Дисертації з теми "Investment games"
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Lau, Wing Yan. "Two-person games on strategies of irreversible investment /." View Abstract or Full-Text, 2003. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?MATH%202003%20LAUW.
Повний текст джерелаKao, Jennifer L. "Noncooperative games of information sharing and investment : theories and applications." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/30823.
Повний текст джерелаBusiness, Sauder School of
Graduate
Karlsson, Jennie. "Support in Strategic Investment Decisions : Using Option Games in an Uncertain and Competitive Environment." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för industriell ekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-17328.
Повний текст джерелаFagart, Thomas. "Dynamic imperfect competition and irreversible investment." Thesis, Paris 1, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA01E023.
Повний текст джерелаThis thesis studies the role of the irreversibility of investment on the dynamic imperfect competition. It is composed of four theoretical articles and a general introduction. The second chapter studies the role of demand evolution on the possibility of preemption under irreversible investment under imperfect competition. It shows there is no possibility of preemption when there is no jump of demand. Indeed, the linearity of investment cost creates no incentive for the firms to delay investment. When there is no demand evolution, this prevents preemption. The third chapter focuses on the dynamics of firms' capacity when the irreversibility of investment is partial. It shows that the investment dynamics exhibits an efficiency property, and that some initial asymmetry in capacity can be preserved in the short run, but disappears in the long run. The fourth chapter considers the investment choice of firms when there are two different productive capacities embodying different types of technology. One technology permits to produce at a lower marginal cost but the purchasing price of the capacity using this technology is higher. Due to the presence of a financial constraint, firms use different technologies at the same time, and a preemption equilibrium appears. Finally, this paper presents a counter intuitive policy result: an increase in the price of one of the capacities may increase its utilization. The last chapter studies the impact of the irreversibility of investment on collusion possibility. The irreversibility of investment reduces the profitability of short run deviation, as the deviating firm has to invest in order to increase its capacity, and it creates a long run effect. lndeed, once the deviating firr has invested, it is committed toits new capacity. The deviation may thus lead to a preemption of the punishing firm. This preemption effect can make collusion harder to sustain for more patient firms
Olsson, Jessica, and Malin Wallvik. "Hantering av osäkerhet i strategiska investeringar : en kvalitativ undersökning på SME-företag i nordöstra Skåne." Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Sektionen för hälsa och samhälle, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-11111.
Повний текст джерелаMost companies’ main goal is to maximize the value of their company and one way to increase the value of the company can be to invest. An important factor in order to succeed with an investment is to create a strategy and stick to it. Strategies can be structured in different ways, but what they all have in common is the need to manage uncertainties. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate what kind of uncertainty small- and medium sized enterprises experience when they invest, as well as how they manage this. Our selection of small- and medium sized enterprises is based on the fact that the majority of previous research within this particular subject investigates large companies. The research strategy in this thesis is mainly exploratory, since our goal is to increase the knowledge within this partly unexplored subject. We chose to narrow our selection down to companies within the industrial sector in the North East of Skåne. This thesis consists of a qualitative method, where in-depth interviews were conducted with six respondents from different companies. Together with the opinions from the respondents and previous research, interpretations were made which made it possible to create conclusions. The primary conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that investment uncertainty can be managed in different ways depending on the company, even though the companies are operating within the same sector. The companies use different types of strategies in order to manage what they experience as uncertainty, although some of them use the strategies more than others. We wish to increase the understanding and the knowledge of existing uncertainties as well as how to manage these. Our intension is to help small- and medium sized enterprises feel more secure about their investment decisions in the future. Safer decision-making results in reduced uncertainty thus increase the chances of making profitable investments.
Koop, Matthew. "Mega Event Organizing Committees: Investment in Anti-Doping Personnel." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/34208.
Повний текст джерелаIvanov, Asen Vasilev. "Essays in behavioral economics in the context of strategic interaction." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1179515760.
Повний текст джерелаLe, Mai, and Sara Eriksson. "Investeringsbeslut i komplexa projekt : Fallstudie - Överdäckning av centralstationsområdet." Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-254738.
Повний текст джерелаThere are many aspects to consider when investing in complex projects and there exist several methods to evaluate those investments. Complex projects such as a decking over existing thoroughfares engender new areas that generate more utility than just economic. Therefore it is of great importance in case of investment decisions to evaluate the investment with regards to the aspects of interest.Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method used in contexts where more than just the economic aspects are included in the investment decision. The method is well-known and appears in both the academic field and practical at companies. A different method, Option Games is newer and so far mainly applied theoretical and not used in daily practice yet.The aim with this paper is to compare the two methods, Cost Benefit Analysis and Option Games. The goal is to assess which of the two methods best includes the aspects of interest when considering investment decisions for complex projects. The methods will be evaluated based on three selected criteria. Firstly, assumptions and inputs of the two methods. Secondly, their applicability in the current case study and finally the scope of the methods. The paper is conducted as a case study applied on the planned over decking of Stockholm Central station.The result indicates Cost Benefit Analysis to be the preferable method compared to Option Games. Cost Benefit Analysis generates a better foundation when investing in complex projects. Nevertheless, Option Games does regard some aspects that are not considered in the Cost Benefit Analysis method. The most important parameter for both methods is the discount rate in relation to the implemented sensitivity analysis.
Reis, Gelson Antonio de Paula. "Modelo Matemático de Análise de Investimentos para um Jogo de Empresas." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2006. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/8402.
Повний текст джерелаEste trabalho tem como objetivo adaptar um modelo matemático de análise de investimentos para uso em jogos de empresas. O desenvolvimento desta proposta é uma aplicação dos métodos determinísticos financeiros da engenharia econômica VPL, TIR e Payback, identificando a viabilidade econômica e financeira dos empreendimentos simulados e ressaltando a metodologia dos jogos de empresas e o exercício do processo de tomada de decisão, comparando a análise projetada no início do jogo com os resultados realizados no final do jogo. A sua realização efetivou-se com o aproveitamento de dados gerados pelos alunos da disciplina de jogos de empresa do Programa de Pós-graduação da Engenharia de Produção- PPGEP da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria-UFSM
Moura, Rui Jorge Caruço Barroso de. "Opções e jogos: intersecção das opções reais com a teoria de jogos na modelação dinâmica de investimentos em ambiente de incerteza e competitividade." Doctoral thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/10401.
Повний текст джерелаA teoria de finanças empresariais estabelece que urn investimento deve ser realizado quando o seu Valor Actualizado Liquido for positivo. Ao considerar a decisão de investimento em termos de agora ou nunca, esta regra ignora a opção de adiar o investimento. Entretanto, a análise de opções reais - baseada na analogia entre a oportunidade de investimento em activos reais e os instrumentos financeiros derivados - melhorou, consideravelmente, o nosso entendimento sobre as decisões de investimento em ambiente de incerteza. Contudo, a maioria dos modelos de opções reais assume que as oportunidades se desenvolvem em ambientes monopolistas. 0 nosso trabalho analisa o efeito quer do valor da opção de espera quer do valor estratégico do investimento nos timings de investimento num cenário de duopólio - com empresas idênticas e inicialmente inactivas -, combinando a análise de opções reais com a teoria de jogos, "Opções e Jogos". Na presente tese, estabelecemos as funções-valor e as regras óptimas de investimento de urn novo modelo que incorpora, atraves de urn Movimento Geométrico Browniano, a incerteza associada à evolução do valor do projecto bern como a incerteza associada à chegada de novas oportunidades - recorrendo a urn processo de Poisson - e ainda interacções estratégicas.
Traditional corporate finance theory states that an investment project should be undertaken whenever its Net Present Value is greater than zero. This is generally incorrect since it considers only a now-or-never decision and ignores the value of the "option" to delay the investment. The real options literature has improved our understanding of investment problems under uncertainty. This literature stresses the similarity between a financial call option and the opportunity to invest in a real asset. However, most of the real options models assume implicitly a monopoly setting. One of our concerns consists in working out the joint effects of the value of the option to wait and the strategic value of investment, on the firms' timing on investment, in a duopoly setting, by combining game-theoretic and real options methods, Option Games. In our work we derive the strategic value functions and optimal investment rules of a new model, focused on specific and innovative settings regarding the evolution of the opportunity value, through a Geometric Brownian Motion, and the uncertainty related to the arrival of new opportunities - through a Poisson process - and the incorporation of strategic interactions.
Chan, Ka Man. "Two-stage strategic investment /." View abstract or full-text, 2006. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?MATH%202006%20CHAN.
Повний текст джерелаBortoluzzi, Viviane Campanhola. "A CONTRIBUIÇÃO DOS JOGOS DE EMPRESA PARA O ESTUDO DA ANÁLISE DE INVESTIMENTO." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2010. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/8159.
Повний текст джерелаO presente trabalho apresenta uma metodologia de análise de investimentos a ser aplicada no jogo de empresa Metaltec, com o objetivo de facilitar o aprendizado dos principais métodos de análise de investimento. Os jogos de empresa contribuem para esse estudo, pois aproximam o jogador da realidade, aperfeiçoando o aprendizado nas áreas gerenciais, como finanças, produção e vendas. O trabalho foi dividido em dois artigos, o primeiro analisa se as empresas de Santa Maria RS realizam análise de investimento quando adquirem um equipamento. A pesquisa foi realizada com micro e pequenas empresas na cidade de Santa Maria, através de um questionário semi-estruturado. A partir dessa análise chegou-se a conclusão que as empresas não realizam análise de investimento, calculando se o investimento é viável apenas pelo aumento da demanda. E o segundo artigo apresenta a metodologia de análise de investimentos para os jogos de empresa. A pesquisa foi realizada no Curso de Pós-Graduação em Engenharia de Produção com as turmas do segundo semestre de 2008 e do segundo semestre de 2009. A aplicação de 2008 apresentou resultados mais similares, pois seus jogadores eram de áreas afins a engenharia de produção, enquanto que a aplicação de 2009 trouxe várias discrepâncias no decorrer do jogo, devido aos jogadores possuírem diversas formações acadêmicas. Mas mesmo com as dificuldades que os jogadores passaram, o jogo de empresas contribuiu para o aprendizado gerencial deles. E o estudo dos métodos de análise de investimento no jogo de empresa contribuiu para o aprendizado da Engenharia Econômica, facilitando o entendimento, pois se trabalhou no contexto uma empresa e não com problemas descontextualizados.
Hammerschmidt, Anna. "A strategic investment game with endogenous absorptive capacity." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2006. http://epub.wu.ac.at/106/1/document.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаSeries: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
Fisher, James C. D. "Essays in game theory on investment and social organization." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2015. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3688083.
Повний текст джерелаThis dissertation uses cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to examine the role of investment (broadly defined) in social organization. It's composed of three chapters. The first chapter examines bidirectional investment in partnerships and characterizes the stable relationships among the benefits players produce and receive, their costs, and their payoffs. The second chapter extends the model of the first chapter to allow for multilateral matching and investment; it shows that many of the results of the bilateral case remain true in the more general case. The third chapter examines investment in social links to secure future help and characterizes the equilibrium network/linking architecture and welfare.
Pineau, Pierre-Olivier. "Electricity market reforms, institutional developments, investment dynamics and game modeling." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/NQ57476.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаSANTOS, MAURICIO SANT ANNA DOS. "A EVOLUTIONARY REAL OPTION GAME WITH THE OPTION TO DEFER INVESTMENT." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2015. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=26402@1.
Повний текст джерелаCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
O objetivo desta dissertação é demonstrar que mesmo em ambientes em que a decisão do individuo não segue a racionalidade, podemos obter uma estratégia ótima. Com o auxilio do equilíbrio evolucionariamente estável (ESS), conseguimos analisar casos diferentes da literatura usual de teoria dos jogos em que mesmo com escolhas sem racionalidade, encontramos a melhor estratégia, para tal usaremos a metodologia do jogo de opções, união entre a teoria dos jogos e a metodologia de opções reais, juntamente com o conceito de equilíbrio evolucionariamente estável (ESS). Isso é demonstrado através da modelagem de um mercado duopolista assimétrico, sujeito a incertezas. Neste trabalho as firmas são diferentes, existe um duopólio assimétrico. Aqui as empresas são não homogêneas porque uma empresa tem custo operacional mais baixo do que a outra para o mesmo investimento. Isto significa que uma empresa tem vantagem competitiva sobre a rival. Os resultados do modelo mostram que, dependendo do tipo de estratégia assumida pela empresa, é possível que a empresa de baixo custo se torne líder como na literatura usual e em alguns casos encontramos que diferente da expectativa usual é possível que a empresa de alto custo venha a se tornar líder e demonstra que a premissa de racionalidade não é necessária para a escolha inicial da empresa utilizando o conceito de ESS para definir o equilíbrio assim como foi feito no trabalho de Xiao e Yu (2006).
The objective of this dissertation is show that even in environments where the decision of the individual not follow rationality, we can get a optimal strategy. with the help of evolutionarily stable strategy, we analyze different cases of the usual literature on game theory that even with choices without rationality, we find the best strategy, for that we will use the option game methodology, which is the union between gaming theory methodology and option game methodology, with the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). This is demonstrated through modeling of a duopolistic market, with uncertainties, in this dissertation firms are different. Here companies has no-Homogeneous cost because a company has lower operating costs than the other for the same investment. This means that a company has competitive advantage over rival. The model results show that, depending on the strategy assumed by the company it is possible that the low-cost company to become leader as usual in the literature and in some cases also shows that is possible to the high cost company to become leader and demonstrates that the premise of rationality are not necessary for choosing initial strategy, the company can find equilibrium using the concept of ESS to set the balance as was done in the paper of Xiao and YU (2006).
Li, Qing. "Game Theoretic and Analytical Approaches to International Cooperation and Investment Problems." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/32406.
Повний текст джерелаMaster of Science
Sundström, Johannes, and Nikolas Dresmal. "How Early-Stage Investors Assess Investment Opportunities in the Swedish Video Game Industry." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-447617.
Повний текст джерелаJustin, Cedric Y. "A quantitative real options method for aviation technology decision-making in the presence of uncertainty." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/54452.
Повний текст джерелаGoetomo, Filbert. "Esports in Korea: A study on League of Legends team performances on the share price of owning corporations." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1356.
Повний текст джерелаCisneros-Molina, Myriam. "Mathematical methods for valuation and risk assessment of investment projects and real options." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.491350.
Повний текст джерелаScroggin, Steven E. "Essays in dynamic uncertainty : behavioral economics, investment theory and law and economics /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3208637.
Повний текст джерелаWoods, Daniel John. "Does self-serving generosity diminish reciprocal response?" Thesis, University of Canterbury. Economics and Finance, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/8376.
Повний текст джерелаZhu, Chengbin. "Supply Chain Revenue Management Considering Components' Quality and Reliability." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28644.
Повний текст джерелаPh. D.
Cobanli, Onur. "An application of cooperative game theory." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17103.
Повний текст джерелаThe dissertation contains three independent essays on the application of cooperative game theory on the international natural gas trade. The international natural gas network is represented by a stylized disaggregated quantitative model consisting of its major producers, customers, trunk-pipelines and LNG terminals. The value function considers essential characteristics of the international gas trade and characterizes the interdependencies between the major actors. The game is solved with the Shapley value and the nucleolus as alternative indexes for capturing the power of different players. Chapter 1 aims to rationalize players'' interest in the three pipeline projects, i.e., Nord Stream, South Stream, and Nabucco. The chapter relates the investments into the new pipelines to their impact on the power structure and thereby makes conclusions about the explanatory power of the solution concepts. While the Shapley value can explain the recent investments in the new pipelines as a rational attempt to alter the power structure in the network, the nucleolus, in contrast, fails to replicate the empirical evidence. Chapter 2 studies pipeline options of the Central Asian countries aimed at diversifying their transit routes and export markets. The results explain the Central Asian countries'' endorsement for an eastbound pipeline to China rather than a Europe-bound option, and show negligible demand competition between China and Europe for Central Asian supplies. Chapter 3 investigates major supply and demand developments in the global LNG market as well as their impact on the power structure in the Eurasian natural gas trade. The developments benefit European consumers significantly, but barely curtail the power of the established suppliers in close proximity to Europe, such as Russia.
Gamel, Johannes [Verfasser], Klaus [Akademischer Betreuer] Menrad, Klaus [Gutachter] Menrad, and David [Gutachter] Wozabal. "Individual Investors and Socially Responsible Investments – Attitudes and Preferences in the Context of Wind Energy Investments / Johannes Gamel ; Gutachter: Klaus Menrad, David Wozabal ; Betreuer: Klaus Menrad." München : Universitätsbibliothek der TU München, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1159703493/34.
Повний текст джерелаMiranda, de Loureiro Manuel Valentim. "Transmission and Interconnection Planning in Power Systems: Contributions to Investment Under Uncertainty and Cross-Border Cost Allocation." Research Showcase @ CMU, 2017. http://repository.cmu.edu/dissertations/1105.
Повний текст джерелаThureson, Disa. "Cost-Benefit Analysis of climate policy and long term public investments." Doctoral thesis, Örebro universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Örebro Universitet, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-48241.
Повний текст джерелаTracy, William Martín. "Three essays on firm learning." Diss., Restricted to subscribing institutions, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1580809011&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=1564&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Повний текст джерелаESPOSTO, ELENA. "LE AZIONI SONO PIù ELOQUENTI DELLE PAROLE? TESTI E GIOCHI IN UN ESPERIMENTO CONDOTTO IN DUE CARCERI STATUNITENSI." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/40684.
Повний текст джерелаThe thesis presents some of the results of a longitudinal experiment conducted in two U.S. prisons between September 2015 and June 2016. The objective of the analysis is to test the efficacy of studying social preferences in the framework of behavioral Economics and game theory (direct observation of the behaviour of the subjects asked to make choices in real situations), rather than through self-evaluative questionnaires and surveys. In fact, the analysis links the behaviors observed in the games and the explanations given by the subjects. In general it can be said that the behaviors observed in the games are not always sufficient to highlight the social preferences of the subjects, as well as, moreover, are not the narrative answers. The conclusion that comes from the elaborate is that direct observation of the behaviors and analysis of the personal narratives of the subjects are two equally important tools in the study social preferences and that, far from being mutually exclusive, they complement each other.
Liu, Iris. "Are You Smarter than an Ostrich: Does “Skin in the Game” Influence an Investor’s Portfolio Monitoring Behavior?" Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1319.
Повний текст джерелаRibeiro, Roberto Portes. "MULTINVE$T, O JOGO DE SIMULAÇÃO DE INVESTIMENTOS EM UM BANCO." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2007. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/8353.
Повний текст джерелаEste trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar um modelo de jogo de simulação de investimentos no mercado financeiro. O jogo é formado por investidores, que devem tomar decisões envolvendo a aplicação de recursos financeiros no mercado, através dos produtos de investimento de um banco que englobam poupança, CDBs, fundos de investimento e ações. A capacidade de tomar decisões, definir estratégias, entender o funcionamento do mercado, planejar e controlar a utilização dos recursos no mercado financeiro é o diferencial competitivo entre os jogadores. O investidor que descobrir quais os produtos de investimento que fazem o dinheiro render mais é o provável vencedor desta competição. Dessa forma, o jogo possibilita ao investidor iniciante, o contato com a dinâmica do mercado financeiro de uma maneira lúdica e fascinante, sem as sanções da realidade. O Multinve$t foi desenvolvido a partir de modelos de jogos de simulação e de empresas encontrados na literatura, procurando-se adotar características que combinassem com os objetivos do jogo. Por meio das técnicas de simulação e de análises do mercado financeiro, foi possível definir a estrutura do modelo matemático final, obtendo-se assim, uma ferramenta de gestão de recursos financeiros que enfoca a tomada de decisão dos jogadores sob o ponto de vista da relação entre risco e retorno que envolve o funcionamento do mercado financeiro. Finalmente, o jogo foi aplicado em uma turma de mestrado do PPGEP/UFSM para avaliação e análise dos resultados. O Multinve$t é destinado ao investidor iniciante e pode ser usado em disciplinas de graduação, pós-graduação e treinamento ao público em geral
Yeh, Kevin. "Mathematical programming analyses of an established timberlands supply chain with interests in biofuel investments." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/53065.
Повний текст джерелаWendelheim, Felix, and Rickard Carls. "Aktörers beteenden på köpcentrummarknaden." Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-172371.
Повний текст джерелаCobanli, Onur [Verfasser], Wolfgang [Akademischer Betreuer] Hubert, and Christian von [Akademischer Betreuer] Hirschhausen. "An application of cooperative game theory : strategic investments in the natural gas network / Onur Cobanli. Gutachter: Wolfgang Hubert ; Christian von Hirschhausen." Berlin : Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2015. http://d-nb.info/1065301073/34.
Повний текст джерелаLundström, Kristofer, and Arvid Smedsaas. "All your returns are belong to us : An exploratory study of how industry characteristics affect investments in the Swedish video game sector." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-298470.
Повний текст джерелаLeymann, Gunnar [Verfasser], Sarianna [Akademischer Betreuer] Lundan, Sarianna [Gutachter] Lundan, and Guido [Gutachter] Möllering. "Shifting the Rules of the Game : Institutional Change as a Barrier to MNE Investment Activity / Gunnar Leymann ; Gutachter: Sarianna Lundan, Guido Möllering ; Betreuer: Sarianna Lundan." Bremen : Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1187906972/34.
Повний текст джерелаSalas, Gil Andrés Wenceslao. "Factores económicos que se relacionan al posicionamiento de los videojuegos free to play competitivos en hombres en Lima Metropolitana." Bachelor's thesis, Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas (UPC), 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10757/652110.
Повний текст джерелаAt present, the videogames industry has shown great growth compared to other industries, which has generated a greater number of competitors in the sector. Likewise, videogame purchase models have varied over time, making free to play the most attractive modality among videogames. For this reason, competitive free to play video games have chosen to invest in different fields, in order to improve their positioning and attract new users. However, with respect to investments, three factors have been determined that relate to positioning, advertising investment, investment in the competitive scene and investment in influencers. Reason why, each of them is developed, through its approach to videogame marketing. The methodology includes a quantitative and qualitative analysis, through a cross-analysis of the variables, in-depth interviews and focus groups. In this way, the collected is discussed, finding findings of vital importance that validate the hypotheses presented. What places the investment in the competitive scene, as the most important investment for the positioning of esports free to play.
Trabajo de investigación
Wu, Marcio Jolhben. "Análise do efeito do investimento inicial no dilema do prisioneiro contínuo iterado simultâneo e alternado na presença e ausência de ruído em diferentes cenários de incerteza: contrapondo as estratégias RTS e LRS por meio da simulação bas." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/47/47132/tde-02032016-153429/.
Повний текст джерелаThe prisoner\'s dilemma is generally seen as the starting point for understanding the problem of cooperation. In comparison with the discreet and iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, few studies exist on the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma. Most of the works that have investigated the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma has concentrated in the period from 1990 to 2000, not getting conclusive results on the best strategy to be adopted in this type of game. Two different strategies stand out in this kind of dilemma. The first is the RTS strategy (Raise-the-Stakes) of Roberts and Sherrat (1998) that tests the ground before increasing investment in the relationship. The second is the model deriva LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl and Nowak (1999a). This last strategy being in Nash equilibrium cooperative presents three characteristics: (i) generosity, i.e., investing as much as possible at the beginning of the cooperation relationship; (ii) optimism, i.e., rely on the best scenario for the next rounds, and (iii) intransigence. This research has as main goal to reconcile opposing RTS strategies and LRS in a continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, in the presence and absence of noise, with simultaneous moves and alternate and for different values of the parameter w (probability of interacting again). We restrict our analysis to a set of six strategies: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS and RTSM (halfway between RTS and LRS). The method used was the agent-based simulation (ABM) in tournament format, similar to that of Axelrod (2006), Roberts (1998), Sherratt & Nowak & Sigmund (1992) and Nowak & Sigmund (1993). We use the NetLogo software and document the whole process of design and construction of the tool model TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). The results show that most strategies are more favoured unions when the game consists of alternating plays rather than simultaneous. The RTS strategy had better performance in simultaneous games for intermediate values of w, in the presence or absence of noise. In turn, the IRS strategy had better performance when simultaneous games, in the presence or absence of noise, or switched, and in the presence of noise, in both cases, for large values of w
Nylund, Hans. "Electricity across borders : regional cost sharing of grid investments, international benchmarking and the electricity demand of an ageing population." Doctoral thesis, Luleå tekniska universitet, Samhällsvetenskap, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-26747.
Повний текст джерелаGodkänd; 2013; 20130809 (hannyl); Tillkännagivande disputation 2013-09-06 Nedanstående person kommer att disputera för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen. Namn: Hans Nylund Ämne: Nationalekonomi Avhandling: Electricity Across Borders: Regional Cost Sharing of Grid Investments, International Benchmarking and the Electricity Demand of an Ageing Population Opponent: Professor Andreas Stephan, Jönköping International Business School Ordförande: Professor Robert Lundmark, Luleå tekniska universitet Tid: Fredag den 27 september 2013, kl. 13.00 Plats: A109, Luleå tekniska universitet
Růžička, Daniel. "Podnikatelský záměr-vybudování lasergame arény." Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta podnikatelská, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-224478.
Повний текст джерелаJackson, James W. "An examination of the occurrence of the sunk-cost effect in Texas Hold 'Em players in hypothetical game play situations and in a non-gambling investment scenario /." Available to subscribers only, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1203556251&sid=3&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Повний текст джерелаPappa, Dimitra. "The Game of Success : Educational Strategies among Greek middle class parents in the education market of parapaedia." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för pedagogik, didaktik och utbildningsstudier, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-417162.
Повний текст джерелаMosiño, Alejandro. "Investing in the environment : essays on energy efficiency and on the substitution of resources." Thesis, Grenoble, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012GRENA021/document.
Повний текст джерелаGreenhouse gases (GHG) are responsible for some climate change. Humanity faces a choice: either reducing the emissions of these gases or adapt to climate change. In this dissertation we focus on the first solution under the premise that a large part of the greenhouse effect comes from human activities. More precisely, we propose some essays on modeling the determinants of investing in reducing GHG through improving energy efficiency and substituting non-renewable resources (fossil fuels) by renewable resources. We first try and explain the slow diffusion of some energy efficient investments in a general equilibrium framework. We then study the determinants of switching from non-renewable resources to renewable resources when these are perfect substitutes. Finally, we account for the need of dirty resources even if cleaner technologies are available. All these issues are based on models that cannot be fully solved analytically, therefore we also propose in this dissertation a methodology based on the properties of Chebyshev polynomials to compute the solutions
Sjödin, Ulrika. "Insiders’ outside/Outsiders’ inside : Rethinking the insider regulation." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm University, School of Business, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-944.
Повний текст джерелаFinancial speculation has increased dramatically over the last 30 years. This means that a practice that used to be viewed as immoral gambling has become legitimate financial trade. This book explores the genealogy of the coexisting insider trading laws. The insider regulation prohibits trade based on privileged information in order to create equal trading conditions, and in this way uphold confidence in the financial markets among the general public. However, this study shows that the existing view of the insider regulation is misleading and that the regulation is best understood as a game rule aiming to stimulate financial speculation. The protection interest is therefore not primarily the general public, but the financial system as such: the professional market actors sustaining the speculative activities and a growing financial sector.
The consequence of stimulating financial speculation is that today’s authorities are attempting to make the financial markets into a lotto-like game, rather than a market for long-term investment. To make the financial markets into liquid and volatile public “games” means that the risks involved in the financial speculation are created by the human hand and the economic system itself rather than being naturally given. This places desire rather than rational needs as the fundamental ground of the economy. The concluding question is; why are we making our economy into a game?
Ramos, Sérgio Henrique Paiva de Souza. "Entrando em um novo mercado: estudo do caso Gol utilizando-se opções reais e teoria dos jogos." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/2044.
Повний текст джерелаThis work has the goal to create a market entry project valuation model that encompasses two important characteristics: considers the possibility to increase or decrease the project during its execution and incorporates the strategic decision through a competitive scenario modeling, by considering the competitors’ reactions to the threat of a new entrant. The traditional valuation models are discussed briefly, enumerating some arguments for and against its use and create a comparision basis for the proposed model. The real options theory is then used to improve the traditional valuation model through scenario analysis and incorporation of flexibilities related to the project. Finally, with the game theory, its shown how the interactions among the market players can be sistematized and analysed more formally. The model is demonstrated step-by-step, explaining how the strategic games in a duopoly scenario could be modeled, by determining the equilibrium price, the expected profit earned by each player, the investment return and the binomial tree that will return the final value of the valuation process. Through the analysis of the binomial tree generated, it’s also possible to establish what is the dominant strategy for the investment: a simultaneous investment resulting in a Bertrand equilibrium or a sequential movement, resulting in a Stackelberg equilibrium. The investment strategy is then associated to one of the two possible alternatives to enter a new market: by buyout or building of the new business. At the end of this work, based on the proposed model, it’s presented a case study to analyse a new player entry in a specific market, indicating the recommended strategy: for the building or the buyout of a established player. For this study was chosen the airline company Gol Linhas A´ereas, as the new entrant in the brazilian (domestic) market of air transportation of passengers.
O trabalho tem como objetivo criar um modelo de avaliação de investimentos para a entrada em um novo mercado que possua duas características fundamentais: que considere a possibilidade de aumentar ou reduzir o projeto ao longo da sua implementação e que incorpore a decisão estratégica através da modelagem de um cenário competitivo, onde os concorrentes reagem à ameaça de um novo participante. Para ressaltarmos as vantagens dessa nova abordagem de avaliação de investimentos, os modelos tradicionais mais utilizados são analisados brevemente, ressaltando os seus pontos fortes e fracos. Em seguida, explicamos como o modelo de avaliação por opções reais consegue aprimorar avaliação através da análise dos cenários possíveis e das flexibilidades envolvidas. Com a teoria dos jogos, mostramos como a interação de participantes de um mercado pode ser sistematizada e analisada de maneira formal. O modelo é então demonstrado passo-a-passo, mostrando como devemos tratar os jogos estratégicos em um ambiente de duopólio, determinar o preço de equilíbrio do mercado, o lucro esperado para os participantes, o valor do investimento e criar a árvore binomial que determinará o valor final do processo de avaliação. Através da análise da árvore binomial resultante, é possível também verificar qual foi o tipo de estratégia dominante, seja o investimento simultâneo caracterizando um equilíbrio de Bertrand ou um movimento seqüencial, resultando em um equilíbrio de Stackelberg. Por fim, a estratégia de investimento escolhida é associada a alternativas de entrada no mercado, onde podemos comprar a empresa de um concorrente já estabelecido ou construir o novo negócio desde o começo. Ao final do trabalho, com base no modelo proposto, é apresentado um estudo de caso, onde é feita uma análise de entrada de uma nova empresa em um mercado com concorrentes bem estabelecidos, que poderá indicar pela construção e estabelecimento no mercado desde o início ou pela compra de um concorrente já estabelecido. Para esse estudo foi escolhida a companhia aérea Gol Linhas Aéreas como novo entrante no mercado doméstico de transporte aéreo de passageiros.
Silva, Fernando César Nimer Moreira da. "Venture capital: valor da informação, riscos e instrumentos para sua mitigação." Universidade de São Paulo, 2014. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-20012015-162731/.
Повний текст джерелаVenture capital is a business that links two economic agents, entrepreneur and investor, aiming to develop an innovative idea for future sale on the market. The entrepreneur holds knowledge about the idea and the investor has the resources to develop the project. It is distinguished from others by the high degree of uncertainty and risk of the project and requires the use of appropriate contract types for its restriction. The project begins with the contracting stage, in which the parties negotiate the division of risks and return business, followed by the monitoring of the development of the business activities. At the end occurs the divestment, in which the finished business is sold by the investor. From the point of view of Economics, we use Game Theory to present the informational problems, business risks and uncertainties, and the incentives to organize the cooperation between the parties. From the standpoint of Finance, we discuss the decision to finance the business, and alternatives for risk diversification, that is, the possibility of limiting the risks by adopting containment strategies that may increase the interest in contracting. From the point of view of Law, we evaluate the ideal contractual structure for organizing this kind of project. We analyze the main existing contract types, in particular, the limited liability companies and the closed corporations. We present our concerns about the normative support applicable to that type of business, emphasizing the Corporate Law problems. We evaluate the normative support applicable, emphasizing the possibility of limiting the project risks by applying the Corporate Law rules to such ventures. The main risks are the risks applicable to the contracting phase, the risk of incorrect allocation of decision rights between the partners and the risk of premature termination of the project. Due to the nature and characteristics of the venture capital business, we conclude that this type of design is best organized as a plurilateral agreement and that there is no contract type that can be considered ideal to align the interests. Considering all the existing types, the private corporation contract is the most appropriate form, but also unable to limit all the business risks. The conclusion is partially supported by the empirical evidence presented.
Orvoen, Hadrien. "Expressions faciales émotionnelles et Prise de décisions coopératives." Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017EHES0032/document.
Повний текст джерелаFor few decades, rational choice theories failed to properly account for cooperative behaviors. This was illustrated by social dilemmas, games where a self-motivated individual will be tempted to exploit others' cooperative behavior, harming them for his own personal profit. I will first detail how cooperation may rise as a reasonable --- if not rational --- behavior, provided that we consider social interactions in a more realistic context that rational choice theories initially did. From anthropology to neurobiology, cooperation is understood as an efficient adaptation to this natural environment rather than a quirky, self-defeating behavior. Because pertinent information is often lacking or overwhelming, too complex or ambiguous to deal with, it is essential to communicate, to share, and to trust others. Emotions, and their expression, are a cornerstone of humans' natural and effortless navigation in their social environment. Smiles for instance are universally known as a signal of satisfaction, approbation and cooperation. Like other emotional expressions, they are automatically and preferentially treated. They elicit trust and cooperative behaviors in observers, and are ubiquitous in successful collaborative interactions. Beside that however, few is known about how others' expressions are integrated into decision making. That was the focus of the experimental study I relate in this manuscript. More specifically, I investigated how decisions in a trust-based social dilemma are influenced by smiles which are either displayed along a cooperative or defective behavior (``congruently'' and ``incongruently'', resp.). I carried out two experiments where participants played an investment game with different computerized virtual partners playing the role of trustees. Virtual trustees, which were personalised with a facial avatar, could either take and keep participants investment, or reciprocate it with interests. Moreover, they also displayed facial reactions, that were either congruent or incongruent with their computerized ``decision'' to reciprocate or not. Even if the two experiments presented some methodological differences, they were coherent in that they both showed that participants were altered in remembering a virtual trustee's behavior if the latter expressed incongruent emotions. This was observed from participants' investments in game, and from their post-experimental explicit reports. If many improvements to my experimental approach remain to be done, I think it already completes the existing literature with original results. Many interesting perspectives are left open, which appeal for a deeper investigation of face-to-face decision making. I think it constitutes a theoretical and practical necessity, for which researchers will be required to unify the wide knowledge of the major cognitive functions which was gathered over the last decades
Flage, Alexandre. "Essais sur l’analyse économique des discriminations dans le marché de l’emploi et du logement locatif Ethnic and gender discrimination in the rental housing market : evidence from a meta-analysis of correspondence tests, 2006-2017 Discrimination against gays and lesbians in hiring decisions : a meta-analysis Intermediation and discrimination in an investment game : an experimental study." Thesis, Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019UBFCB004.
Повний текст джерелаDiscrimination in the labor and rental housing market generates many economic and social inefficiencies. In order to combat discrimination against minorities, it is essential to know its extent and its different sources. In this thesis, we use both experimental and field data to detect, measure, and investigate discrimination at the first stage of the rental or the hiring process in OECD countries. As a first step, we analyze the level and the sources of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the rental housing market in OECD countries through a meta-analysis of correspondence tests. Results show the presence of substantial discrimination against ethnic minorities and also against male tenants. Subsequent to this, we perform a meta-analysis on discrimination against openly homosexual candidates in the labor market. In addition to revealing a level of discrimination similar to that experienced by ethnic minorities, our study shows differences in treatment according to the gender of the individuals and the type of job tested. Thirdly, we carry out a laboratory experiment to study the effect of intermediation in a context conducive to discrimination. Our results indicate that the smaller level of empirically observed discrimination by real estate agents is not due to intermediation but rather to market-specific factors. Finally, we perform a field experience to detect the presence of discrimination against people with mental, motor or visual disabilities in the rental housing market in France. Consistent with the literature on the labor market, it appears that people with disabilities are also the most discriminated minority in the rental housing market
"Models of multi-period cooperative re-investment games." 2010. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894494.
Повний текст джерелаThesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-113).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
Abstract --- p.i
Acknowledgement --- p.iii
Chapter 1 --- Introduction and Literature Review --- p.1
Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1
Chapter 1.1.1 --- Background and Motivating examples --- p.2
Chapter 1.1.2 --- Basic Concepts --- p.4
Chapter 1.1.3 --- Outline of the thesis --- p.6
Chapter 1.2 --- Literature Review --- p.8
Chapter 2 --- Multi-period Cooperative Re-investment Games: The Basic Model --- p.11
Chapter 2.1 --- Basic settings and assumptions --- p.11
Chapter 2.2 --- The problem --- p.13
Chapter 3 --- Three sub-models and the allocation rule of Sub-Model III --- p.17
Chapter 3.1 --- Three possible sub-models of the basic model --- p.17
Chapter 3.1.1 --- Sub-model I --- p.17
Chapter 3.1.2 --- Sub-model II --- p.18
Chapter 3.1.3 --- Sub-model III --- p.19
Chapter 3.2 --- The allocation rule of Sub-model III --- p.19
Chapter 4 --- A two period example of the revised basic model --- p.25
Chapter 4.1 --- The two period example with two projects --- p.25
Chapter 4.2 --- The algorithm for the dual problem --- p.29
Chapter 5 --- Extensions of the Basic Model --- p.35
Chapter 5.1 --- The model with stochastic budgets --- p.36
Chapter 5.2 --- The core of the model with stochastic budgets --- p.39
Chapter 5.3 --- An example: the two-period case of models with stochastic bud- gets and an algorithm for the dual problem --- p.46
Chapter 5.4 --- An interesting marginal effect --- p.52
Chapter 5.5 --- "A Model with stochastic project prices, stochastic returns and stochastic budgets" --- p.54
Chapter 6 --- Multi-period Re-investment Model with risks --- p.58
Chapter 6.1 --- The Model with l1 risk measure --- p.58
Chapter 6.2 --- The Model with risk measure --- p.66
Chapter 7 --- Numerical Tests --- p.70
Chapter 7.1 --- The affects from uncertainty changes --- p.71
Chapter 7.2 --- The affects from budget changes --- p.71
Chapter 7.3 --- The affects from the budget changes of only one group --- p.71
Chapter 8 --- Conclusive Remarks --- p.77
Chapter A --- Original Data and Analysis for Section 7.1 (Partial) --- p.79
Chapter B --- Data Analysis for Section 7.2 (Partial) --- p.95
Chapter C --- Data Analysis for Section 7.3 (Partial) --- p.98