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1
Harrison, M. "The Soviet Union after 1945: Economic Recovery and Political Repression." Past & Present 210, Supplement 6 (January 1, 2011): 103–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtq042.
Повний текст джерела
2
CHEGODAEV, E. A. "POLITICAL REPRESSION AMONG THE BELARUSIANS OF BASHKIRIA." Izvestia Ufimskogo Nauchnogo Tsentra RAN, no. 3 (September 30, 2021): 96–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.31040/2222-8349-2021-0-3-96-102.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article is devoted to political repressions among Belarusians of Bashkiria in the 30s of the XX century. To date, this ethnic group remains one of the little-studied peoples of the republic, which was a consequence of the long-term priority in the research of the titular Bashkir ethnic group against the background of the ethnocentrism of the historical science of the country. The number of publications devoted to the Belarusians of Bashkiria continues to remain insignificant until now, and most of them are published in the periodical press, as a rule, they have a journalistic, local history, popular science, reference or review orientation. For the first time, the researcher was faced with the task of identifying the dynamics of repressive measures against the ethnic group of Belarusians who lived compactly in rural areas of the region. The analysis of the data of the "Book of Memory of the Victims of Political Repression of the Republic of Bashkortostan" has established that rural residents from among the Belarusian ethnic group suffered more at the initial stages of mass collectivization. this confirms the prosperity of the settlers acquired during the functioning of the farm system of management, as well as the fact that the repressions against Belarusians did not have an ethnic coloring, like their neighbors in the farm residence of Latvians. As an example, the archival and investigative cases of the FSB in the Republic of Bashkortostan from 1931 are considered. The fate of a late-period migrant who emigrated to the Soviet Union in 1926 from the territory of Western Belarus is considered.
3
van Voren, Robert. "Is there a resumption of political psychiatry in the former Soviet Union?" International Psychiatry 11, no. 3 (August 2014): 73–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/s1749367600004550.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
After the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in the spring of 2014, the former Soviet Union again became front-page news. The sequence of events led to an atmosphere reminiscent of the Cold War. In Russia itself it led to a hunt for ‘national traitors’ and ‘foreign agents’ and observers both inside the country and abroad fear a return to Soviet-style repression. For the outside world this may come as a surprise, but human rights activists have been ringing the alarm bells for a few years. Ever since Vladimir Putin took power, the human rights situation has deteriorated. One of the warning signs was the return of the use of psychiatry for political purposes, to ‘prevent’ social or political activism or to ostracise an activist.
4
Buyantueva, Radzhana. "LGBT Russians and Political Environment for Activism." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 54, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 119–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.3.119.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article examines the impact of external and internal state policies on Russian LGBT activism. Drawing on the political opportunity structure (POS) framework, it focuses on the analysis of two factors (the level of state repression on LGBT people and the direction of state foreign policy) and their impact on LGBT activism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s goal for closer relations with the West facilitated the decrease of pressure on LGBT people. That created positive conditions for LGBT activism. Since the late 1990s, however, Russia’s direction in foreign policy has become more assertive. That has facilitated the increase in state repression on LGBT people and activists. Such negative changes in POS have posed challenges for LGBT activism complicating its further development.
5
Mędelska, Jolanta, та Marek Cieszkowski. "Отражение ранних вариантов советских национальных языков в московских русско-иноязычных словарях". Acta Baltico-Slavica 35 (28 липня 2015): 91–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.11649/abs.2011.008.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Reflection of early Soviet dialects of national languages in Russian bilingual dictionaries published in MoscowAfter the October Revolution, over half of the citizens of the new Russian state were non-Russians. The historical homeland of some of them was outside the Soviet Union. The experiences of two largest national minorities: the Germans (1 238 000) and the Poles (782 000) were similar in many respects. Members of both nations were persecuted, suffered massive repression, and were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. The new cultural and political reality (separation from the historical homeland and national languages, influence of Russian and other languages of Soviet Union nations, necessity to use new Soviet lexis and technical/scientific terminology on a daily basis) forced changes in German and Polish used in the Soviet Union. Soviet dialects of national languages were reinforced in books, handbooks, the press, and propaganda materials etc. published in German and Polish in huge number of copies. The Soviet dialects of German and Polish were reflected on the right side of Russian-German and Russian-Polish dictionaries published in the 1930s by “Sovetskaya Entsyklopedia”. The analysis and comparison of the language material excerpted from the dictionaries show that Soviet dialects of both languages were characterized by the presence of orientalisms (result of the constant contact with the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union and their culture) and unique lexis related to the Russian way of life (Russian culinary lexis, names of musical instruments, names of garments) and Sovietisms (i.e. new political terminology and words related to the Soviet way of life). The Germans found it more difficult to adapt their native code to life in the Soviet Union.
6
Bulatov, Aider. "Political analysis of state-confessional and inter-confessional relations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 51 (September 15, 2009): 70–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/2009.51.2078.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
For many centuries and until now, the relationship between the Church (as an institution) and the state has always been controversial, but always relevant. There are vivid examples when in a particular country certain religions had (and still have) the status of even state ones. At the same time, we know from the example of the former Soviet Union that for religious beliefs, the state subjected its citizens to severe repression.
7
Alexopoulos, Golfo. "Stalin and the Politics of Kinship: Practices of Collective Punishment, 1920s–1940s." Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, no. 1 (January 2008): 91–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417508000066.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
At a Kremlin reception on 7 November 1937, Stalin declared that enemies should be eliminated as kinship groups: “And we will eliminate every such enemy [of the state and peoples of the USSR]… . we will eliminate his entire lineage (rod), his family! … Here's to the final extermination of all enemies, both themselves and their clan (rod).”1In the Soviet Union, political enemies were rounded up in groups of kin, family ties marked people as disloyal, and “counterrevolutionary” charges against one person threatened also his or her relatives. The Soviet security police or OGPU-NKVD issued detailed instructions regarding the punishment that should be assigned to the spouses, children, siblings, parents, and even ex-wives of state enemies. Campaigns against anti-Soviet elements rounded up kinship groups, whether these counterrevolutionaries were identified as so-called kulaks, enemies of the people, or traitors to the motherland. To be sure, the collective punishment of kin did not accompany every act of Stalinist repression. The regime's draconian criminal legislation also constituted a form of terror, yet persons sentenced under such laws as those punishing theft of socialist property were dealt with individually; their relatives were not targeted. Only the “politicals,” that is, people accused of disloyalty, treason, or other counterrevolutionary activities experienced terror as family units. It was the collective punishment of kin that made political repression under Stalin truly a mass phenomenon.
8
Daly, Sarah Zukerman. "State Strategies in Multi-Ethnic Territories: Explaining Variation in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc." British Journal of Political Science 44, no. 2 (February 12, 2013): 381–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123412000701.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, its twenty-seven successor states were charged with devising policies with respect to their ethnic minorities. This shock enables an analysis of the conditions that render states more likely to repress, exclude, assimilate or accommodate their minorities. One would anticipate that groups that are most ‘threatening’ to the state's territorial integrity are more likely to experience repression. However the data do not validate this expectation. Instead, the analysis suggests that minority groups’ demographics and states’ coercive capacities better account for variation in ethnic minority policies. While less robust, the findings further indicate the potential importance of lobby states and Soviet multinational legacies in determining minority rights. The results have implications for ethnic politics, human rights, nationalism, democratization and political violence.
9
Savchyn, Valentyna. "Literary Translation behind Bars in the Late Soviet Union: Contextual Voices of Vasyl' Stus and Ivan Svitlychnyi." East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies 8, no. 2 (October 18, 2021): 235–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.21226/ewjus628.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Translation in captivity is nothing new, nor is it restricted to a particular place or historical period. However, this social and cultural phenomenon is marked by a far more frequent occurrence in totalitarian societies. This article examines the practice of literary translation in Soviet labour camps, where, as a result of political repression, Ukrainian scholars, writers, translators, and lexicographers (aka prisoners of conscience) constituted a large part of the incarcerated population. The fact that translation activity thrived behind bars despite brutal and dehumanizing conditions testifies to the phenomenon of cultural resistance and translators’ activism, both of which deserve close scholarly attention. This study provides insights into practical, historical, psychological, and philosophical aspects of translation in extreme conditions. It seeks answers to the questions of why prisoners of conscience felt moved to translate, and how they pursued their work in situations of extreme pressure. Through the lens of translation in prison, the article offers a wide perspective on the issues of retranslation, pseudotranslation, translation editing, text selection, and the functions of literary translation. The focus of the paper is on Soviet Ukraine in the 1970s-80s, when a wave of political repressions led to the appearance of a new generation of prisoners of conscience. Case studies of Vasyl' Stus and Ivan Svitlychnyi are discussed, drawing on their letters during the incarceration period and the memoirs of their inmates.
10
Park, Andrus. "Global Security, Glasnost and the Retreat Dividend." Government and Opposition 26, no. 1 (January 1, 1991): 75–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1991.tb01125.x.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
THE QUESTION ‘WHO WON THE COLD WAR?’ IS STILL BEING debated. In a way it is certainly right to say that communism is collapsing and that Western capitalism has won the cold war. The Soviet Union (I shall not analyse here the situation in other socialist countries) has in fact recognised the complete failure of its economic system. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has lost ground during the relatively free elections in various Soviet republics, etc.Yet we have to take into account that the cold war was largely a war of words, a war of ideas, and in some respects the Soviet Union has done well in the global ideological contest. For a country with a scarcity of food and most elementary consumer goods and with an extensive past record of repression and direct terror it has been extremely successful in establishing its image as a stable and peace-loving partner in the international arena, as a society which is capable of producing more humane, caring, intellectual and trustworthy leaders than most other countries. It is a remarkable achievement and it is even more remarkable that this ideological success has emerged from the ruins of the dull and rigid Brezhnevist ideological machinery.
11
Knight, Amy. "The KGB, Perestroika, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union." Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 1 (January 2003): 67–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039703320996722.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article examines the role of the Committee on State Security (KGB) during the turbulent six-and-a-half years under Mikhail Gorbachev, from March 1985 to December 1991. Contrary to popular impressions, the KGB was never an independent actor in the Soviet system; it acted at the behest of the Communist Party. When Vladimir Kryuchkov replaced Viktor Chebrikov as head of the KGB in 1986, the move signaled what was intended to be a new role for the KGB. But as the reforms launched by Gorbachev became more radical, and as political instability in the Soviet Union became widespread, many in the KGB grew anxious about the possible fragmentation of the country. These concerns were instrumental in the decision by Kryuchkov and other high-ranking KGB officials to organize a hardline coup in August 1991. Even then, however, the KGB was not truly independent of the party. On the contrary, KGB officials were expecting—and then desperately hoping—that Gorbachev would agree to order an all-out crackdown. Because Gorbachev was unwilling to take a direct part in mass repression, Kryuchkov lacked the authority he was seeking to act. As a result, the attempted coup failed, and the KGB was forced onto the defensive. Shortly before the Soviet state was dissolved, the KGB was broken up into a number of agencies that soon came under Russia's direct control.
12
Kundakbayeva, Zhanat, and Didar Kassymova. "Remembering and forgetting: the state policy of memorializing Stalin's repression in post-Soviet Kazakhstan." Nationalities Papers 44, no. 4 (July 2016): 611–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1158157.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The general perception of Western analysts and observers is that the nation-states created as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union all treat the memory of the dark, repressive aspects of the Stalinist regime in public spaces as a symbolic element in the creation of a new post-Soviet identity [Denison, Michael. 2009. “The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan.”Europe-Asia Studies61 (7): 1167–1187]. We argue that the government of Kazakhstan employs non-nationalistic discourse in its treatment of Stalinist victims’ commemoration in a variety of forms, through the creation of modern memorial complexes at the sites of horrific Soviet activity (mass burial places, labor camps, and detention centers), purpose-built museum exhibitions, and the commemorative speeches of its president and other officials. Kazakhstan's strategy in commemorating its Soviet past is designed to highlight the inclusiveness of repression on all peoples living in its territory at that time, not just Kazakhs, thereby assisting in bringing together its multinational and multiethnic society. Thus, the official stance treats this discourse as an important symbolic source of shaping the collective memory of the nation, based on “a general civil identity without prioritizing one ethnic group over another — a national unity, founded on the recognition of a common system of values and principles for all citizens” [Shakirova, Svetlana. 2012. “Letters to Nazarbaev: Kazakhstan's Intellectuals Debate National Identity.” February 7. Accessed July 28, 2015.http://postsovietpost.stanford.edu/discussion/letters-nazarbaev-kazakhstans-intellectuals-debate-national-identity].
13
Funigiello, Philip J. "Managing Armageddon: The Truman Administration, Atomic War, and the National Security Resources Board." Journal of Policy History 2, no. 4 (October 1990): 403–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030600004425.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
“How shall we be governed in an atomic war? Who will make the decisions for defense and survival, and what compulsions will support their peremptory execution? What will be the measure of our cherished liberties?” Clinton L. Rossiter, the distinguished authority on the Constitution, asked these questions at the height of the cold war, a time when relations with the Soviet Union had become very troubled and, at home, red-baiting political campaigns, intolerance, fear, and repression had destroyed much of the liberalism of the New Deal.
14
Evstratov, Maxim V. "MILITARY PERSONNEL AND REPRESSION OF THE 1930s." Historical Search 2, no. 3 (September 28, 2021): 10–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.47026/2712-9454-2021-2-3-10-14.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article examines the issue of carrying out Stalinist repressions against the officers of the late 1930s. Separate problematic plots associated with repressions in relation to the command and control and political composition of the Red Army are highlighted. Mass repressions began in the early 1930s. thanks to falsified charges related to the Viasna case. Based on special research literature, the article reveals the reasons and consequences of the peak of repressions against the military, which fell on the period of the disclosure of the so-called «military conspiracy» in 1937. The background of the conspiracy itself was connected with the fact that around J.V. Stalin there were two large opposing forces, consisting of eminent military men, who had different views on the further development of the army. As a result, the «leader» supported KE Voroshilov’s group, and MN Tukhachevsky’s associates were repressed. The article notes that about 40 thousand people from among the commanders suffered from the repressions of 1937-1938. In 1939, by order of JV Stalin, the mass coverage of repression was suspended, as a result, 11,178 people were reinstated in the army. Any interrelated events inevitably have a cause-and-effect relationship. Many historians, discussing the failures of the Soviet Union in the first year of the Great Patriotic War, come to the conclusion that the professionally formed army, which led to successes during the Civil War, was largely destroyed by the internal policy of the state, which was directly related to the repression of the end 1930s. The massive repressions carried out against the commanding and commanding personnel in the pre-war years inflicted great losses on the Red Army. Events of the 1930s became the main reason for personnel problems in the Red Army, which entailed tragic consequences during the Great Patriotic War.
15
Boldyrev, Ivan, and Martin Kragh. "ISAAK RUBIN: HISTORIAN OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT DURING THE STALINIZATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN SOVIET RUSSIA." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 37, no. 3 (August 11, 2015): 363–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837215000413.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Research within the history of economic thought has focused only little on the development of economics under dictatorship. This paper attempts to show how a country with a relatively large and internationally established community of social scientists in the 1920s, the Soviet Union, was subjected to repression. We tell this story through the case of Isaak Il’ich Rubin, a prominent Russian economist and historian of economic thought, who in the late 1920s was denounced by rival scholars and repressed by the political system. By focusing not only on his life and work, but also on that of his opponents and institutional clashes, we show how the decline of a social science tradition in Russia and the USSR as well as the Stalinization of Soviet social sciences emerged as a process over time. We analyze the complex interplay of ideas, scholars, and their institutional context, and conclude that subsequent repression was arbitrary, suggesting that no clear survival or career strategy existed in the Stalinist system, due to a situation of fundamental uncertainty.
16
Williams, Dana M., and Matthew T. Lee. "Aiming to Overthrow the State (Without Using the State): Political Opportunities for Anarchist Movements." Comparative Sociology 11, no. 4 (2012): 558–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341236.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract The anarchist movement utilizes non-statist and anti-statist strategies for radical social transformation, thus indicating the limits of political opportunity theory and its emphasis upon the state. Using historical narratives from present-day anarchist movement literature, we note various events and phenomena in the last two centuries and their relevance to the mobilization and demobilization of anarchist movements throughout the world (Bolivia, Czech Republic, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Venezuela). Labor movement allies, failing state socialism, and punk subculture have provided conditions conducive to anarchism, while state repression and Bolshevik success in the Soviet Union constrained success. This variation suggests that future work should attend more closely to the role of national context, and the interrelationship of political and non-political factors.
17
Cheremushkin (Пётp Чepёмушкин ), Petr. "«Пoлeзныe Идиoты» Глaзaми Пoлякa". Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 45, № 1 (14 грудня 2018): 99–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763324-20171270.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This is a review essay of Dariusz Tołczyk’s book Gułag w oczach Zachodu (The Gulag in the Eyes of the West), which was published in Polish in 2009. This controversial work examines the question of why, for at least the first half of the twentieth century, the West has turned a blind eye to the Stalinist repression. Tołczyk notes that the West paid little attention to the complaints of the Baltic countries and Poland about Stalin’s Great Terror. The reviewer states that the formation of an improved Western image of first Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Gorbachev years by a West that is currently worried about the Putin regime, is Tołczyk’s, a Polish author residing in the United States, main theme.
18
Tyszka, Juliusz. "Student Theatre in Poland: Vehicles of Revolt, 1954–57 and 1968–71." New Theatre Quarterly 26, no. 2 (May 2010): 161–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266464x10000291.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Polish student theatre was a unique artistic movement in the Soviet post-war empire, with a liberty of expression unparalleled elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. As in every political system, in any country, its creators and its public were students and young intellectuals. These theatre-makers used the umbrella of the Polish Students' Union – a surprisingly democratic institution in a totalitarian political order – and all attempts at their repression were usually appeased by the activists of the student organization, often the friends and supporters of the theatre-makers. After the creation of the Socialist Union of Polish Students these activists became more dependent on the Communist Party, but the Party establishment decided, in the period of the ‘thaw’ (1954–57), that the student artistic movement would be maintained as a kind of artistic kindergarten for avant-gardists and supporters of artistic and political revolt, to let them manifest their beliefs within the well-guarded, limited territory of student cultural centres. However, the young rebels overcame these restrictions and created a focus of artistic opposition which had a wide social and artistic influence, especially during subsequent periods of political crisis. Juliusz Tyszka was himself an activist in the student theatre movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Now an NTQ advisory editor, he is head of the Unit of Performance Studies, Institute of Cultural Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University at Poznań, Poland.
19
White, Frederick H. "British Lord, American Movie Idol and Soviet Counterculture Figure." Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 42, no. 1 (April 13, 2015): 64–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04201004.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
For an entire generation of Soviet youth, Tarzan was a provocative symbol of individualism and personal freedom. Previous scholarship has included Tarzan within the larger counterculture movement of the thaw period (1953–64), but has not specifically examined how this occurred. Joseph S. Nye has coined the term soft power to describe the ability to attract and to co-opt rather than to force another nation into accepting your ideals. Within this rubric, Tarzan’s presence in the Soviet Union was simultaneously entertaining and provocative. As literary fare in the 1920s, Tarzan represented an escape from war and revolution and was sanctioned as acceptable reading for Soviet youths. The celluloid Tarzan also represented an escape, but this time from the repressive Stalinist regime and the hardships of post-WWII Soviet society. Raised on both the books and films, a new generation of Soviet youth longed for the individual freedom that Tarzan came to represent. Tarzan’s impact in the Soviet Union is one example of western cultural infiltration that contributed to the idealization of American individualism over the Soviet collective within the Soviet Union.
20
Бычков and Maksim Bychkov. "F. Poletayev and Italian Resistance Movement." Socio-Humanitarian Research and Technology 3, no. 3 (September 10, 2014): 41–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/6229.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article considers participation of Soviet soldiers in
the Italian Resistance on the example of Fyodor Poletayev. The
guerrilla movement which began in Italy is analyzed in the context
of the General history of the country in the 1920–1940-s. The
fascist regime did not have a wide social base. Despite the apparent
inability of the anti-fascist political parties and movements to agree
among themselves and to take radical action to overthrow it, Italian
people have been able to boldly speak out against it. This is reflected
in rapid development of partisan movement, which despite
harsh repression by German occupiers and their Italian allies was
able to conduct intensive work on the liberation of Italy. Soviet
soldiers fought among them. This topic was raised in Soviet historical
and political literature, but has unfortunately dropped out
of public attention recently and therefore requires a sort of resuscitation.
This theme allows identifying the complexity, the diversity
of problems faced by the people of the Soviet Union, and at
the same time shows the role and importance of a common man
on the background of global events.
21
Yordanov, Radoslav A. "Warsaw Pact Countries’ Involvement in Chile from Frei to Pinochet, 1964–1973." Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 3 (August 2019): 56–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00893.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article examines the policies of Warsaw Pact countries toward Chile from 1964, when Eduardo Frei was elected Chilean president, until 1973, when Frei's successor, Salvador Allende, was removed in a military coup. The article traces the role of the Soviet Union and East European countries in the ensuing international campaign raised in support of Chile's left wing, most notably in support of the Chilean Communist Party leader Luis Corvalán. The account here adds to the existing historiography of this momentous ten-year period in Chile's history, one marked by two democratic presidential elections, the growing covert intervention of both Washington and Moscow in Chile's politics, mass strikes and popular unrest against Allende's government, a violent military coup, and intense political repression in the coup's aftermath. The article gives particular weight to the role of the East European countries in advancing the interests of the Soviet bloc in South America. By consulting a wide array of declassified documents in East European capitals and in Santiago, this article helps to explain why Soviet and East European leaders attached great importance to Chile and why they ultimately were unable to develop more comprehensive political, economic, and cultural relations with that South American country.
22
Sardica, José Miguel. "Political Readings of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Portugal." Hungarian Historical Review 10, no. 4 (2021): 768–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.38145/2021.4.768.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The 1956 Hungarian revolution had a resonant echo in Western Europe, gaining large attention and media coverage. This article explores how the small, peripheral Atlantic country of Portugal, on the other side of the European continent (Lisbon lies more than 3,000 kilometers from Budapest), which was under the rightwing conservative dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar’s New State at the time, became interested in the Hungarian events, allowing them to be written about in the most influential newspapers. The article begins with a discussion of the basic context of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and of the Portuguese political context in the mid-1950s (the Salazarist regime and the bulk of the oppositional forces) and then offers an analysis of articles found in seven important Portuguese newspapers. Essentially, it presents a survey of the coverage of the Hungarian Revolution in the Portuguese press and explores how those events were interpreted and how they had an impact on the ideological readings and positions of the government, the moderate opposition, and the radical opposition of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). The 1956 revolution merited extensive coverage in the Portuguese papers, with titles, pictures, and news boxes on the front pages sometimes continuing into the next pages of a given paper or on the last page. The stories were narrated, for most part, in a lively, fluid, sentimental, and apologetic language. The New State in particular, but also moderate publications which were oppositional to Salazar, endorsed the Budapest revolutionaries and criticized and denounced orthodox communism in the form of Soviet repression, either in the name of Christendom, national independence, and the Western European safeguard against communism (in the case of Salazarism), or in the name (and hope) of a democratic surge, which would usher in strident calls for civil liberties (in the case of oppositional voices). With the exception of the press organ which voiced the official position of the Portuguese Communist Party, supporting the Soviet response against the Hungarian insurgents (and thus was in sharp contrast with the larger share of public opinion), there was a rare convergence, despite nuances in the language, in the images, narratives, messages, and general tone of the articles in the various organs of the Portuguese press, which tended to show compassion and support for the insurgents in Budapest because their actions targeted communism and tended to decry the final bloody repression, which exposed the Soviet Union as a murderous regime.
23
Nguyen, Hai Hong. "Resilience of the Communist Party of Vietnam's Authoritarian Regime since Đổi Mới". Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, № 2 (серпень 2016): 31–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500202.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Unlike communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has overcome crises to remain in power for the last 30 years and will most likely continue ruling in the coming decades. Strategies and tactics undertaken by the CPV are found to be identical to those canvassed in the extant literature on the durability of authoritarian regimes around the world. The present paper argues that the CPV's regime has been resilient thus far because it has successfully restored and maintained public trust, effectively constrained its opposition at home, and cleverly reduced external pressures. To support this argument, the analysis electively focuses on four aspects: (1) economic performance, (2) political flexibility, (3) repression of the opposition, and (4) expansion of international relations.
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Lebedeva, Nataliia. "Deportations from Poland and the Baltic States to the Ussr in 1939–1941: Common Features and Specific Traits." Lithuanian Historical Studies 7, no. 1 (November 30, 2002): 95–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-00701005.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The aim of this article is to compare repression policies of the Stalinist regime on the territories annexed by the Soviet Union in September 1939 and June–August 1940. The planning and implementation of deportations from the west of Ukraine and Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had much in common. All the deportations were prepared and carried out on the basis of decisions carefully worked out by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party and was an important element of the sovietization policy on these territories. Deportation was a part of measures designed to destroy political, judicial, social, economic, national, cultural and moral fundamentals and to impose the Soviet order in the annexed territories. Methods of their organization and implementation were absolutely identical. All these deportations were crimes against humanity. At the same time there were certain differences. The planned capture of armies did not take place at the time of the Soviet invasion of the Baltic states. There were no such mass shootings of officers, policemen and jail inmates as in case of Poland. The scale of deportation was not as large as on territories of eastern Poland. This could be explained by the fact that the peoples of the Baltic states considered Sovietization as national humiliation to much larger extent than the peoples who had suffered under Polish or Romanian yoke. It forced the Stalinist ruling elite of the USSR at first to demonstrate a certain respect towards local customs, carry out nationalization of industry and banking slowly and more cautiously, to refrain from collectivization and not carry out mass deportation until the very eve of war between the Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany.
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Chatterjee, Choi. "Imperial Subjects in the Soviet Union: M.N. Roy, Rabindranath Tagore, and Re-Thinking Freedom and Authoritarianism." Journal of Contemporary History 52, no. 4 (October 2017): 913–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022009417716754.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The compelling trope of ‘Russia and the West,’ or to be more precise, ‘Russia Under Western Eyes,’ has produced a vast and significant body of literature. This has helped in the political framing of the twentieth century as a world divided between the democratic and market-based nations of the West, and the dictatorial and state controlled countries in the Soviet East. Simultaneously, it has served to bury, blunt, and otherwise obscure perspectives from the colonized world on the East–West dichotomy. An analysis of the travel writings of two important Indian visitors to the Soviet Union, M.N. Roy and Rabindranath Tagore, shows that Europe’s imperial subjects filtered their impressions of Soviet authoritarianism through their own experiences of repressive Western imperialism, thus charting a new global map of political freedom. Roy and Tagore’s writings, powered by both their colonial and Soviet experiences, make a significant contribution to the twentieth-century intellectual debates on moral freedom, individualism, and authoritarianism.
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FAIRCLOUGH, PAULINE. "The Russian Revolution and Music." Twentieth-Century Music 16, no. 1 (February 2019): 157–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1478572219000148.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Nearly thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have got used to seeing the Bolshevik Revolution as the prelude to a failed political experiment, albeit one that lasted a remarkably long time. But why do we see it as a failure? After all, the Soviet Union was a vast empire regarded as the military equal of the United States, feared and hated by successive US presidents, whose influence extended far beyond Soviet borders to include regimes in Africa, South East Asia, Central and South America. Had Mikhail Gorbachev not been removed in 1991, and had the Soviet system been able to reform itself into something like the form of communism we see today in China, no one would regard those seventy-plus years of Soviet power as a failure at all. What is meant by failure, in truth, is not really military or economic failure so much as a failure to sustain and uphold the ideals of equality and social justice that originally drew so many to the communist cause. The haemorrhaging of members from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1956, for instance, was a result of widespread feelings of shock and disgust after Nikita Khrushchev's revelations at the Twenty-First Party Conference that year, at which he delivered his so-called ‘secret speech’ condemning Stalin's regime. For those who left the CPGB, and other communist parties across Western Europe, it was painful to realize that what they had for decades dismissed as ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’ had in fact been accurate reportage. Most shocking of all was learning that the mass arrests and disappearances of the 1930s, and even the show trials of prominent Politburo and party members, were not proportionate, if regrettable, responses to plots to murder Stalin and overthrow Soviet power at all, but rather Stalinist crimes of epic and tragic proportions. Right up to the end of the Communist regime in Russia, reports of political and religious repression, the continued use of the Gulag system, confinement and forced treatment of dissidents in mental hospitals, literary and other cultural censorship continued to filter through the Iron Curtain.
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Almaev, Rustam Z. "The Fate of Educators in the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic During the Struggle Against “Bourgeois Nationalism” (1937-1938)." RUDN Journal of Russian History 19, no. 1 (December 15, 2020): 95–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8674-2020-19-1-95-118.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article discusses the political repressions of 1937-1938 in the fi eld of public education, with the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as its case study. The author assembles new archival documents, mass media materials and memoirs of contemporaries to illuminate the regional specifi cs of repression in the broader context of the Stalinist era. Particular attention is paid to how “enemies of the people” were identifi ed. The author argues that the Bashkir Regional Party Committee, the media, and the party committees of educational institutions, as well as the organs of the NKVD worked in unison to expose “hostile elements” and Trotskyists among directors of educational institutions, specialists in higher education, and public school teachers. The media, as well as the decisions of closed party meetings, were imbued with the spirit of ideological intolerance; they provided the moral and ideological justifi cation for the arrests. This article traces a trend that was characteristic of national autonomous republics in general: the persecution of regional leaders and members of the national intelligentsia on charges of “local bourgeois nationalism.” The author also examines how purges in the party, state and educational bodies of the republic targeted “nationalists” directly or indirectly associated with “national and local deviationists” of the revolutionary years. The article also discusses the fate of Bashkortostan’s People’s Commissars of Education who were subjected to repression. Reconstructing the complex social and political situation in the educational sphere of the BASSR allows us to draw important conclusions, and better understand contemporary social and political processes.
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Rokityanskii, Ya G. "The last victim of repressions against science in the Soviet Union." Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 77, no. 2 (April 2007): 198–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1019331607020141.
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Tromly, Benjamin. "Robert Hornsby, Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 313 pp. $99.00." Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no. 4 (October 2016): 267–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_r_00714.
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Furr, Grover. "Yezhov vs. Stalin: The Causes of the Mass Repressions of 1937–1938 in the USSR." Journal of Labor and Society 20, no. 3 (December 11, 2017): 325–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24714607-02003004.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article outlines the causes of the mass repressions of 1937–1938 in the Soviet Union. Primary-source evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that these repressions were the result of anti-Stalin conspiracies by two groups, which overlapped somewhat: the political Opposition of supporters of Grigorii Zinoviev, of Trotskyists, of Rightists (Bukharin, Rykov, and their adherents); and of military men (Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and others); and high-ranking Party leaders, nominally supporters of Stalin, who opposed the democratic aspects of the “Stalin” Constitution of 1936. It discusses Stalin’s struggle for democratic reform and its defeat. The prevailing “anti-Stalin paradigm” of Soviet history is exposed as the reason mainstream scholarship has failed to understand the mass repressions, misnamed “Great Terror.”
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Krysachenko, Valentyn. "RUSSIAN POLICY OF GENOCIDE THROUGH DEPORTATION OF PEOPLES: SYSTEMICITY AND PERMANENCE OF REPRESSION." Politology bulletin, no. 84 (2020): 49–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2415-881x.2020.84.49-71.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article is devoted to the analysis of one of the forms of genocide policy, namely — the crime of deportation, which was practiced by the Russian state throughout its existence. The political significance of the deportations was to curb the resistance of the tamed peoples, to prevent the real or potential threat of anti-Russian movements. Russia, as the successor to the USSR, did not assume political, legal and moral responsibility for the repression, the process of rehabilitation of deported peoples was stopped completely. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the RSFSR tried to take certain steps in this direction, but with the proclamation of the Russian Federation as the successor to the union state, such efforts were completely stopped. In the current conditions in Russia there is no political, legal and moral assessment of crimes, no objective assessment of the causes and consequences of mass repression, rehabilitation of deported peoples committed in part or not at all, a number of regulations of the Soviet period to restrict rights and freedoms procedural use, etc. Moreover, the aggressive actions of modern Russia against independent states, including Moldova, Georgia, Syria, Libya, and especially Ukraine, have been a determining factor in new waves of forced migration of large populations, accompanied by significant human, moral, and material losses. All this imposes a special responsibility on the world community to carry out actions of various ranks (political, legal, economic, etc. ) to deter the criminal actions of the aggressor country and to develop the necessary conditions and requirements for the inevitability of punishment for crimes committed by the Putin regime.
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DUNCAN, PETER J. S. "CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN IDENTITY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST." Historical Journal 48, no. 1 (March 2005): 277–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x04004303.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This is a review of recent English-language scholarship on the development of Russian identity since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The first part examines literature on the economic and political changes in the Russian Federation, revealing how scholars became more sceptical about the possibility of Russia building a Western-type liberal democracy. The second part investigates approaches to the study of Russian national identity. The experience of empire, in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, gave Russians a weak sense of nationhood; ethnic Russians identified with the multi-national Soviet Union. Seeking legitimacy for the new state, President El'tsin sought to create a civic identity focused on the multi-national Russian Federation. The Communist and nationalist opposition continued to promote an imperial identity, focused on restoring the USSR or creating some other formation including the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics. The final section discusses accounts of the two Chechen wars, which scholars see as continuing Russia's imperial policy and harming relations with Russia's Muslim population. President Putin's co-operation with the West against ‘terrorism’ has not led the West to accept Russia as one of its own, due to increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism.
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Bobrus, V. V. "LENINGRAD INSTITUTE OF TRANSFUSION UNDER THE SIEGE AND IN FIRST POSTWAR PERIOD. TRUTH AND FICTION." Marine Medicine 6, no. 5(S) (January 20, 2021): 29–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.22328/2413-5747-2020-6-s-29-45.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Basing on detailed study of open information and documentary sources, the author of the paper assumed the ground-lessness of official narrative setting out in the A. A. Crohn’s book «Deep-sea master. A tale of friend” (Moscow, New World Journal. Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union Publishing House, 1984. 272 p.) with regard to causes of conviction of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Diver No. 1 — A. I. Marinesco, as a result of malice from former director of Leningrad Institute of Transfusion (LIT) — associate professor, candidate of medicine V. V. Kuharchik. An exceptional importance of collaborative work of collective and chiefs of LIT on organization of donor movement under the severe conditions of the siege Leningrad and in a time of despiteous political repressions during the Great Patriotic War was shown. On the basis of analysis of confusion of biographies of two special persons: A. I. Marinesco and V. V. Kuharchik, it was made a conclusion of necessity of continuation historical and documentory studies aimed to discover the historical truth representing heroism of Soviet people at struggle with fascism.
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Martin, Guy. "Preface: Democratic Transition in Africa." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 21, no. 1-2 (1993): 6–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0047160700501589.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Since 1989, the “winds of change” have swept throughout Africa, signaling the dawn of a new era, variously referred to as the “second independence,” or the “Springtime of Africa.” After three decades of authoritarian one- (or no) party rule characterized by political repression, human rights abuses, economic mismanagement, nepotism and corruption, democracy is spreading like bushfire throughout Africa. In 1992 an evaluation of the Carter Center’s African Governance Program, noted that 9 African countries may be described as “democratic,” 4 are under a “directed democracy” regime, and 31 are in transition to democracy, with various degrees of commitment. Popular struggles for democracy in Africa are not new, they have been here since independence. But recent changes in the structure of the international system (notably successful popular struggles for democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) have created a generally favorable and supportive environment for their development and maturation.
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Haytoğlu, E., and A. Zh Arkhymatayeva. "Justification of politics during the Soviet Stalinist era in Kazakhstan from a historical point of view." BULLETIN of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. Historical sciences. Philosophy. Religion Series 132, no. 3 (2020): 68–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2020-132-3-68-83.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The main aspects in historical development of the Republic of Kazakhstan were Stalin’s s policy in the 20 – 30s of the twentieth century which was famous as “the Great Repression”. The article was written on the basis of different researches and the historical record. It provides information on eliminating the traditional structure in Kazakhstan by the Soviet government in Stalin’s time, measures to weaken the social and economic forms of the traditional agriculture of the Kazakh people, the country’s industrialization policy, mass collectivization and creation of collective and State farms, the policy on confiscation of the wealthy peasants’ property and challenges related to the population decline. To establish the socialist structure based on the ideology of economy, the political structure and the culture in the Soviet time was carried out with unprecedented extent in the mentality of Kazakh society and consequences of ambiguity which have not occurred in the past .It is significant to realize general trends in the social transformations of the Eurasian multicultural space, the modernization and the culture in order to study this unique experience. The current situation analysis of the scientific knowledge requires understanding Kazakh history from a conceptual viewpoint and clarifying a number of events of selected period. Kazakhstan passed the difficult path in restructuring of a new policy, the economy and the social culture as part of the Soviet Union.
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Saktaganova, Z. G., and G. M. Baigozhina. "On the question of the specifics of the implementation of national policy in Kazakhstan in the «stagnation era»: 1965-1985." BULLETIN of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. Historical sciences. Philosophy. Religion Series 137, no. 4 (2021): 107–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2616-7255-2021-137-4-107-122.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article discusses general trends, as well as features in the implementation of Soviet national policy in the Kazakh SSR in the period from 1965 to 1985, referred to in Russian historiography as the «Brezhnev era». The purpose of this article is to study the soviet national policy pursued in the Kazakh SSR during the period under review, to identify its characteristic features, problems of implementation, and to identify its consequences for the national local Kazakh population and, in general, the socio-political development of Kazakhstan The authors for the first time introduced into scientific circulation some archival materials of the funds 929 and 1890, including statistical data on the nomenclature of the party apparatus of the Kazakh SSR at various levels with their allocation on a national basis, as well as the distribution of students in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions by nationality and national composition of researchers in the 1960s - 1970s. The novelty of this article lies in the fact that the authors, based on the analysis of archival data, as well as materials of domestic and foreign studies on this issue, attempted to identify the features of solving the personnel issue in the party apparatus of the Kazakh SSR at various levels, the formation of intellectual, cultural and educational potential on the national principle. The authors concluded that the Soviet national policy in Kazakhstan during the designated period was contradictory and had negative consequences for the national development of the Kazakh population. This was large because Kazakhstan, unlike many other Union republics, turned into a «laboratory of the friendship of peoples» with damage to the development of the Kazakh language and culture. The nationalist-minded Kazakh intelligentsia was subjected to repression and persecution by public and party organizations. Internationalization and implementation of the project of the «Soviet people» were carried out by traditional repressive, command, and administrative methods, which naturally caused resistance and protest moods among the Kazakh population.
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Usov, Pavel. "Evolution of the Belarus-Russia Union State: from integration to attempts of incorporation." Studia i Analizy Nauk o Polityce, no. 1 (June 30, 2020): 95–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/sanp.9839.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Russian-Belarus political and economic integration was one of the basic factors of the forming of the neo-authoritarian regime in Belarus. Russian economic support for president Lukashenko provided rapid winding up of democratic transformation in Belarus and preserved the administrative managing of the national economy.
For a long period, Belarus society had been stuck in the soviet style of political life. At the same time, such a style of the political system allowed Russia to keep Belarus in the sphere of its cultural and geopolitical influence. As a result, Belarus was hardly open to a constructive relations with the West, and regular political repressions kept the country isolated.
During the second period of Lukashenko's authoritarian rule, when the Russian policy got significantly more aggressive, the integration became destructive for Belarusian statehood. It is evident that Moscow has been trying to realize an idea to restore some kind of a new empire project, and uses different tools to achieve the goal. It might be said that integration is one of the mechanisms of a hybrid war which Russia wages against post-Soviet republics. Taking into consideration that Belarus has not developed full economic and political relations with the West, its economic and political system is widely dependent on Russia, which puts Belarus in a difficult, critical position.
The continuation of the integration with Russia may result in the loss of Belarus' independence. Even though Lukashenko has been able to resist Kremlin’s insistence on the “deeper integration”, Belarus is still a part of the Union State, and stability of the political and economic system of the country depends on Russian support. No doubt, Moscow will continue its policy of wider control and subordination of Belarus.
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Golovlev, Alexander. "Theatre Policies of Soviet Stalinism and Italian Fascism Compared, 1920–1940s." New Theatre Quarterly 35, no. 04 (October 8, 2019): 312–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266464x19000368.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this article Alexander Golovlev offers a comparative examination of the theatre policies of Fascist Italy and Stalinist Soviet Union. He argues that, although the two regimes shared parallel time frames and gravitated around similar institutional solutions, Italian Fascism was fundamentally different in its reluctance to destroy the privately based theatre structure in favour of a state theatre and to impose a unified style, while Stalin carried out an ambitious and violent campaign to instil Socialist Realism through continuous disciplining, repression, and institutional supervision. In pursuing a nearly identical goal of achieving full obedience, the regimes used different means, and obtained similarly mixed results. While the Italian experience ended with the defeat of Fascism, Soviet theatres underwent de-Stalinization in the post-war decades, indicating the potential for sluggish stability in such frameworks of cultural-political control. Alexander Golovlev is Research Fellow at the International Centre for the History and Sociology of World War II and Its Consequences, National Research University, Higher School of Economics / Fondation de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, and ATLAS Fellow, Centre d’histoire culturelle des sociétés contemporaines, Université de Versailles-Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines/ Université Paris-Saclay. His most recent publications include ‘Sounds of Music from across the Sea: Musical Transnationality in Early Post-World-War-II Austria’, in Yearbook of Transnational History 1 (2018) and ‘Von der Seine an die Salzach: die Teilnahme vom Straßburger Domchor an den Salzburger Festspielen und die französische Musikdiplom atie in Österreich während der alliierten Besatzungs zeit’, Journal of Austrian Studies (2018). He is currently working on the political economy of the Bolshoi theatre under Stalinism.
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Beraia, Eka. "Migration Problems at the Regional Security Level: Reasons for Georgian Migration Abroad." Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 26, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): 117–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/bsp.2021.26.01.09.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract Migration has become one of the most current themes in the reality of Georgian society since the destruction of the Soviet Union. However, this process dates backs to the twentieth century in the history of Georgian migration. Wars, chaos and turmoil, geopolitical location, and social and political conflicts constantly triggered the population to migrate either within the country or abroad. The most recent history of Georgian migration can be divided into several waves or phases: 1. Before the 1950s (Soviet Union regime), when the population was forced to leave their living place by brutal political repressions; 2. In the period of the 1950s to the 1990s, when Georgians migrated within the territory of the Soviet Union Republic; 3. The mass migration of the 1990s, which was caused by social crisis, economic hardship, political turmoil, military conflicts (including inter-ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and South Ossetia (1988–1992) and the civil war of 1993, against the democratically elected Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia; 4. The later migration outflow from Georgia was mainly recorded in 2000, when a huge wave of migrants went to Russia but, as the visa regime had been restricted, Georgian citizens had to choose another destination. This time migrants headed to European countries and the USA. It has to be mentioned that since 2002, the emigration process has become more and more diverse as the motivation of migrants varied as well as the places of destination. Unfortunately, the data that reflects the precise picture of migration in Georgia does not exist. Even the official data cannot be acknowledged as accurate information about the migrants or migration because of the absence of a precise mechanism that collects reliable statistical information. It depicts data based on various sources and methodologies that should be taken into consideration when highlighting the number of migrants.
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Каденюк, О. С. "Public-educational organizations of Wolina the 20's - 30's of the XX century." ВІСНИК СХІДНОУКРАЇНСЬКОГО НАЦІОНАЛЬНОГО УНІВЕРСИТЕТУ імені Володимира Даля, no. 3(259) (February 18, 2020): 32–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.33216/1998-7927-2020-259-3-32-36.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article, on the example of Volyn, analyzes the activities of public organizations in the Ukrainian ethnic lands that became part of Poland and the Soviet Union after the signing of the Riga peace treaty. These lands were the reflection of the most tragic pages in the history of Ukraine. More than once, they have played an extraordinary role in the history of the entire Ukrainian people, which has been reflected in his fate. The defeat of national liberation competitions in 1917 - 1921 and the tragic consequences of these events for the Ukrainian statehood turned Volyn into a specific socio-political and geopolitical region. The events in these territories, as well as the policies of the governments of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the USSR and the Second Commonwealth, were decisive for the Ukrainian population living on ethnic Ukrainian lands and those who found themselves in other countries.
Our research suggests that the socio-economic processes in Volyn during the interwar period were an interesting social phenomenon when Ukrainians were immigrants in their ethnic lands among Ukrainians. The line of the Soviet-Polish border, which was the frontier of the opposition, attracted the most active participants in the national liberation struggle, who continued it under new conditions of statelessness, political and ideological pressure, persecution and repression by the smelling regimes. Work and activity in the interwar period of prominent political figures of the UNR era, religious, cultural and educational figures in the territory of Western Volyn, was of great importance not only for the population of the region, but also for the Ukrainian people.In the Volyn lands, the Orthodox Church had a huge influence on the people, Christian morality in the interwar period acted as the dominant ideology. No political party or NGO has had such an impact on the masses as the church. Understanding this, the Ukrainian clergy not only defended the Orthodox faith on both sides of the borders that divided Volhynia, but also nurtured national consciousness, language, and culture.
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Sivov, Anatoly N. "Transformation of Soviet Ideological Attitudes in the Works of A.N. Yakovlev in 1985-1991." RUDN Journal of Russian History 19, no. 2 (December 15, 2020): 468–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8674-2020-19-2-468-482.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The present article studies the views of the godfather of Glasnost, CPSU Central Committee Secretary Alexander N. Yakovlev (1923-2005), and how they evolved during the Perestroika period in the second half of the 1980s. The author analyzes Yakovlev's positions on issues of Soviet ideology at the beginning of Perestroika, arguing that at that time his statements on the need for radical improvement of ideological work did not differ from the views of other party leaders. Yakovlev's personal biography shaped his interpretation of important events of twentieth-century Russian history; he had fought in the Great Patriotic war and participated in the work of the 20th Party Congress and in the Commission of the CPSU Central Committee for the rehabilitation of victims of political repression. Yakovlev became the target of critique from the leaders of the newly created Communist party of the RSFSR, as well as from conservative CPSU members, in particular during the XVIII Party Congress in the summer of 1990; they criticized Yakovlev's work in the Central Committee of the CPSU and the extent of his influence on M.S. Gorbachev. The article traces changes in Yakovlev's assessments of the socialist formation, of Marxism, and of the political and legal structure of the CPSU. The author identifies a direct link between the problems of social and political life in the Soviet Union and changes in Yakovlev's public statements. This analysis leads to the conclusion that Yakovlev's influence on the President of the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev, was not as big as sometimes assumed. Since the beginning of 1991, Yakovlev's influence was gradually declining, and on the eve of the August putsch it reached its lowest point. The article is based on Yakovlev's published articles and public speeches as well as on archival materials from his personal fund that is preserved in the State Archive of the Russian Federation.
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Tēraudkalns, Valdis. "Cerību laiks: LELB kontakti ar Anglijas baznīcu arhibīskapa Gustava Tūra darbības laikā (1946–1968)." Ceļš 71 (December 15, 2020): 103–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/cl.71.07.
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The purpose of this article is to analyse relationships of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia (ELCL) with the Church of England during Gustavs Tūrs’ time as archbishop. Special attention is given to his visit to U.K. in 1955 as a member of the delegation of Soviet clergy. These contacts are placed in various contexts – theological, socio-political, personal relationships. “Voices” from various sources are placed face to face and confronted with each other. The author has explored materials previously unused in scientific circulation in Latvia – the archive files stored at the Lambeth Palace Library (London). Contacts between the two churches is a continuation of relationships maintained before the Second World War. Delegations of the Lutheran Churches in Estonia and in Latvia had meetings with representatives of the Church of England in 1936 and in 1938. These negotiations resulted in agreement on intercommunion that because of the war was never ratified but respected by the involved parties. The first years after Stalin’s death was a “thaw”, when repression and censorship in the Soviet Union was relaxed. The renewed interest of Soviet leadership in using religious organizations for Soviet foreign politics was used by churches to further their own aims. They tried to reap additional benefits from the Soviet-inspired “parade ecumenism” – theological studies abroad, exchange visits, etc. However, it was not achieved without compromises. Here pops up a theme of collaborationism, which still is sensitive in post-Soviet countries. It may seem easy to evaluate this phenomenon from today’s perspective, whereas for people having no hope that situation would change in their lifetime, adjusting to the political realities was the only option they had. Of course, the question remains what kind of concessions they made to the Soviet system. Contacts between the churches in U.K. and Latvia helped to exchange information; they paved the way to membership in international organizations like the World Lutheran Federation. For Anglicans, the main emphasis during the visit of the delegation of Soviet clergy in 1955 was on Orthodox-Anglican relationships. It is related to the fact that the High-Church movement at that time was at its zenith of influence in the Church of England. The attitude of the Latvian Lutheran Church in diaspora was negative, because it did not recognize ELCL as legitimate, nevertheless, this attitude was not consistent, because the leadership of diaspora church simultaneously tried to maintain personal contacts with the colleagues in Latvia.
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Daigle, Megan. "Love, Sex, Money, and Meaning." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 38, no. 1 (January 23, 2013): 63–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0304375412470773.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent collapse of Cuba’s centralized economy, pursuing relationships with foreign visitors to the island has emerged as a viable means of accessing hard currency, consumer goods, travel, and emigration—of gaining admittance to a perceived better life. In the mid of escalating state repression, a discursive struggle has materialized, assigning meanings to new sexual identities, problematizing these sexual relations, and creating new objects of disciplinary power. Far from simple semantics, defining and naming allows actors within the field of relations—government, police, journalists, mass organizations, individuals—to situate young Cubans within various binaries including good/bad, right/wrong, virtue/vice. Specific labels ranging from crass ( puta or prostituta) to enigmatic ( candelero or luchadora) have ebbed and flowed in popular parlance, each loaded with different raced and gendered implications and political commitments. As state governance of bodies and sexualities evolves, this ethnographic study demonstrates that many young Cubans have begun to use bodily and sexual practices as tools to circumvent poverty, resist state dictates on morality and austerity, and create new subjectivities. Language, for its part, has become a major weapon, alternately disciplinary and liberatory, in the struggle for (self-)definition.
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Shevchenko, Tetiana. "FACTORS OF CONSOLIDATION OF UKRAINIAN PEOPLE IN THE POLITICAL PROGRAMS OF DISSIDENTS (THE END OF THE 1950S TO THE BEGINNING OF THE 1960S)." Almanac of Ukrainian Studies, no. 22 (2017): 152–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2520-2626/2017.22.26.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
An activity of the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union (UWPU) headed by Levko Lukyanenko in West Ukraine at the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1960s was a manifestation of the struggle for independence of Ukraine. Contemporary historiography studies the UWPU’s activity in the context of looking for new forms and methods of the political resistance to the Soviet system in West Ukraine without using the ideology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The result of the struggle depended on the ability to consolidate a whole society by the leaders of the national liberation movement. In the article we shall study the ideas about unity of the Ukrainian society and potential factors of its consolidation in the program documents of the UWPU. A task in hand of the UWPU was “to unmask before workers and peasants an irreconcilable opposite of their interests and the interests of the bureaucratic officialdom as well to compel the direction to comply in the sphere of increasing freedoms of people. Nevertheless an addition complication in the UWPU’s propaganda in West Ukraine was Lykyanenko’s and Kandyba’s, the leading members’ belonging to the system of the Soviet justice which was a part of the party and state structure and estranged deeply from people. The UWPU proclaimed a start of a new stage of struggle for the independence of Ukraine by the most conscientious workers and peasants which are united all over Ukraine and do not communicate with each other. The struggle of the UWPU for Ukraine’s secession from the USSR should be peaceful and according to the Soviet constitution on the tactic and ideological grounds. The UWPU has thought that the idea of the independent Ukraine is only one possible idea which could unite the whole Ukrainian people, exploited by the Russian Soviet colonialist polotics workers and peasants deprived of their rights. The programme of the Union opposed the whole Ukrainian people to the Ukrainian Communists, the representatives of the party and state officialdom, as obedient representatives of the colonial administration. The members of the UWPU, high-principled Marxists, proclaimed their unstinting support the struggle of the Ukrainian Uprising Army for the independence of Ukraine and blamed an armed repression by the Soviet state the Ukrainian underground in West Ukraine. Taking into account the Ukrainian people changed during centuries of slavery and a social oppression the UWPU’s programme does not only presume to challenge the presence of the protest potential of the Ukrainian people but also affirms that in time the Ukrainian people’s aspiration to independence develops widely and its struggle for the independence becomes fiercer. The UWPU suggests to campaign among workers and peasants for the uniting the whole Ukrainian people for the struggle for Ukrainian state independency, as well to win representatives of other nationalities which live in Ukraine, and fight for general democratization of the state structure in the USSR
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Bidzilya, Yuriy. "Transcarpathian print media of the mid and second half of the 20th cс. as a process of deepening the Sovietization of the mass media space of the region". Proceedings of Research and Scientific Institute for Periodicals, № 10(28) (січень 2020): 180–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.37222/2524-0331-2020-10(28)-12.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Against the background of the socio-political events of the time, the article analyzes the process of deepening the totalitarian ways of managing the media in Transcarpathia, the region most recently annexed to the Soviet Union. Communists liquidate newspapers and magazines of other parties, cultural and public associations in the region, and communist government bodies purposefully turn the newly created print media and survivors into a means of destroying dissent. Through custom newspaper publications, the communist administrative-command system not only launches repression against active local cultural and public figures, scholars, writers, clergy, but also uses a titanic effort to ideologically re-educate the population of Transcarpathia through the print media The main function of the media is to promote the communist way of life and class struggle. The author examines the main stages of the transformation of the Transcarpathian print media into communist print media, draws attention to the way in which the Soviet authorities in Transcarpathia fought dissent through the print media, rigidly implemented anti-religious propaganda in the media. Those public and religious figures who did not agree to move to the side of communist power were ruthlessly physically destroyed. Such was the fate of the famous and authoritative among the population of Transcarpathian Greek-Catholic bishop Theodore Romzha. Transcarpathian press of the second half of the 20th century becomes an era of strengthening and deepening of Sovietization. The media actively promoted the idea that the country had entered the era of advanced socialism, and that all peoples in the Soviet Union formed a single historical community – the «Soviet people». In this way, the idea that the national issue was finally resolved was entrenched. At the same time, self-publishing books, which proved quite differently, had a significant impact on Ukrainian society. During these years, Transcarpathia became the base for the transfer of selfpublishing and dissident works to Western Europe for printing. Anti-Communist appearances in neighboring Czechoslovakia, known as the «Prague Spring», have had a major impact on the information space of this region. Keywords: periodicals, journalism, mass media, media space, propaganda, agitation, party press.
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Radchenko, Sergey S. "Mongolian Politics in the Shadow of the Cold War: The 1964 Coup Attempt and the Sino-Soviet Split." Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 1 (January 2006): 95–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039706775212021.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
After Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of some of Stalin's crimes in 1956, the Mongolian People's Republic, following in the footsteps of the “fraternal” Soviet Union, also succumbed to the “thaw.” Khrushchev used de Stalinization to discredit his hardline opponents. Mongolia's leader, Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, was a Stalin-era holdover who came under criticism from his rivals for being unenthusiastic about political reforms. Tsedenbal had good reason to downplay de-Stalinization:He shared responsibility with Marshal Horloogiyn Choibalsan for violent repressions in the 1940s. But Tsedenbal outmaneuvered and eliminated his opponents in the late 1950s and early 1960s and consolidated his grip on power by 1964.Toward the end of that year, however, Tsedenbal once again was challenged, this time from an unexpected direction. Several members of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) used the precedent of Khrushchev's forced retirement from his leadership posts in Moscow in October 1964 as a pretext to overthrow Tsedenbal. At a plenum of the MPRP Central Committee in December 1964, Tsedenbal was accused of incompetence, corruption, disrespect for principles of “party democracy,” lack of economic discipline, and overreliance on the Soviet Union for credits. But Tsedenbal rebuffed the “anti-party group” and depicted the affair as an attempted coup engineered by pro-Chinese sympathizers and spies. Soviet leaders were wary of Chinese efforts to “subvert” Moscow's in fluence in the socialist camp and were therefore willing to endorse Tsedenbal's version of events.
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Grechenko, V. A. "Legal and Organizational Principles of Militia Activities of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1956." Bulletin of Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs 94, no. 3 (September 29, 2021): 15–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.32631/v.2021.3.01.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The year 1956 was significant both in the history of Ukraine and the USSR, but also for world history. The death of I.V. Stalin in 1953 marked the beginning of the partial liberalization of the political regime in the Soviet Union; the strongest impetus for the continuation and intensification of this process was in 1956, the year of the XX Congress of the CPSU and the CPSU Central Committee Resolution “On overcoming the Stalin’s cult of personality and its consequences”, where a lot of terrible truth about the Soviet past was told for the first time. This significantly changed the political and socio-economic situation in the country, in fact prevented further mass repression of the population and significantly changed the role of law enforcement agencies, which really began to acquire the characteristics of law enforcement. There was a change of the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, which was another step in clearing the state leadership of the most odious Stalinist personnel and meant strengthening the control of the communist party agencies over the militia. The new leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs believed that the main shortcoming in the activities of the militia was the lack of activity in the fight against crime and the significant level of crime among police officers themselves. There were also shortcomings in the operative work on crime prevention and detection. The selection and placement of personnel was badly organized in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There were many cases, when people without proper training were assigned to important areas of operative and investigative work in the militia. Departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and militia divisions in oblasts were reorganized into unified departments of internal affairs of executive committees of oblast Soviets of Workers’ Deputies, and militia departments in cities and districts were transformed into militia divisions of executive committees of city and district councils. That meant the resumption of dual subordination of local law enforcement agencies to executive committees of councils and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But that reorganization did not have the desired effect.
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Conterio, Johanna. "Controlling Land, Controlling People: Urban Greening and the Territorial Turn in Theories of Urban Planning in the Soviet Union, 1931-1932." Journal of Urban History 48, no. 3 (March 14, 2022): 479–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00961442211063171.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article explores the relationship between urban planning and social order in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. From the mid-1930s, urban planners sought to shape the social order by reducing urban population density, limiting urban growth, and controlling mobility. The article explores how urban planners translated the ideal of less densely populated cities into designed built environments, through a study of how they theorized urban green space. This study ties the history of urban planning to the history of urban policing, mass operations, and the social repressions of the Stalinist 1930s through the lens of territoriality. It treats the rise of urban planning and urban policing as part of a single, state project to establish social order in cities, through establishing control over territory, implicating Soviet urban planners in the violent processes of social engineering of Stalinism.
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Mandel, David. "La crise du socialisme réellement existant." Études internationales 13, no. 2 (April 12, 2005): 283–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/701351ar.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The Soviet Union and its East European glacis are experiencing their second major wave of crisis since the death of Stalin. But unlike the "de-stalinization" crisis of the second half of the 1950s, which was largely political and was overcome through a combination of repression and reform that left the system basically intact, the present crisis cannot be weathered so easily and threatens to usher in a period of political upheaval, as it has already in Poland and, to some extent, in Romania. On the most obvious level, the crisis manifests itself in the constant decline of the economic growth rate since the late 1950s, which has put an end to the slow but steady rise in living standards, the basis upon which the tacit post-Stalin accord between the bureaucracy and society was founded. The roots of this crisis are deeply structural, but structural reforms, in particular the introduction of the « regulated market mechanism », which appears to be the nly viable alternative open to the bureaucracy, will meet with strong opposition from important sectors of that elite, especially the provincial party bosses, and threaten to create a split in its ranks. At the same time, such a reform is politically unfeasible without important concessions to the working class in the direction of democratization or, at the least, the right to organize into independent trade unions to protect itself against management, whose powers would be greatly enhanced by the reform. But such concessions to the working class, as Poland shows, are perceived by the bureaucracy as a threat to its very existence. At the same time, the working class today is potentially a much more formidable political force than at any time since the civil war. The leadership is, therefore, in a dilemma. The 1980s are likely to see the explosive combination of a simultaneous crisis "as the top" and "at the bottom".
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Percival, Mark. "Britain's ‘Political Romance’ with Romania in the 1970s." Contemporary European History 4, no. 1 (March 1995): 67–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s096077730000326x.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
‘King takes Queen’. This is how John Sweeney summed up his view of the state visit by Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to Britain in June 1978, an event which marked the high point of what theTimesreferred to as ‘Britain's political romance with Romania’ in the 1970s. Sweeney's book, in common with other post-revolutionary writing on Romania, roundly condemns Britain's foreign policy-makers for supporting a repressive regime.1However, in the 1970s the situation was not viewed in such clear-cut terms. In the early part of the decade, books by British writers praised Ceausescu, and Romania often received favourable coverage in the British press.2It was almost universally seen as a country which, although internally rigidly communist, pursued an independent foreign policy and was consequently a thorn in the flesh of the Soviet Union. It was keen to industrialise and to expand its economic ties with the West in order to do so. Apologists for British policy would argue that it was therefore both politically and economically beneficial to support Ceausescu. Politically it would weaken Moscow's control over the Eastern Bloc, and economically it would benefit British industry. Indeed, the two were related – the more economic ties Ceausescu had with the West, the stronger his political independence from Moscow would become.