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Статті в журналах з теми "Incentive provision"
Müller, Daniel, and Philipp Weinschenk. "Rater Bias and Incentive Provision." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 24, no. 4 (October 2015): 833–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12118.
Повний текст джерелаHandayani, Riaty. "Tax Minization as a Moderator on the Effect of Tunnelling Incentive and Bonus Mechanism on Transfer Pricing Provisions." European Journal of Business and Management Research 6, no. 4 (July 9, 2021): 88–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.24018/ejbmr.2021.6.4.930.
Повний текст джерелаLatham, Stephen R. "Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians." American Journal of Law & Medicine 22, no. 4 (1996): 399–432. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0098858800011904.
Повний текст джерела유소진, Lee Junyoup, and 이은서. "CEO Equity Incentive and Antitakeover Provision." Korea International Accounting Review ll, no. 83 (February 2019): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.21073/kiar.2019..83.010.
Повний текст джерелаKvaløy, Ola, and Trond E. Olsen. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly." Economica 83, no. 332 (April 8, 2016): 741–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12179.
Повний текст джерелаSusilawati, Neni, Citra Yadin Ramadhena, Mayang Permatasari Syahputri, and Regina Canda Wardhani. "EVALUATING COVID-19’ TAX INCENTIVES: MEASURING THE POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND PROSPECTIVE POLICY ANALYSIS ON THE EXTENDED PROVISION." Sebatik 26, no. 1 (June 1, 2022): 87–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.46984/sebatik.v26i1.1813.
Повний текст джерелаEderer, Florian, Richard Holden, and Margaret Meyer. "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision." RAND Journal of Economics 49, no. 4 (September 26, 2018): 819–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12253.
Повний текст джерелаBrunner, Markus, and Kai Jörg Sandner. "Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision." International Journal of Game Theory 41, no. 3 (October 5, 2011): 565–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0303-9.
Повний текст джерелаCosta, Cristiano M., Daniel Ferreira, and Humberto Moreira. "Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision." Economics Letters 86, no. 3 (March 2005): 379–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.001.
Повний текст джерелаRoemer, John E. "Incentive provision and coordination as market functions." Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung 43, no. 1 (February 2010): 6–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12651-010-0027-5.
Повний текст джерелаДисертації з теми "Incentive provision"
Costa, Cristiano Machado. "Organizational design and incentive provision." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/71.
Повний текст джерелаWe model the trade-off between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix or- ganizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. Moreover, the results show that there is always a level of bias for which matrix design can achieve the expected profit obtained by shareholders if they could directly control the firm. We also show that the main trade-off, i.e., hierarchical versus matrix structure is preserved under asymmetric levels of bias among managers and when low-level workers perceive activities with complementary efforts.
Gu, Bon-Sung. "Incentive provision and monitoring in financial contracting and trade." Thesis, University of York, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.239813.
Повний текст джерелаLi, Bingqin. "Housing reforms and work incentive effects : a case study of Tianjin, People's Republic of China." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272283.
Повний текст джерелаKusterer, David Jakob [Verfasser], Patrick [Akademischer Betreuer] Schmitz, and Oliver [Akademischer Betreuer] Gürtler. "Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents / David Jakob Kusterer. Gutachter: Patrick Schmitz ; Oliver Gürtler." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105376250X/34.
Повний текст джерелаKusterer, David J. [Verfasser], Patrick [Akademischer Betreuer] Schmitz, and Oliver [Akademischer Betreuer] Gürtler. "Incentive provision with multiple tasks and multiple agents / David Jakob Kusterer. Gutachter: Patrick Schmitz ; Oliver Gürtler." Köln : Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln, 2014. http://d-nb.info/105376250X/34.
Повний текст джерелаOrtega, Pacheco Daniel Vicente. "Investigating the role and scale of transactions costs of incentive-based programs for provision of environmental services in developing countries." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1292450247.
Повний текст джерелаBarrenechea, Méndez Marco A. "The provision of incentives and organization design." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/117322.
Повний текст джерелаThis dissertation comprises three essays on the economic analysis of organizations. The first essay provides further evidence on the role of uncertainty and job complexity in blue-collar workers’ pay-for-performance and autonomy decisions. It proposes an econometric approach that encompasses previous procedures taken in the related literature in order to explain the differences in the resulting outcomes that may be due to differing methodological approaches. Although our evidence comes from a distinct institutional context, a dataset of Spanish plants, they are nevertheless fairly consistent with previous analyses. The main stylized fact is that workers’ autonomy and pay-for-performance strength are interrelated decisions. Additionally, autonomy is positively related to job complexity and uncertainty, which suggests that the relationship between these latter variables and the pay-for-performance strength could be through autonomy. When we control for autonomy, the positive and significant relationship between pay-for-performance strength and job complexity disappears, while that between pay-for-performance strength and uncertainty becomes more negative. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed. The second essay argues that the design of job is the result of a set of interrelated decisions: the worker autonomy to decide the tasks to be carried out, the way in which the work will be monitored and the compensation associated with the information generated by the monitoring process. It provides empirical evidence on the design of jobs for blue collar workers in Spanish industrial establishments by analysing the relations among and determinants of autonomy, monitoring and wages. We present a theoretical model that is consistent with the empirical evidence and allows us to rationalize the relations among these variables. In short, the model predicts that autonomy permits workers to introduce innovative tasks that are more difficult to monitor and that the level of monitoring determine the quality of information on workers’ effort and ultimately their compensation. The third essay provides evidence on the role of mission congruence for reliance on pay-for-performance and autonomy. Using a dataset of childcare facilities in Minnesota, we find that mission congruence between teachers and employers is negatively related to the likelihood of reliance on pay-for-performance and positively related to teacher autonomy. These results support the idea that the identity of workers plays an important role in the design of organizations. In addition, as in previous empirical studies, we find that pay-for-performance and autonomy tend to be given together.
Li, Jianpei. "Three essays on efficiency and incentives in teams and partnerships." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/561396469.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаGomes, Paulo Ernesto Monteiro. "Incentivos fiscais na provisão de bens públicos : estudo para o caso brasileiro." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2014. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/17737.
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Este trabalho segue o estudo de Zhuravskaya (2000) e analisa o efeito de um aumento marginal da arrecadação per capita dos impostos estaduais e municipais na diferença do volume de transferências per capita repassadas pela União a estados e municípios no período seguinte. Dado que a maior parte das transferências recebidas pelas unidades subnacionais são constitucionais, a qual não há discricionariedade por parte do governo federal no seu repasse, esse estudo utiliza as transferências voluntárias para efeito de análise. Também testa-se se o fato de o governante local ser aliado político do presidente implica que haverá algum favorecimento no repasse de renda. Os resultados obtidos apontam que os incentivos fiscais no Brasil não são tão fracos, pois a arrecadação tributária local pouco influencia o repasse de transferências voluntárias. E que não há evidências que o apoio político tenha impacto no repasse das transferências. ________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
This present work studies the dynamics between local tax base and shared revenue. Zhuravskaya (2000) finds that fiscal incentives in Russia are weak, because any change in local government's own revenues is almost entirely offset by changes in shared revenues. This paper shows that Brazilian municipalities and states own's revenues has no influence on the voluntary transfers from the federal government, so that the fiscal incentives of public goods provision cannot be declared weak. Moreover, we could not identify an impact of political alignment between the mayors or the governors and the Brazilian President on the voluntary intergovernmental transfers.
Tsitinidis, Alexandros, and Kenneth Duru. "Managerial Incentives and Earnings Management : An Empirical Examination of the Income Smoothing in the Nordic Banking Industry." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-202105.
Повний текст джерелаКниги з теми "Incentive provision"
Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9.
Повний текст джерелаLaffont, Jean-Jacques. Provision of quality and power of incentive schemes in regulated industries. Cambridge, Mass: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989.
Знайти повний текст джерелаSocial entrepreneurship business models: Incentive strategies to catalyze public goods provision. Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Знайти повний текст джерелаLacetera, Nicola. Individual preferences, organization, and competition in a model of R&D incentive provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.
Знайти повний текст джерелаHolmström, Bengt. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Stanford, Calif: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 1985.
Знайти повний текст джерелаFick, Gary J. Time-related incentive and disincentive provisions in highway construction contracts. Washington, D.C: Transportation Research Board, 2010.
Знайти повний текст джерелаTrost, Steve, Gary Fick, Ells Tom Cackler, and Lee Vanzler. Time-Related Incentive and Disincentive Provisions in Highway Construction Contracts. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.17226/14392.
Повний текст джерелаWork incentives and welfare provision: The 'pathological' theory of unemployment. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.
Знайти повний текст джерелаEckardt, Martina, Jörg Dötsch, and Stefan Okruch, eds. Old-Age Provision and Homeownership – Fiscal Incentives and Other Public Policy Options. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75211-2.
Повний текст джерелаPersonal provision of retirement income: Meeting the needs of older people? Cheltenham, U.K: Edward Elgar, 2009.
Знайти повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "Incentive provision"
Hoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Introduction." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 1–7. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_1.
Повний текст джерелаHoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 11–43. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_2.
Повний текст джерелаHoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 45–77. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_3.
Повний текст джерелаHoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 79–90. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_4.
Повний текст джерелаHoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 93–128. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_5.
Повний текст джерелаHoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 129–84. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_6.
Повний текст джерелаHoppe-Fischer, Eva I. "Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection." In Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision, 185–95. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9_7.
Повний текст джерелаInoue, Hiroshi, Masatoshi Miyake, and Li Guan. "Influence of Risk Incentive by Limited Dividend Provision." In Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, 255–62. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22833-9_30.
Повний текст джерелаDigilina, Olga B., and Daria V. Lebedeva. "Resource Provision for Innovation: State and Incentive Measures." In Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems, 1254–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69415-9_137.
Повний текст джерелаLin, Li, Jinpeng Huai, Yanmin Zhu, Chunming Hu, and Xianxian Li. "A Multi-agents Contractual Approach to Incentive Provision in Non-cooperative Networks." In On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: OTM 2008, 231–48. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88871-0_17.
Повний текст джерелаТези доповідей конференцій з теми "Incentive provision"
Park, Jaeok, and Mihaela van der Schaar. "Incentive provision using intervention." In IEEE INFOCOM 2011 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/infcom.2011.5935229.
Повний текст джерелаQiao, Dandan, Shun-Yang Lee, Andrew Whinston, and Qiang Wei. "Incentive Provision and Pro-Social Behaviors." In Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2017.675.
Повний текст джерелаVermillion, Sean D., and Richard J. Malak. "A Theoretical Look at the Impact of Incentives on Design Problem Effort Provision." In ASME 2018 International Design Engineering Technical Conferences and Computers and Information in Engineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc2018-85845.
Повний текст джерелаChen, Yishan, Shuiguang Deng, and Jianwei Yin. "Incentive-driven Edge Cooperation for Service Provision." In 2021 IEEE International Conference on Web Services (ICWS). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icws53863.2021.00080.
Повний текст джерелаKumar, Suraj, Deep Kiran, and Rinkesh Meena. "Incentive-Based Flexibility Provision in Centralized Home Energy Management System." In 2021 IEEE 8th Uttar Pradesh Section International Conference on Electrical, Electronics and Computer Engineering (UPCON). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/upcon52273.2021.9667616.
Повний текст джерелаMcCombie, Charles, Neil Chapman, and Thomas H. Isaacs. "The Crucial Importance of the Back-End in Multinational Initiatives to Enhance Fuel Cycle Security." In The 11th International Conference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management. ASMEDC, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icem2007-7208.
Повний текст джерелаMakarov, Anton Dmitrievich, and Anastasiia Valeryevna Sedova. "The development of cycling and the construction of sports facilities as an incentive for the development of the cycling infrastructure of the city." In 2022 33th All-Russian Youth Exhibition of Innovations. Publishing House of Kalashnikov ISTU, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22213/ie022131.
Повний текст джерелаPetrović, Jovana. "PRUŽANjE JAVNIH USLUGA ELEKTRONSKIM PUTEM – EUPRAVA." In XVIII Majsko savetovanje. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Law, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/xviiimajsko.755p.
Повний текст джерелаDamle, Sankarshan, Moin Hussain Moti, Praphul Chandra, and Sujit Gujar. "Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/30.
Повний текст джерелаVybihal, Vaclav. "FISCAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISION OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES." In 2nd International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts SGEM2015. Stef92 Technology, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2015/b23/s7.037.
Повний текст джерелаЗвіти організацій з теми "Incentive provision"
Lacetera, Nicola, and Lorenzo Zirulia. Individual Preferences, Organization, and Competition in a Model of R&D Incentive Provision. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17031.
Повний текст джерелаCamous, Antoine, and Russell Cooper. Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26654.
Повний текст джерелаPoterba, James, and Todd Sinai. Income Tax Provisions Affecting Owner-Occupied Housing: Revenue Costs and Incentive Effects. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14253.
Повний текст джерелаShah, Ashni, and Rob Mills. Funding Mechanisms to Incentivize Sustainable and Inclusive Water Provision in Kenya’s Arid Lands. Oxfam; Social Finance, August 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.21201/2018.3279.
Повний текст джерелаAgan, Amanda, Matthew Freedman, and Emily Owens. Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24579.
Повний текст джерелаHotz-Hart, Beat. Thematic synthesis “Market Conditions and Regulation” of the NRP “Energy”. Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), November 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.46446/publication_nrp70_nrp71.2019.4.en.
Повний текст джерелаvan den Boogaard, Vanessa, and Fabrizio Santoro. Explaining Informal Taxation and Revenue Generation: Evidence from south-central Somalia. Institute of Development Studies, March 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ictd.2021.003.
Повний текст джерелаBirch, Izzy. Financial Incentives to Reduce Female Infanticide, Child Marriage and Promote Girl’s Education: Institutional and Monitoring Mechanisms. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2021.005.
Повний текст джерелаAlvarez Pagliuca, Claudia, Juan Martínez Álvarez, Pablo Pereira Dos Santos, Tomás Serebrisky, and Ancor Suárez-Alemán. Financiamiento sostenible de la infraestructura económica y social en América Latina y el Caribe: tendencias, actores e instrumentos. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, October 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004497.
Повний текст джерелаUchitel, Aleksandr D., Ilona V. Batsurovska, Nataliia A. Dotsenko, Olena A. Gorbenko, and Nataliia I. Kim. Implementation of future agricultural engineers' training technology in the informational and educational environment. [б. в.], June 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/123456789/4440.
Повний текст джерела