Дисертації з теми "Intuition and emotion"

This thesis was designed to examine two non-rational decision approaches in individual and team decision making. In Chapter 2 (Paper 1), a normative theory about how people should use intuition in making complex decisions is proposed. I draw from extant literature to derive why allowing intuition to interrupt analysis is beneficial to complex decision processes. In Chapter 3 (Paper 2), the theory of intuitive interruptions is applied to the entrepreneurial context. I argue that allowing intuitions to interrupt analysis helps entrepreneurs navigate the ambiguous environment in which they often find themselves. Chapter 4 (Paper 3) documents findings on the phenomenon of teams’ escalation of commitment and the effect of hope. According to the results, when faced with continuous negative feedback, teams that remain hopeful persist in the face of mounting costs. In Chapter 5 (Paper 4), changes in self-efficacy and team efficacy beliefs as responses to performance feedback were examined. The results indicated that the relationship between negative feedback and a decrease in efficacy beliefs is mediated by depressive realism—the negative yet realistic expectations of future outcomes. In summary, this thesis finds that non-rational approaches facilitate decision making by filling in the gaps, colouring the tone and changing the course of thinking where exhaustive information processing (i.e., full analysis) is not possible. Employing non-rational approaches can either be a deliberate choice or a reaction of human nature. Employing non-rational approaches does not necessarily yield favourable or unfavourable results. However, the analysis confirms that non-rational approaches are largely involved in complex decision making. Findings from this thesis add to our knowledge about how complex decisions are made by individuals and teams.

This thesis is a critical study of the prospects for contemporary accounts of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism is an epistemological theory about the nature of our justified ethical beliefs, whose central claim is that we have at least some non-inferentially justified beliefs. Having been out of favour for much of the latter-part of the twentieth century, ethical intuitionism is enjoying something of a renaissance. Contemporary proponents of the view have shown that ethical intuitionism need not fall foul of the main objections previously brought against it. Furthermore, developments in epistemology have helped to make the notion of non-inferential justification (and the associated view, epistemological foundationalism) more philosophically respectable. As I will suggest, non-inferentially justified belief paradigmatically involves a belief that is justified by a non-doxastic state. In this thesis I will consider four accounts of ethical intuitionism which each claim that a particular kind of non-doxastic state can ground justified ethical beliefs: understandings, intellectual seemings, perceptual experiences and emotional experiences. Note that contemporary ethical intuitionists do not commit themselves to there being a distinctively ethical non-doxastic state. Rather, contemporary ethical intuitionists adopt a sort of innocence by association strategy, suggesting that that we gain non-inferential justification in ethics in much the same way as we get non-inferential justification in other domains. It is my purpose in this thesis to subject each of these four accounts of contemporary ethical intuitionism to sustained philosophical criticism. Although I do not think that ethical intuitionism is implausible, it is my view that the current enthusiasm for the position ought to be seriously tempered, and that much work will need to be done in order to make it acceptable as a meta-ethical view. Firstly, with regard to the understanding (self-evidence) account I argue that there are serious problems with the view that the substantive Rossian principles are non-inferentially justifiably believed on the basis of an adequate understanding of their content. Secondly, I go on to suggest, inter alia, that proponents of the intellectual seemings account of intuitionism cannot appeal to their favoured general epistemological principle in order to ground their ethical epistemology. Given this, much work needs to be done on their part in order to show why we ought to think that intellectual seemings with an ethical content that is substantive get to justify. Thirdly, against the ethical perception account I suggest that even if it is true that ethical agents have perceptual experiences which represent ethical properties, it is not at all obvious that this supports ethical intuitionism, since insofar as such experiences get to justify, it seems plausible that they will ground inferentially or mediately justified beliefs. I do, however, suggest that a related perceptual view may be able to ground a plausible account of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. Finally, I consider the ethical emotions account. Given that this is a relatively new view on the philosophical scene I spend much of my time defending it against some serious recent objections brought against it. However, I will also suggest that there are question marks surrounding the epistemological credentials of emotional experiences and that much work will therefore need to be done in order to make the view that emotional experiences do in fact non-inferentially justify ethical beliefs acceptable.

Two contrasting forms of advice for decision-makers are to either follow one’s heart (emotions) or one’s head (reason). This is a false dichotomy – but how should decision-makers combine heart and head? Decisions can be fruitfully analysed as a set of components: a decision-problem embedded within an on-going situation, with values-at-stake, possible options-with-consequences, choice, action and review. Structured decision-making models (head theories) approach this multifaceted nature of decisions by a divide-and-conquer strategy with thinking tasks provided to help decision-makers clarify the decision-problem, identify important values-at-stake, find credible options, choose the most credible option, act effectively and fairly review the outcomes of the choice. Emotions are complex and can also fruitfully be analysed as a set of components: an appraisal of a situation’s implication for the actor’s goals and values, bodily and cognitive changes, phenomenological experience and desires. Emotions can both help and hinder decision making, so wise decision-makers should neither ignore nor rely upon emotions, but instead treat emotions as fallible resources. The complex nature of emotions implies that different emotion-enabled tasks might assist decision-makers for different components of the decision. On the basis of this analysis an emotion-enabled, structured, decision-making procedure was developed and investigated by taking ten participants with decision dilemmas through the procedure. This investigation, based on repeated use of the Hermeneutic Single-Case Efficacy Design, provided some initial support for the effectiveness of the model: participants found the procedure generally helpful (p < 0.005), had increased confidence in their final choice (p < 0.005), which at follow-up they were satisfied with (p < 0.005). The use of emotions as fallible resources was also investigated through tracing emotion-enabled changes in participants’ decision making. Suggestions for further development and investigation of integrating emotions into structured approaches are offered.

Humans are a social species. Automatic affective responses generated by neural systems wired into our brains create a moral intuition or “gut-feeling” of wrong and right that guides our moral judgments. Humans are also an intelligent, problem solving and planning species with neural structures that enable cognitive control and the ability to reason about the costs and benefits of decisions, and moral judgments, not the least. Previous research suggests that moral intuition and moral reasoning operates on different neural networks - a dual process of moral cognition, that sometimes gives rise to an inner conflict in moral judgments. Early lesion studies found correlations between damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and changes in moral behaviour. This has been further established through brain imaging studies and the suggestion is that VMPFC mediates affective signals from the amygdala in moral decision making and is highly involved in generating the gut-feeling of right and wrong. However, some moral issues are complex and demand higher level processing than intuition, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) seems to be responsible for the rational, cost-benefit reasoning during moral judgments. Further, recent research suggests that during moral judgments, the brain employ neural systems that generates the representation of value, perspective and cognitive control as well as the representation of the mental and emotional states of others. The present thesis aims to investigate prominent and up to date research on the neural correlates of necessary components in moral cognition, and to examine the function of moral intuition versus reason in relation to current complex moral issues. Moral intuition is supposedly an adaption to favour “us” before “them”, not to be concerned with large scale cooperation, which may explain why we treat many moral issues with ignorance. Understanding how the moral brain works involve understanding what sort of tasks the neural mechanisms in moral cognition evolved to handle, which may explain why some modern issues are so difficult to solve.

ABSTRACT RECOGNITION OF EMOTIONAL FACIAL EXPRESSION IN ALCOHOL DEPENDENT INPATIENTS Dursun, Pinar M.S., Department of Psychology Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Faruk Genç
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z June 2007, 130 pages The ability to recognize emotional facial expressions (EFE) is very critical for social interaction and daily functioning. Recent studies have shown that alcohol dependent individuals have deficits in the recognition of these expressions. Thereby, the objective of this study was to explore the presence of impairment in the decoding of universally recognized facial expressions -happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, surprise, and neutral expressions- and to measure their manual reaction times (RT) toward these expressions in alcohol dependent inpatients. Demographic Information Form, CAGE Alcoholism Inventory, State- Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), The Symptom Checklist, and lastly a constructed computer program (Emotion Recognition Test) were administered to 50 detoxified alcohol dependent inpatients and 50 matched-control group participants. It was hypothesized that alcohol dependents would show more deficits in the accuracy of reading EFE and would react more rapidly toward negative EFE -fear, anger, disgust, sadness than control group. Series of ANOVA, ANCOVA, MANOVA and MANCOVA analyses revealed that alcohol dependent individuals were more likely to have depression and anxiety disorders than non-dependents. They recognized less but responded faster toward disgusted expressions than non-dependent individuals. On the other hand, two groups did not differ significantly in the total accuracy responses. In addition, the levels of depression and anxiety did not affect the recognition accuracy or reaction times. Stepwise multiple regression analysis indicated that obsessive-compulsive subscale of SCL, BDI, STAI-S Form, and the recognition of fearful as well as disgusted expressions were associated with alcoholism. Results were discussed in relation to the previous findings in the literature. The inaccurate identification of disgusted faces might be associated with organic deficits resulted from alcohol consumption or cultural factors that play very important role in displaying expressions.

A phenomenon explored in the field of the cognitive neuroscience of morality is moral sensitivity, which is a collective name for a subjective experience related to the ability to detect and respond to morally relevant cues in a given social situation. This thesis will review the underlying neural mechanisms of moral sensitivity and three key components: Empathy, moral disgust and moral intuition, also called moral “gut-feeling.” Initially, the thesis provides a basic explanation of what moral sensitivity entails and the primary observations of which brain regions are often associated with moral sensitivity. Studies show that emotion and cognition seem to be essential to the experience of moral sensitivity, which will be further emphasized by reviewing the chosen key components. Research on morality and empathy suggests that the affective and the cognitive components of empathy each are essential to moral sensitivity. The second key component, moral disgust, describes how moral sensitive people react to violations to society by being motivated to keep away from social interactions with poor moral influence. Research on the third key component explains how moral sensitivity can be affected by moral intuitions, here moral “gut-feelings,” depending on the closeness and emotional salience in a given situation.

Cette recherche qualitative identifie le rôle de l’expérience face à l’intuition et à l’émotion dans la décision clinique de l’infirmière d’accueil et d’orientation des urgences hospitalières. La problématique du rôle triple de l’expérience sur le raisonnement, sur la nature et le contrôle du « ressenti » éprouvé dans le feu de l’action est étudiée au travers de l’influence de la posture de connaissance face à l’expérience induisant l’acquisition et l’usage de savoirs explicites et implicites (Dewey, 2004) agissant sur le modèle opératif de pensée d’un professionnel (Pastré, 2011). La méthodologie, orientée par une posture théorique multi référentielle (Ardoino,1986), articule les approches de la décision en économie (Simon, 1983), en neurosciences (Berthoz, 2003 ; Damasio, 1995) avec les travaux sur l’intuition dans la pensée bi-systémique (Kahneman, 2016) et les approches du rôle cognitif des émotions (Livet, 2002 ; Rimé, 2009, Thievenaz, 2017). Des entretiens semi-directifs et d’explicitation (Vermersch, 1994) sont conduits auprès de vingt infirmiers-ères, de deux hôpitaux.Six propositions théoriques émanent des résultats. L’existence d’une posture « cognitivo-émotionnelle » face à l’expérience vécue dans l’action est découverte. Elle génère un mode et des modalités de raisonnement et d’élaboration d’indicateurs cliniques ou de savoirs d’action mais aussi un mode décisionnel à partir du vécu de l’expérience. Elle influence la nature « ressenti » qui est intuition ou émotion ou étonnement. Selon sa posture, l’infirmière cherche à confirmer son intuition. Elle cherche des preuves à son étonnement, régule son émotion ou renonce à prendre une décision, ou se protège de tout « ressenti »
This doctoral thesis’ research identifies the roles of experience in the effects of intuition or emotion and clinical reasoning and characterizes the nature of the “feeling” rising; The “multiréférentiel” (Ardoino, 1986)theoretical and methodological framework links a pragmatist understanding of implicit or explicit experiential learning’s through an active or passive knowing posture (Dewey, 2004) with theoretical works concerning the decision processing in economics (Simon, 1983), in neurosciences (Berthoz, 2003; Damasio, 1995) and with the cognitive function of emotion (Livet, 2002;Rimé, 2009). Intuition is replaced in dual process theories of cognition (Kahneman, 2016). Data were collected from two French Parisian emergency’s departments through twenty emergency nurses differently experienced in triage, volunteered to take part in the study,. Semistructured interview collected the nurses’posture of knowing. “Elicitation interviews’” (Vermersch, 1994)recalled nurses’ thinking procedures in the heat of the moment and shows how nurses’ control their “feeling” and the set of the contextual determinants. Six theoretical propositions derived from the findings. During the patient’s examination and the clinical reasoning process, nurses adopt a particular “cognitive – emotional”posture of knowing and reflective thinking. This posture has an impact on the control of the nurse’s feeling andof the nature of what she felt and on the decision type. Depending of her posture, nurses will take into account her “feeling” or not. A negative emotion stops the decision making process. Intuition involves the search of additional fact or clues or clinical signs. The cognitive uncertainty induces a specific inquiry. The nurses’ “feeling’’ empirically characterize is an intuition, an emotion, an uncertainty

The interest in crisis management is increasing for some decades now, since researchers and organizations have realized that crises can endanger them severely and that all kinds of organization are potentially under the constant threat of crises. Artificial intelligence (AI) is also in the heart of the attention as some tasks, traditionally occupied by humans, are already replaced by AI agents, and the fast development achieves more and more promising results. As the core of AI, decision-making has been identified, which itself can also completely change the outcome of a crisis. Thus, the idea to explore the junction of these two fields in the light of decision-making processes appeared to be highly inter-esting. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is: first, to find out what is really important in deci-sion-making processes in crisis management, second, to figure out abilities and limita-tions for human and artificial intelligences, and lastly, how artificial intelligence can af-fect important characteristics of decision-making processes in a foreseeable period of time. Putting all together led to the research question: How artificial intelligence can affect decision-making processes in crisis management? To guide these efforts, a qualitative method with an interpretivist approach has been cho-sen. Therefore, crisis experts (managers and consultants) and AI experts (researchers and developers) were interviewed. Also, notes were taken from a conference about artificial intelligence. As a result, it has been found out that speed and comprehensiveness are two crucial fac-tors when making decisions in crisis situations. Additionally, empirical findings figured out that this approach needs to be extended by the two decision parameters short- and long-term effect as it is not just about decision-making itself, but also about the feasibility and future consequences of decisions made. A model for ‘successful decision-making in crisis situations’ could be developed and the roles of intuition and rationality as well as abilities and limitations were clarified for both, human and artificial intelligence. Based on this understanding, artificial and human intelligence could have been placed within our model, showing the complement nature of them. Finally, an exploratory an-swer to the research question could be derived, presented as short-, medium-, and long-term perspectives. Even though crisis management can be expected to be one of the last organizational fields invested by AI, the results show that there are great benefits of ap-plying AI in crisis management, leading in a high potential that AI will change the picture dramatically.

Syftet med denna essä är att undersöka facilitatorers handlande när ett skifte i en grupp äger rum. Med skifte avses en ny förståelse av ett innehåll som bearbetas. Facilitator är den som underlättar en grupps process att arbeta med någon typ av material eller fråga. Essäns frågeställning är vilka aspekter av praktisk kunskap utövar facilitatorn när hon erfar att en grupp skiftar sin förståelse. Studien är fenomenologisk och etnografisk då facilitatorers egna erfarenheter är i fokus. I essän ställs egen erfarenhet, intervjuer och samtal med fem facilitatorer i dialog med improvisationsteater och filosofer som skrivit om praktisk kunskap. Ur dessa samtal träder ett antal aspekter av praktisk kunskap fram. En aspekt är intuition som blir till i det relationella, kroppsliga och erkännande mötet med andra. När tanken inte förmår vägleda kan intuition infinna sig baserat på känslan som kommer ur intention och tidigare erfarenheter. Erfarenheter är en aspekt av praktisk kunskap och bildar mönster med andra erfarenheter. Intuition utgår från dessa erfarenheters mönsterbildning och vägleder vidare handling. En annan aspekt är samspelet mellan känsla, emotion, tanke och handling, både som kronologiskt och överlappande skeende. En ytterligare aspekt är kunnande-i-handling liksom reflektion-i-handling som akt av konstnärlighet och hantverkskunnande vilket leder vidare till betydelsen av att kunna improvisera. En facilitator har att vara i det skeende som pågår utan att ta över skeendet. Det är i unika skeenden som aspekter av den praktiska kunskapen yttrar sig som en helhet bestående av flertal samverkande aspekter. Det handlar om ett förhållningssätt att vara varande som facilitator.
The purpose of this essay is to investigate the actions of facilitators when a shift in a group takes place. Shift refers to a new understanding of a content being processed. Facilitator is the one who facilitates a group's process of working with any type of material or issue. The essays question is which aspects of practical knowledge the facilitator exercises when she experiences that a group is shifting its understanding. The study is phenomenological and ethnographic as the facilitators' own experiences are in focus. In the essay the own experience, interviews and conversations with five facilitators are put in dialogue with improvisation theatre and philosophers who have written about practical knowledge. From these conversations, a number of aspects of practical knowledge appear. One aspect is intuition formed in relational, bodily and recognition meetings with others. When the thought is not able to guide, intuition can emerge based on the feeling that comes from intention and previous experience. Experiences are an aspect of practical knowledge and form patterns with other experiences. Intuition is based on the pattern formation of these experiences and guides further action. Another aspect is the interaction between feeling, emotion, thought and action, both as a chronological and overlapping course of events. Further aspect is knowledge-in-action as well as reflection-in-action as the act of artistry and craftsmanship, which further leads to the importance of being able to improvise. A facilitator has to be in the course of events that goes on without taking over the event. It is in unique course of events that aspects of practical knowledge manifest themselves as a whole consisting of several interacting aspects. It is about an approach to be as a facilitator.

La question directrice de la présente thèse est : « Quel type d'états sont des intuitions ? » Nous appelons la réponse développée ici Affectivisme Intellectuel. L'affectivisme soutient que les intuitions sont des expériences affectives, ou plus précisément : ce sont des cas spécifiques de sentiments épistémiques, de sentiments de vérité et de sentiments de fausseté. Dans un premier temps, l'état cible dont l'affectivisme est une théorie est distingué d'autres choses que nous appelons aussi « intuition ». Le profil caractéristique des « intuitions » au sens des expériences intuitives ciblées par la théorie est ensuite décrit : Les expériences d'intuition sont des états mentaux conscients qui sont (partiellement) caractérisés par leur phénoménologie caractéristique (mais pas nécessairement sui generis). Elles sont en outre 1) intentionnelles, 2) assertives, 3) motivationnelles, 4) non engageantes, 5) susceptibles de degrés dans 5.1) leur contenu et 5.2) leur insistance, 6) phénoménologiquement épistémiquement valuées (autrement dit, il existe des intuitions positives concernant la vérité et négatives concernant la fausseté) et 7) non volontaires. Nous soutenons qu'une bonne théorie des expériences intuitives doit rendre compte de ce profil de caractéristiques et ainsi qu'une bonne réponse à la question directrice devrait être capable de reconnaître et d'expliquer ces caractéristiques. Les théories de l'intuition existantes donnent les réponses suivantes : L'Eliminativisme soutient que le terme « intuition » n'a pas d'extension—les intuitions n'existent pas. Le doxasticisme soutient que les intuitions sont des états doxastiques. Le perceptualisme soutient que les intuitions sont semblables aux expériences perceptuelles. Nous démontrons que toutes les approches existantes sont insatisfaisantes. Soit elles ne sont pas en mesure de reconnaître les caractéristiques des intuitions, soit elles ne sont pas en mesure de les expliquer (soit elle ne peuvent ni l'un ni l'autre). Le reste de la thèse est consacré au développement d'une nouvelle théorie de l'intuition : l'Affectivisme Intellectuel. La réponse à la question directrice est la suivante : les intuitions sont des expériences affectives, ou plus précisément : il s'agit de cas spécifiques de sentiments épistémiques, de sentiments de vérité et de sentiments de fausseté. Pour motiver cette réponse, le type psychologique des sentiments ou expériences affectives est introduit et caractérisé : les expériences affectives, dont les sentiments corporels tels que la douleur ou le plaisir corporel et les sentiments émotionnels tels que la peur ou la joie sont des sous-classes paradigmatiques, sont valuées, excitatoires, motivationnelles et riches intentionnellement en s'engageant dans une division du travail représentationnel avec les autres états mentaux. Ensuite, la classe des sentiments épistémiques est introduite et caractérisée. La thèse défend ensuite l'idée que les sentiments épistémiques sont des expériences affectives. Une fois cela établi, elle identifie et analyse ensuite des sentiments épistémiques spécifiques comme candidats prometteurs pour une identification avec des expériences intuitives : sentiments de justesse et leurs contraires. Il s'avère qu'une variété propositionnelle de ces sentiments, les sentiments de vérité et les sentiments de fausseté, a le même profil caractéristique que les expériences intuitives. Nous soutenons ainsi que les intuitions positives doivent être identifiées aux sentiments de vérité et les intuitions négatives doivent être identifiées aux sentiments de fausseté. En vertu du fait que ces sentiments sont des expériences affectives, l'affectivisme non seulement reconnaît les caractéristiques des intuitions, mais les explique aussi. Les intuitions ont les caractéristiques qui sont les leurs pour essentiellement les mêmes raisons que les sentiments corporels et émotionnels les ont- parce qu'elles sont des expériences affectives (spécifiques)
The guiding question of the present thesis is: “What kind of states are intuitions?” The answer developed here is Intellectual Affectivism or Affectivism (about intuitions). Affectivism claims that intuitions are affective experiences, or more precisely: they are specific instances of epistemic feelings, feelings of truth and feelings of falsity. First, the target state of which Affectivism is a theory is delineated from other things we call “intuition”. Then the feature profile of “intuitions” in the target sense of intuition experiences is outlined: Intuition experiences are occurrent conscious mental states that are (partially) characterised by their characteristic (but not necessarily sui generis ) phenomenology. They are furthermore 1) intentional, 2) assertive, 3) motivational, 4) noncommittal, 5) gradable in 5.1) content and 5.2) pushiness, 6) phenomenally epistemically valenced (i.e. there are positive intuitions concerning truth and negative intuitions concerning falsity) and 7) nonvoluntary. It is argued that this feature profile needs to be accommodated by a good theory of intuition experiences, i.e. a good answer to the guiding question should be able to acknowledge and explain these features. Extant intuition theories provide the following answers: Eliminativism claims the term “intuition” has no extension — intuitions do not exist. Doxasticism claims intuitions are doxastic states. Perceptualism claims intuitions are similar to perceptual experiences. It is shown that all the existing answers are unsatisfactory. Either they cannot acknowledge the features of intuitions or they cannot explain them (or both). The rest of the thesis is dedicated to the development of a new intuition theory: Intellectual Affectivism. The answer it gives to the guiding question is the following: intuitions are affective experiences, or more precisely: they are specific instances of epistemic feelings, feelings of truth and feelings of falsity. To motivate this answer, the psychological kind of feelings or affective experiences is introduced and characterised: affective experiences, of which bodily feelings such as bodily pain or pleasure and emotional feelings such as fear or joy are paradigmatic subclasses, are valenced, arousing, motivational and richly intentional by engaging in a division of representational labour with other mental states. Then the class of epistemic feelings is introduced and characterised. The thesis proceeds to make a case for epistemic feelings being affective experiences. Having established that, it goes on to identify and analyse specific epistemic feelings as promising candidates for an identification with intuition experiences: feelings of rightness and feelings of wrongness. It turns out that a propositional variety of these feelings, feelings of truth and feelings of falsity, has the same feature profile as intuition experiences. Thus, the claim goes, positive intuitions are to be identified with feelings of truth and negative intuitions are to be identified with feelings of falsity. In virtue of these feelings being affective experiences, Affectivism cannot only acknowledge the features of intuitions but also explain them. Intuitions have the features they have for essentially the same reasons as bodily and emotional feelings have them —because they are (specific) affective experiences

On a l’habitude, concernant Bergson et Popper, de souligner que le second emprunte au premier la notion de « société ouverte » en la détournant de son sens. C’est une erreur : au moment où il met cette notion au centre de La société ouverte et ses ennemis, Popper est persuadé d’être l’inventeur de la notion. Lorsqu’il apprend que Bergson en a fait usage avant lui, il marque la différence entre les deux sociétés ouvertes tout en reconnaissant une similitude entre les deux sociétés closes. Mais comment, si la société close s’oppose, par définition, à la société ouverte, et si les deux notions de « société close » sont similaires, les deux notions de « société ouverte » pourraient-elles être fondamentalement dissemblables ? Nous nous demandons, dans une première partie, jusqu’où les deux sociétés closes peuvent être considérées comme similaires et s’il est possible d’en construire une conception unifiée. Nous cherchons d’abord à montrer comment Bergson et Popper, en partant de problèmes différents, finissent par se rejoindre sur la notion d’une morale naturelle close. Nous montrons ensuite que ces deux modalités du clos — exclusivisme guerrier et holisme conservateur — se trouvent chez les deux auteurs, sans qu’ils ne leur accordent la même importance : un certain nombre de différences souterraines annoncent les oppositions à venir sur la société ouverte. Ces différences n’empêchent toutefois pas l’élaboration d’une conception unifiée de la société close. Nous suivons Bergson pour articuler les deux modalités du clos en considérant que la cohésion sociale trouve en partie sa source dans l’hostilité à l’égard des ennemis. Notre deuxième partie se demande si ce qui apparaît au premier abord comme contradictoire entre les deux sociétés ouvertes ne pourrait pas plutôt être considéré comme des tensions au sein d’une même société ouverte. Nous insistons d’abord sur ce qui peut apparaître comme contradictoire en montrant que l’ouverture n’a pas le même sens chez Bergson et chez Popper : passage de la cité à une société comprenant l’humanité pour le premier, passage à une cité où sont libérés les pouvoirs critiques de l’homme pour le second. La société ouverte de Popper est close pour Bergson, la société ouverte de Bergson relève pour Popper d’une nostalgie pour la société close. Mais la contradiction vient du fait qu’on compare la modalité de l’ouvert que chacun privilégie et qui n’est pas la même. Il faut, pour avoir une vision plus juste, comparer la modalité rationaliste de l’ouverture chez les deux auteurs, et la modalité mystique de l’ouverture chez l’un et chez l’autre. En procédant à cette comparaison, on peut montrer que ces deux modalités sont l’une et l’autre une façon, pour une société, de transcender la nature, d’être créatrice. En ce qui concerne la modalité rationaliste de l’ouverture, c’est Popper qui parvient à en montrer le caractère créateur, sur le plan théorique comme sur le plan pratique — Bergson en étant empêché par sa conception de l’intelligence ; pour ce qui est de la modalité mystique, c’est Bergson qui montre comment elle permet à une société de transcender, au moins partiellement, la nature — Popper en étant empêché par sa conception de l’amour. A partir de là, il ne semble pas impossible d’élaborer une conception unifiée de la société ouverte articulant ces deux modalités : la modalité rationaliste de l’ouverture repose sur la foi en la fraternité humaine, laquelle ne peut trouver son plein élan que dans la modalité mystique. Il est vrai qu’il y a tension entre ces deux modalités de l’ouvert, mais leur équilibre est nécessaire à la société qui s’ouvre : la présence de la modalité mystique évite à la modalité rationaliste, qui permet le conflit, une dégénérescence guerrière ; la présence de la modalité rationaliste évite à la modalité mystique, qui transcende les conflits dans l’enthousiasme, de dégénérer en « nationalisme mystique »
It is usually said, when talking about Bergson and Popper, that the former borrows the notion of “open society” to the latter and diverts its meaning. It is a mistake: when he puts this notion in the center of The open society and its enemies, Popper is convinced that he is the one who came up with the notion. When he learns that Bergson used it before him, he underlines the differences between both open societies, while admitting a similarity between both closed societies. But how, if the closed society opposes, by definition, the open society, and if both notions of “closed society” are similar, could both notions of “open society” be fundamentally dissimilar?We are wondering, in our first part, to what degree the two closed societies can be considered similar, and if it is possible to build a unified conception of both of them. We are first seeking to show how Bergson and Popper, while starting from different issues, end up reuniting on the notion of a closed natural morality. We are then showing that these two modalities of the closed – warrior exclusivism and conservative holism – are found in both authors, although they don’t give it the same degree of importance: a number of underlying differences are announcing the upcoming oppositions on the open society. These differences, however, do not prevent the elaboration of a unified conception for the closed society. We are following Bergson to articulate both modalities of the closed while considering that social cohesion comes partly from hostility towards enemies. Our second part questions if what first shows up as a contradiction between both open societies could not be considered rather as tensions among one same open society. We first insist on what can appear as contradictory by showing that openness doesn’t have the same meaning for Bergson it does for Popper: for the former, it’s stepping from the city to a society containing humanity. For the latter, it’s stepping to a city where man’s critical powers are liberated. Popper’s open society is closed to Bergson, and Bergson’s open society is, to Popper, an expression of the longing for the unity of the closed society. But the contradiction comes from comparing each author’s preferred modality for openness, which differs. It is necessary, to have a better vision, to compare the rationalist modality of openness for both authors, as well as the mystical modality of openness for one and the other.By proceeding to this comparison, we can show that these two modalities are both a way for a society to transcend nature, for it to be inventive or creative. When it comes to the rationalist modality of openness, Popper is the one who manages to show its creative aspect, in both theory and practice – Bergson being restrained to do so by his conception of intelligence; when it comes to the mystical modality, it is Bergson who shows how it allows a society to transcend, at least partially, nature – Popper being restrained to do so by his conception of love.From this point, it doesn’t seem impossible to elaborate a unified conception for the open society articulating both of these modalities: the rationalist modality of openness is based on faith in human fraternity, which can only reach its fullest with the mystical modality. It is true that there is tension between these two modalities of openness, but their balance is necessary for a society that opens up: the mystical modality’s presence prevents the rationalist modality, that allows conflict, to fall into warrior degeneracy; the rationalist modality’s presence prevents the mystical modality, that transcends conflicts in enthusiasm, to degenerate into “mystical nationalism”

Denna studie är grundad i intervjuer som ägde rum på en reklambyrå. Studiens syfte är att utforska innebörden av 'kreativitet' i reklamvärlden. I intervjuerna betonade informanterna i synnerhet vikten av att reklam kommunicerar genom känslor och emotioner. I denna uppsats ges en närmare inblick i vad informanterna anser att känslor och emotioner har för innebörd för reklamskapande. Detta görs genom att tillämpa fenomenologisk teori. Den fenomenologiska analysen förser oss med en djupare och mer vidsträckt förståelse för den intuitiva kunskap informanterna förmedlar. Den öppnar således upp förståelsen för varför känslor och emotioner anses vara grundläggande för reklamskapande. Utifrån en fenomenologisk förståelse för känslor och emotioner diskuteras sedan reklamens roll i samhället i helhet.
This study is based on interviews that took place in an advertising agency. The purpose of the study is to explore the meaning of 'creativity' in the world of advertising. In the interviews, the interviewees especially pointed out the importance of feelings and emotions as a means for communication in advertisement. This thesis provides a closer view of the significance feelings and emotions are considered to have in advertising. This is done by ways of phenomenological theory. The phenomenological analysis provides us with a deeper and more far-reaching understanding of the intuitive knowledge that is brought forth by the interviewees. It opens up an understanding of why feelings and emotions are considered to play a fundamental part in the creation of advertisement. Based on a phenomenological understanding of feelings and emotions I will then discuss what part advertising plays in society as a whole.

While traditional behavioral weight loss programs have been successful at producing weight loss, weight maintenance is difficult to achieve. Addressing stress, one major contributing factor in weight gain, may be a potential solution. The purpose of this study was to test a stress-management program (EBT) for changes in weight and blood pressure, and maintenance of those changes. Obese adults (N=33) were randomized to two weight loss groups for a seven-week intervention and a seven-week follow-up period: an intuitive eating group or a stress management group. The intuitive eating group did not have any statistically significant changes in weight or blood pressure at seven or 14 weeks. The stress management group had significant changes at seven weeks in weight (p=0.05) and systolic (p=0.005) and diastolic (p=0.05) blood pressure. Weight decreased by 2.9 pounds at seven weeks and decreased a total of 4.4 pounds over the 14 weeks (p=0.05) in the EBT group. The EBT approach appears promising for weight loss and weight maintenance. More research with larger samples sizes and longer trial periods need to be done in order to draw a conclusion on the usefulness of this intervention.

[Abstract]: This dissertation addresses several highly-critical issues in affective computing and agent architecture design including knowledge representation, motivation, emotion appraisal and affective decision making. The approach presented integrates motivational drives, goals and associated behaviours via a multi-dimensional Affective Space. The research focuses on an emotionally motivated artificial intelligence (EMAI) architecture. This architecture dispenses with the ideas implemented in contemporary affective agent architectures where individual emotional states are modelled as individual variables, integrated and processed using complex algorithms. Contemporary approaches required significant programming effort to modify them for domains outside their realm, integration of new emotional states and high-level complex affective decision making. Unlike contemporary affective agent architectures, the EMAI architecture reasons using a multi-dimensional decision making process where emotional states are modelled as coexisting locations in a six-dimensional affective continuum called the Affective Space. Through use of the Affective Space, an EMAI agent can predict the effect that certain behaviours will have on its emotional state and in turn decide how to behave. Furthermore, the agent can use the emotions produced from its behaviour to update its beliefs about particular events and entities. The nature of the Affective Space also allows an EMAI agent to deal with processes related to emotion synthesis in a more effective manner than contemporary architectures. These processes include the natural diminishing of an emotional state's strength over time, the way in which emotions can influence an agent's perspective of a situation and the way in which an agent can migrate from one emotional state to another. This dissertation contributes crucial and unique concepts and formalisations of emotion based intelligence for agent construction to the domain of Artificial Intelligence (in particular Affective Computing). It introduces a unique process for emotionally motivated decision making based on holistic and atomic appraisals made with respect to events. The thesis contained within has been supported through experimentation that has confirmed the effectiveness of the emotion synthesis technique in the EMAI architecture and how this is used to produce intelligent agents capable of emotional reasoning and decision making.

Ce travail avait pour objectif d’étudier les déterminants psychologiques potentiels du surpoids et de l’obésité et de contribuer à l’évaluation d’une prise en charge triaxiale de cette maladie chronique, complexe et socialement handicapante. La revue de littérature nous a permis d’appréhender les hypothèses étiologiques de l’obésité et ses conséquences médicales, sociales et psychologiques, ainsi que les différents modèles psychologiques proposés. Notre travail s’est ensuite dirigé vers trois études qui avaient toutes pour objectif d’évaluer l’effet de la prise en charge du Groupe de Réflexion de l’Obésité et du surpoids (GROS) sur le poids, l’alimentation intuitive, l’alimentation émotionnelle, la restriction cognitive et la satisfaction corporelle. Les recherches n’ont pas permis de mettre en évidence l’efficacité de la prise en charge du GROS, comparativement à une autre prise en charge. Néanmoins, et avec toutes les limites énoncées, elle aurait un effet positif sur le poids et sur l’alimentation intuitive. Enfin, notre travail s’est conclu avec l’étude MOS dont le but était de repérer les déterminants psychologiques potentiels du surpoids et de l’obésité en comparant les sujets normo-pondéraux et les sujets en surpoids ou obèses sur plusieurs variables : l’activité physique hebdomadaire, le stress perçu, la restriction cognitive, les stratégies de gestion émotionnelle, la personnalité et la présence d’évènements de vie stressants ou traumatiques. Toutes les analyses ont mis en évidence que la restriction cognitive était un prédicteur de l’IMC de même que l’âge et le stress perçu. En revanche, le fait que la symptomatologie traumatique prédise de façon négative l’IMC nous a fortement surpris. D’autres recherches sont nécessaires pour confirmer ces résultats aux perspectives thérapeutiques et préventives
The purpose of this work was to study the potential psychological determinants of overweight and obesity and to contribute to the evaluation of triaxial management of this chronic, complex and socially disabling disease. The literature review allowed us to understand the etiological hypotheses of obesity and its medical, social and psychological consequences, as well as the various psychological models proposed. Then, our work focused on three studies that were aimed to evaluate the effect of the management of the Groupe de Réflexion sur l’Obésité et le Surpoids (GROS), the Frenchy think tank on obesity and overweight, on weight, intuitive diet, weight loss and weight loss. emotional eating, cognitive restriction and body satisfaction. The research did not highlight the effectiveness of the management of the GROS, compared to another treatment. Nevertheless, and with all the limitations, it would have a positive effect on weight and intuitive eating. Finally, our work was concluded with the MOS study, the purpose of which was to identify the potential psychological determinants of overweight and obesity by comparing normo-weight subjects and overweight or obese subjects on several variables: weekly physical activity, perceived stress, cognitive restraint, emotional management strategies, personality and the presence of stressful or traumatic life events. All analyzes showed that cognitive restraint was a predictor of BMI as well as age and perceived stress. On the other hand, the fact that traumatic symptomatology predicts BMI negatively surprised us. Further research is needed to confirm these results with therapeutic and preventive perspectives

In this thesis, I present my themes at two levels. On one level I am concerned with learning in secondary school science, which the science education literature has shown to be problematic in some areas, while at the second level, I am concerned with my own learning, which leads me to search for a methodology consistent with my developing theory about learning and change. I have constructed a partial explanation for unsatisfactory learning in science, using a cross-disciplinary body of literature (including that relating to critical literacy teaching, second language learning, social and cognitive psychology, and sociolinguistics). Taken as a whole, the literature seemed to suggest that deep learning and change depend to some extent on the nature of interpersonal relationships in the classroom, and (tacit) cultural rather than rational factors, and that these needed more research in the science education context. As a result my research became focused on teacher-student interpersonal relationships and the language mediating these. After early studies exploring several science education contexts, I finally collaborated with a teacher of a Year 8 science class in trialing an intervention using affirmational dialogue journal writing. This resulted in a more democratic and generally improved psychosocial learning environment, as well as some new insights into the nature of the communication problems associated with typical science classroom discourse. Articles written at different stages of this overall research program were accepted for publication by major science education journals on three continents. At the same time, my desire to use a methodology consistent with my own developing theories about the nature of learning and change led me firstly to using different methodologies in successive case studies (multivariate analysis of survey data, ethnography, and action research). As I became increasing aware of social factors involved in the construction of knowledge, I wrote two articles dealing with emerging methodological issues and these were accepted for publication in international publications. However, I later went on to become more aware of broader ecosocial system factors (cf. Lemke, 1995), and then ecobiological factors (Maturana & Varela, 1992), and this led to my becoming increasingly reflexive about the underlying process implicit in my repeated epistemological and methodological revolutions. I found that non-rational aspects were implicated, and decided that this somewhat intuitive underlying practice needed to be presented explicitly as my metamethodology, not only because ofits apparent productiveness, but because it exemplified and extended the theories about learning that I had developed with my research in science classrooms. This new methodology, which I call "ecobiosocial system analysis", is a synthesis of sociocultural, psychological, and physiological principles in an ecosocial system that includes tacit biological aspects of understanding. Moreover this shifting understanding had serious implications for how I (re)presented my research in the thesis document, which I had originally assumed had to be an objective scientific account. As my epistemological beliefs changed, this became a decision to present first a narrative inquiry (Clandinin & Connelly, 1990), and then a critical action research account (Kemmis, 1994). Finally, however, I realised that such unified narratives misrepresented research practice as I had experienced it and, ifI were to be consistent with my own theories, a new method of presenting my research needed to be found. This series of changes could be seen as an evolution, in which case it would make sense to disregard the earlier thinking and present the research only in relation to the final theoretical paradigm. My preferred perspective is to see my research as moving between paradigms, none of which has ultimate superiority. Hence, I insist on presenting the whole (somewhat messy and multi-paradigmatic) process, by juxtaposing the differently voiced articles and my final meta-account. In fact the knowledge resulting from earlier studies had already been validated by the research communities to which it belonged (by fact of publication), while the final stage of knowledge has yet to gain such validation by researcher peers. As a consequence of my conviction that my learning should be seen as a particular case created by a particular ecobiosocial system, I present a central autobiographical chapter. This focuses on sociocultural and psychological childhood and adult experiences, which I suggest have influenced my epistemological beliefs and research practice at a deeper level than the literature I read during my PhD. Even though the resulting metamethodology is shown to be an implicit one to some extent, often operating at tacit levels, I nevertheless present both design and methods chapters. The design chapter proposes a justification of the (meta)methodology in terms of current theories from a range of fields (cognitive science, organisational change theories, critical theory, and socio-biological ecological system theories). The methods chapter then analyses my somewhat intuitive research process in retrospect, based on samples of my personal journal writing, on-line communications, and other associated activities. In summary, the thesis explores the nature of deep learning and change in two rather different contexts, and proposes that such processes involve a complex of interrelated cognitive, social and biological aspects. This proposition not only has implications for teaching and learning science but led me to a new methodology, ecobiosocial system analysis. It also led me to challenge the traditional thesis structure which represents learning as an entirely rational process and knowledge as unitary. Moreover, given that I challenge the belief that either thought or practice can be significantly changed by a purely logical account, I do not draw explicit conclusions but rather trust to what I have been able to communicate in a more organic way throughout the thesis document.

Dr. Eleine Mad är Madeleine Jacobsssons talesperson för dom vetenskapliga och paranormala upptäckter som uppstår i hennes världar. Hon beskriver innehåll, teknik och estetik utifrån ett kategoriseringssytem där konsten delas upp som olika typer av komponenter och därefter avkodas dessa allteftersom. För att förstå intuitionens inblandning i arbetsprocessen omförvandlas den till tre separata roller av en Sökare, Samlare och Myntare. Med rollerna försöker jag beskriva på vilka sätt som intuitionen är till gagn eller av förödelse för det konstnärliga arbetet. Sagan om M handlar om en grodlik karaktär, Delop, som lämnar sin hemplanet för att uppsöka andra världar. I sitt sökande hittar Delop ett folkslag vars syn och levnadssätt skiljer sig från hennes erfarenheter av “verkligheten” såsom hon lärt sig att överleva i den.
Dr. Eleine Mad is Madeleine Jacobsson's spokesperson for the scientific and paranormal discoveries that arise in her worlds. She describes content, tecniques and aesthetics based on a categorization system where art is divided into different types of components and then decoded as they go. To understand the intuition's involvement in the work process, it is transformed into three separate roles by a Seeker, Collector and a Myntare(In swedish language the one who is a "myntare" -is verbally declaring a concept or term). With these roles I try to describe in what ways intuition is beneficial or devastating to the artistic work. The story of M is about a frog-like character, Delop, who leaves the home planet to seek out other worlds. In her search, Delop finds a world whose views and lifestyles differ from her experiences of "reality" as she learned to survive in it.

Recorded sound and image material of the presentation is available for private use.

Using action orientation after failure as a measure of individual differences in emotion regulation abilities (ERA), this thesis’ studies investigated the impact of ERA on cognition, behavior, and own versus imposed goals differentiation. The first study used cortisol as a physiological stress marker to replicate the link between ERA and the ability to make intuitive judgments under stress. High ERA were associated with increased performance in an intuition task under stress. In contrast, when feeling no stress, low ERA were associated with increased performance in an intuition task. The second study showed that ERA can compensate for depression-associated biased processing of negative stimuli. This effect was present even at mild to moderate depression levels. Replicating earlier findings, the third study showed that ERA are associated with an increased ability to distinguish self-chosen from imposed goals. Most importantly, the study identified activation in the right medial prefrontal cortex as a neural correlate of identifying self-chosen goals, and activation in the anterior cingulate cortex, as a correlate of falsely identifying imposed goals as self-chosen ones. Altogether, these studies show the necessity to consider individual differences in ERA in stress, clinical, and motivational research. The findings are discussed with respect to three theories that relate to motivation and personality from behavioral and neurobiological perspectives, namely, Personality Systems Interaction Theory, Predictive and Reactive Control Systems Theory, and Self-Determination Theory.

碩士
國立虎尾科技大學
經營管理研究所
101
The purpose of this study first was to examine and secondly compare the three factors emotion, intuition and rational analysis that influence financial decision-making of Taiwanese and Vietnamese investors. There have 225 respondents in both Viet Nam and Taiwan joined the survey. Results found that: intuition, emotion and rational analysis affected both Vietnamese and Taiwanese investors. These three factors co-influence in pairs: rational analysis plus intuition, rational analysis plus emotion, finally intuition plus emotion also affect two nations’ investors when they do make decisions. This study also found out an interesting result that personal experience of intuition failed to influence Taiwanese investors. Hope of taking profit failed to influence Vietnamese investors. There have significant cross-countries gender differences under the influence of intuition, emotion and rational analysis. Taiwanese males and Vietnamese females are prone to be more affected by rational analysis. Both of them also are affected by co-influence of emotion and intuition. Vietnamese males and Taiwanese females are prone to be more affected by intuition when they do make decisions. Two of them are affected by the co-influence of rational analysis and intuition. Both Taiwanese and Vietnamese females are prone to be more affected by emotion when they do make decisions they are also more affected by the co-influence of rational analysis and emotion.

This practice-led MA project in performance focuses on the use of narrative elements within dance theatre. Following the work of Pina Bausch and Lloyd Newson it investigates processes for integrating narrative with the abstract properties of dance. Whilst Bausch and Newson have approached narrative from divergent perspectives, both have utilised it in ways that embrace ambiguity, encouraging interpretation but refusing definitive meaning. This project expands these perspectives to further explore this space between specificity and ambiguity. It suggests a story through movement and physicality and investigates the ability of narrative to connect directly to the emotional core of the spectator.

碩士
國立雲林科技大學
資訊管理系碩士班
100
This paper proposes a novel method to provide an enhanced music recommendation system with both high quality and customization. Through mood/situation categorization and expert attributes, this study builds an experienced-based recommendation system called “MoMusic” to provide users unlimited online music streaming recommendation which differs from previous each-song-buying recommendation. Because moods and situations are easier to be understood by users and therefore precisely applied in users’ regular life, this paper gives up traditional approaches and simplifies music domain, such as the genre, melody and tempo into more intuitional concepts. This paper uses the dataset from online music stream provider, KKBOX. After characterized by music experts, the music dataset is mapped with the result from music preference questionnaire by related expert attributes and mood/situation categorization to output recommendation song lists. Through the experiment, the accuracy of MoMusic can reach approximately two times higher than random song lists and KKBOX-like song lists. The usefulness evaluation of music emotion model is 0.89 and integrated system satisfaction is 0.96. As results, the proposed recommender can be guaranteed with more effective and intuitional music streaming recommendation.

This study examines how leaders enable their organisations to adapt and succeed in complex environments. Through the joint lenses of complexity theory and the cognition and social neuroscience of leadership it focuses on how leadership directly influences the creation and ongoing function of an adaptive organisation. The study includes the comparison of four leaders through embedded case studies as an abductive approach to initial theory building, and the follow up of two of them as a comparative method of analysis, and it generates a substantive theory of leadership cognition called emergent logic. This leadership approach is especially relevant to leading complex human systems in emergent environments, the scenario for the majority of organisations in the present day. This thesis addresses two questions: How do leaders of adaptive organisations think? And what do leaders of adaptive organisations do? Among the major findings the study reveals that a critical success factor is the leader’s capacity to create and guide a complex human system by establishing and maintaining a shared mental model of its collective purpose, guided by deeply held and articulated values. The cognitive constructs of complexity and emergent logic have a direct and indirect effect on individuals and the organisation, and facilitate the creation of an adaptive operational culture and organisational mind, and the complementary enabling structures that allow for ongoing evolution through emergence, transformation and diffusion as required. Thus the organisation and its people can progressively build more complex emergent mental models and solutions in the face of increasingly common unpredictable situations, leading to the capability for organisational adaption and evolution over time. In contributing to the theory of creating and leading adaptive organisations, supported by empirical research, this study has improved our understanding of the effect of the leader’s cognitive capacity on organisational adaptability and the level of entanglement; revealed the links between the creation of adaptive organisational structures and their culture; examined the growth of individual and collective capability to manage the increasing complexity and emergence created by successful adaption and evolution; identified the common elements of various types of complex systems that are relevant to adaptive change; presented a model of emergent logic and described the empirical use of that model over time.
Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Business School, 2014

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada no ISPA – Instituto Universitário para obtenção de grau de Mestre na especialidade de Psicologia Clínica.
A Alimentação Consciente (AC) e a Alimentação Intuitiva (AI) são abordagens de comportamento alimentar baseadas na premissa de confiar nos sinais fisiológicos de fome e saciedade. Com o objetivo de explorar preditores da AC e AI, e o seu impacto em variáveis de saúde, desenvolveram-se dois modelos de equações estruturais. A amostra englobou 960 participantes que completaram a Escala de Alimentação Intuitiva (IES-2), o Questionário de Alimentação Consciente (MEQ), a Escala de Compulsão alimentar (BES) e o Questionário de Três Fatores do Comportamento Alimentar (TFEQ-R21). O primeiro e o segundo modelo que testam, respetivamente, a relação entre a AC ou a AI, e comportamento alimentar disfuncional, variáveis sociodemográficas e de saúde, demonstraram uma qualidade de ajustamento sofrível (1: χ2/df = 4.803; CFI = .843; GFI =.874, TLI = .818; RMSEA = .063; 2: χ2/df = 4.914; CFI =.888; GFI =.861, TLI = .873; RMSEA = .064). Indivíduos com comportamentos de ingestão compulsiva mais graves e maior frequência de comportamentos de alimentação emocional manifestavam comportamentos menos frequentes de resposta emocional (β = -.249, p < .001; β = -.689, p < .001) e de desinibição (AC) (β = -.492, p < .001; β = -.149, p < .001), e pareciam comer menos por razões físicas e não emocionais ( β= - .147, p<.001; β = -.754, p < .001). A AC esteve significativamente associada à AI (r = 0.457; p = < .01). Contudo, falta ainda perceber quais as implicações práticas da utilização destas abordagens em conjunto ou separadamente.
Mindful Eating (ME) and Intuitive Eating (IE) are approaches to eating behavior based on the premise of trusting in hunger and satiation’s physiological signs. With the aim of exploring ME and IE predictions, as well as their impact on health variables, two structural equations models were developed. The sample included 960 participants which completed the IES-2 - Intuitive Eating Scale; MEQ - Mindful Eating Scale; BES – Binge Eating Scale and TFEQR21 – Three Factor Eating Questionnaire. The first and the second model that test, respectively, the relation between ME or IE, and disfunctional eating behavior, sociodemographic and health variables have shown a reasonable adjustment quality (1: χ2/df = 4.803; CFI = .843; GFI = .874, TLI = .818; RMSEA = .063; 2: χ2/df = 4.914; CFI = .888; GFI = .861, TLI = .873; RMSEA = .064). Individuals with more serious compulsive ingestion attitudes displayed less frequent emotional responses behaviors (β = -.249, p < .001; β = -.689, p < .001) (ME) and disinhibition (β = -.492, p < .001; β = -.149, p < .001) (ME), and seemed to eat less not so much for emotional reasons as for physical ones (β = -.147, p < .001; β = - .754, p < .001). ME was significantly connected to IE (r = 0.457; p = < .01). However, we still need to understand which pratical implications of use both collectively and separately.

Facilitating forgiveness: an NLP approach to forgiving is an attempt at uncovering features of the blocks that prevent people to forgive. These blocks to forgiveness can be detected in the real life situations of the six individuals who told me their stories. The inner thoughts, feelings and the subsequent behaviour that prevented them from forgiving others is clearly uncovered in their stories. The facilitation process highlights the features that created the blocks in the past thus preventing forgiveness to occur. The blocks with their accompanying features reveal what needs to be clarified or changed in order to eventually enable the hurt individuals to forgive those who have hurt them. The application of discourse analysis to the stories of hurt highlights the links between the real life stories of the individuals within their contexts with regard to unforgiveness to the research findings of the existing body of knowledge, thereby creating a complexly interwoven comprehensive understanding of the individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviours in conjunction with their developmental phases within their socio-cultural contexts. Neuro-linguistic-programming (NLP) is the instrument with which forgiving is facilitated in the six individuals who expressed their conscious desire to forgive, because they were unable to do so on their own. Their emotions had the habit of keeping them in a place in which they were forced to relive the hurtful event as if it were happening in the present. Arresting the process of reliving negative emotions requires a new way of being in this world. The assumption that this can be learnt is based on the results from a previous study, in which forgiveness was uncovered by means of the grounded theory approach as a cognitive process (Von Krosigk, 2000). The results from the previous research in conjunction with the results and insights from this research study are presented in the form of a grounded theory model of forgiveness.
Psychology
D. Litt. et Phil. (Psychology)

This thesis concentrates on contexts and view-points, that should determinate the character of activities designed for gifted children in foreign languages classes. This work proposes some methods and ways that are convenient for gifted learners. It deals also with the characteristics of the teacher, who is able to conduct the gifted and the characteristics of the gifted in order to devise such activities that satisfy their special cognitive, emotional and social needs.

O projeto de investigação “Criatividade, filosofia e emaravilhamento” foi desenvolvido com um grupo de crianças do ensino pré-primário e duas turmas do 1º ciclo de escolaridade. A investigação decorreu em Comunidades de Investigação Filosófica, através da aplicação da metodologia de Filosofia Para Crianças, de Mathew Lipman. Sendo a matriz deste projeto holística, a dimensão cognitiva integrou a corporalidade e fê-la dialogar dialeticamente com os conceitos de sensibilidade estética (aisthésis) e razão prática (phronésis), através de uma poiésis orientada para o desenvolvimento cognitivo, ético e estético. O recurso às técnicas de criatividade de David Prado Diez, nomeadamente a Analogia Inusual, o Torvelinho de Ideias e o Relaxamento Criativo, permitiu estabelecer o diálogo entre a imaginação, a cinestesia, a criatividade e o discurso argumentativo. A cooperação, a intersubjetividade, a comunicação autêntica, a vivência imagética da beleza, da harmonia e da paz, visaram a formação de um ethos comum e de uma consciência em simbiosinergia com as comunidades bióticas e com o cosmos.
The research project "Creativity, philosophy and Amazement" was developed with a group of preschool children and two classes of the 1st cycle: from the 1st and the 2nd year, respectively. The research took place in communities of Philosophical Research, through the application of the methodology laid out in Philosophy for Children, by Matthew Lipman. The matrix of this project was holistic, and thus the cognitive dimension included corporeality aspects, in conjunction with the concepts of aesthetic sensitivity (aisthésis) and practical reason (phronésis) through a poiésis oriented towards a cognitive, ethical and aesthetic development. The use of the creative techniques of David Prado Diez, notably the Unusual Analogy, the Whirlwind of Ideas and Creative Relaxation, allowed for a dialogue between imagination, kinesthesia, creativity and argumentative discourse. Cooperation, intersubjectivity, authentic communication, the visual experience of beauty, harmony and peace, aimed at the formation of a common ethos and a conscience in symbiosynergy with the biotic communities and with the cosmos.