Статті в журналах з теми "Islamisme – Irak"

This article examines the strategy of the Iranian Tudeh Party in concert with its Soviet and East German patrons and allies during and after the Iranian revolution of 1979. The article assesses the thinking behind the Tudeh's strategy of unwavering support for Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his Islamist allies, even after other major leftist parties had begun fighting the new Islamic regime. This strategy was a product of the international Communist movement's model of revolution in the developing world that envisioned new states following a “non-capitalist path of development.” In Iran, this was compounded by the use of Allende-era Chile as a model for the politics of revolutionary Iran, as well as a deep conviction that Islamism could not provide an effective model of governance in the twentieth century and therefore would collapse of its own accord within months after the Islamists seized power.

In an earlier work Making Islam Democratic (2007), I attempted to interrogate the infamous question of whether Islam was compatible with democracy. I concluded that whereas Islamism (understood as deploying Islam as a political project to establish Islamic state) was unlikely to embrace democratic polity, ‘post-Islamism’ could. My early formulation of ‘post-Islamism’ was based primarily on the experience of Iran in the late 1990s. In this essay I try to see how much this concept has a broader resonance, given that Islamist movements in the Muslim world have experienced significant changes in the past three decades. Basing itself on numerous empirical studies of shift in the political Islam, the essay focuses on revisiting the concept of ‘post-Islamism’ by addressing the questions that its application to other experiences of Islamist politics may raise, as well as the questions that critiques have raised since the concept’s inception. Post-Islamism emerges as a critique from within and without of Islamist politics.

<p><em>This study aims to analyze the relationship between Islam and the state in Saudi Arabia and Iran, using the approach of post-Islamism. Post-Islamism is a concept that refers to the shift of Islamist groups towards modernity and democracy. It was first introduced by Iranian intellectual, Asef Bayat, in the 1990s. Since then, it has been used to analyze the phenomenon of political Islam in different countries, especially after the Cold War. In Saudi Arabia, changes have occurred since Mohammed bin Salman was appointed as crown prince in 2016. In Iran, civil society actions, such as the 2022 death of Mahsa Amini, have driven the change. The research problem is to compare the post-Islamism model that occurs in Saudi Arabia and Iran. The comparative case study method with library research techniques was used. The research findings show that the pattern of post-Islamism in Saudi Arabia differs from that of Iran. In Saudi Arabia, post-Islamism is top-down, starting from state politics without civic movement. However, Iran illustrates the opposite - it is bottom-up and initiated by civil society against the state.</em></p>

Le projet d’islamisation des universités a émergé tout de suite après la prise de pouvoir des islamistes en Iran, en 1979. Pour le mener à bien, ils ont même proclamé la « révolution culturelle ». Mais en dépit de la propagande et de l’application de multiples mesures politiques durant une décennie, ils n’ont pas pu atteindre leur objectif. C’est le nouveau Guide suprême, Ali Khamenei, qui en désignant formellement les sciences humaines et sociales, nées en Occident, comme le nouvel ennemi de la République islamique et de ses fondements idéologiques et théoriques, a demandé l’élaboration d’une feuille de route pour islamiser ces sciences. Dans cet article, nous rappellerons brièvement le premier temps, celui de la « révolution culturelle », et ses résultats, puis nous examinerons la politique d’islamisation des sciences humaines et sociales mise en place depuis 2010. Il s’agit de mettre en lumière les intentions du régime théocratique qui, derrière la politique d’islamisation des sciences sociales, œuvre pour contenir le développement de la pensée critique et, par là même, cherche à fabriquer des « hommes et femmes islamiques ».

Lamia Rustum Shehadeh’s timely book, The Idea of Woman inFundamentalist Islam, begins with a brief biography of influential “fundamentalists.” She examines the context in which they formulated their theoriesand the extent to which they influenced each other, a process thatallows us to see their ideas as a response to the historical, political, andsocial environments in which they lived. For example, the MuslimBrotherhood, founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, not only helped formulateand consolidate Islamic revivalism in Egypt, but also helped provide ablueprint for a sociopolitical organization that promoted the political Islamor Islamism influencing chapters in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine.The ideas promoted by the Brotherhood also spread to Sudan, where theycontinue to guide the current regime’s policies. In some cases, as in Iran andSudan, pronouncements of these ideologues influence state law and publicpolicy. At other times they challenge the state, as in Tunisia.Al-Banna promotes the view that Muslim countries became impoverishedand fell under European control because they have deviated fromIslam. He suggests that Muslims see Islam as the solution to their problems.However, al-Banna and other Islamists believe that Islam’s historicaltraditions are irrelevant for modern times. Instead, they propose areturn to what they believe to be the traditions of the Prophet’s time andthat of the first four caliphs. Moreover, they advocate the use of ijtihad(independent judgment), a practice that allows them to interpret seventhcenturytraditions in light of modern needs. Islamist ideologues reservethis practice for themselves, and thus largely marginalize its alternativeuses by feminists and other progressive groups to advance women’s rightsor minority rights ...

Since 2012 one can speak about a real civil war in Syria with participation of different political forces. Extremist Islamist jihadist groups like “Front al-Nusra” and “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant” (ISIL) play very active role among them. Relations between ruling elites and Islamists have been very complex in Syria during the past decades. On the one hand, Syrian Alawite regime is secular and nationalist. On the other hand, official Damascus used to be one of the sponsors of the militant Islamist anti-Israeli and anti-Western groups in the Middle East. Besides, Syria is a close ally of Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Shi'ite Hizbullah. From our point of view, the union between Assad's Syria and Islamist groups was rather tactical than strategic one. Syria always played very important role for Sunni Islam, e.g., “the Land of Sham” had a big importance in eschatological beliefs of Sunni Muslims as a place of the final battle between Believers and Dajjal (Anti-Christ). Many foreign Islamist militant involved in Syrian War are inspired by this belief. Additionally, although a big majority of Syrians are Sunni, a dominance of Alawite sect in the political and social and economic life of the country disaffects of many Syrians with an escalation of Syrian conflict. Islamization of “Syrian revolution” is connected with cruel oppression of opposition by Assad's forces and powerless position of the West. At the same time, islamisation is a common feature of the Arab Spring. Arab Spring extremist Islamists have appeared along with relatively moderate Islamist and secular pro-Western groups. Foreign militant Jihadists play an important role in radicalisation of Islamist factor in the conflict. While Shi'ite groups (like pro-Iranian Hizbullah) regards Syria as a crucial part of Shi'ite belt from Mediterranean to Iran, Sunni extremists are not going to lose ground in the face of Shiite 'heretics'. The involvement of Arab Wahhabi monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) in the current turbulence must be also noted. ISIL is now the key actor of Syrian civil war. It is active not only in Syria but also in Iraq, the homeland of the organization. Initially, this Sunni militant group was closely connected to Al Qaeda. Now the relationships between them are rather tense because of ISIL’s efforts to overmaster another Jihadist group, “Front al Nusra”. The strategic aim of the ISIL is an establishment of an Islamic State (in Iraq and later in Syria) and the restoration of Caliphate. The tactics of the ISIL include guerrilla warfare and cruel terrorist attacks against military and civil people. In Syria ISIL fights against Assad's forces as armed opposition (both secular and Islamist) for control over territories and power. “Front al Nusra” (Front of Support of the Land of Sham People, FN) is genetically connected to ISIL. In terms of ideology there are no divergences between two groups, but they are rivals when it concerns the issues of popular support and political influence. Some Syrian people consider FN as a local group in contrast to foreign militants dominated ISIL. Activities of Jihadist groups is a real danger not only for Syria, but for the whole region and even worldwide.

In the article, different reasons for the long-lasting war against international terrorism under the Islamist banner are analysed. Notwithstanding the "Al-Qaeda's" weakening, since autumn 2001, many new groups have sprung up threatening the international security. Till now, the war has been waged only against terrorists, but no serious attention has been paid to neutralization of radical Islamism as an ideology causing terrorism. In connection with the military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-western feelings have been growing up breeding radical Islamism. It is emphasized in the article that the antiterrorist coalition in its present state is unable to fulfill its mission. It can become really efficient only if Muslim r&#233;gimes would increase their input into the common struggle. Standing on the ground of traditional Islam they could easier curb Islamism and thus cut the roots of terrorism.

As the political climate between many western and Muslim nations continuesto intensify, the rhetoric of a “clash of civilizations” has reemerged inour news media, governments, and academic institutions. Muslims andnon-Muslims, with varying political agendas, insist that Islam is inherentlyincompatible with modernity, democracy, and the West. Yet the contributorsto Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle Eastand Europe demonstrate otherwise as they examine the (re)Islamization ofEurope and the Middle East and reveal the ways in which “Islamic politicalactivism” (p. 3), or Islamism, promotes modernization.In the first of three sections, “Issues and Trends in Global Re-Islamization,” François Burgat describes how the progressive components of Islamization get hidden under a myriad of misconceptions. The termIslamist, he asserts, often serves to essentialize Muslim political activists bydepicting them as a homogenous group comprised of Islamic militants. Theuse of this term also “tends to strengthen the idea that Islamists are the onlyones using … religion for political purposes” (p. 28), though clearly otherindividuals, institutions, and religious organizations use religion for politicalends as well. Due to the essentialized and reductionist uses of the term, thereal characteristics of Islamism as a “relative, plural, and reactive” phenomenonare rarely recognized (p. 18). These obscuring lenses blur the image(s)of Islam even more in a country like France, where issues related to religionare often relegated to the “irrational.” In such contexts, Islamist movementsare constantly invalidated, though the activists’ reasons for opposition maywell be rooted in legitimate political, economic, and social factors.The obscurants that Burgat details in chapter 1 often cause individualsto view Islamists as anti-modernist and retrogressively reactionary. Yet inchapter 2, “The Modernizing Force of Islam,” Bjorn Olav Utvik argues “thatif Islamism is a reaction it is a progressive one, a step forward into somethingnew, not trying to reverse social developments, but rather to adapt religionso that it enables people to cope with the new realities” (p. 60). Utviklinks modernization to both urbanization and industrialization and characterizesit as a phenomenon that results in increased individualization, socialmobilization, and recognition of state centrality in achieving political ends(p. 43). He then proceeds to draw parallels between the goals of Islamistmovements and characteristics of modernization.In the next chapter, “Islam and Civil Society,” John Esposito furtherdemonstrates Islam’s compatibility with modernization and, more specifically,with democracy. He surveys Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, Iran,and the Gulf states in an effort to illustrate the importance, functionality,and popularity of their Islamic organizations. Importantly, he asserts thatwhile most of these Islamist movements begin by working within the foldof the governments’ established political processes, “the thwarting of a participatorypolitical process by governments that cancel elections or represspopulist Islamic movements fosters radicalization and extremism” (p. 92).Esposito suggests that increasing open competition for political power inthese countries and sustaining a reexamination of traditional Islamic rulingsregarding pluralism, tolerance, and women’s role in society will result ingreater compatibility between Islam and democracy ...

This article examines the relationship between religion and sociopolitical development in the context of the re-emergence of popular social movements in Muslim societies in the Middle East and North Africa. It makes a case that despite the decline of Islamism as a mode of social mobilization, religion maintains an active presence within the public sphere. Focusing on the religious-political discourses of Abdolkarim Soroush and neo-Shariatis, as the representatives of two distinct post-Islamist currents in post-revolutionary Iran, the article identifies some of the capacities and limitations of their particular conceptions of democratic public religiosity for contributing to the ongoing processes of change in Iran and other contemporary Muslim societies.

Bringing rightist movement studies into the Iranian context, this study advances a generalizable understanding of the ideological, moral, and cultural activism of Islamist movements and their rightist counterparts. While numerous studies have discussed the economic explanation of rightist movements, I integrate Islamist movements in the Muslim world and rightist movements in the West to develop a generalizable cultural and moral explanation of rightist movements. Value and ideological conflicts, as well as moral outrage, drive this integrated understanding of rightist movements. The rise of innovative and contentious forms of millennialism in Iran—especially the increasing salience of the Jamkaran mosque, the rise of new media outlets and millennial discourses, and pertinent policies—provide evidence for proposing this generalizable understanding. I argue that the rise of performative contentions surrounding millennialism, known as Mahdaviat, within the pro-regime revolutionary rightist movement in Iran was Islamists’ ideological response to liberal threat perceptions. These threat perceptions were activated before the liberal Reform era (1997–2005). After the ascent of Ahmadinejad to power in 2005, ideological millennialism became the dominant discursive field in Iran’s state politics. Drawing on narratives of prominent Islamist figures and media personalities in Iran and events surrounding Mahdaviat, this paper advances a generalizable argument of the moral and cultural explanation of rightist movements.

By analyzing the interest displayed by the followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in writings by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, this article shows how the Shi'i Islamist movement in Iran and Afghanistan was both transnational and influenced by Sunni Islamists in the Arab world. Using mostly Iranian and Afghan sources, this article discusses these influences through the notion of Islamic revolutionary ecumenism. While much attention has been given to Khomeini's call to "export" Iran's Islamic Revolution, this article shows some of the ways his own followers "imported" their ideology.

Oriental Christianity is not only a special part of global Christianity, but also its oldest one. The members of the ancient Christian community in the Hellenistic city of Antioch were the first to be called christianoi — Christians.2 But with the recent developments of the Syrian Crisis, the deep- rooted Christians of the region see themselves as a threatened minority. Since the Islamist rebel militia, the so called al-Dawlah al-lslamiyah ("The Islamic State") announced the establishment of a caliphate in parts of the region of northeastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, threats against local Christians have been occurring more frequently. Recently, Islamists have forced Christians to either convert to Islam, to flee, or in the case of refusal, they have even been killed (Gol 2014).

A few authors, while comparing the foreign policy of the Shah with that of khomeiny, have come to the conclusion either of a "total break" or, conversely, of a "continuity" with regard to the policy of Iran towards the Soviet Union. However, keeping only the Soviet Union in mind, but viewed from various levels in time and space, one can observe a break which derives from ideological incompatibility, then again a continuity which result s from some kind of realization of internal or external pressures. The fear arising from a threatening contiguity, the diplomatic isolation which followed the seizing of power in 1979, the pressure of political forces favourable to the USSR, the Kurdish minority in search of external allies, especially from the north, the ruinous war with Irak, the geopolitical constraints are such that the fundamentalists have not followed through their hostility to the end, in spite of its being fed by a series of historical resentments. The attitude of Iran towards the USSR still remains a real stake in its internal policy. The revolutionary turmoil has brought about a less blurred image of the USSR despite some confusion, an image once varied, then becoming apparently unified. The course of relations between Iran and the USSR depends to a great extent on the internal dynamics of the Iranian revolution, but also on the political evolution in the Middle East and on the new power struggle which could come about in that region.

AbstractConclusions from empirical analyses on how Islam influences democratic attitudes in Arab countries differ widely, and the field suffers from conceptual ambiguity and largely focuses on “superficial” democratic support. Based on the non-Middle Eastern literature, this study provides a more systematic theoretical and empirical assessment of the linkages between Islamic attitudes and the popular support for democracy. I link belonging (affiliation), commitment (religiosity), orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism to the support for democracy and politico-religious tolerance. Statistical analyses on seven WVS surveys for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia show that tolerance levels are remarkably lower than “democratic support”; the influence of being (committed or orthodox) Muslim and Muslim political attitudes are negligible however. Political Islamist views strongly affect tolerance negatively. They also influence “support for democracy,” but if the opposition in an authoritarian country is Islamic, these attitudes actually strengthen this support.

Dix-sept ans après la chute de Saddam Hussein, l’État irakien est paralysé par un système politique clientéliste, la violence de partis-milices et les ingérences étrangères. Alors que l’organisation État islamique (Daech) ne semble plus représenter une menace existentielle pour le pays, l’ordre politique mis en place par l’intervention américaine de 2003 cristallise la colère de la population .

What terms should we use to describe Islamic radicalism? We can distinguish two different types: fundamentalist and integrist. Although the second term is difficult to translate into English, it enables us to make enriching comparisons with modern Catho licism.

With the dramatic rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, we witnessed the revival of the Islamism-fascism comparison. This paper begins with a short history of the Islamism-fascism comparison. It then argues that both Islamism and fascism are coherent political ideologies. The author proposes a four-fold typology of different discourses in respect of the Islamism-fascism comparison, which are called ‘Thou shall not compare’, ‘Islamofascism’, ‘Islamofascism as epithet’, and ‘Dare to compare’. It’s concluded that we should compare Islamism and fascism, but that the two ideologies are distinctive, totalitarian ideologies. Clerical fascism is the closest ideologically to Islamism, although it is also a distinctive political ideology.

Abstract: This article deals with analyzing the place and the political Islam occupies on the Palestinian territories. The author tries to prove that despite the “Arab spring” and growing popularity of Islamism in the neighbor Arab countries its popular support among Palestinians is low. The main reason for this is Israeli total control of political, economic and - partially - social processes taking place in the West Bank. Position of the officials in Ramallah who together with Tel-Aviv strictly contain spread of Islamism throughout the West Bank also has a strong suppressing effect. Central Palestinian leadership may be called one of the few secular political establishments that are still in power in the Arab countries. The main explanation for this is the desire to make a positive effect on the international community, which Palestine totally depends on in political and financial terms. Also one should keep in mind secular beliefs of the current political elite in Palestine. President Mahmoud Abbas with his counterparts from FATAH and PLO represent old type of Arab nationalist politicians, almost all of who were stripped from power after the beginning of “Arab spring” in 2011. Finally, Palestinian society itself still feels united by the idea of national liberation from the Israeli occupation. This helps Palestinians to put aside the issue of religious self-identification. According to the surveys, most of Palestinians still rank their national identity number while describing their identity, while religion comes only second (despite the strong stable tendency for growing Islamization of their views). The only Palestinian enclave where political Islam has gained ground is isolated Gaza Strip. However ruling there “Islamic Resistance Movement” (HAMAS), despite declared anti-Zionism and Islamism, in reality show pragmatic readiness for certain coordination of its actions with Israel and central government in Ramallah. Nowadays one can witness the deepening conflict within the Islamist camp - between HAMAS and more radical Salafists, who support “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria. In the final end the fate of Political Islam in Palestine will depend on the success of Middle East peace process.

The article is devoted to the problem of the national security of Russia. The reasons that influenced the intensification of threats in connection with the events in Afghanistan are identified. The analysis of all the circumstances that caused the exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan. The article convincingly shows that the main reason for the destabilization of the situation in Afghanistan was the ill-considered and poorly organized withdrawal of US and NATO troops from the country, which provoked a humanitarian catastrophe in the country. The author notes that over the 20 years of the US stay in Afghanistan, it has not been possible to solve urgent political and socio-economic problems, political stabilization has not occurred. The crisis worsened in the country, the official Afghan government, which held power for several decades with US military support, could not resist. The Taliban (banned in the Russian Federation) came to power in the country, with the support of the majority of the population, and in a non-military way. The author believes that it is now unclear whether the moderate Taliban, seeking to establish international contacts, will remain in power, or the radical terrorist Islamist elements of the Taliban movement (banned in the Russian Federation) will prevail, whose activities are to whip up a terrorist threat, impose radical Islamism, and spread drug trafficking, etc. Migration flows from Afghanistan will increase, among which suicide bombers can penetrate into other countries. All this is not only an internal affair of Afghanistan, but also poses a threat to overall international security. For the countries adjacent to Afghanistan — Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, India, Central Asian countries and Turkey — a number of serious questions arose about the prospects for the development of the situation in Afghanistan, including significant threats to regional security: international terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, support for extremist and separatist movements from the territory of Afghanistan, encouragement of radical Islamists in neighboring countries with the victory of the Taliban (banned in the Russian Federation), etc. Russia is making every effort to establish constructive cooperation with neighboring countries and the United States in order to resolve the Afghan crisis.

AbstractA great number of scholarship has been devoted to examining the impacts of domestic politics to foreign policies. Many studies have also examined the impacts of international politics to domestic politics, focusing on democracy-building or constructing political institutions within the framework of the state-building. However, such scholarship has not focused enough on the impacts of international politics to opposition forces and their relationship to political conflict in the post-conflict era. In countries that have experienced regime change, the formerly exiled opposition forces that became the ruling parties had changed their policies under the influence of the host country and other foreign actors in international politics during their exile. This paper sheds light on the two main Iraqi Islamist parties, the Da‘wa Party and the SCIRI, and clarifies their changing policies under the influence of the host countries and international politics. It also makes clear how these changes were reflected by the political conflict in post-war Iraq. Scholars of Iraqi politics have discussed the reasons of political conflict in post-war Iraq as following: (1) sectarian conflicts as a result of the artificiality of the Iraqi state; and (2) struggles for the mobilization of votes in elections. Against these arguments, this paper considers the historical and international impacts on the formerly exiled Islamist ruling parties as a more significant factor in explaining the reasons for political conflict in post-war Iraq.By analyzing primary sources on segments of the Da‘wa Party and the SCIRI after their exile, the following two facts are clarified: First, the two Islamist parties came to have differing ideology as well as policy as a result of the influences from the host country and international politics, which reflected the political conflict in post-war Iraq. The SCIRI maintained good relations with the host country, Iran, and had its original Islamist ideology, while the Da‘wa Party, not being able to maintain cooperative relations with the host country, consequently changed its Islamist ideology to a more nationalist ideology under the direct influence of Western society. In the post-war era, the SCIRI attempted to construct a regional government in the south based on a transnational Islamist ideology, while the Da‘wa Party attempted to construct a centralized government based on a nationalism that aimed to strengthen national unity. Second, the international societies’ intervention into the Iraqi opposition forces created mutual distrust, which in turn prolonged political conflict in post-war era. Therefore, an analysis of the historical and international impacts on opposition forces is necessary to understand the reasons for the political struggles in the post-conflict countries.

In this critically insightful and highly readable book of political ethnogra- phy, Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at University of Toronto, seeks to explain how and why Islamist movements continue to militarily prevail and politically succeed in forming proto-states, over clan, ethnic, and/or tribal based competitions, amidst the chaos and disorder of civil wars across the contemporary Muslim world, from Mali to Mindanao. To this end, Ahmad seeks to go beyond the usual expositions that center the explanatory power of Islamist ideologies and identities, which dominate the scholarly fields of political science, international relations, security studies as well as the global public discourse shaped by journalists, politicians, and the punditry of shouting heads everywhere. Through a deep, immersive study of power in Afghanistan and Soma- lia, Ahmad demonstrates the profoundly symbiotic relationship between Islamists and the local business class. While recognizing the interconnec- tions between violent conflict and illicit trade is nothing new, Ahmad’s explication of the economic logics of Islamist proto-states furnishes a nov- el two-stage dynamic to explain the indispensability and ubiquity of this Islamist-business alliance in conflict zones. The first is the gradual social process of conversion of the business class’ worldview and practice to align them with Islamist identity formations, which is “aimed at mitigating un- certainty and improving access to markets” (xvii). Alongside this long-term socialization is a second, short-term political-economic dynamic of rapid shift in the business class’s collective patronage of a new Islamist faction, based on the assumption that it will lower the cost of business. The for- midable alliance between business class interests and Islamist institutions brings forth the new Islamist proto-state. Chapter one of the book adum- brates this two-stage argument and offers justifications for the two case studies, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The second chapter unpacks the two-stage dynamic in detail. We learn that in modern civil wars across the Muslim world, business communi- ties intentionally adopt ardent Islamist identities as a practical means to- ward building trust and lowering cost. Islamist factions, aspiring toward hegemony, offer the possibility of economic relationships that transcend the ethnic boundaries which limit rival factions rooted in clan, tribal, or ethno-linguistic social formations. This leads to the second, faster conver- gence of business-Islamist interests, wherein the Islamist groups leverage their broader social identity and economic market to offer stronger secu- rity at a lower cost. This development of an economy of scale leads the local business elites to throw their financial support behind the Islamists at a critical juncture of militant competition. Once this threshold is met, Islamist factions rapidly conquer and consolidate territories from their rel- atively socially constrained rivals to form a new proto-state, like the Taliban regime and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). When we look at the timeline of their development (the Taliban in 1994 and the ICU in 2006), we notice a similar length of gestation, about 15 years of war. This similarity may be coincidental, but the political-military threshold is the same. Both societ- ies, ravaged by civil war, reached a stalemate. At this critical juncture the positional properties of Islamist formations in the field of civil war factions gives the Islamists a decided economic (cost analysis) and social (trust building across clan/tribal identities) advantage. Chapters three to six examine each of the two processes for the se- lected sites of inquiry. Thus chapters three and five, respectively, explore the long-term Islamist identity construction within the smuggling industry in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, and the Somali business elites’ gradual convergence with Islamists. In chapter four, Ahmad explores the second dynamic in the context of rising security costs during the Afghan civil war. Mullah Omar’s Taliban provided the order and security across the borderland that had previously eluded the variety of industries. This allowed the Taliban to expand on the backs of voluntary donations, rather than extortions like their rival tribal warlords, which in turn allowed them to recruit and retain more disciplined fighters (81). The source of these donations was the business class, especially those involved in the highly lucrative transit trade, which, before the rise of Taliban, paid immense op- portunity cost at the hands of rapacious local and tribal warlord fiefdoms and bandits. Instead of the multitude of checkpoints crisscrossing south- ern Afghanistan and the borderlands, the Taliban presented a simplified administration. While the rest of the world took notice of their repressive measures against women’s mobility, education, and cultural expression, the men of the bazaar appreciated the newly acquired public safety to ply their trade and the lowered cost of doing business. Chapter six, “The Price of Protection: The Rise of the Islamic Courts Union,” demonstrates a similar mutually beneficial Islamist-business relationship emerging out of the incessant clan-based militia conflicts that had especially plagued southern Somalia since the fall of the last national government in 1991. Businesspeople, whether they were tycoons or small business owners, had to pay two types of tax. First was what was owed to the local racket or warlord, and the second was to the ever-fragmenting sub-clan militias and their checkpoints on the intercity highways. Unlike their rival, the Transitional Federal Government (TGF), ICU forged their supra-clan institutional identity through a universalist legal discourse and practice rooted in Islamic law and ethics. They united the courts and their associated clan-based militias, including al-Shabaab. Ahmad demonstrates, through a synthesis of secondary literature and original political ethnogra- phy, the economic logics of ICU’s ability to overcome the threshold of ma- terial and social support needed to establish the rule of law and a far-reach- ing functioning government. If the Taliban and the ICU had solved the riddle of creating order and security to create hegemonic proto-states, then what was their downfall? Chapter seven gives us an account of the international interventions that caused the collapse of the two proto-states. In the aftermath of their de- struction, the internationally supported regimes that replaced them, de- spite immense monetary and military aid, have failed to gain the same level of legitimacy across Afghanistan and Somalia. In chapter eight, Ahmad expands the scope of analysis to North/Western Africa (Al-Qaeda in the Is- lamic Maghrib: AQIM), Middle East (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: ISIS), and South Asia (Tahrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan: TTP). At the time of this book’s publication, these movements were not yet, as Ahmad posits, closed cases like the Taliban and the ICU. Thus, the data from this chapter’s comparative survey furnishes suggestive arguments for Ahmad’s larger thesis, namely that Islamist proto-states emerge out of a confluence of economic and security interests rather than mere ideological and identity politics. The epistemic humility of this chapter signals to this reader two lines of constructive criticism of some aspects of Ahmad’s sub- stantiation of this thesis. First, the juxtaposing of Islamist success against their clan-/tribal iden- tity-based rivals may be underestimating the element of ethnic solidarity in those very Islamists’ political success. The most glaring case is the Taliban, which in its original formation and in its post-American invasion frag- mentations, across the Durand Line, was more or less founded on a pan- or-tribal Pashtun social identity and economic compulsions relative to the other Afghan ethno-linguistic communities. How does one disaggregate the force of ethnic solidarity (even if it is only a necessary condition, rather than a cause) from economic calculus in explaining the rise of the Taliban proto-state? The second issue in this juxtaposition is that when we compare a suc- cessful Islamist movement against socially limited ethnocentric rivals, we discount the other Islamist movements that failed. Explanations for those Islamists that failed to create a proto-state along the lines of the ICU or the Taliban, such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (Somalia) or Gulbuddin Hekmat- yar’s Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan), needed to be more robustly taken into account and integrated into the substantiation of Ahmad’s thesis. Even in the section on ISIS, it would have been helpful to integrate the case of Jabhat al-Nusra’s (an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria) inability to create a proto-state to rival ISIS. We must ask, why do some Jihadi Islamist movements prevail against each other and why do others fail? Perhaps some of these Islamist movements appear too early to scale up their operation (i.e., they precede Ahmad’s ‘critical juncture’), or they were too embroiled and too partisan in the illicit trade network to fully leverage their Islamist universalism to create the trust and bonds that are the first part of Ahmad’s two-stage dy- namic. Possible answers would need to complement Ahmad’s excellent po- litical ethnography with deeper quantitative dives to identify the statistical variations of these critical junctures: when does the cost of warlords and mafias’ domination outweigh the cost of Islamist-Jihadi movements’ social- ly repressive but economically liberating regimes? At which point in the social evolution of society during an unending civil war do identities forged by the bonds of blood give way to those imagined through bonds of faith? These two critical suggestions do not diminish Ahmad’s highly teach- able work. This book should be read by all concerned policy makers, schol- ars in the social sciences and humanities, and anyone who wants to go be- yond ‘culture talk’ historical causation by ideas and identity and uncover structuralist explanations for the rise of Jihadi Islamist success in civil wars across the Muslim world. It is especially recommended for adoption in cog- nate courses at the undergraduate level, for its combination of erudition and readability. Maheen ZamanAssistant ProfessorDepartment of HistoryAugsburg University

In this critically insightful and highly readable book of political ethnogra- phy, Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at University of Toronto, seeks to explain how and why Islamist movements continue to militarily prevail and politically succeed in forming proto-states, over clan, ethnic, and/or tribal based competitions, amidst the chaos and disorder of civil wars across the contemporary Muslim world, from Mali to Mindanao. To this end, Ahmad seeks to go beyond the usual expositions that center the explanatory power of Islamist ideologies and identities, which dominate the scholarly fields of political science, international relations, security studies as well as the global public discourse shaped by journalists, politicians, and the punditry of shouting heads everywhere. Through a deep, immersive study of power in Afghanistan and Soma- lia, Ahmad demonstrates the profoundly symbiotic relationship between Islamists and the local business class. While recognizing the interconnec- tions between violent conflict and illicit trade is nothing new, Ahmad’s explication of the economic logics of Islamist proto-states furnishes a nov- el two-stage dynamic to explain the indispensability and ubiquity of this Islamist-business alliance in conflict zones. The first is the gradual social process of conversion of the business class’ worldview and practice to align them with Islamist identity formations, which is “aimed at mitigating un- certainty and improving access to markets” (xvii). Alongside this long-term socialization is a second, short-term political-economic dynamic of rapid shift in the business class’s collective patronage of a new Islamist faction, based on the assumption that it will lower the cost of business. The for- midable alliance between business class interests and Islamist institutions brings forth the new Islamist proto-state. Chapter one of the book adum- brates this two-stage argument and offers justifications for the two case studies, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The second chapter unpacks the two-stage dynamic in detail. We learn that in modern civil wars across the Muslim world, business communi- ties intentionally adopt ardent Islamist identities as a practical means to- ward building trust and lowering cost. Islamist factions, aspiring toward hegemony, offer the possibility of economic relationships that transcend the ethnic boundaries which limit rival factions rooted in clan, tribal, or ethno-linguistic social formations. This leads to the second, faster conver- gence of business-Islamist interests, wherein the Islamist groups leverage their broader social identity and economic market to offer stronger secu- rity at a lower cost. This development of an economy of scale leads the local business elites to throw their financial support behind the Islamists at a critical juncture of militant competition. Once this threshold is met, Islamist factions rapidly conquer and consolidate territories from their rel- atively socially constrained rivals to form a new proto-state, like the Taliban regime and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). When we look at the timeline of their development (the Taliban in 1994 and the ICU in 2006), we notice a similar length of gestation, about 15 years of war. This similarity may be coincidental, but the political-military threshold is the same. Both societ- ies, ravaged by civil war, reached a stalemate. At this critical juncture the positional properties of Islamist formations in the field of civil war factions gives the Islamists a decided economic (cost analysis) and social (trust building across clan/tribal identities) advantage. Chapters three to six examine each of the two processes for the se- lected sites of inquiry. Thus chapters three and five, respectively, explore the long-term Islamist identity construction within the smuggling industry in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, and the Somali business elites’ gradual convergence with Islamists. In chapter four, Ahmad explores the second dynamic in the context of rising security costs during the Afghan civil war. Mullah Omar’s Taliban provided the order and security across the borderland that had previously eluded the variety of industries. This allowed the Taliban to expand on the backs of voluntary donations, rather than extortions like their rival tribal warlords, which in turn allowed them to recruit and retain more disciplined fighters (81). The source of these donations was the business class, especially those involved in the highly lucrative transit trade, which, before the rise of Taliban, paid immense op- portunity cost at the hands of rapacious local and tribal warlord fiefdoms and bandits. Instead of the multitude of checkpoints crisscrossing south- ern Afghanistan and the borderlands, the Taliban presented a simplified administration. While the rest of the world took notice of their repressive measures against women’s mobility, education, and cultural expression, the men of the bazaar appreciated the newly acquired public safety to ply their trade and the lowered cost of doing business. Chapter six, “The Price of Protection: The Rise of the Islamic Courts Union,” demonstrates a similar mutually beneficial Islamist-business relationship emerging out of the incessant clan-based militia conflicts that had especially plagued southern Somalia since the fall of the last national government in 1991. Businesspeople, whether they were tycoons or small business owners, had to pay two types of tax. First was what was owed to the local racket or warlord, and the second was to the ever-fragmenting sub-clan militias and their checkpoints on the intercity highways. Unlike their rival, the Transitional Federal Government (TGF), ICU forged their supra-clan institutional identity through a universalist legal discourse and practice rooted in Islamic law and ethics. They united the courts and their associated clan-based militias, including al-Shabaab. Ahmad demonstrates, through a synthesis of secondary literature and original political ethnogra- phy, the economic logics of ICU’s ability to overcome the threshold of ma- terial and social support needed to establish the rule of law and a far-reach- ing functioning government. If the Taliban and the ICU had solved the riddle of creating order and security to create hegemonic proto-states, then what was their downfall? Chapter seven gives us an account of the international interventions that caused the collapse of the two proto-states. In the aftermath of their de- struction, the internationally supported regimes that replaced them, de- spite immense monetary and military aid, have failed to gain the same level of legitimacy across Afghanistan and Somalia. In chapter eight, Ahmad expands the scope of analysis to North/Western Africa (Al-Qaeda in the Is- lamic Maghrib: AQIM), Middle East (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: ISIS), and South Asia (Tahrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan: TTP). At the time of this book’s publication, these movements were not yet, as Ahmad posits, closed cases like the Taliban and the ICU. Thus, the data from this chapter’s comparative survey furnishes suggestive arguments for Ahmad’s larger thesis, namely that Islamist proto-states emerge out of a confluence of economic and security interests rather than mere ideological and identity politics. The epistemic humility of this chapter signals to this reader two lines of constructive criticism of some aspects of Ahmad’s sub- stantiation of this thesis. First, the juxtaposing of Islamist success against their clan-/tribal iden- tity-based rivals may be underestimating the element of ethnic solidarity in those very Islamists’ political success. The most glaring case is the Taliban, which in its original formation and in its post-American invasion frag- mentations, across the Durand Line, was more or less founded on a pan- or-tribal Pashtun social identity and economic compulsions relative to the other Afghan ethno-linguistic communities. How does one disaggregate the force of ethnic solidarity (even if it is only a necessary condition, rather than a cause) from economic calculus in explaining the rise of the Taliban proto-state? The second issue in this juxtaposition is that when we compare a suc- cessful Islamist movement against socially limited ethnocentric rivals, we discount the other Islamist movements that failed. Explanations for those Islamists that failed to create a proto-state along the lines of the ICU or the Taliban, such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (Somalia) or Gulbuddin Hekmat- yar’s Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan), needed to be more robustly taken into account and integrated into the substantiation of Ahmad’s thesis. Even in the section on ISIS, it would have been helpful to integrate the case of Jabhat al-Nusra’s (an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria) inability to create a proto-state to rival ISIS. We must ask, why do some Jihadi Islamist movements prevail against each other and why do others fail? Perhaps some of these Islamist movements appear too early to scale up their operation (i.e., they precede Ahmad’s ‘critical juncture’), or they were too embroiled and too partisan in the illicit trade network to fully leverage their Islamist universalism to create the trust and bonds that are the first part of Ahmad’s two-stage dy- namic. Possible answers would need to complement Ahmad’s excellent po- litical ethnography with deeper quantitative dives to identify the statistical variations of these critical junctures: when does the cost of warlords and mafias’ domination outweigh the cost of Islamist-Jihadi movements’ social- ly repressive but economically liberating regimes? At which point in the social evolution of society during an unending civil war do identities forged by the bonds of blood give way to those imagined through bonds of faith? These two critical suggestions do not diminish Ahmad’s highly teach- able work. This book should be read by all concerned policy makers, schol- ars in the social sciences and humanities, and anyone who wants to go be- yond ‘culture talk’ historical causation by ideas and identity and uncover structuralist explanations for the rise of Jihadi Islamist success in civil wars across the Muslim world. It is especially recommended for adoption in cog- nate courses at the undergraduate level, for its combination of erudition and readability. Maheen ZamanAssistant ProfessorDepartment of HistoryAugsburg University

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the paradoxical consequences the so-called “Arab Spring”, from 2011 to 2014/15, which has led in various countries of the Arab world and beyond to different outcomes, but nowhere to stable democracy. We intend to discuss the outcomes of those political mobilizations and revolts, paying special attention to (a) the role of Islamist movements and (b) U.S reactions to the recent Mideast upheavals. We start with a general analysis and go to a few case studies (e.g. Egypt, Syria, and Turkey). In discussing the impact of Islamism, we attempt a classification of currents along two coordinates, one parameter contrasting Sunni and Shiite movements, the other laying out the continuum from pacific-modernist to violent jihadist. We defend that the dynamics of intra-Islamist tensions (such as Sunni jihadist against the Shiite Hizbullah-Syria-Iran axis) are no less crucial than the religious-secularist divide for understanding recent developments. Regarding US policies, we emphasize the dilemmas and contradictions within U.S government. We investigate the hypothesis that the US was caught largely unaware by the Arab Spring, and that its reactions suffered from the amorphousness of prior positions of the Obama administration, combined with leftovers from the Bush period. Internal contradictions of Obama’s Middle East doctrine coupled with a general isolationist trend have precluded the US from assuming more forceful policies, creating frustrations on all sides, and enflaming rather than dousing the fires of anti-Westernism in the Islamic world.Keywords: Arab Spring ; U.S policies ; Syria; jihadist. Resumo: O principal objetivo deste artigo é discutir as consequências paradoxais da chamada "Primavera Árabe", que a partir de 2011 aos nossos dias produziu em vários países do mundo árabe diferentes resultados, mas em nenhum lugar chegou-se à democracia estável. Temos a intenção de discutir os resultados dessas mobilizações políticas e revoltas, com especial atenção para (a) o papel dos movimentos islâmicos e (b) as reações e posturas dos EUA ante os recentes levantes no Oriente Médio. De uma análise geral partiremos para estudos de caso (como Egito, Síria e Turquia). Ao discutir o impacto do islamismo, tentamos uma classificação das correntes ao longo de duas coordenadas, um deles contrastando movimentos sunitas e xiitas, e outro que define o continuum de pacifista - modernista para jihadista –violento. Postulamos que a dinâmica das tensões intra- islâmicos (como a de jihadistas sunitas contra o eixo Hezbollah -Síria- Irã xiita) não são menos importantes do que a divisão religiosa - secular para compreender os desdobramentos recentes. No que diz respeito aos EUA, destacamos os dilemas e contradições dentro do governo dos EUA. Nós investigamos a hipótese de que os EUA foi pego de surpresa em grande parte pela Primavera Árabe, e que as reações do governo Obama traduzem mais um recolhimento do que um novo engajamento.Palavras-chave: Primavera Árabe; Políticas dos EUA; Síria; jihadismo. DOI: 10.20424/2237-7743/bjir.v4n3p442-475

This article looks at the structure and the dynamics of the Middle Eastern crisis set in motion by the events of the Arab Spring. At the heart of the crisis was Syria, where antigovernment protests broke out in early 2011, almost in parallel with other countries also affected by the Arab Spring. Starting from late March 2011, the unrest morphed into a civil war, leading to a large-scale crisis engulfing the country by the end of the year. At first, the opposition to the Syrian regime consisted of numerous groups with varying political affiliations – from liberals to Islamists – however, by early 2012, radical Islamism came to dominate the opposition forces. And by the end of the same year, the opposition was spearheaded by an openly terrorist organization – the al-Nusra Front, an outgrowth of the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. Over the same period, regional and international forces were becoming more and more involved in the Syrian crisis. Since 2012, in parallel with the Syrian crisis, there has been another internal conflict raging in the Middle East, namely in Iraq, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) taking the foreground and combining groups of Iraqi al-Qaeda militants with Baathist underground forces. In 2014–2015, ISIL took hold of large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, effectively turning the Syrian civil war into a regional conflict. In addition to Syria and Iraq, the ongoing crisis has involved – either directly or indirectly – such actors as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and a number of other regional powers. Turkey has been indirectly involved in the Syrian crisis since its very beginning, but starting from 2016 its engagement in the conflict has become much more active – not only in Syria, but also in Iraq. In 2013, Iran started to interfere in the Syrian crisis directly, using its Shia allies, and expanded its presence onto Iraq in 2014. Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s participation in the Syrian conflict has been indirect, mainly through military and financial assistance provided to their clients inside the country. However, Saudi Arabia’s activities in Syria have started to decline in 2015, due to its military involvement in Yemen, which – in a broader context – can be perceived as a peripheral component of the large regional conflict. In addition to the above mentioned components, one could also name a number of other equally important factors to the crisis. One of them is that the ranks of al- Nusra and ISIL militants have been reinforced not only by people coming from the Arab countries, but also from the citizens of Western Europe, North America and the former USSR. Another factor has been the growing role of Kurdish groups in the confrontation with the terrorists, especially with ISIL. This has led to the creation of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. At the same time, an armed confrontation began in Turkish Kurdistan, which Turkey views as a threat to its territorial integrity. The Syrian crisis has also been marked by involvement of global powers, such as the US and Russia. The US-led international coalition has not succeeded in changing the course of the conflict – on the other hand, Russia’s involvement since the second half of 2015 has made a significant difference. With the end of the campaign against ISIL already in view, and with the prospects for a successful intra- Syrian settlement, it would seem reasonable to raise the question of the post-conflict configuration of the region, which is discussed at the end of the article.

Abstract: This article aims at analyzing agenda of socio-political changes among Indonesian middle class muslim . Compared with other middle class groups, middle class muslim is a middle class which tends to have political sense toward political changes. It is caused by its political experiences they have got such as alienation, authoritarianism, and inequality. Those ironic experiences make Indonesian middle class become political agent. Political experiences which have happened in middle east such as Turkey, Iran, and Egypt become main preferention to analyze current situation. Therea are two prominent perspectives to see socio-political changes which are addressed to Indonesian middle class muslim: post Islamism and Islam populism . The first perspective, political changes is synergically based on mutual cooperation between Islam, democracy, and liberalism. On the other hand, the second one, revolusion is placed as the main strategy of affirmative political change done by middle class. More specifically, Islamist ideology rejects religious modernity and seeks to oppose Islam against secular, pluralistic and liberal understandings of the “emancipated self” and the democratic public sphere. Those both perspectives are then used to analyze case of Indonesian middle class muslims. This article will elaborate more deeply to analyze socio-political changes among Indonesian middle class muslims.الملخص: هذا الكتاب يحصل ليتخذ الفرق فى الثقفة والسياسيّة على الفنّ المتوسط للمسلمين الاندونسي اختلافا بالفنّ المتوسّط الاخرى. الفنّ المتوسط للمسلمين كان فنّا متوسطا سياسيّا على اختلاف السياسيّة. ذالك الفصل يشمل بكون السياسيّة المحصول كمثل رأي الناس. و يشمل ايضا هذا الكتاب يتّخذ على المعاشرة بالمعروف. كثرة حال السائريصير فنّا متوسّطا للمسلمين للدلالة السياسيّة. السياسيّة فى كون مثل المعاشرة فى العرب, كمثل مصرى, تركى, عير اختيار الاولى للتخاذ الفرق على الثقفة السياسيّة فى ذالك المكان. امّا الاوّل رأيان فى نظر فرق ثقفة السياسيّة بعلاملت فنّ متوسّط المسلمين. وهو بعد الاسلاميّة و الاسلامية الذى نصر المستضعفين. الرأي الاوّل, يحصل على الحضارة و دموكراتية و الحرّية. الرأي الثانى, يحصل على التغيّر بطريق الاوّل من تغيير السياسيّة تأكيدا يعمل على الفنّ المتوسّط. رأيان يستقبل ليتّخذ فنّ المسلمين فى اندنسي. هذا الكتاب يصير فى تغيير ثقفة السياسية على فنّ متوسّط المسلمين فى اندنسي.Abstrak: Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis agenda perubahan sosial politik bagi kelas menengah muslim Indonesia. Dibandingkan dengan kelas menengah lainnya, kelas menengah muslim adalah kelas menengah yang politis terhadap perubahan politik. Hal tersebut terkait dengan adanya pengalaman politis yang dialami seperti halnya alienasi, otoritarianisme, maupn juga ketimpangan. Berbagai kondisi satir itulah yang menjadikan kelas menengah muslim tampil sebagai agen politik. Pengalaman politik seperti yang terjadi dalam kasus masyarakat Timur Tengah seperti Mesir, Turki, dan Iran menjadi preferensi utama dalam menganalisis perubahan sosial politik yang ada. Terdapat dua perspektif penting dalam melihat agenda perubahan sosial politik yang dialamatkan oleh kelas menengah muslim yakni post-Islamisme dan Islam populisme. Perspektif pertama lebih mengandalkan adanya sinergi antara Islam, demokrasi, dan liberalisme. Perspektif kedua lebih mendudukkan revolusi sebagai jalan utama perubahan politik afirmatif yang dilakukan oleh kelas menengah. Kedua perspektif itulah yang kemudian dilihat dalam menganalisis kasus kelas menengah muslim Indonesia. Tulisan ini akan mengelaborasi lebih dalam mengenai agenda perubahan sosial poltik dalam kelas menengah muslim Indonesia.

Résumé Cette recherche a pour objectif d’expliquer le changement et la continuité dans les stratégies de développement économique pendant la Première République (1980-1988) en Iran. La stratégie de développement économique a connu une transformation importante après la révolution islamique en 1979. Pendant la Première République, la stratégie du « socialisme islamique » a été appliquée par le nouvel État islamique. La question principale est la suivante : quels sont les facteurs déterminants de la continuité et du changement dans les stratégies de développement en Iran ? Selon notre approche théorique, les nouvelles stratégies de développement s’expliquent par les changements et la transformation dans les institutions politiques, particulièrement l’État. Nous appuyant sur l’approche néo-institutionnaliste, nous présentons le modèle explicatif suivant : la configuration et l’interaction particulière de quatre facteurs expliquent le choix et le changement dans les stratégies de développement économique en Iran : l’État, la société civile, le système mondial et les idées.

Abstract The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has perpetuated a negative rhetoric of the West and the United States in particular since the Islamic Revolution. With the help of ethnographic examples, this essay argues that parts of youth in urban Iran are fascinated by the West in a way that stands in stark contrast to the negative image given by the Islamic Republic. Résumé Le gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran a perpétué une rhétorique négative de l'Occident et des États-Unis en particulier depuis la révolution islamique. À l'aide d'exemples ethnographiques, cet essai soutient que des parties de la jeunesse de l'Iran urbain sont fascinées par l'Occident d'une manière qui contraste fortement avec l'image négative donnée par la République islamique.

Abstract Following the 1979 Revolution, the new regime began propagating a pan-Islamic ideology in order to unify Muslims under the rule of one country, the Islamic Republic of Iran. While it succeeded in recruiting proxies for this purpose, it has yet to succeed in materializing pan-Islamism. Iran’s proxies, who are currently active in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are not only assisting Iran to reach its strategic goal of becoming the dominant power in the Middle East, but they are also beginning to import Iran’s human rights policies. One emerging example is the case of the Bahá’ís. In recent years, the Houthis, who are Iran’s proxy in Yemen, have begun severely persecuting the Bahá’ís in that country. The Bahá’ís in Yemen make only 1 percent of the non-Muslim population but they are the most persecuted group there. What this article aims to tackle are the reasons why there is a divergence in Iran’s bilateral versus multilateral export of human rights violation policies and why the Bahá’ís are a target of the Houthis in the middle of a conflict when this proxy has been created to fight against Saudi Arabia.

Les récentes manifestations en Iran ont affaibli le gouvernement du président Hassan Rohani qui s’efforce de conserver une ligne centriste. On assiste à une contestation radicale qui met en cause la légitimité des institutions. La colère d’une part croissante de la population menace la survie du régime mis en place par l’ayatollah Khomeyni.

Lige siden Hizb’allah første gang fandt vej til alverdens forsider for et kvart århundrede siden, har den Islamiske Republik Iran og ayat’allah Muhammed Hussein Fadlallahs indflydelse på organisationen været genstand for megen debat. Artiklen foreslår, at en diskursanalytisk og kritisk diskursanalytisk forståelse af religiøse magtstrukturer kan være med til at nuancere forståelsen af Hizb’allahs aktørråderum og relationskomplekser. Der argumenteres således for, at organisationen er underlagt wali al-faqihs autoritet, men i de senere år har udviklet stadig større frihedsgrader. I udfyldelsen heraf har marja al-taqlid Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah været en vigtig inspirationskilde, om end organisationen officielt følger Ali al-Khamenis marjaiyyat. Som konsekvens har organisationens medlemmers hverdag på mange områder været mere præget af maraji altaqlid, Ali al-Sistani og afdøde Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah end af Ali al-Khamenei.

This study addresses a lack of compatibility or similarity between two or more facts. Discrepancies in the meta-law, body of law or law above law. The study is to find out the obstacles and challenges of rights in constitution and Iraqi constitution as a case study. In post-2003, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, new constitution been imposed on Iraq (as some scholars affirm that) by the US. Moreover, both liberalism and Islamism been pushed as a law in “Iraqi New Constitution”. The study will focus on the individual, minority, and gender rights Islamism principle in Iraqi constitution and the inconsistency between both liberalism and Islamism in Iraqi Constitution. To test our argument, the study is using quantitative data. The study finds out that Iraqi constitution articles are inconsistent with each other. What is more, there are declining in the rights of individual, minority, and women.

This article analysis Ali Ezzatyar’s The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan, which aims to prove how the Kurds’ supposed indisposition towards political Islam qualifies them to be the natural allies of the West and the Western powers. Supported by the two theses of shared social values and shared rivalries between the Kurds and the West, and centred around its main protagonist Ahmad Muftizadeh’s supposedly alternative form of political Islam, the book is based on two premises: a declining relationship throughout the twentieth century between Kurdish identity and Islamism, and the inconsequential nature of the relationship between Iranian Islamism and Kurdish Islamism. In contrast, and in order to save history from merely serving policy-making, this article argues that the relationships involved were determined in the wider context of the process of the modernization of Iran, in which political Islam emerged and, albeit to a limited extent, influenced the development of a religious Kurdayeti or Kurdishness represented by Muftizadeh.

Considering the “relativization of identity”, “the positive recognition of the other”, “the mutual evaluation of cultures”, and the “creation of a normative world culture” as “four main kinds of cosmopolitan relationships” and, therefore, using the term cosmopolitanism in a “post-Western” register of meaning, I will make a case that Iranian identity in a post-Islamist condition needs a kind of struggle for recognition if it wants to locate itself at the interface of the local and the global. Taking the correlation between the discourse of post-Islamism and a deconstructive theory of identity into consideration, this paper addresses a central question in identity studies: can a downgraded identity rooted in a decent civilization—one in which both “moral” and “material” values for the globalized word have demoted—be reinvented? I argue that being accorded recognition, however, is different from self-congratulation within the boundaries of a local identity. In the former case, a nation’s identity is recognized for something it offers to the multifacetedness and multidimensionality of the contemporary world. In the latter, that identity retreats to the civilizational memory of ancestors now no longer relevant to the world issues. For a nation to reinvent its cultural identity from a universal vantage point, it is necessary to articulate its experiences in particular cultural forms which can be understood by others. It is only then that one’s self becomes known to the other, as well as to oneself. This paper will deconstruct the concept of identity and then discuss the challenges and prospects of reinventing identity in the particular context of post-Islamist Iran. Challenges refer to the crises of an identity that could prevent its revitalization such as a persistent failure to acknowledge the historical crisis of an identity in terms of both “material” and “cultural” measures. Prospects refer to the availability of internal mechanisms that could enable reinvention of an identity, e.g., the availability of internal mechanisms that would allow the reinvention of cultural identity.

Protector of Shiites, export of Islamist revolution, fight against Israel and support of Palestine – the religious element plays an obvious role in Iran’s foreign relations. At the same time, several foreign policy actions and positions of Iran indicate the prioritization of material national interests (of geopolitical and economic nature): a recent example is the nuclear deal from July 2015. The article will first discuss theoretical approaches in the social sciences for the analysis of religion in international relations; subsequently, the ideological foundation and constitutional principles of the Islamist Republic of Iran are set out as the basis for empirical case analyses in the final section.

Ideology is an important determinant in foreign policy.However, it has its implications. Pahlavi Shah's Westernization policies and their dissociation with Islamic ideology were the main features of their rule. The early leadership of Pakistan and Iran(Muhammad Reza Shah) were secular in outlook, paid little attention to ideology and had shared interests. While in Pakistan, the religious identity and its liberal national identity are still debated, and Pakistan has to reconcile between the two competing points of view. The Islamic revolution was unique in character as the earlier resolutions in the world were predominantly secular, while in Iran, it had religious trappings. The intellectuals in Iran like Jalal Al-Ahmed, Shariati, and all shades of parties played a significant role in inciting the people for the revolution. In South Asia, Allama Iqbal, Jamal ud-din Afghani, and Maulana Maududi influenced the people for Pan-Islamism and a utopian Islamic society. The after math of the Iranian revolution were grim, and people at the helm of affairs at the time of Shah were either executed or left the country for good. The relations between Zia ul-Haq and Khomeini, two proponents of Islamic ideology, were not good. Zia combined the elements of Islamism with pragmatism, while Khomeini was more radical and committed to its ideology.