Статті в журналах: "Investment games"

1

Edmunds, Gillette. "Investment Games." Transactional Analysis Journal 33, no. 1 (January 2003): 68–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/036215370303300110.

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2

Smit, Han T. J., and Lenos Trigeorgis. "Flexibility and Games in Strategic Investment." Multinational Finance Journal 14, no. 1/2 (June 1, 2010): 125–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.17578/14-1/2-4.

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3

FLÅM, S. D., and Y. M. ERMOLIEV. "Investment, uncertainty, and production games." Environment and Development Economics 14, no. 1 (February 2009): 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x08004579.

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ABSTRACTThis paper explores a few cooperative aspects of investments in uncertain, real options. By hypothesis some production commitments, factors, or quotas are transferable. Cases in point include energy supply, emission of pollutants, and harvest of renewable resources. Of particular interest are technologies or projects that provide anti-correlated returns. Any such project stabilizes the aggregate proceeds. Therefore, given widespread risk aversion, a project of this sort merits a bonus. The setting is formalized as a two-stage, stochastic, production game. Absent economies of scale, such games are quite tractable in analysis, computation, and realization. A core imputation comes in terms of shadow prices that equilibrate competitive, endogenous markets. Such prices emerge as optimal dual solutions to coordinated production programs, featuring pooled commitments, or resources. Alternatively, the prices could result from repeated exchange.

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4

Leung, Chi Man, and Yue Kuen Kwok. "Patent-investment games under asymmetric information." European Journal of Operational Research 223, no. 2 (December 2012): 441–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.06.033.

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5

Suttinon, Pongsak, Asif Mumtaz Bhatti, and Seigo Nasu. "Option Games in Water Infrastructure Investment." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 138, no. 3 (May 2012): 268–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000168.

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6

Chen, Xin, and Zhisong Chen. "Cost allocation of capacity investment games." Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 60, no. 6 (August 5, 2013): 512–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nav.21549.

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7

Anderson, Steven T., Daniel Friedman, and Ryan Oprea. "Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment." American Economic Review 100, no. 4 (September 1, 2010): 1778–803. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1778.

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Several impatient investors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost. (JEL C73, D44, D82, G31)

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8

Larson, Nathan. "Strategic Delay in Global Games." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 16, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 83–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0062.

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AbstractWe study strategic uncertainty in an investment coordination game when players have the option to delay acting. Absent the option to delay, the global games literature shows that efficient equilibrium outcomes are possible only when they are also risk dominant. In contrast, we show that when delay is not too costly, strategic uncertainty can encourage delay in such a way that efficient investment occurs whenever it is “worth waiting for.”

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9

Smit, Han T. J., and Lenos Trigeorgis. "Valuing Infrastructure Investment: An Option Games Approach." California Management Review 51, no. 2 (January 2009): 79–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41166481.

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10

Wintein, Stefan, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx, and Marieke Quant. "Multiple Fund Investment Situations and Related Games." Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 63, no. 3 (March 30, 2006): 413–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0060-x.

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11

Gumede, Musa, Vusi Mazibuko, and Pumela Msweli. "Commonwealth Games: can Africa afford the games?" Public and Municipal Finance 6, no. 1 (April 5, 2017): 57–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/pmf.06(1).2017.06.

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The Commonwealth Games Federation recently awarded the hosting of the 2022 Games to Durban, South Africa. This will be the first time the Games are hosted in the African continent. The paper looks into whether tangible benefits for hosting mega-events are less or more important than intangible benefits. In investigating this issue, the paper takes a political geography theoretical stance for its ability to provide normative ideological content for explaining intangible and tangible values for hosting Commonwealth Games. The paper looks at pros and cons for investing in mega-event infrastructure and also looks at the cost of hosting the Games for cities. The 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi budgeted $240 million for the entire Games, but the actual costs after the Games were found to be $1.7 billion. Similarly, in 2014 Glasgow, the cost of the Games was calculated at £575 million ($690 million). The paper looks at whether South Africa as the 2022 Commonwealth Games host can afford the games. It also considers the impact of the Games on national identity, national pride and patriotism here identified as novelty values that preserve social cohesion, a social attribute that has to be in place to build a robust economy. The paper concludes by noting that the success of the Games will depend on deliberate investment in catalytic facilities in areas that will be sustained post event. The amount of novelty value generated out of the Commonwealth Games will depend on how successful the Games are and on how the communities are able to interact with the facilities post event.

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12

Giné, Xavier, Pamela Jakiela, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Morduch. "Microfinance Games." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 60–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.2.3.60.

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Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse. (JEL D82, G21, G31, O16)

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13

Siegel, Ron. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments." American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 1, 2010): 2230–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2230.

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This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in these games and apply it to study competitions in which a fraction of each competitor's investment is sunk and the rest is paid only by the winners. Complete-information all-pay auctions are a special case. (JEL D44, D72, D82)

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14

AHMED, E., A. S. HEGAZI, and A. S. ELGAZZAR. "ON SPATIAL ASYMMETRIC GAMES." Advances in Complex Systems 05, no. 04 (December 2002): 433–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219525902000614.

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The stability of some spatial asymmetric games is discussed. Both linear and nonlinear asymptotic stability of asymmetric hawk-dove and prisoner's dilemma are studied. Telegraph reaction diffusion equations for the asymmetric spatial games are presented. Asymmetric games of parental investment is studied in the presence of both ordinary and cross diffusions.

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15

Wang, Shuai, Zhaojin Xu, and Lianzhong Zhang. "Non-Fixed Investment in Voluntary Public Goods Games." Journal of the Korean Physical Society 72, no. 9 (April 28, 2018): 972–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.3938/jkps.72.972.

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16

Watanabe, Takahiro. "REAL OPTIONS AND SIGNALING IN STRATEGIC INVESTMENT GAMES." Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 61, no. 1 (2018): 18–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.15807/jorsj.61.18.

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17

Oliveira, Fernando. "The value of information in electricity investment games." Energy Policy 36, no. 7 (July 2008): 2364–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.005.

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18

Maillé, Patrick, Bruno Tuffin, and Jean-Marc Vigne. "Technological investment games among wireless telecommunications service providers." International Journal of Network Management 21, no. 1 (January 2011): 65–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nem.776.

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19

Long, Hui, Rizhao Gong, and Jiaqian Yao. "Heterogeneous investments induced by emotions promote cooperation in public goods games." Europhysics Letters 137, no. 2 (January 1, 2022): 21001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/ac4795.

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Abstract Emotion plays an important role in heterogeneous investments and has some direct effects on the cooperation behaviour of a player in a public goods game (PGG). How this irrational factor affects the heterogeneous investments and what level of cooperation is present in players with emotions are still unknown to us. Here, the heterogeneous investments induced by emotions into a PGG were introduced. The emotional index was firstly quantified by considering a memory-cumulative effect, and then an investment formula was proposed based on this emotional index. At last, the effect of emotions on the cooperation behaviour in a PGG was investigated. Results show that the heterogeneous investments induced by emotions can improve cooperation significantly in a PGG, and that an increase of the memory length, the emotional increment, or the memory discounting factor can improve the cooperation level.

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20

Sundqvist, Pia, and Liss Kerstin Sylvén. "Language-related computer use: Focus on young L2 English learners in Sweden." ReCALL 26, no. 1 (January 2014): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0958344013000232.

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AbstractThis paper presents findings from a study investigating young English language learners (YELLs) in Sweden in 4th grade (N = 76, aged 10–11). Data were collected with the help of a questionnaire and a one-week language diary. The main purpose was to examine the learners’ L2 English language-related activities outside of school in general, and their use of computers and engagement in playing digital games in particular. A comparison is made between language-related activities in English, Swedish, and other languages. Another purpose was to see whether there is a relationship between playing digital games and (a) gender, (b) L1, (c) motivation for learning English, (d) self-assessed English ability, and (e) self-reported strategies for speaking English. In order to do so, the sample was divided into three digital game groups, (1) non-gamers, (2) moderate, and (3) frequent gamers (≥4 hours/week), based on diary data (using self-reported times for playing digital games in English). Results showed that YELLs are extensively involved in extramural English (EE) activities (M = 7.2 hrs/w). There are statistically significant gender differences, boys (11.5 hrs/w) and girls (5.1 hrs/w; p < .01), the reason being boys’ greater time investment in digital gaming and watching films. The girls, on the other hand, spent significantly more time on pastime language-related activities in Swedish (11.5 hrs/w) than the boys (8.0 hrs/w; p < .05), the reason being girls’ greater time investment in facebooking. Investigation of the digital game groups revealed that group (1) was predominantly female, (2) a mix, and (3) predominantly male. YELLs with an L1 other than Swedish were overrepresented in group (3). Motivation and self-assessed English ability were high across all groups. Finally, regarding the self-reported strategies, code-switching to one's L1 was more commonly reported by non- and moderate gamers than frequent gamers.

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21

Browne, Sid. "Stochastic differential portfolio games." Journal of Applied Probability 37, no. 1 (March 2000): 126–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1239/jap/1014842273.

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We study stochastic dynamic investment games in continuous time between two investors (players) who have available two different, but possibly correlated, investment opportunities. There is a single payoff function which depends on both investors’ wealth processes. One player chooses a dynamic portfolio strategy in order to maximize this expected payoff, while his opponent is simultaneously choosing a dynamic portfolio strategy so as to minimize the same quantity. This leads to a stochastic differential game with controlled drift and variance. For the most part, we consider games with payoffs that depend on the achievement of relative performance goals and/or shortfalls. We provide conditions under which a game with a general payoff function has an achievable value, and give an explicit representation for the value and resulting equilibrium portfolio strategies in that case. It is shown that non-perfect correlation is required to rule out trivial solutions. We then use this general result explicitly to solve a variety of specific games. For example, we solve a probability maximizing game, where each investor is trying to maximize the probability of beating the other's return by a given predetermined percentage. We also consider objectives related to the minimization or maximization of the expected time until one investor's return beats the other investor's return by a given percentage. Our results allow a new interpretation of the market price of risk in a Black-Scholes world. Games with discounting are also discussed, as are games of fixed duration related to utility maximization.

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22

Browne, Sid. "Stochastic differential portfolio games." Journal of Applied Probability 37, no. 01 (March 2000): 126–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021900200015308.

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We study stochastic dynamic investment games in continuous time between two investors (players) who have available two different, but possibly correlated, investment opportunities. There is a single payoff function which depends on both investors’ wealth processes. One player chooses a dynamic portfolio strategy in order to maximize this expected payoff, while his opponent is simultaneously choosing a dynamic portfolio strategy so as to minimize the same quantity. This leads to a stochastic differential game with controlled drift and variance. For the most part, we consider games with payoffs that depend on the achievement of relative performance goals and/or shortfalls. We provide conditions under which a game with a general payoff function has an achievable value, and give an explicit representation for the value and resulting equilibrium portfolio strategies in that case. It is shown that non-perfect correlation is required to rule out trivial solutions. We then use this general result explicitly to solve a variety of specific games. For example, we solve a probability maximizing game, where each investor is trying to maximize the probability of beating the other's return by a given predetermined percentage. We also consider objectives related to the minimization or maximization of the expected time until one investor's return beats the other investor's return by a given percentage. Our results allow a new interpretation of the market price of risk in a Black-Scholes world. Games with discounting are also discussed, as are games of fixed duration related to utility maximization.

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23

Khodova, Kristina A. "Genome Games: Market Challenges, Investment Opportunities and Patent Battles." Cellular Therapy and Transplantation 6, no. 1 (March 31, 2017): 44–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.18620/ctt-1866-8836-2017-6-1-44-47.

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24

Jarzęcki, Marek, and Jacek Mizerka. "Elements of the Prospect Theory in Strategic Investment Games." Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia 2015, no. 74/1 (April 30, 2015): 433–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/frfu.2015.74/1-37.

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25

Xu, Lin, Rongming Wang, and Dingjun Yao. "Optimal stochastic investment games under Markov regime switching market." Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization 10, no. 3 (2014): 795–815. http://dx.doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2014.10.795.

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26

Arasteh, Abdollah. "Considering the investment decisions with real options games approach." Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 72 (May 2017): 1282–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.10.043.

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27

Uysal, Ahmet. "Commitment to multiplayer online games: An investment model approach." Computers in Human Behavior 61 (August 2016): 357–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.03.028.

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28

Vedenov, Dmitry V., and Mario J. Miranda. "Numerical solution of dynamic oligopoly games with capital investment." Economic Theory 18, no. 1 (July 2001): 237–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/pl00004133.

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29

Schosser, Josef. "Reply to Ortner." Games 9, no. 4 (November 15, 2018): 94. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040094.

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I address the comments made by Ortner (Games 9(4): 93, 2018) in relation to my note “Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited” (Games 9(2): 26, 2018).

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30

SEİFODDİNİ, Jalal. "A multi-criteria approach to rating Metaverse games." Journal of Metaverse 2, no. 2 (December 31, 2022): 42–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.57019/jmv.1053778.

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Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) took the already profitable gaming industry to a whole new level. Before that, people would pay to buy games, and there were also some in-game purchases. But now every item in games is an NFT, and different NFTs have different prices. A lot of users consider NFT metaverse games an investment opportunity. Therefore, it is vital to evaluate these metaverse games and rate them to find the most attractive investment opportunities. In this paper, we develop a framework for rating NFT metaverse games by considering their various risks and potential upsides through the PROMETHEE II method. Specially, we design a flip ratio that can take into account both the opportunity to flip another cryptocurrency and the risk of being flipped by another cryptocurrency. Our new flip ratio could be a very useful measure of risk-opportunity analysis. We also analyze the crash risk of NFT game tokens' prices through a non-parametric value at risk analysis, which is compatible with the volatile nature of cryptocurrency prices.

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31

Wang, Zhi, Huan Tan, Jing Wang, and Chunyan Hu. "Concession Period Decision Models for Public Infrastructure Projects Based on Option Games." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2015 (2015): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/671764.

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Concession period is an important decision-making variable for the investment and construction of public infrastructure projects. However, we currently have few scientific methods to exactly determine the concession period. This paper managed to seek out concession period decision models for public infrastructure with option game theory, studied the influence of minimum government income guarantee and government investment on concession period, and demonstrated those models in the formulas mentioned in the paper. The research results showed that the increase of minimum government income guarantee value would shorten the concession period, while the increase of income volatility, that is, the uncertainty, would lengthen the concession period. In terms of government investment, optimal concession period would lengthen to some extent with the increase of government investment ratio and the income and the decrease of its guarantee value. Yet, optimal concession period would shorten in case of extreme highness of the government investment ratio due to its high guarantee value. And the government would accordingly shorten the concession period in case of the unchanged government investment ratio with the increased income volatility and risks. Still, the paper put forward the argument that the government would apply various guarantee methods and implement flexible concession period in accordance with the specific circumstances of public infrastructure projects.

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32

Doraszelski, Ulrich, and Juan F. Escobar. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games." Theoretical Economics 14, no. 2 (2019): 597–646. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3230.

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We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work, and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, research and development races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public contribution games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature.

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33

WANG, QIUQI, and YUE KUEN KWOK. "REAL OPTION SIGNALING GAMES OF DEBT FINANCING USING EQUITY GUARANTEE SWAPS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION." International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 23, no. 05 (August 2020): 2050036. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219024920500363.

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We analyze the real option signaling game models of debt financing of a risky project under information asymmetry, where the firm quality is only known to the firm management but not outsiders. The firm decides on the optimal investment timing of the risky project that requires upfront fixed funding cost and subsequent operating costs. The fixed funding cost is financed via either direct bank loan or entering into a three-party equity guarantee swap (EGS) that involves a bank granting the loan and third party guarantor. Under the EGS agreement, the guarantor is obligated to pay all the future coupon stream to the bank upon default of the firm. In return for the provision of the guarantee, the guarantor obtains certain proportional share of equity of the firm at the time when the swap agreement is signed. The share of equity demanded by the guarantor depends on the outside investors’ belief on the firm quality. The low-type firm has the incentive to mimic the investment strategy of being high-type in terms of investment timing and share of equity. The high-type firm may adopt the appropriate separating strategy by speeding up investment or choosing an alternative financing choice. The resulting loss of the real option value of the investment opportunity represents the information cost under separating strategies. We examine the incentive compatibility constraints faced by the firm under different quality types and discuss characterization of the separating and pooling equilibriums. Unlike the usual assumption of perpetuity of investment opportunity, our real option model assumes the time window of the investment opportunity to be finite. We explore how the information cost and nature of separating and pooling equilibriums evolves over the finite time span of the investment opportunity. The information costs and investment thresholds exhibit interesting time-dependent behaviors. We examine the firm’s investment and financing choice between EGS and the direct bank loan against time and other parameters via comparison of the corresponding information costs and investment thresholds.

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Sun, Zongqi, Xuanhui Liu, Siyuan Chen, Yongqiang Ji, and Jianjun Lou. "Stochastic differential investment-reinsurance games with capital injection-barrier dividend." Journal of Shenzhen University Science and Engineering 34, no. 4 (2017): 364. http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1249.2017.04364.

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35

Keller, L. Robin. "Investment and Defense Strategies, Heuristics, and Games: From the Editor …" Decision Analysis 8, no. 1 (March 2011): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.1110.0201.

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36

Yang, Han-Xin, and Jing Yang. "Reputation-based investment strategy promotes cooperation in public goods games." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 523 (June 2019): 886–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2019.04.190.

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37

Kong, Jean J., and Yue Kuen Kwok. "Real options in strategic investment games between two asymmetric firms." European Journal of Operational Research 181, no. 2 (September 2007): 967–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.07.006.

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38

Сухова, E. Sukhova, Сараева, and N. Saraeva. "Higher Education As an Investment in Individual Human Capital." Management of the Personnel and Intellectual Resources in Russia 4, no. 4 (August 17, 2015): 65–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/13244.

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In the present economic conditions it’s important to increase the effi ciency of investment in individual human capital. Higher education for students is an investment in their human capital. Therefore, it is relevant to study the attitude of students to the learning process in the University, to identify factors that reduce the eff ectiveness of learning, i.e. the process of investing. The authors developed two targeted questionnaires and conducted a survey of 141 student of Samara state University of Economics. Analysis of results allowed to formulate and substantiate scientifi c recommendations for improving the eff ectiveness of investments in human capital in the learning process at the University. It is necessary to activate self-training, to clearly structure and present information, to use business games and debates, to praise for success, to positively treat the initiative of students.

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39

Tang, Lijun. "The Role of Nationalism in the Olympics: Reflecting on the 2012 London Games." Sociological Research Online 18, no. 2 (May 2013): 113–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5153/sro.2976.

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The Olympic Games aim to promote the unity and friendship of humankind. By examining a number of stakeholders of the Games, this paper however demonstrates that the Olympics instigate nationalistic sentiments, provide an opportunity for a global audience to experience and express such feelings, and enable nation states and commercial sponsors to harness this. It argues that ironically, it is nationalistic sentiments rather than internationalism that serve the interests of stakeholders and underpin the Games’ popularity, commercial success and state investment.

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40

Stewart, Alexander J., Todd L. Parsons, and Joshua B. Plotkin. "Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 45 (October 24, 2016): E7003—E7009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1608990113.

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Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. This body of work has focused primarily on individuals who face a simple binary choice, such as “cooperate” or “defect.” Real individuals, however, can exhibit behavioral diversity, varying their input to a social interaction both qualitatively and quantitatively. Here we explore how access to a greater diversity of behavioral choices impacts the evolution of social dynamics in populations. We show that, in public goods games, some simple strategies that choose between only two possible actions can resist invasion by all multichoice invaders, even while engaging in relatively little punishment. More generally, access to a larger repertoire of behavioral choices results in a more ”rugged” fitness landscape, with populations able to stabilize cooperation at multiple levels of investment. As a result, increased behavioral choice facilitates cooperation when returns on investments are low, but it hinders cooperation when returns on investments are high. Finally, we analyze iterated rock–paper–scissors games, the nontransitive payoff structure of which means that unilateral control is difficult to achieve. Despite this, we find that a large proportion of multichoice strategies can invade and resist invasion by single-choice strategies—so that even well-mixed populations will tend to evolve and maintain behavioral diversity.

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41

Jöönsson, Kristina. "Laos in 2009: Recession and Southeast Asian Games." Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (January 2010): 241–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.1.241.

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Laos in 2009 was colored by the Southeast Asian Games held in December, and by the effects of the global financial crisis. Growth rates declined as foreign investment, primarily in hydroelectric power and infrastructure, was postponed. Simultaneously, efforts were made to strengthen the reputation of the country internationally.

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42

Li, Xuyue. "Competing Retailers’ Environmental Investment: An Analysis under Different Power Structures." Energies 11, no. 10 (October 11, 2018): 2719. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en11102719.

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Sustainability issues in supply chains have received increasingly significant concern. Facing incentives such as environmental tax and consumer environmental awareness, firms and even retailers have started to make sustainability investments. To evaluate the retailer’s contribution to sustainability issues, we study a supply chain with one manufacturer and two symmetric competing retailers who have the option to make sustainable investment in their upstream members directly in green technology or clean production. We investigate the optimal sustainable investment and operation decisions under three power structures: (1) firms have the same power (Nash game); (2) the manufacturer is more powerful (Manufacturer-lead Stackelberg game) and (3) the retailers are more powerful (Retailer-lead Stackelberg game). By analyzing the optimal decisions and the economic performances, we show that the retailers always have incentives to make sustainable investment in all power structures. However, the retailers’ power affects firms’ decisions, the economic and the environmental performances. When the investment cost is low, the emission reduction due to investment is the most significant with less powerful retailers. With relatively high investment cost, whether the retailers having more power make more sustainable investment depends on the unit tax saving and effect factor of emission reduction on the demand. From the environmental perspective, simultaneous games may conduct the most significant total emission reduction in most cases. We also consider an asymmetric case and compare it with the symmetric one.

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43

Bos, Swen P. M., Tina Cornioley, Anne Dray, Patrick O. Waeber, and Claude A. Garcia. "Exploring Livelihood Strategies of Shifting Cultivation Farmers in Assam through Games." Sustainability 12, no. 6 (March 20, 2020): 2438. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12062438.

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Understanding landscape change starts with understanding what motivates farmers to transition away from one system, shifting cultivation, into another, like plantation crops. Here we explored the resource allocation strategies of the farmers of the Karbi tribe in Northeast India, who practice a traditional shifting cultivation system called jhum. Through a participatory modelling framework, we co-developed a role-playing game of the local farming system. In the game, farmers allocated labour and cash to meet household needs, while also investing in new opportunities like bamboo, rubber and tea, or the chance to improve their living standards. Farmers did embrace new options where investment costs, especially monetary investments, are low. Returns on these investments were not automatically re-invested in further long-term, more expensive and promising opportunities. Instead, most of the money is spend on improving household living standards, particularly the next generation’s education. The landscape changed profoundly based on the farmers’ strategies. Natural ecological succession was replaced by an improved fallow of marketable bamboo species. Plantations of tea and rubber became more prevalent as time progressed while old practices ensuring food security were not yet given up.

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44

Ortiz, Luz, Héctor Tillerias, Christian Chimbo, and Veronica Toaza. "Impact on the video game industry during the COVID-19 pandemic." Athenea 1, no. 1 (September 25, 2020): 5–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.47460/athenea.v1i1.1.

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This work presents trends and comparisons that show a change in the consumption and production of video games in times of confinement due to the health emergency. The video game industry has modified its philosophy and adapted its products to the new requirements and trends of consumers who see in this activity a way to appease the psychological and social impact due to quarantine and isolation. There is evidence of a 65% increase in the use of online video games, which has broken a world record. Products that have new aspects and considerations never before proposed by this great industry have been developed and offered, such as thematic games related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Keywords: Video game, pandemic, online games, confinement. References [1]M. Olff, Screening for consequences of trauma–an update on the global collaboration on traumatic stress.European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 2020. [2]Z. Li, China’s Digital Content Publishing Industry: The 2019 Annual Report on Investment Insights and Market Trends. Publishing Research Quarterly, 2020. [3]R. Agis, An event-driven behavior trees extension to facilitate non-player multi-agent coordination in video games, Expert Systems with Applications, 2020. [4]O. Wulansari, Video games and their correlation to empathy: How to teach and experience empathic emotion. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, 2020. [5]C. Bachen, Simulating real lives: Promoting Global Empathy and Interest in Learning Through SimulationGames. Sage Journal, 2012. [6]S. Fowler, Intercultural simulation games: A review (of the united states and beyond). Sage Journals, 2010. [7]G. Chursin, Learning game development with Unity3D engine and Arduino microcontroller. Journal ofPhysics: Conference Series, 2019. [8]K. Hewett, The Acquisition of 21st-Century Skills Through Video Games: Minecraft Design Process Modelsand Their Web of Class Roles. Sage Journal, 2020. [9]R. Bayeck, Exploring video games and learning in South Africa: An integrative review. Educational TechnologyResearch and Development, 2020. [10]K. Hewett, The 21st-Century Classroom Gamer. Games and Culture, 2021.

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45

Austin, Hailey J., and Robin Sloan. "Through the Shanzhai Lens: Reframing the Transmedial Copying and Remaking of Games." British Journal of Chinese Studies 12, no. 2 (August 6, 2022): 133–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.51661/bjocs.v12i2.186.

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China is one of the fastest growing games markets, housing not only some of the world’s largest video and computer games companies, but also millions of active gamers. From a Western perspective, engagement with China is considered essential to future growth for game developers and publishers, both in terms of inward investment from Chinese publishers and in growing sales with what will become one of the most important markets. However, Western perceptions of copyright, IP, and, copying of games in China can problematise game creators’ and consumers’ views of China. In this paper, we develop a framework for understanding the act of game copying in the West and in China that combines the Chinese concept of shanzhai with developing understandings of the concept “transmedia” and fan-created works. The aim of this framework is to introduce cultural and contextual awareness to our collective understanding of why game copies exist in the West and in China, and how they intersect with existing copyright and IP concerns. Through a case study of the 2018 game Among Us, we demonstrate that the reality of Western and Chinese game ‘copies’ is far more nuanced than is often depicted in Western media.

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46

Ohkita, Kenichi, and Mahito Okura. "Coopetition and coordinated investment: protecting Japanese video games' intellectual property rights." International Journal of Business Environment 6, no. 1 (2014): 92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijbe.2014.058025.

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47

Pilipenko, I. "The Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Evaluating Efficiency of Public Investment Projects (The Case of Sochi-2014 Winter Olympic Games)." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 11 (November 20, 2011): 57–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2011-11-57-78.

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The paper analyzes shortcomings of economic impact studies based mainly on input- output models that are often employed in Russia as well as abroad. Using studies about sport events in the USA and Olympic Games that took place during the last 30 years we reveal advantages of the cost-benefit analysis approach in obtaining unbiased assessments of public investments efficiency; the step-by-step method of cost-benefit analysis is presented in the paper as well. We employ the project of Sochi-2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Russia to evaluate its efficiency using cost-benefit analysis for five accounts (areas of impact), namely government, households, environment, economic development, and social development, and calculate the net present value of the project taking into account its possible alternatives. In conclusion we suggest several policy directions that would enhance public investment efficiency within the Sochi-2014 Olympics.

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48

Sheranova, Arzuu. "Political invention of the World Nomad Games in Kyrgyzstan." Kulturní studia 2021, no. 2 (November 1, 2021): 66–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.7160/ks.2021.170203.

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This paper examines ‘invention’ of a new ‘tradition’, that is of nomadic games in Kyrgyzstan blessed by its prehistoric past of nomadism. Since 2012 the Kyrgyz government had introduced the World Nomad Games (the WNGs) in Kyrgyzstan. The country hosted three spectacular games in the northern oblast of the country – Yssyk-Kul. Hundreds of sportsmen worldwide took part in these events and thousands of tourists rushed into the country to watch the games. In fact, Kyrgyz nomadic games are more than just a revival of old nomadic traditions, but they are political inventions. Using Hobsbawm’s framework of ‘invented traditions’ (1983), I examine the World Nomad Games as invented tradition. I argue that the Kyrgyz leadership invented tradition of nomadic games to tackle with contemporary issues, such as a need for attraction of foreign investment and promotion of tourism. As I illustrate the WNGs project was a timely response to improve the country image after a series of political instabilities the country underwent in its recent history.

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49

Phillips, Cody, Madison Klarkowski, Julian Frommel, Carl Gutwin, and Regan L. Mandryk. "Identifying Commercial Games with Therapeutic Potential through a Content Analysis of Steam Reviews." Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 5, CHI PLAY (October 5, 2021): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3474682.

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While evidence supports that some commercial off-the-shelf video games may promote mental wellbeing, it is an extensive time investment to experimentally identify games that benefit players. The time delay between commercial games research and commercial game development can render such research out-of-date. In this work, we explore player-written game reviews as a way to expeditiously identifying games with potential benefits for mental wellbeing. Through a content analysis of review data, we found that players publicly disclose experiences consistent with self-care. Our analysis generated categories related to coping and recovery, emotional regulation, social connectedness, and obsessive play. Through this process, we identified several games as strong candidates for further research. Our work contributes to an emerging research agenda of commercial video games as therapy (VGTx), by providing a technique for rapidly identifying games with therapeutic potential. Further, we demonstrate that Steam user reviews are a valuable source of affective player experience data-a contribution with broad implications for player experience research.

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50

MURPHY, ANNE L. "Lotteries in the 1690s: Investment or Gamble?" Financial History Review 12, no. 2 (October 2005): 227–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0968565005000119.

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In 1693 Thomas Neale, groom porter to their majesties, organised a lottery that offered to its lucky winner a prize of £3,000. The scheme proved a great success, encouraging a variety of entrepreneurs to float similar projects. Indeed, by 1698 lotteries that offered tickets costing as little as one penny allowed all but the most destitute to indulge in dreams of wealth. Although these schemes may be seen as a mere manifestation of the contemporary love of gambling and games of chance, this article argues that they can also reveal much about the nature and progress of the financial revolution.

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