Статті в журналах з теми "Refugees, el salvador"

AbstractDuring the 1980s, more than 20,000 Salvadorans fleeing the violence of the Salvadoran Civil War entered the neighboring country of Nicaragua. Their flight was part of a larger multidirectional migration out of El Salvador in which Salvadorans sought refuge across Central and North America. In response to this unprecedented influx of Salvadoran refugee men, women, and children, the Nicaraguan government—newly under the control of the revolutionary Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)—declared that all refugees would be permitted “the opportunity to survive and produce.” This article argues that the timing of the refugees’ arrival proved mutually beneficial for both the Salvadorans and the FSLN by illustrating how Sandinista officials sought to further agrarian reform projects via refugee integration into agricultural cooperatives. As such, Nicaraguan refugee policy functioned as an integral part of Sandinista statecraft. Through an analysis of refugee-produced sources, government and UNHCR documents, and news reports, this article sheds new light on the entwined histories of Salvadoran refugees and the Sandinista state in the transnational context of the late Cold War period in Central America.

During the 1980s, El Salvador was engaged in a brutal civil war; massacres, torture, and rape pervaded the countryside. This social and economic upheaval created approximately 1.5 million refugees and internally displaced persons throughout Central and North America. Gender is a critical yet understudied aspect of this mass displacement. I analyze humanitarian publications and government documents to examine the discursive gendering of Salvadoran refugees on the international stage. I argue that U.S. activists portrayed Salvadorans as feminized civilian victims in need of rescue by the paternalistic United States to change public opinion of the Salvadoran Civil War and its refugees. These gendered and infantilized constructions belie the reality that the vast majority of Salvadoran refugees to the United States were men of military age. I examine the Salvadoran refugee from a new perspective that foregrounds gender as a category of analysis.

This study compared the MMPI scores of Central American refugees from Guatemala and El Salvador to those of Mexican immigrants. It was expected that subjects from Guatemala and El Salvador would obtain higher scores on the F, D, Pa, and Sc scales because these subjects came from “war-torn” countries. A multivariate analysis of variance yielded no significant differences between the three groups on any of the validity and clinical scales including F, D, Pa, and Sc. Recommendations for cross-national research ace noted especially in light of the new version, or MMPI-2.

Washington, D.C., like many major cities in the U.S., has experienced a large influx of illegal immigrants in the past decade. Hundreds of thousands of Hispanics have entered the United States, many of them fleeing from the political violence in Guatemala and El Salvador. The Washington metropolitan area may have as many as 80,000 refugees from El Salvador alone.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that the number of requests for international refugee or asylum protection increased fivefold from 2010 to 2015. In the United States these requests are mainly filed by citizens from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—the countries collectively referred to as the Northern Triangle of Central America (TNCA). These applicants flee their countries of origin to escape threats to their lives and personal safety from gang violence, organized crime, and even police and military agents. Though the violence cannot be classified as a “war,” the daily life of many Central Americans is currently marked by human tragedies comparable to those experienced during the regional armed conflicts of past decades.

As decades of political repression had by 1980 culminated in a full-scale civil war in El Salvador, thousands of its victims fled the country in search of haven. Costa Rica was viewed as one of the most politically stable and non-repressive countries of Central America and therefore many Salvadoreans asked this country for asylum. At the end of 1980, there were more than 2,000 refugees in Costa Rica and by March 1981, the figure had risen to over four thousand. Between 1980 and 1983 an average of 9,000 refugees per year arrived in Costa Rica.

The Salvadoran civil war destroyed local community life throughout the province of Morazán. Despite the peace accords, poverty, unequal land distribution, and a “culture of violence” demand structural and institutional transformations well beyond the individual moral regeneration offered by churches. Religion, however, supplies coping tools, especially for youth, women, and repatriated refugees. By focusing on local issues, furthermore, churches are fostering social participation among hitherto disenfranchised groups, a critical element in building an inclusive, robust democracy.

Executive Summary2 In the early summer months of 2014, an increasing number of Central American children alone and with their parents began arriving at the US-Mexico border in search of safety and protection. The children and families by and large came from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala — three of the most dangerous countries in the world — to seek asylum and other humanitarian relief. Rampant violence and persecution within homes and communities, uncontrolled and unchecked by state authorities, compelled them to flee north for their lives. On the scale of refugee crises worldwide, the numbers were not huge. For example, 24,481 and 38,833 unaccompanied children, respectively, were apprehended by US Border Patrol (USBP) in FY 2012 and FY 2013, while 68,631 children were apprehended in FY 2014 alone (USBP 2016a). In addition, apprehensions of “family units,” or parents (primarily mothers) with children, also increased, from 15,056 families in FY 2013 to 68,684 in FY 2014 (USBP 2016b).3 While these numbers may seem large and did represent a significant increase over prior years, they are nonetheless dwarfed by refugee inflows elsewhere; for example, Turkey was host to 1.15 million Syrian refugees by year end 2014 (UNHCR 2015a), and to 2.5 million by year end 2015 (UNHCR 2016) — reflecting an influx of almost 1.5 million refugees in the course of a single year. Nevertheless, small though they are in comparison, the numbers of Central American women and children seeking asylum at our southern border, concentrated in the summer months of 2014, did reflect a jump from prior years. These increases drew heightened media attention, and both news outlets and official US government statements termed the flow a “surge” and a “crisis” (e.g., Basu 2014; Foley 2014; Negroponte 2014). The sense of crisis was heightened by the lack of preparedness by the federal government, in particular, to process and provide proper custody arrangements for unaccompanied children as required by federal law. Images of children crowded shoulder to shoulder in US Customs and Border Protection holding cells generated a sense of urgency across the political spectrum (e.g., Fraser-Chanpong 2014; Tobias 2014). Responses to this “surge,” and explanations for it, varied widely in policy, media, and government circles. Two competing narratives emerged, rooted in two very disparate views of the “crisis.” One argues that “push” factors in the home countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala drove children and families to flee as bona fide asylum seekers; the other asserted that “pull” factors drew these individuals to the United States. For those adopting the “push” factor outlook, the crisis is a humanitarian one, reflecting human rights violations and deprivations in the region, and the protection needs of refugees (UNHCR 2015b; UNHCR 2014; Musalo et al. 2015). While acknowledging that reasons for migration may be mixed, this view recognizes the seriousness of regional refugee protection needs. For those focusing on “pull” factors, the crisis has its roots in border enforcement policies that were perceived as lax by potential migrants, and that thereby acted as an inducement to migration (Harding 2014; Navarette, Jr. 2014). Each narrative, in turn, suggests a very different response to the influx of women and children at US borders. If “push” factors predominately drive migration, then protective policies in accordance with international and domestic legal obligations toward refugees must predominately inform US reaction. Even apart from the legal and moral rightness of this approach, any long-term goal of lowering the number of Central American migrants at the US-Mexico border, practically speaking, would have to address the root causes of violence in their home countries. On the other hand, if “pull” factors are granted greater causal weight, it would seem that stringent enforcement policies that make coming to the US less attractive and profitable would be a more effective deterrent. In that latter case, tactics imposing human costs on migrants, such as detention, speedy return, or other harsh or cursory treatment — while perhaps not morally justified —would at least make logical sense. Immediately upon the summer influx of 2014, the Obama administration unequivocally adopted the “pull” factor narrative and enacted a spate of hostile deterrence-based policies as a result. In July 2014, President Obama asked Congress to appropriate $3.7 billion in emergency funds to address the influx of Central American women and children crossing the border (Cohen 2014). The majority of funding focused on heightened enforcement at the border — including funding for 6,300 new beds to detain families (LIRS and WRC 2014, 5). The budget also included, in yet another demonstration of a “pull”-factor-based deterrence approach, money for State Department officials to counter the supposed “misinformation” spreading in Central America regarding the possibility of obtaining legal status in the United States. The US government also funded and encouraged the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras to turn around Central American asylum seekers before they ever could reach US border (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016). Each of these policies, among other harsh practices, continues to the present day. But, by and large they have not had a deterrent effect. Although the numbers of unaccompanied children and mothers with children dropped in early 2015, the numbers began climbing again in late 2015 and remained high through 2016, exceeding in August and September 2015 the unaccompanied child and “family unit” apprehension figures for those same months in 2014 (USBP 2016a; USBP 2016b). Moreover, that temporary drop in early 2015 likely reflects US interdiction policies rather than any “deterrent” effect of harsh policies at or within US own borders, as the drop in numbers of Central American women and children arriving at the US border in the early months of 2015 corresponded largely with a spike in deportations by Mexico (WOLA 2015). In all events, in 2015, UNCHR found that the number of individuals from the Northern Triangle requesting asylum in Mexico, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama had increased 13-fold since 2008 (UNCHR 2015b). Thus, the Obama administration's harsh policies did not, in fact, deter Central American women and children from attempting to flee their countries. This, we argue, is because the “push” factor narrative is the correct one. The crisis we face is accordingly humanitarian in nature and regional in scope — and the migrant “surge” is undoubtedly a refugee flow. By refusing to acknowledge and address the reality of the violence and persecution in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the US government has failed to lessen the refugee crisis in its own region. Nor do its actions comport with its domestic and international legal obligations towards refugees. This article proceeds in four parts. In the first section, we examine and critique the administration's “pull”-factor-based policies during and after the 2014 summer surge, in particular through the expansion of family detention, accelerated procedures, raids, and interdiction. In section two, we look to the true “push” factors behind the migration surge — namely, societal violence, violence in the home, and poverty and exclusion in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Our analysis here includes an overview of the United States' responsibility for creating present conditions in these countries via decades of misguided foreign policy interventions. Our penultimate section explores the ways in which our current deterrence-based policies echo missteps of our past, particularly through constructive refoulement and the denial of protection to legitimate refugees. Finally, we conclude by offering recommendations to the US government for a more effective approach to the influx of Central American women and children at our border, one that addresses the real reasons for their flight and that furthers a sustainable solution consistent with US and international legal obligations and moral principles. Our overarching recommendation is that the US government immediately recognize the humanitarian crisis occurring in the Northern Triangle countries and the legitimate need of individuals from these countries for refugee protection. Flowing from that core recommendation are additional suggested measures, including the immediate cessation of hostile, deterrence-based policies such as raids, family detention, and interdiction; adherence to proper interpretations of asylum and refugee law; increased funding for long-term solutions to violence and poverty in these countries, and curtailment of funding for enforcement; and temporary measures to ensure that no refugees are returned to persecution in these countries.

The regional migration system that includes the U.S., Mexico and the Central American countries is currently in a turbulence. Mexico has become a territory where migrant caravans move, where refugees waiting for a decision on the U.S. asylum are concentrated. The Mexican-American border has become a line attracting hundreds of thousands of migrants hoping for good luck. The constant change of the U.S. migration policy principles increases an uncertainty and chaos level at the border. The role of Mexico in the regional migration system has changed radically in the second decade of the XXI century. Now it acts not only as a labor donor, but also as a key migration transit country and the first safe country to provide asylum and international protection. The transformation that took place affected the change in the status of Mexico in relations with the states of the region. The article examines the key changes in the Mexico migration model - the growth of the immigrants and refugees number, the transit migration management, the initiatives aimed at forming socio-economic development tools in the Northern Triangle countries – Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador.

The World Trade Center Attack or 9/11 tragedy has awakened the international community, particularly the United States (US) to sharpen its foreign policy in facing security threats coming from ‘weak states’. One of the most prominent weak states examples that pose a grave threat to other countries are the Northern Triangle Countries of Central America that referred to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Hence, this paper will discuss the rationale behind US initiatives in dealing with security threats in El Salvador as one of the Northern Triangle Countries. In analyzing the case, the writers will use the weak state concept and national interest concept. The result of this paper finds that El Salvador corresponds to the elements of a weak state and further poses security threats by giving rise to transnational criminal organizations, drug trafficking, and migrant problems in which overcoming those security threats has become US vital national interest. 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Human made conflicts and natural disasters led to a doubling of forced displacement in the past 10 years (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022). Forcibly displaced people are generally challenged with severe mental and physical strains before, during and after their flight. Whereas forcibly displaced people show high levels of resilience (Dangmann et al., 2021), their risk of mental health struggles is markedly increased (Mesa-Vieira et al., 2022). The objective of this study was to explore the perception of regular participation in a co-designed and tailored sport and exercise intervention among adults living in a Greek refugee camp. The methodological approach relied on ethnography including informal discussions and participative observations. Data was collected and documented daily in a research diary over a period of eight months. Additionally, debrief meetings with the coaches (4 women and 4 men) were held regularly. These insights built the basis for a critical understanding and interpretation of 13 focus group discussions (n = 49, 19 women) and 38 self-recorded testimonies (17 women). Focus group discussions were conducted after a 10-week physical activity intervention period. The same participants were asked, after a 10-week follow-up, to provide a self-recorded testimony. Overall, 58 (55.8%) of the participants took part in the physical activities on a regular basis. Regular participation benefitted domains of psychological well-being, social cohesion, personal competencies, change in behavior and physiological health. However, some of the same domains were likewise negatively affected for certain participants, namely social cohesion and physiological health. The results indicate that organized sport and exercise activities have the potential to positively impact the living conditions of adults living in a Greek refugee camp. However, participation is not imperatively beneficial and only a specific target population can be addressed. References Dangmann, C., Solberg, Ø., Myhrene Steffenak, A. K., Høye, S., & Andersen, P. N. (2021). Syrian refugee youth resettled in Norway: Mechanisms of resilience influencing health-related quality of life and mental distress. Frontiers in Public Health, 9, Article 711451. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2021.711451 Mesa-Vieira, C., Haas, A. D., Buitrago-Garcia, D., Roa-Diaz, Z. M., Minder, B., Gamba, M., Salvador, D., Gomez, D., Lewis, M., Gonzalez-Jaramillo, W. C., Pahud de Mortanges, A., Buttia, C., Muka, T., Trujillo, N., & Franco, O. H. (2022). Mental health of migrants with pre-migration exposure to armed conflict: A systematic review and meta-analysis. The Lancet Public Health, 7(5), e469-e481. https://doi:10.1016/S2468-2667(22)00061-5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2022). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2021. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/62a9d1494/global-trends-report-2021.html

This paper charts events that transpired in the spaces between the larger forces that shaped El Salvador's transition from war to peace throughout the 1990s to the present day and tells the story of one place with entwined histories of forests growth, new land rights that were born of peace, and livelihoods being imagined and crafted from both. Over the six years following the signing of the peace Accords in 1992, ten percent of the nation's agricultural land (totaling over 103,300 hectares) was transferred to ex-combatants of both sides and to civilian supporters of the FMLN, through the Accord-mandated Land Transfer Program. By the year 2000, more than 36,000 people had received land through the PTT and an additional program had been created to parcelize and individually title all PTT lands that were formerly deeded collectively. While leaders of both the FMLN and the government set out to influence the post-war social and political landscape and the donor community generated post-war reconstruction projects, a group of ex-combatants, refugees, and displaced returning to the community of Cinquera, department of Cabañas, proceeded to take the land deeded to them as part of the Peace Accords. They subsequently transformed its use and value in ways never foreseen or intended by government land reform officials, FMLN party organizers, or international aid donors. In the process of linking their history to their future, the people of Cinquera created spaces of habitation for themselves and the natural world. To us, they offer a lesson in how a small community's continued struggle to live out their intentions for an alternative society, act by act, may in the end prove the best possible way to negotiate a revolution.Key words: spaces of habitation, El Salvador, livelihoods, land transformation.

In the article investigated the causes and course of the conflict between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, as well as the consequences of the conflict on integration processes in the region. It was noted that the cause of the Salvador-Honduran conflict was in the problems of land reform in Honduras and demographic problems in Salvador; also, in territorial disputes that lasted between the two countries; as well as the uneven development of Salvador and Honduras. In addition, the press of both countries contributed to the aggravation of the crisis, and violence against Salvadorans in Honduras and against Hondurans in Salvador during football matches. In 1969, relations between the two countries deteriorated due to the forced deportation of Salvadorans from Honduras, whom the Honduran government had agreed two years earlier to accept in their country and provide them with land to cultivate. The problem of the deportation of Salvadorans, which was difficult to integrate into Salvador’s economic life due to limited land resources and Salvador’s population overpopulation, posed a number of challenges for the Salvador government. Consequently, the deportations of Salvadorans from Honduras, territorial disputes between the two countries, and Honduras’ economic backwardness from Salvador provoked conflict. The article states that the conflict between Salvador and Honduras resulted according to various sources from 2 to 6 thousand killed civilian and military casualties on both sides; significant number of Salvadorans (according to various sources, from 60 to 130 thousand refugee) who were forcibly deported from Honduras or fled for fear of their future; Honduras and Salvador have suffered significant industrial and social damage as a result of the bombing. However, Honduras suffered more losses, as most of the hostilities took place in Honduran lands; the social situation in Salvador has deteriorated, and the government has been unable to address the economic and social needs of Salvadorans deported from Honduras; Honduras has officially closed its border with El Salvador, thus hindering the circulation of Salvador’ products in Honduras. Thus, the Central American Common Market terminated its regional economic cooperation project; under the rule of both Salvador and Honduras, the political participation of the military was strengthened.

MS-13 is a violent organization that emerged in California in the 1980s and was formed around immigrant children and refugees from El Salvador. The organization's main activity spaces are in Central American countries and the United States, but they also appear in several European countries, such as Spain and Italy. It is estimated that there are currently more than 30,000 members. MS-13 has emerged as a social concern in the United States as former President Trump attacked it as a symbol of anti-immigration policy. Trump used the violence of the MS-13 in a provocative way to set up anti-immigration policies and border barriers he was pushing for. Trump attacked the organization as a threat to national security, not just emphasizing the violence of the MS-13 to justify its anti-immigration policy. In search of new opportunities, migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border were denounced as violent illegal immigrant groups related to transnational criminal organizations. With Trump emphasizing the violence of MS-13 to achieve his political goals and labeling it a detriment to national security, MS-13 has emerged as the main focus of American society. Such attacks on MS-13 can be criticized for hiding excessive prejudice and political intentions. In other words, MS-13 was strategically selected to brand it as a transnational criminal organization that threatens American society and stimulate anti-immigration sentiment. In this article, we would like to broaden our understanding of MS-13 through the context in which MS-13 emerged as a representative gang organization. To this end, I would like to critically examine the background of the emergence of MS-13 and the evaluation that MS-13 is a transnational criminal organization. Since then, we will look at the context in which MS-13 has emerged as a social concern in relation to Trump's anti-immigration narrative.

We close Volume 29 with an issue of Torture Journal focused on measuring processes and results, a subject that has always been considered a priority for the sector. There is a dearth of studies on long-term follow-up to assess rehabilitation success. The paper by Martin Hill and Mary Lynn Everson, “Indicators likely to contribute to clinical and functional improvement among survivors of politically-sanctioned torture” is unique in the length of post-treatment follow-up, and provides an innovative approach in the measurement of rehabilitation outcomes through a structured measure of functional aspects with an instrument designed at the Kovler Center in Chicago. In addition, in the framework of the interminable debate over whether clinical categories of psychiatric classifications respond effectively to the experience of torture victims, Marie Louison Vang and colleagues present in their paper “Testing the validity of ICD-11 PTSD and CPTSD among refugees in treatment using latent class analysis,” a validation study through multivariate models to distinguish between the classic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) diagnosis and the new Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in refugee and torture survivor populations. The results show that this new diagnosis not only complements the previous one but both approaches represent an improved nosological classification and definition of the experiences of torture survivors. Kim Baranowski and collaborators, in their paper, “Experiences of gender-violence in women asylum seekers from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala” propose, supported by the evidence gathered, that types of violence experienced by these women are multi-intersectional, and that restricted categorisation of the concept of torture can ignore the experiences of asylum-seeking women, whose lives, both in their countries of origin, in transit and in the host country, are persistently affected by structural, psychological and physical violence perpetrated by state and nonstate actors alike. Finally, Kristi Rendahland Pamela Kriege Santoso offer in their contribution “Organizational development with torture rehabilitation programs: An applied perspective,” a personal, non-data-driven text representing their experience in supporting the creation of torture victim centres in different countries within the framework of the CVT’s Partners in Trauma Healing (PATH) Project.In this last issue of the journal we would like to thank all the authors that have chosen Torture Journal as the platform to share their research. In particular, we extend our thanks to those anonymous reviewers who have devoted hours and effort to the indispensable task of giving us their critical and constructive view of the journal’s articles. Without them the publication would not be possible.We believe that this issue of the Torture Journal will undoubtedly provide many elements of reflection for our readers. We hope you enjoy reading it as much as we enjoyed preparing it.Torture Journal Editorial Team

This article takes a retrospective look at legal advocacy on behalf of Central American asylum seekers, which has been influential in the development of US asylum law and in the creation of an infrastructure to address immigrants' needs. The article considers three time periods when Central Americans have been deemed to fall outside of the category of refugee: (1) the 1980s, when US administrations argued that Central Americans were economic immigrants; (2) the 1990s, when civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala came to an end; and (3) the 2000s, when some Salvadoran youths in removal proceedings have argued that they faced persecution as perceived or actual gang members. This retrospective analysis highlights the ways in which law can be creatively reinterpreted by legal actors, as well as how legal innovations carry forward traces of prior historical moments.

On remand after reversal of a prior denial of a motion to reopen deportation proceedings and a final order of deportation, petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, presented a renewed application for political asylum as a refugee under section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1158(a) (1982)) (INA or Act). The Immigration Judge found that petitioner had failed to present a prima facie case for eligibility under section 208(a) of the INA, a prerequisite to reopening his deportation proceedings for a hearing on the merits of the asylum claim, and therefore denied petitioner’s motion to reopen and issued another final order of deportation. Petitioner appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On petition for review of the BIA’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (per Winter, J.) reversed the order denying the motion to reopen, remanded the case for determination on the merits of whether petitioner is eligible to be granted political asylum, and held: that petitioner had made a prima facie case that he merits refugee status and thus consideration for political asylum on the basis of his sincere refusal to participate in actions of the Salvadoran Armed Forces condemned by the international community and the likelihood that he would be punished for his refusal to serve with those forces. Judge Murnaghan filed a concurring opinion. On January 5, 1989, the Fourth Circuit granted the Justice Department’s request for a rehearing en banc based on the Department’s position that the decision presented an issue of “exceptional importance” and could have “an enormous potential impact” on U.S. asylum law.

This study aims to examine how historical and contemporary traumas, refugee experiences, and cultural adjustment affect first-generation Salvadoran students’ identities and experiences in higher education. Thirteen Salvadoran college students completed a demographic survey and a semistructured interview. Using grounded theory methodology, three selective, 11 axials, and 36 open themes were identified. Respondents reflected on the impact of trauma. They also discussed challenges of being first generation and navigating through higher education, though reportedly conceptualizing these as symbols of hope and opportunity for their own growth. Findings demonstrate ways institutions of higher education can better support Salvadoran students.

This study explored the Youth Leadership/Peer Tutoring program at Refugee and Immigrant Transitions (RIT), a community-based non-profit organization in Northern California. It includes 12 semi-structured interviews with refugee and immigrant youth leaders. Bringing together works on Community Cultural Wealth (with the addition of Migration Capital) and Critical Refugee Studies collectively as a conceptual framework, this study highlights three themes: (a) commitment to community, family, and giving back; (b) encouraging communication and cultivating a pan-newcomer community; and (c) leadership as commitment to community and positive, collective futurities. Data support a strengths-based framework when working with refugee and immigrant youth as they transition and adjust to their new school environments and communities. All 12 participants were refugee and immigrant newcomer youth who participated as youth leaders/peer tutors in RIT’s Youth Leaders/Peer Tutoring program. Countries of origin included Burma (Karen), Bhutan, Nepal, China, and El Salvador. As scholars and practitioners in the field, we are seeing an increased need and demand for more scholarship in this area through a strengths-based lens, as evidenced by calls from educators and school/district administrators requesting support and resources. We submit this article at a time of growing numbers of immigrant and refugee youth in schools in the United States, including non-diverse school environments that are unprepared (and sometimes unwilling) to receive newcomer youth. Our hope is for this study to reveal possibilities for extending welcome and mutual support through a strengths-based lens within diverse newcomer peer learning environments.

Abstract On June 20, 1986, amid the 12-year civil war in El Salvador (1980–1992), a group of displaced Salvadorans from the northern department of Chalatenango declared San José las Flores their home. As the war between the Salvadoran army and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) intensified in rural areas, many people left to find refuge in other parts of the country. Since the FMLN had an active presence in Chalatenango, the Salvadoran military bombed this region frequently, which transformed las Flores into a ghost town by 1984. Those Salvadorans who decided to hide instead of leaving the country or even the region faced treacherous conditions as they trekked through the mountainous terrain of Chalatenango fleeing from military operations. By 1986, many of these Salvadorans emerged from their precarious living to demand their right to live in San José las Flores. More than three decades after the repopulation of the town, and more than two decades since the signing of the peace accords, residents of las Flores continue to celebrate their history, without fail, every year, bearing witness to a reenactment of the events that led to their town’s repopulation. This article examines these anniversaries, especially its 30th anniversary in 2016, to understand how the town remembers, interprets, and transforms their local history. What prompts residents of las Flores to relive these events? How is social memory and trauma transmitted to the diverse audience in attendance? What does reenactment have to do with collective memory? This article argues that the performance of the repopulation of las Flores, enacted by former guerrilla soldiers, survivors of the war, and their children and grandchildren, demonstrates how the history, memories, and values of this town are transmitted from generation to generation. In Diana Taylor’s words, they remember their collective suffering, challenges, and triumphs through both archival and embodied memory.

Resumen: La presente investigación se centra en visibilizar la situación de injusticia social y desamparo a la que se ven sometidos miles de solicitantes de protección internacional procedentes de El Salvador y Honduras. Esta denuncia de la desnaturalización del derecho de asilo en España tiene como fin último no solo analizar la violación de las cuestiones jurídicas más fundamentales en materia de protección internacional sino también plasmar recomendaciones que redunden en la mejora de las condiciones de vida de este colectivo vulnerable. La investigación plantea una metodología jurídico-social, proponiéndose interrelacionar la normativa jurídica con la realidad fáctica. De este modo, el análisis legislativo converge con la técnica de investigación cualitativa de la entrevista, capaz de favorecer una aproximación a la realidad objeto de estudio bajo la mirada de los protagonistas. Los resultados revelan una serie de disfuncionalidades alrededor del no reconocimiento por parte del Estado español de la protección internacional por motivo de persecución a manos de las pandillas, siendo el principal argumento la ausencia de elementos probatorios suficientes que acrediten la pasividad de las autoridades salvadoreñas y hondureñas frente a las organizaciones criminales reinantes en el Triángulo Norte Centroamericano. Palabras clave: refugio; migración; pandillas centroamericanas; agentes de persecución. Abstract: This research focuses on making visible the situation of social injustice and helplessness to which thousands of applicants for international protection from El Salvador and Honduras are subjected. The ultimate aim of the present denunciation of the denaturalization of the right to asylum in Spain is not only to analyse the violation of the most fundamental legal issues in the field of international protection, but also to make recommendations to improve the living conditions of this vulnerable group. The research proposes a socio-legal methodology, aiming to interrelate the legal regulations with the factual reality. In this way, the legislative analysis converges with the qualitative research technique of the in-depth interview, capable of favoring an approach to the reality under study through the eyes of the protagonists. The results reveal a series of dysfunctions surrounding the non-recognition by the Spanish State of international protection on the grounds of gangs persecution, the main argument being the absence of sufficient evidence to prove the passivity of the Salvadoran and Honduran authorities in the face of the criminal organizations that reign in the Northern Triangle of Central America. Key words: refugee; migration; Central American gangs; persecution agents.

The conference, “Migration and Violence: Lessons from Colombia to the Americas” was held in Bogotá D.C., Colombia at the Pontifi cia Universidad Javeriana on June 29, 2012. The main objective of the conference was to develop inter-disciplinary academic research in Central America and Mexico regarding the relationship between violence, particularly narco-violence, and migration. The setting in Bogotá D.C. was deliberate as the participants discussed how lessons learned from Colombia’s experience with narco-induced migration could be leveraged for the benefit of Central America and Mexico. With the participation of experts on international migration, government representatives, academics, and civil society, the conference highlighted research results and relevant intervention experience concerning this problem in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico.This article presents an analysis of the presentations given and the discussions held at the conference. It consists of four parts. The first section compares the similarities and differences regarding migration and violence in Colombia and El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico. The second section presents the major epistemological challenges emerging from research and models of intervention. The third section presents the implications of the epistemological challenges and their impact on public policy. The fourth section concludes with principal lessons from Colombia for research and intervention in the problem of violence and migration.

The specific concept of G. geckoides was initially ascertained based on a topotypical sample from Salvador, Bahia. Geographic differentiation was studied through the analysis of two meristic characters (tubercles in a paramedian row and fourth toe lamellae) and color pattern of 327 specimens from 23 localities. It is shown that the population from the southernmost locality, Mucugê, is markedly divergent in all characters studied. A Holocene refuge model is proposed to explain the pattern. A decision about the rank to be attributed to the Mucugê population is deferred until more detailed sampling is effected and molecular methods are applied.

Since the mid-1970s, tens of thousands of persons in three out of the five Central American countries have revolted against their governments or fought to repress such rebellions. These conflicts have cost more than a quarter of a million lives and created more than two million internal and external refugees. In 1979 a bloody insurrection toppled Nicaragua's Somoza regime. El Salvador's crippling civil war has escalated and reescalated but remains stalemated. In Guatemala since 1980, brutal counterinsurgency warfare, pro-regime terror, and political reform have failed to eliminate a resurgent guerrilla rebellion. Yet while these countries have rent themselves with political violence, their neighbors Honduras and Costa Rica have in general remained politically peaceful.

Abstract This article describes the testimonies of two arts and crafts collectives during the Salvadoran Civil War in the 1980s. These collectives, open to victims and refugees of the war, emerged as creative spaces during a time of significant social unrest. As participants learned to make and produce arts and crafts, these activities encouraged individual expression and allowed them to heal traumatic experiences. By describing the aspects that motivated and discouraged the involvement of participants over time, we show how the individual and collective aspects of making are important for the sustained participation of the people who engage in maker culture. We draw comparisons between the struggles of these historical movements and of current embodiments of the maker culture, in order to draw conclusions regarding how making can be a personal catalyst in the face of social hardship, the importance of economic sustainability in maker initiatives and how unjust gender dynamics take place in these spaces. The ability to compare and learn from these historical initiatives serves to unpack maker culture as a social asset that can be described beyond the mere use of digital tools and to repurpose it as a more inclusive concept that takes into account narratives from a broader range of expressions of making.

This article re-examines the US–Central American sanctu­ary movement of the 1980s.Our re-examination is motiv­ated by two factors.First, with the passage of time it is pos­sible to discern the movement’s origins in ways that could not be fully articulated while it was ongoing.We are able to show how certain relationships between the movement’s North and Central American activists were celebrated, while others were obscured due to fear for Salvadoran immigrant activists’ safety and concern about inadver­tently undermining the movement’s legitimacy.Specifically, we draw attention to the movement’s transnational nature, noting that what made it so powerful was its origin as part of a broader effort by Salvadoran revolutionaries to mobil­ize North American society to oppose US support for the Salvadoran government.Ironically, to achieve this objective Salvadoran immigrant activists had to stay quiet, become invisible, and abstain from taking certain leadership roles, while embracing identities that may have implied weak­ness or passivity, such as “refugee” or “victim.” Second, the US–Central American sanctuary movement provides powerful insight into future understandings of sanctuary as a concept and practice.The movement’s legacies extend beyond participants’ stated goals, while the movement’s transnational political and organizational focus differenti­ates it from current sanctuary practices.Thus, re-examin­ing its origins and legacies suggests that apparent similar­ities in the form of sanctuary incidents may hide underlying differences and that current sanctuary practices may also eventually have unanticipated consequences.

A heated debate has arisen over U.S. policy toward the large number of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who have come to the United States in recent years. The question is whether the U.S. government should continue to deport these individuals or should offer them some special protection. The key point of debate is the motivation of the émigrés. Officials of the U.S. Department of State and the Department of Justice have maintained that Salvadorans and Guatemalans who come here are merely economic migrants in search of a better life, and that as such, they are ineligible for any special treatment under U.S. immigration law. According to representatives of the Reagan administration, the fact that many Central Americans pass through Mexico on their way to the United States is evidence of their economic motivations.

The Nile hippopotamus is a semi-aquatic mammal with populations that have decreased in the last 10 years, which is why it has been placed in CITES Appendix II, and as vulnerable on the IUCN red list. The artificial breeding of hippos is poorly documented, possibly due to the complexity that this species presents. The Wild Refuge Foundation (FURESA) located in El Salvador, C.A. has kept a pair of Nile hippos (Hippopotamus amphibius) in its facilities. Both specimens have enjoyed good health and have procreated three pups, which died between 3 and 5 days after birth, considering little maternal attention as the main cause of deaths. Due to the above situations, artificial breeding was decided for this occasion. Housing conditions, medical history, feeding techniques and diet, which were used in this breeding, are described.

Durante la última media década se han producido salidas masivas de refugiados procedentes del Triángulo Norte de América Central, es decir, de El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras. Dichas salidas surgen de una serie de procesos históricos perversos, que se refuerzan mutuamente: la implementación profundamente defectuosa de acuerdos de paz igualmente defectuosos que puso fin a las guerras civiles de la región en la década de 1990; la búsqueda de la privatización neoliberal y las políticas económicas «amigables al mercado» que socavan el avance hacia una paz social sostenible; los acuerdos comerciales que infligieron un gran daño a la agricultura campesina; la búsqueda de inversión extranjera en sectores extractivos que desplazaron a pueblos rurales e indígenas y las políticas de las principales instituciones internacionales y del gobierno de Estados Unidos en particular, que profundizaron todas estas tendencias perversas que dejaron a la gente sin medios de vida. Las bandas criminales y la violencia vinculadas al narcotráfico son manifestaciones de estos procesos subyacentes que expulsan a las personas de la región en oleadas de «migración de supervivencia» forzada. The past half decade of massive refugee outflows from the Northern Triangle of Central America –that is, from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras– emerge from a number of perverse and mutually reinforcing historical processes: the deeply flawed implementation of equally flawed peace accords that ended the region’s civil wars in the 1990s; the pursuit of neoliberal privatization and «market-friendly» economic policies that undercut advance toward sustainable social peace, including trade agreements that inflicted great damage to peasant agricultura; the pursuit of foreign investment in extractive sectors that displaced rural and indigenous peoples, and the policies of the major international institutions, and of the United States government in particular, which deepened all of these perverse trends that left people without livelihoods. The gang and criminal violence linked to the narcotics trade are manifestations of these underlying processes that expel people from the region in waves of forced «survival migration».

Introducción: En 2014, la llegada a Estados Unidos de decenas de miles de menores no acompañados (en adelante, MeNAS) desde de El Salvador, Honduras y Guatemala reveló una crisis humanitaria de grandes proporciones resultado de la violencia de los cárteles de las drogas, las pandillas, y en la que también participan agentes del Estado. Este artículo analiza el flujo de menores no acompañados centroamericanos como una crisis humanitaria prolongada y silenciosa que los países involucrados parecen no reconocer. Ante la sólida evidencia que apunta a la violencia como factor clave del desplamiento forzado de miles de MeNAS, se examina como han respondido México y Estados Unidos.Método: La metodología está basada en una revisión de las encuestas aplicadas a menores para identificar las razones por las que dejan sus países (ACNUR, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Jones & Podkul, 2012; Kennedy, 2014); se revisan también estudios sobre la violencia en la región, en particular el índice de homicidios violentos. Se analiza la relación entre violencia y migración forzada de menores no acompañados que estarían en condición de recibir protección, examinanando la brecha existente entre los instrumentos jurídicos en torno al refugio y las políticas con las México y Estados Unidos han respondido a su llegada.Resultados: La situación de violencia generalizada en los países del Triángulo Norte Centroaméricano (TNCA) exhibe las características de una emergencia humanitaria cuya dimensión migratoria está vinculada al desplazamiento forzado de menores no acompañados. Dicha emergencia no ha sido reconocida por los países involucrados, lo que entre otras cosas tiene como consecuencia que los menores que huyen de la violencia no sean atendidos con medidas congruentes con el régimen internacional de protección a refugiados.Discusión o Conclusión: México y Estados Unidos han enfrentado la crisis de menores no acompañados centroamericanos con una serie de medidas que, lejos de atender su dimensión humanitaria, han resultado en la deportación masiva de muchos menores que serían elegibles para recibir asilo y que al retonar a su país corren riesgos que amenazan su vida. Así, el régimen de protección internacional a refugiados no está siendo adecuadamente aplicado adecuadamente. Introduction: In 2014, the arrival in the United States of tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors (UAM) from of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala revealed a major humanitarian crisis resulting from the violence of drug cartels, gangs, and which also involved state agents. This paper analyzes the flow of UAM as a long and silent humanitarian crisis that the countries involved do not seem to recognize. Given the strong evidence pointing to violence as a key factor forced displacement of thousands of UAM, the paper examines how Mexico and the United States have responded to the crisis. Method: The methodology is based on a review of the most influencial surveys on the reasons why children leave their countries (Human Rights Watch, 2016; Jones & Podkul, 2012; Kennedy, 2014; UNHCR, 2014); as well as documenting violence in the region, particularly the rate of violent killings to explore the relationship between violence and forced migration of UAM who would be in condition to receive protection, identifying the gap between the legal instruments of the refugee regime, and the policies of Mexico and the U.S. to responded to the situation.Results: The generalized violence in the Central American Northern Triangle (CANT) countries displays the characteristics of a humanitarian emergency which migratory dimension is linked to the forced displacement of UAM. Such emergency has not been recognized by the countries involved having as a consequence, among other things, that minors fleeing criminal violence have not been subjects of measures which are consistent with the international refugee protection regime.Conclusion: Mexico and the United States have responded to the arrival of UAM with a series of measures that, far from addressing the humanitarian dimensión of the crisis, have resulted in the mass deportation of many minors who would be eligible for asylum. To mamy of these minors, returning to their country poses life-threatening risks. Thus, the international regime of refugee protection is not being properly implemented.