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1
Hilmy, Masdar. "THE CONFIGURATION OF RADICAL ISLAMISM IN INDONESIA: Some Contemporary Assessments and Trajectories." Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam 14, no. 1 (May 1, 2014): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.21154/al-tahrir.v14i1.84.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<em>This paper<strong> </strong>attempts at analyzing the configuration of radical Islamism in contemporary Indonesia. The basic argument developed throughout this paper is that the reality of radical Islamism will always exist as long as all necessary conditions are there. Adopting the opportunity structure theory, among the necessary conditions that lead to the birth and existence of radical Islamism are: 1) Islamist ideology derived from the sacred texts, the Qur’an and Sunnah; 2) socio-political setting and issues where Muslims live; 3) actors, the Islamists, who craft the logics of Islamist ideology based on the interplay between the issues prevalent in the Muslims’ socio-political setting and the ideology constructed from the sacred texts. This article is divided into parts as follows: 1) the streams in Islamist thought and movement; 2) the anatomy of radical Islamism; 3) the membership of radical Islamism, and 4) the trajectories of radical Islamism, before it is ended with concluding remarks.</em>
2
Zulfadli, Zulfadli. "Kontestasi Ormas Islamis di Indonesia." Al-Tahrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam 18, no. 1 (June 5, 2018): 63. http://dx.doi.org/10.21154/altahrir.v18i1.1176.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract: This article discussed about contestation of Islamist mass groups in Indonesia. In general, Islamists or Islamism refers to an islamic organizations which based their political ideology on Islam. This study finds out what strategies used by the islamist group to attain their political agenda and its implications when they are confronting with other mainstream and islamic group. This research uses qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach. This research used theoritical framework of Islamic Revivalism, Political Islam, Islamism and Social Movement theory. The result of the discussion shows that islamis contestation of mainstream islamic mass group in Indonesia to dominate arena through political movements: first, by taking benefits from political opportunity, including transformastion underground movement become legal movement; second, through structural mobilization, which consists of internal mobilization and external mobilization; third, using framing proces, by counter all isues and systems form the west, such as democracy, nationalism and human rights; fourth infiltration by controlling mosque, campus, student, takmir community, bureaucracy and government.الملخص: تناقش هذه المقالة حول صراع المنظمات الإسلامية في إندونيسيا. على سبيل العام كان الإسلاميون حركات إسلامية تجعل الإسلام أساس إيديولوجيتها السياسية. وهذه المقالة ستبحث الاستيراتيجية التي تقوم بها حركة المنظمة الإسلامية لتحقيق أهدافها الاجتماعية والسياسية وكيف آثارها عندما تواجه مجموعة إسلامية أخرى من تيار المنظمة الإسلامية المعتدلة. وهذا البحث من البحث الكيفي الذي يستخدم منهج التحليل الوصفي. والنظريات المستخدمة في هذا البحث هي الصحوة الإسلامية، والسياسية الإسلامية، والنظرية الإسلامية، والحركة الاجتماعية. ونتيجة هذا البحث تدل على أن صراع الحركة الإسلامية السائدة في المجتمع الإندونيسيا من خلال استراتيجية الحركة السياسية: أولاً، استفادة الفرصة السياسية أي استفادة الفرصة الإصلاحية لإنهاء الحركة السرية حتى تصبح الحركة القانونية الرسمية وقامت الحركة حرية. ثانيا، من خلال التعبئة الهيكلية التي تتكون من التعبئة الداخلية والتعبئة الخارجية. ثالثًا، تنظيم عملية الحركة أي عن طريق القيام بمعارضة جميع الأفكار والأنظمة من الغرب مثل الديمقراطية والقومية وحقوق الإنسان. رابعا، أن تدخل هذه الحركة من خلال المساجد والجامعات وطلاب الجامعة ومنظمة المساجد والبيروقراطية والحكومة وما إلى ذلك كالآثار من الصراع الإسلامي.Abstrak: Tulisan ini membahas tentang kontestasi ormas Islam di Indonesia. Secara umum, Islamis atau Islamisme adalah gerakan Islam yang menjadikan Islam sebagai dasar ideologi politiknya. Penilitian ini akan menjawab bagaimana strategi yang digunakan gerakan ormas Islam untuk mencapai agenda sosial-politiknya dan bagaimana implikasinya ketika berbenturan kepentingan dengan kelompok ormas-ormas Islam lainnya yang notabene merupakan ormas Islam mainstream atau moderat. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan deskriptif analisis.Teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah konsep Revivalisme Islam, Islam Politik, Islamisme dan teori Gerakan sosial. Hasil pembahasan menunjukkan bahwa kontestasi islamisme ormas Islam mainstream di Indonesia dalam menguasai arena strategis yang terdapat di masyarakat melalui strategi gerakan politik: pertama, memanfaatkan peluang politik, yaitu peluang reformasi untuk mengakhiri gerakan bawah tanah menjadi gerakan legal sehingga dapat bergerak dengan leluasa. Kedua, memobilisasi struktur, yang terdiri dari mobilisasi internal dengan melakukan pengkaderan secara intensif dan mobilisasi eksternal. Ketiga, penyusunan proses gerakan, yakni dengan cara melakukan pergolakan pemikiran dengan menentang segala pemikiran dan sistem dari Barat, seperti demokrasi, nasionalisme dan HAM. Keempat, melakukan perembesan dengan menguasai mesjid, kampus, mahasiswa, komunitas takmir, birokrasi dan pemerintahan dan sebagainya sebagai implikasi dari kontestasi islamisme.
3
Tambunan, Elia. "INDONESIAN ISLAMISM: THE WAR OF ISLAMIC LITERACY FROM MILLENNIALISM TO RADICALISM." AKADEMIKA: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam 24, no. 1 (September 18, 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.32332/akademika.v24i1.1612.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper shows another dimension of the phenomenon of Islamism Indonesia. By doing the interpretation of a number of circumstantial historical Islam literacy with traces of the historical aspect as the research methodology, the authors found one important factor that gave birth to Islamism Indonesia is literacy not just ideology as believed by many scholars. The resulting literacy evolved in various forms of media, and thus generated by the Indonesia who settled in the Middle East, Islamic Indonesia elite, and ustad virtual at the estuary of the society in the war on Islam. This paper contributes to the efforts of Islamic Studies scholars from Indonesia to include literacy in Islamic Indonesia as part of the phenomenon of global Islamism manifestation in the development of the study of contemporary Islamist movements.
Keywords: Indonesian Islamism, Milleniarism, and Radicalism
4
Harmakaputra, Hans Abdiel. "Islamism and Post-Islamism: “Non-Muslim” in Socio-Political Discourse of Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 53, no. 1 (July 2, 2015): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2015.531.179-204.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Islamism is defined by Asef Bayat as ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an ‘Islamic order,’ in the form of a religious state, sharia law, or moral codes. However, Bayat and other scholars have found that nowadays Islamism is changing and many countries share the traits of post-Islamism instead of Islamism. According to Bayat, post-Islamism is both condition and project to “conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islam in social, political, and intellectual domains.” In short, it has a hybrid tendency to combine Islam and democracy. This paper will discuss how the category of “non-Muslim” is taken place in the socio-political discourse of Islamism and post-Islamism. To limit the discussion, there are only three examples from Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia.[Islamisme menurut Asef Bayat adalah ideologi dan gerakan yang berjuang untuk membentuk semacam “tatanan Islam” dalam bentuk negara Islam, hukum syariat, atau pun hukum etis. Saat ini, islamisme telah berubah. Di beberapa negara muncul gejala post-islamisme yang khas. Bayat mendefinisikan post-islamisme sebagai kondisi dan keinginan untuk mengkonsep alasan dan modalitas untuk mengusung Islam ke ranah sosial, politik, dan keilmuan. Sehingga, muncul pula kecenderungan untuk menggabungkan Islam dan demokrasi. Tulisan ini mendiskusikan konsep “non-muslim” dalam wacana sosial politik terkait dengan Islamisme dan post-Islamisme. Pembahasan dibatasi pada tiga contoh dari Pakistan, Amerika Serikat, dan Indonesia.]
5
Hannase, Mulawarman. "RESPON MUSLIM INDONESIA TERHADAP GERAKAN ISLAMISME DI TIMUR TENGAH: KASUS HAMAS DAN KONFLIK PALESTINA." Rausyan Fikr: Jurnal Studi Ilmu Ushuluddin dan Filsafat 12, no. 2 (February 6, 2018): 161–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.24239/rsy.v12i2.81.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper will examine how the Indonesian Muslim community which consist many streams of religious and social organizations to respond the crisis that involved recently in the Gaza Strip involving Hamas Islamism group. The main issue highlighted in this paper is whether Hamas has network in Indonesia? How the influence of Hamas network in Indonesia towards the development of Islamic fundamentalist thought in Indonesia? Is the Muslim community in Indonesia has the same view in addressing the conflict in the Gaza Strip?This article will use two approaches; the theological and political approach. Theological approach is used to see similarity of the doctrine espoused byHamas with some Islamists in Indonesia. Moreover, this approach is also used to distinguish between Hamas ideological doctrine with the view of other Islamist groups grown today. While political approaches used to answer the question how the political support of the Indonesian people against the Israeli Palestinian conflict, in particular the conflict between Hamas and Israel. Based on review of the above problems, it can be found that from an ideological perspective, Hamas has a strong network in various countries, including Indonesia. Whereas the model of Indonesian Muslims support to the Gaza crisis, at least occurs in three forms: pan-Islamism, diplomatic support and humanitarian support
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Darmawan, Arif Budi, Ayu Dwi Susanti, Azinuddin Ikram Hakim, and Fadhil Naufal. "DI ANTARA DUA ARUS: STUDI FENOMENOLOGI NARASI PASCA ISLAMISME ANAK MUDA MUSLIM DI YOGYAKARTA." Jurnal Sosiologi Reflektif 15, no. 2 (April 24, 2021): 318. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/jsr.v15i2.2048.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The end of the New Order era is an opportunity to develop a new structure in Indonesia. The beginning of the reformation era was marked by the emergence of the Islamist movements or the rising religious spirit era. In this article, the term Islamism is not defined as a discourse within politics of religion, but it refers to narrative spiritual expression in the public space. In a more specific way, this article would like to describe how young Muslims criticize Islamism in their daily lives. This research found that Islamism that occurs in family milieu and in the circle of a friendship has created anxiety mong them. This anxiety appears in the form of disagreement on monolithic definition of Islamism, the criticism of the new pattern of piety in the public space, and the counter narrative to the Islamism phenomenon. Pasca runtuhnya rezim Orde Baru seolah menjadi ‘keran’ bagi terbukanya sistem dan struktur sosial di masyarakat, salah satunya ditandai dengan menguatnya Islamisme atau kebangkitan semangat beragama. Islamisme yang akan diulas di penelitian ini bukan merujuk pada diskursus relasi politik agama, namun lebih kepada eksistensi dari ekspresi keagamaan yang muncul dalam bentuk meningkatnya penggunaan atribut Islam di ruang publik. Penelitian ini secara khusus berupaya memberikan gambaran bagaimana pemuda Muslim mengkritisi fenomena Islamisme dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan adanya Islamisme yang terjadi di ruang lingkup keluarga dan pertemanan melahirkan berbagai keresahan bagi anak muda. Keresahan itu terwujud melalui ketidaksetujuan tentang pemaknaan baru dalam Islam yang dinilai homogen, kritik atas pola kesalehan di ruang publik, dan munculnya konter narasi berupa perlawanan atas fenomena Islamisme.
7
Duraesa, Muhammad Abzar, and Muzayyin Ahyar. "Reproliferation of Islamist Movement in Surakarta: Trajectory and Strategy in The Post Democratization Indonesia." DINIKA : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies 4, no. 2 (December 19, 2019): 201. http://dx.doi.org/10.22515/dinika.v4i2.1637.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Islamist movement has been proliferating in line with the historical trajectory of Indonesia's political journey; starting from the colonial regime, in the beginning of independence, New Order regime and today’s Era Reformasi. The process of Democratization and modernization lead the ideology of Islamism to a new phase of religious movement. Along with the growth of democracy in Indonesia, Islamist movement precisely shows its existence intensely in public sphere. The opening canals of freedom in the Reformation Era became a new space for ideology of Islamism to evolve and adapt some strategies to survive amidst the onslaught democratization in Indonesia. This article aims at looking to what extent the proliferation of Islamist movements after the collapse of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in Indonesia. In this case, Surakarta becomes important to observe because it’s historical context as an embryo in giving birth to earlier Islamist movements, as well as a city famous for the proliferation of ideology of Islamism in Indonesia. Using political sociology approach, this study attempts to understand the path of proliferation of Islamist movements and its various interplayed strategies to the socio-political conditions that occur; either on a global or local scale. This article argues that the development of democracy in Indonesia continues to alter the route map of the Islamist movement. Finally, the results of this study reveal that the proliferation of the current Islamist movement plays a new strategy that appropriated with the development of democracy and technological advancements to gain more public sphere by Indonesian people.
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Ahyar, Muzayyin. "Is Islam Compatible With Democracy? Islamist Movement’s Trajectory on Democratization in Indonesia." Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 25, no. 1 (December 20, 2017): 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/ws.25.1.1335.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p class="ABSTRACT"><span lang="EN">The democratization process in Indonesia is in line with the emergence several Islamic mass organizations which accept or rejected the concept of democracy. Since the pre-independence era, Indonesia has been facing some Islamist groups that opposed to state’s ideology of democracy. This article presents the discussion among scholars about the compatibility between Islamic norms and democratic values, and in what position Indonesia is. The dealing question with the discussion is; does the proliferation of radical Islamist movement signify the incompatibility of Islam and democracy? By using sociological and historical approach, this paper analyzes in order to what extent the values of democracy and Islamism adapt in the frame of a democratic country. The analysis of this research results that the existing radical Islamist movement is not a failure of Indonesia’s effort to harmonize Islam with democracy. Thus, neither the presence of pro-democracy Islamic mass organizations nor the radical Islamist movement cannot be used as the final argument to answer whether Islam compatible with democracy or not. The results of this study reveal that democratization in Indonesia has been accompanied by the proliferation of Islamist movements. The proliferation of Islamist movements nowadays precisely indicates that democracy in Indonesia has a special experience regarding new formula of peacefully religion-state relations.</span></p><span>Proses demokratisasi di Indonesia berjalan seiring lahirnya berbagai organisasi masyarakat Islam yang mendukung maupun menolak demokrasi. Sejak era pra-kemerdekaan hingga era reformasi, Indonesia terus dihadapkan dengan fenomena gerakan Isalmisme yang bersebrangan dengan ideologi Negara. Artikel ini menghadirkan diskusi yang selama ini masih banyak didiskusikan mengenai kesesuaian Islam dan demokrasi, dan di mana posisi Indonesia dalam hal kesesuaian dan ketidaksesuaian Islam dan demokrasi tersebut. Pertanyaan kunci dari artikel ini apakah proliferasi gerakan Islamis radikal menandakan ketidaksesuaian Islam dan demokrasi? Dengan menggunakan pendekatan sosiologi dan historis, artikel ini menganalisis sejauh mana nilai-nilai demokrasi dan Islamisme beradaptasi dalam bingkai Negara yang demokratis. Hasil analisis dari kajian ini menemukan bahwa eksistensi gerakan Islamis radikal bukan sebuah pertanda akan kegagalan usaha keras Indonesia dalam mengharmonisasikan Islam dan demokrasi. Sehingga, kehadiran ormas Islam, baik pendukung maupun penolak demokrasi, keduanya tidak dapat dijadikan jawaban final bahwa Islam sesuai atau tidak dengan demokrasi. Hasil dari kajian ini menekankan bahwa demokratisasi di Indonesia selalu diwarnai dengan proliferasi gerakan Islamis. Proliferasi gerakan Islamis akhir-akhir ini justru membuktikan bahwa demokrasi di Indonesia memiliki pengalaman khusus terkait formula hubungan agama-negara dalam masyarakat yang demokratis.</span>
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Supratman, Frial Ramadhan. "Before the Ethical Policy: The Ottoman State, Pan-Islamism, and Modernisation in Indonesia, 1898–1901." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 54, no. 2 (December 14, 2016): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2016.542.447-475.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
By drawing on Ottoman-Turkish documents in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives, this paper investigates the role of the Ottoman state and Pan-Islamic ideology on modernisation in Indonesia. The article revisits the process defining the Ethical Policy (Politik Etis) as the turning point of the emergence of modernisation in Indonesia. In existing scholarship, the ‘Ethical Policy’ became the grand narrative in Indonesian history, meanwhile the influence of Pan-Islamism is only seen as the unsuccessful political propaganda of Abdulhamid II on the anti-colonialism movement in Indonesia. Many Indonesian and Ottoman historians view Pan-Islamism in the context of anti-colonialism fighting against the Dutch militarily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This article proposes an alternative view to this narrative which acknowledges Pan-Islamism as a modernisation step for Indonesians which was signed by the Jawi students arrival in Istanbul and shows the Hadhrami community as the agent of modernisation. In short, the article shows the Ottoman influence on the emergence of the Ethical Policy of 1901 in Indonesia.[Menggunakan dokumen-dokumen Turki Utsmani yang disimpan di Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives, makalah ini meneliti peran imperium Utsmani dan ideologi Pan-Islam dalam modernisasi Indonesia. Hal itu dilakukan dengan meninjau kembali proses mendefinisikan Politik Etis sebagai titik balik lahirnya modernisasi Indonesia. Dalam literatur yang ada sekarang, Politik Etis menjadi cerita utama dalam sejarah Indonesia, sementara Pan-Islamisme hanya dipandang sebagai propaganda gagal dari Abdulhamid II bagi gerakan anti kolonial di Indonesia. Kebanyakan sejarawan di Indonesia dan Turki dalam konteks perjuangan melawan penjajah Belanda. Artikel ini menawarkan narasi alternatif yang mengakui Pan-Islamisme sebagai salah satu tahapan penting modernisasi Indonesia yang ditandai dengan datangnya para mahasiswa Jawa di Istambul dan menunjukkan peran komunitas Hadhrami sebagai agen modernisasi.]
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Octavia, Lanny. "Islamism & Democracy: A Gender Analysis on PKS’s Application of Democratic Principles and Values." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 50, no. 1 (June 26, 2012): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2012.501.1-22.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The increasing popular support for Islamist parties in democratic countries incites public suspicion concerning whether the Islamists’ participation in procedural democracy guarantees their commitment for substantial democracy, which in principle requires equality of rights among citizens regardless of their religion and gender. Indeed, gender politics often appears at the centre of the lslamist agenda, as they seek to construct a new moral order based on a conservative gender perspective. A greater concern arises on whether the Islamists will eventually lead society towards democracy or, conversely, towards theocracy. In Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) shows a remarkable development and significant electoral achievement. Some observers viewed that PKS is opportunistically using democratic means to “hijack” it for their Islamist agenda waiting for when political power is in their hands. Others believe PKS’s involvement in real politics will, in the end, lead to a “gradual secularisation” of their Islamist agenda. Based on a gender analysis, this paper examines whether PKS’s fulfillment of the formalist criteria of democracy is compatible with their application of democratic principles and values.[Semakin menguatnya dukungan terhadap partai Islam memincu kecurigaan publik yang mempertanyakan apakah partisipasi kalangan islamis dalam demokrasi prosedural menjamin komitmen mereka bagi tegaknya demokrasi substansial, demokrasi yang mensyaratkan kesetaraan bagi semua orang tanpa terkecuali. Sebenarnya, agenda politik gender yang didengungkan oleh kalangan islamis tidak bisa dilepaskan dari perspektif konservatif mereka mengenai relasi gender. Pertanyaannya kemudian, apakah yang mereka agendakan akan berlabuh pada pemantapan demokrasi atau --sebaliknya‑‑ menuju teokrasi. Di Indonesia, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) adalah satu-satunya partai Islam di Indonesia yang berhasil berkembang pesat dan mampu mendulang suara secara signifikan. Bagi beberapa pengamat, PKS merepresentasikan partai Islamis yang berhasil “menunggangi” demokrasi untuk memperjuangkan agenda islamis mereka. Ini akan tampak jelas jika PKS berhasil menjadi partai penguasa. Kendati demikian, beberapa kalangan lainnya berkeyakinan bahwa keterlibatan PKS dalam politik demokratis akan “mensekulerkan” agenda islamis mereka. Dengan analisis gender, tulisan ini hendak menjawab apakah kriteria formal mengenai nilai dan prinsip demokrasi yang melekat pada PKS sejalan dengan apa yang mereka praktekkan.]
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Umam, Fawaizul, and Khoirul Faizin. "The Institutional Responses of State Islamic Universities to Islamism: Lessons Learned from Three Campuses." Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam 10, no. 2 (December 20, 2020): 252–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2020.10.2.253-283.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study attempts to reveal the trend of Islamism and the institutional responses to it in Indonesian higher education, especially in the Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam Negeri or State Islamic Universities (PTKIN). Three PTKINs, which were UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, UIN Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang, and IAIN Jember, were purposively selected as the research locus. Meanwhile, a case study approach was used to describe Islamism’s trend at these state universities from the 2000s to 2017. It was discovered that the Islamists attempted to infiltrate the campus life through two strategies, which were called persuasive and normative-reeducative. Subsequently, this phenomenon urged the three PTKINs to decide their institutional responses, which have been mainly aimed at deradicalizing campus life and delegitimizing Islamism’s ideology among academics. The institutional responses seem to be pivotal for all PTKINs, especially the three selected schools, because the campus is home to the scientific realm and not a political one. Also, Islamism is a factual threat, both to the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and the ideals of the religion as a blessing for the universe.
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Tomsa, Dirk. "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia." Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 3 (May 12, 2011): 486–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912911404566.
Повний текст джерела
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Kafid, Nur, Zulkifli Zulkifli, Alimun Hanif, and Arif Zamhari. "Islamism, Muslim Millennials, and Local Political Contestation in Indonesia." DINIKA : Academic Journal of Islamic Studies 6, no. 2 (December 30, 2021): 195–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.22515/dinika.v6i2.4844.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
There is a trend of increasing Islamism after the 1998 Reformation Era in Indonesia. The previous studies reveal that it is caused, among others, by the weakness of the state, the decline of the authority of moderate Islamic groups, and the use of social media as da’wahchannels by Islamist groups. This studi is qualitative-based research by employing descriptive method and social content analysis of social media. The data were collected through observations (field study) of the election process in the Solo area, from social media, and in-depth interviews with academicians of UIN Surakarta, the initiators, and participants of the LISaN program. This study revealed that the low quality of political education, manipulative information spread on social media, and lack of autonomous political participation by the Muslim millennials have also contributed to the rise of Islamism. Therefore, the Islamic literacy for courteous and tolerant behavior (Literasi Islam Santun dan toleran, LISaN) is necessary to counter the Islamist movement. The LISaN movement which take form a noisy tolerant majority can be a means of values reproduction and encourage individual participation in political and religious affairs, in a polite and tolerant manner.
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Bazzi, Samuel, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, and Benjamin Marx. "The Institutional Foundations of Religious Politics: Evidence from Indonesia*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 135, no. 2 (December 23, 2019): 845–911. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz038.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract This article explores the foundations of religious influence in politics and society. We show that an important Islamic institution fostered the entrenchment of Islamism at a critical juncture in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country. In the early 1960s, rural elites transferred large amounts of land into waqf—inalienable charitable trusts in Islamic law—to avoid expropriation by the state. Regions facing a greater threat of expropriation exhibit more prevalent waqf land and Islamic institutions endowed as such, including mosques and religious schools. These endowments provided conservative forces with the capital needed to promote Islamist ideology and mobilize against the secular state. We identify lasting effects of the transfers on the size of the religious sector, electoral support for Islamist parties, and the adoption of local sharia laws. These effects are shaped by greater demand for religion in government but not by greater piety among the electorate. Waqf assets also impose costs on the local economy, particularly in agriculture, where these endowments are associated with lower productivity. Overall, our findings shed new light on the origins and consequences of Islamism.
15
Dahlan, Moh. "Geneologi Islamisme di Kalangan Muslim Millenial Indonesia." El-Afkar: Jurnal Pemikiran Keislaman dan Tafsir Hadis 9, no. 1 (June 25, 2020): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.29300/jpkth.v9i1.3234.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the last decade, Indonesian Millennial Muslims have a tendency to choose Islamism as their life trend, so as it becomes a problem in the life of a plural Indonesian people. By using the ushul fiqh approach, data collection techniques using library research and content analysis techniques, this study shows that first, the genealogy of the paradigm of Islamism that develops in Indonesia does not always have a negative connotation that means radicalism, but the paradigm of Islamism among Millennial Muslims in Indonesia has turned out to be a medium for packaging and spreading the paradigm of popular Islamism. Therefore, there is a correlation between the jargon carriers of Islamism and its products. Second, the birth of the paradigm of Islamism among millennial Muslims occurred because of the existence of culture, learning ethos and social media and electronics that have encouraged the birth of the paradigm of Islamism, so that it has brought a new trend that supports an increasingly massive and popular Islamic life with innovative and creative packaging.Third, the implications of the paradigm of Islamism among Millennial Muslims have had positive and negative impacts.The positive impact is that Islamism encourages millennial Muslim generations to learn, understand and practice the teachings of Islam in a comprehensive manner as well as popular Islamic understanding which is in accordance with maqashid al-shari'ah, while the negative impact is that the encouragement of learning, understanding and practicing religious teachings Islam in a comprehension that is exposed to the understanding of radicalism-intolerant can actually lead to intolerant attitudes and behaviour, even radicalism that is contrary to the Maqashid al-Shari'ah
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Lubis, Dahlia. "Islamism in the Perception of the Teachers and the Students of Pesantren Mawaridussalam Deli Serdang North Sumatra." TEOSOFI: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2019): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2019.9.1.1-29.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Many studies on pesantren in Indonesia put more emphasis only on the aspect of pesantren as the oldest Islamic educational institution in the archipelago, instead of any other aspects related to this type of educational institution. Recently, a growing number of studies have shifted their topic into one particular focus, namely radicalism or Islamism in pesantren. This paper aims to examine the responses of pesantren teachers and students to the term Islamism. This study has been conducted at Pesantren Mawaridussalam, an Islamic boarding school located in Batang Kuis village, Deli Serdang, North Sumatra, Indonesia. Specifically, this article elaborates on the responses of teachers and students to the issue of the Islamic state, shariazation (make Islamic law as the law of the state), democracy, and jihād (a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam). The findings of this study indicate that the teachers and the students have varied understandings of Islamism. Some argue that the term is close to Islamists, while some others believe that it is identical to Islamists. Despite such understanding, most of the teachers and the students reject the use of violence in fighting for the ideals of Islam.
17
KYRCHANOFF, Maksym W. "POLITICAL ISLAM IN INDONESIA IN 2021: UMMAH BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND RADICALIZATION." Southeast Asia: Actual Problems of Development, no. 2(55) (2022): 112–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2072-8271-2022-2-2-55-112-124.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The author analyzes the features of development and the main vectors of the transformation of Islamism in Indonesia in 2021. At the end of 2020, the Indonesian authorities, for the first time in several years, attempted to eliminate radical Islam in an institutionalized form, which led to the ban on the activities of the Front for the Defenders of Islam and the arrest of its leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. Therefore, Indonesian Islamists met the beginning of 2021 in a state of organizational and ideological uncertainty. The author of the presented article analyzes ideological and organizational mutations and changes within the discourse of political, moderate and radical, Islam in modern Indonesia. It is assumed that the Covid-19 pandemic has become an impetus for the technical modernization of Islam in contexts of its virtualization. The present article analyzes the problems of activation of the oldest, “historical” organi-zations of Indonesian Muslims, including Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. The author analyzes the congresses held by these organizations in 2021. The article analyzes the role of political parties in the actual history of Indonesian Islamism. Particular attention is paid to the “new” actors represented by the revived Mashumi Party and the Umma Party. The author analyzes the emergence of new and the revival of “historical” Is-lamist parties in contexts of changes in the political space of radical Islam after the Front for the Defenders of Islam was banned. The author believes that the modern Indonesian political Islam is looking for new forms of its own structural self-organization. Therefore, it is shown that Islamism is in the state of reorganization when moderate Islam seeks to use the resources of modernization. The author presumes that both trends are active in the use of virtual space for their development needs.
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Huda, Muchammad Nur. "Post-Islamism: The New Face of Political Islam in Indonesia." Journal Intellectual Sufism Research (JISR) 3, no. 2 (May 27, 2021): 46–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.52032/jisr.v3i2.94.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract. Movement of Islamic politics in post- Islamism is movement ideology in the discourse of contemporary Islamic studies in Indonesia are being crowded discussed. Post-Islamism first time emerged as the faces of Islam political supporters of the ideology of Islamism in contensasi election of the general governor of Jakarta in 2017 through action to defend Islam on 2nd December 2016 or what is known as the 212 movement. This article aims to examine in detail the emergence of post-Islamism as the new face of political Islam in Indonesia and how post-Islamism is built into a "new manifesto" in the Political Islam movement in Indonesia, based on the reading of political anthropological theory. The method that is used is a literature review by using primary data and secondary. Results of the study showed that the movement of political Islam, post-Islamism, still need further study and comprehensive. The term post- Islamism has not been able to uncover the basic facts about how the terms of the force, lived, and could become the ideological basis for the movement of Islam politics its self.
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Arizona, Yance. "The Return of Pancasila: Political and Legal Rhetoric Against Transnational Islamist Imposition." Constitutional Review 5, no. 1 (May 31, 2019): 164. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/consrev516.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The rise of transnational Islamist movements in Indonesia in the last two decades recurrences the old debate between Pancasila and Islamism. This kind of fundamental Islamic movements widespread with their conservative view and it has had detrimental effects on the Indonesian society’s social cohesion. President Joko Widodo seeks to revive Pancasila to confront this threat. This is not for the first time Pancasila is used by the Indonesian government to resolve the tension between Islamic values and nation-state principles. Both President Sukarno and Suharto also used Pancasila as a vehicle to discipline their political opponents. Adopting a non-essentialist approach to Pancasila, I argue that the return of Pancasila in recent years would be more complicated because of the narrative of Pancasila revivalism as an adversarial ideology is bounded by traditionalism and lack of progressive interpretation. Instead of locating Pancasila as the counterpart to Islamism, what is needed is re-interpretation of Pancasila as a unifying ideology.
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Kyrchanoff, Maksym W. "Indonesian Islamists' Information Agenda in early 2021: Islamism at a Crossroads." South East Asia: Actual problems of Development, no. 2(51) (2021): 130–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2072-8271-2021-2-2-51-130-141.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The author analyses the problems of Islamist media activities in Indonesia in the first months of 2021. It is assumed that by the end of 2020, a new stage in the history of Indonesian radical Islam began. The prohibition of the Front of the Defenders of Islam and the arrest of its leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab institutionalised the situation of organisational and ideological uncertainty in radical Islam. It is assumed that “Salam Online” at the early 2021 monopolised the promotion of Islamists opinion in society, when other media minimised their activity. The FPI formally ceased its activities, the Islamists, temporarily lost their leader and the ability to operate using a legal public organisation. The situation of institutional uncertainty did not affect the activity of the Islamist media. In general, the author believes that Islamist media chosen the tactic of waiting, since the prospects for the consolidation of the Islamist political discourse and the possible trajectories of the development of Islamic radicalism remain uncertain.
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Azizah, Nurul. "Islamisme: Ideologi Gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar di Sulawesi Selatan 1952-1965." JURNAL PENELITIAN KEISLAMAN 15, no. 2 (January 22, 2020): 95–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/jpk.v15i2.1585.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstrak: Dalam wacana Historiografi nasional Indonesia, Gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar di Sulawesi Selatan merupakan bagian dari gerakan Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) yang berpusat di Jawa Barat, meskipun dalam kenyataannya Kahar telah memulai gerakannya lebih awal sebelum dia memutuskan bergabung dengan DI/TII. Telah banyak tulisan yang membahas gerakan ini. Namun, artikel ini fokus membahas implementasi ideologi Islamisme dalam gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar. Temuan artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa Islam sebagai ideologi gerakan terwujud dalam sebuah konstitusi yang disebut Piagam Makkalua. Dia mulai mengumpulkan pajak, mendirikan organisasi, organisasi pemuda, organisasi kaum perempuan, semua atas nama negara Islam. Kahar juga memberikan penekanan-penekanan pada komunitas penganut kepercayaan lokal dan nasrani sehingga menimbulkan penolakan terhadapnya.
Title: Islamism: Ideology of the Kahar Mudzakkar Movement in South Sulawesi 1952-1965
Abstract: In Indonesian national historiography, Kahar Mudzakkar Movement in South Sulawesi is part of the Darul Islam / Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia (DI/TII) movement based in West Java, although in reality, Kahar had started his movement earlier before he decided to join DI/TII. There have been many writings that discuss this movement. However, this article focuses on discussing the implementation of the ideology of Islamism in the Kahar Mudzakkar movement. the findings of this article show that Islamism as a movement ideology is embodied in a constitution called the Makkalua Charter. He began collecting taxes, establishing organizations, youth organizations, women’s organizations, all in the name of the Islamic state. Kahar also stresses the community of local and Christian believers that causes rejection of it.
22
Toyibah, Dzuriyatun. "Indonesian Muslim in the Netherlands: Responding to Nationalism, Islamism, Democracy, and Pluralism." Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya 6, no. 2 (September 16, 2022): 165–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v6i2.19746.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
There are very few studies relating to the practice of Indonesian Islam in the Netherlands, and how Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands respond to a number of citizenship issues (such as nationalism, Islamism, democracy and pluralism). This article describes quantitative data based on survey results to understand practice of Indonesian Islam in the Netherlands, and to describe the responses of Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands to a number of citizenship issues. The survey covers demographic information, the practice of Indonesian Islam, responses about several topics such as Indonesia, nationalism and Islam; Islamism, democracy and pluralism, and participation in Islamic organizations. The survey involved 89 respondents living in the Netherlands in 2017. The findings show that rituals associated to Nahdlatul Ulama (the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia) are most common among the Indonesian community in the Netherlands. In general, respondents are strongly nationalists. However, some political Islam principles are becoming more commonplace among Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands, which indicates that the support for Islamism is strong enough among them.
23
Maula, Bani Syarif. "The State Legal Policies on Sharia Application in Changing Pattern of Indonesia’s Islamic Movements." Al Hurriyah : Jurnal Hukum Islam 7, no. 1 (July 12, 2022): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.30983/alhurriyah.v7i1.5455.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p><span>Legal politics are inextricably linked to power politics. Political dynamics in Indonesia are always colored by the dynamics of Islamic politics, as most Indonesians' political aspirations are influenced by Islamic views. This paper examines the evolution of Islamic law in the modern Indonesian democratic system, particularly after the reform era. Indonesia's democratisation gave rise to freedom of expression and opinion. Even today, Islamic conservatism is growing in Indonesia, but this does not mean that radical Islamist groups are gaining strength. Many political organisations, including Islamic parties and other Islamic movements, have liberated themselves and broadened their organisational philosophies in order to address broader issues and concerns. While maintaining their Islamic identity, some Islamic groups are turning towards the secularization of their goals and objectives as a means of adapting to the changing political environment. Political analysts refer to this development as post-Islamism. The current direction of Islamic politics is more accommodating aspects of democracy but still highlights its Islamic sides. This makes the government more accommodative to laws and regulations based on Islamic teachings.</span></p><p><span><em><span>Politik hukum tidak lepas dari aspek-aspek politik kekuasaan. Di Indonesia, dinamika politik juga tidak lepas dari politik Islam, karena aspirasi politik sebagian besar masyarakat Indonesia dipengaruhi oleh pandangan Islam. Makalah ini membahas tentang perkembangan hukum Islam dalam sistem demokrasi Indonesia kontemporer, terutama setelah masa reformasi. Demokratisasi Indonesia memunculkan kebebasan berpendapat dan berekspresi. Bahkan saat ini konservatisme Islam di Indonesia semakin meningkat, namun hal itu bukan berarti menguatnya kelompok Islamis radikal. Banyak organisasi politik termasuk partai Islam dan gerakan-gerakan Islam lainnya melakukan pembebasan diri dan melakukan keterbukaan filosofi organisasi mereka untuk mengakomodasi berbagai masalah dan keprihatinan yang lebih luas. Sambil mempertahankan identitas keislamannya, beberapa kelompok Islam beralih ke arah sekularisasi tujuan dan sasaran mereka sebagai sarana untuk beradaptasi dengan lingkungan politik yang berubah. Analis politik menyebut perkembangan ini sebagai post-Islamisme. Arah politik Islam saat ini lebih mengakomodasi aspek-aspek demokrasi namun tetap menonjolkan sisi keislamannya. Hal ini membuat pemerintah lebih bersikap akomodatif terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlandaskan ajaran Islam.</span></em></span></p>
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Suwarno, Peter. "The Role of Government Political Approaches in the Growth and Decline of Hardline Islamic Movements in Indonesia." Jurnal Sosiologi Agama Indonesia (JSAI) 3, no. 3 (November 30, 2022): 215–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.22373/jsai.v3i3.2092.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
One of the most arduous challenges in the development of Indonesian democracy has been the political contestation between the hardline Islamists vs. secular nationalists. This paper describes how the Indonesian governments dealt with this conflict due to the growing Islamic conservatism and the midst of democratization. For this purpose, this paper examines the controversial government policies during the administration of Soekarno, Soeharto, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and Joko Widodo, who governed Indonesia for at least two terms. The analysis of the data collected from various media and research publications describes and compares the political approaches of these presidents in dealing with hardline Islamic movements. Soekarno had to end his primary reliance on democratic debates that resulted in no agreement by issuing an authoritarian decree allowing him to ban the most powerful Islamist party – Masyumi. Soeharto, who implemented iron-fist policies against the Islamists, created stability for badly needed development, but to maintain his power, he had to meet some of the Islamic demands. Due to the reform era, SBY attempted to be more democratic toward the hardline Islamic appeals, leading to his indecisiveness that enhanced the growth of Islamic hardliners. Jokowi uses legal and discursive strategies to uphold secular nationalism. Still, to deal with Islamic radicalism, he used semi-authoritarian approaches such as banning hardline Islamic organizations. This paper concludes that the Indonesian liberal democratic political approaches could enhance Islamic politics and the growth of hardline Islamism. In contrast, authoritarian or semi-authoritarian approaches to secular nationalism created more stability for the growth of moderate Islam in Indonesia.
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Ropi, Ismatu. "Islamism, Government Regulation, and the Ahmadiyah Controversies in Indonesia." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 48, no. 2 (December 18, 2010): 281–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2010.482.281-320.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Over the past three decades, Ahmadiyah has been at the center of one of the most significant controversies within the Indonesian Muslim community, particularly after the issuance of MUI’s (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/The Council of Indonesian Ulama) Fatwas in 1980 and 2005 respectively. This paper undertakes a discussion of Ahmadiyah, reviewing its initial contacts with several Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Syarikat Islam, its roles in disseminating the idea of progressive and modern Islam among Muslim scholars in 1940s to 1960s. The second part will review internal and external factors contributing to the issuance of MUI Fatwa 1980 in the light of preserving orthodoxy within the Indonesian Muslim community. It will also highlight in brief the government response toward the Ahmadiyah’s case. The last part focuses mainly on the Fatwa 2005 and its impact on the more strained relationships within the Muslim community in Indonesia. It will examine socio-political conditions before and after the Fatwa 2005 in light of the steady rise of a new model of Islamism in Indonesia and the conservative shift within the MUI itself, particularly after the downfall of the New Order’s regime in 1998. The arguments ‘pro and contra’ Fatwa 2005, as well as the ‘awkward position’ of the new government on this issue, will be analysed in detail.
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ASPINALL, EDWARD. "From Islamism to nationalism in Aceh, Indonesia." Nations and Nationalism 13, no. 2 (April 2007): 245–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2007.00277.x.
Повний текст джерела
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Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. "THE RISE OF ISLAMISM AND THE FUTURE OF INDONESIAN ISLAM." Journal International Studies 16 (December 30, 2020): 105–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32890/jis2020.16.7.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Since the downfall of Suharto’s dictatorial regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed a surge of various Islamist groups that have potentially threatened the country’s religious tolerance, civil Islam, and civic pluralism. Moreover, it is suggested that the rise of Islamist groups could likely transform Indonesia into an intolerant Islamist country. However, this article asserts that the Islamist groups are unlikely to reform Indonesia into an Islamic State or Sharia–based government and society, and are unable to receive the support and approval of the Indonesian Muslim majority due to the following fundamental reasons: the groups’ internal and inherent weaknesses, ruptured alliance among the groups, lack of Islamist political parties, limited intellectual grounds of the movement, the accommodation of some influential Muslim clerics and figures into the central government body, and public opposition toward the Islamist groups.
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Zuly Qodir, Hasse Jubba, and Mega Hidayati. "ISLAMISM AND CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN ISLAMIC POLITICS." Jurnal Adabiyah 22, no. 1 (June 29, 2022): 160–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.24252/jad.v22i1a9.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
After the 2019 election, Indonesia is facing changes in political and religious life. In political life, the use of ethnic identity appears as a voter. Meanwhile, in terms of religion, the forces of Islamic conservatism and populism have emerged that have disrupted electoral democracy. The issue of identity politics, Islamic conservatism and populism will continue to grow if the moderate Islamic forces of Muhammadiyah and NU do not appear in political and religious life. The hope of a civilized and non-discriminatory democratic life in the strength of moderate Islam. If the power of moderate Islam is weak, then the power of Islamic conservatism with the power of identity politics and Islamic populism will become a real form of challenge to Indonesian democracy. This article aims to explain the three main challenges of Indonesian democracy after the 2019 Presidential Election, namely the rise of Identity politics; the rise of political Islamism which is compounded in Indonesian political practices. How both of them come into contact with political practices in Indonesia, so that it has an impact on Islamic politics today.
ملخص
توجه الإندونيسيا تفرق الحياة السياسية و الدينية بعد الانتخاب العامي سنة ٢٠١٩ حيث ظهرت هوية العرقية في الحياة السياسية كعاملة منجمة الصوت، بينما في الحياة الدينية ظهرت قوة المحافظة و الشعوبية الإسلامية تتدخل في الديمقراطية الانتخابية. صارت سياسات الهوية و المحافظة والشعوبية الإسلامية دائما تتطور إذا كانت قوة الوسطية الإسلامية المحمدية و نهضة العلماء غير مرئية أمام الحياة السياسية والدينية. كان الأمل بالحياة الديمقراطية حضارية و غير تمييزة في قوة الإسلام المعتدل. إذا ضعفت قوة الإسلامية الوسطية ستصبح قوة التيار الإسلامي المحافظ بقوة سياسات الهوية والشعبوية الإسلامية شكلاً حقيقيًا من أشكال التحدي للديمقراطية الإندونيسية. هذا المقال سيبين ثلاث التحديات الأولى في الديمقراطية الإندونيسية بعد الانتخاب العامي لرئيس الجمهور سنة ٢٠١٩ وهو ايقاظ سياسات الهوية و الإسلام السياسي الذي يتحد في ممارسة السياسة الإندونيسية و كيف يتعامل كلاهما في السياسة الإندونيسية بحيث يكون لها تأثير في السياسة الإسلامية اليوم.
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Aji, Herlambang Andi. "Narasi Islamisme dan Pesantren: Pola Penolakan Islam Politik Di Pondok Pesantren Gontor Ponorogo." JURNAL PENELITIAN KEISLAMAN 15, no. 2 (January 22, 2020): 85–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/jpk.v15i2.1623.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstrak: Polemik yang terjadi antara agama dan negara-bangsa sangat recurrent dan berpotensi menguat ketika terjadi beberapa perubahan penting dalam lanskap politik. Pesantren merupakan salah satu benteng terhadap narasi Islamisme. Setiap pesantren memiliki pola penolakan yang berbeda. Fokus penelitian ini adalah pola penolakan narasi Islamisme di pondok pesantren modern Gontor. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menjelaskan narasi Islamisme dan pola penolakannya di Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah etnografis dalam pengertian untuk memahami praktik serta kehidupan individu sebagai bagian dari komunitas serta cangkupan yang lebih luas, dengan subjek penelitian adalah religious scholar yang merupakan orang-orang yang berlatar belakang pendidikan agama secara formal di Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor. Hasil penelitian menunjukan bahwa dalam menghadapi narasi Islamisme masyarakat Pondok Modern Darusalam Gontor menggunakan wacana Islam moderat puritan (puritanical moderat Islam) aksepsionis dengan kacamata Islamisasi politik. Islamisasi politik bukan berarti ingin merobohkan ideologi NKRI, tetapi tetap menerima konsep negara-bangsa NKRI, termasuk ideologi Pancasila, hanya saja lebih memperjelas dasar dan tujuan-tujuan yang sesuai dengan Islam dengan bersikap semi-rejeksionis terhadap interpretasi pemerintah yang kontroversial.
Kata Kunci: Islamisme, Pesantren, Negara-Bangsa
Title: The Narration of Islamism and Pesantren: Pattern of Rejection of Islamic Politics at Pondok Pesantren Gontor Ponorogo
Abstract: The polemic between religion and the nation-state is very recurrent and has the potential to strengthen when there are some important changes in the political landscape. Pesantren is one of the strongholds against the narrative of Islamism. Each pesantren has a different pattern of rejection. The focus of this study is the pattern of rejection of the narrative of Islamism in the modern boarding school of Gontor. The purpose of this study is to explain the narrative of Islamism and its patterns of rejection in Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor. The research method used is ethnographic in the sense of understanding the practice and life of individuals as part of a wider community and scope, with research subjects being religious scholars who are people with a formal religious education background in Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor. The results showed that in facing the narrative of Islamism, the people of Pondok Modern Darusalam Gontor used a puritanical (puritanical moderate Islam) discourse of Islam in terms of political Islamization. Political Islamization does not mean that it wants to break down the ideology of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, but still accept the concept of the NKRI nation-state, including the ideology of Pancasila, only to clarify the basis and objectives in accordance with Islam by being semi-rejectionist towards a controversial interpretation of government.
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Kirchanov, M. V. "Radical Islam and Ummah in Indonesia in 2021: Actors, Processes and Contradictions." Minbar. Islamic Studies 15, no. 2 (June 24, 2022): 353–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2022-15-2-353-376.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The author analyzes the features of development and the main vectors of transformation of radical political Islam in Indonesia in 2021. It is shown that at the end of 2020, the Indonesian authorities, for the fi rst time in several years, attempted to eliminate radical Islam in its institutionalized form, which led to the ban on the activities of the Islamic Defenders Front and to the arrest of its leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. The author analyzes ideological and organizational mutations and changes within the discourse of radical Islam in modern Indonesia. Particular attention is paid to the “new” actors represented by the revived Mashumi Party and the Ummah Party. The author analyzes the emergence of new and the revival of “historical” Islamist parties in the contexts of changes in the political space of radical Islam after the Front for the Defenders of Islam was banned. The article shows how and why Islamism reorganize itself, actively using the possibilities of the virtual space.
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Alkaf, M., Irwan Abdullah, Zuly Qodir, and Hasse Jubba. "ISLAMISM IN ACEH: GENEALOGY, SHARI’ATIZATION, AND POLITICS." Analisa: Journal of Social Science and Religion 7, no. 2 (December 30, 2022): 165–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.18784/analisa.v7i2.1647.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper argues Islamism in Aceh Province, Indonesia, has a long history within the social structure of the Acehnese people. Genealogically, there are two factors to view Islamism here, namely the relationship between Islam and politics in the past, and the people’s cultural and social construction, which has a strong Islamic base. Therefore, the collective memory about the relationship between Islam and politics, as well as the construction, then has implications in the lives of the Acehnese people in closely viewing those from various aspects. This study applies a qualitative method in which the data were collected through observation, interview, and documentation. The findings indicate that Islamism in Aceh is not a form of compensation from the Government of Indonesia to quell the conflict, but rather the form of aspirations that come from below on the long-standing awareness in the cultural and social structure of the locals regarding the relationship between religion and the state. In addition, unlike similar studies involving the notion of Pan-Islamism, the result shows that Islamism is more likely as the demands to retrieve political recognition.
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Baharun, Hasan, and Robiatul Awwaliyah. "Pendidikan Multikultural dalam Menanggulangi Narasi Islamisme di Indonesia." Jurnal Pendidikan Agama Islam (Journal of Islamic Education Studies) 5, no. 2 (November 2, 2017): 224. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/jpai.2017.5.2.224-243.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p><strong>Bahasa Indonesia:</strong></p><p>Kertas kerja ini memaparkan pendidikan multikultural dalam usahanya menanggulangi narasi Islamisme di Indonesia. Intisari dari pendidikan multikultural adalah sebuah ide dan gerakan pembaruan dalam proses pendidikan. Kemajemukan Indonesia adalah dua mata pisau yang memiliki sisi positif dan negatif. Dalam kemajemukan itu sendiri, keeratan afiliasi kelompok muncul bersamaan dengan potensi perpecahan dalam konteks situasi yang tak terkendali dengan baik. Oleh karenanya, pendidikan multikultural menawarkan demokrasi, kesetaraan, kemerdekaan, dan keberagaman dalam sebuah pendekatan. Dengan kedatangan pendidikan multikultural, ini diharapkan bahwa setiap lapisan masyarakat merasa dikenali, dihargai, diperlakukan secara demokratis dan pantas kendati berbagai perbedaan budaya. Sebagai hasilnya, mereka mendapatkan kesempatan yang sama dalam mencapai tujuan-tujuannya. Indikasi idealnya adalah adanya kemauan untuk menerima dan menghargai kelompok-kelompok lain dari etnik, gender, dan afiliasi keberagamaan dan budayanya. Dengan kata lain, pendidikan multicultural muncul sebagai pengikat, kepenghubungan, pengaman, dan penjamin terhadap keberlangsungan kemajemukan. Ajuan pendidikan multikultural ini muncul untuk mengangulangi narasi Islamisme di Indonesia yang muncul sebagai akibat dari ketika Islam berhadapan dengan modernitas yang identik dengan Barat.</p><p> </p><p><strong>English:</strong></p><p>This paper presents multicultural education in tackling Islamism narration in Indonesia. The heart of multicultural education is the idea and renewal movement in educational process. Indonesian diversity is like a double-edged knife, which involves both positives and negatives. In the diversity itself, strong group affilition emerged as well as potential of disunity appears in the context of unwell-managed circumstances. Hence, multicultural education offers democracy, equality, freedom, and pluralism in a single approach. With the advent of multicultural education, it is hoped that all levels of society will feel recognized, appreciated, democratically and equitably treated despite cultural differences. As a result, they have equal opportunity to achieve their goals. The ideal indication shows the willingness to accept and appreciate other groups of different ethnics, gender, and religious affilition and cultures. In other words, multicultural education exists as a binder, liaison, safety, and assurance of sustainability diversity. This multicultural education proposal emerged in order to overcome the narration of Islamism, which born as encounter efforts between Islam vis-à-vis the modernity associated with the west.</p>
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Dzuhayatin, Siti Ruhaini. "Islamism and Nationalism among Niqabis Women in Egypt and Indonesia." Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 10, no. 1 (May 29, 2020): 49–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i1.49-77.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The phenomenon of the increasing number of niqabis in Indonesia and Egypt has become concern to the government, academics and also civil society. This is due to the involvement of the niqabis or women with the niqab in terrorist networks. Those piece of cloth covering the face is not merely the manifestation of faith but apparently entails a certain ideological doctrine of the so-called Islam kaffah (ultimate Islam) through the establishemnt of Islamic khilafah (Islamic caliphate) as opposed to democracy and modern state. This study aims at observing the extents to which the niqabis negotiate Islam and their nationalism in their respective counties in Indonesia and Egypt where Muslim are the major population. This study employed a mix of methods, qualitative and quantitative involving 205 Niqabis from Indonesia and 87 niqabis from Egypt. The quantitative data were obtained from 292 respondents. While the qualitiative data were collected from 27 niqabis in-depth interview through life story technique, 6 Eqyptians and 21 Indonesians. twelve prominent figures in Egypt and Indonesia were interviewed and two focuse group discussions were conducted in both countries involving women activists, academicians, government employees, and religious leaders. The framework of this study is the contestation between Islamism and nationalism. This study indicated that there is a significant difference between the niqabis of Indonesia and Egypt percieved the national pride. Around 30 percent of Indonesian niqabis are not proud being the Indonesian citizen while in Egypt only about 3 percent. Bank interest is used to measure their Islamic refinement through which Niqabis in both countries share a similar view where almost 90% of them believe that the practice is not Islamic. Moreover, more than 50% support the Caliphate system which means that one in four niqabis consider that the existing government is thoghut (non Islamic) and nearly 15% agree to defend Islam by means of violence.
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Makhasin, Luthfi. "Urban Sufism, Media and Religious Change in Indonesia." Ijtimā'iyya: Journal of Muslim Society Research 1, no. 1 (September 30, 2016): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.24090/ijtimaiyya.v1i1.925.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, I contend that Sufism is only preoccupied with initiating new disciples and performing emotive religious rituals. By focusing on Naqshbandi-Haqqani, I argue that Sufi group actively involves in propagating its teaching to the general public. I also argue that Sufi movement actively involves in public campaign, along with other Muslim groups with similar religious outlook, to respond the perceived growing influence of Salafism and political Islamism among Indonesian Muslims. It represents contemporary public face of Sufism and Sufi activism in Indonesia. At the heart of the argument of this chapter is to examine collective efforts to maintain Sunni orthodoxy (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah) as a dominant religious norm, reclaim Sufism as a legitimate voice within Sunni orthodoxy and general Muslim community, oppose to Salafism and political Islamism, and rationalise Sufism to academic community in Indonesia. This chapter will demonstrate that active propagation through the internet plays a significant role in generating new Islamic consciousness with greater appreciation toward Sufi tradition among Indonesian Muslims. Sufism contributes not only to shape public religious discourse/morality, influence consuming patterns of urban upper-middle class Muslims, but also maintain moderate and peaceful Islam in Indonesia.
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Maula, Bani Syarif. "Post-Islamisme dan Gerakan Politik Islam Dalam Sistem Demokrasi Indonesia." Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum dan Perundangan Islam 9, no. 1 (April 23, 2019): 90–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/ad.2019.9.1.90-116.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Indonesia is a country with a majority Muslim population that implements a democratic system. Based on this democratic system, non-muslims constitutional systems can coexist and play an active role in carrying out religious values in the public sphere as a very visible feature. Nonetheless, the relationship between Islam and the state in the course of Indonesian history always experiences ups and downs. In one period of Indonesian history, Islamic politics was a peripheral thought and movement and even considered a threat to democracy and the value of modernity, because Islamic groups struggled to maintain the ideology of Islamism with the aim of establishing an Islamic state, or at least implementing a traditional Islamic legal system to a modern Indonesian society. However, as the development of the Islamic world coincided with efforts to democratize the Indonesian state, Islamic politics also changed its direction to adjust to these conditions. Islamic groups become more accommodating to the values of democracy and modernity, without having to leave their Islamic identity. This last phenomenon is known as post-Islamism as a socio-political movement in the life of the nation and state in Indonesia.
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Hilmy, Masdar. "The Politics of Retaliation: the Backlash of Radical Islamists to the Deradicalization Project in Indonesia." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 51, no. 1 (June 15, 2013): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2013.511.129-158.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p>This paper seeks to analyze how the program of deradicalization in Indonesia is approached, understood and treated by radical Islamists. This paper argues that the deradicalization program in this country has invited controversies, criticisms and even backlash from radical Islamists on the grounds that it goes against the principles of human rights because of state’s intervention into religious life of its citizens. In addition, it is carried out by violent method which mostly ends with killing the accused terrorists along with the arrest and ambush by security officers. In order to analyze the focus of the study, this paper employs socio-political approach. This paper finds that more thorough approach needs to be employed by the state within the framework of human rights. Therefore, the ideology of radical Islamism and terrorism must be dealt with from two sides; at the upstream and the downstream levels. At the upstream level, the program of deradicalization must be carried out within the framework of interdepartmental and ministerial partnership. This program should invite as many institutions as possible to be involved and reach as wide audience as possible. At the downstream level, the program of deradicalization must abide to human rights principles. The security approach taken by the government should not end with killing or dehumanizing terrorists. By doing so, the national program of deradicalization can appeal as wide sympathy possible and will not harvest backlash from the Islamists.</p><p> [Artikel ini mendiskusikan bagaimana program deradikalisasi di Indonesia dipahami, dimengerti, dan disikapi oleh kalangan Islamis. Tulisan ini berasumsi bahwa program deradikalisasi yang dilakukan memincu kontroversi, kritik, bahkan memicu juga aksi balasan yang dilancarkan kalangan Islamis radikal. Beberapa kalangan menilai program tersebut melanggar prinsip hak asasi manusia karena merepresentasikan bentuk intervensi negara terhadap kehidupan beragama masyarakatnya. Lebih dari itu, beberapa program dilaksanakan dengan melakukan tindak kekerasan dan kerap berakhir dengan penangkapan, penganiayaan, bahkan pembunuhan tersangka teroris. Dalam menganalisis tema tulisan, pendekatan sosialpolitik digunakan. Artikel ini kemudian menemukan bahwa pendekatan yang berangkat dari nilai-nilai hak asasi manusia perlu dipertegas. Karena itu, ideologi islamis-radikal and terorisme harus dilihat melalui dua sisi secara bersama. Pada level atas, program deradikalisasi dilakukan dengan kerjasama antar lembaga dan kementerian terkait. Dengan begitu, program deradikalisasi diwujudkan dengan mengajak sebanyak-banyaknya lembaga untuk terlibat serta memperluas target audien. Pada level bawah, program deradikalisasi harus mematuhi prinsip hak asasi manusia. Pendekatan keamanan yang dominan dilakukan tidak harus berakhir dengan membunuh atau dengan melanggar hak asasi manusia yang juga melekat pada diri Islamis dan teroris. Dengan model seperti ini, program nasional deradikalisasi mampu memperoleh dukungan dan simpati masyarakat luas dan dapat meredam aksi balasan kalangan Islamis.]</p>
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Maufur, Maufur. "Narrating Islamism in Indonesia: State, Agency, and Social Resilience." Religió: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama 7, no. 2 (September 10, 2017): 320–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/religio.v7i2.761.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Islamism or the so-called political Islam is conceptualized as a socio-political, rather than a solely religious phenomenon. Inherently characterized by a singularly defined religious concept of purity and a clear-cut distinction between “we” and “them”, it manifests into a various form of activities where “terrorism” is the most violent one. Following a series of terrorist attacks in the country, the Indonesian government through The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) launched a de-radicalization program that aims to restrain and combat religious radicalism and “terrorism”, particularly through its “stick and carrot” approach. Despite its success story in pacifying some terrorist activities in the country, the program is severely criticized for not dealing with the root causes of terrorism. It is also considered counter-productive as it creates resistance and hatred toward the state for specifically targeting Islam and, therefore, it provides incentives for religious radicalism and terrorism. The research conducted in Yogyakarta Province found that Islamism spreads and gains acceptance in the certain sections in public through certain social channels and agencies. However, this paper argues that the existing cultural virtues and local wisdom could create social resilience against such radicalization process.
Keywords: Islamism, Radicalism, Terrorism, Local Wisdom
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Arifianto, Alexander R. "Rising Islamism and the Struggle for Islamic Authority in Post-Reformasi Indonesia." TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia 8, no. 1 (September 10, 2019): 37–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.10.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractThe successful ‘Defending Islam’ rallies of 2016–2017 provide clear evidence that Islamism is on the rise in contemporary Indonesia. Mainstream Islamic authorities, including groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, are increasingly losing their authority to newer, more conservative Islamic preachers and groups. What explains this phenomenon – and what does it mean for the moderate perspectives that many predicted would dominate Islam in Indonesia in the post-Reformasi era?This article argues that three main mechanisms can explain the rise of Islamism in Indonesia: 1) the creation of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ in post-Reformasi Indonesia and the way in which this marketplace has contributed to the rise of Islamism and the breakdown of Islamic authority; 2) the ascent of new Islamic authority figures, who propagate their views using new methods, ranging from social media to campus da'wa organisations and community-based activities (majelis taklim); and 3) the growing influence of new Islamic groups and preachers, who are building alliances with established religious elites and politicians. Such alliances strengthen the influence of new Islamic authorities, while further marginalising religious minorities, such as Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims.
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Iswadi, Iswandi. "STUDI GERAKAN IDEOLOGI PARTAI POLITIK PADA PEMILU 2019." Politica: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara dan Politik Islam 7, no. 1 (December 30, 2020): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.32505/politica.v7i1.1459.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The ideology contestation is basically a classic polemic, where after independence the ideology of Islam was confronted with nationalism and took root until now (reform). However, the momentum of the 2019 election political contestation was again marked by the struggle of ideology namely ideology of Islamism and nationalism. The polemic began with the emergence of religious issues that were raised on the surface of political actors as a hegemony in taking the sympathy of voters. The existence of religion as a central issue began in 2016-2017 related to the prosecution of Ahok who insulted religious values (Islam), and among the political parties involved in the demonstrations namely PPP, PKS, PBB, and PKB. In that momentum the beginning of the revival of Islamic ideology as the power in defending Islamic sovereignty.
Judging from the ideology of political parties in Indonesia in the 2019 election political contestation, the ideology of political parties based on the statutes and bylaws (AD / ART) that the ideology applied can be classified into three parts namely ideology Nationalism, Islamism, and Nationalist-Religious, and the three ideologies. This can be proven based on the results of a survey from Australia 2017-2018 based on the voters. However, political parties based on multiple ideologies, PAN, PKB and Democrats, each have priority orientation. PAN and PKB tend to polarize the values of Islamism (religious), while Democrats are more dominated by nationalist issues.
The concept of Islamic political ideology, in the context of political contestation in political party elections, is basically a necessity to implement the values of ri'ayah, taqwin, irshad and ta'dib through political education, or campaign in elections to achieve mutual benefit, both parties whose ideology Islamism, nationalism and nationalist-religious, so as to build the moralistic side of society, and intelligence in responding to the issues that exist in the election apart from that, political parties in confronting political contestation the emphasis of the movement must reflect the value of poverty, the three ideologies have been packaged in the values of Pancasila in the third principles of Indonesian unity.
Asbtak
Kontestasi ideology pada dasarnya polemik klasik, dimana pasca kemerdekaan ideologi islam dihadapkan dengan nasionalisme dan mengakar sampai sampai saat ini (reformasi). Akan tetapi momentum pemilu 2019 kontestasi politik kembali diwarnai pergulatan ideology yakni ideology islamisme dan nasionalisme. Polemik tersebut berawal dengan mencuatnya isu keagamaan yang dimunculkan dipermukaan pelaku politik sebagai hegemoni dalam mengambil simpati pemilih. Eksistensi agama sebagai sentral isu berawal tahun 2016-2017 terkait penuntutan terhadap ahok yang melecehkan nilai-nilai agama (islam), dan diantara partai politik yang terlibat dalam demonstrasi yakni PPP, PKS, PBB, dan PKB. Dalam momentum tersebut awal mencuatnya kembali ideologi islam sebagai of the power dalam mempertahan kedaulatan Islam.
Menilik ideologis partai politik di Indonesia pada konstestasi politik pemilu 2019, ideology partai politik berdasarkan anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah tangga (AD/ART) bahwa ideologi yang diterapkan dapat diklasifikasikan menjadi tiga bagian yakni ideology Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan Nasionalis-Religius, dan ketiga ideology tersebut dapat dibuktikan dengan berdasarkan hasil survey dari asutralia 2017-2018 berdasarkan pemilih. Namun demikian partai poltik yang berasaskan ideologi ganda, PAN, PKB dan Demokrat, masing-masing memiliki kiblat prioritas. PAN dan PKB condong polarisasi nilai-nilai islamisme (religious), sedangkan Demokrat lebih didominasi oleh isu-isu nasionalis.
Konsep ideology politik islam, dalam konsteks kontestasi politik dalam pemilu partai politik pada dasarnya sebuah keharusan mengimplementasikan nilai-nilai ri’ayah, taqwin, irsyad dan ta’dib melalui pendidikan politik, ataupun kampanye dalam pemilu guna mencapai kemaslahatan bersama, baik partai yang berideologi islamisme, nasionalisme dan nasionalis-religius, sehingga terbangun sisi moralistik masyarakat, dan kecerdasan dalam menanggapi isu-isu yang ada dalam pemilu. selain dari itu partai politik dalam menghadapi konstestasi politik penekanan gerakannya harus mencermikan nilai kemaslahan, ketiga ideology tersebut telah kemas dalam nilai-nilai pancasila pada sila ketiga persatuan Indonesia.
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Sakai, Minako, and Amelia Fauzia. "Islamic orientations in contemporary Indonesia: Islamism on the rise?" Asian Ethnicity 15, no. 1 (April 16, 2013): 41–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2013.784513.
Повний текст джерела
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Hasan, Noorhaidi. "Piety, Politics, and Post-Islamism: Dhikr Akbar in Indonesia." Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies 50, no. 2 (December 27, 2012): 369. http://dx.doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2012.502.369-390.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p>Dhikr akbar has developed into a performance that provides the opportunity for the sharing of political ideas, thus helping to constitute and negotiate a new public sphere. It is one of the most remarkable developments in the public visibility of Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia. Involving reflexive actions which are significant in the construction of personal and social identity, the dhikr akbar has the ability to silently invoke relations, actions, symbols, meanings and codes, and also to bind in one symbolic package changing roles, statues, social structures and ethical and legal rules. An active religiosity which takes the form of peaceful, esoteric expressions, the dhikr akbar represents a new sense of piety. To some extent, it can be conceptualized as an alternative to religious fundamentalism, an outward-oriented activism tempted to change the society or existing system with one based on religion. Normally performed in a cultural space which attracts public esteem, it serves as a concentrated moment of communality and expression of a community’s faith and, at the same time, a means of empowering political, social and economic networks.</p><p>[Dhikr Akbar berkembang menjadi ‘panggung’ di mana gagasan politik dapat disemai, karena itu berperan dalam mengokohkan dan menegosiasi ruang publik baru. Dhikr Akbar adalah salah satu bentuk ritual Islam di ruang publik yang berkembang pasca Orde Baru. Melalui aktifitas reflektif yang berperan dalam pembentukan identitas personal dan sosial, dhikr akbar mampu memunculkan relasi, aksi, simbol, makna, dan kode, sekaligus untuk mempertemukan kesemuanya dalam satu bentuk simbol peran yang berubah, status, struktur sosial, dan etika serta aturan hukum. Sebagai satu bentuk religiusitas aktif yang berbentuk corak Islam yang tenang dan berorientasi pada dimensi dalam-esoteris, dhikr akbar dapat disebut pula sebagai satu bentuk kesalehan baru. Bentuk kesalehan dapat juga merupakan bentuk keagamaan yang berbeda dengan fundamentalisme, yang berorientasi pada aktifisme dimensi luar dengan tujuan merubah masyarakat atau sistem yang berlaku dengan sistem yang dianggap Islami. Dhikr akbar yang biasanya diselenggarakan di ruang budaya menarik perhatian masyarakat. Kegiatan ini menjadi aktifitas yang mampu menyatukan komunalitas dan ekspresi agama serta pada saat yang sama, mempertemukan jaringan politik, sosial, dan ekonomi.</p>
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Umam, Fawaizul. "IDEOLOGICAL INVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMISTS." ULUL ALBAB Jurnal Studi Islam 20, no. 1 (June 25, 2019): 25–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/ua.v20i1.5714.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Islamism as one of transnational political Islam ideologies continues to spread throughout the world. Many researchers read the phenomenon of strengthening Islamism solely as part of the Islamic social movements. This article looks at it further as a threat to the social cohesiveness of contemporary society. It intends to describe the Islamism from (1) its genealogy to ideological ideas about the unification of dîn (religion) and dawlah (state) and (2) measuring how relevant that idea is realized in a global and national context and (3) proposing a counter-ideology as a solution. Genealogically, Islamism ideology shows the tendency of revivalism and even fundamentalism, which tries to set Islam as a single system in society life. For contemporary Indonesia concept, the ideology is not only realistic, but is also potentially destructive to the unity, the country-nation awareness, the democracy, and Islam’s mission as raḥmat li al-‘âlamîn. Its deployment can be forestalled by revitalizing an alternative strategic discourse containing Islamic values into every dimension of life in this country. Based on the documentary review, its research findings are expected to enrich the discourse as well as an early warning system for national solidity and religious solidarity, especially in Indonesia.
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Argenti, Gili, Caroline Paskarina, Nani Darmayanti, and Nandang Alamsah Deliarnoor. "Post-Islamism in Indonesia: Analysis of Islamic Political Party Programs in the 2019 National Elections." Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 11, no. 1 (January 3, 2022): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.36941/ajis-2022-0011.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Although most Indonesia's population is Muslim, the Islamic parties' votes do not show a significant general election. This tendency encourages Islamic parties to develop post-Islamism to win the sympathy of majority Muslim voters in Indonesia. Ahead of the 2019 election, identity politics or sectarian politics had strengthened in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election, and even identity politics had long ago emerged with the proliferation of Sharia regulations in several regions, as well as the issuance of the MUI Fatwa regarding the illegitimacy of secularism, liberalism, and pluralism. This study aims to see whether Islamic parties maintain Post Islamism in political programs in the 2019 election. The research uses a library research method by collecting data from books, journals, national print, and online media. The study results explain that Islamic parties remain consistent in using the Post Islamism approach in the 2019 election, even though their vote acquisition is stagnant as a middle board party.
Received: 4 September 2021 / Accepted: 15 November 2021 / Published: 3 January 2022
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Jamhari, Jamhari, and Testriono Testriono. "The Roots of Indonesia's Resilience Against Violent Extremism." Studia Islamika 28, no. 3 (December 31, 2021): 517–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v28i3.23956.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article explores Indonesia’s institutional foundations to understand the country’s resilience against violent extremism. First, Pancasila has been the foundation of an inclusive state that can bind Indonesian diversity. Second, multiparty elections allow Islamist groups to participate in politics and express their aspirations constitutionally, thus moderating their violent strategies. Third, the support of the largest Islamic organizations, especially NU and Muhammadiyah, for counterterrorism and law enforcement against extremist orchestrated by the government. Both organizations exhibit a stronghold essential to countering the Salafi jihadist ideology. However, although infrequent and small in scale, the continued acts of violent extremism in Indonesia have shown that there is still room for the terrorist ideology to grow. Some Islamic educational institutions deliberately educate students to support Islamism, and some students are introduced to Salafi jihadist ideology. Such a development should serve as a warning for the government to pay more attention to the curriculum and teachers, especially in Islamic educational institutions.
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Evans, D. H. "II. The ‘Meanings’ of Pan-Islamism: The Growth of International Consciousness Among the Muslims of India and Indonesia in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century." Itinerario 11, no. 1 (March 1987): 15–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0165115300009360.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
A commentator on Muhammad Iqbal, the great poet-philosopher of.Muslim India, once wrote that ‘Pan-Islamism is not actually defined anywhere’. If true, it has not been through want of trying. Since the term ‘Pan-Islamism’ became common currency in the late nineteenth century, a variety of European journalists, colonial officials and academic researchers (not to mention Muslims themselves) have striven to offer a precise interpretation of the phenomenon. But they have failed to develop any consensus, even on basic questions: what was Pan-Islamism? why was it? or even, has it ever existed? Some have considered it an essentially religious drive, others as a political mobilisation. Some observers have presented it as a movement, as a disciplined, and perhaps clandestine, organisation with active members and fixed purposes. Others have dismissed it as mere sentiment, as nothing more than the vaguest of emotional attachments between co-religionists. A number, believing that Pan-Islamism seeks to re-create a past perfection, have argued that it aims to regroup Muslims under one sovereign authority much as they had enjoyed during the Prophet's lifetime. Others, on the other hand, have sensed more modern connotations, claiming that it intends to forge an exclusive international federation of Islamic states with the very real potential for threatening non-Muslim countries. At least one Marxist writer has distinguished between ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ strains.3 This suggests that Pan-Islamism might both nurture the longings for some distant past and be responsive to the demands of the present.
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A'la, Abd, Muktafi Muktafi, Abu Bakar, Mukhammad Zamzami, and Ahmad Fathan Aniq. "Islamism Denounced: Madura Kiais’ Perspective of Nationalism." Karsa: Journal of Social and Islamic Culture 29, no. 2 (December 27, 2020): 134–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.19105/karsa.v29i2.4876.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The transmission of Islamism among the kiais and their students in Madura has become more critical to examine in the last decade. However, some kiais of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Bangkalan Madura see that Islamism or political Islam will gradually erode their national commitment. This article intends to reinterpret the nationalism vision of several kiais of NU and measure the extent of their views on the ideology of Islamism discoursed by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). By interviewing several kiais, this study finds that the propagation of Islamism in Bangkalan has not been as massive as occurred in Pamekasan, another sub-districts in Madura. The FPI-style Islamism in Bangkalan has been propagated only by a small group though they are vigorously active on social media. The majority of the NU community remains devoted to nationalism, committing that the NKRI is the final state. Islamic moderation promulgated by the kiais has been widely accepted and deeply rooted among the NU community. They believe nationalism and religion should not be separated from the spirit of their struggle (khittah). These two elements have united within their fighting spirit and become the primary trigger in devoting themselves to the nation and state to preserve national sovereignty and the integrity of Indonesia.
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Tanthowi, Pramono U. "Religiosity, parties and election: Islamization and democratization in post-Soeharto Indonesia." Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 2, no. 1 (June 1, 2012): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v2i1.1-27.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The political development in Indonesian during the first decade of reform era<br />witnesses a resurgence of Muslim politics, which had been facing a political impass<br />during the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast to current political development in the<br />Arab World, the resurgence of Muslim politics in Indonesia has been marching<br />hand in hand with democratization. The blossoming of tens of Islamic political<br />parties by no means that they speak with a single voice. Rather, political Islam is<br />now represented by parties with more diverse platforms. Those parties are not<br />only varied in their commitment to an Islamist agenda but also strongly divided<br />on this agenda. Yet, they all welcome and uphold “Muslim” aspirations. As far as<br />their performance in the 1999 and the 2004 elections is concerned, there was a<br />significant decline for Muslim politics compared to the first democratic election of<br />1955. The results reflected the minority appeal of Islamism, regardless of both<br />the fact that the majority of the Indonesians are Muslims and the fact that there<br />has been increasing Islamic revivalism within Indonesian society.
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Nurlinah, Rizkika Lhena Darwin, and Haryanto. "After Shari‘ah: Islamism and Electoral Dynamics at Local Level in Indonesia." global journal al thaqafah 8, no. 2 (December 31, 2018): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.7187/gjat122018-2.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In recent years, scholars have considered that in addition to the ideological factor, the implementation of shari’ah in Indonesia is caused by voter mobilization. In other words, shari’ah regulatory policy at local level is influenced by the interests of local politicians to influence voter preferences in seeking votes and winning elections. This article reviews some of the theses by analyzing Islamism and electoral dynamics in two regions which implement many shari’ah regulations. This article deals with the latest trends “after shari’ah” (as being or has been applied), looking for similarities and differences, as it predicts the future by correlating local shari’ah and electoral issues in Aceh and South Sulawesi. The article found that there is a tendency for local politicians to no longer use shari’ah issues as the primary means of mobilization to influence voters. It is also found that the Islamic shari’ah no longer affected voter preferences at grassroots level in both Aceh and Sulawesi, despite the growing trend of public display of religiosity in Muslim societies in general. This phenomenon, while it explains an apparent shift in movement of local actors, it as well suggests a similar shift in the Muslim community’s attitude toward shari’ah politics. Conceivably there is an increasing recognition of the politics of welfare over that of shar’iah politics that is now being massively displayed in the electoral politics in Indonesia.
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Karim, Syahrir, Samsu Adabi Mamat, and Bayu Taufiq Possumah. "Islamism and Democratization in Indonesia Post-Reformation Era: Socio-Political Analysis." International Journal of Islamic Thought 6, no. 1 (December 1, 2014): 79–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.24035/ijit.06.2014.008.
Повний текст джерела
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Sarhindi, Irfan Latifulloh, and Rysa Sahrial. "Narratives on the 212 Movement and Tauhid Flag Transformation from the Boudieusian Perspective." Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan 29, no. 2 (November 30, 2021): 231–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/ws.29.2.10759.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The so-called Tauhid flag was exclusively known as HTI's (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) symbol of Islamic caliphate re-establishment. However, after its burning incident in 2018, the flag appears to be one of the symbols of post-Islamist populism. By using the Bourdieusian perspective's framework, this study aims to understand the prior narrative of the Tauhid flag, the narrative of the 212 movements, and how the narrative of the 212 movements influenced the transformation of the narrative of the Tauhid flag. The data in this study were taken from 180 sampled tweets using proportionate stratified random sampling. The data were elaborated with related news and publications and then condensed, codified, and categorized. This study revealed that the prior narrative of the Tauhid flag was the narrative of institutional Islamism, aiming to re-establish the Islamic caliphate through a peaceful act. Meanwhile, the 212 movements represent the narrative of post-Islamist populism. When the Tauhid flag became the central issue in several 212 movements, the flag's narrative transformed into post-Islamist populism. It means that the widespread acceptance of the Tauhid flag has a little impact, if none, on HTI's caliphate campaign.