Дисертації з теми "Military operations, Naval – German"

This thesis assesses British naval and military co-operation in the form of combined operations during the Nine Years War, 1688-1697, and the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. The operational history of the joint actions is related and used to drive forward the determination of two inter-related themes. These are, how combined operations might be defined as an instrument of warfare during this period; and secondly, the place of such operations within the military component of Britain's wartime Grand Strategy. With respect to the former, previous definitions embodying the benchmarks of objectives and composition of force are set against the history and built upon to incorporate three further categories of definition: theatre of war, bureaucratic control and command structure. As a result, it is argued that no blanket definition for combined operations can be arrived at, but that any one of the five categories can provide insights into combined operations as an instrument of warfare. The second theme places the strategic objectives of these operations within the context of British war policy and explores their relationship to the 'Maritime' and 'Continental' strategic traditions. While it becomes clear that combined operations were thought to possess neither an independent nor a war-winning strategic capability, they do appear to have consistently filled a role in Grand Strategy which acted either simultaneously or separately in support of the naval and military strategic interests. With the categories for definition and a strategic role established for such joint army-navy ventures, the thesis concludes by considering whether during these wars there were any factors common to the more successful, and conversely to the failing, combined operations. Although a pattern or mould for a successful combined operation cannot be established, it is shown that the origins of the developed historical practice of this type of warfare - demonstrated to such effect later in the eighteenth century - can be traced in the two wars considered in this study.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Middle East Technical University, 2004.
Keywords: Air Defense, Naval Task Group, Formation, Weapon Target Allocation Problem, Military Operations Research, Quadratic Assignment, Location.

This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The dismissal was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British merchant shipping. The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued unabated. The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified. As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably Lloyd George. Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made. Firstly, given the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable. Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having regard to primary source documentation. Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, can be discounted. Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, Commander of the British Forces France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe's removal from office. Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe's successor, Admiral Wemyss, is misconceived.

History
Ph.D.
This dissertation investigates the reasons behind combined military and naval offensive expeditions that Great Britain conducted outside of Europe during the Great War. It argues that they were not unnecessary adjuncts to the war in Europe, but they fulfilled an important strategic purpose by protecting British trade where it was most vulnerable. Trade was not a luxury for the British; it was essential for maintaining the island nation's way of life, a vital interest and a matter of national survival. Great Britain required freedom of the seas in order to maintain its global trade. A general war in Europe threatened Great Britain's economic independence with the potential of losing its continental trading partners. The German High Seas Fleet constituted a serious threat that also placed the British coast at grave risk forcing the Royal Navy to concentrate in home waters. This dissertation argues that the several combined military and naval operations against overseas territories constituted parts of an overarching strategy designed to facilitate the Royal Navy's gaining command of the seas. Using documents from the Cabinet, the Foreign and Colonial Offices, the War Office, and the Admiralty, plus personal correspondence and papers of high-ranking government officials, this dissertation demonstrates that the Offensive Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense drafted the campaign plan. Subsequently, the plan received Cabinet approval, and then the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, and the Colonial Office coordinated with allies and colonies to execute the operations necessary to prosecute the campaign. In Mesopotamia, overseas expeditions directed against the Ottoman Empire protected communications with India and British oil concessions in Persia. The combined operations against German territories exterminated the logistics and intelligence hubs that supported Germany's commerce raiders thereby protecting Britain's world-wide trade and its overseas possessions.
Temple University--Theses

In 1793, Great Britain embarked on a war against Revolutionary France to reestablish a balance of power in Europe. Traditional assessments among historians consider British war planning at the ministerial level during the First Coalition to be incompetent and haphazard. This work reassesses decision making of the leading strategists in the British Cabinet in the development of a theater in the Mediterranean by examining political, diplomatic, and military influences. William Pitt the Younger and his controlling ministers pursued a conservative strategy in the Mediterranean, reliant on Allies in the region to contain French armies and ideas inside the Alps and the Pyrenees. Dependent on British naval power, the Cabinet sought to weaken the French war effort by targeting trade in the region. Throughout the first half of 1793, the British government remained fixed on this conservative, traditional approach to France. However, with the fall of Toulon in August of 1793, decisions made by Admiral Samuel Hood in command of forces in the Mediterranean radicalized British policy towards the Revolution while undermining the construct of the Coalition. The inconsistencies in strategic thought political decisions created stagnation, wasting the opportunities gained by the Counter-revolutionary movements in southern France. As a result, reinvigorated French forces defeated Allied forces in detail in the fall of 1793.

L’esercito italiano e la conquista della Catalogna (1808-1811) Uno studio di Military Effectiveness nell’Europa napoleonica Settori scientifico-disciplinari SPS/03 – M-STO/02 La ricerca ha lo scopo di ricostruire e valutare l’effettività militare dell’esercito italiano al servizio di Napoleone I. In primo luogo attraverso un’analisi statistica e strategica della costruzione, e del successivo impiego, dell’istituzione militare del Regno d’Italia durante gli anni della sua esistenza (1805-14); successivamente, è stato scelto un caso di studi particolarmente significativo, come la campagna di Catalogna (1808-11, nel contesto della guerra di Indipendenza spagnola), per poter valutare il contributo operazionale e tattico dei corpi inviati dal governo di Milano e la loro integrazione con l’apparato militare complessivo del Primo Impero. La tesi ha voluto rispondere alla mancanza di studi sul comportamento in guerra dell’esercito italiano e, allo stesso tempo, introdurre nella storiografia militare italiana la metodologia di studi, d’origine anglosassone e ormai di tradizione trentennale, di Military Effectiveness. La ricerca si è primariamente basata, oltre che sulla copiosa memorialistica a stampa italiana e francese, sulla documentazione d’archivio della Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales di Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Parigi), del Ministère de la Guerre francese (Service historique de la Défence, di Vincennes, Parigi) e del Ministero della Guerra del Regno d’Italia (Archivio di Stato di Milano). Dal punto di vista dei risultati è stato possibile verificare come l’esercito italiano abbia rappresentato, per Bonaparte, uno strumento duttile e di facile impiego, pur in un contesto di sostanziale marginalità numerica complessiva di fronte alle altre (e cospicue) forze messe in campo da parte dell’Impero e dei suoi altri Stati satellite e alleati. Per quanto riguarda la campagna di conquista della Catalogna è stato invece possibile appurare il fondamentale contributo dato dal contingente italiano, sotto i punti di vista operazionale e tattico, per la buona riuscita dell’invasione; questo primariamente grazie alle elevate caratteristiche generali mostrate dallo stesso, ma anche per peculiarità disciplinari e organizzative che resero i corpi italiani adatti a operazioni particolarmente aggressive.
The Italian Army and the Conquest of Catalonia (1808-1811) A Study of Military Effectiveness in Napoleonic Europe Academic Fields and Disciplines SPS/03 – M-STO/02 The research has the purpose of reconstruct and evaluate the military effectiveness of the Italian Army existed under the reign of Napoleon I. Firstly through a statistic and strategic analysis of the development, and the following deployment, of the military institution of the Kingdom of Italy in the years of its existence (1805-14). Afterwards, a particularly significant case study was chosen, as the campaign of Catalonia (1808-11, in the context of the Peninsular War), in order to assess the operational and tactical contribution of the regiments sent by the Government of Milan and their integration in the overall military apparatus of the First Empire. The thesis wanted to respond to the lack of studies on the Italian army’s behavior in war and, at the same time, to introduce the methodology of the Military Effectiveness Studies (of British and American origin and, by now, enriched by a thirty-year old tradition) in the Italian historiography. The research is primarily based, besides the numerous memoirs of the Italian and French veterans, on the archive documentation of the Secrétairerie d’état impériale (Archives Nationales of Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, Paris), of the French Ministère de la Guerre (Service historique de la Défence, of Vincennes, Paris) and of the Italian Ministero della Guerra (Archivio di Stato di Milano). About the results, it has been verified how the Italian army has become a flexible and suitable instrument for Bonaparte, albeit in a context of substantial overall numerical marginality in comparison to the heterogeneous forces available to the Empire and its others satellites and allied states. Regarding the campaign of Catalonia, instead, it was possible to ascertain the fundamental contribution of the Italian regiments, in an operational and tactical perspective, for the success of the invasion. This was primarily due to the excellent general characteristics shown by the expeditionary force, but also to disciplinary and organizational peculiarities that have made the Italian corps suitable for particularly aggressive operations.

Through the Freedom of Navigation Program, established in 1979, the United States exercises diplomatic and military options for disputing maritime claims it judges to be inconsistent with customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Yet, despite the United States’ universal commitment to freedom of navigation and the law of the sea, it has behaved inconsistently from 1979-2013. This dissertation examines the variation and asks under what conditions the United States demonstrates its refusal to acquiesce to maritime claims—either by issuing a diplomatic protest or driving a warship through the disputed waters. This dissertation introduces a new dataset of every coastal state in the world over this 34-year period, coding each type of maritime claim made by every coastal state in the world, whether the United States disputes that particular claim, and whether the United States takes some kind of diplomatic or operational action to dispute it. The mixed-method analysis proceeds with a large-n quantitative analysis that sets up a qualitative case study on the Strait of Hormuz. The dissertation begins and concludes with a discussion of current conditions in the South China Sea and the United States activity in this disputed region. This study finds that territorial and usage claims are twice as strongly correlated with operational assertions as a response than diplomatic protests. More specifically, coastal states that require foreign ships to obtain permission prior to entering their territorial sea are most highly correlated with operational assertions. When the United States disputes a maritime claim, military powers and wealthy states are no more likely to receive Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPS) than others. Moreover, bilateral trade relationships and polity type hardly seem to matter. Similarly, neither the number of ships nor diplomatic representation increases the likelihood of FONOPS. Rather, a coastal state’s possession of nuclear weapons significantly increases the likelihood of receiving an operational assertion—especially if that states has made a declaration upon ratification of UNCLOS.