Статті в журналах з теми "Legal relationships"

In modern conditions of management, the aspects of ensuring the stability of banks and the development of the banking system of Ukraine are of particular importance. During 2014-2017 in our country, 88 banks were recognized as insolvent, almost all of them – commercial. This tendency is disappointing. Most scholars assert that the turnaround of the banking system is possible only through the improvement of deposit, credit, and settlement operations. This statement is undoubtedly true, but these scholars forget about the importance of regulating the legal relationships that arise in the banking sector and establishing the interaction between the entities of such legal relationships. The purpose of the research is to determine the essence of banking legal relationships in Ukraine based on the existing scientific approaches, the current legislation of Ukraine and the practice of its implementation, as well as the specific and problematic aspects of harmonizing the interests of the entities of the relevant legal relations. For this purpose, the essence and structure of banking legal relationships are considered. It is determined that the main structural elements of these legal relationships are: 1) objects, 2) the content of banking legal relationships, 3) the basis of banking legal relationships – legal norms and legal facts, 4) entities (participants) – the direct participants in banking relationships, the bearers of mutual rights and obligations. The conclusions of the article state that Ukrainian banking legislation requires a serious revision concerning the coordination of the interests of the entities of banking legal relationships. The key task is to eliminate unnecessary and outdated normative and legal acts that could cause legal confusion or impose excessive burdens on entities of banking legal relationships. In developing the modern regulatory framework for the interaction of entities of banking relationships, a new rapid spread of cyber-risks, compliance risks and financial crime risks, which significantly affects the state of the banking system and is not reflected in the current banking legislation of Ukraine, should be taken into consideration. Banks as the main entities of banking relationships should assume risks and financial responsibility. It will contribute to the stabilization of the banking system of Ukraine and the economic development of the national economy.

More than a simple command of a sovereign, law is a form of moral communication, something that helps constitute the way we conceive of ourselves, our community, and our culture. In this essay, I argue that law is a form of “world projection,” a way for human communities to use law as an aesthetic way to understand themselves. Within this legal world are narratives that present an idealized reflection of our world. Law has two functions, a reflective function, in which it mirrors the actual world and a reflexive function, in which it corrects undesirable aspects of the actual world. It is through these functions that law describes the narratives within legal relationships in order to say something real and important about those corresponding relationships in the actual world.

AbstractThe concept of community has a new importance for legal theory and legal sociology. It allows an escape from traditional conceptions of the relationship between law, state and political society. It makes possible the development of a pluralistic view of law that realistically recognises powerful globalising and localising pressures shaping contemporary law. Community is best thought of initially in terms of four ideal types of collective involvement, derived from Weber's types of social action. These imply different kinds of trusting relationships and different regulatory needs. A sense of attachment and a degree of stability in relationships is also necessary to community. Actual groups combine relationships of community in many different ways. Law's contemporary task is to express and coordinate the regulatory needs surrounding structures of community within and beyond the nation state.

In this article it analyzes the regulations of the Civil Code, which relates to the origin of the legal relationship apropos of the guarantee (mortgage).It notices on the variety of the terms, used by the legislators which relates the origin of the guarantee (mortgage) legal relationships. Here the lacks of the legal technique appeared. But the variety of the terms is caused first of all by the complexity of the complex of the legal relationships, which is the legal construction of the mortgage (guarantee). This is why the necessity of the investigation of the origin of the separate types of the mentioned legal relationship appears. At the moment of the conclusion of the agreement of mortgage the legal relationship which substance contains the rights of mortgagee to satisfy its requirement, guaranteed by the mortgage, appears only as the relationship, which has the frame character, because the standard of law, which is the base of the legal relationship has not the signs of the direct operation. Other legal relationships, which are the part of the legal construction of the mortgage, appear both at the moment of the conclusion of the agreement and later at the coming of the appropriate judicial cases. The definition of the moment of the origin of the separate types of the guarantee( mortgage) legal relationship allow to bring in these relationship the necessary legal determination and to choose correctly the means of the defense of the right of participants of the proper relations.

Live-in relationship, that is, living together as couple without being married to each other in a legally accepted way, is considered a taboo in India. But recently, such relationships are being increasingly common due to a variety of reasons. In absence of any specific legislation, rules, or customs on the subject, the Supreme Court has issued certain guidelines in its judgment for regulating such relationships. This article tries to figure out the current legal positions governing the live-in relationships in India after making a systemic assessment of these judgments. Live-in relationship between two consenting adults is not considered illegal and if the couple present themselves to the society as husband and wife and live together for a significant period of time, the relationship is considered to be a relationship “in the nature of marriage” under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Consequently, the female partner is entitled to claim alimony under its provisions. Children born out of such relationships are considered legitimate and entitled to get share in the self-acquired property of their parents, though they are not entitled for a coparcenary share in the Hindu undivided family property. Live-in relationships may enable the couple to know each other better, but such no-strings-attached relationship has its disadvantages as well. The couple faces multiple social and logistics problems in day-to-day living. From mental health point of view, it is considered better to be engaged in a good-quality relationship than living alone and having no relation at all.

The subject of the article is the views of prof. P.P. Serkov and other domestic legal scientists on the problems of legal relations and its moral component from the standpoint of a lawyerresearcher. The article considers theoretical and methodological aspects of the doctrine of legal relationships, the content, patterns of the emergence and development of elements of the mechanism of legal relationships, the problems of classification of legal relationships, debatable issues of general regulatory legal relationships. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of approaches and theoretical provisions related to understanding the complex type of complex legal relationship.The purpose of the study is to confirm the scientific hypothesis of P.P. Serkov about the mechanism of legal relationship from the point of view of its relation with issues of morality, social aspects of subjective and social life, as well as to formulate conceptual ideas and specific proposals for improving the mechanism of complex legal relationship and its part, the mechanism of corporate and ethical legal relationship in the sphere of advocacy.Methodology and methods. The research methodology is based on the dialectical method, which made it possible to consider the judgments of scientists in development with existing contradictions and relations with new phenomena in law enforcement. The article also uses methods of analysis and synthesis, deduction and induction, modeling and extrapolation, formal legal and comparative legal method.The main results, scope of the application. The scientific and practical validity of the doctrine of the legal relationship mechanism created by P.P. Serkov is shown in the article. The presence of a moral component in each act of legal regulation, as well as the significance of the scholar's ideas and hypotheses in expanding the possibilities of general theoretical and sectoral research in this area and creating conditions for improving law-making and law enforcement practice are brought into light.Conclusions. The direction of development of the mechanism of complex legal relationship has been substantiated and specific proposals have been formulated to improve its part the mechanism of corporate and ethical legal relationship in the field of the legal profession.

The article is devoted to the definition of the nature of legal relations that develop during the conclusion of public contracts. The author examines these legal relationships and reveals absolute and relative legal relationships that arise when concluding public contracts. The meaning and legal consequences of the obligation to conclude them are determined. The judgments expressed in science, according to which, prior to the commencement of the procedure for concluding a public contract between a person engaged in entrepreneurial or other income-generating activities, and the other party, there is an absolute obligation are critically evaluated. The inadmissibility of the idea that the abovementioned person does not have an obligation to conclude a public contract at all, and the action of article 426 of the Civil Code should be qualified as a reflexive action of law, is recognized as unacceptable. It is proved that the obligation relationship certainly arises within the framework of the construction of a public contract, but not from the moment the obligation arises to conclude it, but from the moment of the onset of a special legal fact the appeal of a specific consumer.

The study of the patterns of the development of constitutional legal relationships allows us to understand the main, determining relationships between subjects and phenomena and, therefore, not only to analyze phenomena that have developed in an objective legal reality, but also to predict the development of constitutional legal relationships in the medium and long term with a high level of probability. The patterns of constitutional legal relationships are considered as systematically repeated historically and politically conditioned interrelated facts aimed at building a rule-of-law State, recognition of a human, his rights and freedoms as the highest value. The paper highlights general and special patterns. General patterns are inherent not only in constitutional legal relations, but also in any other legal relationship in the conditions of the established objective legal reality. General patterns include incompleteness of the normative basis of constitutional legal relations, the desire to expand, and the increase in the density of the normative basis of legal relations under conditions of insufficient systematization of constitutional legislation. Special patterns arising from the peculiarities of the subject matter of the constitutional law regulation include continuity of constitutional legal relations, prevalence of subjective factors in the development of constitutional legal relations, formalization of constitutional legal relations that are central to the system of legal relations. In the light of the revealed patterns, further development of constitutional legal relationships will go along the way of increasing the density of the legal basis of legal relationships, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, involving an increasing range of public relations in the constitutional legal relations. At the same time, the impact of both subjective and objective factors on the content of legal relations will increase.

Full TextThe first law enacted in Canada to protect existing Aboriginal rights was section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 The first law in Canada to recognize the rights of non-human animals as anything other than property has yet to be enacted. The first Supreme Court of Canada (hereafter referred to as the Court) case to interpret section 35 was R. v. Sparrow.3 The 1990 case confirmed an Aboriginal right of the Musqueam peoples of British Columbia to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes. Since this precedent-setting case, many similar claims have been brought before the courts by way of the fluctuating legal space created by s.35. Many of these cases have been about establishing rights to fish4, hunt5, and trap non-human animals (hereafter referred to as animals). The Court has developed, and continues to develop tests to determine the existence and scope of Aboriginal rights. These tests primarily embody cultural, political and, to a surprisingly lesser degree, legal forces. One of the principal problems with these tests is that they privilege, through the western philosophical lens, the interests of humans. Animals are, at best, the resources over which ownership is being contested. The Euro-centric legal conceptualization of animals as 'resources' over which ownership can be exerted is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the relegation of animals solely to a utilitarian role is antithetical to Indigenous-animal relationships and therefore demonstrates one of the fundamental ways the Canadian legal system is ill equipped to give adequate consideration to Indigenous law. Second, failure to consider animals' inherent value and agency in this context reproduces the human-animal and culture-nature binaries that are at the root of many of western Euro-centric society's inequities. This paper argues that Aboriginal peoples' relationships with animals are a necessary, integral and distinctive part of their cultures6 and, therefore, these relationships and the actors within them are entitled to the aegis of s.35. Through the legal protection of these relationships, animals will gain significant protection as a corollary benefit. If the Court were to protect the cultural relationships between animals and Aboriginal groups, a precondition would be acceptance of Indigenous legal systems. Thus, this paper gives a brief answer to the question, what are Indigenous legal systems and why are animals integral to them? The Anishinabe (also known Ojibwe or Chippewa) are Indigenous peoples who have historically lived in the Great Lakes region. The Bruce Peninsula on Lake Huron is home to the Cape Croker Indian Reserve, where the Chippewas of Nawash First Nation live. The people of this First Nation identify as Anishinabe. The Anishinabek case of Nanabush v. Deer is a law among these people and is used throughout the paper as an example of Indigenous-animal relationships. Making the significant assumption that s.35 has the capacity to recognize Indigenous law, the subsequent section of the paper asks why we should protect these relationships and how that protection should be achieved. Finally, the paper concludes that both the ability of s.35 to recognize Indigenous-animal relationships, and the judicial and political will to grant such recognition, are unlikely. Indigenous-animal relationships are integral to the distinctive culture of the Anishinabek, however the courts would be hesitant to allow such an uncertain and potentially far-reaching right. This is not surprising given that such a claim by both Indigenous and animal groups would challenge the foundations upon which the Canadian legal system is based. There are many sensitive issues inherent in this topic. It should be noted the author is not of Indigenous ancestry, but is making every effort to learn about and respect the Indigenous legal systems discussed. While this paper focuses on a number of Anishinabek laws; it is neither a complete analysis of these practices, nor one that can be transferred, without adaptation, to other peoples. Finally, Indigenous peoples and animal rights and Indigenous law scholars, such as Tom Regan and Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, respectively, may insist on an abolitionist approach to animal 'use' or reject the legitimacy of s.35 itself.7 These perspectives are worthy and necessary. This paper positions itself amongst these and other sources in order to reflect upon the timely and important issue of the legal status of Indigenous-animal relationships. I:WHAT ARE INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? The Law Commission of Canada defines a legal tradition as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, the role of law in the society and the polity, the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught.”8 Indigenous legal traditions fit this description. They are living systems of beliefs and practices, and have been recognized as such by the courts.9 Indigenous practices developed into systems of law that have guided communities in their governance, and in their relationships amongst their own and other cultures and with the Earth.10 These laws have developed through stories, historical events that may be viewed as ‘cases,’ and other lived experiences. Indigenous laws are generally non-prescriptive, non-adversarial and non-punitive and aim to promote respect and consensus, as well as close connection with the land, the Creator, and the community. Indigenous laws are a means through which vital knowledge of social order within the community is transmitted, revived and retained. After European ‘settlement’ the influence of Indigenous laws waned. This was due in part to the state’s policies of assimilation, relocation and enfranchisement. 11 Despite these assaults, Indigenous legal systems have persevered; they continue to provide guidance to many communities, and are being revived and re-learned in others. For example, the Nisga’a’s legal code, Ayuuk, guides their communities and strongly informs legislation enacted under the Nisga’a Final Agreement, the first modern treaty in British Columbia.12 The land and jurisdiction claims of the Wet’suwet’en and Gitxsan Nations ultimately resulted in the Court’s decision in Delgamuukw,13 a landmark case that established the existence of Aboriginal title. The (overturned) BC Supreme Court’s statement in Delgamuukw14 reveals two of the many challenges in demonstrating the validity of Indigenous laws: “what the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en witnesses[es] describe as law is really a most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by the Indians [sic] themselves.” The first challenge is that many laws are not in full practice, and therefore not as visible as they could be and once were. What the courts fail to acknowledge, however, is that the ongoing colonial project has served to stifle, extinguish and alter these laws. The second challenge is that the kind of law held and practiced by Indigenous peoples is quite foreign to most non-Indigenous people. Many Indigenous laws have animals as central figures. In Anishinabek traditional law, often the animals are the lawmakers15: they develop the legal principles and have agency as law givers. For instance, the Anishinabek case Nanabush v. Deer, Wolf , as outlined by Burrows, is imbued with legal principles, lessons on conduct and community governance, as well as ‘offenses’ and penalties. It is not a case that was adjudicated by an appointed judge in a courtroom, but rather one that has developed over time as a result of peoples’ relationships with the Earth and its inhabitants. An abbreviated summary of the case hints at these legal lessons: Nanabush plays a trick on a deer and deliberately puts the deer in a vulnerable position. In that moment of vulnerability, Nanabush kills the deer and then roasts its body for dinner. While he is sleeping and waiting for the deer to be cooked, the Wolf people come by and take the deer. Nanabush wakes up hungry, and out of desperation transforms into a snake and eats the brains out of the deer head. Once full, he is stuck inside the head and transforms back into his original shape, but with the deer head still stuck on. He is then chased and nearly killed by hunters who mistake him for a real deer. This case is set within the legal context of the Anishinabek’s treaty with deer. In signing the treaty, the people were reminded to respect beings in life and death and that gifts come when beings respect each other in interrelationships.16 Nanabush violated the rights of the deer and his peoples’ treaty with the deer. He violated the laws by taking things through trickery, and by causing harm to those he owed respect. Because his actions were not in accordance with Anishinabek legal principles, he was punished: Nanabush lost the thing he was so desperately searching for, and he ended up nearly being killed. This case establishes two lessons. The first is that, like statutory and common law, with which Canadians are familiar, Indigenous law does not exist in isolation. Principles are devised based on multiple teachings, pre- vious rules and the application of these rules to facts. That there are myriad sources of Indigenous law suggests that the learning of Indigenous law would require substantial effort on the part of Canadian law-makers.17 The second is that animals hold an important place in Indigenous law, and those relationships with animals – and the whole ‘natural’ world – strongly inform the way they relate to the Earth. II: CAN CANADIAN LAW ACCEPT INDIGENOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS? If there were a right recognized under s.35 concerning the Indigenous-animal relationship, what would it look like? Courts develop legal tests to which the facts of each case are applied, theoretically creating a degree of predictability as to how a matter will be judged. Introduced in Sparrow, and more fully developed in Van der Peet, a ‘test’ for how to assess a valid Aboriginal right has been set out by the Court. Summarized, the test is: “in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.”18 There are ten, differently weighted factors that a court will consider in making this assessment. The right being ‘tested’ in this discussion is the one exemplified in Nanabush v. Deer: the ability of Indigenous peoples to recognize and practice their laws, which govern relationships, including death, with deer and other animals. The courts have agreed that a generous, large and liberal construction should be given to Indigenous rights in order to give full effect to the constitutional recognition of the distinctiveness of Aboriginal culture. Still, it is the courts that hold the power to define rights as they conceive them best aligning with Canadian society19; this is one way that the Canadian state reproduces its systems of power over Indigenous peoples.20 The application of the Aboriginal right exemplified in Nanbush v. Deer to the Sparrow and Van der Peet tests would likely conclude that the Anishinabek do have an integral and distinctive relationship with animals. However, due to the significant discretion of the Court on a number of very subjective and politically sensitive factors, it is uncertain that the Nanabush v. Deer case would ‘pass’ Van der Peet’s required ten factors.21 This is indicative of the structural restraints that s.35 imposes. 22 The questions it asks impair its ability to capture and respect the interrelationships inherent in Indigenous peoples’ interactions with animals. For example, the Court will characterize hunting or fishing as solely subsistence, perhaps with a cultural element. Shin Imai contends these activities mean much more: “To many…subsistence is a means of reaffirming Aboriginal identity by passing on traditional knowledge to future generations. Subsistence in this sense moves beyond mere economics, encompassing the cultural, social and spiritual aspects for the communities.”23 Scholar Kent McNeil concludes that: “regardless of the strengths of legal arguments in favour of Indigenous peoples, there are limits to how far the courts […] are willing to go to correct the injustices caused by colonialism and dispossession.”24 It is often not the legal principles that determine outcomes, but rather the extent to which Indigenous rights can be reconciled with the history of settlement without disturbing the current economic and political structure of the dominant culture. III:WHY PROTECT THE ANIMAL-INDIGENOUS RELATIONSHIP? Legally protecting animal-Indigenous relationships offers symbiotic, mutually respectful benefits for animals and for the scope of Aboriginal rights that can be practiced. For instance, a protected relationship would have indirect benefits for animals’ habitat and right to life: it would necessitate protecting the means necessary, such as governance of the land, for realization of the right. This could include greater conservation measures, more contiguous habitat, enforcement of endangered species laws, and, ideally, a greater awareness and appreciation by humans of animals and their needs. Critical studies scholars have developed the argument that minority groups should not be subject to culturally biased laws of the mainstream polity.24 Law professor Maneesha Deckha points out that animals, despite the central role they play in a lot of ‘cultural defences,’ have been excluded from our ethical consideration. Certainly, the role of animals has been absent in judicial consideration of Aboriginal rights.26 Including animals, Deckha argues, allows for a complete analysis of these cultural issues and avoids many of the anthropocentric attitudes inherent in Euro-centric legal traditions. In Jack and Charlie27 two Coast Salish men were charged with hunting deer out of season. They argued that they needed to kill a deer in order to have raw meat for an Aboriginal religious ceremony. The Court found that killing the deer was not part of the ceremony and that there was insufficient evidence to establish that raw meat was required. This is a case where a more nuanced consideration of the laws and relationships with animals would have resulted in a more just application of the (Canadian) law and prevented the reproduction of imperialist attitudes. A criticism that could be lodged against practicing these relationships is that they conflict with the liberty and life interests of animals.28 Theoretically, if Indigenous laws are given the legal and political room to fully operate, a balance between the liberty of animals and the cultural and legal rights of Indigenous peoples can be struck.29 Indeed, Indigenous peoples’ cultural and legal concern for Earth is at its most rudimentary a concern for the land, which is at the heart of the challenge to the Canadian colonial system. If a negotiated treaty was reached, or anti-cruelty and conservation laws were assured in the Indigenous peoples’ self government system, then Canadian anti-cruelty30 and conservation laws,31 the effectiveness of which are already questionable, could be displaced in recognition of Indigenous governance.32 Indigenous peoples in Canada were – and are, subject to imposed limitations – close to the environment in ways that can seem foreign to non-Indigenous people.33 For example, some origin stories and oral histories explain how boundaries between humans and animals are at times absent: Animal-human beings like raven, coyote and rabbit created them [humans] and other beings. People …acted with respect toward many animals in expectation of reciprocity; or expressed kinship or alliance with them in narratives, songs, poems, parables, performances, rituals, and material objects. 34 Furthering or reviving these relationships can advance the understanding of both Indigenous legal systems and animal rights theory. Some animal rights theorists struggle with how to explain the cultural construction of species difference: Indigenous relationships with animals are long standing, lived examples of a different cultural conception of how to relate to animals and also of an arguably healthy, minimally problematic way to approach the debate concerning the species divide.35 A key tenet of animal-Indigenous relationships is respect. Shepard Krech posits that Indigenous peoples are motivated to obtain the necessary resources and goals in ‘proper’ ways: many believe that animals return to the Earth to be killed, provided that hunters demonstrate proper respect.36 This demonstrates a spiritual connection, but there is also a concrete connection between Indigenous peoples and animals. In providing themselves with food and security, they ‘manage’ what Canadian law calls ‘resources.’37 Because of the physical nature of these activities, and their practical similarity with modern ‘resource management,’ offering this as ‘proof’ of physical connection with animals and their habitat may be more successful than ‘proving’ a spiritual relationship. Finally, there are health reasons that make the Indigenous-animal relationship is important. Many cultures have come to depend on the nutrients they derive from particular hunted or fished animals. For example, nutrition and physical activity transitions related to hunting cycles have had negative impacts on individual and community health.38 This shows the multidimensionality of hunting, the significance of health, and, by extension, the need for animal ‘resources’ to be protected. IV: HOW SHOULD WE PROTECT THESE ABORIGINAL RIGHTS? If the Anishinabek and the deer ‘win’ the constitutional legal test (‘against’ the state) and establish a right to protect their relationships with animals, what, other than common law remedies,39 would follow? Below are ideas for legal measures that could be taken from the human or the animal perspective, or both, where benefits accrue to both parties. If animals had greater agency and legal status, their needs as species and as individuals could have a meaningful place in Canadian common and statutory law. In Nanabush v. Deer, this would mean that the deer would be given representation and that legal tests would need to be developed to determine the animals’ rights and interests. Currently the courts support the view that animals can be treated under the law as any other inanimate item of property. Such a legal stance is inconsistent with a rational, common-sense view of animals,40 and certainly with Anishinabek legal principles discussed herein.41 There are ongoing theoretical debates that inform the practical questions of how animal equality would be achieved: none of these in isolation offers a complete solution, but combined they contribute to the long term goal. Barsh and James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson advocate an adoption of the reasoning in the Australian case Mabo v. Queensland,42 where whole Aboriginal legal systems were imported intact into the common law. Some principles that Canada should be following can also be drawn from international treaties that Canada has or should have signed on to.43 Another way to seek protection from the human perspective is through the freedom of religion and conscience section of the Charter. Professor John Borrows constructs a full argument for this, and cites its challenges, in Living Law on a Living Earth: Aboriginal Religion, Law and the Constitution.44 The strongest, but perhaps most legally improbable, way to protect the animal- Indigenous relationship is for Canada to recognize a third, Indigenous order of government (in addition to provincial and federal), where all three orders are equal and inform one another’s laws. This way, Indigenous laws would have the legal space to fully function and be revived. Endowing Indigenous peoples with the right to govern their relationships would require a great acquiescence of power by governments and a commitment to the establishment and maintenance of healthy self-government in Indigenous communities. Louise Mandell offers some reasons why Canada should treat Aboriginal people in new ways, at least one of which is salient to the third order of government argument: To mend the [E]arth, which must be done, governments must reassess the information which the dominant culture has dismissed. Some of that valuable information is located in the oral histories of Aboriginal Peoples. This knowledge will become incorporated into decisions affecting the [E]arth’s landscape when Aboriginal Peoples are equal partners in decisions affecting their territories.45 V: CONCLUSION A legal system that does not have to justify its existence or defend its worth is less vulnerable to challenges.46 While it can be concluded that s.35 has offered some legal space for Indigenous laws and practices, it is too deeply couched in Euro-centric legal traditions and the anthropocentric cultural assumptions that they carry. The most effective strategy for advancing Indigenous laws and culture, that would also endow many animals with greater agency, and relax the culture-nature, human-animal binaries, is the formal recognition of a third order of government. Lisa Chartrand explains that recognition of legal pluralism would be a mere affirmation of legal systems that exist, but which are stifled: “…this country is a multijuridical state, where the distinct laws and rules of three systems come together within the geographic boundaries of one political territory.” 47 Revitalizing Indigenous legal systems is and will be a challenging undertaking. Indigenous communities must reclaim, define and understand their own traditions: “The loss of culture and traditions caused by the historic treatment of Aboriginal communities makes this a formidable challenge for some communities. Equally significant is the challenge for the Canadian state to create political and legal space to accommodate revitalized Indigenous legal traditions and Aboriginal law-making.”48 The project of revitalizing Indigenous legal traditions requires the commitment of resources sufficient for the task, and transformative change to procedural and substantive law. The operation of these laws within, or in addition to, Canadian law would of course cause widespread, but worthwhile controversy. In Animal Bodies, Cultural Justice49 Deckha argues that an ethical relationship with the animal Other must be established in order realize cultural and animal rights. This paper explores and demonstrates the value in finding legal space where cultural pluralism and respect for animals can give rise to the practice of Indigenous laws and the revitalization of animal-Indigenous relationships. As Borrows writes: “Anishinabek law provides guidance about how to theorize, practice and order our association with the [E]arth, and could do so in a way that produces answers that are very different from those found in other sources.”50 (see PDF for references)

Purpose. Research of problems arising in law enforcement practice for the protection of the rights of consumers of educational services. Differentiation of judicial and other ways of protecting educational rights. The correlation of the standards for educational and consumer legislation in resolving disputes on protection of rights of consumers of educational services. Methodology: dialectics, analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction, formal legal method. Conclusions. The legislation on consumer protection applies exclusively to educational services provided on the basis of full reimbursement of training costs, i.e. under the appropriate commutative contracts for the provision of educational services. In order to apply measures to protect the rights of a consumer acting in good faith, it is necessary in each case to establish the scope of service provision in comparison with the degree course scheme. Consumer demands for a significant reduction in the cost of paid educational services in the absence of real grounds are a manifestation of «consumer extremism». Scientific and practical significance. The results obtained in this article can be used in further research to solve the problem, in scientific and pedagogical activities, and in law enforcement activities of bodies dealing with specific disputes. These provisions can also be useful to consumers, since the correct choice of the procedure and method of protection accelerates the achievement of the goal of protecting the violated right.

Competitors are increasingly relying on collaborative relationships guided by intermediate forms of governance (i.e., strategic alliances, hybrids, networks) to find and maintain competitive advantages. In contrast, antitrust analysis has emphasized cartels and joint ventures as the primary modes of collaboration among competitors. This focus overlooks many intermediate forms of governance. This and other trends in antitrust have resulted in confusion over proper treatment of collaborative relationships. The authors examine these trends with the objective of developing an analytical framework that clarifies current law for horizontal collaboration. Implications for managerial practice, policy, and research are provided.

This research is qualitative, and the type of data source is secondary data, so the data collection technique used in this research is documentation. The analysis was carried out using content analysis data analysis. From this research, it was found that the law that regulates marriage Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 tentang perkawinan sebagaiman telah diganti dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2019. In addition, marriage is also described in Kompilasi Hukum Islam Law article 39-point (1) letter a. In addition, civil law also regulates the prohibition of marriage which is explained in Article 30 of KUH. Thus, both in religious law and state law, inbreeding does not provide space at all. According to Islamic law, incest is strictly prohibited or forbidden in the religion as stated in the QS. An-Nisa: 22, 23 who should not and may not marry. By customary law, it is strictly forbidden to have incest or incest because it violates the norms and values that apply in society.

The article is devoted to the study of legal relationship as a phenomenon that exists in two modes of being of law: legal reality and legal validity. Classical approaches to the definition of a legal relationship as a social relationship regulated by law are criticized. The understanding of the legal relationship as a result of the implementation of legal norm is also criticized. It is recognized that these approaches do not fully provide a scientific characteristic of legal relationships as a social and legal phenomenon. Instead of the usually distinguished elements of a legal relationship in the form of a subject, object and content, it is proposed to study its dynamic parameters. The dynamics of a legal relationship is considered as a result of the intentionality of the legal consciousness of its subject. In legal reality, a legal relationship is studied as a social action in the conditions of adaptation of the subject to the environment. This legal relationship is due to the general normativity of biological, social and technical origin. The vital normativity of legal reality is considered as a determinant of legal relations. The locus of control in this legal relationship is focused on the subject exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations. In legal validity, the legal relationship is due to the intentionality of the legal consciousness of the subject to implement legal norms through legal interaction with other participants in the legal relationship. The normativity of legal reality is based on legal regulation through legal acts (individual and general). In such a legal relationship, the subjects exercise their legal capabilities to the fulfillment of the legal duties assigned to other subjects. The locus of control is shifted to other participants in the legal relationship who exercise their rights and perform legal duties. In legal interaction, mutual recognition of the right is provided by the instance and/or the party of the legal relationship. In the legal validity, the physical, social and value, as well as vital normativity are supplemented by legal normativity. It is designed to neutralize social contradictions caused by the limitations of space, as well as the irreversibility of time. It is proved that the proposed concept of legal relations contributes to the solution of practical issues of the primacy of the legal norm or legal relationship, the revision of the criteria for differentiation of the legal system, the determination of the ratio of legal relations and offenses, the scientific consideration of some sectoral problems of the classification of legal relations. It is noted that the proposed concept of a legal relationship as a social action or legal interaction is quite conditional and applicable for cognitive purposes. In practice, quite often there is an intersection or mutual overlap of one type with another, a transition from legal reality to legal reality.

The current stage of development of public relations is characterized by active digitalization processes. Law, being an important regulator of public relations, as well as other legal phenomena, including legal relations, are influenced by digital technologies. In the article author discusses theoretical and legal approaches to the digitalization of legal phenomena (using the example of tax legal relations). The features of the processes of digitalization of tax legal relations are investigated, the prerequisites and content of digitalization of tax legal relations are determined.

The doctor-patient relationship in Indonesia has changed. In the past, patients were inferior to doctors, but over time the relationship has put the two in a more balanced position. This article aims to examine the legal substance in regulating doctor-patient relationships in Indonesia. The arguments presented in this study demonstrated the increase in the number of civil lawsuits or complaints/criminal lawsuits has a substantial impact on legal resolution shifting. Although the law placed the legal relationship among two parties as mere contract-civil relationship, the criminalization is increasingly favored in recent years. As a recommendation, future law-making process needs to comprehensively consider medical science as the basis to lay the legal foundation in regulating doctor-patient relationships.

The subject of this research is the institution of procedural responsibility and its relations with legal relationships and legal practice. In her research Chuklova defines genetic, coordination, subordination and functional relations. According to the author, implementation of procedural responsibility provisions creates both material and procedural legal relations. The author demonstrates that the institution of procedural responsibility either relates to legal relationships at the functional genetic level disregarding the definition of a particular legal relationship or acts as a result of legal regulation or means of regulation. There should be legal grounds for creating such an institution, too. The institution of procedural responsibility creates conditions for discovering the truth in criminal, civil or administrative cases, thus demonstrating subordination relations. The research is based on general and special research methods such as comparative law, formal law analysis, functional and systems approaches, etc. As a result of the research, the author concludes that judicial practice is a coordination link between procedural form and material law, however, many court decisions demonstrate a negative tendency in implementation of the procedural responsibility provisions when there is a total substitution of one term with the other. For example, contempt of court includes such actions as numerous continuous disqualifications, non-submission of documents, failure to appear in court, non-compliance with court orders, negative remarks about a judge's professional or personal qualities. The article is funded by The Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project No. 19-011-00103 А 'Legal Responsibility in Russia's Legal System: the Concept of Interaction, Interconnection and Elimination of Contradictions with Other Elements of Legal System'. 

In everyday life, people enter a multitude of social relationships with their peers. A social relationship turns into a legal relationship only if there is a legal norm that governs it. The law can not be conceived in the absence of the legal norm, so we can say that the legal norm is an essential element of the law.

The article deals with the content and nature of legal relations arising in connection with participation in the corporation. It is proved that the right of participation in the corporation is an element of legal capacity to form absolute regulatory relationship. Corporate relations being relative legal relations are based on an absolute right to participate.

New families of looked-after children may experience varying levels of support depending on the legal order the child is under. It is time to end these discrepancies to ensure all get the right support

Absolute legal relations as a conflict of laws phenomenon require in-depth analysis and classification in order to ensure the most effective state of their protection. In the present article, the author raises the question of the general orientation of absolute legal relations, as well as the possibility of their differentiation into general and specific ones. The author examines their classification types depending on their belonging to private or public law; depending on the specifics of the object and its influence on the dynamic and static components of absolute legal relations; depending on the branch of law; depending on the purity of the nature of the absolute legal relations themselves. The author also analyzes the expediency of identifying quasi-absolute legal relations. The importance of resolving the issue of the correct classification of absolute legal relations is dictated by its influence on the degree of legality and guarantee of the process of realization of absolute and inalienable rights of the individual.

The article is devoted to consideration of the civil-juridical specificity of confidentiality relationships in context of differentiationthe law on branches and specialties of their influence over social connections.The author states that the value of information legal relationships for a long time was underestimated. But in modern circumstancesthe issue of civil-juridical specificity of confidentiality relationships in context of separation the branches of law have becomeurgent, especially in the light of the Concept of modernization the Civil Code if Ukraine.Despite the episodically regulation of abovementioned relationships by provisions of current civil legislation, including CivilCode of Ukraine, and that special laws regulates private relationships as well as public relationships of confidentiality in informationfield, the private-juridical signs of appropriate relationships are clear enough. Such relationships can be established with participationof legally equal persons and be material or non-material. At the same time inclusion of information to legal scheme of market circulationand conferring on it the legal regime of relationship`s object completely solve the problem of juridical character of such relationships.The break of confidentiality that leads to material harm can establish private-juridical relationships even if such a break was committedwithin public relationships. The material character of appropriate harm determines the necessity of its compensation within protectivejuridical civil mechanisms.The civil-legal relationships of confidentiality inherit the specificity of information relationships that can be characterized gene -rally as integrability. Such relationships can be material as well as non-material and at the same time they can be established in differentspheres of social connections: in sphere of civil circulation of things, in sphere of services, during succession, in legal intellectual sphereetc., and at the same time save their private-juridical character.

Judges, scholars, and commentators decry inconsistent areas of judicially created policy. This could hurt courts’ policy making efficacy, so why do judges allow it to happen? I show judicially-created policy can become inconsistent when judges explain rules in more abstract terms than they decide cases. To do so, I expand standard case-space models of judicial decision making to account for relationships between specific facts and broader doctrinal dimensions. This model of judicial decision making as a process of multi-step reasoning reveals that preference aggregation in such a context can lead to inconsistent collegial rules. I also outline a class of preference configurations on collegial courts (i.e., multi-member courts) in which this problem cannot arise. These results have implications for several areas of inquiry in judicial politics such as models of principal-agent relationships in judicial hierarchies and empirical research utilizing case facts as predictor variables.

Автор отмечает особенности регулирования семейных отношений в составе предмета права социального обеспечения и наследственного права. Отмечаются различия семейных связей и семейных правоотношений в контексте обеспечения прав и интересов граждан нормами соответствующего отраслевого законодательства. The author notes the peculiarities of the regulation of family relations as part of the subject of social security law and inheritance law. Differences in family ties and family legal relations in the context of ensuring the rights and interests of citizens by the norms of the relevant industry legislation are noted.

The evolution of the EU legal system reveals a generalisation of mutual recognition variations. On the one hand, these variations are always based on the same structuring elements: mutual trust, equivalence and country-of-origin. Depending on the subject (e.g.taking into account whether harmonisation exists and the EU freedom concerned), each of these structuring elements acquires greater or lesser significance, ultimately determining the degree of conditionality or automaticity at recognition phase. On the other hand, the function of any of those variations creates the legal conditions to establish transnational legal relationships subject to different national legal orders. All these consequences are the result of two fundamental aspects: 1) The EU option by relational regulatory model which ensures the connection between equivalent national rules, using conflict of laws with special techniques. 2) The conferral of transnational effectiveness to national rules and administrative actions to allow the exercise of freedoms granted by EU law.

Background: In any aging society, the sociolegal construction of intergenerational relationships is of great importance. This study conducts an international comparison of a specific judicial issue: whether active labor unions have the legal right to strike for the purpose of improving the benefits given to nonactive workers (specifically, pensioners). Method: A comparative case law methodology was used. The texts of three different Supreme Court cases—in the United States, Canada, and Israel—were analyzed and compared. Findings: Despite the different legal outcomes, all three court rulings reflect a disregard of known and relevant social gerontology theories of intergenerational relationships. Conclusion: Social gerontological theories can play an important role in both understanding and shaping judicial policies and assisting the courts in choosing their sociojudicial narratives.

Kirsten Anderson, research and policy manager at Coram Children's Legal Centre, examines the government's reluctance to make relationships and sex education statutory for pupils in primary and secondary schools