Дисертації з теми "Naturalismo morale"
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BORRI, MICHELE. "Natura, Morale, Diritto : dalla metaetica analitica al neurodiritto." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/76990.
Повний текст джерелаThe substantial development of research in the field on neurosciences which has taken place in the course of the last decades points out a remarkable advancement, from both a scientific and philosophical point of view, contributing to a broad redefinition of the traditional representations of the “human being” and, likewise, it suggests the need to reconsider some conceptual categories concerning human nature, ethics and the law, that are widely employed in the philosophical debate. Following this basic perspective, the exposition starts with an investigation concerning some of the most meaningful concepts which were developed in the realm of Analytic Metaethics -such as the Hume’s law or the naturalistic fallacy- which are often used to keep separate the two domains of empirical science and moral philosophy, under the menace of committing the error of naturalistic fallacy or infringing the tenets of the Hume’s law. Therefore, in the first part of this work, some issues will be discussed in order to show that the traditional notions of Hume’s law and naturalistic fallacy are highly contentious in themselves and, moreover, they do not offer any reliable foundations to support the hypothesis that moral philosophy and empirical science are, and should be kept, necessarily detached from one another; on the contrary : the current development of neurosciences is beginning to open new horizons for philosophical and legal thinking. The second part of the work aims to provide an essential reconstruction of some major perspectives, endorsing the pertinence of a scientifically based form of naturalism in relation to the study of ethics and the law. As a matter of fact, since the times of Darwin the debate concerning the evolutionary origins of moral behaviour has been greatly controversial and, worse still, it has been also strongly affected by many ideological and political arguments which were well away from the thought of Darwin himself. Nevertheless, the current research in this field has made clear that most of Darwin’s intuitions were fundamentally correct, and therefore the origins of moral and legal behaviour can be adequately investigated and accounted for on the basis of a natural history of human evolution. Finally, the discussion takes into consideration some of the most significant implications deriving from the new orientations in the field of neurosciences, and evaluates their main consequences with regard to a few key concepts of moral and legal thinking, such as those of values, free will and criminal responsibility, justice and social order. To conclude with a few words from Darwin himself : “much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history”.
Nunes, Cristina de Moraes. "RESPONSABILIDADE E SENTIMENTOS MORAIS: UMA PROPOSTA DE NATURALIZAÇÃO DA RESPONSABILIDADE MORAL." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2016. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/3869.
Повний текст джерелаThis study seeks to address the relevance of moral sentiments for moral responsibility attribution through reactive theory of Peter Strawson and his critics. The central thesis which I try to hold onto is that the attribution of moral responsibility is something quite complex, it is related to how we respond the actions of the agents, but also involves the rational capacity of reflective self-control agent, being able to present reasons for his action and be able to control his desires. Thus, the morally responsible agent is one that is motivated by his desires, but he is able to reason morally on what the consequences of his action. In other words, be a responsible person involves having social competence to act in accordance with moral norms, but also be able to reflect on his practice, so a subject with normal cognitive powers and able to regulate his beliefs and desires. Given the cultural pluralism, we note that there is a symmetrical relationship between the moral sentiments and moral beliefs, so that the moral sentiments may be influenced by moral beliefs we form throughout our life as well as moral beliefs are formed from feelings. These moral beliefs may be revised or regulated, this review may come from the acquisition of new information, which may come from comparing our set of beliefs with the set of beliefs of another culture. But this regulation of moral beliefs is the result of an evolutionary process that our species suffered, which it has made over the years, people could improve their way of working with the others, and also be able to autonomously question whether certain beliefs are in fact true. What I propose is that science is an ally of ethics, and scientific explanations can contribute to a better understanding of what is morally right and wrong. Understanding our human nature we become more able to 'see' the world differently and realize that certain emotions can contribute to our social life. In this way, we can realize that it makes no sense to continue resentful of someone in a situation which the agent has good grounds for leaving to feel such a feeling. Realizing this we can notice the complexity of our human species and how much we still need to advance the field of morality, seeking a moral improvement that does not happen only in the context of standards, but mostly at maturity that allows being able to analyze the circumstances and the reasons for the action with greater discernment. To defend such a position, I will use Strawson reactive theory, and criticism raised to such a theory by Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998), namely that Strawson fails to present a rational capacity guide the allocation of moral responsibility. The solution to this problem is to defend the rational capacity, as well as the social competence of the agent, it is a necessary condition to consider the morally responsible people, including the rational capacity of the agent is what allows him to reflect on his social practice. To better assess these issues it is necessary an analysis of the moral psychology and knowledge to know about the way people in their daily lives assess the actions of the agents and consequently assign moral responsibility to them. So my goal is to show how proposal of Strawson is still relevant to discussions about attribution of moral responsibility, as well as propose a progress in discussion on this topic by means of a moral realist naturalist position.
O presente estudo busca tratar da relevância dos sentimentos morais para a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, através da teoria reativa de Peter Strawson e de seus críticos. A tese central, a qual procuro sustentar, é que a atribuição de responsabilidade moral é algo bastante complexo, está relacionada à forma como reagimos frente às ações dos agentes, mas também envolve a capacidade racional do agente de autocontrole reflexivo, estando apto em apresentar razões para a sua ação e ser capaz de frear os seus desejos. Desse modo, o agente moralmente responsável é aquele que se sente motivado por seus desejos, mas é capaz de raciocinar moralmente sobre quais seriam as consequências da sua ação. Em outras palavras, ser uma pessoa responsável envolve ter competência social para agir de acordo com as normas morais, mas também ser capaz de refletir sobre a sua prática, ou seja, um sujeito com suas capacidades cognitivas normais e capaz de regular as suas crenças e desejos. Dado o pluralismo cultural, podemos notar que há uma relação simétrica entre os sentimentos morais e as crenças morais, de modo que os sentimentos morais podem ser influenciados pelas crenças morais que formamos ao longo de nossa vida, bem como as crenças morais serem formadas a partir dos sentimentos. Essas crenças morais podem ser revisadas ou reguladas, essa revisão pode vir da aquisição de novas informações, que podem vir da comparação de nosso conjunto de crenças com o conjunto de crenças de outra cultura. Mas também essa regulação das crenças morais é resultado de um processo evolutivo que sofreu a nossa espécie, que fez com que, ao longo dos anos, as pessoas pudessem aprimorar o seu modo de conviver com as demais e também ser capaz de autonomamente questionar se determinadas crenças são, de fato, verdadeiras. O que proponho é que a ciência é uma aliada da ética, sendo que as explicações científicas podem contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do que é correto e incorreto moralmente. Compreendendo a nossa natureza humana, tornamo-nos mais aptos a ver o mundo de maneira diferente e perceber que certas emoções podem contribuir para a nossa vida social. Dessa maneira, podemos dar-nos conta de que não faz sentido continuar ressentido com alguém numa situação em que o agente apresenta boas razões para que deixemos de sentir tal sentimento. Perceber isso faz com que notemos a complexidade de nossa espécie humana e o quanto ainda precisamos avançar no campo da moralidade, buscando um aprimoramento moral que não se dá apenas no âmbito de normas, mas principalmente na maturidade que permite sermos capazes de analisar as circunstâncias e as razões para a ação com maior discernimento. Para defender tal posição, utilizarei a teoria reativa de Strawson e a crítica levantada a tal teoria feita por Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) e Fischer e Ravizza (1998), a saber, que Strawson falha em apresentar uma capacidade racional que guie a atribuição de responsabilidade moral. A solução para tal problema é defender que a capacidade racional, assim como a competência social do agente, é uma condição necessária para considerar as pessoas moralmente responsáveis, inclusive a capacidade racional do agente é que lhe permite refletir sobre a sua prática social. Para avaliar melhor tais questões, faz-se necessária uma análise sobre questões de psicologia moral e de conhecimento moral, para saber como as pessoas, no seu cotidiano, avaliam as ações dos agentes e, consequentemente, atribuem-lhes responsabilidade moral. Portanto, o meu objetivo é mostrar como a proposta strawsoniana continua sendo relevante para as discussões sobre a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, mas também apresentar uma proposta de avanço na discussão sobre esse tema através de uma posição naturalista realista moral.
Almeida, Leandro Thomaz de 1978. "Literatura naturalista, moralidade e natureza." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/270046.
Повний текст джерелаTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem
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Resumo: O critério moralizante, presente de maneira inconteste enquanto elemento de atribuição de valor dos romances produzidos em meados do século XIX no Brasil, também esteve presente na literatura naturalista. Essa constatação, nada óbvia se considera a crítica sobre o naturalismo produzida durante todo o século XX, ampara-se tanto na recepção crítica dos romances naturalistas contemporânea ao seu lançamento, quanto na elaboração teórica do escritor Émile Zola. Ao se deter no tema da moral enquanto critério avaliativo da literatura de finais do XIX, o presente trabalho procura também explicar a relação que a literatura e o naturalismo guardaram com a idéia de natureza, muito presente nas discussões que envolveram a tarefa de representação da realidade que seria própria ao naturalismo. Ele propõe ainda uma leitura dos romances Bom- Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, a partir das discussões teóricas tratadas na tese
Abstract: The moral criterion for evaluating the literature, unchallenged while the mid-nineteenth century in Brazil, was also present in the literature naturalist. This finding, nothing obvious if one considers the criticism on naturalism produced throughout the twentieth century, is supported by both the critical reception of contemporary naturalistic novels, as the theoretical elaboration of the writer Émile Zola. By dwelling on the theme of morality as a criterion of evaluation literature from the late nineteenth, this thesis also seeks to explain the relationship that literature and naturalism kept with the idea of nature, very present in discussions involving the task of representing reality that would be proper to naturalism. He also proposes a reading of the novels Bom-Crioulo, A carne e Livro de uma sogra, taking into account the theoretical discussions addressed in the thesis
Doutorado
Historia e Historiografia Literaria
Doutor em Teoria e História Literária
Kavetski, Silvio. "Realismo, naturalismo e semântica moral." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFSC, 2017. https://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/178105.
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O naturalismo moral é a teoria metaética que sustenta que fatos e propriedades morais são fatos e propriedades naturais. Desde que G. E. Moore apresentou o seu argumento da questão aberta, tem havido várias críticas a essa teoria, o que fez com que os filósofos articulassem várias teorias metaéticas alternativas ao naturalismo, tais como intuicionismo, emotivismo, prescritivismo e a teoria do erro. Mas a partir da década de oitenta David Brink, Richard Boyd e Nicholas Sturgeon desenvolveram uma nova versão do naturalismo moral ? o naturalismo não reducionista ? que, argumentativamente, evita essas objeções e apresenta inúmeras outras vantagens. O resultado foi uma reascensão do realismo moral naturalista. No entanto, dois filósofos formularam uma objeção ao naturalismo não reducionista, que ficou conhecida como ?Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral?, que tem gerado bastante discussão. O objetivo deste trabalho é reconstruir as linhas principais desse debate mostrando que: o naturalismo não reducionista realmente tem boas respostas a algumas críticas frequentes, tais como o argumento da questão aberta de Moore, a reformulação de Hare deste argumento, à objeção construtivista, à crítica de relativismo, ao argumento do desacordo moral etc; e que, mesmo que o argumento da terra gêmea moral seja o seu principal problema, o que parece ser o caso, há algumas estratégias de respostas possíveis a favor do naturalista.
Abstract : Moral naturalism is the metaethical theory that maintains that moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties. Since G. E. Moore presented his open question argument there have been several critiques to this theory, which made the philosophers articulate several alternative metaethical theories to naturalism as intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism and the error theory. But from the eighties David Brink, Richard Boyd and Nicholas Sturgeon developed a new version of moral naturalism ? the non reductionist naturalism ? that, arguably, avoids these objections and it have numerous another advantages. The result was a resurrection of naturalistic moral realism. However, two philosophers formulated an objection to non reductionist naturalism that became known as ?Moral Twin Earth Argument? that has generated much discussion. The objective of this work is to reconstruct the main lines of this debate showing that: the non reductionist naturalism really have good replies to some frequent critiques such as Moore?s open question argument, Hare?s reformulation of this argument, the constructivist?s objection, the critique of relativism, to the moral disagreement?s argument etc; and that, even if the moral twin earth argument be its main problem, what looks to be the case, there are some possible response strategies in favor of the naturalist.
Sias, James. "Naturalism and Moral Realism." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/21.
Повний текст джерелаIgansi, Luca Nogueira. "Normatividade e valor no naturalismo moral." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2014. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/4380.
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Este trabalho investiga o naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas, em especial a de G. E. Moore. Parto da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresento então o naturalismo moral numa versão humeana, que sugere uma abordagem descritivista da moralidade, em oposição ao viés prescritivista. Trabalho as origens do naturalismo e apresento algumas posições em metaética a fim de melhor entender a situação contemporânea do debate moral no que tange à naturalização da ética, contrastando teorias da ação e do valor quanto ao tema da motivação e da normatividade morais.
This work addresses contemporary moral naturalism from the investigation of an array of formulations of the argument known as the naturallistic fallacy, as from the contrast of a few non-naturalistic theories, especially G. E. Moore’s. Proceeding from the analysis of such formulations of the argument in the formal context of contemporary metaethics, attempting to assert the validity of the naturallistic fallacy in the current context, as so its limits in its application against moral naturalism. Then I am going to present moral naturalism in a humean version, which suggests a descriptivist naturalism instead of a prescriptivist one. Such origins of naturalism will be worked with and some positions in metaethics to further understand of the contemporary situation of the moral debate concerning the naturalization of ethics will be presented, contrasting theories of action and of value on the matter of moral motivation and normativity.
Coyne, Steven. "Semantic arguments against moral naturalism." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/36841.
Повний текст джерелаWong, Ching Wa. "Psychoanalytic theory and moral naturalism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.413032.
Повний текст джерелаViggiano, Andrea <1976>. "Moral explanations and ethical naturalism." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2007. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/325/1/VIGGIANO-TESI.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаViggiano, Andrea <1976>. "Moral explanations and ethical naturalism." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2007. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/325/.
Повний текст джерелаSaunders, Josiah Paul. "Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Philosophy and Religious Studies, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/992.
Повний текст джерелаCampbell, Michael. "Being human : fine-tuning moral naturalism." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2012. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/being-human(164780a7-2816-4fd3-9163-f8addefa279f).html.
Повний текст джерелаDevitt, Michael. "Realismo moral: una perspectiva naturalista." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2012. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113208.
Повний текст джерелаVogelmann, Rafael Graebin. "Cognitivismo avaliativo descritivista : uma objeção." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/157030.
Повний текст джерелаDescriptive Evaluative Cognitivism is the thesis according to which ascriptions of value aim at describing features of reality. According to this thesis, to be valuable is just to instantiate some property or to take part in some relation. The effort of evaluative reflection and discussion is conceived as an effort to adjust our evaluative convictions to reality, and if we succeed in this effort we obtain evaluative knowledge. Ascriptions of value distinguish themselves from other descriptive propositions in virtue of the peculiar character of the features of reality they aim to describe. The goal of this dissertation is to present an objection to this thesis. The defender of Descriptive Cognitivism must specify the domain of reality ascriptions of value are about. It is by reference to it that the cognitivist must explain the distinctive traits of value judgments. There are two available options: either value judgments are about a domain of facts that transcends natural reality, or they are about natural facts. In the first chapter I argue that Cognitivism in its Non-naturalistic form cannot account for the covariation of value. Covariation consists in the fact that differences in value are always accompanied by non-evaluative differences. Our ascriptions of value comply with this constraint, but we cannot make sense of it if we assume that Non-naturalist Cognitivism is correct. Descriptive Cognitivism must, therefore, adopt a Naturalistic form. In the second chapter I argue that the only reason to prefer Naturalist Cognitivism to alternative characterizations of value judgments is the fact that it can account for the objectivity of value ascriptions according to a certain conception of objectivity According to this conception, only those features of reality accessible in abstraction from any particular perspective, including the perspective characterized by the propensity to certain behavioral and affective responses that we acquire during our moral education, are objective. I argue that this conception of objectivity does not hold and that, therefore, we have no reason to accept Naturalist Cognitivism. In the third chapter I argue that even if we had some reason to suppose that ascriptions of value consist in the description of natural aspects of reality, this characterization of value judgments also fails to account for a distinctive feature of such judgments - the restriction on the outsourcing of value judgments. The restriction on outsourcing consists in the fact that the opinion of would-be value experts cannot provide a reason to accept a certain value judgment. Usually the expert opinion can provide a reason to accept descriptive judgments, and if we assume that ascriptions of value describe natural features of reality, then we cannot account for this restriction. I conclude that we must reject Descriptive Cognitivism.
Baumard, Nicolas. "Une théorie naturaliste et mutualiste de la morale." Paris, EHESS, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008EHES0033.
Повний текст джерелаWhy are we moral? This work relies on two approaches. The naturalist approach comes from the tradition of moral sense (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith) and aims at explaining morality with the help of tools coming from natural sciences (evolutionary theory, cognitive psychology). The mutualist approach comes from the social contract tradition (Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls) et see moral relationships as mutually advantageous interactions. Thus, this work distances oneself from non naturalist theories of morality ( culturalist theories, rational choice theories) and fron non mutualist theories (group selection or altruistic theories, sentimentalist or continuiste theories). This works shows that numerous moral situations (justice, solidarity, moral dilemmas, economic games, crimes without victim) are better explained in a naturalist and mutualist framework
Tiefensee, Christine Marx Johannes. "Moral realism : a critical analysis of metaethical naturalism /." Marburg : Tectum Verlag, 2008. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=9783828895348.
Повний текст джерелаTiefensee, Christine. "Moral realism a critical analysis of metaethical naturalism." Marburg Tectum-Verl, 2005. http://d-nb.info/987403958/04.
Повний текст джерелаLandolt, Phillip Louis. "Naturalis obligatio and bare moral or social duty." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.627027.
Повний текст джерелаKatz, Jessica Mefford. "Non-natural Moral Properties: Sui Generis or Supernatural?" Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1537983825549632.
Повний текст джерелаNascimento, Edson Evangelista do. "Razão e sentimento nos julgamentos morais (em David Hume)." Florianópolis, SC, 2003. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/xmlui/handle/123456789/85389.
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Segundo Hume, a razão sozinha jamais poderia fundamentar a moral, pois ela necessita de um sentimento básico de dor e prazer, relacionado não só ao nosso interesse particular, mas também ao geral, que lhe dê um sentido prático relativo à ética. Da mesma forma, em poucos casos nossos julgamentos morais são derivados exclusivamente do campo do sentimento, sendo necessário que a racionalidade tome partido indicando o verdadeiro valor do objeto em questão, e, em muitos casos, indicando ações que se tornam deveres por melhor se adequarem aos sentimentos morais e receberem o assentimento destes. Explicitar essa relação entre sentimento e razão no âmbito moral é a nossa tarefa no presente trabalho. E ao fazermos estaremos apontando, mesmo não sendo o objeto dessa dissertação, os limites do naturalismo de Hume, limites que ele próprio coloca para o tratamento da moral. Tal é a fronteira entre natureza e cultura no território ético, segundo a perspectiva humana.
Boeddeling, Annika. "Moral realism : time to relax?" Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/274563.
Повний текст джерелаGARCÍA, DUEÑAS JUAN ANTONIO. "LA ILUSIÓN Y EL DOBLE. TRES PARADOJAS EN LA FILOSOFÍA DE CLÉMENT ROSSET (MORAL, NATURALISMO E IDENTIDAD)." Tesis de Licenciatura, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11799/95426.
Повний текст джерелаLustila, Getty L. "Hume on the Nature of Moral Freedom." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/118.
Повний текст джерелаHoback, Brady John. "What motive to virtue? Early modern empirical naturalist theories of moral obligation." Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3101.
Повний текст джерелаRadcliffe, Nathan W. "Nietzsche’s Naturalism as a Critique of Morality and Freedom." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1350611814.
Повний текст джерелаFaraci, David N. S. "How to Be (and How Not to Be) a Normative Realist." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1344441342.
Повний текст джерелаKarasek, Felipe Szyszka. "Sobre a interpreta??o da natureza : contribui??es e limites do naturalismo para o problema da moral na filosofia de Nietzsche." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2016. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/6752.
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This doctoral dissertation addresses the analysis of the contemporary debate that puts forward the relation between Friedrich Nietzsche?s thought and philosophical naturalism. From this analysis, I argue that Nietzsche's thought cannot be related, prima facie, to any preconceived type of naturalist proposal. To achieve this goal, I analyze the following arguments: (i) the current debate about naturalism in Nietzsche tends to value a typology and wards off the meaning of philosophy proposed by him; (ii) it is not possible to relate Nietzsche's thought to any kind of preconceived concept of naturalism, though one can find naturalistic perspectives in his philosophy; (iii) Nietzsche can only be considered a naturalistic philosopher insofar as his philosophy is to represent a new approach away from the naturalistic categories that can be found in contemporary philosophy; (iv) his naturalistic perspectives are related to a notion of nature remote from the concept of nature proposed by contemporary naturalism; (v) the problem of morality in Nietzsche is related to his project of a transvaluation of values which is upheld by his notion of nature; (vi) the problem of morality in Nietzsche intends to seize the tragic element in its constitution.
O objetivo deste estudo ? analisar o debate contempor?neo que prop?e a rela??o do pensamento de Friedrich Nietzsche com o naturalismo filos?fico. A partir dessa an?lise, procuro demonstrar que o pensamento de Nietzsche n?o pode ser relacionado com nenhum tipo de proposta naturalista fechada. Para atingir esse objetivo, analiso os seguintes argumentos: (i) o debate atual a respeito do naturalismo em Nietzsche tende a valorizar uma tipologia e se afasta do significado de filosofia proposto por ele; (ii) n?o ? poss?vel relacionar o pensamento de Nietzsche a um tipo de naturalismo fechado, mas ? poss?vel encontrar perspectivas naturalistas em sua filosofia; (iii) Nietzsche s? pode ser considerado um fil?sofo naturalista se a sua filosofia representar um novo tipo de abordagem, diferente das categorias naturalistas que existem na filosofia contempor?nea; (iv) suas perspectivas naturalistas est?o relacionadas com uma no??o de natureza distante do conceito de natureza proposto pelo naturalismo contempor?neo; (v) o problema da moral em Nietzsche est? conectado com o seu projeto de transvalora??o dos valores, o qual est? sustentado pela sua no??o de natureza; (vi) o problema da moral em Nietzsche pretende apreender o elemento tr?gico em sua constitui??o.
Cardoso, Fernando da Costa. "Por que rejeitar o reducionismo em ética?: falacia naturalista e superveniencia moral na obra de G. E. Moore." Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1843/ARBZ-7X4DPB.
Повний текст джерелаA presente dissertacao aborda, no plano metaetico, a questao da naturalizacao da etica a partir dos trabalhos de G. E. Moore (1873 1958). Moore desenvolveu uma argumentacao visando testar a validade de uma etica naturalizada. Sua resposta inicial apresentada no livro Principia Ethica (1903), negativa, passa pela constatacao de que todas as tentativas nesse sentido acarretam um erro fundamental, a saber, a falácia naturalista, falacia essa que seria confirmada pelo experimento do argumento da questão aberta. Dessa posicao inicial, nosso autor passou a defesa de uma posicao nao-naturalista no campo da etica. No entanto, as dificuldades em torno dessa posicao levaram-no a uma reavaliacao de suas posicoes iniciais e ao que pode ser considerado uma descoberta: o carater superveniente das propriedades morais frente as propriedades naturais. E esse percurso que procuramos percorrer e compreender na dissertacao.
Descarreaux, Samuel. "Friedrich-Albert Lange (1828-1875) : les apories de la naturalisation de l'épistémologie kantienne et ses implications pratiques." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/35226.
Повний текст джерелаPettersson, Bo. "The world according to Kurt Vonnegut moral paradox and narrative form /." Åbo [Finland] : Åbo Akademi University Press, 1994. http://books.google.com/books?id=lXlbAAAAMAAJ.
Повний текст джерелаMuller, Laurent. "De l’histoire de la philosophie à la philosophie de l’avenir : l’évolution de la morale d’après Jean-Marie Guyau." Thesis, Paris 10, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA100144/document.
Повний текст джерелаAt the time of evolutionist science and the decline of the religious absolute, what moral obligation can be thought and practised nowadays ? Such is the problem Jean-Marie Guyau, a French philosopher of the late 19th century, intends to make a decisive contribution to.In this research work, we suggest rediscovering the logical and chronological route followed by Guyau to elaborate his own thought. This thought has to be understood as the logical outcome of a raised issue which starts by studying the history of moral philosophy.After elaborating a method of comment upon past doctrines, Guyau thinks he can interpret the history of morality as an antagonism between naturalism (from Epicurus to Mill and Spencer) and idealism (from Epictetus to Kant and Fouillée). A thorough scrutiny allows Guyau to show the gaps of each of these traditions : idealism absolutises what is only hypothetical ; the obligation theorized by sensualism is dissolved by this same theory ; as for evolutionism, the ultimate shape taken by the science of customs, its view of the future is wrongfully based on the model of the past. From then on, obligation cannot be conceived either as categorical or as instinctive any more : it must be thought from the principle which involves as few presuppositions (life) as possible, and must not be considered as uniform but anomic any more. Relying on naturalist beginnings, Guyau’s philosophy then tries to idealize the moral existence of Man ; this increase in vitality is mainly handed over through education. Actually, not only does Guyau reconsider its purpose, i-e raising moral standards, but also its means, namely suggestion
Gonzalez, Ariel. "The Incompatibility of Freedom of the Will and Anthropological Physicalism." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2014. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1591.
Повний текст джерелаB.A.
Bachelors
Philosophy
Arts and Humanities
Hamon, Pascaline. "Les antinaturalismes fin-de-siècle de Barbey à Barrès (1877-1908). Exploration d'un labyrinthe critique, sociologique, philosophique, esthétique et moral." Thesis, Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018USPCA069/document.
Повний текст джерелаAntinaturalists! This term brings out the figures of critics of the nineteenth century, whose names have remained more or less engraved in memory and in literary history: Barbey d'Aurevilly, Leon Bloy, Leon Daudet, but also Pontmartin, Remy de Gourmont or Jean-Marie Guyau ... fascinating authors by their virulence, their rejection of modernity, their philosophical positions out of norm or innovative ... The present study tends to show the diversity that can animate this group, which is defined by the negative as "those who oppose Zola's literature". This alliance of opposites allows them to constitute themselves in full force on the literary chessboard.To apprehend this tension between the plurality of figures and the strength of a group whose unity is shattered on the Dreyfus affair, a first part will propose some pathways in the sociology and philosophy of the time, which highlight a complex landscape, traversed by strange phenomena of breaks and continuity. Then, questioning the way in which antinaturalists form a critical discourse. A chapter devoted to antinaturalist rhetoric will only reinforce the idea of multiplicity within this group. A double-movement of construction and deconstruction of this concept, will lead to reevaluate some grievances addressed to Zola by his enemies to highlight phenomena of re-borrowing and singular and paradoxical positions, which testify to the importance of the naturalist author in the literary field of the late nineteenth century, both literary and political
Latour, David. "L'éthique écologique chez Henri David Thoreau." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM3077.
Повний текст джерелаThoreau’s nature writing is rooted in 19th century New-England. Fed on New-England’s values, the author shows life should be spared and not spent in vain in mundane activities. In order for him to do so, he chooses the way of a life of simplicity and solitude in nature, which enables him to question what society traditionally sees as virtues.Living alone in the wild is an anthropocentric means to reach happiness because nature provides man with all that he needs. Hence, Thoreau is a naturalist who lives in nature and walks in ii. His naturalism becomes more and more estranged from Emerson’s theory on immanence. The real scientist can watch animals using his subjectivity and can go so far as to see in certain animals the incarnation of some virtues.To nuance this anthropomorphist approach, Thoreau advocates zoocentrism. This point of view can even lead to a peaceful cohabitation between species. However, Thoreau’s writing and actions are fed with paradoxes as far as hunting, fishing and being a vegetarian is concerned. To live in harmony with nature, Thoreau gests closer to the Indian model which has limits. Thoreau makes many suggestions, among which the creation of national parks
Gagnon, Alex. "Vertus et éducation morale." Thesis, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/24356.
Повний текст джерелаMoral education is a central aspect of the virtue ethics of Aristotelian tradition. Many authors are attached to the idea that a good ethical theory should inform us about how to form better moral agents. The ethicists of virtue consider that it is through an education of character that virtuous agents can be fashioned. But is such an education really possible? And if it is, what does it consist of? This thesis aims to answer these questions by exploring the horizons of the theory of virtues, horizons that now exceed the limits of philosophy. By first questioning moral naturalism in the theory of virtues, liberal naturalism is retained as the most realistic metaethical position for the future of the theory. It must take into account scientific advances, particularly in social psychology, if it wishes to achieve its educational objectives. To follow this approach, the central characteristics of the concept of virtue are identified and then tested by the situationist critique of virtues. According to the situationism, many empirical studies would show that the moral behaviors of the agents are determined by circumstantial and arbitrary factors. Therefore, a central feature of the theory, the robustness of virtues, is abandoned. This abandonment, however, does not mark the end of the theory of virtues: it is then oriented towards moral education where it remains relevant thanks to the literature on expertise and emotional intelligence. This theoretical and empirical framework makes it possible to give a solid foundation for the education of virtues. Some difficulties remain in implementing concrete curricula for the education of virtues in schools. For the future, researchers will have to take up the challenges of the school environment and the measurement of virtues.
Rubin, Michael. "Synthetic ethical naturalism." 2009. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3349739.
Повний текст джерелаDishaw, Samuel. "L'éthique et sa place dans la nature." Thèse, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/16195.
Повний текст джерелаOne of the burning questions among metaethical realists is whether moral facts and properties are natural or non-natural. In this thesis, I argue that we should treat a family of arguments for non-naturalism with considerable scepticism: the Open Question Argument, the Normative Intuition, and the argument from the Is-Ought Gap. Moore’s famous Open Question Argument only supports moral non-naturalism if it begs the question against the modest (non-reductionist) naturalist. As for the Normative Intuition, it either commits the fallacy of inferring on the basis of a thing’s specific difference that it does not belong to the genus it putatively belongs to, or it underestimates the breadth of natural properties that possess the features which non-naturalists allege are distinctive of moral and normative properties. The argument from the Is-Ought Gap, for its part, underestimates the ubiquity of the logical and conceptual gap that allegedly marks a deep metaphysical discontinuity between the normative and natural domains.
Stanley, Shaun. "Naturalizing normativity: exploring the relationship between evolutionary naturalism and moral realism." Thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10539/18465.
Повний текст джерелаWhat is the relationship between evolutionary naturalism and moral realism? More specifically, is moral realism compatible with evolutionary naturalism? Moral realism depends on the view that our ‘moral intuitions’ are epistemically reliable. Considerations from evolutionary science allegedly suggest otherwise. Certain evolutionary naturalists employ these considerations in so-called ‘Evolutionary Debunking’ arguments which show, if sound, that moral realism is unjustified or implausible. Evolutionary naturalism, therefore, appears to be incompatible with moral realism. I consider this to be a forceful challenge for moral realism. In this dissertation I investigate whether or not, or in which sense, the challenge is successful. I argue that (what I call) ‘moral realism (traditionally construed)’, a version of moral realism which depends on the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’, is, given evolutionary naturalism and evolutionary science, probably implausible. I outline a version of moral realism (‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed)) which does not depend on the epistemic reliability of our ‘moral intuitions’. I argue that given evolutionary naturalism, evolutionary science, and nativist evolutionary psychology, ‘moral realism’ (nontraditionally construed) is a naturalized version of moral realism, and is probably compatible with evolutionary naturalism. If the outline of ‘moral realism’ (non-traditionally construed) is plausible, then there is a form of moral realism which is compatible with evolutionary naturalism. If it is not then ‘moral realism’ (traditionally construed) is probably implausible given evolutionary naturalism.
Allen, Katy. "Moral Responsibility and the Natural Order." Thesis, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1974/693.
Повний текст джерелаThesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-14 14:36:23.511
Blili-Hamelin, Borhane. "Liberté? : réflexion sur un problème dans l'éthique de Theodor Adorno." Thèse, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/4732.
Повний текст джерелаThroughout Theodor Adorno’s moral thought runs a paradoxical demand : that morality should be fully rooted in both the liveliest impulses and the keenest reasonings. More than a quirk among Adorno’s many, this essay suggests that this problem plays a pivotal role in his ethics. The current research seeks to develop a strategy to conjointly articulate these two demands. To this end, I will try to expound the following hypothesis : the analysis of the problem of freedom and unfreedom set forth by the first of the ‘models’ in Negative Dialectics enables making sense of both the bond and the disparity between the impulsive and rational constituents of adornian ethics. This study will first focus on the problem of unfreedom and its embodiment in the concrete phenomena of anti-Semitism as well as the animal fear and rage that it builds upon. It will then go on to examine Adorno’s conception of freedom in its two facets : «full theoretical consciousness» and «spontaneous impulse». It will finally try to ascertain the more general relevance of this interpretation of the problem of freedom for making sense of Adorno’s ethics, by trying to make sense on that basis of his «new categorical imperative».
Blackaby, Mike. "A Worldview Analysis of Sam Harris' Philosophical Naturalism in The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values." Diss., 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10392/5263.
Повний текст джерелаSaunders, Joe. "Kant's departure from Hume's moral naturalism : a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy /." 2007. http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/etd/adt-NZCU20080114.085033.
Повний текст джерелаWolf, Frederick Andrew. "Deconstruction, dialectics and a sense of relatedness." Diss., 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/18707.
Повний текст джерелаReligious Studies
M.Th. (Religious Studies)
IANNUCCI, GIULIA. "Naturalizzare l'individuo: menti, soggettività e nicchie ecologiche." Doctoral thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11573/1360660.
Повний текст джерелаDraelants, Isabelle. "Un encyclopédiste méconnu du XIIIe siècle : Arnold de Saxe." Phd thesis, 2001. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00700745.
Повний текст джерела