Статті в журналах з теми "Police abolition movement"

Abstract As the South African student movement of 2015–16 began to develop a deeper critique of the character of the transition out of apartheid and its minimal effect on the institutions of colonialism and apartheid, the administrators of postapartheid universities worked with the managers of the security infrastructure of the state to orchestrate a national police shutdown of the student and worker movement. This essay is an effort to sustain an objection to that coordinated effort, and to work through a proposal for how the new managers of the postapartheid state and university could have—should have—acted otherwise. This proposal is called abolition pedagogy, a refusal of the long-standing relationship between education and violence, and a reading of the pedagogic labor involved in antiviolence work. In the midst of the recent student protests, a 1969 exchange of letters between Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse—in which Adorno justifies his having “called the police” on the student movement in Germany—was used to justify calling the police on South African students some fifty years later. This article unpacks the citation, and uses Adorno's own commitment to critique as a “force field” to show up the limitations of his position, and to call for a different mode of engagement with the difficulties and possibilities of ongoing struggle. Adorno's “force field” is contrasted with his poor reckoning with jazz and his inability to see the work of critique in jazz and by implication in many other forms. Abolition pedagogy pursues a transformative orientation to histories of violence, asking how to sustain strategies for their unmaking.

The global resurgence of the Black Lives Matter movement in May 2020 led to an unprecedented reckoning with the racism within Aotearoa New Zealand’s police and prison systems. For Pacific peoples, this led to reflections on the racism of the police during the dawn raids of the 1970s and the racist police violence that Pacific peoples and Māori continue to face today. Notably, when the state apologised for the dawn raids in August 2021, it failed to acknowledge, let alone make amends for, this ongoing racist violence. Therefore, as a Pacific abolitionist legal scholar, in this article I argue that Pacific peoples and wider society in Aotearoa New Zealand must hold the state to account for the inherent racism of not only the police, but prisons as well. Specifically, I argue that we must ‘freedom dream’ ( Kelley 2002 , np) of police and prison abolition by supporting calls by Māori and other criminal justice advocates to achieve abolition through constitutional transformation premised on honouring te Tiriti o Waitangi. In making this argument, I draw on Black American abolitionist legal scholar Dorothy Roberts’ concept of ‘abolition constitutionalism’, which challenges abolitionists to grapple with whether abolition can be achieved within existing constitutional frameworks ( Roberts 2019 , 122). Accordingly, I offer a Pacific perspective on Tiriti-based abolition constitutionalism which further develops the case for why abolition cannot be achieved within current constitutional arrangements within which te Tiriti o Waitangi has long been, and will continue to be, undermined by Parliament.

The murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers in 2020 was a watershed moment, triggering protests across the country and unprecedented promises by city leaders to “end” the MPD. We use interviews and archival materials to understand the roots of this decision, tracing the emergent split between activists fighting for police reform and police abolition in the wake of the initial Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in Minneapolis. We compare the frames used by these two sets of movement actors, arguing that abolitionists deployed more radical frames to disrupt hegemonic understandings of policing, while other activists fought to resonate with the existing discursive structure. After years of police reform, Floyd’s death and the rebellion that followed gave abolitionist discourses more resonance. In the discussion, we consider the future of public safety in Minneapolis and its implications for understanding frame resonance in Black movements.

Prisoner and prison radio – audio production and broadcasting that services prisoner and prison communities – has existed in a variety of forms in a diverse range of countries for over 30 years and has recently seen a surge in popularity and awareness. At the same time, the prison abolition movement has also gained momentum and visibility, after an equally long presence and history. Recently in the United States, the New York City Council voted to close Rikers Island by 2026 in response to community campaigning driven by an abolition agenda. Likewise, the Black Lives Matter movement has introduced an abolitionist discourse (especially around defunding police services) to the mainstream vernacular. This article considers the relationships between broadcasters/audiences and the State – embodied through government departments responsible for managing the incarceration of its citizens, and how these impact on prisoner radio’s capacity to act as an agent of change. To do so, we take a scholactivist approach to critically reflect on our experiences as prisoner radio practitioners and researchers and consider the potentials for prisoner radio to either support or hinder a prison abolition agenda. Can the genre contribute to the prison abolition movement when it often requires the support of the prison-industrial complex to exist?

An interview with Chicago-based Black historian, activist and writer Barbara Ransby in July 2020 as to how to understand the significance of the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) uprisings across the US. Ransby defines the movement and the forces that made George Floyd’s murder a pivotal point for so many people, bringing them on to the streets in over 500 locations. She explains the gestation of the movement against ‘racial capitalism’ from 2012 onwards and its current political formation as made up of an array of forces. The largest most organised coalition is the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL). She traces the white Left’s unwillingness to see the Black working class as now the defining point of class politics and addresses issues of police violence, incarceration and white supremacy. Organic solidarity is developing between progressive groups around an abolition agenda, which is simultaneously about dismantling the carceral state and building new institutions.

Background & methods National protests in the summer of 2020 drew attention to the significant presence of police in marginalized communities. Recent social movements have called for substantial police reforms, including “defunding the police,” a phrase originating from a larger, historical abolition movement advocating that public investments be redirected away from the criminal justice system and into social services and health care. Although research has demonstrated the expansive role of police to respond a broad range of social problems and health emergencies, existing research has yet to fully explore the capacity for health insurance policy to influence rates of arrest in the population. To fill this gap, we examine the potential effect of Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on arrests in 3,035 U.S. counties. We compare county-level arrests using FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program Data before and after Medicaid expansion in 2014–2016, relative to counties in non-expansion states. We use difference-in-differences (DID) models to estimate the change in arrests following Medicaid expansion for overall arrests, and violent, drug, and low-level arrests. Results Police arrests significantly declined following the expansion of Medicaid under the ACA. Medicaid expansion produced a 20–32% negative difference in overall arrests rates in the first three years. We observe the largest negative differences for drug arrests: we find a 25–41% negative difference in drug arrests in the three years following Medicaid expansion, compared to non-expansion counties. We observe a 19–29% negative difference in arrests for violence in the three years after Medicaid expansion, and a decrease in low-level arrests between 24–28% in expansion counties compared to non-expansion counties. Our main results for drug arrests are robust to multiple sensitivity analyses, including a state-level model. Conclusions Evidence in this paper suggests that expanded Medicaid insurance reduced police arrests, particularly drug-related arrests. Combined with research showing the harmful health consequences of chronic policing in disadvantaged communities, greater insurance coverage creates new avenues for individuals to seek care, receive treatment, and avoid criminalization. As police reform is high on the agenda at the local, state, and federal level, our paper supports the perspective that broad health policy reforms can meaningfully reduce contact with the criminal justice system under historic conditions of mass criminalization.

In the face of socio-political marginalization, frontline communities reclaim power by harnessing peer wisdom and resilience. The year 2020 marked the confluence of a global pandemic and widespread resistance against anti-Black racism and police violence, highlighting the value of peer voices and community perspectives. To dismantle and transcend carceral approaches to community care, the field of social work is invited to join a larger anti-carceral mental health movement that honors lived experience and works alongside peers to build identity-affirming structures of mental health care. This article examines the ways in which frontline communities benefit from expanded access to anti-carceral formal and informal peer support as a mental health safety net that interrupts harm and prioritizes agency, consent, and self-determination. This paper broadens social work’s conceptualization of peer support through theoretical frameworks of anti-carceral social work, abolition, and intersectionality. Social work and its adjacent fields are called to urgently center Black liberation, collective healing, and community care by advocating for the integration of formal and informal peer support into mental health policy and practice. This paper strategically leans into a lineage of critical peer thought scholarship by utilizing footnotes and citations to model the ethical acknowledgment of peer labor within human rights movements. This intentional structure promotes radical solidarity that resists the exploitation of people with lived experience.

Prison and police abolition has become a major political philosophy in North American discourse following the 2020 George Floyd protests. The philosophy remains divisive, and North American abolitionists seeking to coalition-build, provide resources for vulnerable populations and garner public support continue to experience challenges. We explore current usage of digital tools among abolitionists and the potential of a digital mapping tool to address these challenges. We conduct an interview study with 15 abolitionist organizations to understand activists' perspectives on the value of digital tools for organizing and a content analysis of 25 existing digital tools that convey abolitionist ideas to the public. Our findings together reveal (1) opportunities for digital mapping and HCI to support abolitionist activism and grassroots activism more broadly and (2) the challenges of digitally and spatially representing a movement that is intentionally grassroots, clandestine, and often involves organizers working in disparate locations.

The protests in the autumn of 2022 began after the death of the Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini, for which the opposition blamed the Islamic regime’s morality police. The initial demands for the abolition of the morality police very quickly gave way to radical demands for the elimination of the Islamic regime and the resignation of the Supreme Leader. The protests quickly spread to hundreds of cities and villages in all provinces of the country. Up to 2 million people took part in them. The protests were emphatically secular in nature, and the main slogan of the protesters was the slogan “Woman, life, freedom”. By and large, the mass protests in the autumn of 2022 proved to be the most intense, radical and bloody since the Islamic revolution, as the regime officials themselves admit. Despite the fact that the regime was able hold on, there are the risks of recurrence of similar mass actions in the coming years. If Iran manages to reach an agreement with the United States to lift sanctions, it will have a positive impact on economic development, but political reasons for discontent will remain. Therefore, Iran needs serious domestic political and economic reforms. The protest movement in Iran is in many ways similar to the mass protests in the Arab East during the Arab Spring, which indicates similar socio-political issues.

For many years, the unit of the Nigerian Police Force, Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) was accused of violent crimes and violation of human rights of citizens. One wondered if SARS had dual operational duties – to kill and dehumanise those it ought to protect. Between October and November 2020, multitude of Nigerian youths took to the street to demand for abolition of SARS, thus #EndSARS protest. Photography was at the heart of the social movement. Employing digital methods including compositional analysis and audience interpretation, this paper examines a selection of #EndSARS-related photographs and their accompanying comments retrieved from social media in relation to the impact on the street demonstration. I investigate the modes of creating the images and how they produce political effects. I argue that the use of images in the #EndSARS protest illuminates the rising conviction among Nigerians that photography can aid in the transformation of their precarious living conditions. These include the use of the camera in the conventional sense of framing the fleeting world. Others are digital editing of photographs, staged production and appropriation of images that may have no connection with the protest. Then, I analyse as political act the sense of obligation with which the images are produced and circulated. These lines of enquiry contribute to the emerging work on how photography and social media are converging to transform the political sphere.

The article is devoted to the study of legal regulation of migration control, security, legal regulation of asylum, integration of immigrants, etc. in EU countries, as well as its generalization and identification of stages of development of suchregulation. It is established that, in general, there are four such stages: 1) from the beginning of the formation of the European Community to the end of the 1960s; kin. 60’s - 70’s of the XX century .; 80 years of the twentieth century. - zero years of theXI century; 4) since the 10 years of the XI century. It was established that at the first stage of the formation of the European Community migration policy was not relevant in the legal regulation. It is researched that the beginning of the second stage is connected with the adoption in 1968 of the Regulation «On freedom of movement of workers within the community», which aimed to create incentives for mobility and flexibility of labor migrationwithin European education. This Regulation provides for the elimination of any discrimination on grounds of nationality between workers of the Member States in respect of employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. It was determined that in the third stage migration of economic-social migration was transferred to the sphere of politics. An important factor in the politicization of migration has been the use of an asylum institute for immigration purposes as an alternative way of economic immigration to EU countries. This period is characterized by the interstate cooperation of European countries within the framework of the Task Force on Immigration (Trevi) and the Schengen Group, as well as with functional organizations such as the police, the Schengen Agreement on the free crossing of borders between the participating countries and the abolition of border controls in Maastricht the definition of migration, asylum and refugees became part of theThird Pillar and the Treaty of Amsterdam, where sections of the Third Pillar concerning immigration, asylum and refugees as were komunitaryzovani.It is concluded that the European Union countries are in the fourth stage of the development of legal regulation of migration control, which began with the migration crisis of 2014-2015, but has not yet been resolved with the problems and challengesfaced by the participating countries.

This article discusses the novelty of the women’s movement in encouraging women’s political representation and advocating for the elimination of domestic violence. Data is obtained through interviews with actors involved in the women’s movement, especially actors from civil society organizations. The results of the study show that the women’s movement in the Advocacy on Affirmative Policy in Election becomes a sign of the inclusion of women in the political agenda. While the women’s movement in the advocacy for Law on the Abolition of Domestic Violence dismantles private and public dichotomies that are detrimental to women in the context<br />of domestic violence. This study also shows that women’s movements need strong concepts, adaptive strategies and synergies with various elements to be able to push the women’s agenda and encourage change.

Abstract “Queer as in Abolition Now!” introduces the special issue “Queer Fire: Liberation and Abolition.” The issue brings together scholars, artists, and writers working at the intersections of queer theory, critical race studies, and radical activist movements to consider prison abolition as a project of queer liberation and queer liberation as an abolitionist project. Pushing beyond observations that prisons disproportionately harm queer people, the contributors demonstrate that gender itself is a carceral system and demand that gender and sexuality, too, be subject to abolition. Drawing on methodologies from the social sciences, humanities, and fine arts, contributors offer fresh vocabularies and analytical lenses to the ongoing work of constructing liberatory futures without prisons, police, or the tyranny of colonial gender systems.

Feminists campaigning for the abolition of prostitution have long argued that it is men who buy sex, rather than prostitute women, who should be penalised and reformed. In recent years, the phenomenon of ‘trafficking’ in persons has provided feminist abolitionists with a more high profile platform from which to lobby on prostitution issues, and they have found policy makers increasingly receptive to calls to penalise men who buy sex. This has encouraged some feminist abolitionists to forge alliances with those who would more usually be viewed as ‘enemies’ of feminism and other progressive social movements (police chiefs calling for more extensive police powers and tougher sentencing policy, anti-immigration politicians calling for tighter border controls, and moral conservatives urging a return to ‘family values’). This paper is concerned with the dangers of such liaisons. It begins with a brief review of the findings of recent research on the demand for commercial sexual services, then puts forward some reasons why feminist abolitionists should be cautious about calling on the state to penalise sex buyers.

Abstract Substantial progress has been made towards worldwide abolition of capital punishment, and there are good reasons to believe that more progress is possible. Since 2000, the pace of abolition has slowed, but by several measures the number of executions in the world has continued to decline. Several causes help explain the decline, including political leadership from the front and an increased tendency to regard capital punishment as a human rights issue rather than as a matter of domestic criminal justice policy. There are significant obstacles in the movement to eliminate state killing in the world, but some strategies could contribute to additional decline in the years to come.

Abstract: Anti-Asian violence during the pandemic has been largely framed by mainstream media as an individual response to the pandemic and reduces anti-Asian violence to "hate" toward Asians, therefore justifying increased use of law enforcement and carceral punishment of individuals committing hate incidents. Additionally, some members of the Asian American community advocate for policy changes and collection of hate crimes statistics that rely more on carceral punishment. Other members of the Asian American community argue that hate crime statistics and legislation do not provide systemic changes necessary to address anti-Asian violence. Specifically, Asian American abolition feminists are challenging mainstream narratives that isolate violence to conversations of racism alone and calling for the abolition of the carceral system that is historically and inherently responsible for violence against Black, Indigenous, people of color (BIPOC) communities and women. This paper addresses carceral solutions to anti-Asian violence and the opportunities of abolition feminism as an Asian American feminist praxis to challenge violence against Asian Americans. Focusing on survivor-led movements and responses to violence in its multiple forms, I discuss how abolition feminism may be necessary for redressing anti-Asian violence. I also consider how Asian American abolition feminism can achieve truly liberating, transformative solutions and healing to violence through an abolitionist and decolonial feminist praxis that centers and engages with Indigenous Pacific Islander communities.

This article argues that, in the face of worsening conditions from climate change, enhanced border enforcement, a growing wealth gap, housing crises, and policing, social movements should focus on expanding mutual aid strategies. Mutual aid projects directly address survival needs, mobilize large numbers of people to participate in movements actively rather than solely participating online or through voting, and offer spaces to practice new social relations. The article looks at examples from efforts for migrant justice, police and prison abolition, disaster relief, and other contemporary struggles and discusses potential pitfalls of mutual aid strategies, such as supplementing and therefore stabilizing existing systems of maldistribution and adopting principles and practices from the charity frameworks that proliferate in capitalism.

The purpose of this study is to examine the elements of the black civil rights movement in American popular music in the 1960s. Therefore, in order to help understand popular music and the black civil rights movement, the overall flow was examined, and the form of the black civil rights movement observed through this was observed through social background and lyrics analysis. The elements of the black civil rights movement in popular music were identified as four elements: abolition of racism and equality, demand for institutional change, identity and decision-making, cooperation and solidarity, and these elements are provided as basic data to prove the characteristics of popular music used as a means of the times and civic consciousness.

In recent years the debate on the legitimacy of the infliction of corporal punishment by parents on their children has been intensified. This traditional parental power has been challenged both at governmental and legislature levels and in the courts, in some cases leading to its prohibition — a policy which has now been endorsed by various international norm-setting bodies. This article traces the historical development of this abolitionist movement on the international plane and seeks to identify the ideologies which have motivated it. In particular, it assesses the respective roles of the child protection ideology, which is concerned with the prevention of victimization, and the children's rights perspective. The contravening role of the family rights ideology is also considered. The article also uses case-studies to analyse the interplay of these forces on the national level, and considers the usefulness of this analysis to predict abolition.

Abstract This article aims to reflect on the politics of contemporary carceral LGBT movements and to delineate the (im)possibilities of an anti-colonial queer abolitionism. From the southern Americas, the authors elaborate a brief genealogy of the punishment of queer bodies in Brazil, marking the impossible promises of safety made by the penal “cystem.” By elaborating a critique of carcerality in LGBT contemporary politics, the authors argue for a refusal of the colonial world's solutions to violence. Amid (im)possibilities, this article formulates some elements for anti-colonial, queer abolitionist practices that envision the end of prisons and police, as well as the abolition of gender, sexuality, class, and race as structures of this world. It presents the refusal, the imagination, an ethics of incommensurability, and an active daily building of other possibilities as imbricated elements of anti-colonial, queer abolitionist struggles. Those practices may well be a path to set on fire this world, this present prison house, in the name of queer abolitionist futures.

The article attempts to carry out a comparative analysis of the agrarian policy pursued by the governments of the White Movement during the Civil War (1918–1920). The period of the second half of the XIX – early XX century was marked by the development of land relations in the Russian Empire. Despite serfdom abolition, peasant land scarcity continued to be the main problem of the peasant issue. The First World War, like the Russian-Japanese war, was supposed to be a small victorious war in order to postpone making the final decision on the agrarian issue. Absence of reforms combined with a protracted nature of the war contributed to the emergence of new liberal democratic forces in Russia. Beginning with February 1917, the Provisional Government tried to pursue a revolutionary policy to raise the authority of the government among soldiers, peasants and workers. However, political misconceptions and mistakes contributed to further power decentralization in Russia, which led first to the counter-revolution formation, and only then to isolation of the White Movement from this united front. With small resources, the leaders of the European part of the movement faced a problem that was not yet solved. Despite the Decree on Land adopted by the Soviet government, redistribution of land was not carried out, the agrarian issue continued to be acute, especially in the outskirts, which were under the rule of the whites. In contrast to the Decree on Land, the leaders of the White Movement had to pursue their own policy, which would be more attractive to the peasant masses. 95% of the population of Russia was peasants, so to gain their support would mean victory in the civil war. The regional and the national character of the White Movement determined future agrarian policy. It is also necessary to take into account that domestic policy was implemented in wartime conditions, which affected the effectiveness of reforms. Contradictions between the right-wingers and left-wingers delayed the development and implementation of reforms, which ultimately resulted in their failure. However, despite this, the white governments managed to lay a regulatory framework in their territorial entities, while taking into account the national and climatic specifics of the region.

The 1975 Algiers Agreement is a political and legal agreement signed between Iraq and Iran to end the chronic border problems between them after the abolition of the Saadabad Agreement of 1937 from the Iranian side unilaterally on 19/4/1969 and the demarcation of the border between the two neighboring countries. In the waters of the Shatt al-Arab in favor of Iran in return for non-support of the Tehran government of the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq, has already collapsed this movement as a result of a mysterious international and regional deal, Moreover, this agreement has met the historical demands of Shahnashah Iran to extend its sovereignty over the Gulf And the region, in addition to strengthening the American influence of this region to counter the influence of the Soviet Union, as the signing of this agreement as a result of manipulation of the paper by the American and Iranian interests and joint scheme in the Gulf, the Algiers agreement is a mysterious political and legal deal at the expense of Iraqi territory and at the expense of Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq to end The long-standing problems between Iraq and Iran, and therefore be replaced by this illegal agreement is not in place and the Iraqi and Iranian borders have become clear and final. The United States and Iran Israel has used the movement Kurdish liberation as a bargaining policy against the Soviet Union for the Gulf region, and vice versa Kurdish liberation movement has benefited these financial aid and internal and international Tazizmkantha.

This article deals with the study of the views of the Soviet intelligence on the so-called short-lived “Caliphate movement”, which originates from the then British India. Even after its official abolition in 1924, this institution did not lose its symbolic appeal for Muslims across the world. As an idea it continued offering the Muslims a sense of the umma i.e. the global community of Muslims. The author offers the Soviet intelligence interpretation of the idea of the Caliphate movement in the context of the Soviet “eastern” foreign policy. The article describes this issue through the prism of interaction between the Eastern Department of the OGPU (USSR Secret service) and Musa Bigiyev, a prominent Russian Muslim leader of the 19th–20th cent. Based on hitherto unknown archival materials and the most recent Russian and foreign historical studies, the author offers a comparative analysis of the attitudes of various Soviet and Communist Party institutions to the Caliphate idea and the Caliphate movement in the context of anti-colonial, anti-European struggle. In conclusion article shows the discrepancy between the strategy and tactics of Soviet intelligence services as opposed to the views of European (in particular, British) intelligence services. As a result, these activities contributed to the restriction of independence of the Russian Muslim elite on one handside, strengthening the anti-Caliphate feelings and Islamophobic views among the Soviet management elite on the other.

The paper is devoted to the study of the EU internal market. It was determined that the main goals of creating an internal market were to stimulate economic growth in the region, improve the quality and availability of goods and services, and reduce prices. The free movement of goods is one of the key freedoms of the EU's internal market and is seen as the basis of EU policy, as it offers producers access to member states' markets and consumers a wide range of goods. The main historical moments of the formation of the free movement of goods are considered, namely the reduction of customs barriers between countries and the establishment of a unified customs policy for third countries through the European Customs Union; abolition of customs duties between member states since 1968; harmonization of national legislation. It has been established that today the free movement of goods means that EU countries do not have to charge customs duties on goods produced in the EU when they cross the border, or on goods produced in third countries when they enter the EU. In addition, charges having an equivalent effect on trade or quantitative restrictions on imports are also prohibited. At the same time, it is determined that the provisions of Art. 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU allows member states to take measures that have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions if they are justified by general, non-economic considerations. However, the arguments used by member states to justify import or export barriers were interpreted by the EU court quite strictly, using the proportionality criterion. It is well-founded that one of the problems faced by EU member states is that belonging to the single market means that a single country does not have the right to refuse the sale of products produced in other countries of the Union, which is considered acceptable. The use of restrictive measures provided for in Art. 36, which may impede the free movement of goods, require a scientific analysis to demonstrate the existence of a risk.

After the fall of east orientated political system and coming of the pluralistic system in the Yugoslav federation, the nationalisms that claimed to dominate Yugoslavia, such as Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian nationalism came to the surface, which also led to the overthrow of Yugoslavia. Following the abolition of Kosovo's limited autonomy of 1974, in March 1989, the Milosevic Serb regime during the 1990s imposed violent measures in all Kosovo institutions by removing Albanian workers from their jobs. Thus, Kosovo, Albanians were expelled collectively from the education process in the Albanian language, and left school and university facilities. Efforts to reach an agreement between Albanians and Serbian representatives for education during 1992 were unsuccessful. In these difficult contexts, the parallel education system of Kosovo Albanians was organized. In these difficult circumstances, students and Albanian students continued learning outside school facilities. After ignoring the Kosovo problem in the peace agreement reached in Dayton for Bosnia, the dissatisfaction with the peace policy led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova grew all over Kosovo. In these circumstances, professors and students with vision began to talk about the organization of peaceful protests against the Serbian regime. After a long process, a new student movement took place at the University of Prishtina, which marks the beginning of the great protest on 1 October 1997. In this paper, we analyse the attitudes of international diplomacy with a special emphasis on the West in relation to this movement following the 1 October 1997 peace protests in Kosovo.

One of the EU strategies to address the challenges associated with EU membership, and in itself a precondition for membership, is regional co-operation and good neighborly relations. De facto interdependence and cooperation between neighboring countries in one area (such as infrastructure, transport, energy, free trade) is expected to lead to further cooperation in a wider range of areas, but also to regional stability, reconciliation and ultimately towards European integration. Lessons can be learned from examples of co-operation between Visegrad and the Baltic states, but for the Western Balkans, given their ethnic differences and past armed conflicts, building close regional ties and trust is even more important. Although not all countries in the region have opened membership negotiations, they are all involved in the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), a framework that aims to prepare them for eventual membership. The SAP places particular emphasis on regional co-operation and good neighborly relations. Regional co-operation has advanced and 'taken root' in the Balkans for a number of reasons and has been 'a transformative experience'. In addition to economic arguments (faster economic growth in general and smoother EU integration), there were also political reasons for strengthening regional cooperation. The need to create permanent conditions for security, stability, peace and development has been a major driver. Since the 1990s, numerous formats and initiatives for regional cooperation have been established in the Western Balkans covering a wide range of areas. Starting with the 1999 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the Western Balkan countries have joined in a range of formats and initiatives with a wide range, including economic, functional, political and security co-operation . The initiative to create Open Balkan or otherwise known as Mini-Schengen was first proposed by the former Prime Minister of Albania, Fatos Nano in the early 1990s. Nano's idea was to create a common economic zone on the Balkan Peninsula. But this idea was not elaborated due to the start of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Such an initiative was returned to the table by the Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama during the meetings held in the framework of the Berlin Process. In 2018, Rama proposed such an idea to improve political relations between the countries of the region. The successful implementation of the Open Balkans Initiative may be accompanied by several challenges. For example, the abolition of border controls could exacerbate drug trafficking and various criminal activities. The European Commission has already stressed that the so-called Balkan route is one of the main entry points for various types of illegal drugs in the EU. Accompanied by a high level of corruption, with organized crime and officials often involved in acts of corruption with impunity, abandonment of border controls can turn out to be fertile ground for criminal activities. Moreover, in a borderless region, it may be almost impossible to keep track of the entry and importation of citizens' goods by third parties from different markets. Given that the former place the heterogeneous visa regimes of the participating countries under great stress, the latter would be particularly challenging in the light of different customs policies and import duties. If these challenges are not addressed properly, they can be an obstacle to deepening regional cooperation . If the strong commitment to this initiative continues, solutions can be found to the challenges presented. At the Skopje Summit, the troika announced that steps to establish a joint software and information exchange system are already under way. Together with a high level of coordination between interior ministries, the risks of increasing the volume of cross-border criminal activities can be mitigated. On the other hand, the exchange of information alone is not enough to prevent third-country nationals from entering a country without visa restrictions and then simply moving to another where such agreements with the country of origin do not exist. Establishing a joint visa regime may be the only solution. The same logic can be applied to goods entering a borderless market if they are required to pay customs duties of different levels for each country. However, in this case, just harmonizing customs policies would not suffice as countries would inevitably lose border revenues due to the lack of internal borders. Establishing joint regional institutions and external tariffs may be the required action. Otherwise, the participating countries of the Open Balkans endanger the porous borders like those between Norway and the EU, with common violations. It took Serbia nine years to finally fully implement the Integrated Border Management agreement by making the Joint Border Crossing Point operational. The functioning of the border crossing was part of the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia on economic normalization signed at the White House on 4 September. In 2011, Pristina and Belgrade signed the Integrated Border Management (IBM) Agreement as part of an EU-mediated dialogue with the parties agreeing to build permanent border crossings between the two countries, enabling the authorities of both places to work under one roof . When the agreement was signed, the Kosovo side claimed that with the IBM Agreement, Serbia recognized Kosovo's Independence, while the Serbian side insisted that IBM did not mean the recognition of Kosovo and continued to refer to border points as administrative lines. Although the EU-funded Joint Border Crossing Point in Merdare was finalized last year, the Serbian side refused to use the new facility with Serbian police and customs still working on temporary facilities. But the Serbian side finally agreed to relocate its staff to the new facilities. The move was welcomed by the US government and President Donald Trump's Special Envoy for Dialogue, Richard Grenell. A new agreement, part of the so-called "Mini-Schengen Initiative", this new agreement will allow freedom of movement between the two countries for Serbian and Albanian citizens without having to present a passport at border checkpoints: they will simply be able to present a national identity card to gain entry. The Mini-Schengen Action Plan for Freedom of Movement and a Common Regional Market between the Western Balkan countries now has the support of Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Montenegro as the only hostage. Between 2021-2024, the action plan aims to implement the four freedoms on which the European Union is based and which EU countries currently enjoy: goods, services and capital, in addition to freedom of movement. During the signing of the agreement, the leaders of the 3 countries present also signed a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the fight against the new coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), which includes details about travel restrictions. Under this agreement, Serbia, Albania and Northern Macedonia have agreed that negative PCR tests for COVID-19 will not be required for trips between the 3 countries and that information on coronavirus cases in the 3 countries will be shared between them. This paper will address the initiative taken by the Albanian state for an open Balkans and other cases in the region. Received: 10 September 2022 / Accepted: 21 October 2022 / Published: 30 November 2022

The article is devoted to the decolonization of Ukrainian culture as an important factor of nation-building in the European perspective. At the same time, decolonization is a current trend in Western academic thought, which is embodied in social activism, in particular, in the wok movement and the culture of abolition. Postcolonial studies has become an intellectual battleground. These studies draw a new front line in the culture wars. Rethinking Western culture in light of its imperial expansionist past defines the goal of decolonization. However, the tendency towards the politicization of vouk and the culture of cancellation. carries the risks of undermining the basic values of Western culture - freedom of thought and the rule of law, while the decolonization of Ukrainian culture has a different purpose. Unlike cultural decolonization in Western countries, cultural decolonization in Ukraine is aimed at legitimizing modern European values (Lisbon Agreement, 2007) by overcoming the «Russian-oriented» (Eurasian) tradition of thinking.Identifying the authentic contents of Ukrainian culture and refuting its imperial-Soviet interpretations is one of the main tasks of the decolonization of Ukrainian culture. The article offers a comparative analysis of Ukrainian and Western versions of cultural decolonization in order to avoid uncritical borrowings and ignoring the peculiarities of the Ukrainian context. The successful decolonization of Ukrainian culture requires the development of its 1) concept, 2) methods of theoretical substantiation, and 3) methods of practical implementation. The article states that the decolonization of Ukrainian culture becomes possible if its research strategies are deprived of colonial influences, which reveal indications of the imperial and Soviet scientific paradigm of social and humanitarian knowledge. The key concepts of the research are referring to the works of Nigel Giggar (2023), Douglas Murray (2022), Linda Martín Alcoff (2023), Jonh Darwin (2009), Kwasi Kwarteng (2013), Yaroslav Hrytsak (2022), Serhii Plokhii (2021, 2023), Timothy D. Snyder (2017, 2918) and others.

Abstract For Marx, the alienation of wage labor and inherent crisis tendencies of capital would foster collective grievances and support for communist movements promising revolution and the abolition of private property, creating a society wherein “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” But a combination of material factors, the rise of the welfare state, increased wages, and later consumerism as well as ideologies such as religion and/or nationalism, thwarted revolutionary fervor in industrial societies. Nevertheless, Marxist theory provides a number of important insights that help us understand contemporary social mobilizations beginning with noting how historical legacies, materials conditions, class interests, and episodic crises dispose many movements, even those that take place on cultural terrains in public spheres and spaces while political economic/historical factors may not be evident. This can clearly be shown by understanding the nature of racism and the massive protests following the murder of George Floyd. The roots of racism, qua white ‘superiority’ were rooted in the colonial era in which the settlers enslaved Africans and forcibly displaced the native populations for clear economic gains. This was ideologically ‘legitimated’ by the dehumanization of racialized Others, it also provided ‘superior’ status and identity to Christian Caucasians. Moreover, such ideologies were sustained through violence, whether armed plantation owners, slave catchers, militias, and later police. For a variety of reasons, slavery ended but racism endures to this very day. But that said, between the growing economic and educational status of Africans Americans and the more progressive cosmopolitan/inclusive values and practices of the young, racism, for many, has waned. But police violence has not. In the face of growing inequality, the pandemic crisis that led to an economic crisis, especially onerous for the young and peoples of color, the murder of George Floyd, going viral, indicated how a number of the crises of neoliberal transnational capitalism migrated to the culture and led to massive protests and resistance against racism and police brutality.

Purpose This paper aims to focus on the concept of abolition of black money and the demonetization movement started in India for cleaning black money and its impact on corporate world and Indian economy. It discusses the corporate governance effect of the demonetization scheme and various policy measures taken by the government to unearth and curb the black money in the country. It also states the challenges in its process of implementation and implications for future. Design/methodology/approach It appraises and reviews the concept of demonetization and its process in India since its implementation on November 8, 2016. Findings The biggest positive effects of this move were eradication of stocked and staked up money, cleansing of the financial system and improving governance in India. But its implementation had mix outcomes with its own challenges for future improvement. Practical implications The lessons drawn from the experience are expected to pave way for the countries at large. Originality/value It is an original paper on demonetization in India, and it is hoped that the lessons learnt thereof will pave the way for the world at large.

The reforms carried out in Russia in the 1860-70s contributed to the industrial development of the country, but along with the changes in the economy changes in the socio-cultural sphere were no less large-scale. Due to the mass mobility of the population after the abolition of serfdom, representatives of different estates were involved in the general socio-cultural movement. One of the important indicators of the social modernisation of Russian society included the changed level of literacy of the population, caused by the need for competent personnel for the growing industry, transport, communications and management. Using the example of Kostroma and Yaroslavl provinces, the article shows the dynamics of changes in the literacy rate of the population in the late 19th – early 20th centuries which exceeded all-Russian indicators, both for urban and rural populations and was associated with the successful implementation of state policy in the field of education, the consequences of the introduction of the new Military Charter as of 1874 and the peculiarities of the socio-economic development of the provinces associated with the developed craftsmen’s internal migration.

The study examines the transformation of the legal status of agricultural cooperatives in Russia from the period when the Provisional Government came to power to 1929, the period when this type of cooperation was liquidated as a separate entity. The study demonstrates changes in cooperative legislation after the February Revolution of 1917 until the late 1920s — from expanding the democratic foundations of cooperative societies to the complete abolition of agricultural cooperation as a separate type of this socio-economic movement. The legislation of the Provisional Government on cooperation, including agricultural, expanded the rights of agricultural societies, established a unified legal status for all types of cooperatives, introduced the concept of a “cooperative society” into legal circulation for the first time, allowed cooperatives to form unions, and outlined a clear algorithm for the organization of cooperative activities. The period of “war communism” was characterized by extremely harsh measures regarding the state control of cooperatives. During the New Economic Policy, the legislator adopted imperial cooperative legislation, granting democratic rights and freedoms to cooperatives. This was driven by the difficult financial situation of the population, especially peasants, and the acute shortage of food products. The policy of building a socialist state determined the further fate of agricultural cooperation, as well as cooperation in general, transforming it from a private-law institution into a public-law one and thereby depriving it of the fundamental principles on which it had been built for several decades.

On the back of decades of austerity, marketisation, credentialization and related neoliberal conceptions of education and society, a student debt crisis has emerged in higher education (HE). Despite the well-documented history of government-guaranteed income contingent loans (ICLs) indenturing students and their present and future families, such loans continue to be canvassed by policymakers and interest groups as an ideal ladder of educational opportunity, particularly for students from traditionally excluded communities. In this paper, the author brings together insights from Jeffrey Williams’ Pedagogy of Debt, Carter G Woodson’s Miseducation, Ha-Joon Chang’s idea of Bad Samaritans, and Kwame Nkrumah’s theory of Sham Independence as conceptual building blocks to reinforce the wall of resistance against the orthodoxy of debt as a paradigm for HE funding in South Africa. To add to the student debt abolition movements and the voices calling for freeing public HE, this paper critically reviews the recommendations of South Africa’s 2017 Fees Commission Report. This is done to offer an analysis that makes explicit the likely impact of the proposed student loan policy on South Africa. As we imagine transitioning towards the new African University, this paper makes a case for freeing public HE for all, on the basis of mutual aid, transitional and reparative justice.

104 years ago the Civil War began in Russia. Civil War 1917–1922 is one of the largest civil wars in human history. She had a great influence on the course of not only Russian, but also world history in the XX century. In the conditions of the socio-economic catastrophe experienced by the country at that time, all social and political contradictions in society exacerbated, which gave the Civil War mass character and duration. Today the topic of "decossackization" remains very relevant and in demand. The scientific relevance of the problem of decossackization is caused by the lack of generalizing studies. Currently, there is a significant amount of literature, which reflects the history of civil confrontation in Russia. Literature was created at different times and, as a result, differed in different methodological positions. The Civil War in Russia was studied, seen, reflected from two opposite sides – from the side of the victors and from the side of the vanquished. Difficult times do not have unambiguous assessments and interpretations. It is no coincidence that this period is included in the list of the so-called “difficult questions of history”. Soviet historians began to deal with the problem of decossackization in the 60s. 20th century. Within the framework of what was permitted, researchers could talk about the problems associated with the policy of decossackization in Russia. In the Soviet period, "decossackization" was understood as the elimination of the Cossacks as a socio-ethnographic community in general, characteristic features, characteristics, properties, signs of the Cossacks. In different historical periods, the term "decossackization" was understood as the abolition of class benefits and hardships. In the second half of the 19th – early 20th century. there was no oppression, persecution, destruction and violent influence on the Cossacks at that time. In the late 80s. – the beginning of the 90s. the problem of decossackization is closely associated with the repressive policy of the Bolsheviks in the Cossack regions of the country. From this we can conclude that two different meanings are put into the conventional term “decossackization”. One interpretation of this term speaks of the formal, administrative abolition of the estate rights and obligations of the Cossacks as a social-class category. Another interpretation is about purposeful and large-scale repressive actions against the Cossacks. Today, scientific discussions about the causes, nature and consequences of the anti-Bolshevik struggle during the Civil War continue. More and more researchers are being drawn into the polemical space. The author does not pretend to cover the entire array of publications, the total number of which is several hundred, we will focus on the most general trends in the analysis of the events of the Civil War and armed uprisings against the policies of the Bolsheviks in 1917–1922. The hypothesis of the study is that the overwhelming majority of armed uprisings against the Bolshevik policy in Soviet Russia in 1917–1922. were of a local nature, without going beyond a certain territory, and also were not coordinated in time. The defeat of the anti-Bolshevik uprisings was influenced by: the insurrectionary movement was not homogeneous in goals, slogans, composition; the spontaneous nature of performances at the initial stage; lack of an organizing center; focus on intra-regional problems; superiority in the strength of the Red Army; territorial fragmentation. The movement against the policy of the Bolsheviks, in spite of its scale, as a result remained local, tied to their native farms, villages, villages. According to the author of the article, the scientific novelty of the research lies in the identification and study of the features of the military-political confrontation in the context of the "small Civil War" in the south of Russia.

The paper is a continuation of the previous analyses of penal policy pursued by Polish courts. The directions and shape of penal policy are the resultant of many different elements. Analysed in the present paper is the impact on that policy of changes in: penal law; detected crime; and some characteristics of the population of convicted persons. The 1980s abounded in far-reaching changes of penal legislation. In the years 1980-1981, the tremendous “Solidarity” movement failed to bring about a penal law reform despite the fact that its representatives started intensive work toward that aim, preparing and stimulating others to prepare drafts of such reform. The imposition of martial law secured continued power to the communists; its social costs, however, were extremely high. An item on the bill society were forced to pay was the inclusion into penal law of many elements typical of the law of war which aggravated criminal responsibility. Thus (1) the competence of military courts was extended to various categories of civilians; (2) the application of special modes of procedure was introduced or extended, including the single-instance summary proceedings; (3) many statutory penalties were aggravated; (4) many different categories of acts were penalized which had not been punishable before, including in particular pursuit of trade union activities and organization of strikes and protests; (5) internment was introduced as an administrative form of preventive deprivation of liberty. The abrogation of martial law resulted in removal of most but not all of the above aggravations. A new tide of severe provisions came with the acts of May 1985 which in fact created a new “martial law” in penal law. It consisted in: (1) extension of applicability of the existing and introduction of new “simplified” modes of procedure which involved limitation of the defendant’s right to defence; (2) aggravation of the statutory penalties for many acts; (3) vast extension of the application of additional penalties; (4) limitation of the applicability of suspended sentences; (5) exclusion of conditional release of multiple recidivists; (6) extension of the conditions of withdrawal of parole. Therefore, penal policy was shifted twice towards aggravation in the 1980s, the first such shift was made in 1982 and continued with reduced force throughout 1983, and the second one taking place in the years 1985‒1988. Departure from the over-punitive penal law of People’s Republic of Poland started in 1989 with the emergence of the new political order which created the initial conditions for the building of the Third Republic. In 1989, just the first steps were made, followed by few farther in the years 1990‒1991, towards changing the contens of penal law and reforming the most glaring effects of its abuse. Such steps met with immense difficulties. The attachment to former penal law proved strong: to penal law with indefinite statutory features of situences, with severe penalties which could be accumulated and imposed in the conditions of far-reaching limitation of the right to defence or even by default. According to an opinion often expressed in official statements, penal policy was to be determined first and foremost by the state of crime. The extent and trends of crime in general and of the separate offences were to “force” the authorities accordingly to shape penal policy. The incessantly growing threat to public order and citizens’ safety, and to social property in particular, was to justify the need for aggravated and accumulated penalties. Also penal lawyers who noticed the direct relationship between crime and punishment tended ‒ and still tend today for that matter ‒ to suppose that an identical relationship can be found between crime as a mass phenomenon and punishment as a proces of distribution of condemnations through the imposition of penalties by courts. Yet whatever the relations between punishment ‒ its severity in particular ‒ and crime, they are in fact very weak indeed. This is shown by facts: crime comparable as to extent and gravity meets with most different punishment in different countries. A growth in crime sometimes leaves penal policy unchanged, and at other times results in its aggravation or mitigation; similar are the effects of a decrease in crime. Poland is a good example here: in the 1970s, detected crime was on the decrease but penal policy gained in strictness; in the 1980s, crime went up and the aggravation of penal policy continued. In the first of those decades, the decrease in crime was said to have resulted from the particular shape of penal policy pursued then; in the next one, the need forstrict penal policy was argued to follow from the growth in crime. Never mentioned, instead, was a trend of crime which would actually justify a mitigation of penal policy. As we know, the extent and also largely the structure of detected crime, that is of crime recorded by the police, is the resultant of many different organizational, legal, and often also political factors. The real extent and structure of crime can hardly be seen through that screen, and its picture is often distorted. In the former “socialist” states, the extent of crime was a political issue: generally speaking, it shaped the way the authorities expected it to shape. During the 1970s and even in 1980, the number of detected offences ‒ those confirmed in preparatory proceedings ‒ was 320‒350 thousand a year. Starting from 1981, it went up rapidly to 540 thousand in 1984. For the next few years, it was falsely kept at a similar or even somewhat lower level which was to manifest the effectiveness of the drastic statutes of May 1985. Early in the 1990s, the situation was changed radically: the extent of detected crime was no longer perceived as a political issue regulated as the authorities requested. In the years 1990‒1992, the number of detected offences became stabilized at 860‒880 thousand a year. It is believed to have actually gone up, and it no doubt did go up in the economy-related spheres: the real number of offences against foreign currency and customs regulations, tax offences, frauds, embezzlements etc. was indeed greater. III. The above-mentioned growth in the number of detected offences was hardly reflected in the numer of persons found guilty in criminal proceedings. There were about 200 thousand such persons a year, and the numer only went down in years when amnesty laws were passed. Penal legislation provides for different penalties for the separate offences. Therefore, in order to appraise the enhanced or reduced severity of penal policy, it is important to investigate any possible changes in the proportions of those offences throughout the 1980s. In the years 1980‒1991, convictions for crimes (where the statutory penalty is deprivation of liberty for at least 3 years) regularly amounted to 3‒4%, and those for the more serious offences (statutory pelalty of at least 1 or 2 years imprisonment) – to 19‒31%. In the early half of the 1980s, there was a shift towalds a greater proportion of convictions for the less serious offences. The opposite trend could be noticed in the latter half of the decade. Generally speaking, the bulk of convicted persons were guilty of less and less serious offences during the discussed decade, the proportion of convictions for serious crimes remaining rather stable in that period. This trend could be noticed under the statutes of May 1985 which shows how unrelated they were to the real situation in the sphere of crime, and how much they depended on other factors such as e.g. the ruling elites’ desire to have their revenge on society for the events of 1980-1981. The situation changed in the years 1989‒1991 when the proportion of persons convicted for the more serious offences started to go up rapidly. This sole element considered – that is, the structure of crime – were penal policy stable throughout the years l980‒1988, there should have been more and more sentences to penalties not involving deprivation of liberty, and the length of inprisonment should have been reduced. In the years 1989‒1991, instead, a greater number of longer immediate prison sentences could be expected. The most severe, of all penalties provided for by Polish law is capitol puishment. In the years 1981‒1982, there were 3‒4 valid sentences to that pe- nalty a year, the number going up to a dozen or so in the years 1984‒1986. The common courts imposed death penalty for homicide only. Since 1988, not a single valid sentence to death has been imposed by those courts (though it was imposed by invalid sentences in isolated cases). This de facts abolition can be hoped to persist, especially as the new draft penal code does not provide for capital punishment. The death penalty has first of all a symbolic sense; it is difficult to say why the authorities insisted on rejecting all the postulates for its abolition. Instead, the basic instrument that determines the punitiveness of the Polish penal system is unconditional deprivation of liberty. Penal policy of the 1970s had few good points; one of them was a limitation of the use of that penalty, noticeable at the end of the decade. This trend was further intensified in 1981 when 19% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate imprisonment. Under martial law and in the period of its suspension, there was a slight shift away from that policy (2l‒22%). It was finally abandoned in the years 1984‒1986: in 1986, 30% of those found guilty were sentenced to immediate inprisonment. In 1988, the policy-makers came back to their senses, and re-orientation of penal policy was started: sentenced to immediate imprisonment were 21% of those found guilty. This proportion went further down to 18% in 1989, but then proceeded to rise again in the years 1990‒1991 (19‒20%). The above-mentioned change in the structure of crime in those years considered, this fact cannot possibly be seen as evidencing the aggravation of penal policy. The imposition of unconditional deprivation of liberty evolved in a way that is worth mentioning here. In the latter half of the 1970s, the number of sentences to that penalty became stabilized at 190-200 per 100 thousand of adults, a great improvement compared to the early half of that decade (228‒273 per 100 thousand of adults). In the 1980s, the number of unconditional prison sentences went further down to about 150 per 100 thousand of adults, barring the period of validity of the acts of May 1985 when it again exceeded 200. Thus on the whole, the range of imposition of immediate impressonment was further reduced – a most satisfactory development. As regards the length of that penalty, that is the term to be spent in prison, there has been little improvement. Prison terms of under 1 year, considered short in Poland, still constitute a mere 8‒13% of all sentences to unconditional deprivation of liberty. Thus nearly 180 persons per 100 thousand of adults in the years of validity of the statuts of May 1985, and about 130-140 in the other years were sentenced to prison terms of at least one year, the number only going down to somewhat less than 100 in the years when amnesty laws were passed. Instead, the incidence of sentences to long prison terms of at least 3 years remained relatively stable: sentenced to that penalty were 30‒40 persons per 100 thousand of adults. The length of sentences can also be considered from a different angle, i.e. that of the average length of the discussed penalty. In the years 1980‒1991 the average length of unconditional prison term was practically unchanged and amounted to 24‒25 months (barring the year 1985 when it nearly reached 27 months). Therefore, the following trend emerped: the imposition of immediate imprisonment is gradually limited but its average length remains at a practically unchanged level. It is an extremely high level at that, the fact considered that the bulk of offences for which the Polish offenders were convicted involved the lower statutory penalty of 6 months deprivation of liberty at most. Of the greatest importance among the reactions to an offence which do not involve deprivation of liberty in Poland is the penalty of conditional deprivation of liberty. Its incidence went up rapidly under martial law (from 29% in 1980 to 37% in 1982) and remained at a high level for the next few years. It is only recently that the proportion of such sentences has been reduced to its original level. There is a great variety of shapes this particular penalty can assume: it can be combined with fine, supervision, and various duties imposed on the person sentenced to that penalty, and also with additional penalties and payment to the injured person or for a public purpose. In the years 1980‒1984, it was very often combined with fine (7l‒78% of cases). This proportion went down in the next years (to 55‒60%) which was however accompanied by an unusual growth in the imposition of additional penalties, such as in particular confiscation of property and forfeiture of things, and also of payment to the injured personor for a public purpose. In the years 1989‒1991, that is after abrogation of the states of May 1985, the proportion of cases where fine was imposed together with conditional deprivation of liberty again went up to two thirds of all cases of imposition of that penalty. (The amount of fines will be discussed further on). The penalty of limitation of liberty, introduced by tle 1969 penal code, had some problems fighting its way into the practice of criminal justice. In the latter half of the 1970s, though, its proportion among the bulk of penal measures became stabilized at 12‒14%. The same trend could be noticed in the years 1980‒1981. The aggravation of criminal responsibility under martial law resulted in reduction of sentences to that penalty (to as low a level as 7% in 1984). Instead, the next aggravation introduced by the statutes of May 1985 led to a growth in both the number and proportion of sentences to limitation of liberty. Surprising as it may seem at first sight this development can be explained by the fact that by force of the provisions adopted in 1985, that penalty could be imposed in proceedings by penal order, i.e. in the absence of the defendant. His objection to the decision admittedly rendered the order invalid, but he was not protected by the ban on reformatio in peius. In the years 1989–1991 the proportion of limitation of liberty in the bulk of penal measures imposed went down to the extent of rendering that penalty unimportant. In 1989, it was imposed on 7.4% of those found guilty; in 1990 – on 3.5%; and in l991 – on a mere 2.7%. In the 1990s, the relative incidence of imposition of the separate forms of that penalty started to change rapidly. Deduction from the remmeration for work was imposed on 53% of persons sentenced to limitation of liberty in 1989, on 38% in 1990, and on 21% in 1991. Unpaid supervised work came to the foreground (34, 56, and 78% respectively) while referral of the convicted person to work practically disappeared (l3, 6 and, 1% respectively). Fine as a self-standing penalty has never been extensively imposed in Poland as opposed to the situation in many other penal systems, the West European ones in particular. Late in ten 1970s, the proportion of fines became stabilized at 11–13% and remained unchanged throughout the early half of the 1980s. It then proceeded to go up a little in the years 1986–1988 (15–16%), and stopped at 13–15% in the years 1989–1991. The proportion of fines can be expected to grow in the future, mainly at the sacrifice of conditional deprivation of liberty combined with fine. As important as the length of a prison term is the amount of a fine imposed. The repressiveness of fines can be appraised through reference to the average monthly wages in socialized economy. Compared to them, the average fines under the 1969 code evolved significantly. The use of fines was intensified in two parallel ways. First, their imposition together with deprivation of liberty grew more and more frequent (up to 69% of all persons sentenced to a prison term in 1980). Second, the amount of fine was raised (to 2.5 times the monthly wages in 1980). Important changes in this respect took place in the 1980s. In the early half of the decade, the accumulation of fines with deprivation of liberty was further extended (to 75% of prison terms in 1984). On the other hand, the relative amount of fines went down (to about 1,5 times the monthly wages in socialized economy). This situation changed radically with the introduction of the statues of May 1985 which involved a drastic raise in the amount of fines (in the years 1986–1987, to about 4 times the average monthly wages in the case of fines as additional penalties combined with deprivation of liberty, and to 2.5 times – in the case of self-standing fines). A next far-reaching change took place in the years 1989–1991. The relative amount of fine went down to about 0.5 time the monthly wages – a considerable reduction of repressiveness, even the general impoverishment of society considered. One of the penal measures introduced by the 1969 penal code is conditional discontinuance of criminal proceedings. It can be applied to first offenders guilty of the less serious acts whose guilt is self-evident. The measure was appllied by the public prosecutor in nearly 90% of cases, and by the court in about l0% of cases only. Like unconditional deprivation of liberty, conditional discontinuance of proceedings can be seen as a specific gauge of aggravation or mitigation of penal policy. With growing severity of that policy, the proportion of persons sentenced to unconditional prison terms goes up, and that of conditionally discontinued proceedings goes down. Is penal policy mitigated, the above proportions are reversed. In the years 1981, 1988, and 1989–1991, proceedings were conditionally discontinued in 24–30% of cases where the suspect was found guilty. Under the special martial law legislation, the proportion was 19–20%, and under the acts of May 1985 – 16–19%. The remaining penal measures, that is additional penalty imposed as the main one, application of educational or corrective measures to persons aged 17 and guilty of misdemeanours, and renouncement of carrying out of the sentence, were used extremely seldom in spite of the considerable possibility of their application (the first two in particular). In the days when those in charge of criminal justice aimed at aggravation of responsibility, there was little room for its mitigation with the use of such measures. The years l980–1988 were characterized first and foremost by a tendency to aggravate penalties. After a short break in 1981, that tendency continued until 1989 when the first changes coul be noticed. In both cases, the period of reorientation of penal policy was too short to yield any farther-reaching changes. In the structure of penal measures, the aggravation of responsibility was expressed mainly in the growing proportion of sentendes to immediate imprisonment and the limited use of conditional discontinuance of proceedings and limitation of liberty when no special procedural provisions incited the use of those measures. The penal policy pursued in the years 1989-1991 was deeply rooted in the practices of people’s Republic of Poland; to be more exact, the trends of that period still today if in a mitigated form. The 1989–1991 mitigation took place on different planes: the legal one, through removal of the specially punitive and glaringly unjust provisions, on the plane of application of law through many small mitigations of penalties which add to a significant whole, and also through a radical reform of prison policy. But the actual mitigation does not go beyond the achievements of “Solidarity” of 1981. As a result, too many and too long sentences of immediate imprisonment are still imposed, and penal measures (imprisonment and fine in particular) are too often accumulated. Briefly speaking, Poland still has the style of punishming shaped after the penal code in force and its interpretation made in the 1970s. A radical abolition of this style and mitigatin of penalties still remains to be done, although the first steps have already been made by now (the virtual abolition of the death penalty and reduction of the amount of fines).

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to analyze hypothetical models of tax policy, determine the necessary conditions for creating an optimal tax system and propose a new transparent fiscal mechanism, the introduction of which would provide unique competitive advantages for investment boom and economic growth in the country. Methodic. The theoretical and methodological bases are results of scientific research of economic development and structure of fiscal policy and the following methods: abstract-logical, theoretical generalization, analysis, grouping, comparison, analogy, dialectical method and systematic approach. Results. The analysis of the basic budget-forming taxes available in the tax systems of many countries of the world makes it possible to conclude their moral obsolescence. There has been proposed a transparent fiscal mechanism - TAXKIN, the quintessence of which is to tax any movement of money (without exceptions) instead of existing budget-forming taxes. The possible TAXKIN rate for Ukraine as an example is calculated based on the amount of budget revenues for the types of taxes that are to be abolished, as well as the volume of transactions and the size of the shadow economy. It is proved that the starting value of TAXKIN to fully offset the abolition of tax revenues is about 2%. TAXKIN tax is withdrawn digitally at the sender's bank automatically at the time of any movement (transfer) of funds, both between individuals and legal entities. The technical requirement for the introduction of the proposed tax is a digital (non-cash) financial system. There are three main starting conditions for TAXKIN start-up in Ukraine: 1) gradual complete abandonment of cash circulation, switching exclusively to non-cash electronic transactions; 2) full legalization of all income, absolute and unconditional tax amnesty; 3) a complete ban on any barter operations. Scientific novelty. A fundamentally new tax model is proposed and substantiated, the quintessence of which is to tax any movement of money instead of existing budget-generating taxes; it would make life easier for society, accelerate economic processes, and at the same time ensure automatic replenishment of the budget, regardless of the will of an individual natural or legal person. Practical significance. The proposed model can be applied in any country. The first country to implement this model will receive unique competitive advantages for the investment boom and economic growth. The results of TAXKIN implementation for the first country to implement it are the creation of the world's best conditions for economic activity in as a whole and for business in particular; total de-bureaucratization of the entire economic system; elimination of all corruption schemes and conditions of corruption related to taxation; accelerating all economic processes and maximum relief the life of the whole society.

The author of the article examines the peculiarities of the Italian political space through a retrospective analysis of that countrys longstanding decentralization process. As a starting point, the author takes the end of the Risorgimento era, during which the national liberation movement of the Italian people united against foreign domination of their fragmented nation. A periodization of the decentralization process is given, indicating its main milestones: 1) the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy (1815 to 1871); 2) the Fascist regime (1922 to 1943); 3) adoption of the Italian Constitution and the Statutes of the Special Regions (1947); 4) regional reform (1970) and; 5) constitutional reform (2001). The key criteria for assessing the degree of decentralization in Italy are considered, including whether the regions have the right to adopt their own laws, initiate legislation at the central level, and participate in international activities. The author concludes that the Italian political elite has succeeded in decentralizing the republic and building a new regional policy based on the principles of subsidiarity. The reforms of the political and legal institutional design were mainly related to the delineation of the spheres of competence between the state and the regions, the consolidation of autonomous status for all regions, the abolition of the government commissioner, and the challenge of regional legislation exclusively by the Constitutional Court, creating the basis for the quasi-federal features of the Italian political and legal system. Thus, it is natural to say that Italy belongs to a special transit form of state structure of the regionalist type, located at the juncture between unitarianism and federalism.

Introduction. The phenomenon of the Ural Republic in the context of the Russian Federation federal model of state structure formation in 1993 is studied. The process of the Russian federalism model development at this stage was complicated by a whole complex of problems and contradictions. The movement of the regional authorities in the Sverdlovsk region to create the Ural Republic in the context of the Russian post-Soviet model of the Federal structure is considered. Methods and materials. The archival materials of the Presidential Executive Office of Russia and state authorities of the Sverdlovsk region are the key sources of the research. The main group of materials for the article preparation consists of analytical notes reflecting the views of the current authorities on the nature of the state-territorial structure and fixing the expert and analytical view of the higher state authorities on the developing processes dynamics and the risks associated with them. Analysis. The process of the Ural Republic creation consisting of several stages is analyzed: forming an idea and holding a regional survey on equalizing the powers of the region with the republics; an attempt to offer its views on the federal structure at the Constitutional Assembly and to implement its achievements into the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation; the announcement of the Ural Republic creation by the leadership of the Sverdlovsk region, the establishment and protection of its position; abolition of the Ural Republic. Results. The Ural Republic phenomenon had some influence on the constitutional project development, but its elimination prevented not only the risks of so-called regional separatism, but also a potentially large state transformation, which consisted in the emergence of more independent regions, the formation of a new regional policy.

In 1868 Ulysses S. Grant remarked that there were three great parties in the United States: the Republican, the Democratic, and the Methodist Church. This was an understandable tribute, given the active role of leading Methodists in his presidential campaign, but it was also a realistic judgment, when set in the context of the denomination's growing political authority over the previous half century. As early as 1819, when, with a quarter of a million members, “the Methodists were becoming quite numerous in the country,” the young exhorter Alfred Branson noted that “politicians… from policy favoured us, though they might be skeptical as to religion,” and gathered at county seats to listen to the preachers of a denomination whose “votes counted as fast at an election as any others.” Ten years later, the newly elected Andrew Jackson stopped at Washington, Pennsylvania, en route from Tennessee to his presidential inauguration. When both Presbyterians and Methodists invited him to attend their services, Old Hickory sought to avoid the political embarrassment of seeming to favor his own church over the fastest-growing religious movement in the country by attending both—the Presbyterians in the morning and the Methodists at night. In Indiana in the early 1840s the church's growing power led the Democrats to nominate for governor a known Methodist, while tarring their Whig opponents with the brush of sectarian bigotry. Nationally, as the combined membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church [MEC] and Methodist Episcopal Church, South [MECS] grew to over one and a half million by the mid-1850s, denominational leaders could be found complaining that the church was so strong that each political party was “eager to make her its tool.” Thus Elijah H. Pilcher, the influential Michigan preacher, found himself in 1856 nominated simultaneously by state Democratic, Republican, and Abolition conventions.

De geschiedschrijving die de ‘Vlaamse Frontbeweging’ tot onderwerp nam, heeft tot dusver te weinig het oog gericht naar de voorgeschiedenis die in nauw verband staat met de afschaffing van de loting en de veralgemening en uitbreiding van de dienstplicht vanaf 1909. Daarbij kwam ook nog eens de eerste taalwet van 1913 die door de strijdkrachten zou moeten toegepast worden. Dit leidde tot een veel sterkere betrokkenheid binnen de Vlaamse beweging. Daarbij werd uit de aard der zaak vooral gerekend op de jonge mannen die nog naar het leger zouden moeten. Zij zouden in staat moeten zijn om de volksjongens zonder veel scholing mee in het ‘Vlaamse’ bad te trekken en zo stapsgewijs het Nederlands een plaats te geven in de strijdkrachten.Al even belangrijk voor een goed begrip is het feit dat de vooroorlogse elite er bijzonder goed in was geslaagd om het leger dienstbaar te maken bij de start van de carrière van wie hoger onderwijs kon volgen via de ‘compagnies universitaires’. In 1909 werd bovendien de categorie van de brancardiers gecreëerd die bestond uit seminaristen, novicen en student-onderwijzers. Zij moesten enkel een cursus volgen in hun vrije tijd.Er werd dus een elite geschapen die amper in contact kwam met de werkelijkheid in het leger en die mijlenver afstond van het beroepskader. Dat leverde de nodige springstof waarop de Frontbeweging kon groeien als een voortzetting van de vooroorlogse katholieke studentenbeweging. Deze jongemannen vonden dat zij hun vooroorlogse agitatie op taalvlak moesten verder zetten in oorlogstijd. Omdat de Duitse Flamenpolitik en de toenemende uitzichtloosheid leidde tot verbittering betekende dit een bedreiging voor de machtspositie van het militaire kaderpersoneel en de koning-opperbevelhebber.De hoop en de verwachting dat de Vlaamse oud-strijders zich na afloop van de oorlog en masse achter de Frontbeweging haar eisenprogramma zou scharen, bleek echter ijdel.__________ “A Wide Field for the Student Movement Lies Open.” On the Origin and Character of the Flemish Front Movement The historiography which takes the ‘Flemish Front Movement’ as its subject has so far paid too little attention to the historical background which is closely tied to the abolition of the conscription lottery and the generalization of the service requirement from 1909. In addition to this was the first language law of 1913 that the armed forces were supposed to follow. This led to a greater participation in the Flemish Movement. This obviously included in large part the young men who still had to go into the army. They had to be up to the task of bringing boys from the common folk who did not have much schooling into the ‘Flemish’ sphere and thus work step-by-step to give Dutch a place among the armed forces.Just as important for a good understanding is the fact that the prewar elite was unusually successful in making the army a stepping stone in the career of those who could follow higher education, through the “compagnies universitaires” (university companies). Most importantly in this regard, in 1909 the category of stretcher-bearer was created, which was made up of seminary students, novice priests and student teachers. They only had to take a course in their free time.Thus, an elite was formed that was nearly never in contact with the day-to-day life of the army and which was miles away from the traditional professional circles. This provided the necessary spark from which the Front Movement could grow as an extension of the prewar Catholic student movement. These young men found that they had to continue their prewar agitation regarding language matters in wartime. Because the German Flamenpolitik (policy of coopting the Flemish Movement) and growing hopelessness led to embitterment, this constituted a threat to their position of power of the military senior staff and the king as commander-in-chief.The hope and the expectation that Flemish veterans would range themselves en masse behind the Front Movement’s list of demands after the end of the war turned out to be in vain.

Concern has been growing about a cyclical pattern or ‘periodicity’ in mental health care over the past 300 years, in which large-scale policy decisions have been made, and then reversed, paying little attention to the particular needs of differing patient groups. Turner (1985) drew attention to the reckless course followed by psychiatry, and how the “discipline that has lost its way” (Lancet,1985) may have done so owing to a poor grasp of its past history. In the movement towards community care, ‘difficult’ or the so-called ‘unrewarding’ (to use Scott's (1970) term) patients are a particularly vulnerable group (Aviram & Segal, 1973; Bachrach, 1980). Increasingly, community services are compelled to cater for less disturbed patients through being selective about whom they will accept. To a degree, forensic services on both sides of the Atlantic have partially filled the gap so created in service provision. For this and other reasons, it is difficult to make a general statement about the effectiveness of deinstitutionalisation and community care. To be more specific, there are basic conceptual difficulties in defining continuity of care and identifying subgroups for which it has different implications (Bachrach, 1981), and there are major methodological difficulties impeding an analysis of such a diffuse and fragmented provision. Scull's (1984) description of the overnight abolition of state facilities for juvenile offenders in Massachusetts in the US between 1969 and 1973 points to the impossibility of making a comparison ‘before and after’, when so much dissolution and decentralisation of services has occurred (see also Jones, 1982). A few model alternatives were described soon after the closures, and Bachrach (1980) has written about the dangers of generalising from model programmes, highlighting the differences between demonstration efforts and reality. It is proposed here that the difficult and offender population might act as a ‘litmus paper’ for the efficiency, or otherwise, of community care in general.

В статье на материалах Государственного архива Рязанской области рассматриваются события Первой российской революции 1905–1907 годов и участие в них крестьян Рязанской губернии. В начале XX века крестьяне являлись самой многочисленной социальной группой. Долгое время в российской истории их права были значительно ограничены, а отмена крепостного права серьезно повлияла не только на социальный статус крестьян, но и на политическое развитие Российской империи, так как крестьянство становилось все более политически активной социальной группой. Возрастало недовольство политикой, проводимой правительством Николая II. Немаловажную роль в данный период сыграли сельские жители Рязанской губернии. В статье предпринята попытка дать полный анализ их участия в политической жизни Российской империи в период Первой российской революции. Для достижения данной цели автором проанализированы источники, хранящиеся в фондах Государственного архива Рязанской области. Следует отметить, что требования рязанских крестьян в период революции не носили сугубо экономический характер и нередко перерастали в политические требования и лозунги, содержащие идеи об изменении формы правления, о создании представительных органов власти и органов местного самоуправления. Автор приходит к выводу, что революция 1905–1907 годов значительным образом повлияла на мировоззрение людей, хотя в практическом смысле не оправдала ожиданий сельских жителей Рязанской губернии. Однако неудовлетворенность результатами Первой российской революции породила новые устремления, дала радикально настроенным силам пищу для размышлений в поисках новых рычагов давления на власть. Во многом благодаря пропаганде различных политических сил крестьяне включались в борьбу и становились верными союзниками рабочего класса в борьбе с самодержавием. Результаты исследования можно использовать в учебных курсах университетов, а также для дальнейших исследований. The article deals with the events of the First Russian Revolution of 1905–1907 and the participation of the peasants of the Ryazan Governorate, based on materials of the State Archive of the Ryazan Region. At the beginning of the 20th century, peasants featured as the largest social group in Russia. For a long time in Russian history, their rights had been limited, and the abolition of serfdom in 1861 seriously affected not only the peasant’s social status, but also the political development of the Russian Empire, as the peasantry was increasingly getting more active as a political social group. Dissatisfaction with the policy pursued by the government of Nicholas II was growing. An important role in this period was played by the rural residents of the Ryazan Governorate. The paper attempts to give a full analysis of the peasants’ participation in the political life of the Russian Empire during the First Russian Revolution. To achieve this goal, the author analyzes important sources of the State Archives of the Ryazan Region. It should be noted that the demands of Ryazan peasants during the period of the revolution were not purely economic in nature, as they often developed into political demands and embraced slogans containing ideas about changing the form of government, about creating representative bodies of power and local self-government bodoes. The author comes to the conclusion that the revolution of 1905–1907 had a significant impact on the worldview of the population, although in a practical sense it did not live up to the expectations of the rural residents of the Ryazan Governorate. However, dissatisfaction with the results of the First Russian Revolution gave rise to new aspirations, and the more radical forces gained in finding new levers of pressure on the authorities. Largely due to the propaganda efforts of various political forces, the peasants joined the struggle and became loyal allies of the hired workers’ class in their struggle against the autocracy. The results of the present study can be used in university history courses, as well as for further research of the issue.

This paper aims at studying O. Lototsky’s journalistic works during the revolutions of 1905-1907, 1917-1921 and the emigration of 1920-1930. The main focus is on the analysis of the position of Ukrainian lands in the imperial era and the Soviet period, as well as the vision of key problems and political prospects proposed in the articles of O. Lototsky. The research methodology is based on the principles of historicism and objectivity. Both general scientific and special-historical methods are used in the study, namely: historical and comparative, problematic, research tools of the history of ideas (intellectual history) and biographistics. The scientific novelty of the research is determined by its focus on the analysis of the content of Lototsky’s journalistic works in the context of opportunities to solve the Ukrainian national issue in the conditions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Conclusions. O. Lototsky’s creative legacy contains a significant amount of journalistic material. Their topics are diverse: from reviews of the economic situation of Ukrainian lands to the analysis of the state of educational institutions in the Russian Empire and the problems of the clergy. Considerable attention in these materials is devoted to the Ukrainian national issue. Due to O. Lototsky’s active social activity from 1906 to 1917, the topics of his essays frequently intertwined with the problems in which he was directly involved (for example, the status of the Ukrainian language and the abolition of bans on its use). The position of the Ukrainian lands as part of the Russian Empire and other states in the specified period was of his particular concern. During the emigrant era, the publicist continued to express his vision of the situation of Ukrainian territories within the USSR. The leading idea expressed in most of O. Lototsky’s materials of that period was that the state policy of both the Russian Empire and the USSR did not provide for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state, let alone support for Ukrainian culture. Given the historical experiences of the Ukrainian lands, O. Lototsky in the 1920s and 1930s was an active supporter of the creation of an independent state. O. Lototsky’s diverse creative legacy, his active social and political activities leave many more aspects for further elaboration, analysis, and determination of the significance of his heritage in the intellectual history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian movement.

актуальность научной статьи заключается в необходимости современного и всестороннего анализа процесса социально-экономического развития дореволюционной России в XIX – начале XX века, в котором аграрно-крестьянский вопрос имел приоритетное и определяющее значение. Характеристика специфики его решения в Оренбургской губернии обогащает отечественную историческую науку, способствует более глубокому и системному пониманию происходящих процессов и явлений во всей Российской империи. В исследовании сделана попытка проанализировать решение аграрно-крестьянского вопроса в Оренбуржье. Изучено положение в деревне, освещены вопросы работы Оренбургского губернского дворянского комитета по крестьянскому делу, а также крестьянское движение в исследуемом регионе. Дана оценка настроениям и позициям помещиков Оренбургской губернии в преддверии отмены крепостного права в дореволюционной России. Результаты регионального исторического научного исследования могут быть использованы для проведения дальнейшей исследовательской работы по проблематике и обновлению лекционного материала по дисциплине «История России», «История Урала», «История России XIX века», а также спецкурсов для студентов исторических факультетов, связанных с внутренней политикой Российской империи и аграрной истории в системе высшего образования. the relevance of the scientific article lies in the need for a modern and comprehensive analysis of the process of socio-economic development of pre–revolutionary Russia in the XIX – early XX century, in which the agrarian and peasant issue was of priority and decisive importance. The characteristic of the specifics of its solution in the Orenburg province enriches the national historical science, contributes to a deeper and more systematic understanding of the processes and phenomena taking place throughout the Russian Empire. The study attempts to analyze the solution of the agrarian and peasant question in Orenburg region. The situation in the village was studied, the issues of the work of the Orenburg provincial Noble Committee on Peasant Affairs, as well as the peasant movement in the region under study, were highlighted. An assessment is given of the sentiments and positions of the landowners of the Orenburg province on the eve of the abolition of serfdom in pre-revolutionary Russia. The results of the regional historical scientific research can be used for further research on the problems and updating of lecture material on the discipline «History of Russia», «History of the Urals», «History of Russia of the XIX century», as well as special courses for students of historical faculties related to the internal policy of the Russian Empire and agrarian history in the higher education system.

In the late Joseon Dynasty, Heungseon Daewongun abolished the seowon in 1868 due to the excessive construction of clan seowons and various problems of the seowons as the base of the Bungdang. Later, as Heungseon Daewongun stepped down in 1873, Confucian scholars actively engaged in the movement to restore seowon. In the Gyeongnam area, there were about 298 seowon and sau during the Joseon Dynasty. After the demolition, there were 31 new and restored places from 1868 to 1910, 38 Japanese colonial eras, and 78 places from liberation to the present, respectively. The first time was when Gojong, like Heungseon Daewongun, maintained a strong policy that it was impossible to restore seowon. For this reason, most Confucian scholars built an altar(壇) on behalf of Seowon and continued the ritual for ancient sages(先賢). If the conditions for setting up an altar were not possible, a school or shrine was established at the site of the seowon, and a yeongdang was established if there was a portrait. In Gyeongnam, 31 seowon were restored in various forms such as Jaesil, Gangdang, Jeongsa, Sau, and Jeongja. By region, there are 7 Sancheong, 4 in Changwon, Miryang, and Ulsan, 3 in Uiryeong, and 2 in Gimhae and Changnyeong, respectively. Restoration and establishment of Japanese colonial era showed a slight increase from the previous period. This is because the effect of the abolition of seowon disappeared during the period, and the importance of traditional education was increasing as part of rescue activities through education. By region, there are 7 in Sancheong, 6 in Haman, 5 in Hapcheon, 3 in Geochang, Jinju, and Hamyang, and 2 in Uiryeong and Changnyeong regions, respectively. After liberation, the growth rate increased from the 1970s, starting with four cases in the 1940s, and reached its peak in the 1980s, and has been rapidly decreasing since then. The increase since the 1970s seems to have occurred as a result of economic development that led to the honor of the family's famous ancestors. However, Doyang Seowon(道陽書院) in Sancheong established after 1978, Wolbong Seowon(月峰書院) in Gimhaein 1984, and Taedong Seowon (泰東書院) in Hapcheon in 2012, are characterized by celebrating Confucian scholars during the modern era. Seowon restored to commemorate the modern and contemporary Confucian scholars should be viewed from the perspective of establishing and reconstructing the academic transmission space of those who were the last heirs of traditional Confucianism, rather than simply seeing it as an outdated product.

Historical Background and the Emergence of New Bibliographic Units in the Context of the Contemporary Political Moment Demand a Reevaluation of Previous Interpretations Related to Events in the Territory of the Former Socialist Yugoslavia. This paper focuses on the Historical Agreement, also known as the Zulfikarpašić-Milošević Agreement, initiated by Muslims (Bosniaks). The agreement was intended as a peace and political initiative but came late in the context of the war in Croatia and the policy of regionalization pursued by the Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After leaving the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Adil Zulfikarpašić founded the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO), with the support of academician Muhamed Filipović. Dissatisfied with the policies of the SDA, Zulfikarpašić and Filipović sought to address the crisis through a different approach. In the case of the MBO, this approach involved historical reconciliation with the Serbs. While the leaders of the MBO structured this agreement as a peace and political initiative, its implementation was not possible due to the opposing state-legal concepts from the Bosniak (Muslim) side. The concept of a union of free states, central to the MBO's agreement, did not receive support from the Serbian side. In such a constellation of relationships, Yugoslavia could continue to function only as a federal state, as it best served Serbian state interests. The fundamental aim of this work is to shed light on the events preceding the agreement, what the agreement entailed, and why it ultimately failed. The introductory section of the paper analyzes Muslim (Bosniak)-Serbian historical reconciliation, which includes the period of Austro-Hungarian rule and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia when certain Muslim (Bosniak) politicians formed a specific type of alliance with the Serbs. The position of Muslims (Bosniaks) in the early 1990s significantly differed from that at the beginning of the 20th century. The paper dedicates a substantial portion of its pages to significant events in the Second Yugoslavia to provide a comprehensive synthesis. The 1974 Constitution, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), the rise of Milošević, the abolition of autonomy for provinces in Serbia, and the republic-level elections were all events that preceded the agreement. Special attention in the paper is given to the participants of the agreement as significant political protagonists of that period, as well as the political parties whose members were part of the agreement and the architects of the policies of that era. Adil beg Zulfikarpašić undeniably played a central role in the efforts to reach a historical agreement between Muslims (Bosniaks) and Serbs. After World War II, Zulfikarpašić went into exile, where he launched the Bosanski pogledi magazine in the early 1960s. During his time in exile, he operated from various political-ideological positions, later emerging as one of the ideologues of Bosniak identity. In 1963, Zulfikarpašić participated in the founding of the Democratic Alternative, a movement in which Bosniak, Croatian, Serbian, and Slovenian intellectuals advocated for the democratization of Yugoslavia and the concept of free states within Yugoslavia. The foundation of this movement was a departure from Yugoslavia, i.e., communism, and alignment with the Western bloc of countries that based their policies on the principles of capitalism and democracy. Zulfikarpašić remained unwaveringly convinced of the correctness of the political initiative for reconciliation with the Serbs, considering the agreement the best solution under the circumstances and the only alternative to the impending war. A. Zulfikarpašić, as the main architect of the agreement, left Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 1991, and shortly thereafter, his party colleague, academician Muhamed Filipović, terminated all processes related to the agreement.

The spectacular success of BJP in the recent General Elections invited a mixed assessment from different positions. But mostly it was oversimplification and undermining of its success. On the other hand, the victory of AAP in assembly elections was taken as an alternative in making. For example along with other commenter’s in an article (published in The Indian Express, 26 May 2014, op-ed page) renowned lawyer and AAP leader Shri Shanti Bhushan analysed the electoral success of BJP and the future course for AAP that lacks in substance. It tried to under-assessed the BJP’s success and oversimplified the road ahead for AAP. As it like wait till BJP does the same blunders as Congress did. In this paper some light will be thrown on BJP’s success and legacy but will mainly discuss the AAP phenomena in Indian politics with a view to access the recent developments in party and as an emerging alternative that can also be an opportunity to capture the space vacated by the Left movement in India. First of all I would like to argue that considering the BJP after the failed Janta Party Experiment as a ‘faction of Janta Party’ (Shri Bhushan’s views) is not a correct judgment. Actually the Bhartiya Jan Sangha was the last party that remained as Janta Party coalition after the other four parties that came together without merging their distinctive identities to form Janta Party left the coalition at their will to pursue their own ambitions. Hence it was not just a matter of chance that the new party that emerged on the Indian political scene after the failed Janta experiment named Bhartiya Janta Party (Bhartiya Jana Sangha + Janta Party = Bhartiya Janta Party). The then leaders not only launched a new party with inheriting the name but also the legacy. As it was more moderate and reformed on many policy agendas by incorporating Gandhian- JP Legacy to fight against the ruling dispensation. That seed has now grown as a Banyan tree and shadowing the Indian political scene defying all ifs and buts. Although it is still to be tested that how will a full majority BJP will work in coming years as many scholars of Indian politics doubt the BJP’s course of action as a single full majority party (see Christophe Jaffrelot, 2003). It is also because the earlier BJP led government was a crippled and soft BJP as NDA coalition and also Atal Bihari Bajpai as its leader and was not able to pursue its core Hindutwa demands of building Ram temple, Uniform Civil Code and the abolition of Article 370 of the Constitution for the full merger of J&K into Indian Union.

University of Prishtina, serving as an institution of education and science and as a centre of Albanian democratic and cultural movements, since its foundation was amongst the institutions on the target of Serbian regime. Upon abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989, the Serbian regime started the discriminatory policies against the Albanian population, the overwhelming majority population in Kosovo, including the expulsion of the Albanian pupils and students from the schools and university premises, massive dismissals from work, etc. It was the academic year 1991/1992 when the doors of the University of Prishtina were closed to Albanian students and teachers. The University of Prishtina and its campus in the center of the capital Prishtina, libraries, institutes and student dormitories all remained available to Serbian and other non-Albanian teachers and students. The Albanian population created a parallel state, a unique example in the world, and such state created the parallel institutions in various fields of life, such as health, culture and education, including also the parallel University of Prishtina. This paper, in light of the sources of the time (documents in the Archive of the Rectorate of University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”, published reports of the international organisations, press of the time) and the relevant historiography aims at elaborating: the initial protests and resistance of Albanian professors and students against the violent measures imposed by the Serbian regime; how the students and teachers were expelled from the facilities of the University of Prishtina; the procedures and the circumstances under which was established the Parallel University of Prishtina; how this parallel university functioned in the situation of pressure and continuous violence from the Serbian regime, at private facilities in the suburbs of the city; how the entire Albanian population from Kosovo was mobilized to support this university. The paper offers data from the unpublished documents which are stored at the Archive of the Rectorate of the University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”, regarding the number of planned and enrolled students, which indicates how the political situation was reflected on the number of students who attended the university studies. Particular attention in the paper was paid to the students’ protests of 1997 by elaborating how this Parallel University, through the peaceful student protests, influenced the sensitizing of the international institutions and media on the question of the Albanian people in Kosovo. It emphasizes the important role of students represented by Independent Union of Students of the University of Prishtina (Unioni i Pavarur i Studentëve i Universitetit të Prishtinës - UPSUP), who gained the support and encouragement of international political personalities of the time for the continuation of peaceful student activism. Despite all the drastic challenges the Parallel University of Prishtina functioned in all the segments that characterize a university. All managerial mechanisms were developed, teaching was held in three cycles of study, even though only private premises were available but no laboratories, libraries and dormitories, new students were enrolled, staff were continuously recruited and promoted, and university textbooks were prepared. However, due to many factors, including the emigration of the Albanian population, the continuous violence by the Serbian police, and the financial difficulties of Albanian families, the number of students was constantly decreasing. In addition, this situation impacted their learning. The lack of literature and laboratories, teaching and learning in private premises and homes, the constant dangers and mistreatment by the Serbian regime, were making university studies a very difficult mission. However, the Parallel University of Prishtina turned into a centre of peaceful resistance and a symbol of determination to continue studies and advancement in the Albanian language regardless of the extreme political and social situation. The University did not interrupt the work even in the state of war, until 21 March 1999. All this readiness, will and peaceful resistance had gained the attention and respect of international opinion.

Abstract The positioning of movements for social and political change as forms of postemancipation abolition democracy has a long history. Abolition has been the watchword under which initiatives proceed to eradicate the death penalty, human trafficking, nuclear weapons, the hegemony of Wall Street, prisons, police, the deportation of immigrants, and more. The essays in this forum examine nineteenth-century abolitionism’s complicated legacy through the prism of contemporary frameworks and agitations for justice and social transformation. The working papers reflect vital ongoing debates about abolition’s afterlives while meditating upon a series of pressing current concerns: migrant justice, the humanitarian rhetoric of some anti-racist initiatives, the activism of Erica Garner following the murder by police of her father, the racialization of madness and violence, the prison-abolition movement, and climate activism. By addressing the mobilization of rhetorics of slavery and abolition in our own vexed political moment, the contributors reveal that to think abolition now is necessarily to rethink abolition then.

Abstract International criminal law is a carceral system, which responds to mass atrocities by holding some individuals criminally responsible for these events and then, generally, imprisoning those individuals. I ask what alternative responses might be envisaged, and if we can build a carceral abolitionist movement for international criminal law. Such a movement would refuse imprisonment and policing as the main responses to mass atrocity, and instead would seek to understand the social causes and conditions that cause such mass atrocity, and also how (and why) criminal law has become the preeminent ‘legitimate hand of justice’. In this article, I attempt to bring into conversation two particular intellectual movements: the collective scholarship and praxis of domestic carceral abolition movements; and those critical scholars of international criminal law who have already set out some of the limits and possibilities of the field. I set out the structural conditions of international criminal law, particularly its ideological grounding in neoliberalism and its relationships to race, global capital and colonialism and imperialism, which result in a legal system that criminalizes some and exonerates others. I then particularly examine some tools that already exist for building an abolition movement for international criminal law. These include the defence of duress, transformative reparations and the role of defence lawyers. These tools are admittedly part of the carceral system, and therefore cannot be the key to an abolition movement for international criminal law. However, they may assist us in the short or medium term as we imagine and work towards a better world without the need for a carceral system of international criminal law that relies on police and prisons.

The prison abolition movement has brought attention to the American carceral crisis, or better yet, the mass incarceration and disproportionate criminalization of Black people in America. It has also led to and fomented recent calls to defund prison systems, the police, and to remove police from schools. While discussions of prison abolition have been addressed in the carceral studies literature, they are seldom addressed in the education literature and particularly in early childhood education. Given the ways in which young Black children are and have been negatively impacted by issues of mass incarceration (e.g. absence of family members, school-prison nexus), the lack of attention to the American carceral crisis and teaching about prison abolition is beyond concerning and contributes to the stanchless anti-Black violence Black children face in early childhood classrooms. Drawing on pro-Blackness, the imprisoned Black radical tradition, and abolitionist teaching, we introduce what we term prison abolition literacies– literacies practices that bring awareness to the injustices of the carceral state and encourage young children to become prison abolitionists––so that teachers can infuse prison abolition into the early childhood education curriculum.