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Tassano, Velaochaga Hebert Eduardo. "Competition and utility regulation." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116247.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
With the entry into force of the Constitution of Peru of 1993, the economic model of social market economy, which was accompanied by an institutional reform, creating four (4) regulators of utilities and one (1) competition agency, was established. The economic model of social market economy, guarantees free competition in the market as a general rule, establishing a regulatory framework for public services that before the reform, were managed directly by the State. Thus, in this paper we will learn how to set up the Peruvian institutional framework and what are the main similarities and differences between competition and regulation, for which we will detail the functions of the competition agency and regulatory bodies as well as interaction between the two.Con la entrada en vigencia de la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993, se estableció el modelo económico de economía social de mercado. Como parte del mismo, se realizaron una serie de reformas institucionales del Estado, creándose cuatro organismos reguladores de los servicios públicos y una agencia de competencia. El modelo económico de economía social de mercado garantiza la libre competencia en el mercado como regla general, estableciendo un marco regulatorio para los servicios públicos que, antes de la reforma, eran gestionados directamente por el Estado. Así, en el presente trabajo podremos conocer cómo se ha establecido el marco institucional peruano y cuáles son las principales similitudes y diferencias de la competencia y la regulación, para lo que detallaremos las funciones de la agencia de competencia y la de los organismos reguladores, así como la interacción que existe entre ambos.
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Enhan, Li. "Competition and regulation in telecommunications industry." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/400246.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
La industria de las telecomunicaciones ha sido considerada durante mucho tiempo como un monopolio natural y regulado. Sin embargo, con el desarrollo de la tecnología y los cambios de perspectiva en las teorías económicas, poco queda de la caracterización como monopolio natural en este sector. La moderna industria de las telecomunicaciones presenta las notas de efecto de red, dinamismo, convergencia y mutabilidad. El mercado de las telecomunicaciones requiere tanto desregulación como liberalización para mejorar la eficiencia, la innovación y, por último, para incrementar la protección del consumidor. La experiencia desreguladora de los Estados Unidos y de la Unión Europea constituye un buen ejemplo para los países que están en proceso de abrir el mercado de telecomunicaciones, como sucede en China. Igualmente, la implementación de un Derecho de la competencia como el de la UE debería ser el modelo para la reforma de la industria de las telecomunicaciones en China. Por una parte, el Derecho de la competencia debe aplicarse para controlar los comportamientos anticoncurrenciales en el sector chino de las telecomunicaciones y debe crearse una agencia reguladora específica para el sector que garantice un acceso leal al mercado y una estructura equilibrada. Por otra parte, al resolver los conflictos entre la normativa de la competencia y la ordenación del sector, debe otorgarse preferencia a la primera sobre la segunda al inicio del proceso liberalizador.Telecommunications industry had been seen as natural monopoly industry and regulated for a long time. However, with the development of technologies and the change of the view of economy theories, this industry remains little feature of natural monopoly. And modern telecommunications industry exhibits the characteristics of network effect, dynamic, convergence and sensitivities. Telecom market requires both deregulation and liberalization to improve the efficiency, innovation, and ultimately to enhance consumer welfare. The experience of deregulation in the United States and the European Union can be taken as a good example for the countries who are in the progress of opening the telecom market, such as China. Especially, the implementation of the EU competition law will provide the enlightenment for reform of telecommunications industry in China. On one hand, competition law should be applied to adjust the anti-competitive behaviors in Chinese telecom industry and independent sector-specific regulatory agency should be established to ensure fair market access and balanced market structure. On the other hand, in dealing with the conflicts between competition law and sector-specific regulation, at the beginning of liberalization, competition law should be taken precedence over the regulatory policy.
3
Gaggero, Alberto A. "Emprical Essays on Competition and Regulation." Thesis, University of Essex, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.504833.
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McCahery, Joseph. "Regulatory competition, economic regulation, and law." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1997. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/34750/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
One often meets the view that economic regulation should be understood in terms of Pareto efficiency. Economic theories of law have traditionally focused on concepts such as market failure, efficiency, and inefficiency. Proponents assume that under the conditions of perfect competition, rational economic actors will enact courses of action that tend to induce Pareto outcomes. The idea of perfect competition means that markets which are competitive will induce efficient outcomes. The perfect competition approach has focused on the conception of market failure as the foundation for designing regulatory policy. Until recently, lawyers overwhelmingly relied upon a model of economic contract, developed over the last two decades in law and economics, as a normative structure to guide efficient decision-making.
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Du, Toit Roscar. "Regulation of competition in a global economy." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0022/MQ50929.pdf.
Повний текст джерела
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Zamorano-Ford, Jorge. "Essays on environmental regulation under imperfect competition." Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01E057.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Cette thèse couvre deux sujets : le dessin des permis à polluer et la gestion des déchets. Le premier chapitre analyse la mise en œuvre des permis à polluer. Le chapitre se concentre sur les impacts de la distribution liés à la sévérité de l’allocation gratuite basée sur la production courante quand deux secteurs sont couverts par le marché des permis et le plafond reste constant. Un nouveau type d’augmentation des profits dans les secteurs qui ne sont pas exposés à la concurrence internationale a été démontré théoriquement. Le deuxième chapitre traite la question de la différenciation de l’allocation des permis dans les différentes régions, liée à la possibilité des entreprises à délocaliser. Les conditions dans lesquelles le bien-être décroît avec la délocalisation sont déterminées. Dans ce cas, des distributions gratuites de permis peuvent être utilisées pour éviter la délocalisation des entreprises. Le troisième chapitre compare l’efficacité des programmes de la responsabilité élargie du producteur (REP) avec l’efficacité d’une ex-ante taxe. La taxe permet plus de flexibilité ex-ante quant aux conditions du marché, mais la REP permet plus d’adaptation ex-post aux réalisations des coûts. Ainsi, l’efficacité relative de la REP augmente avec l’incertitude des coûts et la compétitivité du marchéThis thesis covers two subjects. One is the design of pollution permits and the other is the waste management. The first chapter analyses the implementation of pollution permits. It focuses on the distributional impacts linked with the stringency of output-based allocation,when two sectors are covered by the market for permits and the total cap is held constant. Theoretically demonstrated is a new type of profit increase in sectors that are not exposed to international competition. The second chapter addresses the issue of differentiating permit allocation across areas, this being linked to the possibility of firms to relocate. The conditions under which welfare decreases with relocation are determined. In such a case, free allowances may be used to prevent firms from relocating. The third chapter compares the efficiency of extended producer responsibility (EPR) programs and the efficiency of an ex-ante tax. The tax allows more ex-ante flexibility regarding market conditions, but the EPR allows more ex-post adaption to cost realizations. As a result, the relative efficiency of the EPR increases with uncertainty of the costs and competitiveness of the market
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Chen, Pin-Yi. "Resource competition in CRISPR-mediated gene regulation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127156.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering, May, 2020Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, May, 2020
Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-79).
CRISPR-mediated gene regulation is known for its ability to control multiple targets simultaneously due to its modular nature: the same dCas9 effector can target different genes simply by changing the associated gRNA. However, multiplexing requires the sharing of limited amounts of dCas9 protein among multiple gRNAs, leading to resource competition. In turn, competition between gRNAs for the same resource may hamper network function. In this thesis, we develop a general model that takes into account the sharing of limited amounts of dCas9 protein for arbitrary CRISPR-mediated gene repression networks. We demonstrate that, as a result of resource competition, hidden interactions appear, which modifies the intended network regulations. As a case study, we analyze the effects of these hidden interactions on repression cascades. In particular, we illustrate that perfect adaptation to resource fluctuations can be achieved for certain network topology. Then, we analyze the stability properties of uncertain systems that are affected by resource competition via contraction analysis. Finally, we perform a combined analytical and experimental study on a two gRNA parallel network to demonstrate the resource competition effect.
by Pin-Yi Chen.
S.M.
S.M.
S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering
S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Tziatzias, Georgios. "Essays on banking competition, regulation and stability." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2017. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/111143/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The turbulent period of the last decade has highlighted the importance of the financial sector and the need for a flexible set of regulations and due diligence in order to have a healthy, sustainable and prosperous financial system. It has also given rise to important questions about the effect of current regulation and competition policies on the bank’s behaviour, economic growth and financial stability. This thesis has attempted to answer these questions, firstly, by analysing the effect of capital requirements on the UK banks’ choice for risk and capital and found evidence that they consider them as complements. This is making the policymaker’s decision more complicating as the end result of the bank’s stability cannot easily be determined because of that co-movement. Secondly, this thesis supports the existence of the bank capital channel for the case of the UK commercial banks. The focus is on the composition of their loan portfolio and capital growth following a change in capital requirements. I find evidence of structural change in the bank’s loan and capital management approach during and after the financial crisis, with the banks become significantly more responsive to capital requirements changes compared to the period before the crisis. Thirdly, the competition-fragility is documented for advanced Western economies when using concentration and market power as proxies for competition, while the competition-stability is present when using the Boone indicator which a measure of firm efficiency. Lastly, a strong regulatory framework becomes more beneficial for less competitive markets.
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Carrasco, Blanc Humberto Rolando. "Regulation as a mechanism to encourage competition in the Chilean telecommunications market : towards the concept of emulated competition." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25851.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis proposes to determine the role of regulation that promotes competition in the telecommunications market in Chile. Regulation has been used in the telecommunications sector at different points in time to fulfil various market needs. Before liberalisation of the telecommunications market, regulation established the parameters of the state-owned telecommunications company. Later, regulations specified the rights and duties of the incumbent. Hypothetically, a higher degree of regulation is necessary to develop new markets, and once progress has been made, a lesser degree of rules is required. This heavier regulation has been called 'regulation for competition', ‘regulatory competition law’ or 'synthetic competition'. Instead, this research proposes the concept of ‘emulated competition’, which is useful to clarify the role of regulation as a mechanism to promote competition. To build the concept of ‘emulated competition’, the thesis reviews the relationship between sectoral regulation and competition law from a theoretical viewpoint. Subsequently, the thesis carries out a comparative analysis between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) regarding the treatment of certain abuse of dominance cases, particularly with regard to ‘margin squeeze’. To study the Chilean model, the research reviews the constitutional framework of economic regulation and competition law, examining the evolution of pro-competition regulatory tools since the beginning of privatisation. Furthermore, the thesis analyses the case law and regulation issued by the Chilean competition authority in the same period. The analysed topic allows a review of how emulated competition operates in Chile. To sum up, competition law alone is not the best way to introduce competition in the telecommunications market. Therefore, sector-specific regulation has been used to promote competition. In some jurisdictions, it works together with competition law, such as in the EU and Chile. In others, they are incompatible, such as the US. Emulated competition rules could have a higher impact on competition law when they are complements. The research also proposes a model for considering non-economic objectives in competition law matters, and it is a breakthrough in the debate of how to incorporate them in such situations. Finally, the emulated competition concept provides a systematic way of dealing with the intended and unintended effects of pro-competition regulatory tools. The concept itself summarises the contribution to the literature.
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Nystedt, Jens. "Competition, regulation and integration in international financial markets." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-539.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Chapter I - Derivative Market Competition: OTC Markets Versus Organized Derivative Exchanges Recent regulatory initiatives in the United States have again raised the issue of a ''level regulatory and supervisory playing field'' and the degree of competition globally between over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and organized derivative exchange (ODE) markets. This chapter models some important aspects of how an ODE market interrelates with the OTC markets. It analyzes various ways in which an ODE market can respond to competition from the OTC markets and considers whether ODE markets would actually benefit from a more level playing field. Among other factors, such as different transaction costs, different abilities to mitigate credit risk play a significant role in determining the degree of competition between the two types of markets. This implies that a potentially important service ODE markets can provide OTC market participants is to extend clearing services to them. Such services would allow the OTC markets to focus more on providing less competitive contracts/innovations and instead customize their contracts to specific investors’ risk preferences and needs. Chapter II – Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation Efforts at crisis resolution that succeed in reducing potential inefficiencies and instability in the international financial system are in the interest of both the private and the public sector. Unlike in the domestic context, in the international context, in the absence of clearly established rules of the game, the approaches adopted toward crisis resolution, and the extent to which they are interpreted by market participants as setting a precedent, can have profound implications for the nature and structure of international capital flows. The key conclusion of this chapter is that recent experiences with payment suspensions and bond restructurings are limited as guides to determining the future success or failures of these initiatives, as the private sector most likely has adapted in order to minimize any unwanted public sector involvement. Chapter III - European Equity Market Integration: Cyclical or Structural? Reviewing the empirical evidence of equity market integration in the European Union, the chapter finds a significant increase in the importance of global sector factors for a number of industries. Unlike most past studies, which only covered developments during the bull market of the late nineties, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the degree of Euroland equity market integration has declined gradually following the bursting of the TMT bubble. This seems to suggest that the findings of previous studies that Euroland equity markets were nearly fully financially integrated is worth revisiting. There are, however, several good reasons to believe that the structural factors driving European equity market integration have yet to play themselves out fully. Institutional investors both outside the Euroland area and within have substantial untapped capacity to take on Euroland exposures and invest additionally in Euroland equities.Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004
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Seifert, Jacob. "Essays in competition policy, innovation and banking regulation." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9456.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis investigates the optimal enforcement of competition policy in innovative industries and in the banking sector. Chapter 2 analyses the welfare impact of compulsory licensing in the context of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property. When the risk-free rate is low, compulsory licensing is shown unambiguously to increase consumer surplus. Compulsory licensing has an ambiguous effect on total welfare, but is more likely to increase total welfare in industries that are naturally less competitive. Compulsory licensing is also shown to be an effective policy to protect competition per se. The chapter also demonstrates the robustness of these results to alternative settings of R&D competition. Chapter 3 develops a much more general framework for the study of optimal competition policy enforcement in innovative industries. A major contribution of this chapter is to separate carefully a firm's decision to innovate from its decision to take some generic anti-competitive action. This allows us to differentiate between firms' counterfactual behaviour, according to whether or not they would have innovated in the absence of any potentially anti-competitive conduct. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that the stringency of optimal policy will be harsher towards firms that have innovated in addition to taking a given anticompetitive action. Chapter 4 develops a framework for competition policy in the banking sector, which takes explicit account of capital regulation. In particular, conditions are derived under which increases in the capital requirement increase the incentives of banks to engage in a generic abuse of dominance in the loan market, and to exploit depositors through the sale of ancillary financial products. Thus the central contribution of this chapter is to clarify the conditions under which stability-focused capital regulation conflicts with competition and consumer protection policy in the banking sector.
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Whitehouse, John Peter. "Uk filling stations : regulation and competition to 1990." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.289893.
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Lutzenberger, Martin. "Regulation, innovation, and competition in the postal industry." Aachen Shaker, 2008. http://d-nb.info/993423922/04.
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Shabgard, Bita. "Three essays on industrial organization: competition, price setting, regulation." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/671327.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Aquesta tesi doctoral es troba en el camp de l'organització industrial i se centra en tres mercats, és a dir, el mercat de motors de cerca, la indústria bancària i el mercat de pagaments amb targeta. Utilitzo enfocaments teòrics i empírics per estudiar qüestions clau en aquests mercats, com la competència, la fixació de preus i el antimonopoli. En aquest sentit, aquesta tesi doctoral té els tres objectius següents.
El primer objectiu és estudiar si i en circumpstancies circumstàncies l'asimetria entre els motors de cerca tendeix a augmentar o disminuir amb el temps i si és possible augmentar el domini amb la monopolització. En aquest sentit, exploro i resolc un joc d'inversió de duopoli dinàmic per dos motors de cerca competidors on inverteixen simultàniament en R & D per millorar la qualitat dels resultats de cerca al llarg de el temps. Els resultats mostren que, en determinades condicions, l'asimetria entre els motors de cerca s'esvaeix amb el temps i la ruta òptima de qualitat i inversió en R & D convergeix cap a l'equilibri d'estat estacionari. A més, trobo que quan la taxa de descompte és prou gran, l'asimetria entre els motors de cerca augmenta amb el temps i l'estructura de mercat passa d'un duopoli a un monopoli.
En segon lloc, estudi de com el projecte de Zona Única de Pagaments en Euros (SEPA) afecta la competència entre els bancs europeus en el mercat de pagaments minoristes. Per abordar aquesta pregunta, exploro i resolc un model de competència de preus no lineal entre dos bancs asimètrics en termes de capital considerant la discriminació de preus en pre-SEPA i preus uniformes en post-SEPA sota la presència d'economies d'escala. Els resultats mostren que el patró de transaccions té un paper vital en els efectes de la SEPA sobre la competència entre bancs. La competència és menys intensa en l'etapa posterior a la SEPA quan el patró de transaccions està orientat a nivell nacional. A més, la comparació d'abans i després de la SEPA suggereix que la aquestaintensifica la competència quan les economies d'escala són prou grans. A més, mostro que l'excedent de consumidor millora després de la SEPA com a resultat de preus uniformes, però l'efecte en el benestar depèn del cost de compliment del seu compliment.
En tercer lloc, examino empíricament com els canvis en la taxa d'intercanvi afecten els preus minoristes a Espanya. La tarifa d'intercanvi és un pagament del banc del comerciant (anomenat adquirent) a el banc de titular de la targeta (anomenat emissor) per transacció amb targeta. Aquesta és una tarifa fonamental que afecta l'ús de pagament amb targeta per part de la titular de la targeta i l'acceptació de la targeta per part d'un comerciant. Em centro en els dos costats del mercar i estudi les relacions a curt i llarg termini entre la taxa d'intercanvi i els preus minoristes considerant un panell de 10 sectors comercials diferents a Espanya des del primer trimestre del 2008 fins al quart trimestre del 2019. Els resultats mostren que, a llarg termini, els preus minoristes disminueixen com a resultat de la disminució de la taxa d'intercanvi, com havien esperat les autoritats antimonopoli.Esta tesis doctoral se encuentra en el campo de la organización industrial y se centra en tres mercados, a saber, el mercado de motores de búsqueda, la industria bancaria y el mercado de pagos con tarjeta. Utilizo enfoques teóricos y empíricos para estudiar cuestiones clave en estos mercados, como la competencia, la fijación de precios y el antimonopolio. En este sentido, esta tesis doctoral tiene los tres objetivos siguientes. El primer objetivo es estudiar si y en qué circunstancias la asimetría entre los motores de búsqueda tiende a aumentar o disminuir con el tiempo y si es posible aumentar el dominio con la monopolización. En este sentido, exploro y resuelvo un juego de inversión de duopolio dinámico para dos motores de búsqueda competidores donde invierten simultáneamente en R&D para mejorar la calidad de los resultados de búsqueda a lo largo del tiempo. Los resultados muestran que, en determinadas condiciones, la asimetría entre los motores de búsqueda se desvanece con el tiempo y la ruta óptima de calidad e inversión en R&D converge hacia el equilibrio de estado estacionario. Además, encuentro que cuando la tasa de descuento es suficientemente grande, la asimetría entre los motores de búsqueda aumenta con el tiempo y la estructura del mercado pasa de un duopolio a un monopolio. En segundo lugar, estudio cómo el proyecto de Zona Única de Pagos en Euros (SEPA) afecta la competencia entre los bancos europeos en el mercado de pagos minoristas. Para abordar esta pregunta, exploro y resuelvo un modelo de competencia de precios no lineal entre dos bancos asimétricos en términos de capital considerando la discriminación de precios en pre-SEPA y precios uniformes en post-SEPA bajo la presencia de economías de escala. Los resultados muestran que el patrón de transacciones tiene un papel vital en los efectos de la SEPA sobre la competencia entre bancos. La competencia es menos intensa en la etapa posterior a la SEPA cuando el patrón de transacciones está orientado a nivel nacional. Además, la comparación de antes y después de la SEPA sugiere que la SEPA intensifica la competencia cuando las economías de escala son lo suficientemente grandes. Además, muestro que el excedente del consumidor mejora después de la SEPA como resultado de precios uniformes, pero el efecto de la SEPA en el bienestar depende del costo de cumplimiento de la SEPA. En tercer lugar, examino empíricamente cómo los cambios en la tasa de intercambio afectan los precios minoristas en España. La tarifa de intercambio es un pago del banco del comerciante (llamado adquirente) al banco del titular de la tarjeta (llamado emisor) por transacción con tarjeta. Esta es una tarifa fundamental que afecta el uso de pago con tarjeta por parte del titular de la tarjeta y la aceptación de la tarjeta por parte de un comerciante. Me centro en dos lados del mercado y estudio las relaciones a corto y largo plazo entre la tasa de intercambio y los precios minoristas considerando un panel de 10 sectores comerciales diferentes en España desde el primer trimestre de 2008 hasta el cuarto trimestre de 2019. Los resultados muestran que, a largo plazo, los precios minoristas disminuyen como resultado de la disminución de la tasa de intercambio, como habían esperado las autoridades antimonopolio.
This doctoral dissertation is in the field of industrial organisation and focuses on three markets namely search engine market, banking industry, and card payment market. I use theoretical and empirical approaches to study key issues in these markets such as competition, price setting, and antitrust. In this regard, this doctoral dissertation has three objectives as follows. The first objective is to study whether and under what circumstances asymmetry between search engines tends to increase or decrease over time and whether increasing dominance with monopolisation is possible. In this regard, I explore and solve a dynamic duopoly investment game for two competing search engines where they simultaneously invest in R&D to improve the quality of search results over time. The results show that under certain conditions, the asymmetry between search engines vanishes over time and the optimal path of quality and R&D investment converge to the steady-state equilibrium. I further find that when discount rate is sufficiently large, the asymmetry between search engines increases over time and the market structure turns from duopoly to monopoly. Second, I study how Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) project affects competition among European banks in the retail payment market. To address this question, I explore and solve a model of non-linear price competition between two asymmetric banks in terms of capital by considering price discrimination in pre-SEPA and uniform pricing in post-SEPA under the presence of economies of scale. The results show that the transaction pattern has a vital role in the effects of SEPA on competition between banks. Competition is less intense in post-SEPA when the transaction pattern is domestically oriented. Moreover, comparison of pre- and post-SEPA suggests that SEPA intensifies competition when economies of scale are large enough. I further show that consumer surplus improves in post-SEPA as a result of uniform pricing but the effect of SEPA on welfare depends on the compliance cost with SEPA. Third, I empirically examine how changes in the interchange fee affect retail prices in Spain. The interchange fee is a payment from the merchant's bank (called the acquirer) to the cardholder's bank (called the issuer) per card transaction. This is a fundamental fee that affects the card payment usage by a cardholder and the card acceptance by a merchant. I focus on two sides of the market and study the short- and long-run relationships between the interchange fee and retail prices considering a panel of 10 different merchant sectors in Spain from the first quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2019. The results show that in the long-run, retail prices decrease as a result of declining interchange fee as had been expected by antitrust authorities.
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Aspalter, I. M. "Molecular regulation of tip cell competition during sprouting angiogenesis." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2014. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1421232/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Sprouting angiogenesis describes the formation of blood vessels from preexisting ones, a process guided by leading endothelial tip cells, followed by stalk cells. It has previously been established that the transient and dynamic specification of both phenotypes is mediated by DLL4/NOTCH signalling, which is primarily actuated by vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) and the corresponding vascular endothelial growth factor receptor 2 (VEGFR-2). The ability of a cell to outcompete its neighbour is determined by VEGFR signalling mediated production of DLL4 and subsequent activation of NOTCH in the adjacent cell. The stalk cell phenotype, induced by NOTCH activation, is reinforced by SMAD signalling through a crosstalk between both pathways. However, the downstream effectors of NOTCH and the molecular link to SMAD signalling in tip cell competition are unknown. During my PhD I have identified Neuropilin-1 (NRP1) as a critical NOTCHregulated determinant of tip/stalk specification. I have found that endothelial cells lacking one or both functional alleles of NRP1 are unable to form tip cells when competing with WT cells. Despite NRP1 having been previously described as a coreceptor of VEGFR-2, my data indicate that NRP1 functions independently of VEGFR-2 during tip/stalk selection. Furthermore, I have shown that inhibition of NOTCH is not sufficient to rescue the profound stalk cell phenotype of NRP1 deficient cells. Thus, I have identified NRP1 as the first bona fide downstream effector of NOTCH signalling in regulating angiogenesis. Furthermore, my data provides the missing link between NOTCH and SMAD signalling in stalk cell specification, as it shows NRP1 to be a negative regulator of the TGF- β/ALK5/SMAD2 pathway. Additionally, in contrast to NOTCH ablation, inhibition of ALK5 quantitatively restores the ability of NRP1 null cells to contribute to the tip position. I conclude that NRP1 is a key regulator of tip/stalk cell specification in sprouting angiogenesis; differential NRP1 levels act as key effector.
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Suppliet, Moritz [Verfasser]. "Advertising, Competition, and Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Industry / Moritz Suppliet." Düsseldorf : Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 2016. http://d-nb.info/1081214600/34.
Повний текст джерела
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Hardt, Michael Hermann. "Behaviour and ownership in the theory of competition and regulation." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1996. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1447/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Ownership matters. It affects residual rights under incomplete contracts and, therefore, incentives. The first chapter of this thesis analyzes in how far ownership can be substituted by other economic factors. Contrary to an assumption found in the literature market foreclosure can be achieved without vertical integration in the following scenarios: repeated games, reputation games, and also in a finitely repeated game when there are switching costs. The main chapter is concerned with implications of ownership in regulated industries where a monopolistic supplier of an essential input is required by a regulator to charge cost based prices. Our analysis focuses on the impact of ownership on the monopolist's incentives to exploit informational asymmetries about production costs. We conduct a comparative study of vertical integration, vertical separation, and joint ownership. Effects on welfare, investments incentives, and entry are analyzed for each ownership structure. Joint ownership performs best. Accounting separation is shown to be generally ineffective as regulatory instrument. We use an alternative model which allows to take into account network duplication. Starting from a free market analysis of equilibrium pricing and entry decisions we explore the relation between ownership and the degree of regulation required in order to ensure efficient outcomes. Two part tariffs, network duplication, price discrimination and a long-term commitment to fixed input prices induce reductions of final prices. The final part of this thesis investigates results in the theory of competitive market equilibrium. Many of these results rely on restrictive assumptions on consumer behaviour. We analyze in how far traditional equilibrium theory is robust against a relaxation of underlying assumptions. We do not assume agents to be rational in the sense that their choices arise from maximisation. Randomly fluctuating demand is allowed for and consequences for predictions made by traditional competitive equilibrium theory are re-examined.
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Reynolds, Michael Matthew. "Theoretical investigations into competition, regulation, and integration in transport networks." Thesis, University of Hull, 2009. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:8394.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis consists of three parts. In the first part, we review the literature and some of the key issues in UK transport. We identify a need to discourage car use and the role that public transport plays in this. We discuss the various options available to policymakers to reduce problems of congestion and pollution. We note how the emphasis on deregulation and competition to promote public transport, and discourage car use, have had perverse side effects. In some cases, public transport services have become disintegrated; resulting in reductions in flexibility and increasing the generalised cost of travelling – making public transport less attractive. This raises an important question: how do we encourage a greater degree of service integration without undoing the gains from competition? The second part of the thesis, explores this issue using a theoretical transport network model. We find that various regimes involving private firms are likely to lead to the provision of an integrated ticketing system, but that not all such regimes are socially desirable. We consider how the configuration of regulatory policy may steer the private firms to produce more socially desirable outcomes. The deregulation of elements of the UK public transport network has often led to situations approaching local monopoly. The third part of this thesis investigates the private (monopoly) incentive to offer joined-up services relative to the social incentive. The more complete the service provision, the closer the match with consumer’s preferences, and the lower the generalised cost of travel. We find the monopolist does not always choose the socially desirable level of service, even when economically viable, but it may be possible to induce this provision through entry or threats of entry on a sub-set of the network. The thesis ends with a summary of the main results and suggestions for further work.
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Zogheib, Jean-Marc. "Essays in industrial organization : competition and regulation in network industries." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019IPPAT002.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Dans le premier chapitre de la thèse, je m'intéresse à l'impact de la politique du contrôle des concentrations sur le choix de fusion d'une firme qui peut soit effectuer une fusion nationale, soit effectuer une fusion internationale. Un enseignement du premier chapitre est que la politique du contrôle des concentrations doit prendre en compte les fusions futures qui peuvent être engendrées par une fusion initiale. Par exemple, le scénario d'une sortie du marché étranger par fusion suite à une fusion internationale non profitable. Une politique du contrôle des concentrations trop sévère pourrait en fait agir comme une barrière à la sortie et donc décourager les fusions internationales. Dans le deuxième chapitre la thèse, j'examine l'impact de la compétition entre une firme privée et des firmes publiques sur les prix et l'investissement dans de nouvelles infrastructures.Du fait de fonctions objectifs différentes, la firme privée en monopole choisira le prix de monopole alors que la firme publique nationale choisit un prix permettant des subventions croisées entre zones à bas coûts et zones à coûts élevés. Le prix d’une firme publique locale dépend de la zone où elle est située. En monopole, la firme publique nationale a le niveau de couverture le plus élevé, alors que le niveau de couverture de la firme privée et des firmes publiques locales est identique. En duopole, les prix sont compléments stratégiques pour la firme privée et substituts stratégiques pour les firmes publiques. La compétition amène la firme privée à baisser ses prix, contrairement aux firmes publiques qui peuvent être amenées à les augmenter. Dans le troisième chapitre de la thèse, j'étudie l'impact de la compétition entre deux firmes en prix et en divulgation de données personnelles. Dans un marché biface, il y a les consommateurs d'un côté, et un courtier en données de l'autre. Je démontre que les firmes adoptent deux types de stratégies commerciales qui sont la résultante d'un arbitrage entre l'exploitation des données personnelles, le niveau données personnelles apportées par le consommateur, et la disposition à payer des consommateurs. Si les consommateurs ont une disposition à payer faible, les firmes emploient une stratégie impliquant des prix bas (voire négatifs) et un niveau de divulgation de données élevé. Si les consommateurs ont une disposition à payer élevée, les firmes emploient une stratégie impliquant des prix élevés et un niveau de divulgation de données nul. En single-homing, une fusion augmente le pouvoir de marché et n'a pas d'impact sur le niveau de divulgation de données. Avec le multi-homing, une fusion a pour impact de diminuer les prix et d'augmenter le niveau de divulgation de données si les firmes ne peuvent pas monétiser les données des multi-homersIn the first chapter of the thesis, I study how merger policy affects the choice between in-market and cross-border merging. An insight of the first chapter is that the merger policy should consider subsequent mergers triggered by an initial decision to merge, which here corresponds to the scenario of an exit-by-merger after a failed cross-border merger. In the second chapter of the thesis, I examine the impact of competition between a private firm and public firms on prices and investment in new infrastructures. An insight from this analysis is that due to distinct objective functions, the private firm charges the monopoly price when it is a monopoly, while the national public firm charges a price such that it cross-subsidizes between low-cost and high-cost areas. Local public firms charge prices contingent on the investment cost in their own area. In monopoly, the national public has the largest coverage, whereas the local public firms cover the same areas as the private firm. In mixed duopoly, prices are strategic complements for the private firm and are strategic substitutes for public firms. Competition leads the private firm to set lower prices, while public firms may charge higher prices. In the third chapter of the thesis, I investigate the impact of competition between two firms in prices and information disclosure levels. In a two-sided market, there are consumers on one side, and a monopoly data broker on the other side. An insight from this analysis is that firms adopt two types of business strategies due to a trade-off between the exploitation of consumer information, the level of information provision, and consumer valuations. If consumer valuations are sufficiently low, firms engage in disclosure of consumer information (low-privacy regime) and charge low (even negative) prices. In contrast, if consumer valuations are sufficiently high, firms do not engage in disclosure of consumer information (highprivacy regime) and always charge positive prices. If consumers single-purchase, a merger to monopoly increases market power but is privacy-neutral. With multi-purchasing, a merger to monopoly decreases prices and privacy levels if firms are unable to monetize multi-purchaser information
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Lutzenberger, Martin [Verfasser]. "Regulation, Innovation, and Competition in the Postal Industry / Martin Lutzenberger." Aachen : Shaker, 2009. http://d-nb.info/1161305327/34.
Повний текст джерела
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McKenzie, Taylor. "Railroads, Their Regulation, and Its Effect on Efficiency and Competition." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22734.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Railroads have been subject to federal regulation since 1887. Due to the development of competing modes of transportation and changes in types of products being shipped, regulation began to impede efficiency and viability of firms, leading to partial deregulation of the industry in 1980. Partial deregulation allowed railroads to reduce costs, notably through mergers and line abandonment, which were aggressively pursued following deregulation and led to dramatic efficiency gains. However, concerns remain over increased consolidation, lack of competition in the industry, and the ability of firms to continue to realize efficiency gains. This dissertation investigates more recent developments in the rail industry with an eye towards regulation's effect and role.
I begin with a study into the markups of price over marginal cost and elasticities of scale in the rail industry. Scale elasticities provide information on where firms are operating on their average cost curves, and markups provide a more theoretically appealing method of examining pricing behavior than the revenue-to-variable-cost measure currently used by regulators. I extend previously developed methods to identify markups and scales for each firm and in each year. I find prices well in excess of marginal cost, and evidence firms are operating near minimum efficient scale, indicating efficiency gains from deregulation may be fully realized.
I then present a study that examines productivity changes in the rail industry and the role of technological change. I extend stochastic frontier frameworks to allow productivity and the state of technology to evolve flexibly through time and vary across firms. I find firms turn towards technological innovation to realize productivity gains when other channels previously offered by deregulation are not available.
I finish with a study of allocative errors in the rail industry. I again extend a stochastic frontier model to include differences in production across firms and allow allocative errors to be correlated with competitive pressures. I find that incorporating flexibility into the description of firm production is crucial for obtaining unbiased estimates of allocative errors, overcapitalization is prevalent in the rate-regulated rail industry, and additional competition does not appear to reduce inefficiency.
This dissertation includes unpublished co-authored material.
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Konings, M. J. "Pacing and opponents : the regulation of exercise intensity during competition." Thesis, University of Essex, 2018. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/22288/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The goal-directed regulation of the exercise intensity over an exercise bout has been shown to be an essential determinant for performance. During their competition, exercisers are required continuously to make decisions about how and when they are going to invest their limited available energy resources. The regulation of the exercise intensity is an intriguing area of sport science research, and a complex one as demonstrated by the multitude of different theories regarding pacing that are around attempting to explain how this is done. Previous research revealed optimal pacing strategies in time trial exercise and the importance of feedback regarding the internal bodily state. The present thesis adds onto this knowledge by highlighting the external world around the exerciser and its effect on pacing. This has been done by focusing on arguably the most important external variable in competitions: the opponent. It has been shown how opponents could invite exercisers to adjust their pacing behaviour in real-life competitions and in controlled laboratory situations. Moreover, it has been illustrated that even the same opponent could evoke different pacing responses and alter the information-seeking behaviour, depending on the competitive situation that is presented towards the exerciser. It has been demonstrated how an accumulation of preceding race efforts could impact the pacing and performance of elite athletes during their competition. Finally, the reciprocal interaction in pacing decision-making between the effect of an opponent and the internal state of the exerciser was demonstrated, providing novel insights into the regulatory mechanism of exercise regulation. The present findings of this thesis emphasizes the importance of what is happening around the exerciser for the outcome of the decision-making process involved in pacing, and highlight the necessity to incorporate human-environment interactions into models that attempt to explain the regulation of exercise intensity.
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Pemberton, Anne. "Government Regulation in the Wireless Telecommunications Industry: The Impact of Wireless Number Portability." Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3077.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Thesis advisor: Frank GollopBy November 2003, wireless telecommunications operators were required by the FCC to have implemented wireless number portability. The FCC and the media claimed that this decrease in the cost of switching would force operators to react competitively by either decreasing prices or increasing the services offered at the same price to prevent customers from migrating to competitors. This paper empirically analyzes the effect that this regulation had on plan prices offered by the top four U.S. cellular operators over the period of Q2 2002 through Q2 2008, identifying whether they increased or decreased and by how much. This paper concludes that three out of the four nationwide carriers lowered prices in response to the implementation of wireless number portability
Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics Honors Program
Discipline: College Honors Program
Discipline: Economics
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Gragera, Albert. "The Economics of Parking: Essays on Regulation, Competition and Information Frictions." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/458117.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Parking policy has attracted considerable research interest in the past, but it is currently a hotly debated topic given the market-oriented turn taken by the sector and the complexities of the market’s intrinsic distortions.
The empirical literature tends to focus on curbside parking and generally considers garage parking simply as an outside option. However, garage parking is just as relevant as curbside parking, to the extent that the vast majority of parking spaces in European cities are provided by off-street parking garage facilities. Indeed, none of the previous studies take into account the impact of curbside parking regulation instruments on garage demand and private operators’ price setting behavior; neither do they analyze the potential contribution of public garage provision to correct market distortions (as a means to counterbalance private garage localized market power), nor take into account potential information frictions that translate into market outcomes that deviate from perfect competition scenario.
Thus, Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of garage fee and curbside regulation characteristics (fee and type of dedicated spaces) on garage parking demand (for both occasional parkers and subscribers). It presents an empirical estimation of garage demand elasticity to the garages’ own fee and curbside fee cross-elasticity, which suggests that both goods are not perfect substitutes and curbside parking is preferred.
As such, it identifies a relevant pricing distortion in the case of Barcelona. The chapter also provides evidence that the characteristics of curbside space regulation (commercial, mixed or resident-exclusive) has an impact on demand, but not always the one initially intended. Based on these results, we suggest policy interventions to address the pricing distortion and stress the need for an integrated market policy approach.
Chapter 3 explores the determinants of private garage prices, focusing specifically on cost shifters and the interaction between curbside regulation and garage price-setting decisions, while also analyzing the role of market structure. It shows that the main price drivers are provision costs and quality shifters (land value, capacity, number of opening hours and type of payment). It suggests a negative relation between garage fee and curbside fee, capturing just how inefficiently the curb is used (cruising) and so giving garage operators the opportunity to further exert their market power. The chapter also challenges the assumption that more competition drives prices down, and shows that current public garage provision does not affect them. It shows that only the dominant position of private operators in the relevant market is positively related to garage prices. Additionally, our findings also confirm the possible theoretical link between parking and retail prices. Given these outcomes, the chapter examines potential policy interventions to address parking market distortions.
Chapter 4 provides compelling evidence of the existence, and of the degree, of information frictions in the garage market. It also empirically tests whether parkers’ lack of knowledge affects the level of prices they end up paying, suggesting that information frictions do translate into undesired market outcomes. It shows that information frictions are so pervasive that active search during a given trip does not help drivers reduce the fees they pay and only passive information acquisition through experience seems to help them. The chapter also suggests that garage operators might engage in price obfuscation, which allows them to exploit the consumers’ lack of knowledge. Addressing existing information frictions therefore is a relevant policy issue if parking market efficiency is to be achieved and we make some recommendations regarding policy interventions that might be useful in this regard.
Chapter 5 outlines the general conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis and identifies the policy implications derived from the study. The chapter stresses how the curbside premium represents an important price distortion in Barcelona’s parking market and highlights the roles that the private sector and information friction play in this. We specifically stress the need to change current curbside and publicly provided garage parking pricing schemes and the added need of taking the private sector into account in an integrated parking market approach. In this chapter, we also identify the need to address the issue of imperfect information and practices of price obfuscation if market efficiency is to be achieved. Here, we propose a number of policy interventions that exploit the leading role played by the public sector in Barcelona’s parking market and explore potential initiatives for public-private collaboration. Although our recommendations focus on the specific case of Barcelona, they may very well apply to other cities that face parking market distortions. Finally, based on the
we identify further lines of research.La gestió de l'aparcament ha rebut una considerable atenció a nivell de recerca i és actualment un tema candent degut a les noves iniciatives de tarifació dinàmica i les complexitats intrínseques que suposen les distorsions en el mercat de l'aparcament. La literatura empírica s'ha enfocat majoritàriament cap a la gestió de l'aparcament en calçada, tot i que els garatges són generalment els que ofereixen la major part de l'oferta d'aparcament en ciutats europees i d'EEUU. Aquesta tesi s'analitza quin és l'impacte de la regulació de l'aparcament en calçada sobre la demanda als garatges, detectant quin grau de substitució hi ha entre ambdós i proposant una mesura de la distorsió de preu existent (que no permet assolir l'eficiència en el mercat); així com els factors que determinen la fixació de preus dels operadors privats, el paper de la competència i la provisió pública de garatges sobre els mateixos. A més, també s'aporta una primera evidència d'informació imperfecta en aquest mercat; distorsió que agreuja l'externalitat de cerca d'aparcament en calçada i el poder de mercat localitzat dels garatges. A partir de les evidències trobades es proposen un seguit d'actuacions i modificacions de la regulació de l'aparcament per assolir la seva eficiència econòmica en aquest mercat.
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Easaw, Joshy Zachariah. "Network access regulation and competition policy : the UK contract gas market." Thesis, University of Leicester, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/30156.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Increasingly policy-makers and regulatory theorists have focused on network access regulation. This thesis examines the role of network access regulation as part of a regulator's overall competition policy or strategy to introduce competition into privatised industries. It examines in detail recent theoretical models of network access regulation. The analysis is undertaken in the context of the UK contract gas market. British Gas (BG) was privatised in 1986, and the gas industry structure remained vertically integrated. The incumbent, or in the present case, BG, retains control of the gas network transmission while competing in the final goods, or retail, market. The present research provides a theoretical framework examining the impact of regulatory and competition policies with respect to both the final goods market and network access, on the competitive process in the contract gas market. This is done using a unique dataset on the UK contract gas market made available by a leading gas analyst and broker; John Hall Associates. The theoretical analysis distinguishes between the potential strategic advantage of both BG and the main competing shippers. BG, as the incumbent in the vertically integrated industry, has pre-entry advantages, while the main competing shippers who are wholly or partially owned by North Sea gas producers and operate as downstream firms in the retail market potentially have post-entry advantage. The entrants pricing behaviour followed a distinct and separate path to that of BG's. An empirical analysis of the entrants' pricing behaviour is conducted. This is done within the context of supergames or repeated games explanation of dynamic oligopoly behaviour. The relationship between access charges and market structure, or the level of market concentration is also empirically established, which shows the impact of access charges on the competitive process, market structure and final goods prices. The estimates are used to give an empirical application of the "Direct-plus-Opportunity Cost Regime" (DORC) model of access pricing. Consequently, the various policy options and choices open to a policy-maker are considered.
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Stronzik, Marcus [Verfasser]. "The European Natural Gas Sector Between Regulation and Competition / Marcus Stronzik." Bremen : IRC-Library, Information Resource Center der Jacobs University Bremen, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1035263467/34.
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Oya, Kazuo. "The relationship between competition law and telecommunications regulation : a comparative assessment." Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=80945.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis seeks to contribute to solving the debate about the framework of rules and institutions applicable to public utility sectors, by adopting both economic theories, such as natural monopoly, network effects, and public goods, and practical analysis of the telecommunications sectors for both Australia and the United States. Governments must reevaluate the framework regulating public utility sectors whenever rapid technological advancements occur. This thesis argues that the antitrust authority better enforces competition rules, and that the sector-specific authority better enforces technical and universal service rules. The justification of the special competition rule concerning bottleneck facilities access should be limited. As for the universal service scheme, the enforcer should ensure competitive neutrality and adopt pro-competitive instruments. This framework would allow for a more market-oriented and economy-wide regulatory administration, as well as enforcement of the universal service scheme based on a more accurate reflection of the fundamental values of citizens.
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Mu, Hairong. "Three essays on regulation and competition in the Chinese telecommunications industry." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.505719.
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Campion, Marie-Geneviève. "Competition between originators and generics : public regulation and incentives to innovate." Thesis, Paris 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA010015/document.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Dans une économie mondialisée sur un secteur très concurrentiel, ce travail de recherche articulé en cinq parties propose d’étudier de nouveaux schémas de concurrence entre médicaments princeps et génériques au sein de l’Union Européenne, en intégrant les articulations entre régulation publique et incitations à innover. Dans une première partie introductive, les spécificités réglementaires très évolutives des marchés pharmaceutiques sont présentées ainsi que leurs conséquences induites sur les systèmes de prix et l'innovation.La deuxième partie, vise à analyser dans un premier temps l'approche adoptée par la Commission Européenne et les autorités de concurrence des divers Etats membres quant à la définition du marché pertinent de produits sur ces marchés. Plus particulièrement, dans un second temps, une étude empirique des schémas de substitution existants est développée à partir des décisions prises par la Commission Européenne de 1989 à 2011 en matière de fusions dans le secteur concerné. Cet examen des différents critères retenus pour définir la taille du marché pertinent souligne la tendance lourde à définir des marchés pertinents de produits toujours plus étroits, atteignant même le niveau moléculaire.Dans la troisième partie, l’analyse du système de prix de référence mis en place dans de nombreux Etats membres sur ces marchés concurrentiels, montre,en prenant en compte les avantages informatifs des princeps, dans quelle mesure la mise en place d'un tel système, peut favoriser l’innovation.Sous la quatrième partie, la modélisation de l'impact des nouveaux modèles d'accords de partage de risques se propose d’étudier comment de tels accords peuvent résoudre les problématiques d'aléa moral et de sélection adverse sur ces marchés, en incitant les entreprises à investir dans leur produit et à renforcer la qualité des biens fournis.Enfin, la partie cinq conclut le travail en mettant en perspective les résultats obtenus et en analysant les conséquences sous-jacentes pour les politiques publiquesThe aim of this thesis is to examine the competition patterns that exist between originators and generics by focusing on the articulations between regulation and incentives to innovate. Once the characteristics of regulation in pharmaceutical markets is reviewed in the first chapter and an analysis of some current challenges related to cost-containment measures and innovation issues is performed, then in the second chapter, an empirical study is performed to investigate substitution patterns. Based on the EC´s merger decisions in the pharmaceutical sector from 1989 to 2011, this study stresses the key criteria to define the scope of the relevant product market based on substitution patterns and shows the trend towards a narrower market in time. Chapters three and four aim to analyse in depth two widespread measures, the internal reference pricing system in off-patent markets, and risk-sharing schemes in patent-protected markets. By taking into account informational advantages of originators over generics, the third chapter shows the extent to which the implementation of a reference price for off-patent markets can contribute in promoting innovation. Finally, in the fourth chapter, the modeling of risk-sharing schemes explains how such schemes can help in solving moral hazard and adverse selection issues by continuously giving pharmaceutical companies incentives to innovate and supplying medicinal products of a higher quality
30
Savva, Nicos. "Real options : competition in market regulation and cooperation in partnership deals." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.612824.
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Bobe, Jonathan Mark. "Power, competition and regulation : the case of the UK brewing sector." Thesis, University of Portsmouth, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.311291.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis explores the role of unequal power relationships between business enterprises in the UK brewing sector and how these asymmetries shape the dynamic and direction of changei n patternso f geographicailn dustrialisation.P ower has,t o date,r emaineda largely neglected concept in economic relationships as considered in economic geography. A new model of geographical industrialisation is developed in this thesis that focuses on capital: capital relations, incorporates the dynamic nature of enterprises and the networks of relations within which they are embeddedt,h e asymmetryo f power relations within and betweene nterprisesa ndt he dynamicc hangesin markets tructured uring periodso f recession and restructuring. It further seeks to explore the relationship between stability and instability in the derivation of emerging patterns of geographical industrialisation. The model is based on the concept of circuits of power (Clegg, 1989) which has been successfully applied to economic geography over recent years (Taylor, 1995,1996; Taylor and Hallsworth, 1996,1999; Taylor eta!, 1995). In this model inequalities in power between enterprisese stablishesth e basesu pon which competition can take place and go on to create the context within which social relationships are established and can develop. However, as currently specified this approach neglects the collective agency of enterprises inherent in segmented economic sectors (Taylor and Thrift, 1982a, 1982b, 1983). By the incorporation of appropriate insights from the study of complexity, collective agency, the element of process within the circuits of power framework, can be more fully understood. In this way those processes that create instability and flux in enterprises, but which at the same time lead to periodic stabilisations, can be identified. The thesis is divided into four parts. Part I. makes explicit the limitations of current theories of geographical industrialisation (Chapters 1 and 2) and proposes a new model (Chapter 2), incorporating the concepts of circuits of power and complexity, that addresses these limitations. Part II of the thesis (Chapters 3,4 and 5) tests the model against historical trajectories of change in the UK brewing sector identifying six cycles of change since 1700. For each cycle, by applying the model, the processes that have instigated and promulgated change are made explicit. Distinct enterprise segmentations, associated with each period of relative stability during these cycles, are also identified. Part III of the thesis, through a questionnaire survey (Chapter 6) and a series of semistructured interviews (Chapter 7), uses the model to examine the state of the UK brewing sector at the present time. Chapter 6 identifies contemporary enterprise segments active within the sector and the differential action of pressures upon these segments. In doing so the path dependent trajectories ofchange ofenterprise segments, and the limitations imposed upon such trajectories, are made explicit. Chapter 7 considers, through the model, the day to day interactions of enterprise segments and how these interactions reinforce the negotiated inequalities inherent in asymmetrical power relations. Coping strategies adopted by enterprises during a period of instability are identified and the relationship between the market and interpersonal relationships are made explicit. It is concluded that the model proposed in this thesis provides for a more realistic interpretation of changing patterns of geographical industrialisation than previous models
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Clements, Michael Edward. "Local telephone quality-of-service : the impact of regulation and competition." The Ohio State University, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1273857327.
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Abel, Jaison R. "Pricing and competition in local telephone markets under price-cap regulation." The Ohio State University, 1999. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1277316624.
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Clements, Michael E. "Local telephone quality-of-service : the impact of regulation and competition /." The Ohio State University, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1486397841222342.
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Abel, Jaison R. "Pricing and competition in local telephone markets under price-cap regulation /." The Ohio State University, 2000. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1488190595940809.
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Akbar, Yusaf. "The links between trade and competition policy : a comparison of natural resource and complex manufacturing industries." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.300595.
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Prasad, Aiyaswami Natesa. "Three Essays on R&D| The Effect of Competition and Regulation." Thesis, University of Connecticut, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3569929.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The three essays focus on important facets of R&D such as the impact of competition, regulation and the difficulties in measuring R&D and the dollars to be allocated to R&D by a firm. In the first essay, we investigate Aghion etal. (2005), model on the relationship between R&D and competition. We identify limitations in previous empirical tests of the model. Further, R&D appropriability plays no role in the model although literature assigns it a significant role. Our comprehensive tests reveal that the model does not fully explain the R&D-competition relationship, and the results depend on the competition measure used. We investigate the role R&D appropriability and confirm its significance. Hence the model needs refinements. This study enhances our knowledge of the role competition and R&D appropriability play in enhancing R&D and helps formulate policies that promote R&D.
In the second essay, we analyze the changes in pharmaceutical firms' stock prices following the recall of Vioxx, Merck's blockbuster drug, apropos three theories based on government regulation, product liability, and firms' reputations. We conduct an event study of estimated abnormal share returns using a Fama-French 3 factor model under seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation. Our investigations support government regulation theory and suggest that R&D-intensive firms suffer maximum adverse returns. Adverse returns reflect anticipated regulatory changes in approvals for new drugs. Drug recall harms the industry and future availability of new drugs. Stable and fair drug approvals policy can help the industry flourish.
The third essay critically examines measurement of R&D. R&D capital and cited patents are used in the literature to measure R&D intensity and investigate market returns for R&D. The results are ambiguous. Previous literature suggests that patents are distinct from R&D expenditure, and R&D is influenced by competition. We suggest eight new measures based on the interplay between R&D and competition. We empirically test these measures on pharmaceutical and computer software industries which have the highest R&D intensities of all industries. The new measures are more significant than R&D capital and offer further insights on R&D in these industries. These measures help in capital allocation for R&D at firm level which maximizes stock returns.
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Cini, Michelle Marie Charlotte. "Policing the internal market : the regulation of competition in the European Commission." Thesis, University of Exeter, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.359802.
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Nasser, Thomas-Olivier. "Imperfect markets for power : competition and residual regulation in the electricity industry." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/10323.
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Vagliasindi, Maria. "Competition, access pricing and regulation in a second degree price discrimination setting." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1995. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/81921/.
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In broad terms, this work aims to gain a greater understanding of the particular features introduced in the regulatory set-up by competitive issues and vertically related markets. Specifically, we explore their impact on the profitability of the market and the p~ssibility for the incumbent to maintain monopoly profits under different regulatory regimes. There was a time when utilities industries and in particular telecoms each seemed to be a natural monopoly. Most governments liked it that way because they owned the monopoly and siphoned off some of the profits. Nowadays, competition is spreading in most utilities market and it becomes imperative to assess its impact on the tariffs and in general on social welfare. We deal with a second degree price discrimination model allowing the players -namely, an incumbent, who has a natural monopoly on the network, and a rival- to make use of non-linear pricing in intermediate and final goods. In this framework the entrant's choice of the customer types is endogenised in a sequential multistage game, where the incumbent, who is undoubtedly the most powerful player, acts as a first mover. We also show that cream skimming, contrary to the general wisdom, can be welfare enhancing. Particular attention is devoted to the access pricing problem which is becoming the key issue to the regulators, examining the relevance of simple pricing rules, such as the Baumol-Willig rule. Despite the presence of a growing literature in these areas, other models fail to incorporate the use of non-linear access pricing. Since price discrimination is common in practice this omission can lead to misleading results. Our analysis shows that the regulator should not allow competition for the low-demand consumers' types or by a less efficient entrant and should impose the adoption of socially optimal non-linear access tariffs. Therefore the general conclusion is that competition will not obviate the need of regulation.
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Guo, Qiang [Verfasser], and Dirk [Akademischer Betreuer] Simons. "Essays on regulation, accounting and market competition / Qiang Guo. Betreuer: Dirk Simons." Mannheim : Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim, 2014. http://d-nb.info/1059695634/34.
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Monareng, Katlego Donavin. "Using Competition law to promote broader public interest issues in merger regulation." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/45991.
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Heatwole, Kathleen B. "A Determination of the Association of Competition and Regulation With Hospital Strategic Orientation." VCU Scholars Compass, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10156/1804.
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Yoshizawa, Hikaru. "The International Dimension of EU Competition Policy: Does Regional Supranational Regulation Hinder Protectionism?" Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/228572.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
There is an increasing recognition of the international presence and regulatory influence of the EU in competition policy. Despite a scholarly focus on its international dimension, the issue of nationality-based (non-) discrimination has insufficiently been investigated in the existing literature on EU competition policy. Thus, this research aims to fill this gap in the literature by examining whether the EU internally and externally utilizes its competition rules for the objective of promoting (potential) national and European champions, while disadvantaging non-EU based companies operating inside and outside the European internal market. Empirical findings validate two hypotheses of this research: that the supranational institutional setting of the EU in competition policy constrains the ability of member states to use their competition policies for neomercantilist, and even for protectionist purposes; and that the institutional setup assures nationality-blind enforcement by EU competition regulators, even vis-à-vis non-EU based companies. The research also identifies key systemic factors which either constrain or empower the EU as a regulatory power in the competition policy domain. The empirical analysis draws on both quantitative data and in-depth studies of recent major cases. Most cases are from the period between September 1990 and August 2015, involving American and Japanese companies, which have a strong presence in European economies.EU competition policy is highly supranational and has a distinctive goal of market integration. In order to understand better how these features shape EU competition policy, this research proposes an original model of ‘stringent competition policy’, drawing on the theory of regulatory states. This model is more useful than the essentially neomercantilist model of strategic competition policy in explaining the EU’s enforcement without regard to the nationality of firms. Internally, the supranational institutional setting significantly constrains the ability of the member states to utilize their competition policies for neomercantilist and protectionist purposes. Regarding external consequences of this policy, the EU stringently enforces its competition rules regardless the nationality of firms involved in law infringements, though some cases involving non-EU firms were highly politicized and contested. To ensure that its stringent competition policy does not deteriorate the international competitiveness of European firms, the EU has been promoting competition policy externally, especially since the 1990s. However, the EU’s ability to play a leadership role in global multilateral fora is limited, despite its dedication and ambitions. This is because the EU’s regulatory power is fundamentally constrained by systemic factors such as a sharp increase in the number and heterogeneity of competition policies around the world, the deadlock of WTO negotiations on world competition law, and the emergence of transgovernmental networks such as the ICN. At the same time, these systemic factors have created the demand of younger competition authorities for reference points, if not models, and this opened up a window of opportunity for the EU to promote its competition policy rules and norms more extensively in third states. Overall, this research contributes to the EU competition policy literature by firmly placing it in a wider debate on competition and/versus competitiveness in the study of global political economy.Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Brunekreeft, Gert. "Regulation and competition policy in the electricity market : economic analysis and German experience /." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verl. Gesellschaft, 2003. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=010483641&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Dibotelo, Gorata Tlhale. "Merger regulation in Botswana: does the Competition Act 2009 adequately provide for mergers?" Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/4597.
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Hořánková, Kristýna. "Konkurence v regulatorice: implementace BASEL II v Kanadě." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-81987.
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The aim of this paper which is called "Competition in Regulation: Implementation of BASEL II in Canada" is to analyze the introduction of Basel Rules in the banking sector in Canada. The goal is to prove that the economical stability, high concentration of the banking sector and a simple system of regulation and supervision can be a competitive advantage for a banking market. The analysis is based on the comparison of the implementation of BASEL II in Canada, the USA and the European Union.
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Martínez, Santos Fernando. "Competition and Regulation in the Retail Broadband Sector: a Holistic Approach for Pricing Policies." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/320177.
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This thesis analyses the pricing policies used by operators when they establish broadband tariffs. The studies draw on datasets that combine broadband plans’ characteristics and tariffs with other sources of data at country level to reflect the market structure and regulation activity. The pricing models in this dissertation share the common thread of using three groups of variables to explain the level of broadband prices: 1- the characteristics of the broadband service, 2- the operators’ commercial strategies, and 3- the market structure and regulatory policies implemented. The pricing models are estimated using the following econometric techniques: pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with country and time fixed effects, and two stage least squares (2SLS, instrumental variable techniques).
The level of broadband prices concerns both national governments and international organisations, and this dissertation contributes to provide some guidance to regulators and competition authorities, helping them in the implementation of policies so as to foster competition in the market and ultimately stimulate the diffusion of broadband services.
The first thesis chapter analyses the determinants of broadband Internet access prices in a group of 15 EU countries between 2008 and 2011. Using a rich panel data set of broadband plans, it is shown how downstream speed (Mbps) increases prices, and that the price per Mbps of cable modem and fibre technologies is lower than that of xDSL. Operators’ marketing strategies are also analysed as it is shown how much prices rise when the broadband service is offered in a bundle with voice telephony and/or television, and how much they fall when download volume caps are included. The most insightful results of this study are provided by a group of metrics that represent the situation of competition and entry patterns in the broadband market. It is found that consumer segmentation positively affects prices. Moreover, broadband prices are higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream access and lower in countries where there is an intensive use of direct access (local loop unbundling). However, there is not a significant impact of inter-platform competition on prices.
The second chapter analyses the strategies adopted by mobile operators when they set the prices of broadband plans. It is explained that operators design multi-tier price schemes in order to segment consumers according to their preferences. Operators usually offer only a few unlimited usage contracts and three-part tariffs for data limited plans. In the later case, the tariff includes an access fee, a usage allowance (the number of GB that consumers can use for free), and a penalty system for the case in which consumers exceed the contracted allowance. The empirical model shows that the prices of usage based contracts are lower than those of unlimited contracts, and that the monthly price depends on the type of penalty included in the plan. The prices also depend on other characteristics of the service such as the provided technology, the download speed and the telephone call allowances. It is also explained that most plans bundle mobile broadband plans with smartphones. This type of plans last longer and might be more expensive than the plans that only include the SIM card. Specifically, it is shown that the monthly price of the broadband service is more expensive when the plan includes an iPhone or a Samsung. Moreover, it is found that the monthly prices are higher when the plan includes a discount for the acquisition of the smarthphone. Finally, this chapter also studies the effects of market structure and entry regulation on prices and shows that mobile virtual operators have helped to reduce prices.
The third chapter studies the mobile broadband market in Spain. The mobile broadband service has experienced a strong expansion in Spain, reaching a penetration of over 70% of the population at the beginning of 2014. This growth can be explained by the benefits that offer the third and the fourth generation of mobile technology, and by the continuous price reductions. In spite of this, prices in Spain are still higher than the European average. This chapter explains the process of technological innovation that has allowed the emergence of mobile broadband, and its launch in Spain. New commercial strategies used by mobile operators, such as bundling and plans that include fixed and mobile services are examined. The analysis shows that the presence of mobile virtual network operators and bundling have been effective in fostering competition and reducing prices. It is also discussed how technological convergence between fixed and mobile services has promoted restructuring and market concentration.
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Law, Stephen M. "Economic policy interactions, intellectual property rights and competition policy : exclusive licensing and rate regulation." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD_0013/NQ28289.pdf.
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Ezrachi, Ariel. "Regulation of cross border mergers and acquisitions : from unilateral to cooperative competition law enforcement." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.248887.
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