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1
Santos, Gilberto Santiago Silva, Michel de Matos Tosta, and Odilanei Morais Dos Santos. "THE INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY ON PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRATS." Rio Oil and Gas Expo and Conference 22, no. 2022 (September 26, 2022): 367–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.48072/2525-7579.rog.2022.367.
Повний текст джерела
2
Sambharakreshna, Yudhanta. "Shariah Financing Model on Salt Mini Plant UTM in Order to Increase Production and Income Numbers." JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES 05, no. 08 (August 26, 2022): 2406–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.47191/jefms/v5-i8-34.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The purpose of this study is to provide an alternative model of Islamic financing to the salt business, namely the Mini Plant of Salt UTM. The existence of a shariah financing system that applies the principle of profit sharing allows the Mini Plant of Salt UTM and the publick to access capital through shariah financial institutions and also gain knowledge and reference in accessing capital to fund salt production activities. Data collection techniques were carried out using direct observation and interviews with the manager of the Mini Plant of Salt UTM, the Padelegan village apparatus, and the Islamic financial institution BMT NU Mandiri and BMT Sidogiri Pamekasan branch. The results of data analysis show that the Mini Plant of Salt UTM has developed a salt innovation that has been prototyped into food salt and non-food salt. Other research results found that the activities carried out by the UTM Salt Mini Plant until now have focused on research activities regarding salt. However, the Mini Plant of Salt UTM has not carried out salt processing on the available salt ponds land in the Padegelan village, Pademawu Pamekasan so that it has not been able to generate salt production and income for the Mini Plant of Salt UTM. The Mini Plant of Salt UTM has capital constraints in carrying out salt processing where the source of funds only comes from the University's DIPA. In an effort to overcome the funding problem, the Mini Plant of Salt UTM can use an alternative sharia financing with a mudharabah contract. This contract applies the concept of profit sharing to distribute profits. The provisions of sharia financing with mudharabah contracts can be implemented if the customer already has business activities that result in buying and selling transactions (current production activities)
3
Xu, Jiayang, Jian Cao, Sanjay Kumar, and Sisi Wu. "Optimal government and manufacturer incentive contracts for green production with asymmetric information." PLOS ONE 18, no. 8 (August 9, 2023): e0289639. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289639.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Governments commonly utilize subsidy policy to incentivize manufacturers to produce green products, promoting sustainable development. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, some manufacturers may dishonestly misrepresent the green degree of their products to secure higher subsidies. This study examines different incentive contracts between the government and a green product manufacturer who keeps private information of a product’s green-degree in a principal-agent model. Lump-sum transfer and fixed- and flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contracts are proposed to investigate screening and improving green-degree issues. To further enhance the flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contract, we construct a non-linear coordinated contract based on the Nash bargaining solution. The revelation principle and Nash bargaining are performed for comparison and analysis of the contracts. We find that the lump-sum contract reveals true green-degree information but fails to impel manufacturers to improve product’s green-degree in developing countries where green product development is in initial stages. In contrast, both fixed- and flexible- proportion benefit-sharing contracts are effective in reveling and enhancing green-degree. The non-linear coordination contract optimizes resource allocation and achieves Pareto improvement. An applied case study for inkjet printer operations and numerical experiments corroborate our model findings.
4
Ariyon, Muhammad, Sukendi Sukendi, Ridwan Manda Putra, Husnul Kausarian, and Bella Santika. "Comparison of oil and gas fiscal policies in Southeast Asian Countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam." BIO Web of Conferences 70 (2023): 06007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/bioconf/20237006007.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study's objective was to examine the comparison of petroleum management policies in accordance with the concession contract system and production sharing contract system in several countries in the Southeast Asia region. In contrast to existing research, this comparison focuses more on the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, which are developing countries producing petroleum in the Southeast Asia region. Moreover, this comparative research will be used to identify the kind of oil and gas contract that will yield the highest profits for Indonesia. Since Indonesia is a developing nation that is an archipelago, it depends heavily on its oil and gas resources for foreign exchange, necessitating the creation of suitable oil and gas management laws. Comparison of oil and gas policies undertaken through interviews with oil and gas law experts and a literature review of the history of the petroleum management policies in each country. The study's findings indicate that production sharing contracts are more profitable to implement in developing maritime countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam compared to the concession system. This is due to the implementation of a production sharing contract system in the state has a strong position towards contractors. Apart from that, the provisions in the Production Sharing Contract also require the use of domestic labor and goods. This will definitely increase the multiplier effect and technology transfer so that Indonesia is expected to be able to compete with other countries.
5
Husna TR, Cut Asmaul. "Implikasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Terhadap Regulasi Production Sharing Contract." Jurnal Konstitusi 9, no. 4 (May 20, 2016): 597. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk941.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
After the Constitutional Court ruling has implications for regulatory 36/ PUU-X/2012 production sharing contract. Relationship between BP Migas (state) with the Business Entity or Permanent Establishment has put the state’s position and business entities or permanent establishments that manage oil and gas in an equal position. As a result, the state lost discretion to make regulations for the benefit of the people, but the state, as a representation of the people in the control of natural resources should have the discretion to make rules that benefit the overall prosperity of the people. Some of the conditions are far from optimal, Indonesian oil and gas industry is still heavily dependent on foreign domination. Associated with the conditions present in Aceh, the amount of funding for oil and gas shares, did not show a decrease in the poverty rate
6
Ola, Victor D., Azubuike H. Amadi, Raphael Okeke, and Paul O. Okafor. "Comparative Analysis of Nigeria and Malaysia’s Production Sharing Contract (PSC)." European Journal of Business and Management Research 6, no. 1 (January 7, 2021): 11–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2021.6.1.678.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The oil and gas industry is governed by policies with the aim of smoothening the business relationship between the Government, the International Oil Companies (IOC’s) and the Host communities. Different oil producing countries have their own laws governing petroleum activities and these laws vary from country to country based on the B-PEST factors which are Biological, Political, Environmental, Social and Technology. However, reserve size and oil type can also influence petroleum laws. Countries like Nigeria relies strongly on petroleum bills such as the PIB in which this research will be analyzing the Production Sharing Contract (PSC) which is a significant subset of the PIB. Comparison between the existing PSC of Malaysia and that of Nigeria was captured in this research and the analysis of the PSC was done based on the Government Take, National Oil Company (NOC) and the Contractor’s benefits. 26.67% and 56.58% recovery cost, 28.67% and 26.28% Government revenue, 23.14% and 7.64% NOC share, 21.52% and 9.50% Contractor share of revenue per barrel was arrived at for Malaysia and Nigeria respectively, showing that the Malaysian PSC model yields more income to the country when compared to that of Nigeria without necessarily short-changing the contractors or the IOCs. Finally, the reasons behind these deficits were highlighted and recommendations made to improve the PSC and benefits for all parties to the contractual agreements.
7
Romadhon, Topan Meiza. "PENGATURAN PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT DALAM UNDANG-UNDANG MINYAK DAN GAS." JURNAL HUKUM IUS QUIA IUSTUM 16, no. 1 (2009): 88–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.20885/iustum.vol16.iss1.art6.
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Susanti, Alifi Tria, Ahmad Roziq, and Whedy Prasetyo. "Muzara'ah Contract Agricultural Accounting Model." IQTISHODUNA: Jurnal Ekonomi Islam 12, no. 1 (April 1, 2023): 123–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.54471/iqtishoduna.v12i1.1830.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Profit sharing in the agricultural sector has been known for a long time, so it applies from generation to generation. Profit sharing is found in several areas, including Lumajang Regency, Tekung District which according to statistical data has a land area of 1,878.34 hectares and the majority of commodities are rice plants up to 4,342 hectares, but the number of profit sharing practices is not matched by regulations on accounting required by owners and land managers in being responsible for the distribution of business results. The purpose of this study is to analyze the agricultural production sharing system for the muzara'ah contract and produce an accounting model for the muzara'ah contract. The research method uses qualitative methods in general and phenomenology in particular. The results of this study prove that the practice of profit sharing practiced by the owners and managers of rice fields is a muzara'ah contract whose recording is done by simple recording. The accounting model produced in this study is an income statement, cash flow and profit sharing principle in accordance with the acknowledgment and muzara'ah contract.
9
Chu, Leon Yang, and David E. M. Sappington. "Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts." American Economic Review 97, no. 1 (February 1, 2007): 419–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.419.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
We extend William Rogerson's (2003) intriguing analysis of simple procurement contracts to settings where the supplier's innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly. Although the simple contract that Rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely, it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely. We show that in all settings under consideration, a simple pair of contracts – one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement – can always secure more than 73 percent of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract. (JEL D86)
10
Arifin, Kasman, and Dina Hidayat. "COST RECOVERY ANALYSIS IN PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT IN UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY (STUDY ON GAS UPSTREAM INDUSTRIES INDONESIA)." Dinasti International Journal of Economics, Finance & Accounting 1, no. 6 (February 3, 2021): 1023–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.38035/dijefa.v1i6.356.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study aims to: 1) analyze empirically and test the effect of cost recovery in the Production Sharing Contract (Oil and Gas Production Sharing). 2) empirically analyze and test the effect of cost recovery in the upstream Oil and Gas Industry on State Revenues. The unit of analysis of this research is the upstream oil and gas industry managed by the Indonesian government with a Production Sharing Contract system with 44 companies or contract operator cooperatives. The population includes those who work as operators of cooperation contract contractors and SKK MIGAS with 62 manager levels, 51 professionals and 18 university researchers. And the researchers also used secondary data in SKK MIGAS in the 1984-20019 period. This research uses a qualitative approach, and the analysis of the data used is descriptive analysis, because the data analysis is done not to accept or reject hypotheses, but in the form of descriptions of observed symptoms, which are not always in the form of numbers or coefficients between variables . However, the emphasis is not on hypothesis testing, but on efforts to answer research questions through formal and argumentative ways. The results of the study indicate that there is a relation between the Cost Recovery component and the terminology in the Production Sharing Contract in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry in Indonesia . By placing the right cost post on cost recovery will be able to reduce production costs from the Cooperation Contract Contractor (KKKS).
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Kinney, Brent D. "Petroleum Laws and Model Contracting Terms – Production Sharing in China." Energy Exploration & Exploitation 13, no. 5 (October 1995): 461–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014459879501300505.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Jurisdiction for China's petroleum administration has been separated with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) vested with exclusive rights in the on-shore and China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) given exclusive jurisdiction off-shore. Both of these state companies have published model production sharing contracts which are similar in all material respects but which differ from the usual production sharing contract by incorporating taxation and royalty obligations in addition to production sharing arrangements in one document.
12
Ma, Weimin, Ranran Zhang, and Shiwei Chai. "What Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy and Cooperation Contract." Sustainability 11, no. 20 (October 10, 2019): 5584. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11205584.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Green innovation, implemented by enterprises, contributes to sustainable development and environmental protection. However, because of the high cost and high risk of green innovation, enterprises are reluctant to step into green innovation activities in practice. Government subsidies are conducive to promoting green innovation in enterprises. To investigate firms’ preferences for green innovation, we consider a three-player game in a supply chain where a government offers subsidies (price, innovation, or both subsidies) to a manufacturer and a retailer, while the latter two players cooperate with each other through contracts (revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts). By exploring the impacts of government subsidies and cooperative contracts on the optimal level of green innovation efforts and profits of participants, we find that: (1) for green innovation that leads to increased production costs, the government should subsidize both the retailer and the manufacturer to improve the level of green innovation; (2) the revenue-sharing contract is more effective than the cost-sharing contract under the premise of government subsidies; and (3) the revenue-sharing ratio decreases in production and innovation costs, while the cost-sharing ratio increases in these two costs.
13
Sugiyartomo, Fakharsyah Hanif. "The Legality of Oil & Gas Production Sharing Contract Gross Split Scheme." Indonesian Journal of Energy 2, no. 1 (February 28, 2019): 29–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.33116/ije.v2i1.33.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
As an oil producing nation, Indonesia embodied its authority to manage its oil resources through article 33 paragraphs 3 of The Republic of Indonesia Constitution 1945. Regarding the article, this means that the state has the authority to manage Indonesian natural resources, directly or indirectly, through other public and/or private institutions and the profit of such activity shall be for the benefit of the people. This granted the state to appoint other institution, including a National/International Oil Company (NOC/IOC), to manage the exploration and production of oil, as that particular activity is regarded as a high risk and high capital business. In order to do so, according to Law no. 22 2001, the state may appoint a NOC/IOC through a production sharing contract. In this research, it is founded that the regulation that governed a production sharing contract with the gross split mechanism—Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 8 2017 jo. Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources No. 52 2017—does not have a strong legal basis. In overall, the management of oil and gas through the gross split mechanism does not gives a maximum benefit for the state, and does not attract the IOC/NOC interest to explore and produce oil and gas in Indonesia. Therefore, in this paper, the reviewing of oil and gas management through a gross split mechanism is recommended.
Keywords: management, gross split scheme, income taxes
14
Okoro, Emmanuel E., Joseph Echendu, Lawrence U. Okoye, Samuel E. Sanni, Kale B. Orodu, and Rita I. Okoro. "NIGERIA DEEP OFFSHORE INLAND BASIN PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT ACTS: EVALUATING CONTRACTOR’S TAKE." International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 11, no. 4 (June 8, 2021): 97–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.11244.
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15
Liu, Mingming, Zhen Wang, Lin Zhao, Yanni Pan, and Fei Xiao. "Production sharing contract: An analysis based on an oil price stochastic process." Petroleum Science 9, no. 3 (August 17, 2012): 408–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12182-012-0225-6.
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16
Yang, Honglin, and Jiawu Peng. "Coordinating a fresh-product supply chain with demand information updating: Hema Fresh O2O platform." RAIRO - Operations Research 55, no. 1 (January 2021): 285–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2021024.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Motivated by Hema Fresh’s new-retail case, we study the coordination of a two-echelon fresh-product supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single retailer. Due to a long production lead time, the supplier has to make production decision in advance based on early demand information. The market demand can be updated during the supplier’s production lead time. Hence, the retailer would make order decision according to the latest demand information. Incorporating risk-sharing mechanism of overproduction and overstock, we propose a novel bi-directional risk-sharing contract to coordinate such a supply chain with demand information updating. We construct a two-stage optimization model in which the supplier first decides production quantity, and then the retailer decides final order quantity not exceeding the supplier’s initial production. In both the centralized and decentralized systems, we analytically derive the unique equilibrium of production and order decisions in a Stackelberg supplier-led game. We prove that the proposed contract can realize supply chain perfect coordination and explore how the proposed contract affects the members’ decisions. The theoretical results show that, by turning the risk-sharing proportions, the supply chain profit can be arbitrarily split between the members, which is a desired property for supply chain coordination. Compared with the single risk-sharing contract, the proposed contract results in a greater supply chain profit and achieves Pareto improvement for both members. Furthermore, we also explore how the risk preference and negotiating power affect the contract selection and the additional profit allocation of the supply chain. Numerical examples are presented to verify our theoretical results.
17
Antoñanzas, Fernando, Carmelo Juárez-Castelló, and Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas. "Risk-Sharing Agreements in Pharmaceutical Markets." Studies of Applied Economics 31, no. 2 (March 29, 2020): 359. http://dx.doi.org/10.25115/eea.v31i2.3331.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this article, we model the relationship between a health authority and a pharmaceutical firm when the real efficacy of the drug manufactured by the firm is uncertain. The ex-ante information on the efficacy of the new drug is provided by the outcomes of a clinical trial. We focus on two types of contracts. On the one hand, the health authority can set a unit price regardless of the ex-post real effectiveness of the drug (traditional contract, i.e. no risk sharing). Alternatively, the health authority can make the payments contingent upon the observed ex-post effectiveness (risksharing contract). The optimal contract depends on the trade-off between the monitoring costs, the marginal production cost and the health cost derived from treatment failure. When the efficacy of the drug in the clinical trial is relatively high, a traditional contract is optimal for relatively low marginal costs. When the efficacy in the clinical trial is relatively low, the health authority always prefers to condition the payments upon the effectiveness outcomes.
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Chen, Xu, Xiaojun Wang, Xiaoqiang Zhu, and Joseph Amankwah-Amoah. "To share or withhold? Contract negotiation in buyer–supplier–supplier triads." Industrial Management & Data Systems 120, no. 1 (November 26, 2019): 98–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/imds-07-2019-0374.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose This paper seeks to fill the literature gap that lacks of exploring negotiation strategy with competing partners under asymmetric production-cost information. The purpose of this paper is to examine firms’ optimal contract negotiation strategies in buyer–supplier–supplier triads where there are concurrent negotiations between the retailer and two competing manufacturers. Design/methodology/approach The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain, in which the retailer has the option of segmented or unified negotiation policy, whereas the two competing manufacturers can withhold or share production cost information in the negotiation. Based on game theory, the authors derive the manufacturers’ optimal wholesale prices and the retailer’s optimal retail prices with eight possible scenarios. Optimal strategic choices and operational decisions are then explored through the comparative analysis of equilibriums of eight possible scenarios. Findings The authors find that the retailer will adopt different negotiation strategies depending on manufacturers’ decisions on sharing or withholding their production-cost information. When both manufacturers share their production-cost information, the retailer will adopt a unified negotiation policy. The high-efficiency manufacturer should adopt the same information-sharing strategy as the low-efficiency manufacturer in order to gain more profit. Originality/value The modelling helps to bring further clarity in supply chain contract negotiation by offering a conceptual framework to enhance our understanding of the effects of information-sharing strategy and negotiation policy in the negotiation process form the perspectives of all engaging parties. Managerial insights derived from the research will enable retailers and manufacturers to make informed and better strategic and operational decisions to improve market competitiveness.
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Li, Guo, Lun Ran, Xiaohang Yue, and Zhaohua Wang. "Dynamic Pricing and Supply Coordination with Reimbursement Contract under Random Yield and Demand." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2013 (2013): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/631232.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper investigates the dynamic pricing and supply chain coordination in a decentralized system that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, in which both the market demand and production yield are stochastic. We show that the centralized expected profit is jointly concave in the production quantity and order quantity when the price is ex-ante selected. We also derive the equilibrium strategies in the decentralized system and prove that the entire profit of supply chain is inevitably lower than that under centralized system. Based on this, we propose a reimbursement contract to coordinate the decentralized supply chain so as to achieve the maximized profit. It is worth mentioning that, under reimbursement contract, the equilibrium production and order quantities are irrelevant to the manufacturer's risk sharing coefficient but are only determined by the supplier’s risk sharing coefficient.
20
Intaniasari, Kirana. "Gross Split Contract Framework Regulation on the Caring for People." BESTUUR 8, no. 2 (July 30, 2020): 96. http://dx.doi.org/10.20961/bestuur.v8i2.43141.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p>This study aims to determine the model of oil and gas governance in Indonesia in terms of the interests of the State to protect natural resources that should be controlled for maximum use for the prosperity of the people. This study is based on the results of normative legal studies that are descriptive. The type of data used is secondary data obtained from literature study data collection techniques, which are then analyzed by carrying out systematic interpretation of the law. Systematic means, making a classification of written legal materials, to facilitate the work of analysis and construction. The results of this study show that oil and gas management arrangements began in the Dutch colonial period and continue to change with the times up to now, specifically the regulation of upstream oil and gas. Upstream oil and gas management has changed several times, namely the Concession system, the Contract of Work system, Production Sharing Contract (PSC) and finally the Gross Split Production Sharing Contract. The emergence of Gross Split aims to improve the PSC system and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of oil and gas production sharing patterns. Even though Gross Split still has weaknesses, but when compared to the previous system, Gross Split is more in line with the country's goal of being as broad as possible for the people.</p><p> </p><p><strong> </strong><strong>Keywords:</strong> Mining; Gross Split; Welfare State.</p>
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Pramita, Dira Asri, Nunung Kusnadi, and Harianto Harianto. "EFISIENSI TEKNIS USAHA TERNAK AYAM BROILER POLA KEMITRAAN DI KABUPATEN LIMAPULUH KOTA." Jurnal Agribisnis Indonesia 5, no. 1 (February 14, 2018): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.29244/jai.2017.5.1.1-10.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<em>Due to the high cost of investment in broiler production and the risk involved, various types of lease arrangement in broiler production exist in Indonesia. Two of the best known arrangement include the contract system and the informal profit sharing system. The difference in these two types of arrangement lies in the degree of cooperation which influence their technical efficiency. This study aims to measure the technical efficiencies of broiler farms with the contract system and the profit sharing system. This study also analyzed the basic determinants of the technical efficiency, as well as the socio-economic variables that affect business performance. Cross section data was collected from Limapuluh Kota district between July to September 2015. The purposive sampling technique was used to identify 87 farmers of which 50 were involved in the contract system arrangement while 37 were involved in the profit sharing arrangement. The data was analyzed using the Cobb-Douglas Stochastic Production Frontier. The results showed that the type of lease arrangement affects the level of technical efficiency. When compared, the technical efficiency of contract system arrangement was higher than that of the informal profit sharing arrangement. The age and experience of broiler farmers significantly influenced the level of technical efficiency. However, while age was positive experience was negative.</em>
22
Hassan, Shafiqul, Yusuff Jelili Amuda, Mohsin Dhali, and Saghir Munir Mehar. "Contract Structure of Production Sharing Agreement by International Oil Company in Exploration of Petroleum Resources in Developing Countries." International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 13, no. 3 (May 17, 2023): 7–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.14142.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Presently, there is little focus on the contractual agreement, particularly on the production sharing agreement by the International Oil Companies in the exploration of petroleum resources of developing countries. The primary objective of this paper is to critically explore the contract structure of production-sharing agreements by International Oil Companies in the exploration and development of petroleum resources in developing countries. Content analysis was used as the methodology of the study after examining several literatures. The findings indicate that the contract structure of the production sharing agreement (PSA) between National Oil Companies (NOC) and International Oil Companies (IOC) plays a significant role in the cost and risk of exploration and development of oil. In addition, it is noted that the joint committee of the NOC and IOC plays a paramount role in monitoring the operations of PSA between the NOC and IOC. Hence, from the gross oil production, the NOC gets its share as profit while IOC gets its share income tax. As an instrument of contract structure in the oil and gas sector, PSA needs further entrenchment between IOC and NOC to avoid likely issues that can emanate between the two parties in the face of current developments.
23
Kurniawan, Faizal. "BENTUK PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM TERHADAP KEKAYAAN MINYAK DAN GAS BUMI SEBAGAI ASET NEGARA MELALUI INSTRUMEN KONTRAK." Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan 2, no. 3 (April 23, 2018): 471. http://dx.doi.org/10.25216/jhp.2.3.2013.471-492.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
State has the power to manage natural resources for the sake of social justice, the general welfare and are used as much as possible the greatest benefit for the greatest welfare of people. Contract law is the main instrument used to protect the state assets including oil and gas. Production Sharing Contract as a legal safeguard for oil and gas, is a fundamental pillar in the effort and utilization management activities of oil and gas. In the contracts involving the Government, called government contract, there is a unique characteristic which is not entirely subject to private law. In principle, the state should not be harmed, called as state immunity. This principle also applies universally in the interest of protecting the state assets. Keywords: Production Sharing Contract, Government Contract, State Immunity, Protection of State Assets Clause.
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Tambunan, Maria R. U. D., and Gabriel Muara Thobias Silalahi. "Article: Resolving Conflicts Between Production Sharing Contracts and Tax Treaties in Indonesia." Intertax 52, Issue 2 (February 1, 2024): 154–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/taxi2024022.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article discusses the uncertain dispute settlement for a conflict resulting from applying a reduced rate stipulated in a tax treaty or a domestic withholding tax rate agreed to in a production sharing contract (PSC) on branch profit tax (BPT) in Indonesia. The contractor, the permanent establishment of a non-resident entity in Indonesia, interpreted that a reduced rate shall apply whereas the Indonesian tax authority adhered to applying the prevailing domestic withholding tax rate at the time that the PSC was signed. The ambiguousness between the tax treaty and the PSC led the disputed entity to choose litigation as the primary alternative of dispute settlement even though the tax treaty facilitates resolving the problem through a mutual agreement procedure (MAP) or another possible dispute resolution. Further, Indonesian civil law does not implement the jurisprudence. The dispute will continue if renegotiation is not reached. To reduce the chance of a potential dispute in the future, a stabilization clause to accommodate the change of the regulation during the period of the contract has been included, however, it only applies to the latest version of the PSC. Tax treaty, production sharing contract, branch profit tax
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Rahayu, Sang Ayu Putu. "PRINSIP HUKUM DALAM KONTRAK KERJASAMA KEGIATAN USAHA HULU MINYAK DAN GAS BUMI." Yuridika 32, no. 2 (August 24, 2017): 333. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/ydk.v32i2.4774.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The main issues elaborated in this legal research are the legal principles of tender during a pre-contractual stage and the principles of contract law on Cooperation Contract known as Production Sharing Contract (PSC) based on Laws Number 22 Of 2001 Concerning Oil and Gas. The type of this research is normative study and the approach of this research are conceptual approach, statute approach, and case approach. There are two results in this research. Firstly, in the process of tender during a pre-contractual stage of Cooperation Contract, the principles of responsive competition, transparency and the principle of accountability must be applied. The principle of responsive competition is the most important to be implemented since the tender process produces a competition to get a working area. In addition, the tender process of Cooperation Contract is also related to the principles of transparency and accountability that plays to protectthe interests ofthe state and to get a competent contractor.Secondly, in formation and performance of the Cooperation Contract, the principle of proportionality sharing should be emphasized, especially when formulating the proportion of production sharing. Cooperation Contract is also related to the principle of transparency that plays an important role on state revenues from the upstream oil and gas business activities, because a transparent process will result in optimal outcomes. Finally, in Cooperation Contract, the principles of responsive competition, transparency, accountability, and the principle of proportionality sharing should be clearly stated in the rules and legal norms.
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Hernandoko, Andrey, and Mochammad Najib Imanullah. "IMPLIKASI BERUBAHNYA KONTRAK BAGI HASIL (PRODUCT SHARING CONTRACT) KE KONTRAK BAGI HASIL GROSS SPLIT TERHADAP INVESTASI MINYAK DAN GAS BUMI DI INDONESIA." Jurnal Privat Law 6, no. 2 (October 2, 2018): 160. http://dx.doi.org/10.20961/privat.v6i2.24760.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p>Abstract<br />This study is aimed to know the differences between Product Sharing Contract and Gross Split along with the effects that appear in investment sector on the change of Product Sharing Contract to Gross Split. This study is based on the result of normative law study which has descriptive characteristic. The kind of data which was used was secondary data which was obtained by using literature review data collecting technique, the next was analyzed by doing law interpretation systematically. Systematic means by making classifications toward those written law materials to ease analysis and construction works. The results of this study showed the differences between Production Sharing Contract and Gross Split were that in Gross split has no longer familiar with cost recovery and base split in gross split were 57%:43% for oil production and 52%:48% for natural gas production. Moreover, in Gross split there was no First Tranche Petroleum and inside Gross Split there were variable components and progressive components to the additional of contractor split. Beside that, the authority of SKK Migas in the post implementation of Gross Split was changed in their orientations into focusing on exploration production, security, work safety, domestic component,even human resources matter. The second, Gross Split could give and increase oil and gas investmentclimate in Indonesia because it was more profitable than PSC. This was showed from Internal Rate of Return (IRR) Gross Split which bigger than PSC (Gross Split 28,8%, PSC 24,8%) if the contractor is efficient in operating and managing faster time than Production Sharing Contract, but the government needs to make a rule in Gross Split become Government Regulations and make easier the permission so that it can optimize oil and gas investment situation in Indonesia.</p><p>Key words: product sharing contract; gross split; implication; investment.</p><p>Abstrak<br />Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui perbedaan antara Kontrak Bagi Hasil (Product Sharing Contract) dan Kontrak Bagi Hasil Gross Split serta akibat yang ditimbulkan di bidang investasi atas perubahan Kontrak Bagi Hasil (Product Sharing Contract) ke Kontrak Bagi Hasil Gross Split. Kajian ini didasarkan atas hasil kajian hukum normatif yang bersifat deskriptif. Jenis data yang digunakan berupa data sekunder yang diperoleh teknik pengumpulan data studi pustaka, yang selanjutnya dianalisis dengan melaksanakan penafsiran hukum secara sistematis. Sistemasi berarti, membuat klasifikasi terhadap bahan-bahan hukum tertulis tersebut, untuk memudahkan kerjaan analisa dan konstruksi. Hasil dari kajian ini menunjukkan perbedaan antara Production Sharing Contract dengan Gross Split adalah dalam Gross Split sudah tidak mengenal cost recovery dan base split dalam gross split adalah 57%:43% untuk produksi minyak dan 52%:48% untuk produksi gas bumi. Selain itu di dalam Gross Split sudah tidak ada lagi First Tranche Petroleum, dan di dalam Gross Split terdapat komponen variabel dan komponen progresif untuk tambahan split kontraktor. Selain itu kewenangan SKK Migas pasca penerapan Gross Split berubah orientasinya menjadi fokus pada produksi eksplorasi, keamanan, dan keselamatan kerja, Tingkat Komponen Dalam Negeri (TKDN), hingga persoalan sumber daya manusia. Yang kedua, Gross Split dapat memberikan iklim investasi migas di Indonesia meningkat karena lebih menguntungkan dari PSC. Hal ini terlihat dari Internal Rate of Return (IRR) Gross Split yang lebih besar yakni sebesar 28,8% daripada PSC yang hanya 24,8% jika kontraktor dapat efisien dalam beroperasi dan efisiensi waktu yang <br />lebih cepat daripada Production Sharing Contract, namun pemerintah perlu membuat aturan Gross Split menjadi Peraturan Pemerintah dan lebih mempermudah perizinan agar dapat mengoptimalkan suasana investasi migas di Indonesia.</p><p>Kata Kunci: kontrak bagi hasil; kontrak bagi hasil gross split; implikasi; investasi.</p>
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Li, Xiaoying, and Qinghua Zhu. "Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information." Sustainability 12, no. 5 (March 9, 2020): 2119. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12052119.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In order to improve green performance and achieve sustainability goals, food companies see the need to adopt green supply chain management. However, ensuring a green supply is a tough task since food companies do not always have full information of their suppliers’ efforts in improving their green performance. This information asymmetry issue will lead the food producers to make poor decisions and cause a profit loss. Therefore, to fill this research gap, this study investigates a two-stage supply chain, which consists of one dominated food producer and a food supplier who has private knowledge of its green food material producing (GFMP) cost. To figure out how green performance is the major parameter that influences the decision-making of supply chain members under information asymmetry, this study first expands demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on the green degree of the food products and associated consumer acceptance. It is found that under certain conditions, information sharing will improve the supplier’s green performance and increase the food producer’s profit. This study then presents the prerequisite of green cost information sharing by the food supplier. Furthermore, a newly designed menu of contracts, which combine the wholesale price contract and cost sharing contract, is proposed for the asymmetric information case to incentivize the food supplier to disclose the green effort information and improve the environmental and economic performance of the food supply chain. Numerical experiments are conducted through a case analysis to illustrate and validate the proposed models.
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Okoro, Emmanuel E., Lawrence U. Okoye, Ikechukwu S. Okafor, Tamunotonjo Obomanu, and Ngozi Adeleye. "IMPACT OF PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT PRICE SLIDING ROYALTY: THE CASE OF NIGERIA’S DEEPWATER OPERATION." International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy 11, no. 3 (April 10, 2021): 261–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.10837.
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Kamil, Melda. "Production Sharing Contract sebagai Sistem Pengaturan Bersama pada Penambangan di Kawasan Dasar Laut Internasional." Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan 22, no. 3 (June 29, 1992): 272. http://dx.doi.org/10.21143/jhp.vol22.no3.379.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Berdasarkan doktrin freedom of the seas, bahwa pemanfaatan sumber kekayaan negara yang terdapat didalamnya dimanfaatkan secara sama oleh setiap orang. Dalam perkembangan selanjutnya pengelolaan di kawasan dasar laut Internasional harus dilaksanakan atasnama otoritas dengan paralel sistem. Dalam tulisan ini menyoroti prinsip kerjasama dengan sistem pola bagi hasil (production sharing), yang tentunya lebih banyak memberikan keuntungan komparatif dibanding sistem lisensi/royalty.
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Shafiq, Muhammad, and Huynh Trung Luong. "Production allocation decision using revenue sharing contract with prior commitments and two-way penalties." International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering 26, no. 2 (2017): 247. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijise.2017.083675.
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Luong, Huynh Trung, and Muhammad Shafiq. "Production allocation decision using revenue sharing contract with prior commitments and two-way penalties." International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering 26, no. 2 (2017): 247. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijise.2017.10004389.
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Dirani, Fatima, and Tatiana Ponomarenko. "Contractual Systems in the Oil and Gas Sector: Current Status and Development." Energies 14, no. 17 (September 3, 2021): 5497. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en14175497.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Production activities in the oil and gas industry are capital-intensive and associated with high technology, with these assets not always being available to oil-producing countries or national companies. Any form of interaction between the parties involved in natural resource extraction requires clear regulation regarding contractual relationships. This study attempts to analyze Indonesia’s production sharing contract system in order to assess its applicability to other conditions. The article covers the key aspects of contract theory, provides a classification of contractual systems in the oil and gas sector, and discusses the most common types of contractual agreements. It also considers the key principles of production sharing contracts (PSCs), analyzes the development of PSC practices in Indonesia over the past sixty years, and highlights PSC advantages and disadvantages.
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Sundari, Ayu, and Yudho Taruno Muryanto. "PENERAPAN ASAS ITIKAD BAIK TERHADAP KONTRAK BAGI HASIL DENGAN SISTEM COST RECOVERY DAN GROSS SPLIT." Jurnal Privat Law 8, no. 1 (February 2, 2020): 49. http://dx.doi.org/10.20961/privat.v8i1.40366.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p>Abstract<br />This article aims to find out the urgency of implementing good faith principles in Product Sharing Contracts with Cost Recovery systems and Gross Split. This study is based on the results of the study of descriptive normative law. The type of data used is in the form of secondary data obtained by data collection techniques in the form of library studies, which are then analyzed by implementing systematic legal interpretation. Systematic means, classifies the written legal materials, to facilitate analysis and construction work. The results of this study show the urgency of implementing the good faith principle for Production Sharing Contracts, both with the Cost Recovery system and the Gross Split system, to create fair value which is a reflection of the principle of good faith in dividing the percentage of the contract value. the principle in the Production Sharing Contract both with the Cost Recovery and Gross Split systems can provide a large income for both parties and no party is disadvantaged in the Production Sharing Contract.<br />Keywords: Production Sharing Contracts; Cost Recovery; Gross Split; Principle of Good Faith.</p><p>Abstrak<br />Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui urgensi penerapan asas itikad baik dalam Kontrak Bagi Hasil (Product Sharing Contract) dengan sistem Cost Recovery dan Gross Split. Kajian ini didasarkan atas hasil kajian hukum normatif yang bersifat deskriptif. Jenis data yang digunakan berupa data sekunder yang diperoleh dengan teknik pengumpulan data berupa studi kepustakaan, yang selanjutnya dianalisis dengan melaksanakan penafsiran hukum secara sistematis. Sistematis berarti, membuat klasifikasi tehadap bahan-bahan hukum tertulis tersebut, untuk memudahkan kerja analisa dan konstruksi. Hasil dari kajian ini menunjukan urgensi dari penerapan asas itikad baik terhadap Kontrak Bagi Hasil, baik dengan sistem Cost Recovery, maupun dengan sistem Gross Split yaitu untuk menciptakan nilai keadilan yang merupakan cerminan dari asas itikad baik dalam pembagian persentase dari nilai kontrak tersebut, sehingga dengan diterapkannya asas tersebut dalam Kontrak Bagi Hasil baik dengan sistem Cost Recovery maupun Gross Split dapat memberikan pemasukan yang besar bagi kedua belah pihak dan tidak ada pihak yang dirugikan dalam Kontrak Bagi Hasil.<br />Kata Kunci: Kontrak Bagi Hasil; Cost Recovery; Gross Split; Asas Itikad Baik.</p>
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Putri, Szyva Silviana, Gunardi Lie, and Moody Rizqy Syailendra Putra. "The Urgency of Good Faith Principles in Production Sharing Cooperation Contracts with the Gross Split System." QISTINA: Jurnal Multidisiplin Indonesia 2, no. 1 (June 1, 2023): 462–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.57235/qistina.v2i1.519.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
With the existence of a production sharing contract carried out by the Government with contractors, it is possible to realize equitable energy in Indonesia. Gross Split itself will not eliminate State control in controlling oil and gas. The urgency of applying the principle of good faith in production sharing contracts with the gross split system is very important, with the hope of creating justice for business actors, which is a reflection of the principle of good faith in production sharing contracts with the gross split system, which illustrates that the principle of good faith is very important. important in making agreements, and in making contracts or cooperation must be based on the good faith of both parties in achieving common goals. So it is hoped that the application of this principle in production sharing contracts will be able to have a good impact on the development of the investment world in Indonesia which is increasingly advanced, and avoid losses for both parties.
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Liu, Xiaojing, Wenyi Du, and Yijie Sun. "Green Supply Chain Decisions Under Different Power Structures: Wholesale Price vs. Revenue Sharing Contract." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 21 (October 22, 2020): 7737. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17217737.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers’ low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price—NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing—SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer’s power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer’s power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.
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Tambunan, Maria R. U. D., and Ginda Togatorop. "DUALISME KETENTUAN COST RECOVERY SEBAGAI DASAR PUNGUTAN NEGARA PADA INDUSTRI HULU MIGAS." Veritas et Justitia 7, no. 1 (June 28, 2021): 56–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.25123/vej.v7i1.3740.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article traces and describes the changes made from time to time, to the calculation and determination of government share, as obtained from corporate revenues and tax deducted based on Production Sharing Contract, as used in the Indonesian natural gas and oil sector. Qualitative data is gathered by performing a legal audit and literature review. The issue discussed here is the disagreement existing between the government and contractor regarding the calculation of recoverable cost (based on the Production Sharing Contract) and amount of corporate income tax imposed based on the prevailing tax law. Based on the review of legal materials and literature, the recommended action is to harmonize these two different tax-revenue schemes.
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Chao, Dong, and Yankang Chen. "The Impact of Cost Information Sharing on Procurement Contract Design." Journal of Finance Research 4, no. 2 (November 3, 2020): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/jfr.v4i2.4042.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, we provides contract design mechanisms and analysis for manufacturers to manage decentralized supply chain. Suppose the manufacturer’s final product consists of components, each produced by a different supplier, and the manufacturer first purchases components from suppliers, then assembles them into final product and meet demands aftermarket realization. While supply chain’s internal cooperation always benefits both, suppliers are often reluctant to proactively share their own production cost structure, otherwise manufacturers may depress purchase prices, which may reduce supplier’s profit. Manufacturers on the other hand, prefers to be informed of true cost information in order to gain greater revenues. We takes manufacturer’s perspective and design the optimal contract menu for suppliers, both to enable suppliers to disclose private cost information and to maximize the benefits. We start by modeling the original problem and find that the original problem is a complex multidimensional optimization problem. We then examine the nature of the original problem solving and devise the solution algorithm to arrive at the optimal contract menu. This algorithm reduces the complexity of the original question from o(2 n ) to o(n). We further investigate the influence mechanism of model parameters on the results and find that when market demand increases or the selling price of the final product increases, value of private information increases significantly. However, if market demand uncertainty increases, the value of information may increase or decrease for both sides.
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Antonanzas, Fernando, Carmelo Juarez-Castello, and Roberto Rodriguez-Ibeas. "Should health authorities offer risk-sharing contracts to pharmaceutical firms? A theoretical approach." Health Economics, Policy and Law 6, no. 3 (February 22, 2011): 391–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744133111000016.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractIn this paper, we characterise the risk-sharing contracts that health authorities can design when they face a regulatory decision on drug pricing and reimbursement in a context of uncertainty. We focus on two types of contracts. On the one hand, the health authority can reimburse the firm for each treated patient regardless of health outcomes (non risk-sharing). Alternatively, the health authority can pay for the drug only when the patient is cured (risk-sharing contract). The optimal contract depends on the trade-off between the monitoring costs, the marginal production cost and the utility derived from treatment. A non-risk-sharing agreement will be preferred by the health authority, if patients who should not be treated impose a relatively low cost to the health system. When this cost is high, the health authority would prefer a risk-sharing agreement for relatively low monitoring costs.
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Sumitra Muniandy, Syuhaida Ismail, and Md Ezamudin Said. "Revenue/cost production sharing contract (psc) fiscal regime on marginal gas fields in Malaysia: Case study." Progress in Energy and Environment 26, no. 1 (October 15, 2023): 11–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.37934/progee.26.1.1118.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Despite the increasing global demand for natural gas, there are many marginal oil and gas fields that lie idle and are not developed mainly due to the uneconomic feasibility of the project. One of the main factors hindering the monetization of these small fields is the unfavourable fiscal conditions. This is the main reason why many potential marginal fields that do not meet the economic criteria required for commercial development are stranded. Thus, this paper aims at assessing the existing Revenue/Cost (R/C) Production Sharing Contract (PSC) fiscal regime on marginal gas fields in Malaysia via sensitivity and scenario analysis studies. It is found that reduction in cost of capital, tax rate or other PSC payments parameters helps to improve the NPV however the analysis shows the R/C tranches consists of cost recovery limit, excess cost recovery and profit-sharing percentage are the significant factors driving the cash flow.
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Olleik, Majd, Hans Auer, and Rawad Nasr. "A petroleum upstream production sharing contract with investments in renewable energy: The case of Lebanon." Energy Policy 154 (July 2021): 112325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2021.112325.
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Permatasari, Dewi, Fajril Ambia, Eny Kusrini, and Muhammad Zulkarnain. "Comparison of Gross Split Production Sharing Contract and Taxation Aspects for Economic Incentives in Indonesia." International Journal of Technology 14, no. 2 (April 3, 2023): 246. http://dx.doi.org/10.14716/ijtech.v14i2.5441.
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Bai, Shizhen, and Xuelian Jia. "The Impact of the Cost-Sharing Contract on Capital-Constrained Agricultural Supply Chains." SAGE Open 13, no. 1 (January 2023): 215824402311561. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/21582440231156157.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study attempts to determine the optimal production and pricing decisions of E-Agri-SCF (agricultural product supply chain financed by e-commerce) and analyzes the influence of financing parameters on the optimal decision. Research indicates that the optimal purchase price decision increases with the expansion of the financing interest rate and declines with the expansion of the capital opportunity cost. The expected output factor of agricultural products has no influence on the optimal purchase price decision. The optimal production decision of the farmer declines with the expansion of the financing interest rate and the opportunity cost of capital and increases with the increase in the expected output factor of agricultural products. In particular, we show that due to the uncertainty in the output of agricultural products, the losses caused by decentralized decision-making in the E-Agri-SCF will increase. Therefore, this article proposes using a cost-sharing contract to promote the coordination of E-Agri-SCF. We prove that when farmers share more costs, they obtain higher benefits, while the e-commerce platform does the opposite. This is because the participation of e-commerce platforms in financing has changed the revenue structure of the supply chain. The findings of this article are very meaningful, as they provide management opinions on the financing terms of E-Agri-SCF.
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Mitkus, Sigitas. "THE RISKS AND LIABILITY OF PARTICIPANTS OF A CONSTRUCTION PROCESS FOR DEFECTS OF BUILDING PRODUCTS." Technological and Economic Development of Economy 10, no. 3 (September 30, 2004): 109–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/13928619.2004.9637666.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Sharing of the risk and liability is one of the most important functions of construction contracts. Proper sharing of the risks and liability between the parties of construction contract has a rather big influence on efficiency, quality, and probability of arising disputes between the parties of construction contract in construction projects. A lot of risk exists during the fulfillment of construction projects. One of those risks is the risk of defects of building products. The question of the liability of the parties of construction contract for inappropriate quality of the construction production caused by a bad quality of building products mainly depends on sharing of the risk of defects of building materials in the construction contract. Some aspects of the mentioned risk and liability of the parties of the construction contract might be set by mutual agreement in the construction contract. The other aspects are regulated by imperative norms of the law and the parties of construction contract have not a right to change those imperative conditions of sharing of risks and liability. The article deals with sharing of risk and liability for supplying building products of an improper quality for construction, taking in to account conditions of construction contract, legal regulation and behavior of parties of a construction contract. A tree of forming the alternatives of liability is presented in the article. Liability for supply of defected building products arises not only for parties of a construction contract. The producer (supplier) of building products is responsible for this as well. Variations of liability of the producer (supplier) depending on construction contract conditions are analyzed. A matrix of liability of the producer (supplier) of building products is presented in the article.
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Aprianto, Joko, and Puji Wibowo. "Government Accounting Policy Of Oil And Gas Revenue After Implementation Gross Split Contract: Quo Vadis?" Journal of Law, Administration, and Social Science 4, no. 2 (March 31, 2024): 186–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.54957/jolas.v4i2.760.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Production Sharing Contract (PSC) is a popular scheme for managing interests between oil and gas companies as contractors and the central government as a principal. PSC has been becoming attractive for contractors because the contract provides an incentive, and cost-recovery scheme, whereas all production costs during exploration and exploitation stages would be recovered by the government. However, this long-standing contract creates serious problems regarding efficiency and government revenue aspects. To address these issues, in early 2017, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources stipulate a new regulation to propose a new scheme contract namely gross-split. This policy aims to promote more investment in the oil and gas exploration sector so that lifting can be increased, and also, as an effort to eliminate the debate over cost recovery. In contrast to the cost recovery PSC, in a gross split PSC, there is no longer an assume and discharge facility for indirect taxes and other levies given to contractors. This study aims to determine the implications of the PSC gross split on the oil and gas revenue accounting policy. The author conducted interviews with several informants and analyzed the data using the interactive model of Miles and Huberman. As a result, the gross split implies the recognition of Oil and Gas revenue using gross principle
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Tian, Lin, Baojun Jiang, and Yifan Xu. "Manufacturer’s Entry in the Product-Sharing Market." Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 23, no. 3 (May 2021): 553–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0919.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Problem definition : Mobile communications technologies and online platforms have enabled large-scale consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of their underutilized products. This paper studies a manufacturer’s optimal entry strategy in the product-sharing market and the economic implications of its entry. Academic/practical relevance : Sharing of products or services among consumers has experienced dramatic growth in recent years. The impact of C2C sharing on traditional firms can be very significant. In response to C2C product sharing, many manufacturers (e.g., General Motors and BMW) have entered the product-sharing market to provide business-to-consumer (B2C) rental services in addition to outright sales to consumers. Methodology : We employ a game-theoretic analytical model for our analysis. Results : Our analysis shows that when C2C sharing has a low transaction cost and the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is not very high, the manufacturer will find it not optimal to offer its own rental services to consumers. In contrast, when the C2C sharing transaction cost is high or the manufacturer’s marginal cost of production is high, the manufacturer should offer enough units of the products for rental to squeeze out C2C sharing (in expectation). When the C2C-sharing transaction cost and the manufacturer’s marginal cost are both in the middle ranges, the manufacturer’s rental services and the C2C sharing will coexist, in which case the manufacturer’s entry in the sharing market may reduce the total number of units of the product in the whole market, but increase the consumer surplus and the social welfare. This reduced number of products due to the manufacturer’s B2C rental service also suggests less environmental impact from production. Managerial implications : The production cost and the C2C sharing transaction cost play critical roles in determining the manufacturer’s optimal quantity to use for its B2C rental services and the equilibrium outcome. In some situations, the manufacturer’s entry in the sharing market provides not only economic benefits to the firm and consumers, but also environmental benefits to the society as a whole.
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Zhao, Daozhi, and Hongshuai Han. "Decisions and Coordination in a Capacity Sharing Supply Chain considering Production Cost Misreporting." Complexity 2020 (July 27, 2020): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/1926035.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the manufacturing capacity sharing platform, considering the manufacturing capacity provider’s cost misreporting behavior and the collusion behavior of the platform operator, this paper built a supply chain consisting of a platform operator, a capacity provider with surplus capacity, and a manufacturer with insufficient capacity. This paper studied the influence of the cost misreporting behavior on the supply chain members’ decisions and profits. By use of the game theory, in the scenarios including the supplier misreporting to other supply chain members and the supplier colluding with the platform, the paper analyzed the optimal pricing decision, misreporting coefficient decision, and platform’s service fee decision and further compared the profits of the supply chain and its members. The results show that the capacity provider tends to overstate the production cost for gaining more profits, which exerts negative effects on profits of other members and the supply chain. Compared with the case of misreporting to both the manufacturer with insufficient capacity and the platform, the case of colluding with platform is more favorable to the profits of the manufacturer, the platform, and the supply chain, while the supplier prefers to choose the former situation. When the sales revenue-sharing proportion, cost-sharing proportion, and service fee satisfy certain conditions, the sales revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract can avoid the capacity provider’s cost misreporting behavior and coordinate the supply chain.
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PENG, HONGJUN, MEIHUA ZHOU, and LING QIAN. "SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH UNCERTAINTY IN TWO-ECHELON YIELDS." Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research 30, no. 01 (February 2013): 1250044. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217595912500443.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper researches the coordination models in the supply chain where there are uncertain two-echelon yields and random demand. We analyzed three contracts of revenue sharing (RS), overproduction risk sharing (OS), and combination of RS and OS (RO), and contrasted them with uncoordinated model. We studied the optimal order decision for downstream manufacturer and the optimal production decision for upstream manufacturer. Numerical examples were presented to illustrate the results. The study showed that the RS contract and OS sharing contract both have their advantages and disadvantages and the RO contract could benefit the whole supply chain best. We found out that the OS contract gives the upstream manufacturer incentive to produce more so as to maximize the profit value, but the upstream manufacturer may receive less as the price of overproduced part increases. We also found out that under most scenarios, the supply chain benefits from the yields and demand risks reduction and generates a higher profit. But sometimes in the OS contract the downstream manufacturer profit can increase as yields randomness increases. And, in the uncoordinated case and OS contract, the upstream manufacturer profit can increase as demand randomness increases.
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Zhou, Linan, Gengui Zhou, Fangzhong Qi, and Hangying Li. "Research on coordination mechanism for fresh agri-food supply chain with option contracts." Kybernetes 48, no. 5 (May 7, 2019): 1134–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-08-2017-0291.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose This paper aims to develop a coordination mechanism that can be applied to achieve the channel coordination and information sharing simultaneously in the fresh agri-food supply chain with uncertain demand. It seeks to elucidate how the producer can use an option contract to transfer the risk caused by uncertain demand, impel the retailer to share demand information and improve the performance of supply chain. Design/methodology/approach An option contract model based on the basic model of fresh agri-food supply chain is introduced to compare the production, profit, risk and information sharing condition of the supply chain in different cases. In addition, a case study focusing on the sale of autumn peaches produced by a local producer is investigated, which provides evidence of the applicability of the authors’ approach. Findings The optimal option contract can help the supply chain achieve channel coordination and reach Pareto improvement. In the meantime, such a contract will encourage the retailer to share market demand information with producer spontaneously and help maintain the strategic cooperation between two parties. Research limitations/implications This paper considers a single-producer, single-retailer system and both of them are risk neutral. Practical implications Presented results can be used as suggestions for improving the contract design of fresh agri-food supply chain in China and can also provide references for other countries with similar experiences as China in fresh agri-food production. Originality/value This research introduces the option contract into fresh agri-food supply chain and takes information sharing and the risk caused by uncertain demand into consideration.
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Chen, Junhong, and Yonglong Wang. "Financing Mechanism Design of Small, Medium and Micro Manufacturing Enterprises with Capital Constraints in Different Life Cycle Stages." Frontiers in Business, Economics and Management 12, no. 2 (December 6, 2023): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/fbem.v12i2.14582.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In order to solve the problem that manufacturers have sufficient funds when producing traditional products and lack of funds when producing green products, this paper considers three financing strategies: no financing, bank loan financing and internal financing, and constructs centralized decision-making and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model. It is found that the wholesale price, production input, green input level and supply chain profit of the three financing methods are not optimal under the manufacturer-led decision-making. On this basis, aiming at the overall profit under centralized decision-making, this paper designs the combined contract of "revenue sharing contract + two-part cost + green cost sharing" to coordinate the supply chain, and puts forward the scope of optimal coordination of the combined contract under three financing models.
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Wicaksono, Fermi Dwi, Yusri Bin Arshad, and Haeryip Sihombing. "Monte Carlo Net Present Value for Techno-Economic Analysis of Oil and Gas Production Sharing Contract." International Journal of Technology 10, no. 4 (July 29, 2019): 829. http://dx.doi.org/10.14716/ijtech.v10i4.2051.
Повний текст джерела