Статті в журналах з теми "Inter-governmental balance"

This research discusses the crucial role played by Community Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations in efforts to achieve sustainable development in Indonesia. Sustainable development is the main goal that has received serious attention from various countries, including Indonesia. These development goals pursue an important balance between economic growth, environmental sustainability, and community empowerment. The method used is a qualitative approach involving field surveys, interviews and document analysis. interact directly with leaders of Community Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations during field surveys. This method is used to gain a deeper understanding of the role of Community Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations in varied local contexts and provide a holistic view of their contribution to Indonesia's development. The research results show that Community Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations have great potential in mobilizing the community, advocating for better policies, and providing necessary services for community members. However, there are challenges that need to be overcome, including financial issues, organizational capacity, and relations with government, several empowerment strategies that can be used to strengthen the role of Community Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations in the development process, including increasing organizational capacity, promoting partnerships with the sector private sector, and strengthening inter-organizational networks. This research provides a deeper understanding of how Community Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations can contribute more effectively in supporting sustainable development in Indonesia.

Draft commercial exploitation regulations have been on the agenda of the ISA since several 15-year exploration contracts expired a few years ago. Given the ineffective implementation in practice and the ignored chapter in several mining regulations on the transfer of mining technology, the future Enterprise and developing countries may take a more positive approach to the transfer of mining technology by striking a delicate balance between the provisions on the protection of intellectual property and those on capacity building under the framework of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement, through reciprocal and mutual beneficial means such as direct technology purchasing and investment cooperation. The International Seabed Authority, as the competent inter-governmental organization, has the duty to foster favorable conditions for such transfer.

The Criminal Justice System (CJS) is an inter-dependent multi-organizational justice sector comprising police, prosecution, courts, corrections and many other government agencies. These governmental institutions along with one private force in the shape of the defence lawyers; are primarily responsible for the administration of CJS. The imbalance among these institutions and separate working without meaningful coordination and cooperation to uphold justice are key elements for making CJS ineffective, inefficient, and expensive and even paralyzing it. An Appropriate balance among these institutions and joined up working to uphold justice are the key elements to make the CJS effective, efficient even inexpensive. No single organization can make the CJS effective and efficient. Synergy among the judiciary, prosecution, police and other inter-dependent agencies and authorities is necessary for making the CJS simpler, faster, cheaper and people-friendly. With the help of qualitative and analytical research methodology, this article explores the imbalances in the working of CJS and explains the need for joined working and alignment of the CJS as a way forward and practical solution for making CJS efficient, effective, simpler, faster, cheaper and people friendly.

Purpose – An important theme for a twenty-first century employee is a desire for work and family balance which is devoid of conflict. Drawing on detailed empirical research, the purpose of this paper is to examine the multi-faceted causes and consequences of work-family conflict (WFC) in a non-Western context (Nigeria). Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses qualitative data gleaned from the semi-structured interviews of 88 employees (44 university lecturers and 44 medical doctors) in cities in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. Findings – The findings showed that work pressure, heavy familial duties, poor infrastructural facilities, and a lack of suitable and practicable work-family balance policies are the main causes of WFC in Nigeria. Juvenile delinquencies, broken marriages/families, and an unhappy workforce are among the grave consequences of WFC among Nigerian employees. Originality/value – This paper suggests that the availability of basic infrastructural facilities, more governmental support, practicable work-family policies, inter alia, will reduce the level of WFC for Nigerian employees and will also results in positive spill-over from the work domain to the family domain and vice-versa.

Public procurement is one area needing governmental reforms. It is largely governed by dated rules that businesses feel are not able to encompass the complex needs of a modernising Indian economy. They also feel that there is a plethora of public contract rules often not in harmony with each other creating confusion and giving opportunity for corruption. However, the Modi regime’s anti-corruption mandate should not stifle business initiative that is the main critique against the Public Procurement Bill (2012). An amended public procurement law should inter alia be comprehensive in its coverage. It should incorporate new forms of tendering to cover complex procurement situations, maintain balance between the cost and the quality in tender awards, check abuse of monopoly in single-source procurement, prevent ‘digital divide’ in transparency provisions, maintain balance between external openness and promotion of domestic economy in market access provisions, encourage sustainable public procurement, incorporate effective mechanisms for redressing grievances of bidders and avoid penal provisions punishing offences covered by existing laws. Regulatory reform in public procurement will have substantial economic impact, as government contracts annually average approximately 30 per cent of India’s GDP and cover almost every sphere of government activity. Hence, such a reform will improve India’s anti-corruption/ease of doing business global rankings.

AbstractThe optimal balance between central governmental authority and the degree of autonomy of local public bodies is an enduring issue in public policy. The UK National Health Service is no exception, with NHS history, in part at least, a history of repeated cycles of centralisation and decentralisation of decision-making power. Most recently, a significant reorganisation of the NHS in 2012–13 was built around the creation of new and supposedly more autonomous commissioning organisations (Clinical Commissioning Groups – CCGs). Using Bossert's (1998) concept of ‘decision space’, we explored the experiences of local commissioners as they took on their new responsibilities. We interviewed commissioning staff from all of the CCGs in two regional health care ‘economies’, exploring their perceptions of autonomy and their experiences over time. We found significant early enthusiasm for, and perceptions of, increased autonomy tempered in the vertical dimension by increasingly onerous and prescriptive monitoring regimes, and in the horizontal dimension by the proliferation of overlapping networks, inter-organisational groups and relationships. We propose that, whatever the balance between central and local control that is adopted, complex public services require some sort of meso-level oversight from organisations able to ‘hold the ring’ between competing interests and to take a regional view of the needs of the local health system. This suggests that local organisational autonomy in such services will always be constrained.

Coordinated border management (CBM) refers to a coordinated approach by border agencies, both domestic and international for achieving efficiencies by facilitating trade and travel flows, with maintaining a balance with compliance requirements. The core objective of this paper is to identify governmental agencies cooperation for border governance of Nepal. For the purpose of understanding inter agency cooperation the research uses both qualitative and quantitative approach with descriptive design using both primary and secondary data. The findings show that there are 12 ministries at federal level and 14 departments with 670 borderline agencies in Nepal. The central ministry, departments, regional offices, district offices and borderline offices are the hierarchical system in intra- agencies. At national level there are different working groups and committee form different ministry. At district level, District Administration Office plays a lead role for local border management by instructing and upervising others agencies in interagency coordination. In order to maintain peace, security and curtail cross border crime, the security agencies are having cordial cooperation by exchanging high level information exchange, sharing of work, regular training and joint inspection by constructing different working groups. The study suggests establishing a national border management policy to incorporate all tiers agencies by constructing national border management Authority to coordinate all agencies from central level to local level which reduce unnecessary work duplication by amending relevant statutes.

International financial trilemma is a challenge of balancing the governmental policies ensuring healthy financial sector for facilitating economic development of a country. The scientific purpose of the paper is to develop a model of the international financial trilemma, defining the three key pillars of the international financial trilemma, the corresponding relevant metrics of economy, as well as describing expansion of financial technology as a disruptive element on a trilemma balance. Taking into account the experience of other researches of trilemma concept, analogically to the Energy Trilemma index, the authors developed the trilemma concept for the financial sector. The paper proposes determining the Financial trilemma index basing it on the following pillars: financial stability, financial inclusion and transparency. The authors analyse FinTech services as disruptive element affecting the International Financial trilemma index. As statistical basis of the financial trilemma and its building blocks the set of data from publicly available databases, such as the Global Competitiveness index, the Financial Development index, Global Findex and Doing Business is determined. The generally accepted quantitative and qualitative methods of economic science, inter alia comparative analysis, parameter estimation, grouping, economically mathematical modelling, synthesis, inductive, deductive and logically constructive methods have been used for the research. The financial trilemma index could be used as a tool for modelling an impact assessment of planned policy actions, as well as for developing determined steps for rising values of particular trilemma elements.

An important task in the construction of China’s ecological civilization, the selection and implementation of policy instruments fully reflect the actual effectiveness of the government’s efforts to control air pollution. Based on the content analysis method, this study examines the changing process of air pollution control policy instruments in southwest China from 2010 to 2021 in terms of implementation, synergy, and integration of policy instruments. The results show that, in terms of the degree of mandatory, the frequency of using policy instruments generally increased with time, but the overall balance of the instrument portfolio was poor. In terms of the degree of synergy, a gradual shift occurred from government-led to government-society governance. However, the concept and modes of inter-governmental linkage and cross-regional collaborative governance need to be improved. As for the degree of systemic, a clear trend of instrument integration and more frequent information interaction was found. Emergency-oriented characteristics appear strong, but a regular governance mechanism is lacking. Therefore, this paper provides policy suggestions and academic considerations for further improving the effectiveness of air pollution management in southwest China from three aspects: optimizing the policy tool system, deepening the regional joint prevention and control mechanism of air pollution, and promoting intelligent air pollution management.

State Agreements are agreements between private proponents and a State government which aim to facilitate the development of resources and processing projects and associated public infrastructure. State Agreements have been used extensively throughout Australia and each has been given varying levels of legislative recognition and effect, which in turn affects whether the rights and obligations arising under them have statutory or merely contractual effect. This ambiguity highlights the need to balance within State Agreements the private rights of the proponents with the public interest. The public interest critically involves third party rights to access infrastructure or services developed by proponents under the State Agreement. The introduction of National Competition Principles and regulatory regimes has affected the balance of these interests in favour of the public interest which has, in turn, led to a more stringent approach to State regulation under State Agreements. In particular, States are compelled through inter-governmental, federal and international competition and trade agreements to limit the extent to which it can negotiate its terms in a purely commercial way, embodying concessions in favour of proponents or preferences in favour of the State over other states or countries. Where a State Agreement expressly confers a benefit on third parties associated with access, third parties have successfully sought to enforce those benefits through the Courts, resulting in increased risks and costs for proponents that may not have been originally anticipated. Coupled with the political risks associated with changing governments and government policies, State Agreements, which have historically played a significant role in State development, are increasingly losing their ability to meet the commercial objectives of proponents.

The Black Sea region is increasingly becoming a priority on the international agenda. In fact, a regional approach is emerging as actors understand that common problems need to be addressed jointly. Nevertheless, cooperation efforts are hampered by a number of factors, such as uneven economic and political development within and among countries, nationalist forces, and longstanding animosities between regional players. In this context, it is imperative to foster sound policies aimed at strengthening dialogue and cooperation so as to contain and ultimately resolve conflicts with peaceful means. However, there is little policy-oriented research on the challenges and opportunities for cooperation in the Black Sea region. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of terrorism and its dangers towards the Black Sea region. The work also describes the significance of international terrorism and its general definitions. Besides, the result and findings are based on theoretical studies and assumptions and the result of the analysis of the “Case Study” of the Black Sea region. Case study examines how the Black Sea region influences the spread of terrorism and what threats it poses for this region. Furthermore, the aspects of what makes the region important on international arena are analyzed and the existent and potential security issues are examined, as well as strategic importance of the region for the EU and NATO is analyzed even from academic framework – “Securitization” theory (Buzan, Wæver, De Wilde, 1998). The theory is based on security studies conceptual background and the background spectrum includes: the Copenhagen School and Critical security studies as the type (Ondrejcsak, 2014). Moreover, the Black Sea regional security and geopolitics are to be reviewed and scrutinized in several modalities in aegis of the Securitization theory, like military and economic sectors. The hypothesis provides provision that the Black Sea regional security has already became indispensable part of the contemporary international security system and determines tendency in geostrategic balance at global level. In addition to that the Black Sea Region has to contend with numerous threats of a conventional and non-conventional kind. These hard and soft security problems make the region volatile, insecure and unstable. That is why the region is very vital for inter-governmental organizations, dealing with military security (NATO case) and local actors in case of Georgia’s national security.

The paper analyses the scheme whereby provincial chief constables, encouraged by the Home Office, could call in the help of Scotland Yard's experienced detectives to investigate serious cases, especially murder, that were considered to be beyond the capacity of the local force to solve on its own. While the scheme was on balance successful in that more than 50% of such call-outs between 1919 and 1928 resulted in convictions, it is suggested that its significance extended beyond the mere profit and loss accounting approach. For the arrangements cast a mirror on many of the conflicts and some of the developments in policing during this period. Thus they illuminated the tension between respect for local, even if inexperienced, police autonomy, on the one hand, and efficiency and expertise on the other; or, more broadly, between constitutional localism and central governmental direction of policing in England and Wales. But with the press campaigning for more efficient use of the scheme, its arrangements actually attested to the favourable prospects, in the late 1920s and 1930s, for inter-force cooperation in the form of national crime prevention schemes (such as that designed to intercept cross-country ‘motor bandits’). It was thus one of the unacknowledged elements in the forcing house for organisational change experienced by British policing before the war.

Traditional stability of the Swedish legislative and executive authorities functioning, manifested in the almost complete absence of parliamentary and governmental crises, was questioned by results of the general elections in September 2014. The Alliance of four center-right parties who ruled Sweden from 2006 to 2014 suffered a defeat having lost 32 of 173 mandates. Simultaneously, the informal coalition of three center-left parties that opposed to the Alliance in 2006-2014 increased its representation in the Riksdag from 156 to 159 deputies only. Thus, none of the two inter-party blocks has the absolute parliamentary majority (175) needed for the formation of the own government. At the same time, Sweden Democrats who first entered the Riksdag in 2010 have significantly increased their faction (from 20 to 49 deputies) and thereby strengthened their king maker position (holding the balance of power) in the new parliament. Yet this party is isolated and excluded from the cross-party interaction in the Riksdag because of its Islamofobia and anti-immigrant attitudes. The new government of minority (the Social Democrats and the Green Party) was approved by the Riksdag due to the negative parliamentarism principle which means that the government shall be deemed approved if it does not receive the absolute majority of votes against it. However, many subsequent government bills submitted to the Riksdag are likely to be rejected by the opposition parties of the Alliance with assistance of the Sweden Democrats. To avoid such situation, the government parties have to bargain with smaller center-right parties on particular issues and thus to form a required ad hoc parliamentary majority. After the last elections, the political establishment parties became much more dependent in their interaction on the Sweden Democrats' unpredictable behavior than before. All of these factors greatly complicate the Riksdag's and the government's work as well as sharply increase risks of governmental and parliamentary crises even to the extent of the government's resignation and pre-term elections. It is unusual for Sweden where such elections last took place in 1958.

Investigations on the socioeconomic impacts of mega-dam projects have tended to focus on conventional cost–benefit analysis, while studies exploring perceptions of local communities, who are some of the prime beneficiaries of these development initiatives, are limited. This paper aims to address this research gap through a case study of community perceptions on the socioeconomic impacts of the Merowe Dam in Sudan from the residents of upstream, downstream, and relocated locations. Data were collected primarily through surveys and interviews with residents, government officials, dam implementation authority, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other key informants and a series of indicators were developed for the analysis from the responses. Three inter-related areas of impact were scrutinized: (a) electricity generation; (b) development of modern agriculture; and (c) institutional infrastructure in the region. The results reveal that local communities are fully aware of both the positive and adverse socioeconomic impacts of the Merowe Dam, although these are focused more on the visible impacts closely related to their livelihood and income, such as increased food production, water shortages, electricity supply and its costs. Policy implications include investments in the new settlement areas with respect to the agricultural economy, such as irrigation improvement through electrification, promoting crop diversity, research, development, and diffusion of modern agricultural technologies. Efforts are also needed to strike a balance between provision of utilities and services, (i.e., water, electricity and other infrastructural facilities) provided by the Merowe Dam, amongst communities in relocated, upstream, and downstream locations.

After state and market, NGO regards as third sector in the field of development. NGO produce positive impact on all dimension in marginalized society of developing country like Nepal. To assess the status of non-governmental organization of Nepal in provincial and district level and to identify their prospects and challenges, this article is prepared as the title “locus and focus of third sector in development of Nepal”. It is mainly based on the secondary data of social welfare council, Nepal. Information regarding objectives was collected through various search engines by simple literature review. The status of I/NGO is found unequal at provincial and district level in Nepal. Bagmati province is in top-most position in terms of number of NGO followed by province-2 and province-1. Karnali province is lowest position in terms of number of NGO followed by Sudur Paschim province and Gandaki province. Federalism requires balance development in intra-province and inter-provinces. Being a vehicle of foreign donors to channel their help to the marginalized communities, I/NGO must play effective roles to solve the problem of people neglected by state and market. The joint efforts of all development partners including I/NGO are mandatory to meet financial sustainability and balanced development in Nepal. The governance system transformed from unitary to federal structure in Nepal. Local, provincial, and federal level governments are facing huge resource gaps to perform their roles and responsibilities. The role and responsibility of development partner including I/NGO are vital to fulfilling these gaps. Easy registration process and weak monitoring system of government as well as lack of transparency in I/NGO are the notable issues to address without delay. To meet national commitment “Prosperous Nepal, Happy Nepali” and to fulfill the target of sustainable development goals, joint efforts of all sector like state, market ,I/NGO, cooperative , private sector, international community are mandatory with the visionary and coordinating leadership of federal government of Nepal.

The European integration project as designed by its founders seventy years ago is experiencing difficulties in the current conditions of globalization, confronting challenges which were unpredictable beforehand. Many of these are of crucial character for the European Union, putting in question its constitutional organization, institutional structure, and political sustainability in the international balance of power. The list of most important issues includes ones like the yet incomplete character of the Union’s legal construction, which is balanced between supranational and national forms of regulation; the erosion of legitimacy of European institutions; the growing democracy deficits in transnational and national governance; the decline of solidarity in inter-governmental relations; and the falling level of accountability and decision-making mechanisms in Europe. The very natural response to these problems was a Pan-European discussion, stimulated by European elites after Brexit, on the future of the European project in order to frame existing opinions, provide a fresh start to “the European dream”, and possibly find appropriate solutions to legitimacy problems. An analysis of this ongoing discussion is the main subject of this article. This analysis involves such key issues as the future role of the EU founding agreements, as to keeping them or amending them in order to reconstruct the European constitutional settlement. It demonstrates the complex nature of the basic communitarian concept, in view of its various interpretations by different ideological trends such as cosmopolitism and confederation and federation movements. It explores the current agenda of institutional reforms involving parliamentarian and presidential strategies and reviews proposed solutions of the European leadership problem. The conclusion of the article makes it clear that the European Union is confronted today with the most dramatic challenge in its entire history. It consists in the necessity of making a decisive choice between two polar options — to preserve an amorphous conglomerate of states or to establish a new federal state. This must be done in a rather short period in order to avoid falling apart and to become a full-fledged and independent global political player.

Various researchers have called for research into positive examples of successful triple helix governed ecosystems. Triple Helix collaborations are seen as the solution to tackle the current ‘wicked problems’ of society. Researchers are encouraged to enhance our understanding of governing inter-organizational collaborations (ecosystems) in the context of university-industry-government (Triple Helix) relations. In this paper we therefore describe a case study of the Brainport Eindhoven ecosystem in the Netherlands which embodies a triple helix organization and how the regional governmental structure (Brainport Foundation and Brainport Development) on the one hand stabilizes at a strategic level and on the other hand gives flexibility at the tactical and operational level. This leads to the transfer of knowledge and to innovation and change within the network. Using mixed methods of 1) analysis of (strategic) documents about the regional governance used and how the Brainport Eindhoven mission evolved through time; 2) semi-structured interviews with current and former Brainport Foundation board members and former Brainport Development managers; and 3) network participant observations; we reveal rich experiences from 25 years of Brainport Eindhoven. This research shows the historical overview of Brainport Eindhoven and how the triple helix parties together managed several regional or worldwide crises. This togetherness was crucial in the development of a successful regional ecosystem. Our findings illustrate the fragile balance between stability and flexibility within the ecosystem and its governance based on processes of common sensemaking by all stakeholders. Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the development and governance of triple helix entrepreneurial ecosystems. Finally, this paper makes suggestions for future research by discussing the ambition to transform the ecosystem into a Quadruple Helix (adding the ‘community’ as a fourth pillar) organized ecosystem.

Gender equality is one of the elements of a democratic society, in the political sphere gender balance contributes to the effective realization of the rights of men and women. The purpose of the article is to study the institutional mechanisms for ensuring gender equality and their role among other methods. The relevance of the work is determined by the importance of institutional mechanisms in the context of achieving gender parity. Institutional mechanisms for ensuring gender equality include governmental, parliamentary, and other power structures, including the institution of ombudsman. Institutional mechanisms also include organizations of various forms of ownership, independent agencies and civil society institutions. The effectiveness of institutional mechanisms is determined by a number of factors, including the degree of participation of women's organizations in politics, the political orientation of the government, the current economic situation and others. Mechanisms for the protection of women's rights have become a tool for ensuring gender equality in the international arena and have become a guarantee of national gender transformations. In European countries, the functions of ensuring equality are performed by special bodies and ministries of the relevant profile. There are special bodies in each EU country, which are responsible for ensuring gender equality in all spheres of life. Most often, the role of a special body is performed by the ombudsman institution, or the Center for Equal Treatment, the National Anti-Discrimination Council, the Equality Commission, and so on. At the parliamentary level, the activities of institutional mechanisms are implemented in the form of parliamentary committees on gender equality or inter-party women's factions. The activities of national mechanisms for gender equality are aimed at protecting women's rights, which can be explained by the traditionally less active participation of women in socio-political life. National mechanisms are aimed at ensuring equality in all spheres, as equal rights and opportunities in the labor or social sphere indirectly affect the possibility of exercising rights in socio-political life.

Syrian civil war that started in 2011 is characterized by an extremely high degree of internationalization. The country has become the focus for the different actors in the world and regional politics, as separate states and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. In this sense neighboring (regional) countries, whose own security and stability directly depends on the situation in Syria, show the greatest interest and activity. The Syria’s civil war is seen as an internationalized intrastate conflict – an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict. This article focuses on the interventions of regional actors in the conflict, especially the most powerful regional states (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia). The intervention of regional powers in the Syria’s civil war can be explained by the combination of realist and constructivist approaches. In such an insecure region, all major states seek to maximize their power, famously creating a security dilemma, in which all end up less secure. Against this insecurity, all states “power balance”, in particular by forming alliances against shared threats. The inter-state rivalry for leadership of supra-state communities is endemic, expressed in recurring “cold wars”, in which stronger states deploy ideology and identity discourses to gain allies and subvert rival governments in the search for regional hegemony. Syria became a battleground in «proxy war», in which the warring parties actually serve the interests of their external patrons, who are fighting for regional leadership. Largely as a result of the internationalization of the conflict, Syria became a typical «fragile state» that will produce problems for a long time to come, even when the fighting finally stops: regional instability, refugees problem, criminal activities and extremism. Notwithstanding the Assad regime’s survival and clear victory in the civil war, the main regional interveners’ (Iran and Turkey) interference in Syria will continue, because threats to its national security and regional influence have not been completely eliminated.

The 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis originated from a poor incentive structure in the asset market derived from subprime mortgages. The ultimate bursting and unwinding of an asset bubble (here highly overvalued real estate prices woven into a complex multilayer network of securitization, so called collateralized debt obligations or CDOs) put enormous stress on the financial system, spreading through the global network economy and ultimately resulting in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Economists today agree that the severe economic fallout can be largely attributed to the poor systemic performance of international financial markets. Global macroeconomic imbalances, as well as market failures such as excessive risk taking, misaligned incentives of rating agencies, inefficient liquidity provisions within banks and systemic risk or contagion, i.e., the international and inter-sectoral public goods nature of financial stability, were not sufficiently accounted for by regulation and international macroeconomic policy. This combined financial and economic crisis environment not only put the intrinsic connection between the financial and the real economy back into the spotlight, but also opened up a policy debate about how to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability without jeopardizing microeconomic foundations of the real economy such as competition. In sum, the resulting policy challenge is twofold: First, a new and sustainable balance between free markets, macro industrial policies, and governmental regulation needs to be found in the financial sector, and second, strategic interactions between macro and microeconomic policy goals need to be identified, understood, and balanced. This article will focus on the interaction between macroeconomic crisis management and prudential regulatory responses on the one hand, and competition policy and market structure on the other. We provide a simple economic framework for thinking about the relationship between macro and micro policies as a function of the immediate policy environment, i.e., “extraordinary” financial instability and imminent economic crisis versus “ordinary,” stable economic circumstances. Specifically, we claim that— during severe financial crises—the overall success of policy responses depends on the coordination of three related decisional vectors. First, policy makers must coordinate the responses of multiple regulatory and political actors. Second, they need to follow a systematic, rather than ad hoc, approach that diminishes moral hazard and leaves open a reasonable exit strategy. Finally, policy makers need to consider time consistency. In other words, they need to avoid the temptation to excessively discount post-crisis effects. Overall, this work shall add structure to the ongoing policy debate and provide conceptual guidance for lawyers and economists trying to address the challenges of micro and macro policy integration. In Part I, we provide an overview of the relationship between the financial and real economic sectors and between systemic financial stability and micro-competitive effects. In Part II, we advance our core theoretical proposition—the strategic complementarity of macro and micro policy levers during financial crises. In particular, we demonstrate that policy responses that fail to consider and balance the three key dimensions—coordination among decision-makers, a systematic approach, and time consistency—run the risk of harming both macro and micro-economic well-being in the long run. Finally, in Part III, we illustrate the quite different responses to the financial crisis of the European Union and the United States along the three key dimensions. Our goal is not to provide a comparative assessment of the two systems’ responses or a trans-Atlantic scorecard, but rather to illustrate the possibilities and challenges of coordinating macro and micro responses along the three key dimensions.

Introduction. On August 29, 2013, director of the Department of State National Policy in the Sphere of Inter-Ethnic Relations of the Ministry of Regional Development A. Zhuravskiy answered to the question “Are Cossacks a People?” in the interview with the Cossack Information Centre the following: “The issue of Cossack identity is associated with the success of the state policy of the Russian Federation in relation to the Russian Cossacks. Only specific and effective work on implementing existing conceptual and strategic documents can help overcome the crisis of Cossack identity.” In the conditions of revival of the Russian Cossacks in the 1990s – 2000s, the issue of its identity becomes relevant. The fact is that identity continues to be the basis in solving many problems of arranging the Cossacks as its consolidating component. Methods and materials. The article is based on the principle of historicism, balance in reflecting the characteristics of the Russian Cossacks, chronological sequence of presentation, objectivism. The main source base, first of all, are the regulatory legal acts of the 1990s and the subsequent time. The author was directly involved in developing many of these legal acts at the governmental level. Analysis. Obviously, in the 1990s – 2000s, the problem of identity in modern conditions acquired a global character. The author not coincidentally adresses to the international practice as applied to other peoples. In this connection, the author pays attention to the interpretation of the issue according to the “power and the Cossacks” vector, which is confirmed by the specific material set forth, especially on the participation of Cossacks in modern life in Russia. Despite the fact that much has already been set forth in terms of social, cultural identity as its most accessible types, nevertheless, there is a particular need to study such types of identity as national and territorial ones, which in the modern framework determine the position of the Cossacks in society, its relation to peoples who lived for centuries or jointly. Studying territorial identity will be valuable as well due to the fact that the land for a Cossack’s household remained a priority problem in terms of household management and his military service. Results. Probably, these three dimensions: success of the economic sector, conceptuality in presentation, consideration of the strategy verified by life experience, all sorts of practices will form a solid basis for further studying the problem of the Cossack identity. This will determine the study of other existing types of identity in relation to the Russian Cossacks. At all times, the Cossacks remained adherents of the religion of identity, patriotism, military service, etc. Knowledge of the problem of identity in relation to the Russian Cossacks expands the range of knowledge of society on the history of the Cossacks, both in the past and in the conditions of modernity.

Successful collaboration between the indigenous peoples and the sovereign states of Arctic North America has helped to stabilise the Arctic region, fostering meaningful indigenous participation in the governance of their homeland, the introduction of new institutions of self-governance at the municipal, tribal and territorial levels, and successful diplomatic collaborations at the international level through the Arctic Council. This stability and the reciprocal and increasingly balanced relationship between sovereign states and indigenous stakeholders has yielded a widely recognised spirit of international collaboration often referred to as Arctic exceptionalism. With competition in the Arctic between states on the rise, the multitude of co-management systems and the multi-level, inter-governmental and inter-organisational relationships they have nurtured across the region will help to neutralise new threats to ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ posed by intensifying inter-state tensions.

Evidence from six Mexican states is analyzed about changes in government organisation and performance arising from decentralisation and the recasting of federalism structures. Spurred by rising pluralism, greater electoral transparency, alternancia, and willingness of the Centre to ‘let go’, a more genuine structure of shared powers is emerging between the executive (governors), the legislature and the judiciary. The government bureaucracy is undergoing modernisation, and governors are seeking to share power with legislatures as a means of sharing the responsibilities of statecraft. Local congresses are exercising greater ‘checks’ and ‘balances’ vis-à-vis the executive branch. Finally, the judiciary is beginning to be reorganised, particularly at the national (Supreme Court) level, where it is starting to develop jurisprudence relating to inter- and intra-governmental relations.

This study delves into the challenges and issues arising from asymmetrical democracy in Indonesia, focusing on local political dynamics in regions such as Aceh, Papua, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta (DIY). Through qualitative analysis, researchers assessed how political autonomy and hierarchical administrative structures influence checks and balances within local institutions. In Aceh and Papua, significant issues were identified concerning the perception of political autonomy by regents and mayors, which contrasts with special laws designating the governor as the primary authority. Both regions highlight how historical conflicts and separatist aspirations shape governance structures and local democratic management. Jakarta, with its unique model, demonstrates how the governor's exclusive power at the provincial level can impact inter-governmental interactions and local interests. Meanwhile, in Yogyakarta, the sultan's dominance as governor raises questions about the quality of local democracy and the potential safeguarding of the sultan's interests. These findings underscore the urgent need for stringent checks and balances and clear delineation of authority to ensure effective local governance amidst the challenges of asymmetrical democracy in Indonesia.

ABSTRACTSince Nigeria's transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, the country's Supreme Court has risen from a position of relative political obscurity and institutional vulnerability into a prominent and independent adjudicator of inter-governmental disputes in this chronically conflicted federation. Examined here is the Court's arbitration, during President Olusegun Obasanjo's two civilian constitutional terms (1999–2007), of fifteen different federal-state litigations over offshore oil resources, revenue allocation, local governance and public order. The Court's federalism decisions were remarkably independent and reasonably balanced, upholding the constitutional supremacy of the Federal Government in several findings, tilting towards the states in some declarations, and simultaneously underwriting federal authority and state autonomy in other rulings. Despite the Court's important and independent role, however, the Nigerian federation was vexed by violent conflicts, underscoring the structural, political and constitutional constraints on judicial federalism in this notoriously complex and divided country.

Abstract Successful collaboration between the Indigenous peoples and the sovereign states of Arctic North America has helped to stabilize the Arctic region, fostering meaningful Indigenous participation in the governance of their homeland through the introduction of new institutions of self-governance at the municipal, tribal and territorial levels, and successful diplomatic collaborations at the international level through the Arctic Council. Undergirding each of these pillars of Indigenous participation in Arctic governance is a mutuality of commitment to the principle of co-management of the Arctic that has united Indigenous peoples and the state across Arctic North America. Co-management has become so widely and reciprocally embraced by tribal peoples and states alike that it now provides a stable foundation bridging the Indigenous, transnational world with the Westphalian world of states and statecraft. This stability and the reciprocal and over time increasingly balanced relationship between sovereign states and Indigenous stakeholders has yielded a widely recognized spirit of international collaboration often referred to as Arctic exceptionalism. Along the way, co-management has transformed into both a mechanism of, and powerful paradigm for, trans-Arctic diplomacy that fosters not only greater domestic unity between tribe and state, but between states as well, catapulting mechanisms designed for domestic resource management to the international stage. Arctic exceptionalism has come under recent strain from the renewal of great power competition in the Arctic. As Arctic competition between states rises, the multitude of co-management systems and the multi-level, inter-governmental and inter-organizational relationships they have nurtured across the region can help to neutralize new threats from intensifying inter-state tensions.

The main objective of the public sector as part of the macro-economy is the provision of necessary government services to the public in order to achieve macro-economic stabilisation. Fiscal discipline is the application of fiscal rules to achieve deficit reduction and long-term fiscal consolidation. The aim of the study was to examine the impact of fiscal discipline on Plateau state government expenditure and to determine, given the existence of fiscal discipline, if a significant relationship exists between state government expenditure and the following demographic and economic variables: disposable income, population density, inter-governmental revenue, retirement benefit expenditure, and capital expenditure. State government expenditure, if properly deployed, should lead to expansion of public goods and services and the attainment of economic growth and development. The study made use of secondary data which were collected from Plateau State Ministry of Finance and the National Population Commission Jos. The data were analysed using the linear ordinary least square regression analysis. The result shows that state government expenditure has a significant positive relationship with disposable income, intergovernmental revenue and retirement benefit expenditure, a significant negative relationship with population density and capital expenditure. It was concluded that (i) state government expenditure is not geared towards the expansion of public goods and services that will enhance growth and development (ii) economies of scale in the production and provision of government services is yet to be attained and (iii) state government expenditure is incurred in order to implement possible fiscal discipline mechanisms of balanced-budget or deficit reduction. The study recommends that fiscal discipline mechanisms should be implemented only to the extent that the decision does not constrain expenditure on public goods and services that may result in growth and development

Purpose Border environments differ as foci for conflict discourse. While classic realist theories are used to account for mechanisms of securitized borders, socially oriented theories are often invoked to characterize relaxed borders. This distinguishing pattern regarding securitization reflects a deeply rooted focus on idealized borders, based on implicit expectations that relaxed borders are a viable option and goal for all. This orientation is prone to mistaken assumptions regarding local, national and regional interests and ultimately threatens delicately balanced states of stability. This paper aims to question this somewhat simplified categorization and posit that securitized borders are longstanding realities which warrant more complex theoretical conceptualization. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on documentary study and qualitative field research, mapping and evaluating Israel–Jordan cross-border interactions conducted during 2006-2014. Local civilian interactions were studied using three tools: interviews, non-participant observations and a sector-based analysis of original and secondary sources. In the course of research, many tours and observations of the border region were conducted, and key actors in Israel and Jordan were interviewed: entrepreneurs, local residents, local and national government officials, security personnel and representatives of non-governmental organizations involved in the administration and funding of normalization-promoting initiatives. Findings In light of internal and external security threats which challenge states and border regions in conflict environments and in normalized settings, there is increasing value in recognizing multi-level power relations (“bringing the state back in”) that design, inhibit and ultimately control the inevitability, circumstance and social–political effectivity of any cross-border interaction. Cross-border cooperation (CBC), which evolves gradually, monitored by the border regime and reflecting actual levels of inter-state political dialogue, is a slower yet safer option and a more realistic expectation for CBC, especially in regions of minimal communication between cross-border neighbors. In the backdrop of the Middle East turmoil, Israel and Jordan mark 20 years of peaceful relations, enjoying stability based on shared political and security interests, yet displaying no apparent tendency toward increased cross-border interaction. Given the stark differences in regimes and ongoing regional unrest, this securitized border fulfills local and regional needs and is far from a temporary “second-best” reality. Originality/value The analysis is based on original fieldwork and documentary study, mapping and evaluating Israel–Jordan cross-border interactions conducted during 2006-2014.

PurposeThe corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an essential topic of both life and sociocybernetics. It requires businesspersons and other decision makers to be broad and hence to apply inter‐disciplinarity incorporating many, mutually partly different and therefore interdependent, viewpoints for requisite holism. To do so, they should use systems thinking. But the modern diversity of systems theories, including cybernetics, opens the issue: which systems theory and/or cybernetic should one use? Aims to discuss the dialectical systems theory (DST), its definition of holism and its definition of the seven principal groups of notions making systems thinking possible, when applied in a synergy. This may lead to a requisite holism, and hence to efficiency and effectiveness of the work on and of the CSR; it has often been done so in the 30 years of DST.Design/methodology/approachDesk research and indirect field research were used. The concept of CSR is a rather soft topic. It demands a holistic treatment and hence a plural theoretical foundation following recent trends in economics (business and environmental), management as well as systems thinking. The problem was investigated empirically from the systems‐oriented perspective supported by DST, because it tackles human personality and impacts over it and by it, rather than offers tools for people to use for whatever purposes.FindingsThe CSR concept belongs in sociocyberbetics linking cybernetics, systems theory and social aspects of the reality. The definition of CSR requires humans to think, decide, and act on a very broad basis rather than to reduce their horizons to the narrow habit of businesses to find profit only essential. CSR links the hard‐systemic and soft‐systemic versions of modern systems theories. It could be seen as an attribute of human personality and as a process between humans and organisations.Research limitations/implicationsAs CSR has many dimensions (economic, environmental and social ones, at least), the research focused on the requisitely holistic performance of an organisation being aware of diversified needs of multi‐stakeholders (including its own employees, as well).Practical implicationsThe research findings and conclusions can support endeavors to implement the CSR concept in practice: in organisations, among different stakeholders and broader public audience (including governmental institutions and communities).Originality/valueThe paper provides the theoretical foundation to raise and improve socially responsible activities by supporting a maturing management philosophy approaching the viable, balanced organisation.

Purpose Short-sea shipping (SSS) plays an important role in regional transportation networks by supporting regional trade and improving inter-modality. In particular, countries in north-east Asia, such as China, South Korea and Japan have been served well by local SSS services. While SSS markets in Northeast Asia (NEA) have been developed by bilateral routes with sub-markets, the market structure of each sub-markets varies depending on concentration and competition levels as well as government intervention. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the market structure of SSS markets in the Northeast Asia. Design/methodology/approach Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and concentration ratio are adopted to measure the market concentration from 2013 to 2017 for SSS markets in NEA. Additionally, the balance between supply and demand is investigated by measuring the capacity utilisation factor (CUF) based on slot capacity. Findings The market structure in the NEA SSS markets is influenced by firms’ behaviour under different levels of governmental intervention. Shipping firms in a market with more governmental intervention in market entry tend to focus on balancing supply and demand rather than increasing market share, whereas firms in a market with less intervention (and more competition) tend to increase their market share by pursuing efficient capacity management. Research limitations/implications The period of data set is limited to 2013–2017. Furthermore, prices or revenue for specific routes are not available. Originality/value This paper sheds light on the market structure and behaviour of players in SSS market. In addition, the work has value to measure capacity utilisation based on slot capacity.

The article is devoted to issues of financial decentralization and financial instruments for supporting the development of territorial communities. It is mentioned that the decentralization reform, which includes financial decentralization, is one of the most successful government reforms. It is indicated that the balance of budget revenues and expenditures refers to the achievement of tactical goals, and the harmonization of budget policy to external and internal conditions - to strategic goals. It is noted that local budgets, as an element of the budget system, are an important tool of macroeconomic regulation, and the formation and implementation of local budgets determines the degree of effectiveness of local self-government in the implementation of the functions and powers assigned to them. It was revealed that the reform of inter-governmental relations has shown its effectiveness, as territorial communities have the opportunity to use various tools to support local development to solve their urgent problems. Such instruments include funds from the State Fund for Regional Development, subventions for the implementation of measures for the socio-economic development of territories, funds from the state budget to local budgets for the implementation of infrastructure projects and the development of objects in the social and cultural sphere, funds from programs (projects) of international technical assistance and other programs in case of submission of projects in accordance with the procedure established by law etc. It was investigated that the main achievement of implementing the reforms was the expansion of the revenue potential of local budgets due to the change in the proportion of the inclusion of national and local taxes and fees in the budgets of territorial communities. This ensured effective and balanced development of the respective territories and created opportunities for independent search for sources of strengthening the financial base. So, the consequence of the budget reform and financial decentralization was the changes in the structure of the budget system and the introduction of innovative financial instruments for local development to fulfill the tasks stipulated by the financial and budget policy of the state at the regional and local levels.

The starting point of this study concerns the origins of the polycentric nature of contemporary cities in the western area of the Netherlands, commonly known as ‘the Randstad’. Within the disciplines of planning and urban design the Randstad is considered a textbook example of a polycentric urban hierarchy. Yet, although quite a popular topic, very little is actually known about the driving forces that have given shape to existing urban hierarchies throughout the world. Moreover, the Randstad has also been dubbed ‘Holland’s paradox’ because of its assumed reversed evolution from a primate city hierarchy focused on Amsterdam in early modern times, to a polycentric hierarchy in the 19th century. Why do urban hierarchies change over time and which factors were decisive for the rise of the polycentric Randstad? This study consists of two parts and six chapters. Part I explores the determining factors of change within urban hierarchies. The first chapter gives an assessment of the usefulness of existing theory and ends in confusion: firstly, historiography turns out to be a medley of explanations that are heterogeneous and sometimes even contradictive. Secondly, comparisons of the long-term development of multiple towns are lacking, which makes it difficult to come up with a theoretical approach. In order to make such comparisons and ascertain the impact of certain factors on urban hierarchies over time, it’s necessary to look at the development of a group of towns over a long time-span. Therefore, in the second chapter, simple statistics are compared with existing theory and literature. To do so, demographic data for the nine towns of Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leiden, Delft, The Hague, Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Gouda and Utrecht were compared from their first appearance in the 13th century until the end of the 20th century by projecting their demographic hierarchy in a graph and on a map. In this manner explanations were measured on their applicability for the case of the Randstad. This explorative exercise results in both a description of long-term change in hierarchy in the Randstad and a theoretical approach. Long-term change in the urban hierarchy of the Randstad roughly proceeded in three phases. In the Middle Ages there was a polycentric hierarchy wherein the oldest cities, Utrecht and Dordrecht, were dominant. Although all towns in Holland grew rapidly in the 14th century, by the 1560s one of the youngest and smallest towns, Amsterdam, suddenly took the lead. In the second phase, between 1560 and 1795, a monocentric hierarchy developed with Amsterdam as a primate city. In this dynamic period, where many towns changed ranks, severe growth followed by shrinkage occurred simultaneously with sharpening inequality between towns. In the third phase, between 1795 and 2000, the hierarchy became polycentric once more, with a group of large towns taking the lead. This was mostly due to the extraordinary growth of Rotterdam and The Hague. In contrast with the second phase, the parallel appearance of sharp growth and inequality did not coincide with change in ranks. As a conclusion of part I, in chapter 3 the three determining factors for change in urban hierarchies over time are identified. Urban hierarchy is interpreted as a functional division of tasks between multiple centres, which is the result of differences in the towns’ competitive positions over time. The potency of a town’s competitive position is primarily determined by the interaction of (1) its properties on the one hand and (2) the conditions on the international market on the other. Additionally this interaction is structurally influenced by (3) contribution of a sovereign government. Governments can stimulate or disadvantage towns, but have done so in different ways. Part II further concretizes this approach by further investigation of the third factor. Here, governmental contribution to long-term change in urban hierarchies is given priority over the other two determining factors. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus successively on the constitutional periods of the Middle Ages (1200-1560), the Early Modern Age (1560-1795) and the Modern Age (1795-2000). These periods correspond to the three phases in long-term change in the demographic hierarchy from chapter 2. The aim of part II is twofold. Firstly, to identify and compare the manner in which sovereign government has been able to influence the towns’ competitive positions from the 13th until the end of the 20th century. Which trends are discernable in the toolbox of competitive advantages and their distribution by the sovereign government? How can governmental influence on change in urban hierarchies best be characterized? Secondly, if possible, to point out which governmental measures presumably contributed to change in urban hierarchy in general and, specifically, to the rise of the polycentric Randstad. Which measures show the most plausible correlation with change within the urban hierarchy? In order to identify competitive advantages for each constitutional period, a further look at the functional division of tasks, the economic context, and the governmental organization is taken in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Subsequently an impression of the distribution of so-called competitive advantages over the nine Randstad towns is sketched. At the end of each chapter the competitive advantages of a period are summed up, and their distribution is compared to the demographic hierarchy of chapter 2, to assess their impact. My research has resulted in the following conclusions to the aforementioned questions. During the Middle Ages a town’s competitive position could be stimulated with (1) international trade policy (safe conducts, trade agreements), (2) national economic policy (protectionist measures, staple- and minting policy), (3) exceptions of generally applied restrictions (town charters, toll exceptions), (4) distribution of governmental institutions, (5) donations of land property and kingly privileges, (6) granting of infrastructural concessions and awarding (7) urban autonomy. Heavy taxing and prolonged warfare were competitive disadvantages. In the early modern era (1) international trade policy, (2) distribution of governmental institutions and (3) infrastructural concessions were part of the toolkit. Heavy taxing was once more a disadvantage. During the modern era simulative measures were (1) funding of infrastructure, (2) industrial policy, (3) distribution of governmental institutions, (4) national spatial planning and (5) popular housing policy. Building restrictions were a negative for a town’s competitive position. The toolbox of sovereign government in general consists of three basic types of competitive advantages. Firstly, instruments that were aimed at the competitive position of one town exclusively, like staple rights, town charters, toll exemptions, donations of property and rights, urban autonomy and the distribution of governmental institutions. Secondly, instruments that were aimed at the region as a whole, like national and international economic policy. Third are side effects or collateral damage of other governmental policies, like prolonged warfare, heavy taxing and building restrictions stemming from spatial planning policy. The last category often turns out to be disadvantageous for towns’ competitive positions. Sovereign government didn’t apply the same variety of measures at every period. The overall package moved from a rather versatile toolbox in the 13th and 14th centuries to an increasingly limited one in the early modern period. In the 15th and 16th centuries, a discernable trend towards diminishing the variation in competitive advantages sets in, resulting in a rather limited toolbox in the 17th and 18th centuries. After a short expansion of instruments in the first half of the 19th century and a subsequent phase in the second half of the same century, where the number of instruments again strongly declined, the 20th century once again showed a governmental toolbox of various nature. On the long term, infrastructure and the distribution of governmental institutions were permanently part of the competitive advantages-toolbox; although before the 19th century sovereign government virtually never initiated the construction of infrastructure. Throughout most of the investigated period international economic policy and taxing played a role. Local exceptions like town charters and urban autonomy were exclusively medieval phenomena while spatial planning and popular housing policy are only found in the modern period. During the Middle Ages exclusive competitive advantages and common measures were both applied. Almost all nine towns seem to profit from this, although Dordrecht was generally more privileged than others. From the 15th century on exclusive privileges gradually disappear and more collective measures are taken, from which Amsterdam seems to profit. In the early modern era, the overall majority of measures taken were collective ones aimed at the common interest of towns or the region. Nonetheless, somehow Amsterdam seems to have profited above average without exception. In the modern era so many ‘collective’ stimulating measures were taken that this resulted in rather different competitive positions spatially. The distribution can best be characterized as a continuous strive for balance. Looking at the distribution of competitive advantages, governmental activity was variable throughout the entire period. Lots of competitive advantages were distributed in the 13th, 14th, early 17th and early 19th centuries. Subsequently governmental involvement gradually increased and in the 20th century government had its hands full continuously. In sharp contrast, distribution in the 16th and in particularly the second half of the 17th and 18th centuries was rather sparse. Strikingly, other measures than instruments that were explicitly aimed at the towns’ interests show the biggest correlation with change in the demographic hierarchy as shown in chapter 2. In the Middle Ages structural warfare coincided with the marked rise of Amsterdam and recession in the others; tax pressure in early modern times correlated with the decline of towns with industrial profiles; and 20th century demographic decline related to building restrictions in modern times. In general, the governmental role to change in urban hierarchy can best be understood as a facilitative one. The abovementioned centers of gravity in the distribution of competitive advantages coincided with periods of economic expansion and demographic growth in towns. This was the case in periods of urban expansion in the 13th-14th centuries and the 17th century. Only in the 19th century did governmental action precede urban growth. Although side effects in general seem to have been decisive, there’s one marked exception to the rule. The head start of the three biggest towns, and the catching up of Rotterdam and The Hague, does correlate with the construction of (inter)national infrastructure and the distribution of governmental institutions between the 1850s en 1950s. This means that the rise of the polycentric Randstad, exceptionally, was created by conscious use of aimed governmental instruments! This study concludes with a striking hypothesis. Via the description of the governmental organization in each period, by accident attention is drawn to the fact that by bargaining over tax funds, towns themselves gathered political influence in the 15th and even power in the 17th-18th centuries. The rise of urban power coincides with stagnation in the distribution of competitive advantages and the disappearance of exclusive instruments out of the governmental toolkit. This, firstly, gave rise to the suspicion that, once in power, urban representatives preferably avoid the stimulation of opponents’ competitive positions. When combined with the fact that, after disabling towns financially and politically, sovereign government in the second half of the 19th century pursued a policy wherein they kept aloof of dominant Amsterdam and stimulated other large towns, a second hypothesis can be formulated. Could it be that the rise of the polycentric Randstad wasn’t coincidence, and that Holland’s paradox was the result of a deliberate reckoning with an old political elite?

The starting point of this study concerns the origins of the polycentric nature of contemporary cities in the western area of the Netherlands, commonly known as ‘the Randstad’. Within the disciplines of planning and urban design the Randstad is considered a textbook example of a polycentric urban hierarchy. Yet, although quite a popular topic, very little is actually known about the driving forces that have given shape to existing urban hierarchies throughout the world. Moreover, the Randstad has also been dubbed ‘Holland’s paradox’ because of its assumed reversed evolution from a primate city hierarchy focused on Amsterdam in early modern times, to a polycentric hierarchy in the 19th century. Why do urban hierarchies change over time and which factors were decisive for the rise of the polycentric Randstad? This study consists of two parts and six chapters. Part I explores the determining factors of change within urban hierarchies. The first chapter gives an assessment of the usefulness of existing theory and ends in confusion: firstly, historiography turns out to be a medley of explanations that are heterogeneous and sometimes even contradictive. Secondly, comparisons of the long-term development of multiple towns are lacking, which makes it difficult to come up with a theoretical approach. In order to make such comparisons and ascertain the impact of certain factors on urban hierarchies over time, it’s necessary to look at the development of a group of towns over a long time-span. Therefore, in the second chapter, simple statistics are compared with existing theory and literature. To do so, demographic data for the nine towns of Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leiden, Delft, The Hague, Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Gouda and Utrecht were compared from their first appearance in the 13th century until the end of the 20th century by projecting their demographic hierarchy in a graph and on a map. In this manner explanations were measured on their applicability for the case of the Randstad. This explorative exercise results in both a description of long-term change in hierarchy in the Randstad and a theoretical approach. Long-term change in the urban hierarchy of the Randstad roughly proceeded in three phases. In the Middle Ages there was a polycentric hierarchy wherein the oldest cities, Utrecht and Dordrecht, were dominant. Although all towns in Holland grew rapidly in the 14th century, by the 1560s one of the youngest and smallest towns, Amsterdam, suddenly took the lead. In the second phase, between 1560 and 1795, a monocentric hierarchy developed with Amsterdam as a primate city. In this dynamic period, where many towns changed ranks, severe growth followed by shrinkage occurred simultaneously with sharpening inequality between towns. In the third phase, between 1795 and 2000, the hierarchy became polycentric once more, with a group of large towns taking the lead. This was mostly due to the extraordinary growth of Rotterdam and The Hague. In contrast with the second phase, the parallel appearance of sharp growth and inequality did not coincide with change in ranks. As a conclusion of part I, in chapter 3 the three determining factors for change in urban hierarchies over time are identified. Urban hierarchy is interpreted as a functional division of tasks between multiple centres, which is the result of differences in the towns’ competitive positions over time. The potency of a town’s competitive position is primarily determined by the interaction of (1) its properties on the one hand and (2) the conditions on the international market on the other. Additionally this interaction is structurally influenced by (3) contribution of a sovereign government. Governments can stimulate or disadvantage towns, but have done so in different ways. Part II further concretizes this approach by further investigation of the third factor. Here, governmental contribution to long-term change in urban hierarchies is given priority over the other two determining factors. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus successively on the constitutional periods of the Middle Ages (1200-1560), the Early Modern Age (1560-1795) and the Modern Age (1795-2000). These periods correspond to the three phases in long-term change in the demographic hierarchy from chapter 2. The aim of part II is twofold. Firstly, to identify and compare the manner in which sovereign government has been able to influence the towns’ competitive positions from the 13th until the end of the 20th century. Which trends are discernable in the toolbox of competitive advantages and their distribution by the sovereign government? How can governmental influence on change in urban hierarchies best be characterized? Secondly, if possible, to point out which governmental measures presumably contributed to change in urban hierarchy in general and, specifically, to the rise of the polycentric Randstad. Which measures show the most plausible correlation with change within the urban hierarchy? In order to identify competitive advantages for each constitutional period, a further look at the functional division of tasks, the economic context, and the governmental organization is taken in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Subsequently an impression of the distribution of so-called competitive advantages over the nine Randstad towns is sketched. At the end of each chapter the competitive advantages of a period are summed up, and their distribution is compared to the demographic hierarchy of chapter 2, to assess their impact. My research has resulted in the following conclusions to the aforementioned questions. During the Middle Ages a town’s competitive position could be stimulated with (1) international trade policy (safe conducts, trade agreements), (2) national economic policy (protectionist measures, staple- and minting policy), (3) exceptions of generally applied restrictions (town charters, toll exceptions), (4) distribution of governmental institutions, (5) donations of land property and kingly privileges, (6) granting of infrastructural concessions and awarding (7) urban autonomy. Heavy taxing and prolonged warfare were competitive disadvantages. In the early modern era (1) international trade policy, (2) distribution of governmental institutions and (3) infrastructural concessions were part of the toolkit. Heavy taxing was once more a disadvantage. During the modern era simulative measures were (1) funding of infrastructure, (2) industrial policy, (3) distribution of governmental institutions, (4) national spatial planning and (5) popular housing policy. Building restrictions were a negative for a town’s competitive position. The toolbox of sovereign government in general consists of three basic types of competitive advantages. Firstly, instruments that were aimed at the competitive position of one town exclusively, like staple rights, town charters, toll exemptions, donations of property and rights, urban autonomy and the distribution of governmental institutions. Secondly, instruments that were aimed at the region as a whole, like national and international economic policy. Third are side effects or collateral damage of other governmental policies, like prolonged warfare, heavy taxing and building restrictions stemming from spatial planning policy. The last category often turns out to be disadvantageous for towns’ competitive positions. Sovereign government didn’t apply the same variety of measures at every period. The overall package moved from a rather versatile toolbox in the 13th and 14th centuries to an increasingly limited one in the early modern period. In the 15th and 16th centuries, a discernable trend towards diminishing the variation in competitive advantages sets in, resulting in a rather limited toolbox in the 17th and 18th centuries. After a short expansion of instruments in the first half of the 19th century and a subsequent phase in the second half of the same century, where the number of instruments again strongly declined, the 20th century once again showed a governmental toolbox of various nature. On the long term, infrastructure and the distribution of governmental institutions were permanently part of the competitive advantages-toolbox; although before the 19th century sovereign government virtually never initiated the construction of infrastructure. Throughout most of the investigated period international economic policy and taxing played a role. Local exceptions like town charters and urban autonomy were exclusively medieval phenomena while spatial planning and popular housing policy are only found in the modern period. During the Middle Ages exclusive competitive advantages and common measures were both applied. Almost all nine towns seem to profit from this, although Dordrecht was generally more privileged than others. From the 15th century on exclusive privileges gradually disappear and more collective measures are taken, from which Amsterdam seems to profit. In the early modern era, the overall majority of measures taken were collective ones aimed at the common interest of towns or the region. Nonetheless, somehow Amsterdam seems to have profited above average without exception. In the modern era so many ‘collective’ stimulating measures were taken that this resulted in rather different competitive positions spatially. The distribution can best be characterized as a continuous strive for balance. Looking at the distribution of competitive advantages, governmental activity was variable throughout the entire period. Lots of competitive advantages were distributed in the 13th, 14th, early 17th and early 19th centuries. Subsequently governmental involvement gradually increased and in the 20th century government had its hands full continuously. In sharp contrast, distribution in the 16th and in particularly the second half of the 17th and 18th centuries was rather sparse. Strikingly, other measures than instruments that were explicitly aimed at the towns’ interests show the biggest correlation with change in the demographic hierarchy as shown in chapter 2. In the Middle Ages structural warfare coincided with the marked rise of Amsterdam and recession in the others; tax pressure in early modern times correlated with the decline of towns with industrial profiles; and 20th century demographic decline related to building restrictions in modern times. In general, the governmental role to change in urban hierarchy can best be understood as a facilitative one. The abovementioned centers of gravity in the distribution of competitive advantages coincided with periods of economic expansion and demographic growth in towns. This was the case in periods of urban expansion in the 13th-14th centuries and the 17th century. Only in the 19th century did governmental action precede urban growth. Although side effects in general seem to have been decisive, there’s one marked exception to the rule. The head start of the three biggest towns, and the catching up of Rotterdam and The Hague, does correlate with the construction of (inter)national infrastructure and the distribution of governmental institutions between the 1850s en 1950s. This means that the rise of the polycentric Randstad, exceptionally, was created by conscious use of aimed governmental instruments! This study concludes with a striking hypothesis. Via the description of the governmental organization in each period, by accident attention is drawn to the fact that by bargaining over tax funds, towns themselves gathered political influence in the 15th and even power in the 17th-18th centuries. The rise of urban power coincides with stagnation in the distribution of competitive advantages and the disappearance of exclusive instruments out of the governmental toolkit. This, firstly, gave rise to the suspicion that, once in power, urban representatives preferably avoid the stimulation of opponents’ competitive positions. When combined with the fact that, after disabling towns financially and politically, sovereign government in the second half of the 19th century pursued a policy wherein they kept aloof of dominant Amsterdam and stimulated other large towns, a second hypothesis can be formulated. Could it be that the rise of the polycentric Randstad wasn’t coincidence, and that Holland’s paradox was the result of a deliberate reckoning with an old political elite?

The starting point of this study concerns the origins of the polycentric nature of contemporary cities in the western area of the Netherlands, commonly known as ‘the Randstad’. Within the disciplines of planning and urban design the Randstad is considered a textbook example of a polycentric urban hierarchy. Yet, although quite a popular topic, very little is actually known about the driving forces that have given shape to existing urban hierarchies throughout the world. Moreover, the Randstad has also been dubbed ‘Holland’s paradox’ because of its assumed reversed evolution from a primate city hierarchy focused on Amsterdam in early modern times, to a polycentric hierarchy in the 19th century. Why do urban hierarchies change over time and which factors were decisive for the rise of the polycentric Randstad? This study consists of two parts and six chapters. Part I explores the determining factors of change within urban hierarchies. The first chapter gives an assessment of the usefulness of existing theory and ends in confusion: firstly, historiography turns out to be a medley of explanations that are heterogeneous and sometimes even contradictive. Secondly, comparisons of the long-term development of multiple towns are lacking, which makes it difficult to come up with a theoretical approach. In order to make such comparisons and ascertain the impact of certain factors on urban hierarchies over time, it’s necessary to look at the development of a group of towns over a long time-span. Therefore, in the second chapter, simple statistics are compared with existing theory and literature. To do so, demographic data for the nine towns of Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leiden, Delft, The Hague, Rotterdam, Dordrecht, Gouda and Utrecht were compared from their first appearance in the 13th century until the end of the 20th century by projecting their demographic hierarchy in a graph and on a map. In this manner explanations were measured on their applicability for the case of the Randstad. This explorative exercise results in both a description of long-term change in hierarchy in the Randstad and a theoretical approach. Long-term change in the urban hierarchy of the Randstad roughly proceeded in three phases. In the Middle Ages there was a polycentric hierarchy wherein the oldest cities, Utrecht and Dordrecht, were dominant. Although all towns in Holland grew rapidly in the 14th century, by the 1560s one of the youngest and smallest towns, Amsterdam, suddenly took the lead. In the second phase, between 1560 and 1795, a monocentric hierarchy developed with Amsterdam as a primate city. In this dynamic period, where many towns changed ranks, severe growth followed by shrinkage occurred simultaneously with sharpening inequality between towns. In the third phase, between 1795 and 2000, the hierarchy became polycentric once more, with a group of large towns taking the lead. This was mostly due to the extraordinary growth of Rotterdam and The Hague. In contrast with the second phase, the parallel appearance of sharp growth and inequality did not coincide with change in ranks. As a conclusion of part I, in chapter 3 the three determining factors for change in urban hierarchies over time are identified. Urban hierarchy is interpreted as a functional division of tasks between multiple centres, which is the result of differences in the towns’ competitive positions over time. The potency of a town’s competitive position is primarily determined by the interaction of (1) its properties on the one hand and (2) the conditions on the international market on the other. Additionally this interaction is structurally influenced by (3) contribution of a sovereign government. Governments can stimulate or disadvantage towns, but have done so in different ways. Part II further concretizes this approach by further investigation of the third factor. Here, governmental contribution to long-term change in urban hierarchies is given priority over the other two determining factors. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus successively on the constitutional periods of the Middle Ages (1200-1560), the Early Modern Age (1560-1795) and the Modern Age (1795-2000). These periods correspond to the three phases in long-term change in the demographic hierarchy from chapter 2. The aim of part II is twofold. Firstly, to identify and compare the manner in which sovereign government has been able to influence the towns’ competitive positions from the 13th until the end of the 20th century. Which trends are discernable in the toolbox of competitive advantages and their distribution by the sovereign government? How can governmental influence on change in urban hierarchies best be characterized? Secondly, if possible, to point out which governmental measures presumably contributed to change in urban hierarchy in general and, specifically, to the rise of the polycentric Randstad. Which measures show the most plausible correlation with change within the urban hierarchy? In order to identify competitive advantages for each constitutional period, a further look at the functional division of tasks, the economic context, and the governmental organization is taken in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Subsequently an impression of the distribution of so-called competitive advantages over the nine Randstad towns is sketched. At the end of each chapter the competitive advantages of a period are summed up, and their distribution is compared to the demographic hierarchy of chapter 2, to assess their impact. My research has resulted in the following conclusions to the aforementioned questions. During the Middle Ages a town’s competitive position could be stimulated with (1) international trade policy (safe conducts, trade agreements), (2) national economic policy (protectionist measures, staple- and minting policy), (3) exceptions of generally applied restrictions (town charters, toll exceptions), (4) distribution of governmental institutions, (5) donations of land property and kingly privileges, (6) granting of infrastructural concessions and awarding (7) urban autonomy. Heavy taxing and prolonged warfare were competitive disadvantages. In the early modern era (1) international trade policy, (2) distribution of governmental institutions and (3) infrastructural concessions were part of the toolkit. Heavy taxing was once more a disadvantage. During the modern era simulative measures were (1) funding of infrastructure, (2) industrial policy, (3) distribution of governmental institutions, (4) national spatial planning and (5) popular housing policy. Building restrictions were a negative for a town’s competitive position. The toolbox of sovereign government in general consists of three basic types of competitive advantages. Firstly, instruments that were aimed at the competitive position of one town exclusively, like staple rights, town charters, toll exemptions, donations of property and rights, urban autonomy and the distribution of governmental institutions. Secondly, instruments that were aimed at the region as a whole, like national and international economic policy. Third are side effects or collateral damage of other governmental policies, like prolonged warfare, heavy taxing and building restrictions stemming from spatial planning policy. The last category often turns out to be disadvantageous for towns’ competitive positions. Sovereign government didn’t apply the same variety of measures at every period. The overall package moved from a rather versatile toolbox in the 13th and 14th centuries to an increasingly limited one in the early modern period. In the 15th and 16th centuries, a discernable trend towards diminishing the variation in competitive advantages sets in, resulting in a rather limited toolbox in the 17th and 18th centuries. After a short expansion of instruments in the first half of the 19th century and a subsequent phase in the second half of the same century, where the number of instruments again strongly declined, the 20th century once again showed a governmental toolbox of various nature. On the long term, infrastructure and the distribution of governmental institutions were permanently part of the competitive advantages-toolbox; although before the 19th century sovereign government virtually never initiated the construction of infrastructure. Throughout most of the investigated period international economic policy and taxing played a role. Local exceptions like town charters and urban autonomy were exclusively medieval phenomena while spatial planning and popular housing policy are only found in the modern period. During the Middle Ages exclusive competitive advantages and common measures were both applied. Almost all nine towns seem to profit from this, although Dordrecht was generally more privileged than others. From the 15th century on exclusive privileges gradually disappear and more collective measures are taken, from which Amsterdam seems to profit. In the early modern era, the overall majority of measures taken were collective ones aimed at the common interest of towns or the region. Nonetheless, somehow Amsterdam seems to have profited above average without exception. In the modern era so many ‘collective’ stimulating measures were taken that this resulted in rather different competitive positions spatially. The distribution can best be characterized as a continuous strive for balance. Looking at the distribution of competitive advantages, governmental activity was variable throughout the entire period. Lots of competitive advantages were distributed in the 13th, 14th, early 17th and early 19th centuries. Subsequently governmental involvement gradually increased and in the 20th century government had its hands full continuously. In sharp contrast, distribution in the 16th and in particularly the second half of the 17th and 18th centuries was rather sparse. Strikingly, other measures than instruments that were explicitly aimed at the towns’ interests show the biggest correlation with change in the demographic hierarchy as shown in chapter 2. In the Middle Ages structural warfare coincided with the marked rise of Amsterdam and recession in the others; tax pressure in early modern times correlated with the decline of towns with industrial profiles; and 20th century demographic decline related to building restrictions in modern times. In general, the governmental role to change in urban hierarchy can best be understood as a facilitative one. The abovementioned centers of gravity in the distribution of competitive advantages coincided with periods of economic expansion and demographic growth in towns. This was the case in periods of urban expansion in the 13th-14th centuries and the 17th century. Only in the 19th century did governmental action precede urban growth. Although side effects in general seem to have been decisive, there’s one marked exception to the rule. The head start of the three biggest towns, and the catching up of Rotterdam and The Hague, does correlate with the construction of (inter)national infrastructure and the distribution of governmental institutions between the 1850s en 1950s. This means that the rise of the polycentric Randstad, exceptionally, was created by conscious use of aimed governmental instruments! This study concludes with a striking hypothesis. Via the description of the governmental organization in each period, by accident attention is drawn to the fact that by bargaining over tax funds, towns themselves gathered political influence in the 15th and even power in the 17th-18th centuries. The rise of urban power coincides with stagnation in the distribution of competitive advantages and the disappearance of exclusive instruments out of the governmental toolkit. This, firstly, gave rise to the suspicion that, once in power, urban representatives preferably avoid the stimulation of opponents’ competitive positions. When combined with the fact that, after disabling towns financially and politically, sovereign government in the second half of the 19th century pursued a policy wherein they kept aloof of dominant Amsterdam and stimulated other large towns, a second hypothesis can be formulated. Could it be that the rise of the polycentric Randstad wasn’t coincidence, and that Holland’s paradox was the result of a deliberate reckoning with an old political elite?

Since the 1997 referendum and the creation of the National Assembly for Wales , there has been an almost continual process of review of the governance of Wales . Within the UK’s asymmetrical constitutional landscape, Wales is arguably the most fluid settlement, modelled by shifts in powers, by modifications to the operation and scope of the Assembly and the Welsh government, and by developments in public support for devolution. The constraints and challenges faced by Wales's elected politicians are being shaped by increasing institutional maturity and by newly acquired powers. This is changing political relationships between Wales and UK and it is not unrealistic to expect more stable, balanced and equal inter governmental and inter parliamentary relations in the very near future.

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological categorization and systematization of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism. The author identified at least two groups of causes and factors, i.e. exogenous and endogenous, that define and categorize semi-presidentialism: the actual content of a constitution, the combination of traditions and circumstances (exogenous causes and factors), the composition of parliamentary majority and the position of a president in relation to parliamentary majority (endogenous causes and factors). It was motivated that, within the same constitutional delineation, a specific semi-presidential country can be classified in practice, first of all in the cut of varying institutional rules and formal/actual powers of presidents, governmental cabinets/ prime ministers and parliaments. The researcher found out that taking into account the place and role of political institutions in inter-party competition and party hierarchy has a significant influence on this process. That is why semi-presidentialism was generalized as a system of government, which is comprehensively updated and taxonomied formally and actually. At the same time, it was recorded that semi-presidentialism uses specific hierarchical and transactional relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”. Their combination affects the formal and actual positioning and taxonomy of different types of heterogeneous semi-presidentialism. It was generalized that semi-presidentialism is definitively and permanently characterized with: a restrained and moderate model of separation of powers and appropriate system of checks and balances; popular election of a president for a fixed term; the collective responsibility of a prime minister and a cabinet to a legislature; the actual “securitization” of a president from interference in his or her activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual (or at least formal), but multi-step and different deconcentration or dualization of the executive between a president (the head of state) and a prime minister (the head of governmental cabinet); double or dual nature of the origin and implementation of the executive, but not a double or dual nature of the responsibility of the executive.

Abstract Protecting marine biodiversity and ensuring sustainable use through a seascape approach is becoming increasingly widespread in response to the ecological, social and institutional challenges of scaling ocean management. A seascape approach means clustering spatial management measures (marine protected areas) based around the principles of ecological connectivity, and developing or enhancing collaborative governance networks of relevant stakeholders (managers, community groups, non-governmental organizations) based around the principles of social connectivity. As with other large-scale approaches to marine management, there is minimal evidence of long-term impact in seascapes. This study uses a theory-based, participatory impact evaluation to assess perceived changes attributed to the Atlántida seascape in Honduras (initiated in 2015), encompassing three well-established marine protected areas and the non-legally managed waters between them. Using an adapted most significant change method, 15 interviews with a representative subset of seascape stakeholders yielded 165 stories of change, the majority (88%) of which were positive. Enhanced social capital, associated with cross-sectoral collaboration, inter-site conflict resolution and shared learning, was the most consistently expressed thematic change (32% of stories). Although most stories were expressed as activity- or output-related changes, a small proportion (18%) were causally linked to broader outcomes or impact around increased fish and flagship species abundance as well as interconnected well-being benefits for people. Although minimal (and occasionally attributed to prior initiatives that were enhanced by the seascape approach), this impact evidence tentatively links seascapes to recent related research around the effectiveness of appropriately scaled, ecosystem-based and collaboratively governed marine management that balances strict protection with sustainable use.

In the article analysis of income and expenses of the state budget of Ukraine was conducted. The level of provision of the state budget with financial resources is shown. The essence of the concept of "state budget" is exposed. The main problems of mobilization and use of budget funds are determined. The necessity of improving the efficiency of management of the state budget funds are substantiated and the main ways of their optimization are proposed. The main problems of forming a sufficient amount of budget revenues and ensuring their effective use are identified. Various methods of budget balancing are proposed. The most important items of budget expenditures are considered, the reasons for inefficient budget execution during the studied period are indicated. The ways to improve the optimization of revenue and expenditure parts of the budget are proposed. Based on the results of this work, recommendations for improving economic indicators are proposed. Revenues of the State Budget of Ukraine include receipts (except for those receipts assigned to local budgets in accordance with Articles 64, 66, and 69 of this Code) as provided for in legislation on taxes, duties and mandatory payments and the Law of Ukraine On the Guidelines of Social Protection to Invalids, as well as fees for services rendered by budget entities maintained at the expense of the State budget of Ukraine and other revenue sources identified in legislation, including receipts from the sale of assets owned by the State or enterprises, establishments and organizations, as well as interest and dividends on State-owned shares in property; grants and donations (in value); and inter-governmental transfers from local budgets. Revenues and expenditures must be balanced in the draft Conclusions and Proposals to the State Budget Law. The parameters of revenues and expenditures specified in the Conclusions and Proposals to the Draft State Budget Law must be balanced out. As a result of the analysis, we can conclude that in Ukraine the processes of attracting and distributing budget funds are inefficient, and therefore have a number of problems, including the following: imperfect domestic fiscal policy, outdated approaches to the financing process, lack of an effective strategy for budgeting and control over the implementation of budget programs. The priority task of budget policy of Ukraine is to modernize the budget sector of the economy and to re-orientate the state expenditure in the direction of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Prospects for the development of the state budget in Ukraine are quite ambiguous. However, they are reaching a new level, which is impossible not to mention, because now the budget process in Ukraine is quite developed, despite all the possible problems of the state.

Problem setting. Local government officials should adhere to ethical principles, norms, and rules of official behavior, influencing the creation of a positive image of service in local government bodies. Nowadays, city councils of certain cities concretized ethical norms and rules of behavior of deputies and officials in their ethical codes. Given that such codes aim to influence the increase of citizen trust in a local government body, to ensure the conscientious performance of official duties by deputies and officials, and to regulate the unethical situations, all city councils should develop and implement ethical codes. Recent research and publications analysis. Recent research analysis showed that among domestic scientists who studied ethics of civil servants are O. Antonova, L. Bobko, B. Senyshyn, T. Spodaryk, O. Stanasiuk, T. Vasylevska, O. Drozd, N. Sorokina, Ye. Romanenko. The professional ethics of civil servants was in the focus of the attention of many researchers, such as A. Voitenko, M. Novikova, M. Rudakevych, N. Puhachova, O. Ustymenko, V. Yakobchuk. Malimon and N. Shevchenko stressed the need for adoption of a general code of ethics of civil servants. H. Dzumaheldiieva, I. Serhiienko, L. Serhiienko addressed the issue of forming ethical codes in the system of public administration; however, the issue of creating ethical codes in local government bodies remained beyond the attention of scientists. Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Given the lack of research on ethical codes at the local level, this article aims to analyze the structure and content of the codes of ethics of deputies and ethical conduct of officials adopted by city councils. Paper main body. Today city councils of Berdychiv, Vinnytsia, Dnipro, Kyiv, Kolomyia, Ternopil adopted codes of ethics for deputies. Analyzing them, we can see that their structure is similar. At the beginning of codes, there are general provisions and the main principles that should be followed by deputies at work. The central part contains provisions on the rules of deputy ethics in the city council, at sessions and standing commissions, in the relations with voters. Besides, most codes prescribe rules of conduct for deputies in the relations with political parties, the media, bodies representing other branches of government, inter-fractional relations, meetings with foreign citizens, and stays in other countries, rules of conduct on the Internet.The codes define norms of unacceptable behavior to prevent unethical behavior of deputies. When performing duties, deputies must prevent corruption and conflicts of interest, not abuse resources, receive gifts or benefits. Except for the code of Dnipro city council, the final part of others contains the provisions on the control of their observance by deputies. Although it deals with the reports of violations, the codes do not specify the procedure of consideration, deadlines, and publication of results. The positive side of the ethical codes of deputies of Berdychiv and Vinnytsia city councils is that they define the main concepts used in them, contributing to the correctness of their understanding. Lviv сity сouncil was among the leaders in developing codes of ethical conduct for officials. If we compare its content with Kolomyia and Berdychiv ones, we may note that it is much clear and specific. In particular, it details the moral and ethical principles, standards of behavior of both employees and managers in the performance of their duties, as well as the annex to the code specifies a list of categories of unacceptable behavior according to the nature of violations (abuse of power and resources, interpersonal and professional violations). The approach of city councils to the development of codes of ethics in Ukraine is becoming more balanced. Thus, international and domestic experts were involved in the creation of the draft code of ethical conduct for officials and employees of Lviv City Council, and the officials of the city council, the public, business, and representatives of non-governmental organizations took part in its discussion. Among the innovations of the code was the right of employees to appropriate working conditions, free from harassment, intimidation, threats, blackmail, physical, psychological, financial, bureaucratic, administrative pressure. Besides, the council developed and implemented a notification system for reporting unacceptable behavior. Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. City council codes of ethics play the role of important ethical regulators of the professional conduct of deputies, officials, and employees. They define moral and ethical principles, values, standards, and rules, compliance with which is evidence of a high level of culture and professionalism. Although the unacceptable behavior constitutes an integral part of codes of ethics, the procedure for responding to reports of breaches of conduct is usually unprescribed. A successful example of improving the codes of ethical conduct of officials is the Procedure for receiving, registering, and reviewing reports of its violations, approved by Lviv city council. Today, it is not only important to respond timely to violations of rules of ethical conduct by deputies and officials, but also to prevent its unethical manifestations, in particular by organizing regular trainings on ethical issues aimed at forming expected standards of conduct.

Every crisis at the same time reveals, forewarns and implies changes with cyclical trends that can be analyzed from different disciplinary perspectives, building scenarios to anticipate the future, despite uncertainties and risks. And the current crisis certainly appears as one of the most problematic of the modern era: recently, Luigi Ferrara, Director of the School of Design at the George Brown College in Toronto and of the connected Institute without Boundaries, highlighted how the pandemic has simply accelerated undergoing dynamics, exacerbating other crises – climatic, environmental, social, economic – which had already been going on for a long time both locally and globally. In the most economically developed contexts, from North America to Europe, the Covid emergency has led, for example, to the closure of almost 30% of the retail trade, as well as to the disposal and sale of many churches. Places of care and assistance, such as hospitals and elderly houses, have become places of death and isolation for over a year, or have been closed. At the same time, the pandemic has imposed the revolution of the remote working and education, which was heralded – without much success – more than twenty years ago. In these even contradictory dynamics, Ferrara sees many possibilities: new roles for stronger and more capable public institutions as well as the opportunity to rethink and redesign the built environment and the landscape. Last but not least, against a future that could be configured as dystopian, a unique chance to enable forms of citizenship and communities capable of inhabiting more sustainable, intelligent and ethical cities and territories; and architects capable of designing them. This multifactorial and pervasive crisis seems therefore to impose a deep review of the current unequal development models, in the perspective of that “creative destruction” that Schumpeter placed at the basis of the dynamic entrepreneurial push: «To produce means to combine materials and forces within our reach. To produce other things, or the same things by a different method, means to combine these materials and forces differently» (Schumpeter, 1912). A concept well suiting to the design practice as a response to social needs and improving the living conditions. This is the perspective of Architectural Technology, in its various forms, which has always placed the experimental method at the center of its action. As Eduardo Vittoria already pointed out: «The specific contribution of the technological project to the development of an industrial culture is aimed at balancing the emotional-aesthetic data of the design with the technical-productive data of the industry. Design becomes a place of convergence of ideas and skills related to factuality, based on a multidisciplinary intelligence» (Vittoria, 1999). A lucid and appropriate critique of the many formalistic emphases that have invested contemporary architecture. In the most acute phases of the pandemic, the radical nature of this polycrisis has been repeatedly invoked as a lever for an equally radical modification of the development models, for the definitive defeat of conjunctural and emergency modes of action. With particular reference to the Italian context, however, it seems improper to talk about a “change of models” – whether economic, social, productive or programming, rather than technological innovation – since in the national reality the models and reference systems prove to not to be actually structured. The current socio-economic and productive framework, and the political and planning actions themselves, are rather a variegated and disordered set of consolidated practices, habits often distorted when not deleterious, that correspond to stratified regulatory apparatuses, which are inconsistent and often ineffective. It is even more difficult to talk about programmatic rationality models in the specific sector of construction and built environment transformation, where the enunciation of objectives and the prospection of planning actions rarely achieve adequate projects and certain implementation processes, verified for the consistency of the results obtained and monitored for the ability in maintaining the required performance over time. Rather than “changing the model”, in the Italian case, we should therefore talk about giving shape and implementation to an organic and rational system of multilevel and inter-sectorial governance models, which assumes the principles of subsidiarity, administrative decentralization, inter-institutional and public-private cooperation. But, even in the current situation, with the pandemic not yet over, we are already experiencing a sort of “return to order”: after having envisaged radical changes – new urban models environmentally and climatically more sustainable, residential systems and public spaces more responsive to the pressing needs of social demand, priority actions to redevelop the suburbs and to strength infrastructures and ecosystem services, new advanced forms of decision-making decentralization for the co-planning of urban and territorial transformations, and so on – everything seems to has been reset to zero. This is evident from the list of actions and projects proposed by the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), where no clear national strategy for green transition emerges, even though it is repeatedly mentioned. As highlighted by the Coordination of Technical-Scientific Associations for the Environment and Landscape1, and as required by EU guidelines2, this transition requires a paradigm shift that assumes eco-sustainability as a transversal guideline for all actions. With the primary objective of protecting ecosystem balances, improving and enhancing the natural and landscape capital, as well as protecting citizen health and well-being from environmental risks and from those generated by improper anthropization phenomena. The contents of the Plan explicitly emphases the need to «repair the economic and social damage of the pandemic crisis» and to «contribute to addressing the structural weaknesses of the Italian economy», two certainly relevant objectives, the pursuit of which, however, could paradoxically contrast precisely with the transition to a more sustainable development. In the Plan, the green revolution and the ecological transition are resolved in a dedicated axis (waste management, hydrogen, energy efficiency of buildings, without however specific reform guidelines of the broader “energy” sector), while «only one of the projects of the Plan regards directly the theme Biodiversity / Ecosystem / Landscape, and in a completely marginal way» (CATAP, 2021). Actions are also limited for assessing the environmental sustainability of the interventions, except the provision of an ad hoc Commission for the streamlining of some procedural steps and a generic indication of compliance with the DNSH-Do not significant Harm criterion (do not cause any significant damage), without specific guidelines on the evaluation methods. Moreover, little or nothing in the Plan refers on actions and investments in urban renewal, abandoned heritage recovery3, of in protecting and enhancing areas characterized by environmental sensitivity/fragility; situations widely present on the national territory, which are instead the first resource for a structural environmental transition. Finally yet importantly, the well-known inability to manage expenditure and the public administration inefficiencies must be considered: a limit not only to the effective implementation of projects, but also to the control of the relationship between time, costs and quality (also environmental) of the interventions. In many places, the Plan has been talked about as an opportunity for a real “reconstruction”, similar to that of post-war Italy; forgetting that the socio-economic renaissance was driven by the INA-Casa Plan4, but also by a considerable robustness of the cultural approach in the research and experimentation of new housing models (Schiaffonati, 2014)5. A possible “model”, which – appropriately updated in socio-technical and environmental terms – could be a reference for an incisive governmental action aiming at answering to a question – the one of the housing – far from being resolved and still a priority, if not an emergency. The crisis also implies the deployment of new skills, with a review of outdated disciplinary approaches, abandoning all corporate resistances and subcultures that have long prevented the change. A particularly deep fracture in our country, which has implications in research, education and professions, dramatically evident in the disciplines of architectural and urban design. Coherently with the EU Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 and the European Pillar of Social Rights, the action plan presented by the Commission in March 2021, with the commitment of the Declaration of Porto on May 7, sets three main objectives for 2030: an employment rate higher than 78%, the participation of more than 60% of adults in training courses every year and at least 15 million fewer people at risk of social exclusion or poverty6. Education, training and retraining, lifelong learning and employment-oriented skills, placed at the center of EU policy action, now require large investments, to stimulate employment transitions towards the emerging sectors of green, circular and digital economies (environmental design and assessment, risk assessment & management, safety, durability and maintainability, design and management of the life cycle of plans, projects, building systems and components: contents that are completely marginal or absent in the current training offer of Architecture). Departments and PhDs in the Technological Area have actively worked with considerable effectiveness in this field. In these regards, we have to recall the role played by Romano Del Nord «protagonist for commitment and clarity in identifying fundamental strategic lines for the cultural and professional training of architects, in the face of unprecedented changes of the environmental and production context» (Schiaffonati, 2021). Today, on the other hand, the axis of permanent and technical training is almost forgotten by ministerial and university policies for the reorganization of teaching systems, with a lack of strategic visions for bridging the deficit of skills that characterizes the area of architecture on the facing environmental and socio-economic challenges. Also and precisely in the dual perspective of greater interaction with the research systems and with the world of companies and institutions, and of that trans- and multi-disciplinary dimension of knowledge, methods and techniques necessary for the ecological transition of settlement systems and construction sector. Due to the high awareness of the Technological Area about the multifactorial and multi-scale dimension of the crises that recurrently affect our territories, SITdA has been configured since its foundation as a place for scientific and cultural debate on the research and training themes. With a critical approach to the consoling academic attitude looking for a “specific disciplinary” external and extraneous to the social production of goods and services. Finalizing the action of our community to «activate relationships between universities, professions, institutions through the promotion of the technological culture of architecture [...], to offer scientific-cultural resources for the training and qualification of young researchers [...], in collaboration with the national education system in order to advance training in the areas of technology and innovation in architecture» (SITdA Statute, 2007). Goals and topics which seem to be current, which Techne intends to resume and develop in the next issues, and already widely present in this n. 22 dedicated to the Circular Economy. A theme that, as emerges from the contributions, permeates the entire field of action of the project: housing, services, public space, suburbs, infrastructures, production, buildings. All contexts in which technological innovation invests both processes and products: artificial intelligence, robotics and automation, internet of things, 3D printing, sensors, nano and biotechnology, biomaterials, biogenetics and neuroscience feed advanced experiments that cross-fertilize different contributions towards common objectives of circularity and sustainability. In this context, the issue of waste, the superfluous, abandonment and waste, emerge, raising the question of re-purpose: an action that crosses a large panel of cases, due to the presence of a vast heritage of resources – materials, artefacts, spaces and entire territories – to be recovered and re-functionalized, transforming, adapting, reusing, reconverting, reactivating the existing for new purposes and uses, or adapting it to new and changing needs. Therefore, by adopting strategies and techniques of reconversion and reuse, of re-manufacturing and recycling of construction and demolition waste, of design for disassembly that operate along even unprecedented supply chains and which are accompanied by actions to extend the useful life cycle of materials , components and building systems, as well as product service logic also extended to durable goods such as the housing. These are complex perspectives but considerably interesting, feasible through the activation of adequate and updated skills systems, for a necessary and possible future, precisely starting from the ability – as designers, researchers and teachers in the area of Architectural Technology – to read the space and conceive a project within a system of rationalities, albeit limited, but substantially founded, which qualify the interventions through approaches validated in research and experimental verification. Contrarily to any ineffective academicism, which corresponds in fact to a condition of subordination caused by the hegemonic dynamics at the base of the crisis itself, but also by a loss of authority that derives from the inadequate preparation of the architects. An expropriation that legitimizes the worst ignorance in the government of the territories, cities and artifacts. Education in Architecture, strictly connected to the research from which contents and methods derive, has its central pivot in the project didactic: activity by its nature of a practical and experimental type, applied to specific places and contexts, concrete and material, and characterized by considerable complexity, due to the multiplicity of factors involved. This is what differentiates the construction sector, delegated to territorial and urban transformations, from any other sector. A sector that borrows its knowledge from other production processes, importing technologies and materials. With a complex integration of which the project is charged, for the realization of the buildings, along a succession of phases for corresponding to multiple regulatory and procedural constraints. The knowledge and rationalization of these processes are the basis of the evolution of the design and construction production approaches, as well as merely intuitive logics. These aspects were the subject of in-depth study at the SITdA National Conference on “Producing Project” (Reggio Calabria, 2018), and relaunched in a new perspective by the International Conference “The project in the digital age. Technology, Nature, Culture” scheduled in Naples on the 1st-2nd of July 2021. A reflection that Techne intends to further develop through the sharing of knowledge and scientific debate, selecting topics of great importance, to give voice to a new phase and recalling the practice of design research, in connection with the production context, institutions and social demand. “Inside the Polycrisis. The possible necessary” is the theme of the call we launched for n. 23, to plan the future despite the uncertainties and risks, foreshadowing strategies that support a unavoidable change, also by operating within the dynamics that, for better or for worse, will be triggered by the significant resources committed to the implementation of the Recovery Plan. To envisage systematic actions based on the centrality of a rational programming, of environmentally appropriate design at the architectural, urban and territorial scales, and of a continuous monitoring of the implementation processes. With the commitment also to promote, after each release, a public moment of reflection and critical assessment on the research progresses. NOTES 1 “Osservazioni del Coordinamento delle Associazioni Tecnico-scientifiche per l’Ambiente e il Paesaggio al PNRR”, 2021. 2 EU Guidelines, SWD-2021-12 final, 21.1.2021. 3 For instance, we can consider the 7,000 km of dismissed railways, with related buildings and areas. 4 The two seven-year activities of the Plan (1949-1963) promoted by Amintore Fanfani, Minister of Labor and Social Security at the time, represented both an employment and a social maneuver, which left us the important legacy of neighborhoods that still today they have their own precise identity, testimony of the architectural culture of the Italian twentieth century. But also a «grandiose machine for the housing» (Samonà, 1949), based on a clear institutional and organizational reorganization, with the establishment of a single body (articulated in the plan implementation committee, led by Filiberto Guala, with regulatory functions of disbursement of funds, assignment of tasks and supervision, and in the INA-Casa Management directed by the architect Arnaldo Foschini, then dean of the Faculty of Architecture), which led to the construction of two million rooms for over 350,000 families. See Di Biagi F. (2013), Il Contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero – Tecnica, Enciclopedia Treccani. 5 From Quaderni of the Centro Studi INA-Casa, to Gescal and in the Eighties to the activity of CER. Complex theme investigated by Fabrizio Schiaffonati in Il progetto della residenza sociale, edited by Raffaella Riva. 6 Ferruccio De Bortoli underlines in Corriere della Sera of 15 May 2021: «The revolution of lifelong learning (which) is no less important for Brussels than the digital or green one. By 2030, at least 60 per cent of the active population will have to participate in training courses every year. It will be said: but 2030 is far away. There’s time. No, because most people have escaped that to achieve this goal, by 2025 – that is, in less than four years – 120 million Europeans will ideally return to school. A kind of great educational vaccination campaign. Day after tomorrow».