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1
Grubor, Nebojsa. "Hermeneutics of taste Gadamer’s critique of Kant’s aesthetics in truth and method." Theoria, Beograd 59, no. 3 (2016): 23–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1603023g.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The Article explains Gadamer?s critique of Kant?s aesthetics in Truth and Method (1960). The paper first examines basics characteristics of Kant?s foundation of modern aesthetics (I). This is followed by consideration Gadamer?s interpretations of the process of the subjectivization of aesthetics in Kant?s Third Critique (II). Finally, it considers critique of abstraction aesthetic consciousness and conception of aesthetic differentiation as Gadamer?s attempt to through analysis of Kant?s theory of taste complete its own hermeneutics of art (III).
2
Popovic, Una. "The problem of aesthetic judgment: Perspectives of aesthetics." Filozofija i drustvo 24, no. 3 (2013): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1303005p.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper deals with the interpretation of Kant?s Critique of Judgment from the perspective of aesthetics. Our aim here is to show the immanent relationship between the two main motifs of this work: the analysis of traditional aesthetic problems, such as beauty and taste, on the one hand, and the systematical thinking, philosophy, and Kant?s critical project, on the other. This interpretation is developed in consideration of the prob?lem of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline, within which, for each of the motifs of Kant?s third critique it is shown how it redefines aesthetic into philosophical thought. Finally, the character of critical positioning of aesthetic problems in Kant is shown in light of the opening of the perspective of subjective universality as a theme that connects the two motifs of third critique, but also allows a different view in the domain of intersubjectivity.
3
Pereira, Geraldo Adriano Emery. "A LEITURA ARENDTIANA DA FACULDADE DO JUÍZO KANTIANA." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 38, no. 121 (October 7, 2011): 183. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v38n121p183-210/2011.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Este texto detém-se sobre um tema polêmico no contexto da obra da filósofa Hannah Arendt – a faculdade do juízo. A análise gira em torno da demonstração do modo como as peculiaridades da crítica do gosto kantiana são apropriadas por Arendt, numa leitura política desta faculdade. O artigo ensaia num primeiro momento uma apresentação do juízo de gosto; em seguida aponta os elementos que são apropriados por Arendt e sua leitura política. Deste modo se apresenta uma justificativa teórica para a apropriação arendtiana da faculdade do juízo de gosto kantiana, mostrando que, apesar de seu caráter “sui generis” ela é capaz de revelar aspectos importantes da própria realidade política.Abstract: This paper draws attention to a polemic subject in the context of the work of the philosopher Hannah Arendt – The faculty of judgement. The analysis brings into focus the way the characteristics of KantÊs critique of taste have been used by Arendt in a political interpretation of that faculty. After explaining the Kantian judgement of taste, the paper points out the elements which have been appropriated by Arendt and shows her political reading of them. It proposes so a theoretical justification of the Arendtian use of Kant´s analysis of judgement of taste, making clear that, in spite of its „sui generis‰ character, it is able to uncover important aspects of political reality itself.
4
Sweet, Kristi. "Reflection: Its Structure and Meaning in Kant's Judgements of Taste." Kantian Review 14, no. 1 (March 2009): 53–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001345.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
When Kant announces in a letter to Reinhold that he has discovered a new domain of a priori principles, he situates these principles in a ‘faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure’ (Zammito 1992: 47). And it is indeed in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, named in this letter the Critique of Taste, that we find his elucidation of the relation of the principle of purposiveness to the feeling of pleasure. The kinds of judgements in which our feelings are evaluated in accordance with a principle are what Kant names reflective judgements. And while reflective judgements emerge in the third Critique to include not only judgements of taste, but also judgements of the sublime and teleological judgements of nature, in this paper I will focus on the first, as the question of the relatedness of reflection to pleasure is most pronounced in this context. There is no consensus in Kant scholarship as to what the structure of reflective judgements is, as evidenced by the widely disparate views of those such as Guyer, Allison, Pippin, Ginsborg, Lyotard, and others.
5
Dumler-Winckler, Emily. "Romanticism as Modern Re-Enchantment: Burke, Kant, and Emerson on Religious Taste." Journal for the History of Modern Theology / Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/znth-2015-1001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractThis essay traces the contours of a trans-Atlantic Romantic legacy of aesthetic, moral and religious taste from its inception in Edmund Burke, through its modifications by Immanuel Kant, to its culmination in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Divinity School Address. In A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful Burke suggests that religious experience is an aspect of aesthetic and moral taste. Immanuel Kant follows suit in the Critique of Judgment, offering a distinct account of religious taste. Emerson alludes to yet significantly refines aspects of both accounts in his Divinity School Address. Whereas Kant and Burke’s variously stoic accounts depict good religious taste as an experience of alienation from God and from the world, Emerson’s religious agent cultivates a modern spirituality quite at home in the world. Adapting Burke’s re-enchanted moral psychology of taste, Emerson offers a distinctively religious, indeed Christian, form of this modern re-enchantment. Yet for Emerson, refined religious taste allows agents to recognize the full spectrum of normative demands in nature and thus to make a home of such a world.
6
Rueger, Alexander. "Pleasure and Purpose in Kant’s Theory of Taste." Kant-Studien 109, no. 1 (March 8, 2018): 101–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kant-2018-0003.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract: In the Critique of Judgment Kant repeatedly points out that it is only the pleasure of taste that reveals to us the need to introduce a third faculty of the mind with its own a priori principle. In order to elucidate this claim I discuss two general principles about pleasure that Kant presents, the transcendental definition of pleasure from § 10 and the principle from the Introduction that connects pleasure with the achievement of an aim. Precursors of these principles had been employed by Kant and others in empirical psychology. But how can such principles of empirical psychology be transferred to transcendental philosophy? I suggest that Kant accomplishes this by deriving the connection of pleasure with achievement of an aim from the transcendental definition and the assumption that faculties have interests. I finally reconstruct § 11 as a ‘regressive argument’ from the peculiarities of the pleasure of taste to the need to acknowledge a new faculty.
7
Otabe, Tanehisa. "An Iroquois in Paris and a Crusoe on a Desert Island: Kant’s Aesthetics and the Process of Civilization." Culture and Dialogue 6, no. 1 (September 7, 2018): 35–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340040.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract In section 2 of Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) Immanuel Kant refers to the Iroquois sachem declaring that what pleased him in Paris were cook-shops, not palaces. For Kant the sachem seems to be a barbarian ensnared by his appetite and incapable of disinterested pleasure. This essay, however, argues first that Kant, extracting this episode from “The History of New France” (1744) written by French Jesuit missionary Charlevoix, tacitly advocates the idea of the noble savage, thereby giving the Iroquois sachem the function of criticizing a luxurious civilization. Second, the essay shows that in the “General Remark on the Exposition of Aesthetic Reflective Judgments” Kant evaluates positively a castaway Crusoe as a person who withdraws from civilized society, conscious of the fact that society is far from being a moral ideal. The Iroquois sachem and the castaway Crusoe are examples that anticipate section 83 in the second part of his Critique of the Power of Judgment, which focuses on the role of the faculty of taste in the process of civilization, thereby incorporating into his whole system the theory of taste as expounded in the first part.
8
Allison, Henry E. "Beauty and Duty in Kant's Critique of Judgement." Kantian Review 1 (March 1997): 53–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000066.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
At the end of §40 of the Critique of Judgement, after a discussion of the sensus communis and its connection with taste, Kant writes:If we could assume that the mere universal communicability as such of our feeling must already carry with it an interest for us (something we are, however, not justified in inferring from the character of a merely reflective power of judgment), then we could explain how it is that we require from everyone as a duty, as it were (gleichsam), the feeling in a judgment of taste. (5: 296; 162)
9
Hahmann, Andree. "Kant’s Critical Argument(s) for Immortality Reassessed." Kant Yearbook 10, no. 1 (October 4, 2018): 19–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2018-0002.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractKant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul has received strikingly little attention among Kant scholars, and only very few have regarded it positively. This is not surprising given the numerous problems associated with his argument. However, it is not the only argument for immortality that Kant offers in his critical philosophy. There is also a second argument that differs from the one furnished in the Second Critique and can be found both in the Critique of Pure Reason and later texts from the 1790s. Kant also addresses here many of the problems that interpreters have found with his postulate of immortality in both earlier and later texts. This paper considers the main difficulties associated with the postulate and proposes a coherent interpretation of Kant’s argument. I show that despite the apparent change in his approach to immortality Kant did not in fact substantially alter his position during his critical period.
10
Romo, Vicente De Haro. "Reseña de Kant´s Critique of Spinoza, de O. Boehm." Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía, no. 48 (June 8, 2015): 265. http://dx.doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i48.683.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
En esta reseña, resumo el contenido y expongo la estructura del libro de Omri Boehm, Kant´s Critique of Spinoza, y evalúo los argumentos del autor para tratar de mostrar que en la Crítica de la razón pura el interlocutor de Kant es el filósofo judío.
11
Lukic, Aleksandar. "Kant’s critique of pure reason and the dogmatism of metaphysics." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 1 (2021): 23–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2101023l.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, the author explores Kant?s Copernican revolution that departs from philosophical tradition. Kant challenges a view that the existence of the world (with the totality of all laws that hold in it) is independent of the knower. In view of that, the main focus is on Kant?s analysis of the meaning of a priori knowledge and the critique of old (dogmatic) metaphysics. The aim of this critique, however, was not the dismissal of metaphysics as such, but rather the transcendental foundation of a new one.
12
Dumouchel, Daniel. "Kant et l'expérience esthétique de la liberté." Dialogue 35, no. 3 (1996): 571–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300008878.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Kant and the Experience of Freedom rassemble les articles de Paul Guyer consacrés à l'esthétique de Kant depuis 1982 et un certain nombre de textes inédits qui vont jusqu'à 1991. Il s'agira certainement d'un jalon important dans l'interprétation de l'esthétique de Kant et des questions philosophiques qui y sont apparentées. Le virage qu'y prend l'auteur par rapport à son livre célèbre de 1979, Kant and the Claims of Taste, est également impressionnant. Moins dépendant des débats qui prédominaient dans l'esthétique de l'époque, il ne s'agit plus tant pour Guyer d'essayer de dégager le noyau normatif de la théorie kantienne du goût et d'en faire valoir la cohérence et la légitimité, que d'interroger les rapports multiples et complexes qu'entretiennent l'esthétique et la moralité chez Kant, dans la Critique de la faculté de juger et au-delà.
13
Cannon, Joseph. "The Moral Value of Artistic Beauty in Kant." Kantian Review 16, no. 1 (March 8, 2011): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415410000099.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractIn the third Critique, Kant argues that it is “always the mark of a good soul” to take an immediate interest in natural beauty, because it indicates an interest in harmony between nature and moral freedom. He, however, denies that there can be a similarly significant interest in artistic beauty. I argue that Kant ought not to deny this value to artistic beauty because his account of fine art as the joint product of the “natural gift” of genius and the discipline of taste commits him to the claim that artistic beauty expresses such a harmony between nature and freedom.
14
Palmer, Linda. "A Universality Not Based on Concepts: Kant's Key to the Critique of Taste." Kantian Review 13, no. 1 (March 2008): 1–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400001084.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
‘Beautiful is what, without a concept, is liked universally.’ Thus ends the second Moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful in Kant's Critique of Judgment.What could yield a non-conceptual universality? Kant finds this in the harmonious ‘free play’ of the mental powers, which he characterizes as a mental state that is both non-cognitive and inherently universally valid. In general, any interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory will depend on the view of its relationship to cognition. This relationship itself should be understood in reference to Kant's notion of the mental state (or activity of the cognitive powers) in judging generally, as presented in the Critique of Judgment.
15
Hlobil, Tomáš. "Bolzanova revize Kantova pojetí Betrachtung ve sváru o předmět soudu vkusu." REFLEXE 2023, no. 64 (October 2, 2023): 5–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.14712/25337637.2023.20.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In German pre-critical aesthetics, the term Betrachtung (contemplation) was coined to describe the reception of beauty and art. It was also used by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgment (1790), and by Bernard Bolzano in his treatise On the Concept of Beauty (1843). Both Bolzano and Kant tied the judgment of taste (beauty) to the mere contemplation of the initial object. However, each of them meant something different by this act, and each accorded it a different importance. The study describes Kant’s and Bolzano’s conceptions of mere contemplation, compares them and shows that Bolzano’s concept should be understood as a content modification of Kant’s innovative procedure.
16
Day, Jonathan. "Jazz, Kant and Zen." Culture and Dialogue 4, no. 2 (October 26, 2016): 301–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340017.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Transgression and experimentation are at the heart of the musical composition with which this work begins. The compositional approaches employed developed from a consideration of Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790) which offers a compelling explanation for the apparently bizarre “claim to objectivity” commonly made in judgements of taste. Kant’s final conclusion around the source of the claim is, for me, disappointing. This current work re-examines and extends his argument through an elision with Zen writing, and offers an alternate account. It is posited that the “claim to objectivity” operates as a linguistic marker, acknowledging the presence of experience that is trans-rational and supra-linguistic, and indicating a point/place at which language ceases to be viable. It relies on and incites an implicit shared understanding that aesthetic experience often exceeds language, and further indicates that one or more of the myriad unspeakable things are accessible nearby. This understanding is explored in relation to compositional practice, finding a powerful synergy with the writing of composers, improvisers, and avant-garde/jazz theorists. The work concludes with the suggestion that aesthetic experience and the “beautiful” may therefore signpost the ineffable, referring back to the score with which this work began.
17
Corôa, Pedro Paulo Da Costa. "KANT, ROUSSEAU E AS BASES ESTÉTICAS DO PENSAMENTO." Cadernos de Pesquisa 22 (December 31, 2015): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.18764/cp.v22i0.2974.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
O nosso objetivo é mostrar como a questão relativa ao gosto pode ser encontrada, enquanto forma particular de juízo, na obra de Rousseau, em especial, no Emílio. Em decorrência disso, tudo o que nós aprendemos sobre a gênese moderna do chamado juízo de reflexão estético, identificado à Crítica do juízo, de Kant, se não exige uma correção, nos obriga, pelo menos, a reconhecer, antes do esforço crítico, o surpreendente e certeiro tratamento do tema por parte de Rousseau. Palavras-chave: Rousseau. Kant. Gosto. Juízo. Reflexão. KANT, ROUSSEAU AND THE AESTHETIC BASIS OF THOUGHT Abstract: The aim of this study was to examine the issue regarding esthetic taste as being a form of judgment,in particular in Rousseau’s work Emile. As a result most of what we know concerning the modern origin of judged ofesthetic reflection, as defined in Kant’s Critique of judgment, although not requiring a revision, at least obliges us torecognize the critical, surprising, and discerning treatment of the topic by Rousseau.Keywords: Rousseau. Kant. Esthetic taste. Judgment. Reflection. KANT, ROUSSEAU Y LAS BASES ESTÉTICAS DEL PENSAMIENTOResumen: Nuestro objetivo es demostrar cómo la cuestión relativa al gusto puede ser encontrada, mientras como una forma particular de juicio, en la obra de Rousseau, en especial, en el Emilio. Como resultado, todo lo que nosotros hemos aprendido sobre la génesis moderna del juicio de reflexión estético, identificado a la Crítica del Juicio, de Kant, si no requiere una corrección, nos obliga, por lo tanto, a reconocer, ante del esfuerzo crítico, el sorprendente y adecuado tratamiento del tema por la parte de Rousseau. Palabras clave: Rousseau. Kant. Gusto. Juicio. Reflexión.
18
Sánchez, Manuel. "The conclusion of the deduction of taste in the dialectic of the power of judgment aesthetic in Kant." Trans/Form/Ação 36, no. 2 (August 2013): 45–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-31732013000200004.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. In the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible.
19
Rego, Pedro Costa. "Conhecimento e prazer na estética de Kant." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 11, no. 2 (August 1, 2013): 33–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v11i2.530.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
O argumento de que Kant se serve para distinguir de saída, na Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo, o juízo de gosto do juízo de conhecimento teórico é o de que este último não é acompanhado de modo necessário por um sentimento de prazer, ao contrário do primeiro, que tem num sentimento de prazer sua razão determinante. Mas uma certa passagem da Introdução definitiva da obra parece infirmar essa posição clara da terceira Crítica, a de que onde há conhecimento (stricto sensu) não há geração necessária de sentimento de prazer, e de que se há prazer, então não estamos diante de um juízo de conhecimento pura e simplesmente. O que Kant sugere aí é que, se não há, por um lado, prazer na subsunção de dados sob categorias do entendimento, por outro, existiria um certo prazer no processo judicativo pelo qual reconhecemos objetos segundo conceitos empíricosao subsumirmos indivíduos sob conceitos de espécies e de gêneros. O objetivo do presente trabalho é explicitar essa aparente contradição e buscar uma solução para ela. De um lado, a irredutibilidade do gosto ao conhecimento, seja ele puro ou empírico, segundo os critérios do sentimento de prazer e da referência a conceitos. De outro, a aproximação de gosto e conhecimento na estratégia da dedução e, sobretudo, na identificação, sugerida pela Introdução, de uma finalidade formal e de um certo prazer a ela ligado no processo do conhecimento empírico. AbstractThe argument Kant appeals to in order to distinguish, in the Critique of Judgment, the judgment of taste from the cognitive judgment is that the latter is not necessarily followed by a feeling of pleasure. In spite of that, this clear point from the third Critique - namely, that where is cognition (stricto sensu), there is no necessary pleasure, and where is pleasure, we are not confronted to a pure cognitive judgment -- seems to be disenfranchised by a certain passage in the Introduction. Kant suggests that if there isn't, on the one hand, pleasure in the subsumption of data under categories of understanding, on the other, there would be some pleasure in the judging process through which we recognize objects under empirical concepts when subsume individuals under concepts of species and genera. The aim of this essay is to make explicit and find a solution to this apparent paradox: on the one hand, the irreducibility of taste to cognition, be it pure or empirical, according to the criteria of the feeling of pleasure and the reference to concepts. On the other hand, the reconciliation between taste and cognition in the strategy of the Deduction and, especially, in the identification, implied by the Introduction, of a formal purposiveness and a certain pleasure applied to it in the process of empirical cognition.
20
Corôa, Pedro Paulo Da Costa. "KANT, ROUSSEAU E AS BASES ESTÉTICAS DO PENSAMENTO." Cadernos de Pesquisa 22 (December 31, 2015): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.18764/2178-2229/v.22n.especial/p.66-77.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
O nosso objetivo é mostrar como a questão relativa ao gosto pode ser encontrada, enquanto forma particular de juízo, na obra de Rousseau, em especial, no Emílio. Em decorrência disso, tudo o que nós aprendemos sobre a gênese moderna do chamado juízo de reflexão estético, identificado à Crítica do juízo, de Kant, se não exige uma correção, nos obriga, pelo menos, a reconhecer, antes do esforço crítico, o surpreendente e certeiro tratamento do tema por parte de Rousseau.Palavras-chave: Rousseau. Kant. Gosto. Juízo. Reflexão. KANT, ROUSSEAU AND THE AESTHETIC BASIS OF THOUGHT Abstract: The aim of this study was to examine the issue regarding esthetic taste as being a form of judgment,in particular in Rousseau’s work Emile. As a result most of what we know concerning the modern origin of judged ofesthetic reflection, as defined in Kant’s Critique of judgment, although not requiring a revision, at least obliges us torecognize the critical, surprising, and discerning treatment of the topic by Rousseau.Keywords: Rousseau. Kant. Esthetic taste. Judgment. Reflection.KANT, ROUSSEAU Y LAS BASES ESTÉTICAS DEL PENSAMIENTOResumen: Nuestro objetivo es demostrar cómo la cuestión relativa al gusto puede ser encontrada, mientras como una forma particular de juicio, en la obra de Rousseau, en especial, en el Emilio. Como resultado, todo lo que nosotros hemos aprendido sobre la génesis moderna del juicio de reflexión estético, identificado a la Crítica del Juicio, de Kant, si no requiere una corrección, nos obliga, por lo tanto, a reconocer, ante del esfuerzo crítico, el sorprendente y adecuado tratamiento del tema por la parte de Rousseau.Palabras clave: Rousseau. Kant. Gusto. Juicio. Reflexión.
21
Draskic-Vicanovic, Iva. "Three directions of development of contemporary aesthetics." Theoria, Beograd 62, no. 2 (2019): 107–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1902107d.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The paper deals wit three possible directions of development which contemporary aesthetics can take. First: power of nation?s taste to show off the key characteristics of the whole culture and the spirit of epoche; author calls that ?logic of taste?. Second: development of combined application of phenomenological and iconological method in the analysis of the works of art in order to understand and interprete their context and third: possibility created by Fiedler?s aesthetic interpretation of Kant?s epistemology - development of the idea of formgiving, i.e. aesthetic, essence of human knowledge as such.
22
WANG, WEIJIA. "Beauty as the Symbol of Morality: A Twofold Duty in Kant’s Theory of Taste." Dialogue 57, no. 4 (March 20, 2018): 853–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221731800015x.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the third Critique, Kant claims that beauty is the symbol of morality and that the consideration of this relation is a duty. This paper declares Kant’s argument to be twofold: firstly, experience of beauty strengthens our moral feeling. Secondly, in judging the beautiful, we assume some indeterminate purpose underlying nature, based on which we can conceive of nature as cooperative with our practical pursuit. Hence, for the sake of moral cultivation and moral motivation, it is our duty to regard beauty as the special symbol of morality.
23
Krstic, Predrag. "Unwanted parenthood: Romanticism and Kant." Filozofija i drustvo 26, no. 1 (2015): 88–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1501088k.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Over the Romantic reception of Kant, the author attempts to show a relationship between the Romanticism and the Enlightenment. First part of the paper reconstructs the social conditions that created the strange path of transformation of parts of Kant?s teachings in the romantic motifs. The second part follows the theoretical precomposition of Kant?s thought in Fichte and expressly deviation from it in Novalis and Schlegel. Third section presents the key moments of the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment mind, and fourth its ambiguous pracital-political effects. In conclusion, it is suggested that Romanticism tested and testified the transcending of limits of the very freedom for which Kant believed that man becomes worthy of only if it is used in a lawful and purposeful manner.
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Baranzke, Heike. "Does Beast Suffering Count for Kant." Essays in Philosophy 5, no. 2 (2004): 375–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip2004529.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Ever since Schopenhauer´s accusation, it has been disputed whether Kant´s few remarks concerning the ethical human-animal-relationship in the Lectures and in the Doctrine of Virtue fail to support ethical arguments on behalf of animals. One critique that plays a central role is whether Kant would have forbidden cruelty to brutes for educational purposes. In addition to these old objections, Kant´s ethics is charged to be speciesistic by animal ethicists and animal rights philosophers at present.The following article examines especially §17 of the Doctrine of Virtue, which is the only animal ethical text authorized by Kant himself. The interpretation starts by taking the context of §17 into account, particularly the “Episodic Section on an Amphiboly in Moral Concepts”. The systematic output of the cruelty-account and of the duty classes is then analyzed. Central for the understanding of Kant´s argumentation relating to animals are the perfect duties to oneself, which are linked to Kant´s foundation of human dignity. Finally the roles of the physical and emotional needs of brutes and humans in Kant´s ethics are compared with each other. Some conclusions are then drawn concerning human and animal rights in relation to a duty-based argumentation. The article therefore appreciates Kant´s integration of animal suffering into the very core of his virtue ethics, an integration that may be able to open the door for an enlightened animal ethics based on human responsibility.
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Soc, Andrija. "Kant and the legitimacy of rebellion against the sovereign." Theoria, Beograd 56, no. 4 (2013): 63–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1304063s.
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The main topic of this paper is Kant?s position with respect to whether rebellion of citizens against their sovereign is justified. The first part of the paper introduces the social contract theory and considers three well-known answers to this question - Hobbes?s Locke?s and Rousseau?s. In the second part I deal with Kant?s views relying on those of his works where the relation between government and citizens is the chief subject. It is usually thought that Kant believes that rebellion, or revolution against sovereign is unjustified, or even contradictory. In the third part of the paper I try to outline an alternative interpretation that ascribes him the positive attitude towards revolution in certain contexts, and to which I arrive by using mainly the textual evidence present in the Critique of Judgment.
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Orlova, Yulia. "The concepts of apperception and reflection in Kant and the concept of reflection in Husserl." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 4, no. 1 (2023): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680025802-2.
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The article considers reflection as a method and condition of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and Husserl. At the beginning, the author refers to Kant's predecessors who used the term reflection (Wolf, Baumgartner) and concludes that Kant, when referring to reflection, rather adheres to the tradition laid down by Leibniz. Based on the text of the “Critique of Pure Reason”, the article argues that it is with the help of reflection that the formation of a priori categories and a priori synthetic principles can be explained. The author distinguishes between reflection and the transcendental unity of apperception and examines, within the framework of the phenomenological interpretation of the “Critique of Pure Reason”, the role of this unity in the predilection of sensory diversity. The article shows the continuity in the understanding of reflection between transcendental phenomenology and Kant's philosophy. In Husserl's philosophy, reflection as a method is associated with reduction and contemplation. The author dwells on the features of the use of reflection in Husserl's studies, which include, first of all, the temporal language of description and the dependence of reflection on the phenomena to which it is directed. Orlova Yulia Olegovna (1970 2011) – is a Russian philosopher, Ph.D., in 1998 - 2011 worked at the Department of Ontology and Theory of Cognition of the Faculty of Philosophy of St. Petersburg State University.
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Winegar, Reed. "Kant on God’s Intuitive Understanding: Interpreting CJ §76’s Modal Claims." Kantian Review 22, no. 2 (May 5, 2017): 305–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415417000061.
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AbstractIn §76 of the third Critique, Kant claims that an intuitive understanding would represent no distinction between possible and actual things. Prior interpretations of §76 take Kant to claim that an intuitive understanding would produce things merely in virtue of thinking about them and, thus, could not think of merely possible things. In contrast, I argue that §76’s modal claims hinge on Kant’s suggestion that God represents things in their thoroughgoing determination, including in their connection to God’s actual will. I conclude by using my interpretation to argue that §76’s modal claims do not entail Spinozism.
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Smajevic, Milica. "Deduction of morality and freedom in Kant’s ethics." Theoria, Beograd 63, no. 1 (2020): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2001029s.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant?s two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.
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CRISTY, RACHEL. "Does Wine Have a Place in Kant's Theory of Taste?" Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 1 (2016): 36–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.36.
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ABSTRACT:Kant claims in the third Critique that one can make about wine the merely subjective judgment that it is agreeable but never the universally valid judgment that it is beautiful. This follows from his views that judgments of beauty can be made only about the formal (spatiotemporal) features of a representation and that aromas and flavors consist of formless sensory matter. However, I argue that Kant's theory permits judgments of beauty about wine because the experience displays a temporal structure: the aromas and flavors evolve over the course of a tasting from the bouquet through the palate to the finish. An analogy with music, which Kant describes as ‘a play of sensations in time’, illuminates how wine qualifies as an object of pure judgments of taste: the ‘structure’ of a wine can be compared to harmonic structure, and its development throughout the taste can be compared to the unfolding of melody and harmonic progression.
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Lazos, Efraín. "Kant y el conocimiento de sí mismo." Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, no. 6 (November 1, 1998): 31–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.1998.6.191.
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The paper takes up J. McDowell’s claim in Mind and World that the lack of a serious notion of second nature is an obstacle to an effective response by Kant to the Cartesian view of the self. A reconstruction of the Cartesian model of the mind is offered, as well as an analysis of key passages in the Critique of Pure Reason and P.F. Strawson ́s reception of them, to the effect that there is a sense in which Kant may successfully do away with Cartesian temptations without recourse to the abovementioned notion.
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Rosefeldt, Tobias. "Being Realistic about Kant’s Idealism (Translated by M. Rouba)." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 2, no. 1 (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680015447-1.
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This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of noumenal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This not only allows us to establish a realistic reading of Kant idealism but also to discern the true kernel in Adickes’ infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.
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Govedarica, Jelena. "Kant’s conception of enlightenment." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 2 (2021): 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2102049g.
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By interpreting the basic concepts of Kant?s definition of enlightenment, as well as pointing out the importance of discussion for the development of understanding and explaining the role of state power in educating citizens, the author argues that enlightenment ought to be understood as an imperfect duty of every human being. This duty belongs to the duty of virtue according to which we are obligated, among other things, to advance our own perfection. In order to better understand the responsibility for one?s own minority and meaning of the independent use of one?s own understanding, she explains the cultivation of character as an educational phase in the moral development of an autonomous person. The last chapter responds to a critique of Kant?s theory and offers an interpretation of his ?motto of enlightenment.?
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Merritt, Melissa McBay. "Analysis in the Critique of Pure Reason." Kantian Review 12, no. 1 (March 2007): 61–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000819.
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It is widely supposed that the principal task of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is to carry out some kind of analysis of experience. Commentators as profoundly at odds on fundamental points of interpretation as P. F. Strawson and Patricia Kitcher share this supposition. In a letter to J. S. Beck, Kant seems to endorse this view himself, referring to some unspecified stretch of the Critique as an ‘analysis of experience in general’. The idea that the Critique is engaged in an analysis of experience accords well with an attractive conception of Critical philosophy as making something explicit that is generally only implicit in our cognitive lives. After all, the categorical imperative is no innovation of Kant's practical philosophy, but rather is meant to be revealed as the animating principle of ‘ordinary moral rational cognition’. Likewise, the principles revealed in Kant's theoretical philosophy should be nothing other than the principles that necessarily animate ordinary empirical cognition; and Kant says that experience is, or is a mode of, empirical cognition. For this reason, it is undeniably compelling to think of the Critique as offering some kind of analysis of experience.
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Fedorchenko, Yurii. "Experience of the Preface to Immanuel Kant`s Critique of Pure Reason Translation." Filosofiya osvity. Philosophy of Education 28, no. 1 (August 25, 2022): 212–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.31874/2309-1606-2022-28-1-13.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article provides a substantive philosophical, philological and translational analysis of each paragraph of the Preface to Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. It is revealed the conceptual character of the Preface’s formulations, which shows the logic of the movement of Kant’s thought in philosophy. In particular, the complexity of the problems of Kant’s philosophical research and the unity of his philosophical position, which can be traced in various works of Kant, are visualized. In this light, the Preface acts both as a certain summary and as a general direction for Kant’s subsequent philosophical developments. Pitfalls of possible misunderstanding and, accordingly, inadequate translation of individual provisions set forth in the Preface have been identified. The translation of the Preface must take into account Kant’s respect for metaphysics, which the German thinker seeks not so much to surpass as to improve. Kant’s metaphysics appears not as a frozen doctrine, but as a path of reason, his creative search for answers to the last/first questions of philosophy. This search for reason has been ongoing throughout the history of philosophy and will obviously not be completed by the philosophy of Kant, as he himself was well aware. Criticism of skepticism appears in this light not as a denial of metaphysics as such, but as an identification of weaknesses in one or another historical version of metaphysics. In addition, the study of metaphysics is a matter of discourse – a competition of judgments of different thinkers. Metaphysics concerns not only and not so much the reason of a person, but the person himself as the bearer of the reason. At the same time, Kant emphasizes the self-sufficiency of the reason (with all the mentioned multiple ways of it) as a means of achieving the completeness of metaphysics. This article is an accompaniment to the new Ukrainian translation of the Preface, which is presented below in the same issue of “Philosophy of Education”. The author previously presented these theses for public discussion, but here they received their first academic edition.
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Jiang, Qirui. "Kantian Aesthetics: Free Beauty in Fine Arts." BCP Social Sciences & Humanities 15 (March 13, 2022): 121–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpssh.v15i.371.
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A rose is beautiful. The Mona Lisa is beautiful. What is the difference between these two objects in being beautiful? In Critique of Judgment, Kant famously answers this question with a demarcation between two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) and adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). Natural objects, e.g., a rose, fall into the realm of free beauty while works of fine arts, e.g., the Mona Lisa, adherent beauty. Objects of free beauty do not presuppose conceptual understanding while that of adherent beauty do. We do not regard some objective rules, if any, for the beauty of a rose while some rules seem necessary for properly judging fine arts. However, Kant’s free–adherent beauty distinction is much more nuanced than what he makes explicit in Critique. The theoretical distinction is not as clear-cut as it appears, and this paper shows that a work of fine art as an object of adherent beauty is no more than a special form of free beauty. While taste - the faculty necessary for aesthetic judgments - may be restricted by, be a parergon to, or interact with our conceptual understanding, it necessarily remains free and uncontaminated. Genius - the naturally endowed ability to create fine arts - makes the corporeal existence of a work of fine art possible but is necessarily guided by taste. Furthermore, taste can be conditioned by our understanding but it necessarily guides and makes our understanding possible, i.e., any concepts presupposed for fine arts are aesthetic in origin. This paper concludes that the possibility of free beauty entailed by taste, therefore, is necessarily compatible with the adherent beauty of fine arts.
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Dejeanne, Solange. "Felicidade e dignidade de ser feliz: o sumo bem como ideal dialético da razão prática pura." Studia Kantiana 9, no. 11 (May 10, 2011): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/sk.v9i11.88770.
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Na análise (no seu Commentary on Kant"s Critique of Practical Reason) da questão se existe uma necessidade moral de promover o sumo bem, L.W. Beck considera que Kant engana-se ao defender a possibilidade de uma conexão a priori, necessária, entre virtude e felicidade, e simplesmente observa que nem na natureza nem na lei moral Kant pode encontrar algo mais do que uma conexão contingente entre virtude e felicidade. E assim ele apresenta sua tese em relação ao conceito de sumo bem: não constitui um conceito prático, mas um ideal dialético da razão. - à luz da interpretação de Beck e, principalmente, da releitura dos textos kantianos, especialmente da Fundamentação e da segunda Crítica, neste ensaio trata-se de analisar em que medida Kant está autorizado a defender uma conexão entre felicidade e dignidade de ser feliz (virtude) no conceito do sumo bem.
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Moledo, Fernando. "Kants teleologische Überlegungen zur Menschenwürde in der Vorlesung über Naturrecht Feyerabend." Studia Kantiana 19, no. 1 (June 8, 2023): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/sk.v19i1.90216.
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In this paper I deal with an argument for the foundation of human dignity that Kant sketches in the introduction to his lecture Feyerabend on natural law (1784). After presenting very briefly Kant's discussion of Achenwall's concept of value I argue that the starting point of the argument on human dignity that Kant develops in the introduction to the lecture is teleological. I discuss then the problems that such a starting point inevitably entails regarding Kant´s practical philosophy and offer an explanation as to why Kant was able to include this argument in the introduction to his lecture despite the problems it raises. Finally I claim that despite these problems the central idea of the argument reflects a fundamental idea of Kant's thought on human dignity. In support of the latter I refer to the fact that Kant turns to the same central idea of the argument some years later in his discussion of teleology developed in the Critique of Judgment (1790).
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Romcevic, Branko. "Foucault’s critical ontology." Theoria, Beograd 66, no. 4 (2023): 111–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2304111r.
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In this paper, we deal with Foucault?s interpretation of Kant?s understanding of Aufkl?rung and critique, following first reactions to his later interest in these topics. Then we present the textual situation through which Foucault?s attitude towards Kant was determined, starting with his supplementary thesis from 1961, through the ninth chapter of Order of Things (1966), and up to the text ?What is Enlightenment?? from 1984. In addition, we find that the central was his lecture given in 1978, which was published in 1990. In contains several motifs from Order of Things (related to the question of epistemic coercion), and through the interpretation of Kant?s Aufkl?rung as critical attitude, a line of thought was opened that leads to the essay from Foucault?s last year. The accent of the exposition is placed on Foucault?s combination of Aufkl?rung and criticism with archaeology and genealogy, and on showing not only the face but, understood in a Foucauldian way, the other side of those connections. After that, we come to Foucault?s examination of interpreting Aufkl?rung as a position of critical ontology that will explore the possibilities of transgressing the limits set for us. Finding that Foucault?s late approach to Kant is largely conditioned by his genealogical views and analysis of governance/resistance relationship, we conclude that Foucault did not become a Kantian in the end, but that he carried out a genealogical appropriation of Kant, in order to obtain a greater philosophical communicativeness of his thesis on the subject as a field of self-elaboration. In the final part of the paper, we examine Habermas? objection about Foucault as young conservative.
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최재석. "A Study on the 'Color' Concept in I. Kant`s Critique of Judgment." Journal of Korea Society of Color Studies 24, no. 2 (May 2010): 67–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.17289/jkscs.24.2.201005.67.
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Ahn, Hyun-seok. "The Moral Interpretation and Critique in Kant`s Idea of the Highest Good." Journal of Gamsung 13 (September 29, 2016): 61–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.37996/jog.13.3.
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Prole, Dragan. "Kant and the romantic ontology." Filozofija i drustvo 26, no. 1 (2015): 47–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1501047p.
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In the first part of the paper, the author displays the specificities of the romantic concept of subjectivity. Based on the assumption that the Man is but a minute part of what he might be, the romantics emphasize on the imperative of infinite subjectivity. Giving up on the division of philosophical disciplines, the romantics request a unity of spirit in history. The relationship between Kant and romanticism is mostly deliberated under the auspices of the terms of anarchy and the nomadic spirit, which are pointed out by Kant in the beginning of the foreword to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason as the symptoms of the crisis of metaphysics. What Kant sees as a crisis, the romantics embrace as constitutive moments of subjectivity which aspire to soften the modern rifts by breaking up with all substance. Trying to develop a sketch of the ontology of existence, Friedrich Schlegel evokes Plato?s term ontos on, but ties it with the process of establishing the individual ideal, as opposed to the former link with the objective being. The author concludes that the ontology of existence with romantics is at the same time the metaphysics of subjectivity which cares mostly about originality, selfness and authenticity, about the integration of Kant?s term of dynamically sublime in the midst of the philosophical speech about the true being.
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Nikolic, Olga, and Igor Cvejic. "Social justice and the formal principle of freedom." Filozofija i drustvo 28, no. 2 (2017): 270–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1702270n.
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The aim of this paper is to show, contra the right-libertarian critique of social justice, that there are good reasons for defending policies of social justice within a free society. In the first part of the paper, we will present two influential right-libertarian critiques of social justice, found in Friedrich Hayek?s Law, Legislation and Liberty and Robert Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia. Based on their approach, policies of social justice are seen as an unjustified infringement on freedoms of individual members of a society. In response to this critique, we will introduce the distincion between formal and factual freedom and argue that the formal principle of freedom defended by Hayek and Nozick does not suffice for the protection of factual freedom of members of a society, because it does not recognize (1) the moral obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack factual freedom to a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state to protect civic dignity of all members of a society. In the second part of the paper, we offer an interpretation of Kant?s argument on taxation, according to which civic dignity presupposes factual freedom, in order to argue that Kant?s justification of taxation offers good reasons for claiming that the state has the legal obligation to protect factual freedom via the policies of social justice.
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Dimic, Zoran. "On artistic shaping of citizens’ political gatherings." Filozofija i drustvo 24, no. 3 (2013): 23–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1303023d.
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Following the new reading of Kant?s third critique, which was proposed by Hannah Arendt in her Lectures on Kant?s Political Philosophy, in this paper, the author deals with the function of art in the establishment, organization and profiling of political communities. The focus is primarily on the field of music. The analysis begins with ancient philosophers (Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle) and continues with the problems which relate to artistic shaping of citizens? lives in modern epoch (Rousseau, Kant, Schiller). The goal of the paper is to show that the philosophy of art and the philosophy of music, could be taken as a political philosophy, precisely because the analysis of these phenomena constantly convinces a close intertwining of politics and aesthetics, i.e. art and power, music and power. As a conclusion, we might say that a general aesthetic sense can be seen as a kind of human organ for public aesthetic gathering of citizens. Music, poetry, visual arts, etc., have become tools for the political shaping of citizens, i.e. the tools of their political life.
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Omar Perez, Daniel. "Ontology, metaphysics and criticism as Transcendental Semantics as of Kant." Revista de Filosofia Aurora 28, no. 44 (April 7, 2016): 459. http://dx.doi.org/10.7213/aurora.28.044.ds04.
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The aim of this paper is to present the core of Kant´s critique of traditional metaphysics and ontology as a transcendental semantics that allows reformulating the problem about the objects and their reality. In order to achieve this purpose, we propound a paper divided in two parts: 1. A brief justification of Kant’s semantics interpretation; 2. A work program based on a semantics comprehended as a fundamental part of a method of resolution of philosophical problems. Basically, we can state that the critical position against traditional metaphysics and ontology leads to the question upon: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? This question leads to its conditions of possibility, that is: sensible representations; intellectual representations; syntactic rules; semantic rules (or referential rules, on the relation between intellectual representations and some sort of sensibility or affection); the operator of the syntactic and semantic rules (subject, man, human nature, gender, people etc.). This is what we call the core of Kant’s critique and with which we may begin to solve philosophical problems even beyond those presented by our philosopher. As such, we are briefly going to observe the following steps: 1. From metaphysics in its various senses to the ontology of sensible objects; 2. A critique of pure reason against dogmatic metaphysics; 3. Criticism as semantics; 4. The semantic project and the kinds of judgments; 5. Human nature and the theory of judgment; 6. The work program within Kant’s own work; 7. Subsequent results of Kant’s project
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Kononetc, Daria. "Question about the World and Eugen Fink`s Cosmological Interpretation of Kant`s “Critique of Pure Reason”." HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 4, no. 1 (2015): 224–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.18199/2226-5260-2015-4-1-224-239.
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Yi, Gyeong-hee. "The Way to Morality in Kant`s Aesthetics - Four Concepts in Critique of Jedgement." Journal of Gamsung 14 (March 30, 2017): 183–218. http://dx.doi.org/10.37996/jog.14.6.
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Hrnjez, Sasa. "Cancellation of time: On two modes of extemporalization in Kant and Hegel." Filozofija i drustvo 26, no. 3 (2015): 730–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1503730h.
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This article examines two modes of the canceling of time in a comparative analysis that ought to show the passage from the aesthetic over coming of the form of time in Kant to the historical over coming of natural time in Hegel. The essay begins with a problematization of the form of time in Kant?s first Critique and with the question whet her Kant displaces time outside the framework of mere condition of receptivity. Thereafter we will analyze the key passage from Analytics of the Sublime where Kant writes about the cancellation of time-condition and we will interpret this in the light of an ontology of the eventuality and in the historico-political context of French revolution. Although Kant still does not think time as historical time, the cancellation of time-condition in the experience of the sublime shall be considered as the act of the structuring of time that is emancipated from natural linearity and causal continuity. The thinking of historical time will take place only with He gel, i.e. with his identification of time and concept. In this sense we will analyze Hegel?s notion of "conceptual history" in order to draw a conclusion that in Phenomenology of Spirit is al so at work a modus of annihilation of the natural, linear time, but unlike Kant it is truly articulated as historical occurrence. Time is constituted only as annihilated, since it is the intuitive, sensible, natural and external meaning of time what is sublated, while time in its originary dimension is produced only as hi story-time.
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Baggett, David. "Might Beauty Bolster the Moral Argument for God?" Religions 14, no. 8 (August 10, 2023): 1029. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14081029.
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John Hare argues that Kant, in his Third Critique, offers an aesthetic argument for God’s existence that shares premises with his famous moral argument. Karl Ameriks demurs, expressing skepticism that this is so. In this paper, I stake out an intermediate position, arguing that the resources of Kant provide ingredients for an aesthetic argument, but one distinctly less than a transcendental argument for God or an entailment relation. Whether the argument is best thought of as abductive in nature, a C-inductive argument, or a Pascalian natural sign, prospects for its formulation are strong. And such an argument, for its resonances with the moral argument(s), can work well in tandem with it (them), a fact not surprising at all if Kant was right that beauty—in accordance with an ancient Greek tradition—exists in close organic relation to the good. More generally, along the way, I argue that the sea change in Kant’s studies over the last decade or so should help us see that Kant is an ally, rather than foe, to aesthetic theodicists.
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Filho, Edgard José Jorge. "SOBRE O LIVRE JOGO DA IMAGINAÇÃO COM O ENTENDIMENTO NO JUÍZO DE GOSTO, EM KANT." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 35, no. 112 (April 13, 2010): 221. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v35n112p221-237/2008.
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Na Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo, Kant põe como fundamento do juízo de gosto o livre jogo da imaginação com o entendimento, que, ao produzir o acordo da liberdade da imaginação com a legalidade do entendimento, engendra o prazer sobre o qual se funda esse juízo. O objetivo deste estudo é procurar esclarecer em que consiste a liberdade desse jogo e acordo, considerando, inicialmente, que o princípio da faculdade de juízo reflexiva tem a forma do dever e que, portanto, a imaginação e o entendimento, atuantes nessa faculdade, estariam submetidos a deveres incondicionais, podendo-se atribuir-lhes a liberdade num sentido genuíno e não apenas num sentido psicológico, comparativo. Essa tese é sustentada face às objeções que apelam ao desinteresse do juízo de gosto e ao caráter psicológico da liberdade da imaginação.Abstract: In the Critique of Judgment, Kant lays the foundation of the judgment of taste, namely the free play between imagination and understanding, which, in so far as it produces the accord of the freedom of the imagination with the lawfulness of the understanding, originates the pleasure on which this judgment is based. This study aims at throwing light on what the freedom of this play and accord consists of, considering first that the principle of the faculty of reflective judgment has the ‘ought’ form and, therefore, that the imagination and the understanding, which are active in that faculty, are under unconditional duties, so that freedom in its proper sense, not only in its psychological, comparative sense, may be ascribed to them. We maintain this thesis facing objections relating to the disinterestedness of the judgment of taste and to the psychological character of the freedom of the imagination.
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Kormin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich. "I. Kant: perfection within the structure of the aesthetic field of metaphysics." Философия и культура, no. 3 (March 2021): 22–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0757.2021.3.35612.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The subject of this research is the interrelation between aesthetics and metaphysics as it is reflected in the Kantian transcendentalism. In the “Critique of Judgment”, Kant assumes that the representation of perfection does not correlate with such on the sense of delight; thus, in the first introduction to the “Critique of Judgment”, he is far from considering the solutions to the problem of interrelation between perfection and aesthetic sense of delight persuasive. However, the attitude towards perfection transforms in Kant's later works, the analysis of which demonstrates that the idea of perfection, in essence, is conceived as the method for founding the entire aesthetics, its initial category of the beautiful that coincides with the meaning of the aesthetic perfection the beauty is genuine. The metaphysics of perfection, contained in considered Kant’s work, offers a new perspective on the categorical apparatus of Kantian aesthetics, formed in the “Critique of Judgment”, and broadens the representation on Kantian aesthetics as part of transcendental metaphysics. The concept of perfection implies various aspects of metaphysical research, retaining its immanent qualities in the aesthetics. In predication as an act of modern aesthetic expression, it is difficult to determine any stages and structures that can correlate specifically to perfectionism. The question concerning the field of such correlations remains controversial, inclusive of modern Russian philosophy.