Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Representation (Proportional), Belgium"

Whereas 19th century Belgium is traditionally framed as heavily dependent on France, this image ought to be nuanced for its political system. During what Pierre Rosanvallon named the transnational ‘proportional moment’ (1899-1914), the introduction of Proportional Representation in parliamentary elections generated a French interest in Belgium as the ‘electoral laboratory of Europe’. Arguments raised in the French Chambre des Députés were similar to those used in Belgian Parliament. The present article addresses the structural differences between the electoral debate in both states. Whereas Belgian constitutional doctrine adapted smoothly to the introduction of proportionality (Oscar Orban/Paul Errera) and held a moderate position bordering on that of Hans Kelsen, French doctrine was divided between the Parisian Adhémar Esmein, who defended the majority system as the bedrock of republicanism, and provincial professors of constitutional law, who had corporatist ideas, or were in favour of judicial review (Joseph-Barthélémy, Léon Duguit). Raymond Carré de Malberg’s condemnation of proportional representation as impossible, or as the stepping-stone to direct democracy, ought to be situated within this context.

AbstractAs the first country to introduce proportional representation (PR), Belgium has attracted considerable attention. Yet, we find the existing explanations for the 1899 breakthrough lacking. At the time of reform, the Catholic Party was politically dominant, advantaged by the electoral system, and facing reformist Socialists. Nevertheless, they single-handedly changed the electoral system and lost 26 seats in the first election under PR. We argue that the Catholics had good reasons to adopt PR. Majoritarian rules tend to create high levels of uncertainty because they provide incentives for non-dominant parties to cooperate. Such electoral coalitions are facilitated by multidimensional policy spaces that make electoral coalitions other than between nonsocialist parties possible. PR reduces the effectiveness of cooperation between non-dominant parties, but such certainty comes at a price. In addition, in the presence of dominant parties, divisions over electoral system reform often result in intra-party conflicts that may be more decisive than inter-party conflicts.

On the basis of a candidate’s sex, voters ascribe particular personality traits, capacities, and opinions to candidates (often to the detriment of women), which are referred to as political gender stereotypes. The prevalence of political gender stereotypes has almost exclusively been investigated in the United States. As the presence of these stereotypes is highly dependent on contextual factors, we switch the context and investigate whether they are also present in a List-Proportional Representation (PR) system with a high share of women in parliament spread over different parties. The results of our experimental study, conducted in Flanders (Belgium), provide evidence for the existence of stereotypical patterns. The differences in perceived issue competence are, however, rather small and not always unequivocal, but larger differences were found in terms of ideological position. This leads us to conclude that misperceptions about women’s ideological orientation might be persistent and difficult to overcome. Moreover, our results demonstrate that the argument that female politicians are perceived as more leftist because they disproportionately belong to leftist parties does not hold, as female politicians are rather equally spread over the different parties in Belgium.

Nineteenth-century literature on electoral systems and elections in Belgium was generally made of political pamphlets. Politicians were the most interested in the subject, which seems quite logical for the elections, butis also true for the electoral legislation, because this bas almost continuously been a topic in the political fights in Belgium between 1830 and 1914. Therefore, a lot of research-work on electoral legislation and data was done in the discreet study-roms of local party-offices, as can be learned from the archives of nineteenth-century politicians.The valuable information resulting from this research was usually kept secret for the outside world, for which the politicians reserved their more propagandistic tracts. Nevertheless, out of the bulk of pamphlets on electoral systems and elections, a few books deserve some special attention. Like those aiming to gather the existing electoral data needed for further research : large compilations of vast amounts of jurisprudence on the rather loose electoral laws, or first and timid attempts to make electoral statistics available for the larger public. Analysing just held elections seems on the other hand to have been a sart of monopoly of the politicians themselves. Even if they tried in the first place to fit in the verdict of the electors into their propagandistic schemes, it should be stressed that they also gave timid evidence of trying to respect at least the statistical facts (cf. abstract 1, which is an analysis by the catholic leader Charles Woeste of the part the introduction of the secret ballot in 1877 played in the defeat of bis party one year later).It was only when, from 1890 to 1893, the Belgian constitution was revised, that the subject of electoral systems and elections became also a matter of interest for academic circles. University-professors then began to publish voluminous blue-prints for a new constitution, thereby usually replacing their scientific detachment by politica! engagement. An exception to this is the remarkably serene «mathematical tract» of Victor D'hondt, a law-professor at Ghent University, who in 1882 gave his name to what was to become the most applicated system of proportional representation in the world (cf. abstract 3).After 1900 the first more or less scientific works on the subject, based on critical research, were published: one written by the law-professor of Louvain, Leon Dupriez ( who, in abstract 4, fries to explain why in Liège the workers generally had fewer votes in the plural system than their colleagues of Hainaut), the other one by his French colleague of Montpellier, Joseph Barthélemy, who wrote a voluminous history of the Belgian electoral systems since 1830 (and, in abstract 5, examines the application of proportional representation in the politically motivated nominations at the Belgian courts). Bath in the first place seem to have wanted to improve the knowledge on the subject. Their research and analysis for the first time was not subordinated to their personal political engagement.

A paradox in the comparative literature on electoral systems is that one of the most common systems in Europe – flexible-list proportional representation systems – may be the least understood. Any study of flexible-list systems must start by acknowledging a puzzle: why candidates spend time and effort striving to win preference votes when typically these votes make no difference between election and defeat. Offering the first comprehensive multi-country test of this key puzzle, we provide evidence from Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia that parties will promote to better list ranks in the next election those candidates who are successful at winning preference votes, thereby improving their prospects of election in the longer term and incentivizing them to cultivate personal reputations. Our findings have important implications for party scholars and practitioners when designing, or reforming, political institutions.

El presente artículo aborda el estudio del sistema electoral de la Cámara de Representantes belga y sus reformas electorales. Bélgica fue el primer país europeo en adoptar un sistema de representación proporcional y, desde entonces, sus elementos centrales han exhibido una extraordinaria estabilidad. Sin embargo, con el cambio de siglo, el gobierno de coalición liderado por el liberal Guy Verhofstadt situó el debate sobre las reformas institucionales en el centro de la agenda política. Ello condujo a una reforma electoral que supuso la «provincialización» del mapa electoral, el establecimiento de una barrera electoral del 5 por ciento y la reducción a la mitad del peso de voto de lista. En 2012, se produjo la última reforma electoral, que consistió en la división de la polémica circunscripción de Bruselas-Halle-Vilvoorde. Este último episodio evidencia la complejidad del modelo federal belga, de carácter consociacional, bipolar y con dinámicas centrífugas.This paper deals with the study of the electoral system of the Belgian House of Representatives and its electoral reforms. Belgium was the first European country to adopt an electoral system of proportional representation and, since then, its main elements have exhibited extraordinary stability. However, with the turn of the century, the coalition government headed by the liberal Guy Verhofstadt put the debate on institutional reforms at the center of the political agenda. This led to an electoral reform that involved several novelties: the «provincialization» of the electoral map, the establishment of a 5 percent threshold and the reduction of the list vote weight by half. In 2012, there was the last electoral reform, which consisted of the division of the controversial constituency of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. This last episode shows the complexity of the Belgian federal model, consociational, bipolar and with centrifugal dynamics.

Proportional electoral systems tend to be more beneficial for women's descriptive representation than majority systems. However, within proportional systems the gender equality of election outcomes differs, highlighting the importance of studying the actual use of electoral provisions in proportional representation (PR) systems. Therefore, we investigate the determinants of voting for female candidates in Belgium's local elections. This case is particularly interesting given the equal number of men and women on the candidate lists due to quota regulations, the possibility to cast multiple preference votes (lowering competition), and the high visibility of these local elections and its candidates. At the individual level, we find that women are more likely than men to vote for several women, yet same-sex voting is more common among men. Politically sophisticated respondents vote more often for candidates of both sexes. Against our expectations, a left-wing orientation does not increase the likelihood of voting for women. At the electoral district level, a larger supply of women at the top list position increases the chance to vote for this top woman, but there is no spillover effect to women lower on the list. District magnitude affects the number of preference votes but, against expectations, not the likelihood of voting for women.

Tussen 1884 en 1914 kende België homogeen katholieke regeringen. Wat veranderde de democratisering van het stemrecht in 1893 (algemeen meervoudig stemrecht voor mannen) en de invoering van de evenredige vertegenwoordiging in 1899 aan de machtsverhoudingen binnen de katholieke partij? De conservatieve kiesverenigingen werden toen extern met het socialisme en intern met een opstand van de middenklasse geconfronteerd. Katholieke subelites eisten namens een miljoen nieuwe kiezers de decratisering van de lijsten en de erkenning van deelgroepen op een gezamenlijke lijst. Dit vormt de bredere context ter verklaring van het vrij unieke parcours van de daensistische beweging. In welke mate slaagde de katholieke cijnselite erin haar politiek monopolie in de kiesverenigingen veilig te stellen en hoe deed ze dat? Hoe evolueerde de christendemocratie, die nog geen arbeidersbeweging was? Wat werd de aparte positie van de daensistische beweging en welke voorhoederol nam ze in?Parlementair mislukte de christendemocratische doorbraak in Vlaanderen. Zowel externe als interne oorzaken zorgden voor de genese van een ‘daensistische christendemocratie’ en haar ontwikkeling tot een zelfstandige partij, in tegenstelling tot een integrerende ‘katholieke christendemocratie’. Deze laatste zag haar linkerzijde verzwakt en werd een paternalistisch geleide organisatie. De daensistische beweging daarentegen radicaliseerde qua zelfdefiniëring en programmatische toenadering tot de linkerzijde op sociaal en politiek gebied. De kwestie van al dan niet kartelvorming met liberalen en socialisten tijdens verkiezingen zorgde echter voor een langdurige impasse. Naargelang de katholieke meerderheid in het parlement slonk, hoopten de daensisten scheidsrechter te kunnen worden. Tevergeefs. Wel kon de conservatieve regering vanaf 1907 de katholieke christendemocratie niet langer negeren, zodat haar boegfiguren minister werden. Hun opstelling verscherpte de confrontatie met de daensisten. De voorhoederol van die beweging bleek ook op een andere manier. Gezien het gebrek aan toegeeflijkheid bij de conservatieven en het episcopaat zouden zowel katholieke christendemocraten als katholieke flaminganten in het decennium voor 1914 hun burgerlijke vrijheid in politieke kwesties moeten inroepen en steun van de oppositie nodig hebben om een aantal cruciale eisen te forceren.________The Rupture of “Daensist” Christian-Demo-cracy from the Catholic Establishment and “Catholic” Christian Democracy, 1893-1914Between 1884 and 1914, Belgium had homogeneous Catholic governments. How did the democratisation of the suffrage in 1893 (general multiple suffrage for men) and the introduction of proportional representation in 1899 change power relationships within the Catholic Party? Conservative electoral associations were confronted externally with socialism and internally with a revolting middle class. In the name of a million new voters Catholic subelites demanded democratisation of electoral lists and the recognition of subgroups within a common list. This formed the broader context that explains the very unique trajectory of the Daensist Movement. To what extent did the Catholic censitary elite succeed in securing its political monopoly in electoral associations and how did it do so? How did Christian Democracy, which was not yet a workers’ movement, evolve? What were the particular positions of the Daensist Movement, and what role did they play in the vanguard?In Flanders, the Christian Democratic breakthrough failed in parliament. External as well as internal causes saw to the birth of a ‘Daensist Christian Democracy’ and its development toward an independent party, in contrast to the integration of the ‘Catholic Christian Democracy’. The latter saw its left wing weakened, and became a paternalistically-run organization. The Daensist Movement on the other hand radicalized its self-definition and political program towards the left parties. However, forming a coalition with Liberals and Socialists during elections caused a serious, long-lasting impasse. As the Catholic majority in Parliament shrank, the Daensists hoped to hold the balance of power – in vain. However, the conservative government could not, from 1907 onward, neglect Catholic Christian Democracy, so that leading personalities of the movement became ministers. Their accession to these positions and their political attitude sharpened the confrontation with the Daensists. The vanguard role of the Daensist movement appeared in another manner as well. Given the lack of permissiveness on the part of the conservatives as well as the episcopate, Catholic Christian Democrats and Catholic flamingants had to invoke their civil liberty in political questions, and needed support of the opposition in order to force a few crucial demands through.

This article analyses the election of the Speakers of both houses of the Belgian parliament, the House of Representatives and the Senate, in the period 1918-1974. According to the Belgian constitution, the election of the Speaker is a competence of each house. As can be expected in a system of parliamentary government, the Speakers belong to the government majority, as they did already before 1914. But with the disappearance of a homogeneous majority and the need for cabinet coalitions after 1918 - result of the proportional representation - someeffects which tended to erode parliamentary autonomy more substantially occurred. At several occasions the election of the Speakers was postponed until the result of cabinet formation was known. In addition, the coalition parties had to make an agreement for the partition of the two Speakers' positions. The coalition practice also affected procedure. Since agreements were less easily implemented in a secret ballot, the provisions of the parliamentary statute were put aside for an election by acclamation to strengthen party discipline. In this context a further shift in the election process occurs: from the parliamentary groups to the party leadership. Eventually, the appointment of the Speakers becamepart of the cabinet formation itself. This practice appears to be firmly established in the 1970' and has been criticized severely. It can be considered one aspect of the decline of parliaments in this period.