Статті в журналах з теми "Privileged legal treatment"

The majority of legal systems in Western democracies accord special treatment to religions, e.g. exemptions from generally applicable laws if they conflict with religious convictions. Other beliefs do not usually enjoy such far‑reaching tolerance on the part of the state. The article raises the question of how granting such privilege to religious views can be justified. Arguments of some philosophers (e.g. Thomas Hobbes’) which suggest that an intolerant attitude might sometimes be disadvantageous are in fact only instrumental, and do not prove that tolerance is a moral virtue. This last claim only follows from the arguments of John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, who exemplify two basic approaches in ethics, i.e. utilitarianism and deontology. None of the analyzed arguments for freedom of conscience and religion distinguishes between religious and other beliefs, which suggests that the existing differences in their moral and legal treatment cannot be justified. Therefore, the question arises of whether legal regulations regarding religious and other beliefs should not be equated, so that religious views are not privileged.

Postmigrant conditions do not translate into easy access for migrants who arrive outside of the parameters of orderly migration. While European nations acknowledge the principle of asylum, massive efforts are made to prevent refugees from reaching the territory of the state where they could receive its protection. Even as their physical proximity to Europe increases, their legal proximity typically decreases. The novel Gehen, ging, gegangen (Go, Went, Gone) by German writer Jenny Erpenbeck depicts the experiences of non-privileged migrants whose tales of exile and displacement indicate that most of them will not be recognized as refugees. The play Die Schutzbefohlenen (Charges [The Supplicants]) by Austrian writer Elfriede Jelinek contrasts the treatment of asylum seekers with real-life cases of two ‘VIP foreigners’ who were granted naturalization by the Austrian government. Both texts convey a blunt message: The narratives of those who do (and those who do not) arrive in Europe’s ‘postmigrant societies’ without legal status confirm that the gap between privileged and non-privileged migration is almost impossible to bridge.

AbstractFor some thirty years or more, there have been calls in Germany for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to be given legal standing to ensure correct application and enforcement of environmental law1. The German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU) has long advocated such legal standing for NGOs2, emphasising in particular that the right to bring a representative action in no way constitutes privileged treatment of environmental interests. Rather, it redresses the inequalities of a legal system that places the interests of environment users above those of environment protection3. The representative action has to be seen as a much-needed form of legal standing for public interests that have up to now been unenforceable before the courts. The following article describes the practical experiences with legal standing for NGOs and the relevance of the judiciary, deals with the core elements of the Aarhus Convention, the Directives 2003/4/EC, 2003/35/FC and the proposal for a directive on access to justice in environmental matters and displays the respective comments and recommendations of the Council.

In the light of increasing misunderstanding between the medical and legal professions, this paper seeks, by means of comparative analysis to elucidate the central concerns of the law in regulating the provision of medical treatment and the doctor-patient relationship. The law in most jurisdictions seeks to ensure the full and consistent protection of the patient's rights. It will be seen that this goal requires that objective and judicially determined standards of care be imposed upon doctors. In relation to consent to medical treatment the primary value of individual autonomy implies that the informational needs of the particular patient must determine the legal standard of disclosure. In so far as English judges have privileged the medical profession, above all others, by unquestioningly ratifying its practices in relation to treatment and disclosure, they may be said to have abandoned their constitutionally mandated tasks of adjudication and the development of the law on an objective basis. This position is at odds with that in most other common law countries and is notably isolated within the context of the European Community.

Why do refugees exist – not as an empirical, but as a normative, category? What special sense of duty connects us to those people whom we call refugees, and how does this duty translate into asylum? What does the practice of asylum tell us about who we are, as individuals as well as members of political communities? How does one morally justify the special concern we feel for, and consequently the privileged treatment we give, refugees as compared with other foreigners in need? Revisiting the main features of the ethical debate over asylum and refugeehood, this article argues that the 1951 Refugee Convention provides a coherent framework to explain the ‘refugee privilege’. This contention is based on three features of the Convention, namely: its focus on admission and assimilation; its affirmation of the refugee as a privileged alien; and its emphasis, through the key concept of persecution, on the prohibition of discrimination and the identifying value of tolerance. However, one must acknowledge that a proper understanding of the moral duty to admit and integrate refugees does not suffice to explain contemporary state practice in dealing with the ‘refugee problem’ as a matter of solidarity. This article suggests that there are two additional asylum paradigms at work in today’s world: one takes disaster as a motivation for action, and rescue as the underpinning moral and legal imperative; and the other rests upon a duty not to return individuals to specific forms of danger, absent affinity or even compassion. The article examines some of the impacts which the co-existence of these three paradigms has on the global refugee regime, and their implications for law- and policy-making on asylum, both within and among states.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether altruism justifies ad hoc legislation with reference to three different contexts. One is defined by the libertarian notion of liberty; a second framework corresponds to the egalitarian vision; and a third one originates from social-contract theory. Design/methodology/approach The authors review two stylized visions of liberty, and consider to what extent the current legal systems comply with one of these visions. Moreover, the authors analyse the implications of the contractarian approach. Findings It is shown that current legislation is rather ambiguous and sometimes even contradictory. By and large, the common-law view tends to favour the libertarian approach, while the civil-law visions are closer to what one might expect from social-contract theory. In these cases, however, it seems that the letter of the law is often questioned by the academic community as well as by the judiciary, and decisions eventually follow the judges’ discretionary power. Originality/value This analysis of altruism combines the economic and legal perspectives. Although altruism is always considered an important part of social capital and worthy of privileged treatment, it is shown that policymaking is frequently inconsistent and sometimes contradictory.

The study of the first liberal Penal Codes (Spanish from 1822/1848/1850 and Portuguese from 1852) shows that the Spanish and the Portuguese woman share the same legal frame, but for a few differences. This frame preserves the feminine pattern of behaviour established by the Old Regime Courts, subject to man’s authority and to marriage as a guarantee of social and family order, but with a change: man’s honor resting upon the woman is honesty, not any longer privileged (married and honest) but imposed (home angel) and punished (dishonest woman). Between applying mercy or an exemplary treatment to a woman, liberal law chooses the last. Woman is not the plural category of the Old Regime any more, but the dual category angel/dishonest, which brings about her fragilitas. This leads to equality among women and approach to men in most offenses, but for the glaring inequality with regard to honor. An exception: the Portuguese wife, protected against procuring, has the right to take vengeance on his husband for her honor, whereas the Spanish wife does not have that right. Keywords: Spanish Penal Code 1822/1848/1850. Portuguese Penal Code 1852. Woman. Fragilitas. Honesty.

The mass application of modern medical biotechnology (BAF) and its expansion on a global level have brought numerous challenges at the individual and social level, and the very goal of reproductive technologies has exceeded the treatment of infertility. For LGBTIQ people, the use of BAF in the first place is a matter of reproductive justice that should provide everyone, without distinction, economic, social and political power and resources to make healthy decisions about their bodies, sexuality and reproduction for themselves, their families and their union. The reality, however, is that access to BAF is enjoyed by a small privileged group of people, and many medically infertile persons do not seek BAF because of the high cost of such treatment. As a result, the development of biomedical technology is increasingly becoming a subject of reconsideration and controversy, and less and less an achievement that supports life and health. In this paper, the author discusses when and why access to BAF became a matter of the LGBTIQ rights and whether access to BAF can really be equal for all, given its costs? Finally, the author refers to BAF in terms of domestic legislation and concludes the paper with a call for changes to the legal solution that prohibits the use of BAF for LGBTIQ individuals and couples in Serbia.

The centrality of race to our history and the substantial racial inequalities that continue to pervade society ensure that "race" remains an extraordinarily salient and meaningful social category. Explicit racial prejudice, however, is only part of the problem. Equally important - and likely more pervasive - is the phenomenon of implicit racial prejudice: the cognitive processes whereby, despite even our best intentions, the human mind automatically classifies information in racial categories and against disfavoured social groups. Empirical research shows convincingly that these biases against socially disfavoured groups are (i) pervasive; (ii) often diverge from consciously reported attitudes and beliefs; and (iii) influence consequential behaviour towards the subjects of these biases. The existence of implicit racial prejudices poses a challenge to legal theory and practice. From the standpoint of a legal system that seeks to forbid differential treatment based upon race or other protected traits, if people are in fact treated differently, and worse, because of their race or other protected trait, then the fundamental principle of anti-discrimination has been violated. It hardly matters that the source of the differential treatment is implicit rather than conscious bias. This article investigates the relevance of this research to the law by means of an empirical account of how implicit racial bias could affect the criminal trial trajectory in the areas of policing, prosecutorial discretion and judicial decision-making. It is the author's hypothesis that this mostly American research also applies to South Africa. The empirical evidence of implicit biases in every country tested shows that people are systematically implicitly biased in favour of socially privileged groups. Even after 1994 South Africa – similar to the US – continues to be characterised by a pronounced social hierarchy in which Whites overwhelmingly have the highest social status. The author argues that the law should normatively take cognizance of this issue. After all, the mere fact that we may not be aware of, much less consciously intend, race-contingent behaviour does not magically erase the harm. The article concludes by addressing the question of the appropriate response of the law and legal role players to the problem of implicit racial bias.

The centrality of race to our history and the substantial racial inequalities that continue to pervade society ensure that "race" remains an extraordinarily salient and meaningful social category. Explicit racial prejudice, however, is only part of the problem. Equally important - and likely more pervasive - is the phenomenon of implicit racial prejudice: the cognitive processes whereby, despite even our best intentions, the human mind automatically classifies information in racial categories and against disfavoured social groups. Empirical research shows convincingly that these biases against socially disfavoured groups are (i) pervasive; (ii) often diverge from consciously reported attitudes and beliefs; and (iii) influence consequential behaviour towards the subjects of these biases. The existence of implicit racial prejudices poses a challenge to legal theory and practice. From the standpoint of a legal system that seeks to forbid differential treatment based upon race or other protected traits, if people are in fact treated differently, and worse, because of their race or other protected trait, then the fundamental principle of anti-discrimination has been violated. It hardly matters that the source of the differential treatment is implicit rather than conscious bias. This article investigates the relevance of this research to the law by means of an empirical account of how implicit racial bias could affect the criminal trial trajectory in the areas of policing, prosecutorial discretion and judicial decision-making. It is the author's hypothesis that this mostly American research also applies to South Africa. The empirical evidence of implicit biases in every country tested shows that people are systematically implicitly biased in favour of socially privileged groups. Even after 1994 South Africa – similar to the US – continues to be characterised by a pronounced social hierarchy in which Whites overwhelmingly have the highest social status. The author argues that the law should normatively take cognizance of this issue. After all, the mere fact that we may not be aware of, much less consciously intend, race-contingent behaviour does not magically erase the harm. The article concludes by addressing the question of the appropriate response of the law and legal role players to the problem of implicit racial bias.

The article presents considerations and multifaceted analyses of the conditions and motives of judicial decisions taken after the judgment of the TSUE 19 November 2019, in the context of how Poland’s judiciary system functions. It begins by explaining how to perceive and understand the essence of legal corruption in terms of the use of law, power and professional position. The possibilities of the intentional use of judicial power for specific needs and purposes is discussed in this context. The next part of the paper is devoted to a critical analysis of selectively interpreted right to a tribunal enshrined in art. 45 of the Polish Constitution in connection with other values enshrined therein. The right of every citizen to a fair and public hearing of their case, without undue delay by a competent, independent, impartial and independent court, is presented in terms of the constitutional perspective, the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The problem outlined here is considered from the point of view of protection against the arbitrariness of authorities and the possibility of appealing against personnel decisions enabling employment to be taken up in selected positions in state institutions. Attention is paid to the privileged legal position of judges over other citizens. The issues described and the arguments presented in this article are entirely overlooked in the literature, as well as in public debate. What follows is an explanation of how TSUE rulings are interpreted differently by various public authorities. Reference is also made to the dictum of the Supreme Court judgment of 5 December 2019, which was issued in its Labour Law and Social Security Chamber. That process initiated specific actions and activities taken by individual groups of Supreme Court judges. Finally, the resolution of the combined three chambers of the Supreme Court on 23 January 2020, the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 20 April 2020, and divergent decisions regarding the implementation of the TSUE’s position of 8 April 2020 are discussed.

The article is based on materials of ethnic-sociological research conducted in 2016 on the territory of the republic of the North Caucasus Federal District of the Russian Federation: Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Chechen Republic, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Dagestan, Kabardino- Balkarian Republic. The survey involved 1200 respondents - 200 people from each republic. The article analyzes the question of the validity of granting state and legal privileges of religious organizations. Respondents were asked to express their opinion about granting the state privileges only to the Russian Orthodox Church; only Islam - the most popular religion in the religion; only three traditional religions of Russia (Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism); granting equal rights to all religions or depriving all religions of any privilege. The author comes to the conclusion about almost complete unanimity in the issues of granting religious privileges to the inhabitants of the region - regardless of their religious affiliation, people want equal rights for all religions, they are less willing to grant rights only for all religions. All groups unanimously denied the rights of the privileges of the Russian Orthodox Church, Islam was also unwilling to grant rights to all groups except Chechens, but this option is far inferior to equal treatment of the three traditional or all religions.

Abstract A fundamental feature of international investment law is that it only applies to foreign investment. This has historical reasons and is connected to deep-rooted principles of international law. It has also been a historical cause of controversy because it requires states to treat foreign investors better than they treat their own nationals. This article shows how the international minimum standard for treatment of foreigners nevertheless developed in a dialogue with such a concern for equality. The article argues that the way in which international investment law has developed in recent years into an effective remedial mechanism that can be invoked by individual foreign investors against host states ignores this historical lesson and now poses a particular challenge to its legitimacy. It privileges foreign investors as a select group worthy of more effective legal protection than ordinarily provided under municipal law, challenging the ideal of equality before the law as a basic constitutional value. The article discusses possible justifications of such privilege, arguing that only a more traditional international minimum standard rationale provides a convincing justification of special treatment of foreign investment. This has important implications for the reform of the current investment regime, suggesting that it should be redesigned to adopt a more supplementary role and deferential attitude to domestic law and courts – for example, through a requirement to exhaust local remedies.

Should the basis of the law of damages or compensation for medical negligence be changed or reformed from the basis of private treatment and care to the basis of public treatment and care? This would remove the privilege of the claimant, still secure and safeguard him as a social casualty and save the National Health Service some money. However, the claimant would feel that he was being unjustly compensated.

Therapeutic privilege (TP) is a defence that may be available to doctors who fail to disclose to the patient relevant information when seeking informed consent for treatment if they have a reasonable belief that providing that information would likely cause the patient concerned serious physical or mental harm. In a landmark judgement, the Singapore Court of Appeal introduced a novel interpretation of TP, identifying circumstances in which it might be used with patients who did not strictly lack capacity but might be inclined to refuse recommended treatments. In this paper, we explore the conceptual and practical challenges of this novel interpretation of TP. We propose that more emphasis should be placed on forms of shared and supported decision-making that foster the autonomy of patients with compromised mental capacity while being mindful of the need to safeguard their well-being. The kind of privilege that doctors might need to invoke is one of time and supportive expertise to ensure a flexible, responsive approach calibrated to the individual patients’ needs. The provision of such service would extinguish the need for the novel TP proposed by the Singapore Court of Appeal.

The paper examines the recent developments in the field of business crisis management, with a focus on the European and US legal cultures. The main argument is the need for a consistent framework between insolvency and competition law in the theory of the firm. The present analysis reveals the need for a proper balance between the principle of competition on the merits and the philosophy of business-rescue in order to avoid dysfunctions in the application of insolvency and antitrust statutes. After an overview of the main contact cases between the two disciplines, the article addresses the main lawmakers’ responses to this problem. In this context, the regulation on banking crises management represents a first attempt to strike a proper balance between the (apparently compelling) goals underlying insolvency and competition law. This article aims at providing some guidance for a systematic reading of the two disciplines. Moving from a holistic understanding of the theory of the firm, it suggests assigning competition law a pivotal role in order to pursue efficiency in the market and consistency in legal theory. Investment funds, reserved AIFs, share classes, fair treatment, seniority privilege, minimum interest privilege, non-contagion principle, preferential treatment, shift of wealth

This special communication discusses the current legal and ethical requirements for informed consent to medical treatment of adults in Malawi. It analyzes the scope of the laws and code of ethics on professional discipline, including criminal privilege for surgeries and clarifies when insufficient disclosures entitle patients to compensation under civil law. Inconsistencies and uncertainties in the law are made apparent.It evaluates to which degree disclosure standards of other Commonwealth jurisdictions (e.g. the case of Montgomery) would be suitable for the health care setting of a country like Malawi that is characterized by shortages of resources, high illiteracy rates and a communitarian cultural context. Doctor-patient communication is not alien to African culture and part of sufficient informed consent. In order to balance the need for efficiency in health care delivery, accountability for quality care, fairness and effective patient-doctor communication the authors suggest to adopt the reasonable patient test only, if a defence of heavy workload on case-to-case basis is introduced at the same time. This does not dispense the need for organisational diligence on part of the institutional health care provider within its capacity.

The authors argue that the privatization of health care not only privileges profitable health provision and loses sight especially of community services and basic medical treatment but also tends to imply a crippling change of the legal tools available to face a pandemic. Privatization, flanked by austerity programs, disempowers public health institutions and authorities as well as disables the regular legal regimes covering public health. When confronted by a pandemic, they hold, privatized systems lay bare the limitations of healthcare understood as a business and framed within insurance contracts, not universal rights. After introducing the core elements of neoliberalism and the tailor-made reduction of law’s vertical, regulatory power the authors discuss in which respects public health systems are privatized how deregulation, austerity and reduced welfare are essential to privatization. They show how the law of danger prevention is replaced by a legal regime of market transactions, focusing on the liberalized elements of healthcare and some of the crucial legal instruments in various socio-economic and political contexts. In the final section follows an analysis of various legal strategies in a few selected countries that illustrates how privatization disabled regular infection protection law and as a consequence favored authoritarian responses to the pandemic.

An important problem for medical confidentiality in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the question of whether doctors could be required to give evidence in court about their patients' condition. On the one hand, knowledge that personal information might be divulged in open court might prevent patients from consulting a doctor on sensitive illnesses, to the detriment of their health as well as of public health. On the other hand, valuable evidence might be lost through exclusion of medical testimony, perhaps even leading to errors of justice. This paper compares the different approaches that have been taken to this problem in the United Kingdom, the USA and Germany, and highlights key arguments, cases, and regulations that have shaped the issue of a medical privilege in court. It shows that the origins of the different routes taken – from rejection of a medical privilege to its inclusion in codes of civil and criminal procedure – lay in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Moreover, it suggests that the treatment of confidentiality in court reflected the power relations between the legal and medical professions.

The Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (hereinafter referred to as the Singapore Convention) entered into force on 12 September 2020. The States’ striking enthusiasm for the Singapore Convention since the day of its enactment and onwards seems to be an encouraging indicator of the increasing use of mediation for the settlement of international commercial disputes. More precisely, the Convention establishes an international legal framework for the enforcement of settlements reached through mediation, and provides for a very limited number of requirements thereon. Hence, and considering that the enforceability of arbitral awards is perceived as arbitration’s most important feature, the cross-border enforceability of the settlement agreements reached through mediation conferred by the Singapore Convention could somehow erode arbitration’s edge. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Singapore Convention will promote the use of mediation in the States comprised within the Belt and Road Initiative, in Europe and in the Asia- Pacific, namely within the construction sector and the shipping industry and also in investor-state disputes insofar as the wording of the Convention leaves room for an extensive interpretation that could encompass such disputes. Investment funds, reserved AIFs, share classes, fair treatment, seniority privilege, minimum interest privilege, non-contagion principle, preferential treatment, shift of wealth

In the United States the delivery of health care traditionally has been hierarchical and strictly controlled by physicians. Physicians typically provided patients with little information about their diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment plan; patients were expected to follow their physicians’ orders and ask no questions. Beginning in the 1970s, with the widespread adoption of the doctrine of informed consent to treatment, the physician-patient relationship began to be more collaborative, although the extent of the change has been subject to debate. At a minimum, physicians began to give patients more information and asked them to consent to recommended treatment, the therapeutic privilege to withhold information from patients lost support and eventually was repudiated, and physicians embraced — at least in theory — a more patient-centered conception of health care. More recently, health care and health promotion activities have moved beyond clinical encounters and the strict confines of physician-patient interactions.

<p>The enterprise income tax law in China has for a long time been characterized by the co-existence of two tax codes applied to foreign investment enterprises and indigenous enterprises respectively. Tax privileges granted to foreign investors give rise to the inequality of tax treatment among enterprises in the country. Under the newly released Enterprise Income Tax Law, a unified tax code is to be applied to all enterprises alike, and tax impetus is no longer reserved for foreign investors. This is a move towards developing a platform on which all enterprises in China can compete equally in terms of taxation. A way forward is contemplated over integrating current laws on foreign investment enterprises into the general domain of the commercial law regime, in order that those mutually exclusive legal regulations presently applied to foreign investment enterprises and their local counterparts can eventually be unified in the same way as in the field of taxation.</p>

This study aims to explain the position of tax debt and labour right in bankruptcy. The legal research method used in this research using normative research, the legal rules and legal principles used related to bankruptcy law, tax law and labour law will be a reference in describing the problem of the position of tax debt and labour right in bankruptcy cases. The Taxation Law gives a special treatment and higher position on which the tax debt is first to be paid by the debtor and followed by the right borne by the separatist creditor. On the other hand, Law Number 13 of 2003 concerning Employment also regulates that the labour of the wages and other rights of the labour and positioned the labour as preferred creditor on which the privilege is given by the law. However, there are no statements in the Employment Law that stated the position of labour as a preferred creditor is higher than separatist creditor in the matter of bankrupt as what the Taxation Kaw expressed creditor is higher than the separatist creditor within the matter of tax payment. That distinction seems positioned the preferred creditor status of labour is lower than the position of separatist creditor on the matter of right fulfillment in bankruptcy. It is certainty that the statement which stated that the collection of tax debts have the right to preceded than other debts does not fit in this matter. Eventually, there is a decision of Constitutional Court Number 67/PUU-XI/2013 that provides a change within the position labour’s right on the matter of bankruptcy.

The interrelated constructs of privacy, confidentiality and privilege, much discussed in legal and medical arenas, are sometimes given perfunctory treatment in the education and training of sport psychologists. This article briefly traces the history, debate, and practices of ethical delivery of service from Hippocrates to current sport psychology professional relationships. Sport psychologists often operate in looser environments (e.g. on the pool deck, courtside, in the locker room) than those of other psychologists, and it seems that some concepts of ethical practice, such as confidentiality, are also looser (Andersen, Van Raalte, & Brewer, 2001). This looseness in the field may be, in part, a result of the myriad educational and training pathways people take to get to the point of acting in psychological caring roles with athletes and coaches. This article is a strident questioning of some of the ethically loose practices of individuals and sport institutes in the world of sport psychology services. The author hopes it sparks some lively debate.

AbstractThe Argentine Constitution contains two provisions regarding church-state relations. The first one recognizes the right of all people to the free exercise of religion. The second one provides that the state must financially support the Catholic Church. Based on this latter clause, over the years a complex regulatory scheme has been developed that differentiates that church from all the other churches and religions. Those differences are addressed in this article. The author argues that the religious establishment does not depend only on how the state defines itself (e.g., through a declaration in the constitution), but also on the way in which it treats people based on their religion. If that treatment is unequal—for example, when there are legal privileges only to a single church—then there is a kind of establishment of religion. It has been claimed that the religious establishment is not itself incompatible with religious freedom. In arguing that religious minorities can hold a different opinion, the author offers a brief account of the problems faced by non-Catholic faith communities in Argentina because of the state's unequal treatment. Finally, the author analyzes whether the reasons given to justify the legal differences between religions are acceptable. Otherwise, it could be said that there is discrimination—at least, in a broad sense—against religious minorities. While this article focuses on the Argentine case, the issues addressed are relevant to any country dealing with the unequal treatment of people based on their religion.

The recent media furore surrounding the UK government's hostile environment policy and the treatment of the Windrush generation drew attention to the use of criminal law for regulatory purposes within the context of immigration. The proliferation of immigration offences, and the reproduction of criminal provisions in immigration laws, signals a blurring of the lines between the civil and criminal legal realms: while immigration law purports to be administrative in character it is often effected through criminal law, which is used against citizens and non-citizens in breach of immigration rules when immigration measures alone are ineffective. These 'crimmigration' measures can be understood as examples of hybrid proceduralism. The civil/criminal procedural hybrids used in 'crimmigration' processes are borne of ideologically motivated political expediency, and disproportionately disadvantage vulnerable populations, who are frequently portrayed as deviant. They privilege specific policy goals over considerations of human rights, civil liberties, and due process.

This article examines the legal and ethical rationale for the deportation of ‘foreign criminals’ who have established their homes in the United Kingdom. It argues that provisions relating to automatic deportation constitute a second punishment that can be more accurately described as banishment. The human rights of those defined as ‘foreign criminals’ have been reduced to privileges that are easily withdrawn with reference to the ill-defined public interest. The ability to challenge deportation is then compromised by a non-suspensive appeal process that deliberately undermines the right to an effective remedy whilst further damaging private and family life. With reference to social membership and domicile theories of belonging, it is suggested that those who have made their lives in the UK and established their place and domicile here should be regarded as unconditional members of civil society. As such, they are entitled to equality of treatment in the criminal justice system and should be immune from punitive ‘crimmigration’ measures.

Aim: The presented study is part of the International Study of Discrimination and Stigma Outcomes (INDIGO) conducted in 28 countries. The aim of this study was to compare the degree of experienced and anticipated stigma of patients with schizophrenia in Serbia with world results. Method: The Discrimination and Stigma Scale (DISC) was applied in individual interviews. The sample comprised 732 subjects of the main study and 50 subjects from Serbia. Results: The amount of negative experienced discrimination in Serbia is the same as in other participating countries. The Serbian sample shows more negative discrimination in intimate relationships, personal safety and general harm due to the diagnosis, but more positive discrimination within the family, privileges during treatment of somatic illnesses, and benefits enjoyed in social and retirement insurance. The Serbian sample shows less anticipated discrimination in looking for a close relationship and in stopping self from applying for work. The results show that socio-demographic variables could not predict negative experienced and anticipated discrimination, while those same variables enable the prediction of 34% of positive discrimination. Conclusion: Compared to other investigated countries, stigmatization processes for persons with schizophrenia do not differ considerably in Serbia, which justifies the implementation of unique anti-stigma programmes and joint upgrading of legal regulations.

Abstract ENFORCEMENT OF THE STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN CANADA Conditions inside prisons in Canada as elsewhere, have not been beyond reproach from the time detention was instituted as a type of punishment at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This is not surprising, for society took no further interest in a delinquent once he had been handed over to the penitentiary authorities. The Belgian penologist, Paul Cornil, pointed out the striking contrast that exists between the legal guarantees given an accused during his trial and the free hand given the penitentiary authorities when carrying out his punishment. But in 1955, at the First Congress of the United Nations for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Delinquents, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were adopted. In 1957, the Economic and Social Council approved these Standard Minimum Rules and asked the governments involved to approve their adoption and enforcement. A study of the legislation concerned with federal penitentiaries and Houses of Detention in the Province of Quebec, lead to the realization that the minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners are usually not protected by laws, regulations or by directives in these penal institutions. On the other hand, prison conditions are in fact consistent with the requirements of the rules. These conditions, however, are due to the good will of the authorities and cannot be controlled ; they are considered privileges rather than rights. As a result of these findings, we believe that the Standard Minimum Rules should be considered the Bill of Rights of all individuals deprived of liberty, convicted or not. To do this : 1) the guarantees provided by the Rules must be incorporated in Canadian law and in that of each province ; 2) a thorough knowledge of the Rules must be given to the services, authorities and other groups involved, including the inmates and the public ; 3) inmates must be given the means to have their rights respected by creating an organization that will control and enforce the Standard Minimum Rules ; 4) an evaluation must be made of the measures necessary for the enforcement of the Rules, the methods to be used and the results obtained. However, ideas on rights and privileges change quickly, especially in the field of corrections. Thus in 1972, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency published an Act to Provide for Minimum Standards for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners. This text is noteworthy because it rests on a principle which, in our opinion, should serve as a cornerstone for the re-evaluation of the rights of prisoners : « A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly or by necessary implication, taken from him by law. » Recognition of this kind would contribute towards alleviating the secondary effects of penal sentences, of imprisonment and public stigmatiza-tion. It would lead to a more humane, tolerant and responsible attitude towards those who are hardest hit by public censure.

The focus of research, pertaining to the practice of Islam in prisons, has been primarily on Western countries (the US, the UK, and France) where Muslim inmates struggle with discrimination and stigmatization as “religious radicals” or “terrorists”. Far less is known about the relationship Muslim prisoners have with their faith in countries where Islam is the official religion and imposed by the State, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Understanding the influence of political, legal, and religious institutions is crucial to exploring Islam in Iranian prisons, as well as the role of other less prominent determining factors. This qualitative study examines the practice and perception of Islam in Iranian prisons. Data were collected through 90 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with prisoners and former prisoners, and analyzed using grounded theory. Results show that practicing Islam rituals and converting from a “sinner” to a “believer” was pervasive among inmates on death row and incarcerated mothers who left their children for a life of confinement. Practicing Islamic rituals, which entail the achievement of privileges, especially memorizing the holy Quran or attending congregational prayers, question the authenticity of faith and religious beliefs in prison; prisoners disparage those who practice rituals as “fake believers” who are merely seeking preferential treatment. While practicing Islam rituals provoked hatred and humor among prisoners, attending the Ashura mourning ceremony and performing self-flagellation are respected and admired practices. Iranian prisoners create a subculture where Islam is not pivotal to constructing or reconstructing their identities, yet religious-based rehabilitation still exists.

Full TextThe first law enacted in Canada to protect existing Aboriginal rights was section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 The first law in Canada to recognize the rights of non-human animals as anything other than property has yet to be enacted. The first Supreme Court of Canada (hereafter referred to as the Court) case to interpret section 35 was R. v. Sparrow.3 The 1990 case confirmed an Aboriginal right of the Musqueam peoples of British Columbia to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes. Since this precedent-setting case, many similar claims have been brought before the courts by way of the fluctuating legal space created by s.35. Many of these cases have been about establishing rights to fish4, hunt5, and trap non-human animals (hereafter referred to as animals). The Court has developed, and continues to develop tests to determine the existence and scope of Aboriginal rights. These tests primarily embody cultural, political and, to a surprisingly lesser degree, legal forces. One of the principal problems with these tests is that they privilege, through the western philosophical lens, the interests of humans. Animals are, at best, the resources over which ownership is being contested. The Euro-centric legal conceptualization of animals as 'resources' over which ownership can be exerted is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the relegation of animals solely to a utilitarian role is antithetical to Indigenous-animal relationships and therefore demonstrates one of the fundamental ways the Canadian legal system is ill equipped to give adequate consideration to Indigenous law. Second, failure to consider animals' inherent value and agency in this context reproduces the human-animal and culture-nature binaries that are at the root of many of western Euro-centric society's inequities. This paper argues that Aboriginal peoples' relationships with animals are a necessary, integral and distinctive part of their cultures6 and, therefore, these relationships and the actors within them are entitled to the aegis of s.35. Through the legal protection of these relationships, animals will gain significant protection as a corollary benefit. If the Court were to protect the cultural relationships between animals and Aboriginal groups, a precondition would be acceptance of Indigenous legal systems. Thus, this paper gives a brief answer to the question, what are Indigenous legal systems and why are animals integral to them? The Anishinabe (also known Ojibwe or Chippewa) are Indigenous peoples who have historically lived in the Great Lakes region. The Bruce Peninsula on Lake Huron is home to the Cape Croker Indian Reserve, where the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation live. The people of this First Nation identify as Anishinabe. The Anishinabek case of Nanabush v. Deer is a law among these people and is used throughout the paper as an example of Indigenous-animal relationships. Making the significant assumption that s.35 has the capacity to recognize Indigenous law, the subsequent section of the paper asks why we should protect these relationships and how that protection should be achieved. Finally, the paper concludes that both the ability of s.35 to recognize Indigenous-animal relationships, and the judicial and political will to grant such recognition, are unlikely. Indigenous-animal relationships are integral to the distinctive culture of the Anishinabek, however the courts would be hesitant to allow such an uncertain and potentially far-reaching right. This is not surprising given that such a claim by both Indigenous and animal groups would challenge the foundations upon which the Canadian legal system is based. There are many sensitive issues inherent in this topic. It should be noted the author is not of Indigenous ancestry, but is making every effort to learn about and respect the Indigenous legal systems discussed. While this paper focuses on a number of Anishinabek laws; it is neither a complete analysis of these practices, nor one that can be transferred, without adaptation, to other peoples. Finally, Indigenous peoples and animal rights and Indigenous law scholars, such as Tom Regan and Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, respectively, may insist on an abolitionist approach to animal 'use' or reject the legitimacy of s.35 itself.7 These perspectives are worthy and necessary. This paper positions itself amongst these and other sources in order to reflect upon the timely and important issue of the legal status of Indigenous-animal relationships. I:WHAT ARE INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? The Law Commission of Canada defines a legal tradition as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in the society and the polity, the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught.”8 Indigenous legal traditions fit this description. They are living systems of beliefs and practices, and have been recognized as such by the courts.9 Indigenous practices developed into systems of law that have guided communities in their governance, and in their relationships amongst their own and other cultures and with the Earth.10 These laws have developed through stories, historical events that may be viewed as ‘cases,’ and other lived experiences. Indigenous laws are generally non-prescriptive, non-adversarial and non-punitive and aim to promote respect and consensus, as well as close connection with the land, the Creator, and the community. Indigenous laws are a means through which vital knowledge of social order within the community is transmitted, revived and retained. After European ‘settlement’ the influence of Indigenous laws waned. This was due in part to the state’s policies of assimilation, relocation and enfranchisement. 11 Despite these assaults, Indigenous legal systems have persevered; they continue to provide guidance to many communities, and are being revived and re-learned in others. For example, the Nisga’a’s legal code, Ayuuk, guides their communities and strongly informs legislation enacted under the Nisga’a Final Agreement, the first modern treaty in British Columbia.12 The land and jurisdiction claims of the Wet’suwet’en and Gitxsan Nations ultimately resulted in the Court’s decision in Delgamuukw,13 a landmark case that established the existence of Aboriginal title. The (overturned) BC Supreme Court’s statement in Delgamuukw14 reveals two of the many challenges in demonstrating the validity of Indigenous laws: “what the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en witnesses[es] describe as law is really a most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by the Indians [sic] themselves.” The first challenge is that many laws are not in full practice, and therefore not as visible as they could be and once were. What the courts fail to acknowledge, however, is that the ongoing colonial project has served to stifle, extinguish and alter these laws. The second challenge is that the kind of law held and practiced by Indigenous peoples is quite foreign to most non-Indigenous people. Many Indigenous laws have animals as central figures. In Anishinabek traditional law, often the animals are the lawmakers15: they develop the legal principles and have agency as law givers. For instance, the Anishinabek case Nanabush v. Deer, Wolf , as outlined by Burrows, is imbued with legal principles, lessons on conduct and community governance, as well as ‘offenses’ and penalties. It is not a case that was adjudicated by an appointed judge in a courtroom, but rather one that has developed over time as a result of peoples’ relationships with the Earth and its inhabitants. An abbreviated summary of the case hints at these legal lessons: Nanabush plays a trick on a deer and deliberately puts the deer in a vulnerable position. In that moment of vulnerability, Nanabush kills the deer and then roasts its body for dinner. While he is sleeping and waiting for the deer to be cooked, the Wolf people come by and take the deer. Nanabush wakes up hungry, and out of desperation transforms into a snake and eats the brains out of the deer head. Once full, he is stuck inside the head and transforms back into his original shape, but with the deer head still stuck on. He is then chased and nearly killed by hunters who mistake him for a real deer. This case is set within the legal context of the Anishinabek’s treaty with deer. In signing the treaty, the people were reminded to respect beings in life and death and that gifts come when beings respect each other in interrelationships.16 Nanabush violated the rights of the deer and his peoples’ treaty with the deer. He violated the laws by taking things through trickery, and by causing harm to those he owed respect. Because his actions were not in accordance with Anishinabek legal principles, he was punished: Nanabush lost the thing he was so desperately searching for, and he ended up nearly being killed. This case establishes two lessons. The first is that, like statutory and common law, with which Canadians are familiar, Indigenous law does not exist in isolation. Principles are devised based on multiple teachings, pre- vious rules and the application of these rules to facts. That there are myriad sources of Indigenous law suggests that the learning of Indigenous law would require substantial effort on the part of Canadian law-makers.17 The second is that animals hold an important place in Indigenous law, and those relationships with animals – and the whole ‘natural’ world – strongly inform the way they relate to the Earth. II: CAN CANADIAN LAW ACCEPT INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? If there were a right recognized under s.35 concerning the Indigenous-animal relationship, what would it look like? Courts develop legal tests to which the facts of each case are applied, theoretically creating a degree of predictability as to how a matter will be judged. Introduced in Sparrow, and more fully developed in Van der Peet, a ‘test’ for how to assess a valid Aboriginal right has been set out by the Court. Summarized, the test is: “in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.”18 There are ten, differently weighted factors that a court will consider in making this assessment. The right being ‘tested’ in this discussion is the one exemplified in Nanabush v. Deer: the ability of Indigenous peoples to recognize and practice their laws, which govern relationships, including death, with deer and other animals. The courts have agreed that a generous, large and liberal construction should be given to Indigenous rights in order to give full effect to the constitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of Aboriginal culture. Still, it is the courts that hold the power to define rights as they conceive them best aligning with Canadian society19; this is one way that the Canadian state reproduces its systems of power over Indigenous peoples.20 The application of the Aboriginal right exemplified in Nanbush v. Deer to the Sparrow and Van der Peet tests would likely conclude that the Anishinabek do have an integral and distinctive relationship with animals. However, due to the significant discretion of the Court on a number of very subjective and politically sensitive factors, it is uncertain that the Nanabush v. Deer case would ‘pass’ Van der Peet’s required ten factors.21 This is indicative of the structural restraints that s.35 imposes. 22 The questions it asks impair its ability to capture and respect the interrelationships inherent in Indigenous peoples’ interactions with animals. For example, the Court will characterize hunting or fishing as solely subsistence, perhaps with a cultural element. Shin Imai contends these activities mean much more: “To many…subsistence is a means of reaffirming Aboriginal identity by passing on traditional knowledge to future generations. Subsistence in this sense moves beyond mere economics, encompassing the cultural, social and spiritual aspects for the communities.”23 Scholar Kent McNeil concludes that: “regardless of the strengths of legal arguments in favour of Indigenous peoples, there are limits to how far the courts […] are willing to go to correct the injustices caused by colonialism and dispossession.”24 It is often not the legal principles that determine outcomes, but rather the extent to which Indigenous rights can be reconciled with the history of settlement without disturbing the current economic and political structure of the dominant culture. III:WHY PROTECT THE ANIMAL-INDIGENOUS RELATIONSHIP? Legally protecting animal-Indigenous relationships offers symbiotic, mutually respectful benefits for animals and for the scope of Aboriginal rights that can be practiced. For instance, a protected relationship would have indirect benefits for animals’ habitat and right to life: it would necessitate protecting the means necessary, such as governance of the land, for realization of the right. This could include greater conservation measures, more contiguous habitat, enforcement of endangered species laws, and, ideally, a greater awareness and appreciation by humans of animals and their needs. Critical studies scholars have developed the argument that minority groups should not be subject to culturally biased laws of the mainstream polity.24 Law professor Maneesha Deckha points out that animals, despite the central role they play in a lot of ‘cultural defences,’ have been excluded from our ethical consideration. Certainly, the role of animals has been absent in judicial consideration of Aboriginal rights.26 Including animals, Deckha argues, allows for a complete analysis of these cultural issues and avoids many of the anthropocentric attitudes inherent in Euro-centric legal traditions. In Jack and Charlie27 two Coast Salish men were charged with hunting deer out of season. They argued that they needed to kill a deer in order to have raw meat for an Aboriginal religious ceremony. The Court found that killing the deer was not part of the ceremony and that there was insufficient evidence to establish that raw meat was required. This is a case where a more nuanced consideration of the laws and relationships with animals would have resulted in a more just application of the (Canadian) law and prevented the reproduction of imperialist attitudes. A criticism that could be lodged against practicing these relationships is that they conflict with the liberty and life interests of animals.28 Theoretically, if Indigenous laws are given the legal and political room to fully operate, a balance between the liberty of animals and the cultural and legal rights of Indigenous peoples can be struck.29 Indeed, Indigenous peoples’ cultural and legal concern for Earth is at its most rudimentary a concern for the land, which is at the heart of the challenge to the Canadian colonial system. If a negotiated treaty was reached, or anti-cruelty and conservation laws were assured in the Indigenous peoples’ self government system, then Canadian anti-cruelty30 and conservation laws,31 the effectiveness of which are already questionable, could be displaced in recognition of Indigenous governance.32 Indigenous peoples in Canada were – and are, subject to imposed limitations – close to the environment in ways that can seem foreign to non-Indigenous people.33 For example, some origin stories and oral histories explain how boundaries between humans and animals are at times absent: Animal-human beings like raven, coyote and rabbit created them [humans] and other beings. People …acted with respect toward many animals in expectation of reciprocity; or expressed kinship or alliance with them in narratives, songs, poems, parables, performances, rituals, and material objects. 34 Furthering or reviving these relationships can advance the understanding of both Indigenous legal systems and animal rights theory. Some animal rights theorists struggle with how to explain the cultural construction of species difference: Indigenous relationships with animals are long standing, lived examples of a different cultural conception of how to relate to animals and also of an arguably healthy, minimally problematic way to approach the debate concerning the species divide.35 A key tenet of animal-Indigenous relationships is respect. Shepard Krech posits that Indigenous peoples are motivated to obtain the necessary resources and goals in ‘proper’ ways: many believe that animals return to the Earth to be killed, provided that hunters demonstrate proper respect.36 This demonstrates a spiritual connection, but there is also a concrete connection between Indigenous peoples and animals. In providing themselves with food and security, they ‘manage’ what Canadian law calls ‘resources.’37 Because of the physical nature of these activities, and their practical similarity with modern ‘resource management,’ offering this as ‘proof’ of physical connection with animals and their habitat may be more successful than ‘proving’ a spiritual relationship. Finally, there are health reasons that make the Indigenous-animal relationship is important. Many cultures have come to depend on the nutrients they derive from particular hunted or fished animals. For example, nutrition and physical activity transitions related to hunting cycles have had negative impacts on individual and community health.38 This shows the multidimensionality of hunting, the significance of health, and, by extension, the need for animal ‘resources’ to be protected. IV: HOW SHOULD WE PROTECT THESE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS? If the Anishinabek and the deer ‘win’ the constitutional legal test (‘against’ the state) and establish a right to protect their relationships with animals, what, other than common law remedies,39 would follow? Below are ideas for legal measures that could be taken from the human or the animal perspective, or both, where benefits accrue to both parties. If animals had greater agency and legal status, their needs as species and as individuals could have a meaningful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In Nanabush v. Deer, this would mean that the deer would be given representation and that legal tests would need to be developed to determine the animals’ rights and interests. Currently the courts support the view that animals can be treated under the law as any other inanimate item of property. Such a legal stance is inconsistent with a rational, common-sense view of animals,40 and certainly with Anishinabek legal principles discussed herein.41 There are ongoing theoretical debates that inform the practical questions of how animal equality would be achieved: none of these in isolation offers a complete solution, but combined they contribute to the long term goal. Barsh and James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson advocate an adoption of the reasoning in the Australian case Mabo v. Queensland,42 where whole Aboriginal legal systems were imported intact into the common law. Some principles that Canada should be following can also be drawn from international treaties that Canada has or should have signed on to.43 Another way to seek protection from the human perspective is through the freedom of religion and conscience section of the Charter. Professor John Borrows constructs a full argument for this, and cites its challenges, in Living Law on a Living Earth: Aboriginal Religion, Law and the Constitution.44 The strongest, but perhaps most legally improbable, way to protect the animal- Indigenous relationship is for Canada to recognize a third, Indigenous order of government (in addition to provincial and federal), where all three orders are equal and inform one another’s laws. This way, Indigenous laws would have the legal space to fully function and be revived. Endowing Indigenous peoples with the right to govern their relationships would require a great acquiescence of power by governments and a commitment to the establishment and maintenance of healthy self-government in Indigenous communities. Louise Mandell offers some reasons why Canada should treat Aboriginal people in new ways, at least one of which is salient to the third order of government argument: To mend the [E]arth, which must be done, governments must reassess the information which the dominant culture has dismissed. Some of that valuable information is located in the oral histories of Aboriginal Peoples. This knowledge will become incorporated into decisions affecting the [E]arth’s landscape when Aboriginal Peoples are equal partners in decisions affecting their territories.45 V: CONCLUSION A legal system that does not have to justify its existence or defend its worth is less vulnerable to challenges.46 While it can be concluded that s.35 has offered some legal space for Indigenous laws and practices, it is too deeply couched in Euro-centric legal traditions and the anthropocentric cultural assumptions that they carry. The most effective strategy for advancing Indigenous laws and culture, that would also endow many animals with greater agency, and relax the culture-nature, human-animal binaries, is the formal recognition of a third order of government. Lisa Chartrand explains that recognition of legal pluralism would be a mere affirmation of legal systems that exist, but which are stifled: “…this country is a multijuridical state, where the distinct laws and rules of three systems come together within the geographic boundaries of one political territory.” 47 Revitalizing Indigenous legal systems is and will be a challenging undertaking. Indigenous communities must reclaim, define and understand their own traditions: “The loss of culture and traditions caused by the historic treatment of Aboriginal communities makes this a formidable challenge for some communities. Equally significant is the challenge for the Canadian state to create political and legal space to accommodate revitalized Indigenous legal traditions and Aboriginal law-making.”48 The project of revitalizing Indigenous legal traditions requires the commitment of resources sufficient for the task, and transformative change to procedural and substantive law. The operation of these laws within, or in addition to, Canadian law would of course cause widespread, but worthwhile controversy. In Animal Bodies, Cultural Justice49 Deckha argues that an ethical relationship with the animal Other must be established in order realize cultural and animal rights. This paper explores and demonstrates the value in finding legal space where cultural pluralism and respect for animals can give rise to the practice of Indigenous laws and the revitalization of animal-Indigenous relationships. As Borrows writes: “Anishinabek law provides guidance about how to theorize, practice and order our association with the [E]arth, and could do so in a way that produces answers that are very different from those found in other sources.”50 (see PDF for references)

Originally, the idea of interviewing Iris Marion Young in Barcelona came about after she accepted an invitation to give a public lecture at the Law School of Pompeu Fabra University in May 2002. I had first met Iris back in 1999, at a conference in Bristol, England, and I was impressed deeply by her personality and ideas. We kept in touch since then and exchanged papers and ideas. She was very keen to come to Spain (it seems that her mother had lived some years in Mallorca) and she finally travelled to Barcelona with her husband and daughter in spring 2002.The lecture, which she entitled “Women, War, and Peace,” was meant to be the closing session of a course on Gender and the Law, and was also part of a series of seminars annually organized by the legal philosophy department (the Albert Calsamiglia Seminar). Her work was quite well-known among several Catalan philosophers and political scientists and professor Angel Castiñeira—who, at the time, was the director of Idees (Ideas), a Catalan journal published by the Centre d'Estudis de Temes Contemporanis (Center for the Study of Contemporary Issues)—suggested that she could give a second lecture, which they would publish together with an interview I could prepare. She accepted both proposals, and I started to think of a questionnaire for the interview while I was at Queen's University in Canada earlier that year. Idil Boran, a philosopher and good friend who did her doctorate at Queen's, offered to help me with this endeavour, since she also admired Iris as both a scholar and a person. Together we prepared the questions and sent them to her once she was back in Chicago, as there was not time to conduct the interview in person while she was in Barcelona.In fall 2002, she sent some answers to our questions, but the document was unfortunately incomplete. She was busy at the time, so we didn't want to pressure her to finish the interview. Eventually, the editors of Idees decided to publish the manifest about the war in Iraq subscribed by a large number of American Intellectuals together with fragments of Iris's (antiwar) lectures and an article that she wrote together with Daniel Archibugi, “Envisioning a Global Rule of Law.”1 The interview was thus left unpublished. Both Idil and I thought it would be worthwhile to publish it somewhere else, but, for one reason or another, Iris didn't have the time to complete it and we kept postponing the project. At some point, she said that the questions she left unanswered were too complex or challenging to give a short or quick answer, and that she would need to reflect on them to provide detailed responses.Later, we learned she was ill and we didn't feel it was right to insist on those questions being answered. The issue came up again when she accepted to participate as a keynote speaker at the World Congress of Legal Philosophy held in Granada in June 2005. She then said she would come first to Barcelona (where she and Nancy Fraser had been invited to a workshop by the Catalan Women Institute) and suggested we could sit in a cafe and talk about the issues left out in those unanswered questions. Unfortunately, she had to cancel this trip because of her medical treatment, and I did not have the privilege of sharing time with her again. The following series of questions and responses are the product of this rather extended interview process.Neus Torbisco Casals

<p>Ilias Anagnostakis and Anna Lambropoulou</p><p>An instance of the implementation of the Byzantine institution of asylum in the Peloponnese: the Slavs seek sanctuary in the Church of St Andrew of Patrai</p><p>The events which took place in the Peloponnese in the early ninth century (c. 800) are recorded in later sources, mostly of the tenth century. Following the establishment of the theme system of territorial administration and the securing of ecclesiastical order in the region, the emperor Nikephoros I, in implementing his new fiscal and economic policy, took steps to increase the number of inhabitants by systematically encouraging the settlement of new population groups from outside the area. It was within this general context and during this same period that the rebellion of the Slavs in Achaia, as described by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, needs to be viewed. Clearly, also, the phenomenon needs to be seen within the context of the specific social climate of the region where radical change was taking place and significant breaks with the past were occurring. During the repression of the rebellion the Slavs sought sanctuary in the church of the Apostle Andrew. As a result of this move, however, the rebels were given special treatment as they were viewed as having repented their actions. This was an occurrence whose more general implications are worthy of further study. Looked at from the broader ecclesiastical and political perspective, there are certain characteristic features to be noted in the attitudes towards asylum and the priority ascribed to ecclesiastical over civil law in Constantinople at the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth centuries. At the beginning of the ninth century, during the reign of Nikephoros I and while Tarasios was on the patriarchal throne (784-806), the flight of the defeated Slavs to the Church of St Andrew and the relative leniency that was shown them by the state suggest that here we are dealing with an instance of the workings of the institution of sanctuary in Byzantium. While the sources bring in a host of hagiographie and miraculous elements -the standard baggage of accounts of Christianisation and repentance-he flight of the Slavs to the church of the patron saint of the city constitutes, in our opinion, in instance of mass asylum. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that the respective terminology which was used in Porphyrogenitus' account and was in all likelihood included in the sigillion of Nikephoros I relies, in our view, directly on Byzantine legislative reforms concerning sanctuary.</p><p>This is the first recorded instance of mass asylum and resort to church sanctuary in the middle Byzantine period in the Peloponnese. An effort was made both on the part of the church and the state to find a compromise solution: the former sought recognition of the institution of sanctuary while the latter was concerned to maintain the authority of its judicial and penal organs. The Slavs, who had sought sanctuary in the church, while normally liable to the punishment reserved for insurrection, were in the end granted special treatment. A compromise was found: despite the Slavs' attempt to rebel against the Byzantine authorities, the institution of asylum was fully implemented with the imposition of a number of restrictions and sanctions against the Slav population. The economic side of this treatment, which was generally a feature of the institution of ecclesiastical asylum both in Byzantium and the medieval West, has been well investigated. Indeed, monasticism and land ownership in the region of Bithynia are thought to have developed thanks to the institution of monastic asylum and the geographical boundaries of asylum, and this appears to be the case in the Peloponnese, too, where we see privileges and sigillia being granted for new monasteries and metropoleis in the ninth century. It is particularly interesting to note that the limits of 'rural asylum', i.e. the legal delimitation of the concepts of asylum and imperial donations, are lumped together with the estates of the church or monastery. The transfer of the exploitation of cultivable land to the workers of the monastery or church very often led to the development of settlements in the area. Seen in this light, the introduction of the institution of asylum and its legal delimitation in the case of the ecclesiastical estates of Achaia are directly related to the settlements of the early ninth century. It is probable that in contrast to the case of Syria and Bithynia asylum was not the catalyst behind the gradual settlement of the region of Achaia. However, and more importantly, it did offer solutions to the problems arising from the settlements. In the case of Patrai groups of unruly and discontented peasant populations developed an allegiance to the metropolis and were subsequently integrated to the point that they became entitled to protection from every epinoia adikos ('unjust design').</p><p>Subsequent to the Patrai episode - as far as the evidence allows us to construe- the Empire turned its military operations to the unsubdued, mountainous and more southerly regions of the Peloponnese. By contrast, the Slavs of Achaia were granted sigillia guaranteeing protection from any unapproved measures or epinoia adikos of the metropolitan. The flight of the Slavs to the Church of St Andrew following the miraculous intervention of the Apostle Andrew and the repression of the revolt, as well as the special treatment that they then received at the hands of the Byzantine authorities on account of their seeking sanctuary in the church, can be seen to constitute a form of asylum that is entirely consistent with the political and social climate and with the concept of asylum of the age of Nikephoros I.</p><p> Further investigation of the sigillia and their authenticity and reliability as sources may help to improve our understanding of the implementation and development of the institution of asylum in Byzantium during the reign of Nikephoros I.</p><p> </p>

Social Media is the new avenue for creating connections and sharing of information. Through social media, one can reach a global community. In recent years, we have seen how social media has changed the way we do things. Social Media has been extensively utilized for health education and promotion, proving itself to be an invaluable tool for public health, professional networking and patient care benefit. The challenge has been to use the power afforded by social media responsibly, and to define the line between use and abuse. While there may be laws, implementation proves to be a challenge in the digital age. Therefore, self-regulation and institutional policy remain a critical part. It is therefore urged that hospitals and health care facilities adopt their own social media use policy appropriate for the institution. Below are proposed rules that could guide institutions in developing their own policy for social media use: Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. The health facility recognizes that the exercise of the freedom of expression comes with a responsibility and a duty to respect the rights of others. The health facility likewise acknowledges the fundamental right to privacy of every individual. This policy shall provide rules for responsible social media use. Sec. 2. Definition. For purposes of this policy, the following definitions shall be used: Social Media refers to electronic communication, websites or applications through which users connect, interact or share information or other content with other individuals, collectively part of an online community. This includes Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Blogs, Social Networking sites. Health facility shall refer to the hospital or other health care facilities, including training and educational institutions. Individual shall refer to physicians, employees, other health facility staff, residents, or students to which this policy would apply Sec. 3. Applicability. This policy shall apply to all physicians, health professionals, employees and other health facility staff, including students or residents in training, practicing their profession, working, or fulfilling academic and clinical requirements within the health facility, whether temporary or permanent. Sec. 4. General Principles. Social media use shall be guided by the following principles: In using social media, an individual should always be mindful of his or her duties to the patient and community, his profession and his colleagues. The individual should always be conscious of his or her online image and how it impacts his or her profession, or the institution where he or she is professionally employed, affiliated or otherwise connected. Responsible social media use also requires the individual to ensure that in his or her social media activity, there is no law violated, including copyright, libel and cybercrime laws. At all times, the individual shall respect the right of privacy of others. Use of social media requires a personal commitment to uphold the ethical standards required of those providing health services, upon which patient trust is built. Sec. 5. Social Media for Health Education or Promotion a.The individual using social media for health education or promotion must be well-informed of the matter subject of the social media post, comment or other activity. The individual shall refrain from any activity which spreads or tends to spread misinformation. An article written by an individual and posted in social media must be evidence-based and disclose connections with pharmaceutical or health product companies or other sources of possible conflict of interest. c.Social media shall not be used to dispense specific medical diagnosis, advice, treatment or projection but shall consist of general opinions only. Use of social media should include statements that a person should not rely on the advice given online, and that medical concerns are best addressed in the appropriate setting. The individual shall be careful in posting or publishing his or her opinion and shall ensure that such opinion will not propagate misinformation or constitute a misrepresentation. The individual shall not make any misrepresentations in his or her social media activity relating to content, his or her employment or credentials, and any other information that may be misconstrued or taken out of context. Sec. 6. Professionalism in Social Media Use Individuals are discouraged from using a single account for both professional and private use. Be mindful that an electronic mail address used professionally may readily be linked to a social media site used privately. The individual shall conduct himself or herself in social media or online the same way that he would in the public, mindful of acting in a manner befitting his profession, or that would inspire trust in the service he or she provides, especially if the individual has not separated his or her professional and personal accounts in social media. The individual shall likewise refrain from using the name, logo or other symbol of an institution without prior authority in his or her social media activity. An individual shall not identify himself or herself as a representative of an institution in social media without being authorized to do so. Individuals shall not accept former or current patients as friends or contacts in their personal accounts, unless there is justification to do so, such as a pre-existing relationship or when unavoidable for patient care. In case of online interaction with patients, this should be limited to matters related to the patient’s treatment and management, and which could be properly disclosed. Informal and personal information concerning a patient, colleague or the health facility shall not be posted, shared or otherwise used in social media. Social media shall not be used to establish inappropriate relationships with patients or colleagues, and shall not be used to obtain information that would negatively impact on the provision of services and professional management of the patient. An individual shall refrain from posting, sharing or otherwise using photos or videos taken within the health facility, which would give the impression of unprofessionalism, show parts of the health facility where there is an expectation of privacy, or those which includes colleagues, employees, other health facility staff, or patients without their express consent. The consent requirement shall apply even if the other individuals included are not readily identifiable. Sec. 7. Responsible Social Media Activity In using social media, the individual shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of another. The individual shall not post, share or otherwise use social media with the intent of damaging the reputation of any other individual or institution, especially if the subject is identified or identifiable. c.Derogatory comments about patients, colleagues, employers and institutions or companies should be avoided. An individual may “like” a defamatory post but he or she must use caution when sharing, retweeting or contributing anything that might be construed as a new defamatory statement. A post, comment or other social media activity is considered defamatory if: 1) The activity imputes a discreditable act or condition to another; 2) The activity is viewed or seen by any other person; 3) The person or institution defamed is identified or readily identifiable; 4) There is malice or intent to damage the reputation of another. He or she shall be careful of sharing posts or other contents that are unverified, particularly if it discredits another person or institution, or imputes the commission of a crime or violation of law even before trial and judgment, and violates the privacy of another. Fair and true reporting on matters of public concern shall be allowed provided that the content was obtained lawfully and with due respect for the right of privacy. An individual shall not use copyrighted materials other than for fair use where there is proper citation of source and author. Use of copyrighted material for purpose of criticism, comment, news, reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, and similar purposes is compatible with fair use. An individual is prohibited from: 1) Social media activities that defame, harass, stalk, or bully another person or institution. 2) The use or access of personal social media accounts of others without authority. 3) Posting, sharing or otherwise using any information intended to be private or obtained through access to electronic data messages or documents. 4) Posting, sharing or otherwise using recorded conversations between doctors, individuals or patients, when such recording, whether audio or video, was obtained without consent of all the parties to the conversation Individuals should use conservative privacy settings in their social media account used professionally. The individual should also practice due diligence in keeping their social media accounts safe such as through regular password change and logging out after social media use. Sec. 8. Health Information Privacy The individual shall respect the right to privacy of others and shall not collect, use, access or disclose information, pictures and other personal or sensitive information without obtaining consent from the individual concerned. Physicians, health facility employees and other health staff shall have the duty of protecting patient confidentiality in their social media activity. Personal health information, including photos or videos of patients, shall not be posted, shared or otherwise used in social media without consent of patient. Consent shall be obtained after explaining to the patient the purpose of the intended collection, use, access and disclosure. Consent for use of personal health information shall be written or evidenced by electronic means. An individual shall not post, share or otherwise use any information which could be used to identify patients without their consent, including patient’s location, room numbers, and photographs or videos of patients or their body parts, including code names referring to patients. The individual shall not post, share or otherwise use any other information acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient. The duty of maintaining patient confidentiality remains even after patient’s death. An individual shall not post, share or otherwise use any information relating to the identity, status and personal details of persons with HIV, those who have undergone drug rehabilitation, and victims of domestic violence, rape and child abuse. Sec. 9. Compliance and Reporting. An individual shall strive to develop, support and maintain a privacy culture in the health facility. He or she shall abide by the social media use policy of the institution. An individual who becomes aware of unprofessional behavior, misinformation or privacy violations in social media shall report the matter to the hospital’s privacy officer or the proper office or authority within the facility. Health facilities shall in so far as practicable monitor the social media activity of all physicians, employees and other health facility staff, including students or residents in training, practicing their profession, working, or fulfilling academic and clinical requirements within the health facility, whether temporary or permanent. Sec. 10. Penalty. A violation of this policy may constitute a violation of the code of ethics of physicians and other professions, and other applicable laws. Health Professionals, employees and other Health Facility Staff. Any person found violating this policy will be considered in violation of health facility rules and regulations, and shall be subjected to health facility administrative proceedings, which after notice and hearing, and depending on the severity of the violation, could result to termination of service or withdrawal of privileges. A lighter penalty may likewise be imposed. In determining the severity of the violation, the following factors may be considered: previous violation, if any, the nature of the violation, and the extent of injury or damage. The penalty imposed by the health facility shall be without prejudice to the filing of a complaint before the Civil Service Commission, the Professional Regulations Commission, the Office of the Prosecutor or Ombudsman, or proper courts. Students. In case of students, they shall be reported to the college wherein they are enrolled and shall be subjected to disciplinary proceedings, which could result to expulsion, depending on the severity of the violation, and in accordance with the applicable University and respective College rules. A lighter penalty may likewise be imposed. The disciplinary proceedings shall be without prejudice to other applicable legal remedies.

Background and Objective: Suicide attempts are 10-20X more common than completed suicide and an important risk factor for death by suicide, yet most people who attempt suicide do not die by suicide. The process of recovering after a suicide attempt has not been well studied. The Reasons to go on Living (RTGOL) Project, a narrative web-based study, focuses on experiences of people who have attempted suicide and made the decision to go on living, a process not well studied. Narrative research is ideally suited to understanding personal experiences critical to recovery following a suicide attempt, including the transition to a state of hopefulness. Voices from people with lived experience can help us plan and conceptualize this work. This paper reports on a secondary research question of the larger study: what stories do participants tell of the positive role/impact of the mental health system. Material and Methods: A website created for The RTGOL Project (www.thereasons.ca) enabled participants to anonymously submit a story about their suicide attempt and recovery, a process which enabled participation from a large and diverse group of participants. The only direction given was “if you have made a suicide attempt or seriously considered suicide and now want to go on living, we want to hear from you.” The unstructured narrative format allowed participants to describe their experiences in their own words, to include and emphasize what they considered important. Over 5 years, data analysis occurred in several phases over the course of the study, resulting in the identification of data that were inputted into an Excel file. This analysis used stories where participants described positive involvement with the mental health system (50 stories). Results: Several participants reflected on experiences many years previous, providing the privilege of learning how their life unfolded, what made a difference. Over a five-year period, 50 of 226 stories identified positive experiences with mental health care with sufficient details to allow analysis, and are the focus of this paper. There were a range of suicidal behaviours in these 50 stories, from suicidal ideation only to medically severe suicide attempts. Most described one or more suicide attempts. Three themes identified included: 1) trust and relationship with a health care professional, 2) the role of friends and family and friends, and 3) a wide range of services. Conclusion: Stories open a window into the experiences of the period after a suicide attempt. This study allowed for an understanding of how mental health professionals might help individuals who have attempted suicide write a different story, a life-affirming story. The stories that participants shared offer some understanding of “how” to provide support at a most-needed critical juncture for people as they interact with health care providers, including immediately after a suicide attempt. Results of this study reinforce that just one caring professional can make a tremendous difference to a person who has survived a suicide attempt. Key Words: web-based; suicide; suicide attempt; mental health system; narrative research Word Count: 478 Introduction My Third (or fourth) Suicide AttemptI laid in the back of the ambulance, the snow of too many doses of ativan dissolving on my tongue.They hadn't even cared enough about meto put someone in the back with me,and so, frustrated,I'd swallowed all the pills I had with me— not enough to do what I wanted it to right then,but more than enough to knock me out for a good 14 hours.I remember very little after that;benzodiazepines like ativan commonly cause pre- and post-amnesia, says Google helpfullyI wake up in a locked rooma woman manically drawing on the windows with crayonsthe colors of light through the glassdiffused into rainbows of joy scattered about the roomas if she were coloring on us all,all of the tattered remnants of humanity in a psych wardmade into a brittle mosaic, a quilt of many hues, a Technicolor dreamcoatand I thoughtI am so glad to be able to see this. (Story 187)The nurse opening that door will have a lasting impact on how this story unfolds and on this person’s life. Each year, almost one million people die from suicide, approximately one death every 40 seconds. Suicide attempts are much more frequent, with up to an estimated 20 attempts for every death by suicide.1 Suicide-related behaviours range from suicidal ideation and self-injury to death by suicide. We are unable to directly study those who die by suicide, but effective intervention after a suicide attempt could reduce the risk of subsequent death by suicide. Near-fatal suicide attempts have been used to explore the boundary with completed suicides. Findings indicated that violent suicide attempters and serious attempters (seriousness of the medical consequences to define near-fatal attempts) were more likely to make repeated, and higher lethality suicide attempts.2 In a case-control study, the medically severe suicide attempts group (78 participants), epidemiologically very similar to those who complete suicide, had significantly higher communication difficulties; the risk for death by suicide multiplied if accompanied by feelings of isolation and alienation.3 Most research in suicidology has been quantitative, focusing almost exclusively on identifying factors that may be predictive of suicidal behaviours, and on explanation rather than understanding.4 Qualitative research, focusing on the lived experiences of individuals who have attempted suicide, may provide a better understanding of how to respond in empathic and helpful ways to prevent future attempts and death by suicide.4,5 Fitzpatrick6 advocates for narrative research as a valuable qualitative method in suicide research, enabling people to construct and make sense of the experiences and their world, and imbue it with meaning. A review of qualitative studies examining the experiences of recovering from or living with suicidal ideation identified 5 interconnected themes: suffering, struggle, connection, turning points, and coping.7 Several additional qualitative studies about attempted suicide have been reported in the literature. Participants have included patients hospitalized for attempting suicide8, and/or suicidal ideation,9 out-patients following a suicide attempt and their caregivers,10 veterans with serious mental illness and at least one hospitalization for a suicide attempt or imminent suicide plan.11 Relationships were a consistent theme in these studies. Interpersonal relationships and an empathic environment were perceived as therapeutic and protective, enabling the expression of thoughts and self-understanding.8 Given the connection to relationship issues, the authors suggested it may be helpful to provide support for the relatives of patients who have attempted suicide. A sheltered, friendly environment and support systems, which included caring by family and friends, and treatment by mental health professionals, helped the suicidal healing process.10 Receiving empathic care led to positive changes and an increased level of insight; just one caring professional could make a tremendous difference.11 Kraft and colleagues9 concluded with the importance of hearing directly from those who are suicidal in order to help them, that only when we understand, “why suicide”, can we help with an alternative, “why life?” In a grounded theory study about help-seeking for self-injury, Long and colleagues12 identified that self-injury was not the problem for their participants, but a panacea, even if temporary, to painful life experiences. Participant narratives reflected a complex journey for those who self-injured: their wish when help-seeking was identified by the theme “to be treated like a person”. There has also been a focus on the role and potential impact of psychiatric/mental health nursing. Through interviews with experienced in-patient nurses, Carlen and Bengtsson13 identified the need to see suicidal patients as subjective human beings with unique experiences. This mirrors research with patients, which concluded that the interaction with personnel who are devoted, hope-mediating and committed may be crucial to a patient’s desire to continue living.14 Interviews with individuals who received mental health care for a suicidal crisis following a serious attempt led to the development of a theory for psychiatric nurses with the central variable, reconnecting the person with humanity across 3 phases: reflecting an image of humanity, guiding the individual back to humanity, and learning to live.15 Other research has identified important roles for nurses working with patients who have attempted suicide by enabling the expression of thoughts and developing self-understanding8, helping to see things differently and reconnecting with others,10 assisting the person in finding meaning from their experience to turn their lives around, and maintain/and develop positive connections with others.16 However, one literature review identified that negative attitudes toward self-harm were common among nurses, with more positive attitudes among mental health nurses than general nurses. The authors concluded that education, both reflective and interactive, could have a positive impact.17 This paper is one part of a larger web-based narrative study, the Reasons to go on Living Project (RTGOL), that seeks to understand the transition from making a suicide attempt to choosing life. When invited to tell their stories anonymously online, what information would people share about their suicide attempts? This paper reports on a secondary research question of the larger study: what stories do participants tell of the positive role/impact of the mental health system. The focus on the positive impact reflects an appreciative inquiry approach which can promote better practice.18 Methods Design and Sample A website created for The RTGOL Project (www.thereasons.ca) enabled participants to anonymously submit a story about their suicide attempt and recovery. Participants were required to read and agree with a consent form before being able to submit their story through a text box or by uploading a file. No demographic information was requested. Text submissions were embedded into an email and sent to an account created for the Project without collecting information about the IP address or other identifying information. The content of the website was reviewed by legal counsel before posting, and the study was approved by the local Research Ethics Board. Stories were collected for 5 years (July 2008-June 2013). The RTGOL Project enabled participation by a large, diverse audience, at their own convenience of time and location, providing they had computer access. The unstructured narrative format allowed participants to describe their experiences in their own words, to include and emphasize what they considered important. Of the 226 submissions to the website, 112 described involvement at some level with the mental health system, and 50 provided sufficient detail about positive experiences with mental health care to permit analysis. There were a range of suicidal behaviours in these 50 stories: 8 described suicidal ideation only; 9 met the criteria of medically severe suicide attempts3; 33 described one or more suicide attempts. For most participants, the last attempt had been some years in the past, even decades, prior to writing. Results Stories of positive experiences with mental health care described the idea of a door opening, a turning point, or helping the person to see their situation differently. Themes identified were: (1) relationship and trust with a Health Care Professional (HCP), (2) the role of family and friends (limited to in-hospital experiences), and (3) the opportunity to access a range of services. The many reflective submissions of experiences told many years after the suicide attempt(s) speaks to the lasting impact of the experience for that individual. Trust and Relationship with a Health Care Professional A trusting relationship with a health professional helped participants to see things in a different way, a more hopeful way and over time. “In that time of crisis, she never talked down to me, kept her promises, didn't panic, didn't give up, and she kept believing in me. I guess I essentially borrowed the hope that she had for me until I found hope for myself.” (Story# 35) My doctor has worked extensively with me. I now realize that this is what will keep me alive. To be able to feel in my heart that my doctor does care about me and truly wants to see me get better.” (Story 34). The writer in Story 150 was a nurse, an honours graduate. The 20 years following graduation included depression, hospitalizations and many suicide attempts. “One day after supper I took an entire bottle of prescription pills, then rode away on my bike. They found me late that night unconscious in a downtown park. My heart threatened to stop in the ICU.” Then later, “I finally found a person who was able to connect with me and help me climb out of the pit I was in. I asked her if anyone as sick as me could get better, and she said, “Yes”, she had seen it happen. Those were the words I had been waiting to hear! I quickly became very motivated to get better. I felt heard and like I had just found a big sister, a guide to help me figure out how to live in the world. This person was a nurse who worked as a trauma therapist.” At the time when the story was submitted, the writer was applying to a graduate program. Role of Family and Friends Several participants described being affected by their family’s response to their suicide attempt. Realizing the impact on their family and friends was, for some, a turning point. The writer in Story 20 told of experiences more than 30 years prior to the writing. She described her family of origin as “truly dysfunctional,” and she suffered from episodes of depression and hospitalization during her teen years. Following the birth of her second child, and many family difficulties, “It was at this point that I became suicidal.” She made a decision to kill herself by jumping off the balcony (6 stories). “At the very last second as I hung onto the railing of the balcony. I did not want to die but it was too late. I landed on the parking lot pavement.” She wrote that the pain was indescribable, due to many broken bones. “The physical pain can be unbearable. Then you get to see the pain and horror in the eyes of someone you love and who loves you. Many people suggested to my husband that he should leave me in the hospital, go on with life and forget about me. During the process of recovery in the hospital, my husband was with me every day…With the help of psychiatrists and a later hospitalization, I was actually diagnosed as bipolar…Since 1983, I have been taking lithium and have never had a recurrence of suicidal thoughts or for that matter any kind of depression.” The writer in Story 62 suffered childhood sexual abuse. When she came forward with it, she felt she was not heard. Self-harm on a regular basis was followed by “numerous overdoses trying to end my life.” Overdoses led to psychiatric hospitalizations that were unhelpful because she was unable to trust staff. “My way of thinking was that ending my life was the only answer. There had been numerous attempts, too many to count. My thoughts were that if I wasn’t alive I wouldn’t have to deal with my problems.” In her final attempt, she plunged over the side of a mountain, dropping 80 feet, resulting in several serious injuries. “I was so angry that I was still alive.” However, “During my hospitalization I began to realize that my family and friends were there by my side continuously, I began to realize that I wasn't only hurting myself. I was hurting all the important people in my life. It was then that I told myself I am going to do whatever it takes.” A turning point is not to say that the difficulties did not continue. The writer of Story 171 tells of a suicide attempt 7 years previous, and the ongoing anguish. She had been depressed for years and had thoughts of suicide on a daily basis. After a serious overdose, she woke up the next day in a hospital bed, her husband and 2 daughters at her bed. “Honestly, I was disappointed to wake up. But, then I saw how scared and hurt they were. Then I was sorry for what I had done to them. Since then I have thought of suicide but know that it is tragic for the family and is a hurt that can never be undone. Today I live with the thought that I am here for a reason and when it is God's time to take me then I will go. I do believe living is harder than dying. I do believe I was born for a purpose and when that is accomplished I will be released. …Until then I try to remind myself of how I am blessed and try to appreciate the wonders of the world and the people in it.” Range of Services The important role of mental health and recovery services was frequently mentioned, including dialectical behavioural therapy (DBT)/cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT), recovery group, group therapy, Alcoholics Anonymous, accurate diagnosis, and medications. The writer in Story 30 was 83 years old when she submitted her story, reflecting on a life with both good and bad times. She first attempted suicide at age 10 or 12. A serious post-partum depression followed the birth of her second child, and over the years, she experienced periods of suicidal intent: “Consequently, a few years passed and I got to feeling suicidal again. I had pills in one pocket and a clipping for “The Recovery Group” in the other pocket. As I rode on the bus trying to make up my mind, I decided to go to the Recovery Group first. I could always take the pills later. I found the Recovery Group and yoga helpful; going to meetings sometimes twice a day until I got thinking more clearly and learned how to deal with my problems.” Several participants described the value of CBT or DBT in learning to challenge perceptions. “I have tools now to differentiate myself from the illness. I learned I'm not a bad person but bad things did happen to me and I survived.”(Story 3) “The fact is that we have thoughts that are helpful and thoughts that are destructive….. I knew it was up to me if I was to get better once and for all.” (Story 32): “In the hospital I was introduced to DBT. I saw a nurse (Tanya) every day and attended a group session twice a week, learning the techniques. I worked with the people who wanted to work with me this time. Tanya said the same thing my counselor did “there is no study that can prove whether or not suicide solves problems” and I felt as though I understood it then. If I am dead, then all the people that I kept pushing away and refusing their help would be devastated. If I killed myself with my own hand, my family would be so upset. DBT taught me how to ‘ride my emotional wave’. ……….. DBT has changed my life…….. My life is getting back in order now, thanks to DBT, and I have lots of reasons to go on living.”(Story 19) The writer of Story 67 described the importance of group therapy. “Group therapy was the most helpful for me. It gave me something besides myself to focus on. Empathy is such a powerful emotion and a pathway to love. And it was a huge relief to hear others felt the same and had developed tools of their own that I could try for myself! I think I needed to learn to communicate and recognize when I was piling everything up to build my despair. I don’t think I have found the best ways yet, but I am lifetimes away from that teenage girl.” (Story 67) The author of story 212 reflected on suicidal ideation beginning over 20 years earlier, at age 13. Her first attempt was at 28. “I thought everyone would be better off without me, especially my children, I felt like the worst mum ever, I felt like a burden to my family and I felt like I was a failure at life in general.” She had more suicide attempts, experienced the death of her father by suicide, and then finally found her doctor. “Now I’m on meds for a mood disorder and depression, my family watch me closely, and I see my doctor regularly. For the first time in 20 years, I love being a mum, a sister, a daughter, a friend, a cousin etc.” Discussion The 50 stories that describe positive experiences in the health care system constitute a larger group than most other similar studies, and most participants had made one or more suicide attempts. Several writers reflected back many years, telling stories of long ago, as with the 83-year old participant (Story 30) whose story provided the privilege of learning how the author’s life unfolded. In clinical practice, we often do not know – how did the story turn out? The stories that describe receiving health care speak to the impact of the experience, and the importance of the issues identified in the mental health system. We identified 3 themes, but it was often the combination that participants described in their stories that was powerful, as demonstrated in Story 20, the young new mother who had fallen from a balcony 30 years earlier. Voices from people with lived experience can help us plan and conceptualize our clinical work. Results are consistent with, and add to, the previous work on the importance of therapeutic relationships.8,10,11,14–16 It is from the stories in this study that we come to understand the powerful experience of seeing a family members’ reaction following a participant’s suicide attempt, and how that can be a potent turning point as identified by Lakeman and Fitzgerald.7 Ghio and colleagues8 and Lakeman16 identified the important role for staff/nurses in supporting families due to the connection to relationship issues. This research also calls for support for families to recognize the important role they have in helping the person understand how much they mean to them, and to promote the potential impact of a turning point. The importance of the range of services reflect Lakeman and Fitzgerald’s7 theme of coping, associating positive change by increasing the repertoire of coping strategies. These findings have implications for practice, research and education. Working with individuals who are suicidal can help them develop and tell a different story, help them move from a death-oriented to life-oriented position,15 from “why suicide” to “why life.”9 Hospitalization provides a person with the opportunity to reflect, to take time away from “the real world” to consider oneself, the suicide attempt, connections with family and friends and life goals, and to recover physically and emotionally. Hospitalization is also an opening to involve the family in the recovery process. The intensity of the immediate period following a suicide attempt provides a unique opportunity for nurses to support and coach families, to help both patients and family begin to see things differently and begin to create that different story. In this way, family and friends can be both a support to the person who has attempted suicide, and receive help in their own struggles with this experience. It is also important to recognize that this short period of opportunity is not specific to the nurses in psychiatric units, as the nurses caring for a person after a medically severe suicide attempt will frequently be the nurses in the ICU or Emergency departments. Education, both reflective and interactive, could have a positive impact.17 Helping staff develop the attitudes, skills and approach necessary to be helpful to a person post-suicide attempt is beginning to be reported in the literature.21 Further implications relate to nursing curriculum. Given the extent of suicidal ideation, suicide attempts and deaths by suicide, this merits an important focus. This could include specific scenarios, readings by people affected by suicide, both patients themselves and their families or survivors, and discussions with individuals who have made an attempt(s) and made a decision to go on living. All of this is, of course, not specific to nursing. All members of the interprofessional health care team can support the transition to recovery of a person after a suicide attempt using the strategies suggested in this paper, in addition to other evidence-based interventions and treatments. Findings from this study need to be considered in light of some specific limitations. First, the focus was on those who have made a decision to go on living, and we have only the information the participants included in their stories. No follow-up questions were possible. The nature of the research design meant that participants required access to a computer with Internet and the ability to communicate in English. This study does not provide a comprehensive view of in-patient care. However, it offers important inputs to enhance other aspects of care, such as assessing safety as a critical foundation to care. We consider these limitations were more than balanced by the richness of the many stories that a totally anonymous process allowed. Conclusion Stories open a window into the experiences of a person during the period after a suicide attempt. The RTGOL Project allowed for an understanding of how we might help suicidal individuals change the script, write a different story. The stories that participants shared give us some understanding of “how” to provide support at a most-needed critical juncture for people as they interact with health care providers immediately after a suicide attempt. While we cannot know the experiences of those who did not survive a suicide attempt, results of this study reinforce that just one caring professional can make a crucial difference to a person who has survived a suicide attempt. We end with where we began. Who will open the door? References 1. World Health Organization. Suicide prevention and special programmes. http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/index.html Geneva: Author; 2013.2. Giner L, Jaussent I, Olie E, et al. Violent and serious suicide attempters: One step closer to suicide? J Clin Psychiatry 2014:73(3):3191–197.3. Levi-Belz Y, Gvion Y, Horesh N, et al. Mental pain, communication difficulties, and medically serious suicide attempts: A case-control study. Arch Suicide Res 2014:18:74–87.4. Hjelmeland H and Knizek BL. Why we need qualitative research in suicidology? Suicide Life Threat Behav 2010:40(1):74–80.5. Gunnell D. A population health perspective on suicide research and prevention: What we know, what we need to know, and policy priorities. Crisis 2015:36(3):155–60.6. Fitzpatrick S. Looking beyond the qualitative and quantitative divide: Narrative, ethics and representation in suicidology. Suicidol Online 2011:2:29–37.7. Lakeman R and FitzGerald M. How people live with or get over being suicidal: A review of qualitative studies. J Adv Nurs 2008:64(2):114–26.8. Ghio L, Zanelli E, Gotelli S, et al. Involving patients who attempt suicide in suicide prevention: A focus group study. J Psychiatr Ment Health Nurs 2011:18:510–18.9. Kraft TL, Jobes DA, Lineberry TW., Conrad, A., & Kung, S. Brief report: Why suicide? Perceptions of suicidal inpatients and reflections of clinical researchers. Arch Suicide Res 2010:14(4):375-382.10. Sun F, Long A, Tsao L, et al. The healing process following a suicide attempt: Context and intervening conditions. Arch Psychiatr Nurs 2014:28:66–61.11. Montross Thomas L, Palinkas L, et al. Yearning to be heard: What veterans teach us about suicide risk and effective interventions. Crisis 2014:35(3):161–67.12. Long M, Manktelow R, and Tracey A. The healing journey: Help seeking for self-injury among a community population. Qual Health Res 2015:25(7):932–44.13. Carlen P and Bengtsson A. Suicidal patients as experienced by psychiatric nurses in inpatient care. Int J Ment Health Nurs 2007:16:257–65.14. Samuelsson M, Wiklander M, Asberg M, et al. Psychiatric care as seen by the attempted suicide patient. J Adv Nurs 2000:32(3):635–43.15. Cutcliffe JR, Stevenson C, Jackson S, et al. A modified grounded theory study of how psychiatric nurses work with suicidal people. Int J Nurs Studies 2006:43(7):791–802.16. Lakeman, R. What can qualitative research tell us about helping a person who is suicidal? Nurs Times 2010:106(33):23–26.17. Karman P, Kool N, Poslawsky I, et al. Nurses’ attitudes toward self-harm: a literature review. J Psychiatr Ment Health Nurs 2015:22:65–75.18. Carter B. ‘One expertise among many’ – working appreciatively to make miracles instead of finding problems: Using appreciative inquiry as a way of reframing research. J Res Nurs 2006:11(1): 48–63.19. Lieblich A, Tuval-Mashiach R, Zilber T. Narrative research: Reading, analysis, and interpretation. Sage Publications; 1998.20. Braun V and Clarke V. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qual Res Psychol 2006:3(2):77–101.21. Kishi Y, Otsuka K, Akiyama K, et al. Effects of a training workshop on suicide prevention among emergency room nurses. Crisis 2014:35(5):357–61.

Abstract Since Australia re-established offshore processing on Manus Island and Nauru in 2012, there have been ongoing reports that asylum seekers and refugees are being subjected to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT). People in detention have endured indefinite detention, inadequate provision of health care, and sexual, physical, and mental harm as the government attempts to ‘stop the boats’ and prevent deaths at sea. How can Australia continue to violate the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, while at the same time, promote its offshore detention policies worldwide? This article explores how Australia has engaged in moral disengagement from the pain and suffering of people in detention. Examining self-deception strategies such as denial of torture, denial of responsibility, and denial of wrongdoing, it shows not only how Australia privileged migration deterrence goals over human rights considerations, but utilized legal and humanitarian arguments to evade accountability and deny the existence of, and responsibility and wrongdoing for, torture and CIDT. This article explores the under-examined issue of moral disengagement to show how it is exacerbating the vulnerability of asylum seekers and refugees to torture and CIDT along their migration journeys.

Mesenchymal stem cells (MSCs) are multipotent adult stem cells widely distributed in the bone marrow, umbilical cord, fat, and other tissues and have high proliferation, multi-differentiation, and immunoregulatory abilities. They can inhibit the proliferation of immune cells and the secretion of inammatory factors [26]. Compared with MSCs from other sources, human umbilical cord MSCs (hUCMSCs) have many advantages, such as a wide source, easy access to materials, strong proliferation ability, low immunogenicity, and great differentiation potential. They are most likely to become pluripotent stem cells with clinical application prospects. Wharton's jelly mesenchymal stem cells – WJMSC- provide three classic advantages – ease of collection with no legal or ethical issues, high differentiating potential and low immunogenicity. Shorter doubling time (21) and an extensive ex vivo expansion capacity provides yet another privileged status to these cells compared with embryonic stem cells. Therapeutic potential of these cells lie in their immuno-modulatory properties involving both innate and adaptive immunity. Graft vs Host disease (GvHD), Post transplant scenarios and autoimmune disorders could witness a revolution in treatment approach with greater understanding of the mechanism action of these cells. Regenerative medicine should get an immense benet from proper understanding and utilization of these cells.

<p><strong>COMPRAS PÚBLICAS COMO INSTRUMENTO PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONÔMICO NACIONAL: NOVIDADES E QUESTIONAMENTOS ORIUNDOS DAS ALTERAÇÕES PROMOVIDAS PELA LEI Nº 12.349/2010 </strong></p><p><strong>Resumo:</strong> O poder de compra do Estado é um instrumento relevante para a promoção do desenvolvimento econômico nacional, em especial quando alinhado a outros mecanismos de política industrial de corte vertical. Considerando a magnitude das compras públicas no Brasil, torna-se ainda mais necessário que os certames licitatórios atendam não apenas ao interesse primário da Administração Pública (maior “vantajosidade” nas contratações), mas também realizem políticas públicas vinculadas aos objetivos constitucionais que imperativamente moldam toda a atuação do Estado brasileiro. Neste sentido, torna-se essencial compreender como as alterações promovidas no art. 3º da Lei Geral de Licitações (Lei n.º 8.666/1993) possibilitam a efetiva conformação de políticas públicas a partir do mecanismo das compras governamentais. O presente estudo abordará especialmente as disposições legais e regulamentares que tornam subsistente a concessão de tratamento privilegiado na aquisição de produtos manufaturados e/ou serviços nacionais, seja a partir da instituição de margens de preferência, seja pela restrição à participação de bens importados nos certames licitatórios.</p><p><strong>Palavras-chaves:</strong> margem de preferência; licitações; tratamento privilegiado; restrição a bens importados; desenvolvimento nacional sustentável.</p><p><strong>PUBLIC PURCHASES AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: NEWS AND QUESTIONS FROM THE AMENDMENTS PROMOTED BY LAW Nº 12.349 OF 2010</strong></p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> Public policies can be managed by the application of measures that restrict the government’s purchase of supplies, producing relevant effects in the economic development, especially when these mechanisms are aligned with other vertical industrial policy measures. Considering the magnitude of Brazilian government procurement budget, it becomes strictly necessary that bidding processes conform also the purpose of promoting public policies connected to the economic constitutional aims, that necessarily must shape the role of Brazilian State. This work paper aim to understand how the changes introduced by the art 3º of the General Procurement Law (Law n.º 8.666/1993) allow the effective shaping of public polices from the mechanism of government procurement. This study will discuss in particular legal tools that make subsistente the privileged treatment concession in the puchase of manufactured goods and/or national services, either from the institution of preference margins, either by restricting the participacion of imported goods in the bidding processes.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> preference margins; government procurement; privileged treatment; national development; bidding processes.</p><p><strong>Data da submissão:</strong> 09/11/2016 <strong>Data da aprovação:</strong> 09/12/2016</p>

Abstract Economic globalization has an impact on the dynamics of adjusting the legal rules established in Indonesia. One of them is the legal unification format called the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. The Omnibus Law on Job Creation collects laws related to development and investment. The new thing in this law is the formation of a new institution called the Sovereign Wealth Fund. Various privileges are given to an institution called the Indonesia Investment Authority (IIA), ranging from not being held accountable for a loss to being audited only by a public accountant. This article discusses how laws and regulations build the construction of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Indonesia. The main problem that was analyzed is how the position of the Sovereign Wealth Fund in the structure of the Indonesian state institutions, besides that, it also discusses the issue of the authority and responsibility of the Sovereign Wealth Fund as well as the privileges provided by laws and regulations. All of these issues be the scope of discussion that provide an overview of Indonesia's Sovereign Wealth Fund. The discussion was conducted using a normative juridical method through qualitative analysis using a statutory approach and legal philosophy approach. The inductive conclusion is expected to provide input in strengthening IIA construction so as not to get demands for discriminatory treatment by other state institutions, and the goal of being established by the IIA to accelerate national economic development can be realized. Keywords: Privilege, Indonesia Investment Authority, Omnibus Law on Job Creation, Sovereign Wealth Fund.

Introduction How do we measure intimacy? What are its impacts on our social, political and personal lives? Can we claim a politics to our intimate lives that escapes the normative confines of archaic institutions, while making social justice claims for relationship recognition? Negotiating some of these disparate questions requires us to think more broadly in contemporary public debates on equality and relationship recognition. Specifically, by outlining the impacts of the popular "gay marriage" debate, this paper examines the impacts of queer theory in association with public policy and community lobbying for relationship equality. Much of the debate remains polarised: eliminating discrimination is counterposed to religious or reproductive narratives that suggest such recognition undermines the value of the "natural" heterosexual family. Introducing queer theory into advocacy that oscillates between rights and reproduction problematises indexing intimacy against normative ideas of monogamy and family. While the arguments circulated by academics, lawyers, politicians and activists have disparate political and ethical impacts, when taken together, they continue to define marriage as a public regulation of intimacy and citizenship. Citizenship, measured in democratic participation and choice, however, can only be realised through reflexive politics that value difference. Encouraging critical dialogue across disparate areas of the marriage equality debate will have a significant impact on how we make ethical claims for recognising intimacy. (Re)defining Marriage In legislative terms, marriage remains the most fundamental means through which the relationship between citizenship and intimacy is crystallised in Australia. For example, in 2004 the Federal Liberal Government in Australia passed a legislative amendment to the Marriage Act 1961 and expressly defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. By issuing a public legislative amendment, the Government intended to privilege monogamous (in this case understood as heterosexual) intimacy by precluding same-sex or polygamous marriage. Such an exercise had rhetorical rather than legal significance, as common law principles had previously defined the scope of marriage in gender specific terms for decades (Graycar and Millbank 41). Marriage as an institution, however, is not a universal or a-historical discourse limited to legal or political constructs. Socialist feminist critiques of marriage in the 1950s conceptualised the legal and gender specific constructs in marriage as a patriarchal contract designed to regulate female bodies (Hannam 146). However, Angela McRobbie notes that within a post-feminist context, these historical realities of gendered subjugation, reproduction or domesticity have been "disarticulated" (26). Marriage has become a more democratic and self-reflexive expression of intimacy for women. David Shumway elaborates this idea and argues that this shift has emerged in a context of "social solidarity" within a consumer environment of social fragmentation (23). What this implies is that marriage now evokes a range of cultural choices, consumer practices and affective trends that are incommensurable to a singular legal or historical term of reference. Debating the Politics of Intimacy and Citizenship In order to reflect on this shifting relationship between choice, citizenship and marriage as a concept, it is necessary to highlight that marriage extends beyond private articulations of love. It is a ritualised performance of heterosexual individual (or coupled) citizenship as it entrenches economic and civil rights and responsibilities. The private becomes public. Current neo-liberal approaches to same-sex marriage focus on these symbolic and economic questions of how recognising intimacy is tied to equality. In a legal and political context, marriage is defined in s5 Marriage Act as "the union between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life." While the Act does not imbue marriage with religious or procreative significance, such a gender dichotomous definition prevents same-sex and gender diverse partners from entering into marriage. For Morris Kaplan, this is a problem because "full equality for lesbian and gay citizens requires access to the legal and social recognition of our intimate associations" (201). Advocates and activists define the quest for equal citizenship by engaging with current religious dogma that situates marriage within a field of reproduction, whereby same-sex marriage is seen to rupture the traditional rubric of monogamous kinship and the biological processes of "gender complementarity" (Australian Christian Lobby 1). Liberal equality arguments reject such conservative assertions on the basis that desire, sexuality and intimacy are innate features of human existence and hence always already implicated in public spheres (Kaplan 202). Thus, legal visibility or state recognition becomes crucial to sustaining practices of intimacy. Problematising the broader social impact of a civil rights approach through the perspective of queer theory, the private/public distinctions that delineate citizenship and intimacy become more difficult to negotiate. Equality and queer theory arguments on same-sex marriage are difficult to reconcile, primarily because they signify the different psychic and cultural investments in the monogamous couple. Butler asserts that idealisations of the couple in legal discourse relates to norms surrounding community, family and nationhood (Undoing 116). This structured circulation of sexual norms reifies the hetero-normative forms of relationships that ought to be recognised (and are desired) by the state. Butler also interrogates this logic of marriage, as a heterosexual norm, and suggests it has the capacity to confine rather than liberate subjects (Undoing 118-20). The author's argument relies upon Michel Foucault's notion of power and subjection, where the subject is not an autonomous individual (as conceived in neo liberal discourses) but a site of disciplined discursive production (Trouble 63). Butler positions the heterosexuality of marriage as a "cultural and symbolic foundation" that renders forms of kinship, monogamy, parenting and community intelligible (Undoing 118). In this sense, marriage can be a problematic articulation of state interests, particularly in terms of perpetuating domesticity, economic mobility and the heterosexual family. As former Australian Prime Minister John Howard opines: Marriage is … one of the bedrock institutions of our society … marriage, as we understand it in our society, is about children … providing for the survival of the species. (qtd. in Wade) Howard's politicisation of marriage suggests that it remains crucial to the preservation of the nuclear family. In doing so, the statement also exemplifies homophobic anxieties towards non-normative kinship relations "outside the family". The Prime Ministers' words characterise marriage as a framework which privileges hegemonic ideas of monogamy, biological reproduction and gender dichotomy. Butler responds to these homophobic terms by alluding to the discursive function of a "heterosexual matrix" which codes and produces dichotomous sexes, genders and (hetero)sexual desires (Trouble 36). By refusing to accept the binary neo-liberal discourse in which one is either for or against gay marriage, Butler asserts that by prioritising marriage, the individual accepts the discursive terms of recognition and legitimacy in subjectifying what counts as love (Undoing 115). What this author's argument implies is that by recuperating marital norms, the individual is not liberated, but rather participates in the discursive "trap" and succumbs to the terms of a heterosexual matrix (Trouble 56). In contradistinction to Howard's political rhetoric, engaging with Foucault's broader theoretical work on sexuality and friendship can influence how we frame the possibilities of intimacy beyond parochial narratives of conjugal relationships. Foucault emphasises that countercultural intimacies rely on desires that are relegated to the margins of mainstream (hetero)sexual culture. For example, the transformational aesthetics in practices such as sadomasochism or queer polyamorous relationships exist due to certain prohibitions in respect to sex (Foucault, History (1) 38, and "Sex" 169). Foucault notes how forms of resistance that transgress mainstream norms produce new experiences of pleasure. Being "queer" (though Foucault does not use this word) becomes identified with new modes of living, rather than a static identity (Essential 138). Extending Foucault, Butler argues that positioning queer intimacies within a field of state recognition risks normalising relationships in terms of heterosexual norms whilst foreclosing the possibilities of new modes of affection. Jasbir Puar argues that queer subjects continue to feature on the peripheries of moral and legal citizenship when their practices of intimacy fail to conform to the socio-political dyadic ideal of matrimony, fidelity and reproduction (22-28). Puar and Butler's reluctance to embrace marriage becomes clearer through an examination of the obiter dicta in the recent American jurisprudence where the proscription on same-sex marriage was overturned in California: To the extent proponents seek to encourage a norm that sexual activity occur within marriage to ensure that reproduction occur within stable households, Proposition 8 discourages that norm because it requires some sexual activity and child-bearing and child-rearing to occur outside marriage. (Perry vs Schwarzenegger 128) By connecting the discourse of matrimony and sex with citizenship, the court reifies the value of marriage as an institution of the family, which should be extended to same-sex couples. Therefore, by locating the family in reproductive heterosexual terms, the court forecloses other modes of recognition or rights for those who are in non-monogamous relationships or choose not to reproduce. The legal reasoning in the case evinces the ways in which intimate citizenship or legitimate kinship is understood in highly parochial terms. As Kane Race elaborates, the suturing of domesticity and nationhood, with the rhetoric that "reproduction occur within stable households", frames heterosexual nuclear bonds as the means to legitimate sexual relations (98). By privileging a familial kinship aesthetic to marriage, the state implicitly disregards recognising the value of intimacy in non-nuclear communities or families (Race 100). Australia, however, unlike most foreign nations, has a dual model of relationship recognition. De facto relationships are virtually indistinguishable from marriage in terms of the rights and entitlements couples are able to access. Very recently, the amendments made by the Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws - General Reform) Act 2008 (Cth) has ensured same-sex couples have been included under Federal definitions of de facto relationships, thereby granting same-sex couples the same material rights and entitlements as heterosexual married couples. While comprehensive de facto recognition operates uniquely in Australia, it is still necessary to question the impact of jurisprudence that considers only marriage provides the legitimate structure for raising children. As Laurent Berlant suggests, those who seek alternative "love plots" are denied the legal and cultural spaces to realise them ("Love" 479). Berlant's critique emphasises how current "progressive" legal approaches to same-sex relationships rely on a monogamous (heterosexual) trajectory of the "love plot" which marginalises those who are in divorced, single, polyamorous or multi-parent situations. For example, in the National Year of Action, a series of marriage equality rallies held across Australia over 2010, non-conjugal forms of intimacy were inadvertently sidelined in order to make a claim for relationship recognition. In a letter to the Sydney Star Observer, a reader laments: As a gay man, I cannot understand why gay people would want to engage in a heterosexual ritual called marriage … Why do gay couples want to buy into this ridiculous notion is beyond belief. The laws need to be changed so that gays are treated equal under the law, but this is not to be confused with marriage as these are two separate issues... (Michael 2) Marriage marks a privileged position of citizenship and consumption, to which all other gay and lesbian rights claims are tangential. Moreover, as this letter to the Sydney Star Observer implies, by claiming sexual citizenship through the rubric of marriage, discussions about other campaigns for legislative equality are effectively foreclosed. Melissa Gregg expands on such a problematic, noting that the legal responses to equality reiterate a normative relationship between sexuality and power, where only couples that subscribe to dyadic, marriage-like relationships are offered entitlements by the state (4). Correspondingly, much of the public activism around marriage equality in Australia seeks to achieve its impact for equality (reforming the Marriage Act) by positioning intimacy in terms of state legitimacy. Butler and Warner argue that when speaking of legitimacy a relation to what is legitimate is implied. Lisa Bower corroborates this, asserting "legal discourse creates norms which universalise particular modes of living…while suppressing other practices and identities" (267). What Butler's and Bower's arguments reveal is that legitimacy is obtained through the extension of marriage to homosexual couples. For example, Andrew Barr, the current Labor Party Education Minister in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), noted that "saying no to civil unions is to say that some relationships are more legitimate than others" (quoted in "Legal Ceremonies"). Ironically, such a statement privileges civil unions by rendering them as the normative basis on which to grant legal recognition. Elizabeth Povinelli argues the performance of dyadic intimacy becomes the means to assert legal and social sovereignty (112). Therefore, as Jenni Millbank warns, marriage, or even distinctive forms of civil unions, if taken alone, can entrench inequalities for those who choose not to participate in these forms of recognition (8). Grassroots mobilisation and political lobbying strategies around marriage equality activism can have the unintentional impact, however, of obscuring peripheral forms of intimacy and subsequently repudiating those who contest the movement towards marriage. Warner argues that those who choose to marry derive pride from their monogamous commitment and "family" oriented practice, a privilege afforded through marital citizenship (82). Conversely, individuals and couples who deviate from the "normal" (read: socially palatable) intimate citizen, such as promiscuous or polyamorous subjects, are rendered shameful or pitiful. This political discourse illustrates that there is a strong impetus in the marriage equality movement to legitimate "homosexual love" because it mimics the norms of monogamy, stability, continuity and family by only seeking to substitute the sex of the "other" partner. Thus, civil rights discourse maintains the privileged political economy of marriage as it involves reproduction (even if it is not biological), mainstream social roles and monogamous sex. By defining social membership and future life in terms of a heterosexual life-narrative, same-sex couples become wedded to the idea of matrimony as the basis for sustainable intimacy and citizenship (Berlant and Warner 557). Warner is critical of recuperating discourses that privilege marriage as the ideal form of intimacy. This is particularly concerning when diverse erotic and intimate communities, which are irreducible to normative forms of citizenship, are subject to erasure. Que(e)rying the Future of Ethics and Politics By connecting liberal equality arguments with Butler and Warner's work on queer ethics, there is hesitation towards privileging marriage as the ultimate form of intimacy. Moreover, Butler stresses the importance of a transformative practice of queer intimacy: It is crucial…that we maintain a critical and transformative relation to the norms that govern what will not count as intelligible and recognisable alliance and kinship. (Undoing 117) Here the author attempts to negotiate the complex terrain of queer citizenship and ethics. On one hand, it is necessary to be made visible in order to engage in political activism and be afforded rights within a state discourse. Simultaneously, on the other hand, there is a need to transform the prevailing hetero-normative rhetoric of romantic love in order to prevent pathologising bodies or rendering certain forms of intimacy as aberrant or deviant because, as Warner notes, they do not conform to our perception of what we understand to be normal or morally desirable. Foucault's work on the aesthetics of the self offers a possible transformational practice which avoids the risks Warner and Butler mention because it eludes the "normative determinations" of moralities and publics, whilst engaging in an "ethical stylization" (qtd. in Race 144). Whilst Foucault's work does not explicitly address the question of marriage, his work on friendship gestures to the significance of affective bonds. Queer kinship has the potential to produce new ethics, where bodies do not become subjects of desires, but rather act as agents of pleasure. Negotiating the intersection between active citizenship and transformative intimacy requires rethinking the politics of recognition and normalisation. Warner is quite ambivalent as to the potential of appropriating marriage for gays and lesbians, despite the historical dynamism of marriage. Rather than acting as a progressive mechanism for rights, it is an institution that operates by refusing to recognise other relations (Warner 129). However, as Alexander Duttmann notes, recognition is more complex and a paradoxical means of relation and identification. It involves a process in which the majority neutralises the difference of the (minority) Other in order to assimilate it (27). However, in the process of recognition, the Other which is validated, then transforms the position of the majority, by altering the terms by which recognition is granted. Marriage no longer simply confers recognition for heterosexual couples to engage in reproduction (Secomb 133). While some queer couples may subscribe to a monogamous relationship structure, these relationships necessarily trouble conservative politics. The lamentations of the Australian Christian Lobby regarding the "fundamental (anatomical) gender complementarity" of same-sex marriage reflect this by recognising the broader social transformation that will occur (and already does with many heterosexual marriages) by displacing the association between marriage, procreation and parenting (5). Correspondingly, Foucault's work assists in broadening the debate on relationship recognition by transforming our understanding of choice and ethics in terms of "queer friendship." He describes it as a practice that resists the normative public distinction between romantic and platonic affection and produces new aesthetics for sexual and non-sexual intimacy (Foucault, Essential 170). Linnell Secomb argues that this "double potential" alluded to in Foucault and Duttman's work, has the capacity to neutralise difference as Warner fears (133). However, it can also transform dominant narratives of sexual citizenship, as enabling marriage equality will impact on how we imagine traditional heterosexual or patriarchal "plots" to intimacy (Berlant, "Intimacy" 286). Conclusion Making an informed impact into public debates on marriage equality requires charting the locus of sexuality, intimacy and citizenship. Negotiating academic discourses, social and community activism, with broader institutions and norms presents political and social challenges when thinking about the sorts of intimacy that should be recognised by the state. The civil right to marriage, irrespective of the sex or gender of one's partner, reflects a crucial shift towards important democratic participation of non-heterosexual citizens. However, it is important to note that the value of such intimacy cannot be indexed against a single measure of legal reform. While Butler and Warner present considered indictments on the normalisation of queer intimacy through marriage, such arguments do not account for the impacts of que(e)rying cultural norms and practices through social and political change. Marriage is not a singular or a-historical construction reducible to state recognition. Moreover, in a secular democracy, marriage should be one of many forms of diverse relationship recognition open to same-sex and gender diverse couples. In order to expand the impact of social and legal claims for recognition, it is productive to rethink the complex nature of recognition, ritual and aesthetics within marriage. In doing so, we can begin to transform the possibilities for articulating intimate citizenship in plural democracies. References Australian Christian Lobby. "Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee Inquiry into the Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2009." Deakin: ACL, 2009. Australian Government. "Sec. 5." Marriage Act of 1961 (Cth). 1961. ———. Same-Sex Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws - General Reform) Act 2008 (Cth). 2008. Bell, David, and John Binnie. The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond. Oxford: Polity P, 2000. Berlant, Lauren. "Intimacy: A Special Issue." Critical Inquiry 24 (1998): 281-88. ———. "Love, a Queer Feeling." Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis. Eds. Tim Dean and Christopher Lane. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001:432-52. Berlant, Lauren, and Michael Warner. "Sex in Public." Ed. Lauren Berlant. Intimacy. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2000: 311-30. Bower, Lisa. "Queer Problems/Straight Solutions: The Limits of a Politics of 'Official Recognition'" Playing with Fire: Queer Politics, Queer Theories. Ed. Shane Phelan. London and New York: Routledge, 1997: 267-91. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and London: Routledge, 1990. ———. Undoing Gender. New York: Routledge, 2004. Duttmann, Alexander. Between Cultures: Tensions in the Struggle for Recognition. London: Verso, 2000. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality (1): The Will to Knowledge. London: Penguin Books, 1977. ———. "Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity." Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Ed. Paul Rabinow. London: Allen Lange/Penguin, 1984. 163-74. ———. Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984: Ethics, Vol. 1. London: Penguin, 2000. Graycar, Reg, and Jenni Millbank. "From Functional Families to Spinster Sisters: Australia's Distinctive Path to Relationship Recognition." Journal of Law and Policy 24. 2007: 1-44. Gregg, Melissa. "Normal Homes." M/C Journal 10.4 (2007). 27 Aug. 2007 ‹http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/02-gregg.php›. Hannam, Jane. Feminism. London and New York: Pearson Education, 2007. Kaplan, Morris. "Intimacy and Equality: The Question of Lesbian and Gay Marriage." Playing with Fire: Queer Politics, Queer Theories. Ed. Shane Phelan. London and New York: Routledge, 1997: 201-30. "Legal Ceremonies for Same-Sex Couples." ABC Online 11 Nov. 2009. 13 Dec. 2011 ‹http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/11/11/2739661.htm›. McRobbie, Angela. The Aftermath of Feminism: Gender, Culture and Social Change. London and New York: Sage, 2008. Michael. "Why Marriage?" Letter to the Editor. Sydney Star Observer 1031 (20 July 2010): 2. Millbank, Jenni. "Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Families in Australian Law - Part One: Couples." Federal Law Review 34 (2008): 1-44. Perry v. Schwarzenegger. 3: 09 CV 02292. United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 2010. Povinelli, Elizabeth. Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy and Carnality. Durham: Duke UP, 2006. Puar, Jasbir. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham: Duke UP, 2007. Race, Kane. Pleasure Consuming Medicine: The Queer Politics of Drugs. Durham and London: Duke UP, 2009. Secomb, Linnell. Philosophy and Love. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2007. Shumway, David. Modern Love: Romance, Intimacy and the Marriage Crisis. New York: New York UP, 2003. Wade, Matt. "PM Joins Opposition against Gay Marriage as Cleric's Election Stalls." The Sydney Morning Herald 6 Aug. 2003. Warner, Michael. The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics and the Ethics of Queer Life. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999.

In September 1991 Walt Disney's legal representatives in Israel sued prolific Israeli cartoonist Dudu Geva for using the figure of Donald Duck without permission. The case, which worked its way to the Israeli Supreme Court, sparked a broader conversation in Israel about the place of American cultural icons and idioms in Israeli life. While existing treatments emphasize Jewish Israeli optimism with American influence on their lives, the article demonstrates that some Jewish Israelis had a conflicted relationship with American hegemony, even as their state enjoyed unparalleled privilege under American patronage.

In its preamble, The Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism (WA) commits the state to becoming: “A society in which respect for mutual difference is accompanied by equality of opportunity within a framework of democratic citizenship”. One of the principles of multiculturalism, as enunciated in the Charter, is “equality of opportunity for all members of society to achieve their full potential in a free and democratic society where every individual is equal before and under the law”. An important element of this principle is the “equality of opportunity … to achieve … full potential”. The implication here is that those who start from a position of disadvantage when it comes to achieving that potential deserve more than ‘equal’ treatment. Implicitly, equality can be achieved only through the recognition of and response to differential needs and according to the likelihood of achieving full potential. This is encapsulated in Kymlicka’s argument that neutrality is “hopelessly inadequate once we look at the diversity of cultural membership which exists in contemporary liberal democracies” (903). Yet such a potential commitment to differential support might seem unequal to some, where equality is constructed as the same or equal treatment regardless of differing circumstances. Until the past half-century or more, this problematic has been a hotly-contested element of the struggle for Civil Rights for African-Americans in the United States, especially as these rights related to educational opportunity during the years of racial segregation. For some, providing resources to achieve equal outcomes (rather than be committed to equal inputs) may appear to undermine the very ethos of liberal democracy. In Australia, this perspective has been the central argument of Pauline Hanson and her supporters who denounce programs designed as measures to achieve equality for specific disadvantaged groups; including Indigenous Australians and humanitarian refugees. Nevertheless, equality for all on all grounds of legally-accepted difference: gender, race, age, family status, sexual orientation, political conviction, to name a few; is often held as the hallmark of progressive liberal societies such as Australia. In the matter of religious freedoms the situation seems much less complex. All that is required for religious equality, it seems, is to define religion as a private matter – carried out, as it were, between consenting parties away from the public sphere. This necessitates, effectively, the separation of state and religion. This separation of religious belief from the apparatus of the state is referred to as ‘secularism’ and it tends to be regarded as a cornerstone of a liberal democracy, given the general assumption that secularism is a necessary precursor to equal treatment of and respect for different religious beliefs, and the association of secularism with the Western project of the Enlightenment when liberty, equality and science replaced religion and superstition. By this token, western nations committed to equality are also committed to being liberal, democratic and secular in nature; and it is a matter of state indifference as to which religious faith a citizen embraces – Wiccan, Christian, Judaism, etc – if any. Historically, and arguably more so in the past decade, the terms ‘democratic’, ‘secular’, ‘liberal’ and ‘equal’ have all been used to inscribe characteristics of the collective ‘West’. Individuals and states whom the West ascribe as ‘other’ are therefore either or all of: not democratic; not liberal; or not secular – and failing any one of these characteristics (for any country other than Britain, with its parliamentary-established Church of England, headed by the Queen as Supreme Governor) means that that country certainly does not espouse equality. The West and the ‘Other’ in Popular Discourse The constructed polarisation between the free, secular and democratic West that values equality; and the oppressive ‘other’ that perpetuates theocracies, religious discrimination and – at the ultimate – human rights abuses, is a common theme in much of the West’s media and popular discourse on Islam. The same themes are also applied in some measure to Muslims in Australia, in particular to constructions of the rights of Muslim women in Australia. Typically, Muslim women’s dress is deemed by some secular Australians to be a symbol of religious subjugation, rather than of free choice. Arguably, this polemic has come to the fore since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. However, as Aly and Walker note, the comparisons between the West and the ‘other’ are historically constructed and inherited (Said) and have tended latterly to focus western attention on the role and status of Muslim women as evidence of the West’s progression comparative to its antithesis, Eastern oppression. An examination of studies of the United States media coverage of the September 11 attacks, and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, reveals some common media constructions around good versus evil. There is no equal status between these. Good must necessarily triumph. In the media coverage, the evil ‘other’ is Islamic terrorism, personified by Osama bin Laden. Part of the justification for the war on terror is a perception that the West, as a force for good in this world, must battle evil and protect freedom and democracy (Erjavec and Volcic): to do otherwise is to allow the terror of the ‘other’ to seep into western lives. The war on terror becomes the defence of the west, and hence the defence of equality and freedom. A commitment to equality entails a defeat of all things constructed as denying the rights of people to be equal. Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux and Garland analysed the range of discourses evident in Time and Newsweek magazines in the five weeks following September 11 and found that journalists replicated themes of national identity present in the communication strategies of US leaders and elites. The political and media response to the threat of the evil ‘other’ is to create a monolithic appeal to liberal values which are constructed as being a monopoly of the ‘free’ West. A brief look at just a few instances of public communication by US political leaders confirms Hutcheson et al.’s contention that the official construction of the 2001 attacks invoked discourses of good and evil reminiscent of the Cold War. In reference to the actions of the four teams of plane hijackers, US president George W Bush opened his Address to the Nation on the evening of September 11: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). After enjoining Americans to recite Psalm 23 in prayer for the victims and their families, President Bush ended his address with a clear message of national unity and a further reference to the battle between good and evil: “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). In his address to the joint houses of Congress shortly after September 11, President Bush implicated not just the United States in this fight against evil, but the entire international community stating: “This is the world’s fight. This is civilisation’s fight” (cited by Brown 295). Addressing the California Business Association a month later, in October 2001, Bush reiterated the notion of the United States as the leading nation in the moral fight against evil, and identified this as a possible reason for the attack: “This great state is known for its diversity – people of all races, all religions, and all nationalities. They’ve come here to live a better life, to find freedom, to live in peace and security, with tolerance and with justice. When the terrorists attacked America, this is what they attacked”. While the US media framed the events of September 11 as an attack on the values of democracy and liberalism as these are embodied in US democratic traditions, work by scholars analysing the Australian media’s representation of the attacks suggested that this perspective was echoed and internationalised for an Australian audience. Green asserts that global media coverage of the attacks positioned the global audience, including Australians, as ‘American’. The localisation of the discourses of patriotism and national identity for Australian audiences has mainly been attributed to the media’s use of the good versus evil frame that constructed the West as good, virtuous and moral and invited Australian audiences to subscribe to this argument as members of a shared Western democratic identity (Osuri and Banerjee). Further, where the ‘we’ are defenders of justice, equality and the rule of law; the opposing ‘others’ are necessarily barbaric. Secularism and the Muslim Diaspora Secularism is a historically laden term that has been harnessed to symbolise the emancipation of social life from the forced imposition of religious doctrine. The struggle between the essentially voluntary and private demands of religion, and the enjoyment of a public social life distinct from religious obligations, is historically entrenched in the cultural identities of many modern Western societies (Dallmayr). The concept of religious freedom in the West has evolved into a principle based on the bifurcation of life into the objective public sphere and the subjective private sphere within which individuals are free to practice their religion of choice (Yousif), or no religion at all. Secularism, then, is contingent on the maintenance of a separation between the public (religion-free) and the private or non- public (which may include religion). The debate regarding the feasibility or lack thereof of maintaining this separation has been a matter of concern for democratic theorists for some time, and has been made somewhat more complicated with the growing presence of religious diasporas in liberal democratic states (Charney). In fact, secularism is often cited as a precondition for the existence of religious pluralism. By removing religion from the public domain of the state, religious freedom, in so far as it constitutes the ability of an individual to freely choose which religion, if any, to practice, is deemed to be ensured. However, as Yousif notes, the Western conception of religious freedom is based on a narrow notion of religion as a personal matter, possibly a private emotional response to the idea of God, separate from the rational aspects of life which reside in the public domain. Arguably, religion is conceived of as recognising (or creating) a supernatural dimension to life that involves faith and belief, and the suspension of rational thought. This Western notion of religion as separate from the state, dividing the private from the public sphere, is constructed as a necessary basis for the liberal democratic commitment to secularism, and the notional equality of all religions, or none. Rawls questioned how people with conflicting political views and ideologies can freely endorse a common political regime in secular nations. The answer, he posits, lies in the conception of justice as a mechanism to regulate society independently of plural (and often opposing) religious or political conceptions. Thus, secularism can be constructed as an indicator of pluralism and justice; and political reason becomes the “common currency of debate in a pluralist society” (Charney 7). A corollary of this is that religious minorities must learn to use the language of political reason to represent and articulate their views and opinions in the public context, especially when talking with non-religious others. This imposes a need for religious minorities to support their views and opinions with political reason that appeals to the community at large as citizens, and not just to members of the minority religion concerned. The common ground becomes one of secularism, in which all speakers are deemed to be indifferent as to the (private) claims of religion upon believers. Minority religious groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, invoke secular language of moral tolerance and civil rights to be acknowledged by the state, and to carry out their door-to-door ‘information’ evangelisation/campaigns. Right wing fundamentalist Christian groups and Catholics opposed to abortion couch their views in terms of an extension of the secular right to life, and in terms of the human rights and civil liberties of the yet-to-be-born. In doing this, these religious groups express an acceptance of the plurality of the liberal state and engage in debates in the public sphere through the language of political values and political principles of the liberal democratic state. The same principles do not apply within their own associations and communities where the language of the private religious realm prevails, and indeed is expected. This embracing of a political rhetoric for discussions of religion in the public sphere presents a dilemma for the Muslim diaspora in liberal democratic states. For many Muslims, religion is a complete way of life, incapable of compartmentalisation. The narrow Western concept of religious expression as a private matter is somewhat alien to Muslims who are either unable or unwilling to separate their religious needs from their needs as citizens of the nation state. Problems become apparent when religious needs challenge what seems to be publicly acceptable, and conflicts occur between what the state perceives to be matters of rational state interest and what Muslims perceive to be matters of religious identity. Muslim women’s groups in Western Australia for example have for some years discussed the desirability of a Sharia divorce court which would enable Muslims to obtain divorces according to Islamic law. It should be noted here that not all Muslims agree with the need for such a court and many – probably a majority – are satisfied with the existing processes that allow Muslim men and women to obtain a divorce through the Australian family court. For some Muslims however, this secular process does not satisfy their religious needs and it is perceived as having an adverse impact on their ability to adhere to their faith. A similar situation pertains to divorced Catholics who, according to a strict interpretation of their doctrine, are unable to take the Eucharist if they form a subsequent relationship (even if married according to the state), unless their prior marriage has been annulled by the Catholic Church or their previous partner has died. Whereas divorce is considered by the state as a public and legal concern, for some Muslims and others it is undeniably a religious matter. The suggestion by the Anglican Communion’s Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, that the adoption of certain aspects of Sharia law regarding marital disputes or financial matters is ultimately unavoidable, sparked controversy in Britain and in Australia. Attempts by some Australian Muslim scholars to elaborate on Dr Williams’s suggestions, such as an article by Anisa Buckley in The Herald Sun (Buckley), drew responses that, typically, called for Muslims to ‘go home’. A common theme in these responses is that proponents of Sharia law (and Islam in general) do not share a commitment to the Australian values of freedom and equality. The following excerpts from the online pages of Herald Sun Readers’ Comments (Herald Sun) demonstrate this perception: “These people come to Australia for freedoms they have never experienced before and to escape repression which is generally brought about by such ‘laws’ as Sharia! How very dare they even think that this would be an option. Go home if you want such a regime. Such an insult to want to come over to this country on our very goodwill and our humanity and want to change our systems and ways. Simply, No!” Posted 1:58am February 12, 2008 “Under our English derived common law statutes, the law is supposed to protect an individual’s rights to life, liberty and property. That is the basis of democracy in Australia and most other western nations. Sharia law does not adequately share these philosophies and principles, thus it is incompatible with our system of law.” Posted 12:55am February 11, 2008 “Incorporating religious laws in the secular legal system is just plain wrong. No fundamentalist religion (Islam in particular) is compatible with a liberal-democracy.” Posted 2:23pm February 10, 2008 “It should not be allowed in Australia the Muslims come her for a better life and we give them that opportunity but they still believe in covering them selfs why do they even come to Australia for when they don’t follow owe [our] rules but if we went to there [their] country we have to cover owe selfs [sic]” Posted 11:28am February 10, 2008 Conflicts similar to this one – over any overt or non-private religious practice in Australia – may also be observed in public debates concerning the wearing of traditional Islamic dress; the slaughter of animals for consumption; Islamic burial rites, and other religious practices which cannot be confined to the private realm. Such conflicts highlight the inability of the rational liberal approach to solve all controversies arising from religious traditions that enjoin a broader world view than merely private spirituality. In order to adhere to the liberal reduction of religion to the private sphere, Muslims in the West must negotiate some religious practices that are constructed as being at odds with the rational state and practice a form of Islam that is consistent with secularism. At the extreme, this Western-acceptable form is what the Australian government has termed ‘moderate Islam’. The implication here is that, for the state, ‘non-moderate Islam’ – Islam that pervades the public realm – is just a descriptor away from ‘extreme’. The divide between Christianity and Islam has been historically played out in European Christendom as a refusal to recognise Islam as a world religion, preferring instead to classify it according to race or ethnicity: a Moorish tendency, perhaps. The secular state prefers to engage with Muslims as an ethnic, linguistic or cultural group or groups (Yousif). Thus, in order to engage with the state as political citizens, Muslims must find ways to present their needs that meet the expectations of the state – ways that do not use their religious identity as a frame of reference. They can do this by utilizing the language of political reason in the public domain or by framing their needs, views and opinions exclusively in terms of their ethnic or cultural identity with no reference to their shared faith. Neither option is ideal, or indeed even viable. This is partly because many Muslims find it difficult if not impossible to separate their religious needs from their needs as political citizens; and also because the prevailing perception of Muslims in the media and public arena is constructed on the basis of an understanding of Islam as a religion that conflicts with the values of liberal democracy. In the media and public arena, little consideration is given to the vast differences that exist among Muslims in Australia, not only in terms of ethnicity and culture, but also in terms of practice and doctrine (Shia or Sunni). The dominant construction of Muslims in the Australian popular media is of religious purists committed to annihilating liberal, secular governments and replacing them with anti-modernist theocratic regimes (Brasted). It becomes a talking point for some, for example, to realise that there are international campaigns to recognise Gay Muslims’ rights within their faith (ABC) (in the same way that there are campaigns to recognise Gay Christians as full members of their churches and denominations and equally able to hold high office, as followers of the Anglican Communion will appreciate). Secularism, Preference and Equality Modood asserts that the extent to which a minority religious community can fully participate in the public and political life of the secular nation state is contingent on the extent to which religion is the primary marker of identity. “It may well be the case therefore that if a faith is the primary identity of any community then that community cannot fully identify with and participate in a polity to the extent that it privileges a rival faith. Or privileges secularism” (60). Modood is not saying here that Islam has to be privileged in order for Muslims to participate fully in the polity; but that no other religion, nor secularism, should be so privileged. None should be first, or last, among equals. For such a situation to occur, Islam would have to be equally acceptable both with other religions and with secularism. Following a 2006 address by the former treasurer (and self-avowed Christian) Peter Costello to the Sydney Institute, in which Costello suggested that people who feel a dual claim from both Islamic law and Australian law should be stripped of their citizenship (Costello), the former Prime Minister, John Howard, affirmed what he considers to be Australia’s primary identity when he stated that ‘Australia’s core set of values flowed from its Anglo Saxon identity’ and that any one who did not embrace those values should not be allowed into the country (Humphries). The (then) Prime Minister’s statement is an unequivocal assertion of the privileged position of the Anglo Saxon tradition in Australia, a tradition with which many Muslims and others in Australia find it difficult to identify. Conclusion Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia, partly because it is perceived that their faith is under attack and that it needs defending (Aly). They construct the defence of their faith as a choice and an obligation; but also as a right that they have under Australian law as equal citizens in a secular state (Aly and Green). Australian Muslims who have no difficulty in reconciling their core Australianness with their deep faith take it as a responsibility to live their lives in ways that model the reconciliation of each identity – civil and religious – with the other. In this respect, the political call to Australian Muslims to embrace a ‘moderate Islam’, where this is seen as an Islam without a public or political dimension, is constructed as treating their faith as less than equal. Religious identity is generally deemed to have no place in the liberal democratic model, particularly where that religion is constructed to be at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy, namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. Indeed, it is as if the national commitment to secularism rules as out-of-bounds any identity that is grounded in religion, giving precedence instead to accepting and negotiating cultural and ethnic differences. Religion becomes a taboo topic in these terms, an affront against secularism and the values of the Enlightenment that include liberty and equality. In these circumstances, it is not the case that all religions are equally ignored in a secular framework. What is the case is that the secular framework has been constructed as a way of ‘privatising’ one religion, Christianity; leaving others – including Islam – as having nowhere to go. Islam thus becomes constructed as less than equal since it appears that, unlike Christians, Muslims are not willing to play the secular game. In fact, Muslims are puzzling over how they can play the secular game, and why they should play the secular game, given that – as is the case with Christians – they see no contradiction in performing ‘good Muslim’ and ‘good Australian’, if given an equal chance to embrace both. Acknowledgements This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. References ABC. “A Jihad for Love.” Life Matters (Radio National), 21 Feb. 2008. 11 March 2008. < http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lifematters/stories/2008/2167874.htm >.Aly, Anne. “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42.1 (2007): 27-40.Aly, Anne, and Lelia Green. “‘Moderate Islam’: Defining the Good Citizen.” M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). 13 April 2008 < http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/08aly-green.php >.Aly, Anne, and David Walker. “Veiled Threats: Recurrent Anxieties in Australia.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 27.2 (2007): 203-14.Brasted, Howard.V. “Contested Representations in Historical Perspective: Images of Islam and the Australian Press 1950-2000.” Muslim Communities in Australia. Eds. Abdullah Saeed and Akbarzadeh, Shahram. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2001. 206-28.Brown, Chris. “Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity.” Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. Eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 293-324. Buckley, Anisa. “Should We Allow Sharia Law?” Sunday Herald Sun 10 Feb. 2008. 8 March 2008 < http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,231869735000117,00.html >.Bush, George. W. “President Outlines War Effort: Remarks by the President at the California Business Association Breakfast.” California Business Association 2001. 17 April 2007 < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-15.html >.———. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”. Washington, 2001. 17 April 2007 < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html >.Charney, Evan. “Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere.” The American Political Science Review 92.1 (1998): 97- 111.Costello, Peter. “Worth Promoting, Worth Defending: Australian Citizenship, What It Means and How to Nurture It.” Address to the Sydney Institute, 23 February 2006. 24 Apr. 2008 < http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2006/004.htm &pageID=05&min=phc&Year=2006&DocType=1 >.Dallmayr, Fred. “Rethinking Secularism.” The Review of Politics 61.4 (1999): 715-36.Erjavec, Karmen, and Zala Volcic. “‘War on Terrorism’ as Discursive Battleground: Serbian Recontextualisation of G. W. Bush’s Discourse.” Discourse and Society 18 (2007): 123- 37.Green, Lelia. “Did the World Really Change on 9/11?” Australian Journal of Communication 29.2 (2002): 1-14.Herald Sun. “Readers’ Comments: Should We Allow Sharia Law?” Herald Sun Online Feb. 2008. 8 March 2008. < http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/comments/0,22023,23186973-5000117,00.html >.Humphries, David. “Live Here, Be Australian.” The Sydney Morning Herald 25 Feb. 2006, 1 ed.Hutcheson, John S., David Domke, Andre Billeaudeaux, and Philip Garland. “U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and Patriotic Press Following September 11.” Political Communication 21.1 (2004): 27-50.Kymlicka, Will. “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality.” Ethics 99.4 (1989): 883-905.Modood, Tariq. “Establishment, Multiculturalism and British Citizenship.” The Political Quarterly (1994): 53-74.Osuri, Goldie, and Subhabrata B. Banerjee. “White Diasporas: Media Representations of September 11 and the Unbearable Whiteness of Being in Australia.” Social Semiotics 14.2 (2004): 151- 71.Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971.Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books 1978.Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism. WA: Government of Western Australia, Nov. 2004. 11 March 2008 < http://www.equalopportunity.wa.gov.au/pdf/wa_charter_multiculturalism.pdf >.Yousif, Ahmad. “Islam, Minorities and Religious Freedom: A Challenge to Modern Theory of Pluralism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 20.1 (2000): 30-43.

Some encouraging uses for AI in medicine will lead to potentially novel legal liability issues. Complex algorithms involve an opacity that creates problems for the medical and legal professions alike. As iatrogenic injury is common in medical malpractice, the medical profession is understandably concerned when AI is introduced in diagnostic and therapeutic devices and events and outcome cannot be fully explained due to the “black box” effect. A concern about machine learning algorithms is the black box issue and understanding how conclusions or outcomes are reached. The deployment of AI devices in healthcare will require an increase in a clinician’s understanding of AI to increase the transparency of their use. An important aspect of medical treatment is the notion of “therapeutic privilege”. This will only arise in limited circumstances and requires the clinician to make a judgment, based on reasonable grounds, that the patient’s physical or mental health might be seriously harmed by providing the information. Given the complexity of AI and the black box effect, could too much AI transparency possibly overwhelm a patient, such that it may dissuade them from giving consent in circumstances where treatment is necessary and essential? In other words, too much AI transparency and information may inadvertently hinder treatment and progress.

Thus far, equality before the law is understood as an ideality without limitation and exception. Its enforceability is considered to apply indiscriminately for every law breaker. However, reality of law enforcement says differently when a perpetrator of the crime is called an early age child. Special regulations exist injustice system, law governing it as well as provisions derived from the children rights, although the child is positioned as dealing with the law. In such context of an establishment of law regarding children in conflict with the law, it is interesting to find philosophical roots of distinctive treatment negating equality before the law. The explorative step is more attractive, especially when many mosaics of conception has been discovered about what are the truths whena child is in conflict with the law: 1) violations committed by children are not purely mistakes of the children, 2) children are, nevertheless, having rights that must be fulfilled including when dealing with the law, 3) children has privileges with broad distribution of regulations in various sectors and according to the view based on Pancasila, they are <em>keten</em> (a link) of a nation. Such varied conceptions elicit necessity of unearthing philosophical roots, truths and realitiesthat are always plural. So that, the law established is not only be legal because it is formed in legitimate manner and by legitimate power (<em>pedigree thesis</em>), also incorporating theexisting basic values or moral principles, though not absolute, depending on condition of society (the moral thesis) (Twining, 2009). Thus, study of such legal products is not only be seen as the work of professional, but as Satjipto Rahardjo viewed, it is placed as an scientific object to explain that a law codified in legislation, though, is not something sacred to examine for its philosophical content.<br />

Human Rights is the rights of human beings are naturally without exception and a privilege for the group, as well as the level of a particular social group. These rights are freedom speech with freedom from all forms of oppression that must be upheld, not only by each individual of a State that recognizes the existence and respect of Human Rights itself, but must also be guaranteed by countries without any exceptions, including persons with disabilities in dealing with legal issues.This study used normative research for examining the principles and rules of law by using the legislation approach, and case-based approach. The regulation is regarding human rights in general stipulated in the Constitution Republif of Indonesia 1945, Act 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, Law No. 4 of 1997 on Persons with Disabilities, Law 19 of 2011 on the Ratification of Convention on the Rights of persons with Disabilities, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The right to non-discriminatory treatment as a continuation of the right to equal treatment before the law for persons with disabilities can be realized through the exercise of the right to a fair trial. All such regulations prohibit all forms of discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and will be effective protection against discrimination on any basis.

Europe’s extraordinary response to those fleeing the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has prompted many criticisms of Europe’s treatment of other refugees, and indeed people of colour and members of ethnic minorities fleeing Ukraine. While stark, this differentiated response in not unusual: The global refugee regime treats different refugees differently, as a matter of course. Refugees often encounter racialized migration controls, and systems which privilege some refugees over others. The article seeks to clarify when these practices violate the international legal prohibitions on discrimination on grounds of race and nationality. To do so, it focuses on race discrimination in general international human rights law, clarifying the interaction between general human rights principles and instruments, and the specialist instrument in the field, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. We identify how differences in treatment on grounds of nationality may engage the prohibition on race discrimination both directly (in particular when nationality equates to national origin) or indirectly. Concerning nationality discrimination, the article focuses in particular on the added value of Article 3 of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, which obliges states to ‘apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.’ We examine Article 3 both within the overall scheme of the Refugee Convention and as a source to guide interpretation of international human rights norms.

In both substantive and procedural rules, Islamic law enshrines a comprehensive legal framework that regulates the family system for the realisation of a sustainable justice for all parties to Islamic marriage institution. The basis of the philosophy of Islamic family law is that both husband and wife shall live together harmoniously, with mutual respect in order to produce an upright ummah, bearing rights and responsibilities towards one another. The husband, conferred with the privilege as head of the family and responsible for the wife, enjoys such favour within a limited sphere, to prevent ultra vires chances and abuses. The wife, ordained to bear the duty of followership and obedience towards the husband, is protected with judicial shield from darar which implies aggressive manners and ill treatment of irresponsible husbands. This paper critically examines these crucial issues pointing its sight on the classical texts, statutory provisions and the practical dispensation relating to the effect of darar on the wife and its judicial remedies with Bauchi state of Nigeria as case study. It is based on a qualitative research that employs both doctrinal and empirical research approach. The findings of the research reveal that the application of Islamic law in the Bauchi State Sharīʿah Courts has a number of challenges questioning the consistency of its practical aspect with the theoretical aspect; namely, the classical textual provisions. Keywords: Islamic law; procedure; darar; husband; wife; Bauchi state.

It is surprising that although 12 million people in India suffer from epilepsy this remains a thoroughly under-researched area in the sociology of health and practice. We address this intellectual and policy neglect by reviewing the social, psychological and legal challenges governing the lives of people living with epilepsy (PWE) by paying particular attention to negotiations in arranged marriages and employment. Drawing on the analytical frameworks of the sociological study of stigma, critical race theory and paying attention to the cultural models of health and suffering, this study utilized a combination of (online) survey data (N = 100) and in-depth qualitative interviews (N = 10) with PWE and their families. The online survey was administered to map the level of awareness about epilepsy and its clinical management among the general population, whereas the in-depth interviews were conducted to understand the experience, self-perception and everyday struggles of those diagnosed with the condition. Findings from the survey on non-PWE suggest a general lack of awareness and fearful misconceptions around epilepsy related seizures. In-depth interviews with PWEs revealed concealment (of the illness) as a dominant coping strategy to attenuate the social alienation and rejection associated with epilepsy. Further, PWE participants reported persistent discrimination, harassment and prejudiced understanding of diminished cognitive capacities at workplaces as a result of cultural myths and popular representations of epilepsy-related seizures. The study also demonstrated the significance of institutional support groups in assisting PWE to cope with symbolic violence and forge solidarities. We conclude with reflections on the ethical dilemmas faced by medical practitioners while dealing with social-medical interventions of epilepsy treatment. Overall, results from this study undergird the significance to revisit the social-moral as well as legal frameworks that persistently restrict opportunities for PWE in India. In an attempt to reimagine inclusive futures regardless of disease, disability and affliction, we attempt to move beyond the biomedical gaze and instead privilege stories of individual personhood, struggles and aspirations.

AbstractThe aim of the research is to offer novelty regarding the constitualism of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law regarding Covid-19 which has now become a Law. This study uses a normative research method, with a focus on solving issues (problems) based on legal principles, legal rules, as well as on recognized legal expert opinion or doctrine. Through this research, the researcher offers that the perppu which has now become a law must be declared invalid or revoked because it is unconstitutional. As is well known, the Government issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2020 concerning State Financial Policy and Financial System Stability for Handling Pandemic Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) and / or in the Context of Facing Threats that Endanger the National Economy and / Or Financial System Stability, on March 31, 2020 (now Law Number 2 of 2020, on May 18, 2020). In Article 27 paragraph (1), paragraph (2), and paragraph (3) it is stated that there are parties who have "privileges", namely obtaining legal immunity from all actions they take on the basis of implementing the Covid Perppu. Of course this is a problem, because as a rule of law, Indonesia must provide justice in the form of equal treatment before the law or equality before the law to society without exception. This is stated in Article 27 paragraph (1), Article 28D paragraph (1), and Article 28I paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Thus, the Perppu which has now become a law is contrary to the Constitution, so it must be canceled or declared invalid.Keywords: constitution; Covid-19; equality before the lawAbstrakTujuan penelitian, yaitu menawarkan kebaruan mengenai konstitualisme dari Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang mengenai Covid-19 yang sekarang telah menjadi Undang-Undang. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian normatif, dengan berfokus pada pemecahan isu (masalah) yang didasarkan pada asas hukum, aturan hukum, maupun pada doktrin atau pendapat ahli hukum yang diakui. Melalui penelitian ini, peneliti menawarkan bahwa, perppu yang sekarang telah menjadi undang-undang tersebut harus dinyatakan tidak berlaku atau dicabut karena inkonstitusional. Seperti diketahui, Pemerintah mengeluarkan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2020 tentang Kebijakan Keuangan Negara Dan Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan Untuk Penanganan Pandemi Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Dan/Atau Dalam Rangka Menghadapi Ancaman Yang Membahayakan Perekonomian Nasional Dan/Atau Stabilitas Sistem Keuangan, pada tanggal 31 Maret 2020 (sekarang menjadi Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2020, pada tanggal 18 Mei 2020). Dalam Pasal 27 ayat (1), ayat (2), dan ayat (3) disebutkan bahwa ada pihak-pihak yang mendapat “keistimewaan”, yaitu mendapat kekebalan hukum dari segala tindakan yang dilakukannya atas dasar pelaksanaan perppu covid tersebut. Tentu itu menjadi masalah, karena sebagai negara hukum, Indonesia harus memberikan keadilan berupa perlakuan yang sama didepan hukum atau equality before the law kepada masyarakat tanpa terkecuali. Hal tesebut tercantum dalam Pasal 27 ayat (1), Pasal 28D ayat (1), dan Pasal 28I ayat (2) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945. Sehingga, Perppu yang kini telah menjadi undang-undang tersebut bertentangan dengan Konstitusi, sehingga harus di batalkan atau dinyatakan tidak berlaku.