Дисертації з теми "Metaphysics"

This work represents an interdisciplinary attempt at the development of a-- scientific theory of norms and normativity. Normativity, understood in its most general interpretation as value determinations and prescriptions, has traditionally been troublesome to account by science and difficult to “place” within a scientific worldview. Such an accomplishment is attempted by the joining in conversation of two bodies of literature. The first of these is Steve Fuller’s naturalist epistemology and the second corresponds to the situated study of cognition, along with the epistemologies that have resulted from their findings. These two bodies of literature constitute the most radically naturalist attempts at developing a viable frame of epistemological and/or normative reference within their respective fields.

Clare, the titular character of The Time Traveller's Wife, reflects that "Everything seems simple until you think about it." (Niffenegger, 2003, 1) This might well be a mantra for the whole of philosophy, but a fair few terms tend to stick out. "Knowledge", "goodness" and "happiness" for example, are all pervasive everyday terms that undergo significant philosophical analysis. "Luck", I think, is another one of these terms. Wishing someone good luck in their projects, and cursing our bad luck when success seems so close to our reach or failure could have so easily been otherwise, happens so often that we rarely stop to reflect on what we really mean. Philosophical reflection on the nature of luck has a rich tradition, that is by no stretch confined to the Western philosophical canon. However, it has only very recently become one of the goals of philosophy to provide a clear account of what luck actually amounts to. This, in part, is the goal of this thesis. The thesis has two primary motivations. The first is to offer and defend a general account of luck that overcomes the problems faced by the current accounts of luck that are available in the current philosophical literature. The second is to apply this general account of luck to the areas of metaethics and epistemology where luck has been a pervasive and problematic concept, and demonstrate how this account of luck may resolve or further illuminate some of the problems that the notion has generated. The thesis is roughly split into two parts. The first half of the thesis focuses on the former objective of offering an account of luck. Chapter 1 offers a selected history of the philosophy of luck that spans from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, so that we might properly situate the current work on luck as part of the broader historical importance of the concept. Chapter 2 will set out the major rival to the theory of luck that I will offer - the lack of control account of luck (LCAL). LCAL has various iterations across the literature, but is most clearly articulated by Wayne Riggs (2009) and E.J. Coffman (2006, 2009). Both Coffman and Riggs add and adapt their own conditions to LCAL specifically so that the account may overcome several problems that have been levied against it. These further conditions are not incompatible so, to provide the strongest lack of control account possible, I have combined them to form a lack of control account I have called Combined LCAL - (c)LCAL. The latter part of the chapter pits (c)LCAL against some of the problems that have been raised against LCAL. However, despite the efforts of both Riggs and Coffman, even (c)LCAL fails to counter some of these objections. For these reasons I have rejected LCAL has a viable candidate for an account of luck. Chapter 3 sets out a modal account of luck (MAL), as argued for by Pritchard (2004, 2005, 2014), where an event is lucky only if it occurs in the actual world, but not in a relevant set of nearby possible worlds. Here I further elaborate on how we should understand the modal distances using Lewisian possible world semantics, and what worlds should be taken into consideration when fixing the relevant set of nearby possible worlds. I argue that these relevant sets of worlds should be fixed according to the domain of inquiry of which the luck is being applied - this I call the type of luck. Examples of this is the current literature are resultant luck - the type of luck concerned with the results of our actions, and veritic luck - the type of luck concerned with the modal safety of our belief formation. Due to the multitude of types of luck across disciplinary areas, a general modal account of luck requires flexibility in what factors should fix the relevant sets of possible worlds. I achieve this by providing a [TYPE] function for the general modal account of luck, which is used as a mean of inserting the relevant fixing conditions for any domain of inquiry. Chapter 3, in a similar vein to Chapter 2, pits the general modal account of luck against some of the problems that have been levied against MAL, specifically the Buried Treasure problem raised by Lackey (2008) and the agent causation problem as raised by Levy (2011). More successfully, the modal account offered stands up against these criticisms. For these reasons, the modal condition understood with the [TYPE] function and Lewisian semantics concerning modal distances, will be adopted to make up one half of the conditions for my account of luck. Chapter 4 will look at the second condition for an account of luck - the significance condition. The chapter will set out the reasons for adopting a significance condition at all, and some of the ways in which the condition has been articulated by Rescher (1995), Pritchard (2005) and Ballantyne (2011). All of these current views of the significance condition will be found wanting due to their inability to make sense of certain kinds of luck in specific normative domains. For example, Ballantyne's account of significance focuses on the interests of an agent, yet for certain types of moral luck, the interests of the agent are irrelevant. Instead, I propose a relativised significance condition, where the value of the event is relative to the value of the normative domain in which the luck is being ascribed. Epistemic luck requires a focus on the epistemic significance of the event for the agent, moral luck requires a focus on the moral or ethical significance of the event for the agent, and so on. This I call the kind of luck. Similar to the [TYPE] function for the modal condition for luck, the significance condition requires a [NORMATIVE DOMAIN] function where the relevant normative domain can be inserted depending on the kind of luck. This version of the significance condition will be conjoined with the modal condition as set out in Chapter 3 to form the correct general account of luck. Chapter 5 is the first chapter of the second half of the thesis that concerns applying the account of luck set out in part 1 to more specific domains of inquiry. Chapter 5 concerns moral luck, more specifically, resultant moral luck. Moral luck has traditionally been understood in terms of lack of control. This chapter looks at how Pritchard (2005) and Driver (2014) have attempted to understand moral luck using modal conditions. However, it is argued that these attempts would be more successful if we adopted the account of luck that I have offered in previous chapters. The chapter will go on to look at two possible problems that may be faced by this modal account of luck, and how it may resolve these problems. Chapter 6, the final chapter, looks at epistemic luck, specifically how the adoption of the modal account I have offered resolves a particular problem targeted at anti-luck epistemology by Ballantyne (2013). The problem, Ballantyne argues, is that given that luck requires a significance condition, the degree of significance affects the degree of luck and that the degree of luck involved in our belief formation affects whether we are in a position to know the target proposition, that the result is that degree of significance affects our ability to know. For at least some instances of this - such as the aesthetic significance that we assign to the target proposition - the result will be that non-epistemic factors that have no relevance at all whether an agent is in a position to know will (absurdly, in Ballantyne's view) affect that agent's position to know. The resolution to this problem can be found in a two part solution. The first part is to demonstrate that any degree of veritic epistemic luck results in the agent failing to know. The second is that through the relativisation of the significance condition, any type of value will not affect an agent's position to know, only the epistemic value.
With these two considerations in mind, the latter of which that can only be held through the adoption of the modal account of luck I have offered, the problem may be resolved.

This study provides a comparative analysis, using dialectical hermeneutics, of the philosophy of Plotinus and the depth psychology of C. G. Jung. While coming from different historical contexts, they each address the nature of unconsciousness, or the unconscious. This study concentrates in particular on one archetypal aspect of the unconscious that Jung calls the shadow. According to Jung, the shadow is a psychological dynamic that both hides from our awareness certain aspects or depths of our own inner reality, and also, when recognized, mediates our initial confrontation with those fuller realities. The first aim of this study is to analyze Jung’s view of the psyche, through the lens of shadow, to reveal the shadow in Jung’s work, examining how he denies or disavows metaphysical reality as a legitimate domain of depth psychological inquiry. Secondly, the biographical and historical backgrounds to this shadow are explored, and the potential consequences of it are discussed. Finally, Plotinus’ ancient perspective on unconsciousness and what he understands as the metaphysics of shadow are brought into dialogue with Jung. The goal is to address the shadow in Jung’s work—what his view of depth psychology denies to depth psychology, offering another way of understanding the psyche, and the shadow in particular, that includes metaphysical reality as a legitimate domain of depth psychological experience and analysis.

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
Nietzsche e Heidegger delineiam os caminhos que se entrecortam dando origem ao nosso horizonte de questões: É ainda possível um pensamento que resista ao mesmo tempo à tentação de uma fundamentação absoluta, mas também ao furor desenfreado da maquinação calculadora? É ainda possível um pensamento que se coloque em condições de compreender e também de se posicionar criticamente tanto em relação aos fundamentalismos nostálgicos, quanto em relação à pura efetividade e produtividade que a tecnociência nos impõe? É possível, afinal, distanciar-se da metafísica tradicional sem recair na ingenuidade anti-metafísica de uma superação definitiva e segura? É ainda possível uma outra metafísica? Partindo desse universo inicial de questões procuramos apontar que a metafísica da vontade, ao menos tal como desenvolvida por Nietzsche e pela psicanálise, traz ao primeiro plano uma dimensão estranha à tradição metafísica ocidental: a dimensão pulsional, este terceiro historicamente excluído entre matéria e espírito, corpo e mente, unidade e multiplicidade, mesmidade e diferença, configurando uma outra metafísica nem redutível à metafísica tradicional, nem simplesmente antimetafísica.
Nietzsche and Heidegger determinate the paths that intersect here giving birth to our horizon of questions: Is it possible a thought that resists the temptation of an absolute basis, but also to unbridled fury calculator machination? It is also possible that a thought is put in a position to understand and also to position itself critically in relation to both nostalgic fundamentalisms, and to pure effectiveness and productivity that technoscience imposes on us? It is possible, after all, to distance itself from traditional metaphysics without falling back into naivety anti-metaphysical definitive and safe overcome? Is it still possible to conceive any kind of other metaphysics? From this initial universe of questions we seek to point out that the metaphysics of the will, at least as developed by Nietzsche and psychoanalysis, brings to the fore a dimension strange to the Western metaphysical tradition: the instinctual dimension, this third historically excluded between matter and spirit, body and mind, unity and multiplicity, sameness and difference, setting another metaphysical not reducible to traditional metaphysics, nor simply anti-metaphysical.

Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind. In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.

Experiences are usually multi-faceted and made up of different features. These features are called qualia, the various ways that colours, sounds, and pains, for example, feel to us - the way that they appear to be. These qualitative features are a central part of our lives and seem to have important connections with the world around us - a world which seems to be largely if not entirely physical.

The etymology of the term "information" suggests that it has evolved from the term "form" and a theory of perception in which thoughts are in-formed of the external environment. I briefly trace this conceptual evolution and draw from it the concept that information is the form conveyed by data. I then examine, in some detail, the concepts that accompanied the "information revolution" that started just after the Second World War when technology was developed which greatly facilitated information communication and processing. Several claims about information by more recent contributors are examined before I take an overview that seeks to group some of these into a coherent theory of what information is and how we are informed of the world. I argue that while, generally speaking, philosophers rely on argument to support their views and scientists relies on experimental verification to support their theory, there is an area of research in which synthetic models based on scientific findings can be proposed and analysed to get a better understanding of information.

This dissertation has three parts. In "Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience," I defend David Lewis's metaphysical doctrine of Humean supervenience, and traditional metaphysical reductionism more generally, against an alleged holistic threat encapsulated in the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, realism about quantum mechanics is compatible with Humean reductionism.
Philosophy

This thesis is about the relationship between ethics and language in the work of the contemporary French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. The approach taken is to place his work in the context of a current debate in philosophy about the limits of language and the end(s) of philosophy. In the first chapter it looks at the place and significance of the thinking of Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Derrida in this debate, and locates Levinas' thinking within it by examining his reading of Descartes. The thesis then goes on to examine the major themes in Levinas' work and offers an interpretation of his claims for the `primacy' of the ethics which demonstrates their bearing on the traditional concern with the relationship between metaphysics and the other. The thesis makes special reference throughout to Jacques Derrida's first major essay on Levinas, `Violence and Metaphysics'. The thesis demonstrates the sense in which in Levinas `ethics' is the `enactment' of the philosophical concern with the other. It explores in detail the overlap between this concern with the other in philosophy and the relationship to the other person, in Levinas' thinking. This is undertaken, in this thesis, in the form of a detailed analysis of the relationship between the key notions of the face to face and the third party as is found in his first major work Totality and Infinity. The analysis is then extended to the later work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. In this context, the thesis demonstrates how the beyond being is held to signify within philosophy, by inspiring philosophy with the thought of the other. The thesis as a whole considers how, in Levinas, the beyond being and the relation to the other are antecedent to their thematic representation in philosophy. It examines how the necessity of their representation is related, in Levinas, to a certain injustice vis a vis the other person.

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that metaphysics is a necessary discipline - necessary in the sense that all areas of philosophy, all areas of science, and in fact any type of rational activity at all would be impossible without a metaphysical background or metaphysical presuppositions. Because of the extremely strong nature of this claim, it is not possible to put forward a very simple argument, although I will attempt to construct one. A crucial issue here is what metaphysics in fact is - the nature of metaphysics. The conception of metaphysics which I support could be called Aristotelian, as opposed to Kantian: metaphysics is the first philosophy and the basis of all other philosophical and scientific inquiry. I will argue that this is indeed the most plausible conception of metaphysics. The thesis consists of a brief historical introduction of certain important views concerning the nature of metaphysics, namely Aristotle's, Kant's, Camap's and Quine's, and of a longer survey of the status of metaphysics in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics. I make some critical observations of recent accounts by people like Hilary Putnam, Michael Dummett, Frank Jackson and Eli Hirsch before launching into a thorough analysis of the relationship between metaphysics and other philosophical and scientific disciplines. The central argument of the thesis is that our a priori capabilities, which I claim to be grounded in metaphysical modality and ultimately in essences, are necessary for rational inquiry. Detailed accounts of a priori knowledge and modality will be offered in support of this claim. In fact, my accounts of the a priori and modality are perhaps the most important contributions of the thesis, as given this basis, the 'necessary' role of metaphysics in other disciplines should be quite obvious. I also pursue topics like the metaphysical status of logic and the law of non-contradiction as well as truthmaking, the substance of metaphysical debates, and the methodology of metaphysics. There is, however, a distinct theme which connects the broad range of topics that I discuss: they are all analysed from a metaphilosophical point of view. Indeed, it could be said that this is a metametaphysical survey of the status of metaphysics. The upshot is an original account of the status of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy - the conclusion that metaphysics is the core of all our rational activities, from natural science to logic, semantics and truth.

Whether Aristotle wrote the treatises of Metaphysics with different conceptions of the science of Being in mind has long puzzled scholars. The particular question that causes them unease is whether Aristotle's enterprise in establishing the science of Being through the several treatises of Metaphysics is marked by a general science of Being, studying all departments of Being whatsoever (metaphysica generalis), or whether his investigation of this science reflects an attitude towards a special metaphysics (metaphysica specialis) seeking knowledge of a special department of Being, in this case, God, and therefore should be regarded as a science that is eminently theological. In this thesis, I aim to show that Aristotle's enterprise in Metaphysics does not necessarily hinder reconciliation between the universal and the theological dimensions of the science of Being and that although Aristotle's conception of the science of Being is eminently theological it does not conflict with its also being universal. Furthermore, I aim to show that had the conception of the science of Being in Aristotle's mind not been theological, it would not be universal either.

This thesis develops and defends a Peircean conception of the task of metaphysics and critically compares it with recent anti-metaphysical forms of pragmatism. Peirce characterises metaphysics in terms of its place within his hierarchical classification of the sciences. According to the classification, metaphysics depends on logic for principles and provides principles to the natural and social sciences. This arrangement of the sciences is defended by appeal to Peirce's account of philosophy as 'cenoscopy'. The dependence of the natural and social sciences on cenoscopy is then argued for on the basis of Peirce's rejection of psychologism and in terms of the necessity of abductive inference. Peirce's position is then compared with recent forms of pragmatism. While it is less naturalistic, Peirce's position is defended on pragmatist grounds. An account of Peirce on truth is then developed. Peirce's account of truth in terms of an ideal limit of inquiry is defended as consistent with recent, more deflationary, approaches. The truth of 'abstract propositions' is a matter of local indefeasibility. These abstract propositions are related to the 'absolute truth', understood as a single non-abstract proposition. The truth of this proposition is then understood in terms of an identity theory. Two conceptions of Peircean metaphysics are presented. Both are 'abductive'. Their task is to explain the possibility of success in inquiry. However, only one proposal accepts the notion of an absolute truth. The 'absolutist' proposal is defended as an interpretation of Peirce and as a contemporary option for pragmatist philosophers. The thesis concludes by comparing recent anti-metaphysical arguments due to Huw Price with the Peircean position. Room for the absolutist proposal is defended by means of an account of recent exchanges between Price and Robert Brandom on dispositional modality.

In recent years there has been increasing interest in philosophical theories which downplay the importance of the idea that our words and thoughts represent aspects of the world. The best-known example of these non-representational theories is metaethical expressivism, the view that ethical language and thought is best understood not as representing or describing ethical features of the world, but as expressing our attitudes towards it. Other theories apply similar ideas to other kinds of language and thought, and global versions apply it to all kinds. Non-representationalism has undergone a major shift in the last few decades, and lack of clarity about what it now involves has led some to worry that it is either unintelligible, or else indistinguishable from its representationalist rivals. In the first part of my thesis, I offer a novel reading of the new kind of non-representationalism. I argue that this reading, for the first time, makes the view both intelligible and distinct from representationalism. However I also show that this reading collapses one of the major debates in the recent literature – the debate between global and local non-representationalists. This debate turns out to be empty: properly understood, the disputants already agree with each other. Many writers think that non-representationalism threatens metaphysics, particularly theories which purport to say what makes statements of given kinds true, and to what various kinds of terms refer. Some take this to be an advantage of the view, others a disadvantage. In the second part of my thesis I argue that this common view is deeply mistaken – nonrepresentationalism does not undermine metaphysics. I respond to a number of recent arguments, showing that neither global nor local forms of non-representationalism undermine metaphysics. I argue that non-representationalism is compatible with metaphysics, and that this is not a problem for the view.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2011.
"September 2011." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 74-78).
In this thesis, I investigate the nature of metaphysics and the role it plays in our broader theoretical pursuits. In doing so, I defend it against various criticisms and offer a novel conception of why metaphysical disputes are important. In Chapter One I address the general question of when disputes are defective and when they are worth taking seriously. I first criticize one popular way of answering this question that appeals to the difference between verbal and factual disputes. Verbal disputes involve divergence in what the participants mean by their terms and some think that metaphysical disputes are defective in this way. I argue that this approach fails because the verbal/factual distinction is incapable of doing the work this view requires of it. I then offer an alternative view where the status of a dispute depends on its role in our theorizing. Worthwhile (or, as I call them, significant) disputes are those with appropriate connections to the rest of our theorizing while defective (or insignificant) disputes are insular, with no implications for anything beyond themselves. In Chapter Two I apply the framework developed in the previous chapter to a pair of ontological disagreements: those over the existence of concrete possible worlds and coincident material objects, like a statue and its clay. The question is whether ontological disputes like these have the requisite theoretical connections to render them significant. I argue that they do. I then address some general reasons for doubting their significance, arguing that they are not compelling. In Chapter Three I contrast my approach with some other recent defenses of metaphysics, with particular focus on the views developed by Theodore Sider. Metaphysics is, on these views, an inquiry into the world's fundamental structure. I argue that this approach is unsatisfactory because it cannot guarantee that metaphysical disputes are significant in the way I describe. It thus threatens to render metaphysics irrelevant to our other theoretical activities, undermining many of its legitimate successes, like the role theorizing about metaphysical modality played in the development of modal logics applicable in many different fields.
by Andrew Graham.
Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1999.
Includes bibliographical references.
As Nelson Goodman put it, things are full of threats and promises. A fragile glass, for example, is prone to shatter when struck. Fragility is the glass's disposition, shattering is the manifestation of the disposition, and striking is the circumstances of manifestation. The properties of a fragile glass which are causally efficacious for shattering constitute the causal basis of the glass's fragility. The glass can remain fragile even if it never shatters. One can say of the fragile glass, with certain qualifications, that if it were struck, it would shatter. This much is common ground among philosophers who discuss dispositions. In my dissertation, I defend three claims about dispositions that are more controversial. Some philosophers have claimed that dispositions are causally impotent. I disagree. In my first chapter, I defend the claim that dispositions can be causally efficacious with respect to their manifestations. Among the arguments I consider is the "no work" argument, according to which a disposition's causal basis causally explains its manifestation, leaving no causal work for the disposition to do. I respond to this argument by challenging the Principle of Explanatory Exclusion, according to which complete explanations exclude competitors. Furthermore, many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. In my second chapter, I challenge this view, and defend the possibility of bare dispositions. I argue that the concept of a bare disposition is coherent, and show why arguments recently offered against bare dispositions, such as those based on the Truth Maker Principle, do not succeed in demonstrating that they are impossible. Another common assumption about dispositions is that they must be intrinsic properties of the objects that have them. In my third chapter, I challenge this assumption, and argue that some dispositions are extrinsic properties. Consider the property vulnerability. It seems dispositional in character; something which is vulnerable is susceptible to harm, but is not necessarily being harmed right now. However, it seems as if something could lose the property of being vulnerable without undergoing any intrinsic change. Build a fortress around the vulnerable object and it ceases to be vulnerable.
by Jennifer McKitrick.
Ph.D.

The phrase ‘in virtue of’ is a mainstay of metaphysical discourse. In recent years, many philosophers have argued that we should understand this phrase, as metaphysicians use it, in terms of a concept of metaphysical dependence called ‘grounding’.This dissertation explores a range of central issues in the theory of grounding. Chapter 1 introduces the intuitive concept of grounding and discusses some compulsory questions in the theory of grounding. Chapter 2 focusses on scepticism on grounding, according to which the recent philosophical interest in the topic is misguided. In chapter 3 I discuss grounding’s explanatory roles. Chapter 4 focusses on the claim that if an entity is grounded then it is an ontological free lunch. Chapter 5 discusses and rejects the claim that groundingis a relation between facts. This conclusion raises a problem: if grounding is not a relation between facts it becomes difficult to specify the connections between grounding and explanation and grounding and necessity. But not only is it desirable to specify these relations, it is essential for establishing that grounding is able to play the explanatory roles that are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 6 responds to this problem by outlining an approach to grounding based on David Lewis’s (2003) theory of truthmaking. Against this backdrop I discuss, in chapter 7, some issues in the logic of grounding.

In this essay I comparatively evaluate two realist metaphysical accounts of modality: David Lewis’ (1986) genuine modal realism (GMR), and neo-Aristotelian modal realism (AMR) as put forth by Alexander Pruss (2011). GMR offers a reductive analysis of modal claims of possibility and necessity in terms of claims quantifying over concrete worlds and counterparts, and is in this way committed the existence of a plurality of concrete worlds other than the actual world; AMR, on the other hand, offers an analysis of modal claims in terms of claims about the causal powers of existing objects in the actual world, and identifies these powers and powerful properties as the truthmakers for modal truths of possibility and necessity. I consider two objections to GMR; firstly, that it leads to ethical paradoxes, and secondly, that the counterparts it offers as truthmakers for modal claims are fundamentally irrelevant to the de re modal properties of objects. I argue that AMR bears a prima facie advantage over GMR by reason of its avoidance of those two objections, before evaluating two objections faced by AMR itself, namely, that its analysis is not genuinely explanatory, and secondly, that the ontology of powers fails to account for the full range of metaphysical possibility. I argue that AMR has the resources to avoid these objections, that AMR on balance is more attractive, and that therefore AMR is worthy of serious consideration by advocates of GMR. References LEWIS, DAVID K. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell. PRUSS, ALEXANDER R. (2011). Actuality, Possibility, and Worlds. London: Continuum.

Objects are characterised by their properties. If an object is a red postbox, then it has the property of being red, and the property of being a postbox. This thesis is an attack on a particular view of the metaphysics of properties, according to which some properties are privileged over others. The most well-known theories of privileged properties are Armstrong’s theory of sparse immanent universals (1979b) and Lewis’ natural properties (1983). According to their supporters, only privileged properties perform certain jobs, such as featuring in laws of nature, or grounding similarity between objects. Metaphysical posits are theoretically virtuous if they can account for a range of different phenomena in a relatively parsimonious manner. The ability of privileged properties to perform a range of worthwhile ‘work’, therefore, is what justifies a belief in them. The conclusion I reach is that a single group of properties is not capable of satisfying the key roles commonly attributed to the privileged properties. Without satisfying these roles in concert, a belief in mainstream versions of privileged properties is not justified. The first part of this thesis is devoted to an explication of privilege and the roles which privileged properties are taken to perform. I conclude that three roles in particular, Supervenience, Similarity and Magnetism are key roles for mainstream theories of privilege. In part two, I show that the properties which satisfy the Supervenience role are not the same as those which satisfy the Similarity and Magnetism roles. In the final chapter of this thesis I discuss the implications of my findings for support for theories of privilege.

It is something of an orthodoxy that the nature of causation can be characterised by the following metaphysical theses: that causes do not necessitate their effects, that causes must temporally precede their effects, that causation is governed by laws of nature, that causation entails counterfactual dependence, and that causation is not systematically overdetermined. Two further commonly accepted metaphysical claims are that causal notions give us the correct tools to properly understand agency, and that the causes of actions are mental events. Classical theism, however, is comprised by certain commitments which seem to be in direct tension with each of these metaphysical theses. God is understood to be causally efficacious – a divine being who creates, sustains, and intervenes in worldly affairs – and so who is, indeed the, paradigmatic causal agent. Further, God is said to be atemporal, non-physical, and such that he exists independently of all else. The God of classical theism is also characterised as being omnipotent, at least in the sense that whatever he wills to be the case cannot fail to be the case. The apparent tension between these metaphysical theses which concern causation and those which concern God thus threaten the very coherence of the notion of divine causality. The goal of this thesis is therefore to examine these prima facie theistically problematic theses concerning causation, and to consider ways of making room for a coherent notion of divine causality. In some cases, it will argue that certain causal theses ought to be rejected, in others, it will find ways of resolving the tension.

Biodiversity is a concept that plays a key role in both scientific theories such as the species-area law and conservation politics. Currently, however, little agreement exists on how biodiversity should be defined, let alone measured. This has led to suggestions that biodiversity is not a metaphysically robust concept, with major implications for its usefulness in formulating scientific theories and making conservation decisions. A general discussion of biodiversity is presented, highlighting its application both in scientific and conservation contexts, its relationship with environmental ethics, and existing approaches to its measurement. To overcome the limitations of existing biodiversity concepts, a new concept of biocomplexity is proposed. This concept equates the biodiversity of any biological system with its effective complexity. Biocomplexity is shown to be the only feasible measure of biodiversity that captures the essential features desired of a general biodiversity concept. In particular, it is a well-defined, measurable and strongly intrinsic property of any biological system. Finally, the practical application of biocomplexity is discussed.

The representational theory of mind (RTM) explains the phenomenon of intentionality in terms of the existence and nature of mental representations. Despite the typical characterisation of mental representations in terms of their semantics, RTM is best understood as a metaphysical – more specifically formal ontological – theory whose primary defining feature is stipulating the existence of a class of mental particulars called representations. In this regard it is false, since mental representations do not exist. My argument is primarily methodological. Using an extended analysis of mereology and its variants as paradigmatic examples of a formal ontological theory, I argue for a 'synthetic’ approach to ontology which seeks to form a sound descriptive characterisation of the relevant phenomena from empirical data, to which philosophical analysis is applied to produce a rigorous theory. The value and necessity of this method is proved by example in our discussion of mereology which is shown to be defensible given certain assumptions, in particular perdurantism, but still inadequate as an account of parthood without considerable supplementation. We also see that there are viable alternatives which adopt a more synthetic approach and do not require the same assumptions. Having effectively demonstrated the value of a synthetic approach in ontology I critically examine the methodology employed by RTM and find it severely lacking. In the guise of ‘commonsense psychology’ RTM cavalierly imposes a theoretical framework without regard to empirical data, and this results in a severe distortion of the phenomenon of intentionality it purports to explain. RTM is methodologically unsound, and so its commitment to the existence of mental representations is utterly undermined. Furthermore the most attractive aspect of RTM – its semantics – can be separated from any commitment to mental representations existing. Even RTM’s strongest advocates lack motivation to believe that mental representations exist.

This thesis argues that the fundamental issues within the mental causation debate are metaphysical ones. Consequently, it is only with metaphysical clarity, that any clarity can be gained in the mental causation debate. In order to provide a successful theory of mental causation one cannot divorce oneself from metaphysics. Neither can one hope to provide a theory of mental causation that is somehow neutral between the various metaphysical systems. Rather, to be plausible, a theory of mental causation must be based within an independently plausible metaphysical framework. I divide the metaphysical issues that are of importance to the mental causation debate into three broad groups. Firstly, what causation is a relation between. Secondly, what the existence and identity conditions for properties are. Thirdly, what the causal relation is. Part One of this thesis is concerned with the first of these issues. The interpretation of the argument from causal over determination, and the possible responses to it, depend upon what causation is a relation between. A belief to the contrary, has led to implausible theories of mental causation and the misrepresentation of those positions within the mental causation debate that are ontologically serious. Part Two is concerned with property analysis. It is suggested that a plausible analysis of properties reveals that the true contenders within the mental causation debate are psychophysical reductionism on the one hand, and interactive mentalism on the other. Part Three is concerned with the causal relation. It is argued that the mental causation debate is affected by what one understands causation to be. In particular, whether a causal closure principle that is strong enough to allow one to advance physicalism can plausibly be advanced, depends upon the theory of causation in which one is embedding psychophysical causation.

This dissertation brings a new philosophical perspective to an important topic in the contemporary theology and science dialogue, specifically the theological reception of multiverse thought in modern cosmology. In light of recent cosmological speculation about the plausibility of a 'multiverse,' a cosmic ensemble in which our own universe is just one of many, theological responses have largely focused on the question of whether such a multiverse might be an alternative to divine design (or might itself be compatible with divine design). However, this approach neglects the fundamental metaphysical issues entailed in the multiverse proposal, including its entanglement of the one and the many (a paradox which has itself been a central concern of theological reflection), as well as its intimations of cosmic multiplicity, diversity, and infinity. In this dissertation I provide the first systematic theological engagement with these metaphysical implications. My approach is to draw on ancient and medieval resources (neglected not only in multiverse discussions but also in the theology and science field more generally) to show that the concept of metaphysical participation provides a particularly fertile ground on which theology can engage constructively with multiverse thought. To that end, I focus specifically on the participatory thought of Plato, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa, each of whom seek to understand how a physical cosmos of complexity and immensity might share in divine existence of unity and simplicity. I bring their insights into interaction with a diverse range of contemporary theological, philosophical, and scientific figures to demonstrate that a participatory account of the relationship between God and creation argues for greater continuity between theology and the multiverse proposal in modern cosmology.

In Chapter 1, I defend “the first thesis”, which is that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about something that the expression ‘the East India Company’ may be used to pick out. In Chapter 2, I defend “the second thesis”, which is stronger than the first thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used to truly say something about i. In Chapter 3, I defend “the third thesis”, which is stronger than the second thesis, and which is that an individual i that is picked out by a standard use of the expression ‘the East India Company’ is such that expressions of the form ‘_decided to ’, ‘_wished to ’, ‘_intended to ’ and ‘_believed that p’ may be used in the senses in which they may be used to truly say something about a human person to truly say something about i. In Chapter 4, I try to assuage perplexity as to how it is possible that the third thesis is true, by telling a likely story as to how a situation in which no decision, wish, intention or belief is made or had by anything that is not a human person might evolve into one in which the East India Company makes decisions, and has wishes, intentions and beliefs (in the senses in which a human person may make and have such things). In a postscript, I sketch an explanation of why we are justified in thinking that the Company had a diminished range of mental capacities.

This thesis examines Nietzsche's philosophy as a response to Kant. I show that Kant, as interpreted by Nietzsche, dissociates epistemology and metaphysics. According to Nietzsche, the consequence of this dissociation is the collapse of Kant's transcendental epistemology into a sceptical idealism, which disables the making of positive metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. I argue that Nietzsche overcomes the dissociation of epistemology and metaphysics by rejecting Kant's distinction between constitutive, empirical knowledge and regulative, metaphysical belief. Furthermore, I show that Nietzsche rejects, what he considers to be, Kant's formalistic constitutive epistemology in favour of a regulative and interest-directed account of knowledge. I argue that Nietzsche adopts an internal realist epistemology that stipulates that our epistemic claims must be justified from within our perspectival practices of justification but that such claims must be subject to a realist constraint. Moreover, I propose that Nietzsche is justified, from within these epistemic parameters, in putting forward metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. The thesis is structured in four chapters. Chapter one examines Nietzsche's appropriation of Kant. Chapter two takes up the issue of Nietzsche's perspectivism in the context of his concerns with the issues of justification and truth. The penultimate chapter examines the emergence of Nietzsche's internal realism in his early writings. Finally, chapter four examines Nietzsche's will to power thesis where I contend that the metaphysics of the will to power is both facilitated by and compatible with his perspectivism.

Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, May, 2020
Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
Are metaphysical debates relevant to ordinary empirical inquiry? This dissertation collects a series of papers which answers in the affirmative. The first part of the dissertation is concerned with inductive inference. I argue that we shouldn't expect the world to be amenable to induction if orthodox versions of Humeanism or Non-Humeanism are correct. I then develop and defend a hybrid view, a 'Humean Non-Humeanism', which has a better hope of vindicating inductive inference. The second part of the dissertation is concerned with self-locating belief. While puzzles regarding self-locating belief are often motivated by certain fanciful thought experiments, it has recently been argued that the epistemology of self-locating belief is of central concern to many of the deepest questions in fundamental physics: including the interpretation of quantum mechanics, large-scale cosmology, and the (alleged) fine-tuning of the universe. I begin by arguing that the correct epistemology of self-locating belief is also relevant to classic debates in the metaphysics of time. By exploiting the fact that different theories in the metaphysics of time classify different sorts of facts as 'merely indexical' facts, it can be shown that different views in the metaphysics of time make different empirical predictions. I then turn to argue for the correct epistemology of self-locating belief on metaphysical grounds. I first argue for some conditional claims: if one holds certain (controversial) metaphysical views regarding the nature of objects, properties, and identity across time, then one should uphold a particular theory of self-locating belief. I then go on to argue for an overall metaphysical picture that vindicates these views concerning the nature of objects, properties, and identity across time.
by David Builes.
Ph. D. in Linguistics
Ph.D.inLinguistics Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Sydney, 2002.
Title from title screen (viewed Apr. 24, 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science to the Unit for the History and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Science. Degree awarded 2002; thesis submitted 2001. Includes bibliography. Also available in print form.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1998.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves [119]-121).
There is a traditional picture of belief, according to which someone's having a belief is that person's standing in a certain relation to an abstract object, a proposition. My dissertation examines the metaphysical demands that two problems for this picture of belief make on these abstract objects. The first problem comes to us from Frege's "On Sense and Reference," and the second concerns a certain sort of one's beliefs about oneself, which I call "indexical belief." Frege notes that someone can believe that Hesperus is Hesperus without believing that Hesperus is Phosphorus. It is a short step from Frege's observation to the claim that the sentence "A believes that Hesperus is Hesperus" could be true while "A believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus" is false. Quine has insisted that we cannot address this problem by taking either of these sentences to express a predication of the referent of both names, the planet Venus, as then both sentences would express the same predication of the same object, and this stands in evident tension with the fact that they can differ in truth value. In a recent response to Frege's problem, Mark Richard has taken exactly the route Quine has warned against. In my first chapter, I show that Richard's response is unsuccessful. I then consider the implications of the failure of his response on his proposed semantics for belief and the philosophical motivation he provides for it. I argue that his semantics for belief ascriptions stands in serious tension with its purported philosophical motivation. In the second and third chapters, I turn to the problem about indexical belief. The task of the second chapter is to identify this problem. To this end, I consider three of John Perry's arguments that the traditional picture of belief cannot accommodate indexical belief. I show that even if these arguments are sound, they give us no reason to think that the problem about indexical belief is in any way unique. I then suggest that there is a special problem about indexical belief, despite the failure of these three arguments to isolate it. Special difficulties attend an account of what it is to retain a tensed belief over time, and I suggest that the special problem about indexical belief is, in brief, a generalization of this problem about retention of tensed belief. In the third chapter, I raise the problem about indexical belief in a new way, as arising from a tension between several intuitively plausible claims about the relationship between beliefs and desires, on the one hand, and actions, on the other. This presentation of the problem brings out how the problem is special. I survey several solutions to this problem, including one due to Perry. I then argue that Perry's solution cannot characterize the specific kind of similarity between the beliefs of two different people who share an indexical belief. It allows too much to count as shared indexical belief. Thus Perry's solution inadequately addresses what I have suggested is the unique problem about indexical belief. Finally, I suggest that Frege's response to the problem I raise points the way towards an emendation of Perry's account that will enable it to suitably characterize the special way in which different people can share an indexical belief.
by Cara Spencer.
Ph.D.

The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse the tension between Humean epistemology and Humean ethics. The tension is identified as being due to the strict Humean empiricist epistemology, which severely limits the scope of ethical investigation. A key point of contrast, between Hume’s bundle theory of the self and his commitment to long-term durable character traits, is analysed, to exemplify the difficulties. Humean empiricism leads directly to a bundle conception of the self, one that is comprised entirely of observable impressions and ideas, yet it is unclear how this conception is related to durable character traits, which are an integral part of Humean ethics. The solution offered is that, to be understood coherently, Humean metaphysics should incorporate aspects of powers-based ontologies to replace summative models. Specifically, character traits such as virtues and vices should be understood as tending towards an outcome, rather than adhering to a standard stimulus-response dispositional model. It is argued that this reconceptualization can be achieved without contravening Humean epistemology in any significant way, and that it can be done while maintaining the basic Humean principle that all ideas must precede from a corresponding impression. This thesis will conclude that adopting the metaphysics of powers in a limited sphere of investigation can lead to a stronger Humean metaphysics of character and eliminate contradictions from Humean philosophy as a whole.