK.Disclosure of Interests:Nicolino Ruperto Consultant of: Ablynx, AbbVie, AstraZeneca-Medimmune, Biogen, Boehringer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli-Lilly, EMD Serono, GSK, Hoffmann-La Roche, Janssen, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, R-Pharma, Sanofi, Servier, Sinergie, Sobi and Takeda, Hermine Brunner Consultant of: Hoffman-La Roche, Novartis, Pfizer, Sanofi Aventis, Merck Serono, AbbVie, Amgen, Alter, AstraZeneca, Baxalta Biosimilars, Biogen Idec, Boehringer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Celgene, EMD Serono, Janssen, MedImmune, Novartis, Pfizer, and UCB Biosciences, Speakers bureau: GSK, Roche, and Novartis, Masaaki Mori Grant/research support from: Abbvie Japan, Asahikasei Pharmaceutical, Ayumi Pharmaceutical, CSL Behring, Chugai Pharmaceutical, Japan Blood Products Organization, MSD K.K., Nippon Kayaku, UCB Japan, Consultant of: Daiichi Sankyo, Taisho Pharmaceutical, Jacqueline Clinch Consultant of: Alexion, Speakers bureau: Alexion, Reema Syed: None declared, Naomi Iwata Speakers bureau: Sanofi K.K, Damon Bass Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Beulah Ji Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Anne Hammer Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Mohamed Okily Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Gina Eriksson Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Holly Quasny Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK

Background:Belimumab (BEL) is a human monoclonal antibody that specifically inhibits B-cell activating factor (BAFF). PLUTO is an ongoing trial evaluating efficacy and safety of intravenous (IV) BEL in children ≥5 years of age with cSLE. Efficacy, and safety endpoints of PLUTO have been reported;1briefly, numerically more BEL vs PBO pts met the primary and major secondary efficacy endpoints. We present patient (pt) response to BEL over time.Objectives:To evaluate changes in SLE Responder Index (SRI) 4 and SRI6 responses, and disease activity over 52 weeks, in paediatric pts receiving BEL, or placebo (PBO), plus standard SLE therapy (SST).Methods:PLUTO (GSK Study BEL114055,NCT01649765) is a Phase 2, randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled study. Pts 5–17 years of age with active cSLE were randomised to monthly BEL 10 mg/kg IV, or PBO, plus SST. Endpoints assessed: SRI4 and SRI6 response rate, mean percentage and absolute change from baseline in Safety of Estrogens in Lupus Erythematosus National Assessment (SELENA)-SLE Disease Activity Index (SLEDAI) and Physicians’ Global Assessment (PGA) scores, and percentage of pts with no new British Isles Lupus Assessment Group (BILAG) 1A/2B organ domain scores compared with baseline, all by study visit. The last-observation-carried-forward (LOCF) principle (missing values imputed using the last available non-missing value) was applied to pts who withdrew or received protocol-prohibited medication or a dose of allowable medication that resulted in treatment failure prior to the Week (Wk) 52 visit. Descriptive statistics were used.Results:A total of 93 pts (94.6% female, mean [SD] age 14.0 [2.49] years) were randomised for the intention-to-treat (ITT) population: 53 to BEL and 40 to PBO. Mean (SD) BEL and PBO baseline scores were 10.3 (3.34) and 10.4 (3.63) for SELENA-SLEDAI and 1.3 (0.43) and 1.4 (0.42) for PGA, respectively. Pt number with at least BILAG 1A/2B organ domain involvement at baseline was 37 (69.8%) for BEL and 29 (72.5%) for PBO. SRI4 and SRI6 responses over 52 weeks were mostly numerically higher with BEL than PBO; more BEL than PBO pts were SRI4 and SRI6 responders at Wk 52 (Figure 1). Unadjusted mean (SE) percentage changes from baseline over time in SELENA-SLEDAI and PGA scores generally favoured BEL over PBO, as did unadjusted mean (SE) absolute changes (Figure 2). Wk 52 adjusted mean (95% CI) percentage treatment difference vs PBO was -4.0% (-21.8, 13.9) for SELENA-SLEDAI and -6.1% (-23.9, 11.7) for PGA, while Wk 52 adjusted mean (95% CI) treatment difference vs PBO was -0.7 (-2.4, 1.1) for SELENA-SLEDAI and -0.1 (-0.3, 0.1) for PGA. Over the study duration, numerically more BEL than PBO pts had no new BILAG 1A/2B organ domain scores (Figure 2).Figure 1.SRI4 and SRI6 response by study visitFigure 2.SELENA-SLEDAI and PGA score mean percentage and absolute change from baseline, and no new BILAG 1A/2B organ domain scores compared with baseline, all by study visitConclusion:In line with the main analyses performed at Wk 52,1further analyses of responses over time in SRI4, SRI6 and disease activity generally favoured BEL over PBO. Combined, these results continue to support the efficacy profile of IV BEL in the treatment of children with cSLE.References:[1]Brunner HI,et al.Arthritis Rheumatol.2018;70(59): 3224–5, Abst. 2867Acknowledgments:We acknowledge all PLUTO investigators (PRINTO, PRCSG and otherwise affiliated). Study funding: GSK.Disclosure of Interests:Nicolino Ruperto Consultant of: Ablynx, AbbVie, AstraZeneca-Medimmune, Biogen, Boehringer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli-Lilly, EMD Serono, GSK, Hoffmann-La Roche, Janssen, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, R-Pharma, Sanofi, Servier, Sinergie, Sobi and Takeda, Liza McCann: None declared, Syuji Takei Grant/research support from: Eisai, Consultant of: Novartis, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Speakers bureau: GSK, Sanofi, Tanabe-Mitsubishi, Novartis, Chugai, Ono, Abbvie, Eli-Lilly, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Clarissa Pilkington: None declared, Damon Bass Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Beulah Ji Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Anne Hammer Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Mohamed Okily Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Gina Eriksson Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Holly Quasny Shareholder of: GSK, Employee of: GSK, Hermine Brunner Consultant of: Hoffman-La Roche, Novartis, Pfizer, Sanofi Aventis, Merck Serono, AbbVie, Amgen, Alter, AstraZeneca, Baxalta Biosimilars, Biogen Idec, Boehringer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Celgene, EMD Serono, Janssen, MedImmune, Novartis, Pfizer, and UCB Biosciences, Speakers bureau: GSK, Roche, and Novartis

Background:The calcium-binding proteins S100A8/A9 (calprotectin) and S100A12 (extracellular newly identified receptor for advanced glycation end-products binding protein [EN-RAGE]) are involved in multiple signalling pathways to mediate inflammation, can be secreted by activated monocytes/macrophages and exhibit cytokine-like extracellular functions. Circulating levels of these proteins have been associated with disease and clinical responses in systemic juvenile idiopathic arthritis (sJIA), including treatment response.1 Studies suggest that serum S100A8/A9 and S100A12, which are released at inflammation sites, are more specific biomarkers of local inflammation (e.g. in the synovium) than systemic biomarkers such as CRP and ESR.2,3Objectives:To investigate if baseline S100A8/A9 and S100A12 predict clinical response to abatacept treatment in polyarticular JIA (pJIA), and to assess whether changes from baseline in S100A8/A9 or S100A12 can be better prognostic markers for response to abatacept treatment than CRP in pJIA.Methods:Data are from a phase III trial of SC abatacept for the treatment of pJIA (NCT01844518).4 This 24-month, single-arm, open-label, international, multicentre, two-part study included male and female patients with pJIA aged 2–17 years. This analysis examined the correlation between biomarkers (S100A8/A9, S100A12 and high-sensitivity CRP [hsCRP]) and disease activity (measured using Juvenile Arthritis Disease Activity Score [JADAS]) at baseline, baseline biomarker values as predictors of future treatment response (ACR and JADAS endpoints), and the correlation between change from baseline in biomarker values and treatment response at Day 113.Results:Of 219 total patients, 158 (72%) had S100A8/A9 values and 155 (71%) had S100A12 values at baseline. Median S100A8/A9 and S100A12 values were 3295 ng/mL (normal range, 716–3004 ng/mL) and 176 ng/mL (normal range, 32–385 ng/mL), respectively. S100A8/A9, S100A12 and hsCRP (median 0.20 mg/dL; normal ≤0.6 mg/dL) had a low-to-moderate but significant association with disease activity at baseline; coefficients for associations between JADAS71-CRP low disease activity (LDA) and the biomarkers S100A8/A9, S100A12 and hsCRP were 0.23 (p=0.0038), 0.16 (p=0.0448) and 0.26 (p=0.0001), respectively. Baseline S100A8/A9 level above the median was associated with lower odds of ACR100 at Day 113 (p=0.0052). Figure 1 shows the associations of baseline biomarker values with Day 113 ACR and JADAS scores in the overall population. Baseline S100A8/A9 or S100A12 did not significantly influence ACR50 or ACR70 responses at Day 113, but high baseline values were associated with reduced odds of ACR90 (p=0.01), ACR100 (p=0.005), ACR-inactive disease (ID) (p=0.0001), and JADAS71-CRP (LDA) (p=0.02). By Day 477, elevated baseline S100A12 was still significantly associated with lower odds of ACR100 overall (0.467; p=0.0248) but baseline S100A8/A9 was not; at Day 645, neither was significantly associated with ACR100 response. At Day 113, changes from baseline in S100A8/A9 and S100A12 were correlated with ACR100 (coefficients of 0.22 [p=0.0082] and 0.26 [p=0.0015], respectively) and with ACR-ID (0.22 [p=0.0067] and 0.26 [p=0.0014], respectively); change in hsCRP was not significantly correlated with disease response.Conclusion:S100A8/A9 and S100A12 may serve as prognostic biomarkers to predict response to abatacept treatment at Day 113. Changes from baseline S100A8/A9 and S100A12 levels were more highly correlated with efficacy outcomes including ACR100 and ACR-ID at Day 113 compared with hsCRP.References:[1]Aljaberi N, et al. Pediatr Rheumatol Online J 2020;18:7.[2]Hammer H, et al. Arthritis Res Ther 2011;13:R178.[3]Nordal HH, et al. BMC Musculoskelet Disord 2014;15:335.[4]Brunner H, et al. Arthritis Rheumatol 2018;70:1144–1154.Acknowledgements:Professional medical writing and editorial assistance was provided by Rob Coover, MPH, at Caudex and was funded by Bristol Myers Squibb.Disclosure of Interests:Nicolino Ruperto Speakers bureau: NR has received honoraria for consultancies or speaker bureaus (< 10.000 USD each) from the following pharmaceutical companies in the past 3 years: Ablynx, Astrazeneca-Medimmune, Bayer, Biogen, Boehringer, Bristol Myers Squibb, Celgene, Eli Lilly, EMD Serono, GlaxoSmithKline, Hoffmann-La Roche, Janssen, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, R-Pharma, Sinergie, Sobi and UCB, Consultant of: NR has received honoraria for consultancies or speaker bureaus (< 10.000 USD each) from the following pharmaceutical companies in the past 3 years: Ablynx, Astrazeneca-Medimmune, Bayer, Biogen, Boehringer, Bristol Myers Squibb, Celgene, Eli Lilly, EMD Serono, GlaxoSmithKline, Hoffmann-La Roche, Janssen, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, R-Pharma, Sinergie, Sobi and UCB, Grant/research support from: The IRCCS Istituto Giannina Gaslini (IGG), where NR works as full-time public employee has received contributions (>10.000 USD each) from the following industries in the last 3 years: Bristol Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, F Hoffmann-La Roche, GlaxoSmithKline, Janssen, Novartis, Pfizer, Sobi. This funding has been reinvested for the research activities of the hospital in a fully independent manner, without any commitment with third parties., Grant Schulert Speakers bureau: Novartis, Consultant of: SOBI, Alyssa Sproles: None declared, Sherry Thornton: None declared, Gabriel Vega Cornejo Speakers bureau: AbbVie, Grant/research support from: Bristol Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Janssen, Parexel, Sanofi, Jordi Anton Speakers bureau: AbbVie, Gebro, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, Sobi, Consultant of: AbbVie, Gebro, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, Sobi, Grant/research support from: AbbVie, Amgen, Gebro, GlaxoSmithKline, Lilly, Novartis, Novimmune, Pfizer, Roche, Sanofi, Sobi, Ruben Cuttica Speakers bureau: AbbVie, Bristol Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Lilly, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, UCB, Paid instructor for: AbbVie, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, Consultant of: AbbVie, Bristol Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Lilly, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, UCB, Michael Henrickson: None declared, Ivan Foeldvari Consultant of: Bristol Myers Squibb, Gilead, Hexal, MEDAC, Novartis, Pfizer, Sanofi, Daniel Kingsbury Consultant of: Pfizer, Margarita Askelson Consultant of: Currently working for Syneos Health providing services to Bristol Myers Squibb, Jinqi Liu Shareholder of: Bristol Myers Squibb, Employee of: Bristol Myers Squibb, Sumanta Mukherjee Shareholder of: Bristol Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Employee of: Bristol Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Robert Wong Shareholder of: Bristol Myers Squibb, Employee of: Bristol Myers Squibb, Daniel J Lovell Speakers bureau: Genentech, Wyeth Pharm, Consultant of: Abbott, Amgen, AstraZeneca, Boehringer Ingelheim, Celgene, GlaxoSmithKline, Hoffman-La Roche, Novartis, Pfizer, Regeneron, Takeda, UBC, Wyeth Pharma, Xoma, Alberto Martini Speakers bureau: AbbVie, Novartis, Consultant of: AbbVie, Eli Lilly, EMD Serono, Idorsia, Janssen, Novartis, Pfizer, Alexei Grom Consultant of: AB2Bio, Novartis, Sobi (NovImmune), Grant/research support from: AB2Bio, Novartis, Sobi (NovImmune), Hermine Brunner Speakers bureau: GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, Paid instructor for: Novartis, Pfizer (funds go to CCHMC/employer), Consultant of: Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol Myers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, Janssen, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, UCB (funds go to CCHMC/employer), Grant/research support from: Bristol Myers Squibb, Pfizer (funds go to CCHMC/employer).

It is time for the truth to be brought out ... . Behind the scenes high-ranking Air Force officers are soberly concerned about the UFOs. But through official secrecy and ridicule, many citizens are led to believe the unknown flying objects are nonsense. -- Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence (1947-50), signed statement to Congress, 22 Aug. 1960 As an avid UFO enthusiast, an enduring subject of frustration for me is the complacency and ignorance that tends to characterise public knowledge of the phenomenon itself and its social repercussions. Its hard for people like myself to understand how anyone could not be interested in UFOs, let alone Congressional statements from ex-Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency testifying to an official policy of secrecy and ridicule (in other words, propaganda), which aims to suppress public interest and belief in UFOs. As a student of cultural studies who also happens to be a conspiracy theorist, the idea of the Central Intelligence Agency seeking to manipulate one of the twentieth century's most significant icons -- the UFO -- is a fascinating one, because it allows for the possibility that the ways in which the UFO has come to be understood by the public may involve more than the everyday cultural processes described by cultural studies. A review of the history of the CIA's interest in UFO phenomena actually suggests, quite compellingly I think, that since the 1950s, American culture (and, indirectly and to a lesser degree, the rest of the western world) may have been subjected to a highly sophisticated system of UFO propaganda that originated from the Central Intelligence Agency. This is, of course, a highly contentious claim which would bring many important repercussions should it turn out to be true. There is no point pretending that it doesn't sound like a basic premise of The X-Files -- of course it does. So to extract the idea from its comfortable fictional context and attempt to place it into a real historical one (a completely legitimate endeavour) one must become familiar with the politics of the UFO phenomenon in Cold War America, a field of history which is, to understate the matter, largely ignored by academia. A cursory glance at the thousands of (now declassified) UFO-related documents that once circulated through some of the highest channels of US intelligence reveal that, rather than the nonsense topic it is often considered, the UFO phenomenon has been a matter of great concern for the US government since 1947. To get a sense of just how seriously UFOs were taken by the CIA in the 1950s, consider this declassified 'Secret' memorandum from H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director of Scientific Intelligence, to the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith, dated 24 September 1952: a world-wide reporting system has been instituted and major Air Force bases have been ordered to make interceptions of unidentified flying objects ... . Since 1947, ATIC [Air Technical Intelligence Center, a branch of the US Air Force] has received approximately 1500 official reports of sightings ... . During 1952 alone, official reports totalled 250. Of the 1500 reports, Air Force carries 20 percent as unexplained and of those received from January through July 1952 it carries 28 percent as unexplained. (qtd. in Good 390) Fifteen-hundred reports in five years is roughly three-hundred reports per year, which is dangerously close to one per day. Although only twenty percent, or one-fifth of these reports were unexplained, equalling about 60 unexplained sightings per year, this still equalled more than one unexplained sighting per week. But these were just the unexplained, official sightings collected by ATIC, which was by no means a comprehensive database of all sightings occurring in the United States, or the rest of the world, for that matter. Extrapolation of these figures suggested that the UFO problem was probably much more extensive than the preliminary findings were indicating, hence the erection of a world-wide reporting system and the interception of UFOs by major US Air Force bases. The social consequences of the UFO problem quickly became a matter of major importance to the CIA. Chadwell went on to point out that: The public concern with the phenomena, which is reflected both in the United States press and in the pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that a fair proportion of our population is mentally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible. In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic. (qtd. in Good 393) By "acceptance of the incredible" Chadwell was probably referring to acceptance of the existence of intelligently controlled, disc-shaped craft which are capable of performing aerial manoeuvres far in excess of those possible with contemporary technology. Flying saucers were, and remain, incredible. Yet belief in them had permeated the US government as early as 1947, when a 'Secret' Air Materiel Command report (now declassified) from Lieutenant General Nathan Twining to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, announced that: It is the opinion that: (a) The phenomenon reported is something real and not visionary and fictitious. There are objects probably approximating the shape of a disc, of such appreciable size as to appear to be as large as man-made aircraft. There is a possibility that some of the incidents may be caused by natural phenomena, such as meteors. (b) The reported operating characteristics such as extreme rates of climb, manoeuvrability (particularly in roll), and action which must be considered evasive when sighted or contacted by friendly aircraft or radar, lend belief to the possibility that some of the objects are controlled either manually, automatically, or remotely. -- (qtd. in Good 313-4) This report was compiled only two months after the term flying saucer had been invented, following pilot Kenneth Arnold's historic sighting of nine saucer-like objects in June 1947. The fact that a phenomenon which should have been ignored as a tabloid fad was being confirmed, extremely quickly, by the Air Materiel Command Headquarters suggested that those people mentally conditioned to accept the impossible were not restricted to the public domain. They also, apparently, held positions of considerable power within the government itself. This rapid acceptance, at the highest levels of America's defense agencies, of the UFO reality must have convinced certain segments of the CIA that a form of hysteria had already begun, so powerful that those whose job it was to not only remain immune from such psychosocial forces, but to manage them, were actually succumbing to it themselves. What the CIA faced, then, was nothing short of a nation on the verge of believing in aliens. Considering this, it should become a little clearer why the CIA might develop an interest in the UFO phenomenon at this point. Whether aliens were here or not did not, ultimately, matter. What did matter was the obvious social phenomenon of UFO belief. Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence, realised this in 1952, and wrote to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (in a letter previously classified 'Secret'): It is my view that this situation has possible implications for our national security which transcend the interests of a single service. A broader, coordinated effort should be initiated to develop a firm scientific understanding of the several phenomena which apparently are involved in these reports, and to assure ourselves that the incidents will not hamper our present efforts in the Cold War or confuse our early warning system in case of an attack. I therefore recommend that this Agency and the agencies of the Department of Defense be directed to formulate and carry out a program of intelligence and research activities required to solve the problem of instant positive identification of unidentified flying objects ... . This effort shall be coordinated with the military services and the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense, with the Psychological Strategy Board and other Governmental agencies as appropriate. (qtd. in Good 400-1) What the Director was asserting, basically, was that the UFO problem was too big for the CIA to solve alone. Any government agencies it was deemed necessary to involve were to be called into action to deal with the UFOs. If this does not qualify UFOs as serious business, it is difficult to imagine what would. In the same year, Chadwell again reported to the CIA Director in a memo which suggests that he and his colleagues were on the brink of believing not only that UFOs were real, but that they represented an extraterrestrial presence: At this time, the reports of incidents convince us that there is something going on that must have immediate attention ... . Sightings of unexplained objects at great altitudes and traveling at high speeds in the vicinity of major US defense installations are of such nature that they are not attributable to natural phenomena or known types of aerial vehicles. (qtd. in Good 403) In 1953, these concerns eventually led to the CIA's most public investigation of the UFO phenomenon, the Robertson Panel. Its members were Dr H. P. Robertson (physics and radar); Dr Lloyd V. Berkner (geophysics); Dr Samuel Goudsmit (atomic structure and statistical problems); and Dr Thornton Page (astronomy and astrophysics). Associate members were Dr J. Allen Hynek (astronomy) and Frederick C. Durant (missiles and rockets). Twelve hours of meetings ensued (not nearly enough time to absorb all of the most compelling UFO data gathered at this point), during which the panel was shown films of UFOs, case histories and sightings prepared by the ATIC, and intelligence reports relating to the Soviet Union's interest in US sightings, as well as numerous charts depicting, for example, frequency and geographic location of sightings (Good 404). The report (not fully declassified until 1975) concluded with a highly skeptical, and highly ambiguous, view of UFO phenomena. Part IV, titled "Comments and Suggestions of the Panel", stated that: Reasonable explanations could be suggested for most sightings ... by deduction and scientific method it could be induced (given additional data) that other cases might be explained in a similar manner. (qtd. in Good 404) However, even if the panel's insistence that UFOs were not of extraterrestrial origin seemed disingenuous, it still noted the subjectivity of the public to mass hysteria and greater vulnerability to possible enemy psychological warfare (qtd. in Good 405). To remedy this, it recommended quite a profound method of propaganda: The debunking aim would result in reduction in public interest in flying saucers which today evokes a strong psychological reaction. This education could be accomplished by mass media such [as] television, motion pictures, and popular articles. Basis of such education would be actual case histories which had been puzzling at first but later explained. As in the case of conjuring tricks, there is much less stimulation if the secret is known. Such a program should tend to reduce the current gullibility of the public and consequently their susceptibility to clever hostile propaganda. The panel noted that the general absence of Russian propaganda based on a subject with so many obvious possibilities for exploitation might indicate a possible Russian official policy ... . It was felt strongly that psychologists familiar with mass psychology should advise on the nature and extent of the program ... . It was believed that business clubs, high schools, colleges, and television stations would all be pleased to cooperate in the showing of documentary type motion pictures if prepared in an interesting manner. The use of true cases showing first the mystery and then the explanation would be forceful ... . The continued emphasis on the reporting of these phenomena does, in these parlous times, result in a threat to the orderly functioning of the protective organs of the body politic ... . [It is recommended that] the national security agencies take immediate steps to strip the Unidentified Flying Objects of the special status they have been given and the aura of mystery they have unfortunately acquired; that the national security agencies institute policies on intelligence, training, and public education designed to prepare the material defenses and the morale of the country to recognise most promptly and to react most effectively to true indications of hostile intent or action. We suggest that these aims may be achieved by an integrated program designed to reassure the public of the total lack of evidence of inimical forces behind the phenomena, to train personnel to recognize and reject false indications quickly and effectively, and to strengthen regular channels for the evaluation of and prompt reaction to true indications of hostile measures. (qtd. in Good 405-6) The general aim of the Robertson Panel's recommendations, then, was to not only stop people believing in UFOs, but to stop people seeing UFOs, which constitutes an extreme manipulation of the public consciousness. It was the intention of the CIA to ensure, as subtly as was possible, that most people interpreted specific visual experiences (i.e. UFO sightings) in terms of a strict CIA-developed criterion. This momentous act basically amounts to an attempt to define, control and enforce a particular construction of reality which specifically excludes UFOs. In an ironic way, the Robertson Panel report advocated a type of modern exorcism, and may have been the very birthplace of the idea that such an obvious icon of wonder and potential as the UFO is, it can never be more than a misidentification or a hoax. We cannot be certain to what extent the recommendations of the Robertson Panel were put into practice, but we can safely assume that its findings were not ignored by the CIA. For example, Captain Edward J. Ruppelt, Chief of the ATIC's Aerial Phenomena Branch, has testified that "[We were] ordered to hide sightings when possible, but if a strong report does get out, we have to publish a fast explanation -- make up something to kill the report in a hurry, and also ridicule the witnesses, especially if we can't find a plausible answer. We even have to discredit our own pilots" (Good 407). Comments like these make one wonder just how extensive the program of debunking and ridicule actually was. What I have suggested here is that during the 1950s, and possibly throughout the four decades since, an objective of the CIA has been to downplay its own interest in the UFO phenomenon to the public whilst engaging in secret, complex investigations of the phenomenon itself and its social repercussions. If this is the case, as the evidence -- the best of which can be found in the government's own files (even though such evidence, as tens of thousands of conspiracy theorists continue to stress, can hardly be taken simply at face value) -- indicates, then the construction of the UFO in western popular culture will have to be revised as a process involving more than just the projection of popular hopes, desires and anxieties onto an abstract, mythical object. It will also need to be seen as involving the clandestine manipulation of this process by immeasurably powerful groups within the culture itself, such as the CIA. And since the CIAs major concerns about UFOs haved traditionally been explicitly related to the Cold War, the renewed prominence of the UFO in western popular culture since the demise of the Soviet Union requires immediate, serious investigation in a political context. For the UFO issue is, and has always been, a political issue. I suggest that until this fascinating chapter of American domestic history is explored more thoroughly, the cultural function of the UFO will remain just as poorly understood as its physical nature. References Good, Timothy. Beyond Top Secret: The Worldwide UFO Security Threat. London: MacMillan, 1996. Citation reference for this article MLA style: Adam Dodd. "Making It Unpopular: The CIA and UFOs in Popular Culture." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 2.4 (1999). [your date of access] <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9906/cia.php>. Chicago style: Adam Dodd, "Making It Unpopular: The CIA and UFOs in Popular Culture," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 2, no. 4 (1999), <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9906/cia.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Adam Dodd. (1999) Making it unpopular: the CIA and UFOs in popular culture. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 2(4). <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9906/cia.php> ([your date of access]).

The significance of the Mildura Sculpture Triennials from 1961 to 1978 lies in their role as critical nodal points in an expanding and increasingly complex system of institutions and agents that emerge, expand and interact within the Australian art world. These triennial events provide a valuable case-study of the developments in sculptural practice in Australia and offer a close reading of the genesis of an autonomous field of visual art practice; a genesis dependent upon the expansion of the new tertiary education policies for universities and colleges of advanced education that arose in response to the generational pressure created by the post war baby boom. Given that there was virtually no market for modern sculpture in Australia at the inauguration of these triennials in the 1960s, the extent of the impact of the pressures and expectations of a burgeoning young population upon tertiary education, specifically the art schools, art history departments and art teacher training and, the expanding desire for cultural fulfilment and rapid developments in the cultural institution sector, is delineated at these triennial events. The expansion of the education system and the consequent expanded employment opportunities this offered to young sculptors in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, posited the first real challenge and alternative economy to the existing heterogeneous market economy for artistic works. In order to reinscribe the Mildura Sculpture Triennials into recent Australian art history as an important contributor to the institutional development of Australian contemporary art practice, I have drawn upon the reflexive methodological framework of French cultural theorist and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and his explanation of the factors necessary for the genesis and development of autonomous fields of cultural production. Bourdieu's method provides an interpretative framework with which to identify these components necessary to the development of an institutional identity - the visual arts profession. This autonomous field parallels, conflicts with and at times connects with the heterogeneous art market economy, depending on the strength of its relative autonomy from the field of economic and political power. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Mildura's significance lies in the way that the triennial gatherings provide a view into the disparate components that would connect to and eventually create an autonomous field of artistic production, that of the visual arts profession. However, the evolution of each of the components, which were the bedrock of Mildura, was driven by its own needs and necessities and not by the needs of the larger field of which they would eventually become a part. Bourdieu's understanding of the ontologic complicitiy between dispositions and the development of an autonomous field offers a non-teleological approach to the significance of Mildura as a site to map these rapid changes and also Mildura's subsequent displacement from the historical record.