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Статті в журналах з теми "Jeu à information incomplète"

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Автор: Grafiati

Опубліковано: 7 липня 2024

Оновлено: 7 липня 2024

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1

Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel, Kirill Rudov, and Leeat Yariv. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information." American Economic Review: Insights 4, no. 1 (March 1, 2022): 18–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210123.

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We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others’ preferences. (JEL C78, D11, D21, D47)

2

Forges, Françoise. "Coopération en information incomplète : quelques modèles stratégiques." Revue d'économie politique 127, no. 4 (2017): 467. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/redp.274.0467.

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3

Schummer, James, and Rodrigo A. Velez. "Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 116–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180065.

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Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others’ preferences. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones. (JEL C73, D45, D82, D83)

4

de Clippel, Geoffroy, Jack Fanning, and Kareen Rozen. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information." American Economic Review 112, no. 5 (May 1, 2022): 1522–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201026.

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We study bargaining over contingent contracts in problems where private information becomes public or verifiable when the time comes to implement the agreement. We suggest a simple, two-stage game that incorporates important aspects of bargaining. We characterize equilibria in which parties always reach agreement, and study their limits as bargaining frictions vanish. Under mild regularity conditions, we show all interim-efficient limits belong to Myerson’s (1984) axiomatic solution. Furthermore, all limits must be interim efficient if equilibrium beliefs satisfy no-signaling-what-you-don’ t-know. Results extend to other bargaining protocols. (JEL C78, D82, D83, D86)

5

Hanany, Eran, Peter Klibanoff, and Sujoy Mukerji. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, no. 2 (May 1, 2020): 135–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180302.

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We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player’s strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents’ strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion. (JEL C73, D81, D83)

6

Jong-Hee Hahn. "Monopoly Pricing of Congestible Resources with Incomplete Information." Journal of Economic Research (JER) 12, no. 2 (November 2007): 243–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.17256/jer.2007.12.2.005.

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7

Liu, Crocker H., Adam D. Nowak, and Patrick S. Smith. "Asymmetric or Incomplete Information about Asset Values?" Review of Financial Studies 33, no. 7 (September 16, 2019): 2898–936. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz096.

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Abstract We provide a new framework for using text as data in empirical models. The framework identifies salient information in unstructured text that can control for multidimensional heterogeneity among assets. We demonstrate the efficacy of the framework by reexamining principal-agent problems in residential real estate markets. We show that the agent-owned premiums reported in the extant literature dissipate when the salient textual information is included. The results suggest the previously reported agent-owned premiums suffer from an omitted variable bias, which prior studies incorrectly ascribed to market distortions associated with asymmetric information. (JEL D82, G14, R00) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

8

Laffont, Jean-Jacques. "Collusion et information asymétrique." Articles 73, no. 4 (February 9, 2009): 595–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/602242ar.

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RÉSUMÉ Après avoir justifié l’intérêt empirique et l’intérêt théorique des recherches sur la collusion dans les organisations et les marchés, l’article présente les deux méthodes disponibles aujourd’hui pour l’analyse théorique de la collusion en information incomplète. Ensuite, un bref tour d’horizon de la littérature est proposé et on montre comment la prise en compte de la collusion est un obstacle à la réalisation de l’optimum de premier rang dans la théorie principal-agents lorsque les caractéristiques des agents sont corrélées.

9

Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Michel Moreaux, Marcel Boyer, and Philippe Mahenc. "Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète." Revue économique 42, no. 6 (1991): 1047–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/reco.1991.409329.

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10

Boyer, Marcel, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Philippe Mahenc, and Michel Moreaux. "Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète." Revue économique 42, no. 6 (November 1991): 1047. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3502023.

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11

Mahenc, Philippe, Marcel Boyer, Michel Moreaux, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète." Revue économique 42, no. 6 (November 1, 1991): 1047–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.p1991.42n6.1047.

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12

Nisticň, Rosanna. "I contratti di programma: una questione di multitask?" ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, no. 1 (April 2009): 93–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/poli2009-001007.

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- In the light of the results from a wide empirical investigation, this essay examines some crucial characteristics of the Italian policy measure called Contratti di programma through both the analytical framework of the incomplete contracts literature and the multi-task Principal-Agent theory. The Contratti di programma policy is based on a formal agreement between the Italian Government and private firms to carry on an investment programme comprising a number of different projects (industrial investments; workers training programs; research centres and projects). The essay also provides a number of suggestions for improving the effectiveness of this policy. Keywords: multitask, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, industrial policy Parole chiave: multitask, informazione asimmetrica, contratti incompleti, contratti di programma, politica industriale Jel Classification: D82; D86; L14; L52

13

Chahrour, Ryan, and Robert Ulbricht. "Robust Predictions for DSGE Models with Incomplete Information." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 173–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20200053.

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We provide predictions for DSGE models with incomplete information that are robust across information structures. Our approach maps an incomplete-information model into a full-information economy with time-varying expectation wedges and provides conditions that ensure the wedges are rationalizable by some information structure. Using our approach, we quantify the potential importance of information as a source of business cycle fluctuations in an otherwise frictionless model. Our approach uncovers a central role for firm-specific demand shocks in supporting aggregate confidence fluctuations. Only if firms face unobserved local demand shocks can confidence fluctuations account for a significant portion of the US business cycle. (JEL D82, D83, E13, E31, E32)

14

Co, Catherine Y. "Endogenous Market Structures in International Trade with Incomplete Information." Journal of Economic Integration 11, no. 2 (June 15, 1996): 196–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.1996.11.2.196.

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15

Chen, Yi-Chun, and Gaoji Hu. "A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15, no. 1 (February 1, 2023): 288–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200411.

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We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents’ information leads to another stable state. (JEL C78, D83)

16

Forges, Françoise. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information." Revue économique Vol. 74, no. 1 (November 20, 2023): 529–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.744.0529.

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Aumann [1974] a introduit un nouveau concept de solution pour les jeux sous forme stratégique, l’équilibre corrélé. Aumann [1987] a montré que les actions de joueurs qui sont rationnels au sens de Bayes (c’est-à-dire qui maximisent leur utilité individuelle espérée en fonction de leurs croyances) et qui partagent la même croyance a priori sont distribuées conformément à un équilibre corrélé. Plusieurs extensions du concept de solution ont été proposées pour les jeux à information incomplète. Cet article en fait un bref compte rendu.

17

Chatterjee, Rittwik, Srobonti Chattopadhyay, and Tarun Kabiraj. "Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information." Studies in Microeconomics 6, no. 1-2 (June 2018): 50–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2321022218800183.

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Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses the R&D incentives of a firm when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to each firm. We construct a two-stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that while R&D spillovers reduce R&D incentives under complete information unambiguously, however, it can be larger under incomplete information. JEL Classification: D43, D82, L13, O31

18

Crettez, Bertrand. "Le système d'informations économiques d'une Banque centrale européenne et le principe de subsidiarité." Revue économique 49, no. 4 (July 1, 1998): 989–1003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/reco.p1998.49n4.0989.

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Résumé La question analysée dans cet article est : une Banque centrale européenne doit-elle disposer de son propre système de collecte et de traitement de l'information économique ou bien peut-elle se reposer sur les États membres de l'Union économique et monétaire ? Autrement dit, le principe de subsidiarité doit-il s'appliquer à la collecte des informations économiques ? Le principal inconvénient d'un système décentralisé est que les États membres ont la possibilité de manipuler les informations qu'ils transmettent à la banque en vue de modifier son comportement. Nous modélisons les relations entre la Banque centrale européenne et les États membres par un jeu en informations incomplètes. Nous montrons que si les objectifs de la Banque et des États ne diffèrent pas trop les informations transmises à l'équilibre du jeu sont exactes. Dans ce cas, le principe de subsidiarité s'applique avec efficacité.

19

Kohler, Philippe, and Michael O. Moore. "Design of an Antidumping Rule with Incomplete Information about Material Injury." Journal of Economic Integration 13, no. 1 (March 15, 1998): 62–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.1998.13.1.62.

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20

Cavagnac. "Le "Dilemme des prisonniers": Les arguments d'une coopération en information incomplète." Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, no. 35 (1994): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20075957.

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21

Li, Hao, and Xianwen Shi. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure." American Economic Review 107, no. 11 (November 1, 2017): 3363–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151743.

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A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure—releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types—dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design. (JEL D11, D82, D83)

22

Laffont, Jean-Jacques. "Des règles inflexibles contre la discrétion politique." Économie appliquée 54, no. 3 (2001): 255–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ecoap.2001.1778.

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Cet article propose un modèle d'échange en information incomplète pour analyser l’arbitrage entre des règles constitutionnelles imposées ex ante à des hommes politiques et une large discrétion qui leur serait accordée. L’avantage des règles est de limiter la poursuite d’objectifs privés des hommes politiques. Leur inconvénient est le manque de flexibilité pour s’ajuster aux circonstances.

23

Loertscher, Simon, and Leslie M. Marx. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration." American Economic Review 112, no. 2 (February 1, 2022): 616–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201092.

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We provide an incomplete information bargaining framework that captures the effects of differential bargaining power in markets with multiple buyers and multiple suppliers. The market is modeled as a mechanism that maximizes the expected weighted welfare of the firms, subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and no deficit. We show that, in this model, there is no basis for the presumption that vertical integration increases equally weighted social surplus, while it is possible that horizontal mergers that appropriately change bargaining weights increase social surplus. Moreover, efficient bargaining implies that in equilibrium noncontractible investments are efficient. (JEL C78, D82, D83, G34, K21, L22, L40)

24

Detemple, Jérôme. "Demande de portefeuille et politique de couverture de risque sous information incomplète." L'Actualité économique 69, no. 1 (March 23, 2009): 45–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/602096ar.

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RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article, nous considérons le problème de choix de portefeuille sous information incomplète lorsque l’investisseur maximise l’utilité de sa richesse terminale. Le portefeuille optimal est obtenu de manière explicite en utilisant la formule de représentation d’Ocone et Karatzas (1991) sous changement équivalent de mesure. Lorsque la richesse terminale découle uniquement de la politique d’investissement dans les actifs financiers, le portefeuille optimal a deux composantes : la première est un terme d’espérance-variance pur relatif à l’information de l’investisseur, la seconde un terme de couverture contre les fluctuations de l’estimateur de l’espérance de rendement des actifs financiers. Dans le cas du modèle gaussien, la demande de couverture est reliée à l’erreur d’estimation. Lorsque la richesse terminale provient également d’un cash-flow aléatoire en supplément des fonds générés par la politique d’investissement, nous démontrons que le portefeuille optimal contient aussi des termes de couverture contre (i) les fluctuations stochastiques dans le taux de croissance du cash-flow terminal et contre (ii) les révisions dans l’estimateur du taux d’appréciation du cash-flow terminal. Ces formules généralisent diverses applications considérées dans la littérature. En conclusion, nous abordons le problème d’information asymétrique.

25

Bhaduri, Amit. "Chaotic targeting on the market clearing price." Économie appliquée 47, no. 1 (1994): 197–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ecoap.1994.1060.

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Supposant une information incomplète sur la demande et un flux constant de l'offre, l'article montre comment un ajustement chaotique par les prix peut résulter d’un effort d’égaliser la demande avec l'offre. Dans un modèle en temps discret la révision du prix en pourcentage de chaque période est supposée être déterminere par la variation non planifiée des stocks en proprtion de l'offre totale dans un état d’échange hors de l’équilibre.

26

Gibbons, Robert. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 1 (February 1, 1997): 127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.1.127.

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This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

27

Phelps, Charles E. "Diffusion of Information in Medical Care." Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, no. 3 (August 1, 1992): 23–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.3.23.

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This paper presents evidence that doctors behave very differently in making treatment recommendations depending on the region where they work, creating large variations in the quantities of care delivered to seemingly standardized populations. This evidence on “variations” (and the failure of normal explanations of the variations) leaves almost by default the idea that incomplete diffusion of information about the efficacy of medical information must be largely responsible. The paper then discusses reasons why this problem might occur: difficulties in collecting information about the success of medical procedures; difficulties in establishing property rights to such information, even if it were to be collected; and liability considerations that hinder adoption of any information that is collected. It concludes with some suggestions for addressing these problems.

28

Mellios. "Un modèle d'équilibre général avec volatilité stochastique des taux d'intérêt et information incomplète." Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, no. 51 (1998): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20076139.

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29

Bergemann, Dirk, and Stephen Morris. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective." Journal of Economic Literature 57, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 44–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181489.

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Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information. ( JEL C70, D82, D83)

30

Chassang, Sylvain. "Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts." American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 448–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.1.448.

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This paper studies how agents with conflicting interests learn to cooperate when the details of cooperation are not common knowledge. It considers a repeated game in which one player has incomplete information about when and how her partner can provide benefits. Initially, monitoring is imperfect and cooperation requires inefficient punishment. As the players' common history grows, the uninformed player can learn to monitor her partner's actions, which allows players to establish more efficient cooperative routines. Because revealing information is costly, it may be optimal not to reveal all the existing information, and efficient equilibria can be path-dependent. (JEL C73, D82, D83, D86)

31

Raffo López, Leonardo. "Una discusión sobre la curva de Phillips de Friedman y la tasa natural de desempleo." Lecturas de Economía, no. 67 (July 31, 2009): 119–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n67a2023.

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En este escrito se evalúa la consistencia teórica de la Curva de Phillips de Milton Friedman. Para esto se retoma la exposición de Friedman, destacando sus aportes al análisis de corto plazo del desempleo, los salarios y los precios, frente a la teoría de los clásicos y a la de Keynes. Se examina la hipótesis basada en la tasa natural de desempleo, revisando la utilización de los conceptos de desempleo involuntario, equilibrio macroeconómico e información imperfecta, así como los mecanismos de formación de expectativas de empresarios y trabajadores. Se concluye que su modelo es impreciso e incompleto y que su hipótesis se derrumba si la tasa natural de desempleo es endógena y cambia con los choques exógenos de demanda agregada. Palabras Clave: Curva de Phillips, desempleo involuntario, tasa natural de desempleo, información imperfecta, expectativas adaptativas. Clasificación JEL: E24, E31, E32, B22. Abstract: In this paper I evaluate the theoretical consistency of Friedman.s Phillips curve. For this, I review his own exposition in the subject, making emphasis in his contributions to the short-run analysis of unemployment, wages and prices in front of the classical theory and Keynes.s .General Theory.. I examine his hypothesis founded in the natural rate of unemployment, looking at the use of concepts like involuntary unemployment, macroeconomic equilibrium and imperfect information, and also at the mechanism of expectation.s formation for workers and entrepreneurships. My conclusion is that his model is incomplete and imperfect, and that his hypothesis tumbles down if the natural rate of unemployment is endogenous and changes with the exogenous chocks in aggregate demand. Keywords: Phillips curve, involuntary unemployment, natural rate of unemployment, imperfect information, adaptative expectations. JEL classification: E24, E31, E32, B22. Résumé: Dans cet article on évalue la cohérence théorique de la Courbe de Phillips de Milton Friedman. Pour ce faire, on reprend l.exposition de Friedman tout en soulignant sa contribution à l.étude du chômage dans le court terme, des salaires et des prix face à la théorie classiques et à la théorie keynésienne. On examine l.hypothèse du taux de chômage naturel et l.utilisation des concepts de chômage involontaire, d.équilibre macro-économique et d.information imparfaite, ainsi que les mécanismes de formation des anticipations des entrepreneurs et des travailleurs. On conclut que son modèle est imprécis et incomplet car l.hypothèse d.un taux de chômage naturel s.effondre lorsque le taux de chômage naturel est endogène et sa variation dépend des chocs exogènes de la demande agrégée. Mots Clef: Courbe de Phillips, chômage involontaire, taux de chômage naturel, information imparfaite, anticipations adaptatives. Classification JEL: E24, E31, E32, B22.

32

Arve, Malin, and David Martimort. "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts." American Economic Review 106, no. 11 (November 1, 2016): 3238–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150275.

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We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service: an Income Effect which reduces output distortions. The firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add-on. This Risk Effect reduces the level of the add-on but hardens information revelation for the basic service. The interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions, contract renegotiation, and the value of incomplete contracts. (JEL D47, D81, D86)

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Parlour, Christine A., and Uday Rajan. "Contracting on Credit Ratings: Adding Value to Public Information." Review of Financial Studies 33, no. 4 (August 7, 2019): 1412–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz083.

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Abstract We consider the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete. In our model, a credit rating and a price on a risky bond both provide verifiable signals about a non-contractible state. We allow the investor to both impose ex ante restrictions on the manager’s action and provide outcome-based compensation. The optimal contract is a prohibitive one when the rating and price indicate a high likelihood of a low state, and relies on wages when the low state is less likely. We provide some observable implications of our contracting approach to ratings. (JEL G24, D86)

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Förster, Daniel, and Martin Walther. "The Link Between Incomplete Information on the Interbank Network and Counterparty Risk." Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital: Volume 52, Issue 2 52, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 213–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.2.213.

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Abstract This paper describes a model in which a network of interbank loans leads to a severe amplification of the previously unanticipated insolvency of one bank. Banks that cannot rule out an indirect hit react by selling assets and hoarding liquidity. While this potentially lowers illiquidity risks, it depresses market liquidity and prices. This leads to a negative externality by which sales to acquire liquidity simultaneously lead to lower global sale proceeds and thus to a greater number of insolvencies inducing deadweight losses. Thus, the distribution of information on the network has a direct impact on welfare by itself. Der Zusammenhang zwischen unvollständigen Informationen über das Banknetzwerk und Adressenausfallrisiken Zusammenfassung In dieser Arbeit wird ein Modell betrachtet, in dem das Netzwerk aus Interbankenkrediten die Folgen der unerwarteten Insolvenz einer einzelnen Bank drastisch verstärkt. Banken, die indirekte Verluste nicht ausschließen können, reagieren mit dem Verkauf von Vermögenswerten und dem Horten von Liquidität. Dies führt zwar potenziell zu einer Senkung der Illiquiditätsrisiken, drückt aber die Marktliquidität und Preise. Es kommt zu einem negativen externen Effekt, da die Verkäufe zur Liquiditätsbeschaffung gleichzeitig zu geringeren Verkaufserlösen und damit zu einer größeren Anzahl von Insolvenzen, die Wohlfahrtsverluste mit sich bringen, führen. Demnach hat die Informationsverteilung im Bankennetzwerk einen direkten Einfluss auf die Wohlfahrt. JEL Classification: G01, G11, G21, G33

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Heikkilä, Jussi T. S. "Classifying economics for the common good: a note on the links between sustainable development goals and JEL codes." Journal of Documentation ahead-of-print, ahead-of-print (January 1, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jd-08-2020-0146.

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PurposeThis brief note sheds light on the links between Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations.Design/methodology/approachThree alternative methods based on keyword overlap to establish links between SDGs and JEL codes are presented.FindingsThese simple linkages illustrate that the themes of SDGs have corresponding closely related JEL classification codes.Research limitations/implicationsThe mappings presented in this note are based on simple keyword overlap and are therefore necessarily imperfect and incomplete. There is plenty of room for further development.Practical implicationsDespite the demonstrated possibility of linking SDGs to existing JEL codes, introducing a specific JEL code for each SDG would reduce search costs for those searching for economic research related to specific SDGs.Originality/valueThe first and preliminary attempt to link SDGs and JEL codes.

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Adams, Suellen S. "Information at Play: The Role of Information Behaviour and Meaning-Making." Proceedings of the Annual Conference of CAIS / Actes du congrès annuel de l'ACSI, October 21, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/cais344.

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This paper relates to the conference in the area of user studies. It examines the similarities of information behaviour and meaning making in 4 studies of adult play environments. It will also make a case for the importance of studying information behaviour and meaning-making in play environments. One of these studies is now complete, the other three are ongoing, though two of these are nearly complete.Cette communication porte sur l'étude des utilisateurs et examine les similitudes entre le comportement informationnel et la formulation de sens dans quatre études sur les environnements de jeu pour adultes. Elle justifie par ailleurs l'importance d'étudier les comportements informationnels et la formulation de sens en environnement de jeu. Une de ces études est déjà complétée, les autres sont toujours en cours dont deux qui sont quasi terminées.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 2 (March 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12657.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 1 (January 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12656.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 4 (July 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12659.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 4 (July 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12734.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 5 (September 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12735.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 3 (May 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12733.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 6 (November 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12662.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 1 (January 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12731.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 5 (September 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12660.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 68, no. 3 (May 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12658.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 69, no. 2 (March 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12732.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 61, no. 1 (January 2014): i—ii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12073.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 61, no. 2 (March 2014): i—ii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12074.

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"Issue Information." Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology 61, no. 3 (April 29, 2014): i—ii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jeu.12075.

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