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1
Autrey, Romana L., Shane S. Dikolli, and D. Paul Newman. "Performance Measure Aggregation, Career Incentives, and Explicit Incentives." Journal of Management Accounting Research 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 115–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2010.22.1.115.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT: We examine a setting in which managers have differential career concerns and firm performance is publicly observed using disaggregated measures that are incrementally informative but costly to contract upon. In such a setting, when do firms contract on aggregated rather than disaggregated performance measures? We show that at intermediate levels of managerial career concerns contracting on an aggregate measure can be welfare-enhancing. In this case, the net cost of both contracting directly on an aggregate measure and exploiting career incentives based on disaggregated measures is smaller than the cost of contracting directly on disaggregate measures. Our findings also imply that detailed performance disclosures will be accompanied by lower incentive weights based on aggregate performance when career incentives mitigate distortions caused by aggregation. Further, if performance measures become noisier due to transient shocks, we find that contractual incentive weights on aggregate performance can be either increasing or decreasing, depending on the magnitude of a manager’s career incentives.
2
Ahn, Tae Sik, Iny Hwang, and Myung-In Kim. "The Impact of Performance Measure Discriminability on Ratee Incentives." Accounting Review 85, no. 2 (March 1, 2010): 389–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.2.389.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT: The literature addresses optimal contract design issues that the principal must address to provide proper incentives to the agent. However, there has been limited empirical assessment of how agents actually respond to the performance-evaluation schemes in the contracts offered them. Moreover, the literature overlooks factors, other than those from the pay-for-performance context, that may impact the effectiveness of incentive provisions. This study considers the effect of discriminability on agent performance. We find that (1) agent performance improvement is positively associated with the degree of discriminability, (2) subjective measures are inferior to objective measures in providing incentives to the agent because of the lack of discriminability, and (3) the inferiority of subjective measures for incentive purposes is exacerbated in circumstances in which the discriminability gap between objective and subjective measures is significant. Our findings suggest that, in order to have subjective measures effectively complement objective measures, the accounting profession must develop sound performance measurement systems that define and measure subjective performance with sufficient discriminability.
3
Yang, Jingsong, Jing Zhang, Chunxiang Guo, Ruwen Tan, and Minjiu Yu. "Incentive or Punitive Measure? Analysis of Environmental Regulations in Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (September 4, 2021): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6619980.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In order to investigate the formulation of appropriate environmental regulations in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling, this paper establishes a CDW recycling decision-making system consisting of a contractor, a developer, and the government and analyses the decision-making results and influencing factors of the various stakeholders. Three different types of environmental regulations have been considered in the model: (i) no regulation, (ii) incentive regulation, and (iii) punitive regulation. The research shows that the incentive regulation offers the constructor greater incentives to recycle CDW and yields higher profits for members of the system, and however, when recycling is very costly and CDW is highly damaging, punitive regulation should be implemented, as the incentive regulation leads to lower social welfare. In addition, governments should be more cautious when adopting incentive regulation, because social welfare may be negative under this condition whereas there is no such possibility under the punitive regulation.
4
Dikolli, Shane S., Christian Hofmann, and Susan L. Kulp. "Interrelated Performance Measures, Interactive Effort, and Incentive Weights." Journal of Management Accounting Research 21, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 125–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2009.21.1.125.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT: This study uses principal-agent analysis to investigate how the principal's use of performance measures in the agent's compensation contract are affected by (1) links between performance measures and (2) substitute and complementary characteristics of an agent's efforts. We show that the directional effect of changes in performance measure interrelations on linear incentive weights depends on how the agent's tasks interact with each other (i.e., substitute or complementary interactions). For example, increases in performance measure interrelations do not necessarily imply higher incentive weights on more sensitive and precise performance measures. If efforts are substitutes for each other, the costs of effort are relatively high and the principal induces lower levels of total effort by offering lower incentives. We also show that differences in the combination of performance measure interrelations and effort interactions affect profits in distinctly different ways. When efforts are substitutes for each other, increases in the sensitivities of profit to the other performance metrics (i.e., increased interrelations), and thus to effort, may actually lead to lower profits.
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Moers, Frank. "Performance Measure Properties and Delegation." Accounting Review 81, no. 4 (July 1, 2006): 897–924. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2006.81.4.897.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining how the delegation choice is affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem caused by this delegation. Based on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), I argue that the ability to resolve the incentive problem depends on the contractibility of financial performance measures versus nonfinancial performance measures, where the contractibility depends on the performance measure properties sensitivity, precision, and verifiability. The empirical results show that, if financial performance measures are “good” (“poor”) incentive measures, i.e., high (low) on sensitivity, precision, and verifiability, then using these measures for incentive purposes increases (decreases) delegation. Overall, the results are consistent with the argument that firms design their decision-making process around the quality of contractible performance measures.
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Wang, Dong, and Desheng Wu. "Equity incentive and risk taking: evidence from China." Nankai Business Review International 8, no. 1 (March 6, 2017): 80–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-10-2016-0034.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose China has formally implemented equity incentive for more than 10 years; thus, a considerable number of equity incentive programs has entered the exercise period. This means that it is time to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the incentive effects of equity incentive throughout the whole implementation phase. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between equity incentive, enterprise’s risk taking and risk decisions in China. Design/methodology/approach Using sensitivity of executives’ wealth and stock price (Delta) to measure the alignment effect and using sensitivity of executives’ wealth and stock return volatility (Vega) to measure the risk-taking effect, this paper aims to empirically test the relation of equity incentive and enterprise’s risk taking and risk decisions. Findings The authors find that Vega is positively related to risk taking; however, this improvement was mainly reflected in the private enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises. In terms of corporate policy choice, the authors find that Vega is positively related to firm focus and leverage. But, they have not found that Vega can promote R&D investment. Originality/value Existing studies have mostly concerned about the executives’ opportunistic behavior; however, analyses of the positive effect of equity incentive are limited. The authors use a combination of risk-taking incentives and alignment incentives to test the relationship between equity incentive and risk taking.
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Mulia, Rahmi Putri, Herlina Helmy, and Mia Angelina Setiawan. "Equity Risk Incentives dan Corporate Tax Aggresiveness." Wahana Riset Akuntansi 7, no. 1 (June 25, 2019): 1437. http://dx.doi.org/10.24036/wra.v7i1.104567.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study aims to examine the equity risk incentives relationship with corporate tax aggressiveness. This study uses four proxies to measure corporate tax aggressiveness variables, namely Cash Effectives Tax Rate (CETR), Tax Shelter, Unrecognized Tax Benefits (UTB), and Discretionary Book Tax Differences (DTAX). The equity risk incentives variable is measured using the annual natural total log of compensation of the key management. The study population was manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017. The study samples were determined by purposive sampling method so that samples for each CETR, Shelter, UTB and DTAX were obtained were 235, 180, 210 and 205 companies. Based on panel data regression analysis, the results show that 1) Equity Risk Incentive is negatively related to Cash Effectives Tax Rate but not significant, 2) Equity Risk Incentive is positively related to Tax Shelter but not significant, 3) Equity Risk Incentive is negatively related to Unrecognized Tax Benefits not significant, and 4) Equity Risk Incentive is positively related to the Discretionary Book Tax Differences but not significant. The conclusion of this study is that equity risk incentives are not positively related significantly with corporate tax aggressiveness so the hypothesis is rejected.Keywords: Equity Risk Incentives; Tax Aggressiveness
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Misyak, Sarah A., Molly K. Parker, Meredith Ledlie Johnson, Sam Hedges, Elizabeth Borst, Maureen McNamara Best, and Valisa E. Hedrick. "A Preliminary Evaluation of Virginia Fresh Match: Impacts and Demographic Considerations for Future Fruit and Vegetable Incentive Programs." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 7 (April 5, 2022): 4367. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19074367.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The purpose of this communication is to describe the preliminary evaluation of the Virginia Fresh Match (VFM) financial incentive program for fresh fruits and vegetables for Virginia Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program shoppers and to determine if there were differences in incentive outcomes by race. In this cross-sectional study, a questionnaire was administered to shoppers using Virginia Fresh Match incentives at participating farmers markets and community-based food retail outlets. Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to detect differences in fruit and vegetable consumption between demographic groups over time. Chi-square tests were used to determine if there were associations between race and perceived impact of VFM incentives on making food last and the attribution of VFM incentives to changes in fruit and vegetable consumption frequency. Frequency of fruit and vegetable intake was significantly higher during VFM incentive use, with a difference of 1.17 ± 0.07 and 1.07 ± 0.07 on a Likert scale measure, respectively (p ≤ 0.001). There were racial differences in assertions that VFM incentives helped food to last. VFM incentives were effective at increasing fruit and vegetable consumption, but racial differences should be considered in the administration of VFM to avoid reinforcing systems or approaches that may contribute to disparities in food access and food security.
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Yan, Yaqian. "Study on the Effectiveness of Equity Incentive Models Affecting Internal Control." Highlights in Business, Economics and Management 1 (November 28, 2022): 333–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v1i.2673.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article studies how the equity incentive affects the effectiveness of internal control of listed companies by taking Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as a sample and using the Shenzhen Dibo internal control index of listed companies from 2011 to 2016 to measure the effectiveness of internal control of listed companies. The following three questions are discussed: (1) Whether the impact of equity incentive model on the effectiveness of internal control is positive? (2) Whether the impact of equity incentive intensity on the effectiveness of internal control is nonlinear? In other words, whether there is excess incentive? (3) Is there any difference in the impact of equity incentives between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises? The study found: The use of equity incentives has a positive effect on the effectiveness of the internal control of the company. When the incentive is excessive, it will result in over-incentives, that is, the greater the incentive, the less effective the internal control of the company. The relationship between incentives and the effectiveness of corporate internal control is inverted U-shaped. Different from the viewpoint of the existing literature, the study found that equity incentives in state-owned enterprises can further enhance the effectiveness of internal control. The results of the study show that although most people think equity incentives are conducive to reducing agency problems and increasing the effectiveness of internal control, it is still necessary to control the strength of equity incentive and prevent it from backfiring, which helps firms to reduce the conflict of interests between principles and agents.
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GIBBS, MICHAEL J., KENNETH A. MERCHANT, WIM A. VAN DER STEDE, and MARK E. VARGUS. "Performance Measure Properties and Incentive System Design." Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 48, no. 2 (April 2009): 237–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232x.2009.00556.x.
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Yin, Xianan, Hua Ming, Jing Cui, and Xinzhong Bao. "Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2021 (August 16, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/7073878.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Corporate executives have the decision-making power of resource allocation, and efficient resource allocation is an important measure of high-quality development of enterprises. It is a focal issue whether the compensation incentive can promote the executives to make better use of the enterprise resource allocation. We investigate this question using the data of the Chinese listed companies in 2015–2019 based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and fixed effect model. The results show the following: (1) both monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive can significantly improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and the former is more significant; (2) there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between perquisite consumption incentive and resource allocation efficiency; (3) the above conclusion is still true in state-owned enterprises; (4) in private enterprises, the effect of equity incentive is more effective, but the effect of perquisite consumption incentive is less significant. The results highlight the relationship between compensation incentive and enterprise resource allocation. Our study is expected to guide the executives to formulate reasonable compensation incentives and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.
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Tuszynski, Meg Patrick, and Dean Stansel. "Targeted state economic development incentives and entrepreneurship." Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy 7, no. 3 (September 3, 2018): 235–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jepp-d-18-00033.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between state economic development incentives programs and entrepreneurial activity. Design/methodology/approach The authors use panel data and a fixed-effects model to examine the determinants of five measures of entrepreneurial activity. To measure state economic development incentives programs, they use a new and substantially improved data set from Bartik (2017). They also include a measure for economic freedom, the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America index. Findings The authors find a robustly negative relationship between development incentives and patent activity. They find some evidence that incentives are negatively associated with small business establishments (<10 employees) as a percentage of total establishments but positively associated with the large business establishment (>500 employees) share. They also find evidence of a positive relationship between economic freedom and both patent activity and net business formation. Research limitations/implications The results imply that economic development incentive programs are unlikely to increase entrepreneurial activity and may decrease it. They also imply increased economic freedom (lower taxes, lower spending, and lower governmental restrictions on labor markets) may increase entrepreneurial activity. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this paper provides the first examination of the relationship between development incentives and entrepreneurial activity that utilizes Bartik (2017), a new vastly improved data set of state economic development incentive programs. The paper also contributes to the literature on the relationship between economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity.
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Bouwens, Jan, and Laurence van Lent. "Performance Measure Properties and the Effect of Incentive Contracts." Journal of Management Accounting Research 18, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 55–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2006.18.1.55.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Using data from a third-party survey on compensation practices at 151 Dutch firms, we show that less noisy or distorted performance measures and higher cash bonuses are associated with improved employee selection and better-directed effort. Specifically, (1) an increase in the cash bonus increases the perceived selection effects of incentive contracts, but does not independently affect the perceived amount and direction of effort that employees deliver, and (2) performance measure properties directly impact both effort and the selection functioning of incentive contracts. These results hold after controlling for an array of incentive contract design characteristics and for differences in organizational context. Our estimation procedures address several known problems with using secondary datasets.
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Diana, Patricia, and Chermian Eforis. "The effectiveness of Tax Incentive during Covid-19 Pandemic: Case Study on Indonesian Small Medium Enterprises." 13th GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 13, no. 1 (June 16, 2022): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gcbssproceeding.2022.1(82).
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
As a developing country, Indonesia has economic strength in the real sector which is carried out by small medium enterprises activities. In the latest 2019, globally and also Indonesia’s economiy was depressed by pandemic covid 19. To maintain national economic stability, our government issues a lot of incentive especially in taxation policy. One of them is the tax incentive for SMEs. This research purpose is to measure tax incentive effectiveness specifically for SMEs using several internal government factors such as modernization and socialization of the tax system and also personal tax knowledge from taxpayers. This research is causal study using primary data collected by questionnaire. Respondent criterias prepare according to SMEs classification from the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia. Data in this study analyze using multiple linear regression with SPSS statistics. This research found that modernization, socialization and taxpayer knowledge will improve tax incentive efficiency. Modernization of the tax system and frequent socialization encourage taxpayers to utilize the incentive without having deep knowledge of taxation. Keywords: modernization, socialization, tax incentives, tax knowledge
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Ittner, Christopher D., and David F. Larcker. "Determinants of Performance Measure Choices in Worker Incentive Plans." Journal of Labor Economics 20, S2 (April 2002): S58—S90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/338674.
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Winsten, Jonathan R., Claire Baffaut, Joseph Britt, Tatiana Borisova, Chad Ingels, and Susan Brown. "Performance-based incentives for agricultural pollution control: identifying and assessing performance measures in the United States." Water Policy 13, no. 5 (May 4, 2011): 677–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2011.055.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Current federal and state soil and water conservation programs consist primarily of cost-sharing or compensating farmers for implementing a set of pre-defined best management practices. This approach does not consider specific environmental outcomes or the cost-effectiveness of the program at the farm or watershed level. Performance-based incentives are payments that are attached to a specified environmental performance measure, for example a reduction in nutrient, sediment, pesticide, or bacteria loss from a field, or reduction in loading at the mouth of a watershed. Assessing environmental performance requires the definition of a performance measure, which is used to calculate resulting incentive payments. In this paper, we discuss issues related to the selection of a performance measure, such as the scale at which the performance is measured, modeling versus monitoring, and the ability of the measure to foster farmer learning and adaptive management. Numerous examples of performance measures adopted or considered by watershed stakeholders in several states are presented. Watershed managers, policy makers, and extension agents can consider this information to make informed choices among proposed approaches toward improving water quality in streams affected by agricultural nonpoint source pollution.
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Diana, Patricia, and Chermian Eforis. "The Determinants of Tax Incentive Effectiveness During Covid-19 Pandemic." GATR Journal of Accounting and Finance Review (GATR-AFR) Vol. 7 (2) July - September 2022 7, no. 2 (September 14, 2022): 79–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/afr.2022.7.2(1).
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Objective - The paper aims to measure tax incentive effectiveness specifically for SMEs using internal government factors such as modernization and socialization of the tax system and internal personal taxpayers' factors using tax knowledge. Methodology/Technique – Using primary data collected by questionnaire. Respondent criteria prepare according to SMEs classification from the Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia. Data in this study were analyzed using multiple linear regression with SPSS statistics. Findings - this research found that modernization, socialization, and taxpayer knowledge will improve tax incentive efficiency. Internal government factors consist of modernization of the tax system and frequent socialization, significantly encouraging taxpayers to utilize the incentive without having deep knowledge of taxation. Novelty - This study explains the determinants of tax incentives from both sides, government, and taxpayer, especially for SMEs during pandemic COVID 19 in the Indonesian market. Type of Paper: Empirical. JEL Classification: E62, E64, H25, D83 Keywords: Tax Incentive, Fiscal Policy, Covid-19, Indonesia Reference to this paper should be referred to as follows: Diana, P; Eforis, C. (2022). The Determinants of Tax Incentive Effectiveness During Covid-19 Pandemic, Acc. Fin. Review, 7(2), 79 – 87. https://doi.org/10.35609/afr.2022.7.2(1)
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Cianci, Anna M., Steven E. Kaplan, and Janet A. Samuels. "The Moderating Effects of the Incentive System and Performance Measure on Managers' and Their Superiors' Expectations about the Manager's Effort." Behavioral Research in Accounting 25, no. 1 (August 1, 2012): 115–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-50290.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT: The current study experimentally examines effort expectations (i.e., planned hours) for a manager made by participants in the role of the manager or the manager's superior. The experiment also manipulates the type of incentive system (i.e., bonus based on either strategic or all measures) and the type of performance measure (i.e., strategic or general). We predict and find that the participants in the manager role engage in self-enhancement (e.g., Pfeffer and Fong 2005; Sedikides and Gregg 2008). Specifically, the total hours that managers planned to work were more than the total hours their superiors expected the manager to work. We also find that both the type of incentive system and the type of performance measure moderate managers' tendency to engage in self-enhancement. Compared to a strategic incentive system, managers' self-enhancement was diminished under a comprehensive incentive system. Further, participants in the manager role engage in self-enhancement for planned strategic hours but not for planned general hours. Data Availability: Available upon request.
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Kato, Takao, and Antti Kauhanen. "Performance pay and enterprise productivity: the details matter." Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership 1, no. 1 (June 11, 2018): 61–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpeo-03-2018-0013.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide novel and rigorous evidence on the productivity effect of varying attributes of performance-related pay (PRP) and shows that the details of PRP indeed matter. Design/methodology/approach In doing so, the authors exploit the panel nature of the Finnish Linked Employer–Employee Data on the details of PRP. Findings The authors first establish that the omitted variable bias is serious, which makes the cross-sectional estimates on the productivity effect of the details of PRP biased upward substantially. Relying on the fixed effect estimates that account for such bias, the authors find: (first, group incentive PRP is more potent in boosting enterprise productivity than individual incentive PRP; second, group incentive PRP with profitability as a performance measure is especially powerful in raising firm productivity; third, when a narrow measure (such as cost reduction) is already used, adding another narrow measure (such as quality improvement) yields no additional productivity gain; and fourth, PRP with greater power of incentives (the share of PRP in total compensation) results in greater productivity gains, and returns to power of incentives diminishes very slowly. Originality/value Much of the empirical literature on PRP focuses on a question of whether the firm can increase firm performance in general and enterprise productivity in particular by introducing PRP and if so, how much. However, not all PRP programs are created equal and PRP programs vary significantly in a variety of attributes. This paper provides novel and rigorous evidence on the productivity effect of varying attributes of PRP and shows that the details of PRP indeed matter.
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Khamis, Mohd Rahim, Nazlinda Abdullah, and Shereen Noranee. "Does Government Incentive Influence Compliance Behavior of Business Zakat among Owners of SMEs?: An Evidence Via Rasch Measurement Model." ADVANCES IN BUSINESS RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 2, no. 2 (December 30, 2016): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.24191/abrij.v2i2.10020.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Government incentive is one of the significant factors that influence the compliance behavior of zakat. However, studies which have focused on government incentive such as zakat deduction and compliance behavior of zakat particularly in business zakat scenario is only next to inexistence. Therefore, this study aims to investigate whether the government incentives influence compliance behavior of business zakat among owners of SMEs.A total of 276 questionnaires collected from Small and Medium Entrepreneurs (SMEs) in Selangor and were analyzed using Rasch Measurement Model. The construct is found reliable with Cronbach Alpha of 0.60, person reliability index at 0.65 and item reliability index at 0.98. The statistical indicators such as mean square (MNSQ), Z- standardized (ZSTD), point measure correlation (PtMeaCorr) and Person Item Distribution Map (PIDM) revealed that out of the 247 respondents, 107 respondents (43.3%) who comply with business zakat payment were influenced by government incentives and 140 respondents (56.7%) who did not comply with business zakat payment probably are not influenced by government incentives. The finding of his study implies the significance of Rasch Measurement Model in explaining the compliance behavior of zakat among SMEs. Specifically, this study finds that government incentive is not influence the decision of owners on SMEs community to comply with business zakat payment.
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Kranker, Keith. "The Efficacy of Using Financial Incentives to Change Unhealthy Behaviors Among a Rural Chronically Ill and Uninsured Population." American Journal of Health Promotion 32, no. 2 (March 9, 2017): 301–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0890117117696621.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose: To measure the effects of weight loss, medication compliance, and physical activity financial incentives delivered by health providers to uninsured patients. Design: Full factorial (orthogonal) randomized design. Setting: Primary care clinic in rural Mississippi. Participants: A total of 544 uninsured adult patients with diabetes or hypertension. All patients were enrolled in the clinic’s care management program. Intervention: Patients randomly received 0, 1, 2, or 3 financial incentives. Incentives for weight loss, medication compliance, and physical activity were awarded quarterly over 1 year. Measures: Weight loss, medication compliance, physical activity, and 6 clinical measures related to diabetes and hypertension. Analysis: Cross-section and panel data regression models were used to compare outcomes for those who received incentives to those who did not receive incentives and to measure interaction effects. Results: Effects of the weight loss incentive were positive but statistically insignificant (−3.7 lb; P = .106), while medication compliance was high in both the treatment and control groups (+2.37 percentage points; P = .411), and physical activity take-up was very limited. Effects on clinical outcomes, as well as interaction effects between incentives, were mixed and generally statistically insignificant. Conclusion: This study found little to no evidence that these financial incentives had beneficial effects on the incentivized behaviors in this setting. Likewise, the study found no effects on clinical outcomes nor any systematic evidence of interaction effects between 2 and 3 incentives.
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Romeyke, Tobias, Elisabeth Noehammer, and Harald Stummer. "Patient-Report-Outcome-Measure and Incentives for Inpatient Chronic Care in Germany." Global Journal of Health Science 12, no. 8 (June 12, 2020): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/gjhs.v12n8p127.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
INTRODUCTION: In general, incentive tools like pay for performance (P4P) have positive effects regarding treatment quality and financial outcomes. As they are applicable to the clinical management of chronic conditions like asthma and diabetes, this article analyses their potential for multimodal complex treatment of chronic rheumatic diseases.
METHODS: Cost data for chronic rheumatic diseases with and without specified complex treatments and their respective remuneration are compared to permit specific statements regarding incentive aspects in a DRG setting. Moreover, several standardized Patient-Report-Outcome-Measures (PROMs) are considered in the context of complex treatment to allow not only for efficiency, but also effectiveness evaluation.
RESULTS: In total, 375 patients with complex treatment for rheumatic conditions were surveyed from 2013 to 2018. The incentive is slightly below (4,821.05 €) the costs incurred for complex treatments (4,972.44 €). The results of the used PROMs are positive as pain intensity decreased considerably (p <.001, r=0.75) and mental state complaints were reduced (p <.001).
CONCLUSIONS: PROMs are valid instruments to capture changes in patient well-being. They also help to improve clinical operations and can be used for benchmarking. The P4P approach should cover the costs incurred to ensure the incentive structure.
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Shenoy, Amrita. "The Merit-based Incentive Payment System: Pearson’s Chi-Square and Categorical Dependent Variable Models Analyzed for Domains—Effective Clinical Care and Efficiency/Cost Reduction." Journal of Health Economics and Outcomes Research 8, no. 2 (December 6, 2021): 93–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.36469/jheor.2021.29971.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Background: Following the 2015 repeal of the Sustainable Growth Rate formula, the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ formula under which physicians were reimbursed, two payment systems were put in place to incentivize physicians, one of which was the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). MIPS emphasizes high-quality care that is accessible, affordable, and supports a healthier population. Objectives: This research aims to measure characteristics of MIPS relevant to National Quality Strategy (NQS) domains, quality measure types, and clinical specialties; categorize MIPS with NQS domains and quality measure types by MIPS specialty types; and quantify the relationship between MIPS specialties, measure types, and two NQS domains, Effective Clinical Care (ECC) and Efficiency/Cost Reduction (E/CR), for years 2017 through 2020. Methodology: The Pearson’s chi-square test examined distributions of the analyzed categorical variables. The Categorical Dependent Variable Method examined the association between the dependent and independent variables. Results: The Pearson’s chi-square test showed statistically significant distributions between ECC and E/CR when analyzed with the types of quality measures. There were more process measures (93.81% vs 89.64% [P=.000]) in 2018 versus 2017. This changed minutely with significantly less process measures (93.75% vs 93.81% [P=.000]) in 2019 versus 2018. Finally, measure types changed minutely but significantly with less process measures (93.81% vs 93.75% [P=.000]) in 2020 versus 2019. The regression model showed that ECC was significantly associated with outcome measures through all analyzed years of this research. Conclusion: The above findings show scope for including additional outcome measures, given its importance in MIPS. There is potential to increase the percentage allocation for reporting more outcome measures in quality. This re-allotment infers reporting more outcome measures aligning with priority outcome measures (PROMs). Re-allocating the incentive formula to report more outcome measures aligned with PROMs shows potential to increase reporting of more outcome measures under MIPS.
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Ghani, Hafiza Muriam, Sumaiyah Obaid, Zahid Mehmood Bhatti, Maryam Razzaq, Maria Razzaq, Aiman Niaz, and Sadaf Waris. "Comparison of Balloon-Blowing Exercise and Incentive Spirometry after Thoracotomy." Pakistan Journal of Medical and Health Sciences 16, no. 1 (January 30, 2022): 486–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.53350/pjmhs22161486.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Objective: The objective of this study is to compare effect of balloon blowing exercise & incentive spirometer on Chest expansion, Improvement in lung volumes and capacities, Level of dyspnoea, and on Improvement in progression of walk in post-thoracotomy stable patients. Study Design: Randomized Controlled Trial Place and Duration of Study: Study was conducted in thoracic surgical ICU of Gulab Devi Hospital, Lahore for the period of 6 months from September 2018 - February 2019. Patients and Methods: The sample size was calculated through Open Epi, and it was 48. 24 subjects were assigned to control group A and 24 to experimental group B through non-purposive random sampling technique. Data was collected at base line, 3rd and 5th day after exercise therapy on above stated outcome measures, by using Tape Measure, Digital Spirometer, RPE Scale and Pedometer respectively, from non-critical post-thoracotomy patients. Control Group-A performed routine respiratory physiotherapy + incentive spirometry and Experimental Group- B performed routine respiratory physiotherapy + balloon blowing exercise. Results: BBE + routine respiratory physiotherapy was found equally effective on mentioned outcome measure as Incentive Spirometry + routine respiratory physiotherapy in stated patients. (P >0.05) Conclusion: Based upon statistical analysis, it can be concluded that incentive spirometer can be replaced with balloon-blowing exercise with conventional/routine respiratory physiotherapy in thoracotomy patients who have lung surgeries, to overcome post-op pulmonary complications or to achieve the same outcomes as that of incentive spirometer. Keywords: BBE, Incentive Spirometer, Routine Respiratory Physiotherapy, Post-Thoracotomy Patients
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Owan, Hideo, Tsuyoshi Tsuru, and Katsuhito Uehara. "Incentives and gaming in a nonlinear compensation scheme." Evidence-based HRM: a Global Forum for Empirical Scholarship 3, no. 3 (December 7, 2015): 222–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ebhrm-09-2014-0023.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose – Under a discontinuous and nonlinear compensation scheme, which is prevalent among car dealerships, the amount of a salesperson’s expected daily commission depends primarily on his position in the pay schedule on the day he makes a sale. Salespeople thus vary their efforts and adopt a different pricing strategy week by week, or even day by day. The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive effect of such a nonlinear scheme and provide the evidence that salespeople’s behavior is consistent with the theory. Design/methodology/approach – The authors conduct regression analyses using the transaction data provided by two North American auto dealerships. The authors construct a daily measure of varying incentive intensity and evaluate its impact on the distribution of individual daily sales and the dealership’s gross profit rate. Findings – The authors find that the daily measure of varying incentive intensity has a positive effect on the distribution of individual daily sales and a negative impact on the dealership’s gross profit rate. The results suggest that: salespeople adjust their effort levels in response to the intensity of incentives; and they game the system by lowering the prices when the marginal return to doing so is high. Research limitations/implications – The study shows that there is a high cost associated with the discontinuous nonlinear pay scheme, raising the question of why many auto dealerships use it. Originality/value – This paper sheds light on the undesirable aspects of discontinuous and nonlinear incentive schemes, varied performance and gaming, by quantifying the effects of the worker’s behavior.
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Brink, Alisa G., and Frederick W. Rankin. "The Effects of Risk Preference and Loss Aversion on Individual Behavior under Bonus, Penalty, and Combined Contract Frames." Behavioral Research in Accounting 25, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 145–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-50408.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT: This study examines the effects of risk preference and loss aversion on individual responses to differently framed, yet economically equivalent, incentive contracts. We extend prior research by examining contracts with combinations of bonus, penalty, and clawback incentives. Contracts framed as a combination of bonus and penalty incentives, especially those framed as a clawback, are less attractive to participants than contracts with bonus- or penalty-only incentives. Further, research suggests that individuals' contract preferences are due primarily to loss aversion. We test this conjecture with a new measure of loss aversion. Results indicate that our measure of loss aversion is well calibrated to encompass variation in loss aversion. In addition, participants' loss preferences explain a significant portion of the differences in observed behavior. Importantly, this relation is less significant for clawback contracts, indicating that other preferences may be driving individuals' strong reactions to these contract frames.
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Krishnan, Ranjani, Joan L. Luft, and Michael D. Shields. "Effects of Accounting-Method Choices on Subjective Performance-Measure Weighting Decisions: Experimental Evidence on Precision and Error Covariance." Accounting Review 80, no. 4 (October 1, 2005): 1163–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2005.80.4.1163.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Performance-measure weights for incentive compensation are often determined subjectively. Determining these weights is a cognitively difficult task, and archival research shows that observed performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Ittner et al. (2003) have concluded that psychology theory can help to explain such inconsistencies. In an experimental setting based on Feltham and Xie (1994), we use psychology theories of reasoning to predict distinctive patterns of similarity and difference between optimal and actual subjective performance-measure weights. The following predictions are supported. First, in contrast to a number of prior studies, most individuals' decisions are significantly influenced by the performance measures' error variance (precision) and error covariance. Second, directional errors in the use of these measurement attributes are relatively frequent, resulting in a mean underreaction to an accounting change that alters performance measurement error. Third, individuals seem insufficiently aware that a change in the accounting for one measure has spillover effects on the optimal weighting of the other measure in a two-measure incentive system. In consequence, they make performance-measure weighting decisions that are likely to result in misallocations of agent effort.
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Narpati, Bintang, Kardinah Indrianna Meutia, and ,. Endah Prawesti Ningrum. "The The Role of Giving Incentives and Workload for Employees of Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Bekasi Branch." Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Statistik Indonesia 2, no. 1 (April 21, 2022): 35–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.11594/jesi.02.01.05.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The purpose of this research is to measure the impact of the effect of providing incentives on the workload of employees at BPR Lestari Bekasi Branch. Quantitative descriptive analysis in this study involved 35 (thirty five) employees and used non-probability sampling. Data collected by making a questionnaire and distributed to employees of the company. From this research, it can be concluded that there is a positive and significant impact of providing incentives and workload on the variable of employee productivity at PT. BPR Lestari Bekasi Branch. The statistical test results obtained are incentives and workloads have a positive effect with a coefficient of determination of 78.70% on work productivity and partially each variable has a positive effect and significance on the dependent variable. An increase in the value of incentives and workload can increase the work productivity variable positively and vice versa if there is a decrease in the independent variable it can have an impact on a decrease in the dependent variable. Incentive variables affect the work productivity of employees of PT. BPR Lestari is indicated by the T-count > T-table value, namely (3.566 > 2.035) sig. 0.001 < 0.05 in this case the role of incentives has a positive and significant effect on employee productivity. The workload variable has an impact on the work productivity of PT. BPR Lestari. T-test results > T-table (7.391 > 2.035), sig. 0.000 < 0.05. Simultaneously the two independent variables Incentive and Workload have a positive and significant impact on the dependent variable, namely Work Productivity. The result of the Coefficient of Determination or R Square is 0.787, which means that this incentive has contributed 78.70% to the Work Productivity of PT. BPR Lestari Bekasi Branch.
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GIESECKE, MATTHIAS, and GUANZHONG YANG. "Are financial retirement incentives more effective if pension knowledge is high?" Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 17, no. 3 (December 14, 2017): 278–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474747217000439.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractWe study the combined effects of financial incentives and information provision on retirement behavior. To elicit preferences for retirement timing in the laboratory, we ask subjects to make retirement choices under different payoff schemes that introduce variation in financial incentives. Testing ceteris paribus conditions of the financial incentive alone shows a considerable delay of retirement once early retirement becomes financially less attractive. However, varying available information as another treatment parameter reveals considerable heterogeneity in the functioning of these incentives. Subjects who are explicitly informed about the expected pension wealth respond more strongly to financial incentives compared with those who only know their pension annuity. Being informed about a forward-looking measure of pension benefits makes the financial consequences of retirement choices more salient to the decision maker.
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Hogan, Michelle. "CMS Proposes to Retire Lower Hemoglobin Measure from Quality Incentive Program." Nephrology Times 4, no. 7 (July 2011): 8–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/01.nep.0000403740.45579.a7.
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De Geest, Gerrit, Jacques Siegers, and Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe. "The expectation measure, labor contracts, and the incentive to work hard☆." International Review of Law and Economics 21, no. 1 (March 2001): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0144-8188(00)00034-x.
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Rutten, Robert J., and Luc Damé. "SIMURIS: High-Resolution Solar Physics." International Astronomical Union Colloquium 141 (1993): 184–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0252921100029055.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractThe magnetic fields of the Sun provide the major incentive to do solar physics. The small spatial extent of the magnetically constrained structures and processes in the solar atmosphere provide the major incentive for high resolution solar telescopes. The visibility of the outer solar atmosphere in the ultraviolet and X-ray domains provide the major incentive for solar space telescopes. Cost provides the major incentive to use interferometric techniques. SIMURIS employs short-wave interferometry from space to measure solar structures and processes with high resolution.
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Reichert, Bernhard E., and Alexander Woods. "Does Motivational Orientation Impact the Effectiveness of Incentive Contracts?" Journal of Management Accounting Research 29, no. 2 (July 1, 2016): 87–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-51539.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT Research in psychology has identified that individuals have two distinct neurologically based motivational systems. One system is the behavioral activation system (BAS), which activates individual motivation in response to signals of reward in order to “achieve success.” The second system is the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which activates motivation in response to signals of goal conflict in order to “avoid failure.” We predict and find that a stronger, rather than weaker, BIS attenuates the positive effect of sensitive performance measures on performance. In contrast, the BAS does not moderate the effect of performance measure sensitivity on performance.
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Kazachenko, Oleksandr V., Olesia K. Vasyliaka, Larysa V. Chornozub, and Olha M. Musychenko. "Taxonomy of compulsory and incentive legal consequences (legal measures) of committing illegal acts." Cuestiones Políticas 38, Especial II (December 8, 2020): 151–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.382e.11.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article is prepared for the purpose of publishing the results of scientific research obtained in the process of applying the taxonomic methodology for systematization of measures of legal influence. The methodology used the approaches of philosophical and legal theorization, a dog and systemic functional. One way of conclusion is proposed for the first time to use the taxonomies of legal measures. The study highlighted three aspects of legal measures: relational, predicate and functional. The relational manifestation of taxonomy allowed to identify the substrate of the external form of legal influence, which is the measure. It has been established that the form and method of legal influence is the dominant element of each legal measure. The predicative dimension of taxonomy allowed to form a taxonomic system of information in which the following taxonomic categories and taxa are distinguished: type - social events; subtype - legal measures; class - public and private legal measures; gender - separation of legal measures according to their sectoral affiliation; subgenre: the allocation of incentives and coercive measures; supervision - legal measures in their various forms and other measures that have no signs of legal liability.
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Berzofsky, Marcus E., Lynn Langton, Christopher Krebs, Christine Lindquist, and Michael Planty. "Methods for Improving Representativeness in a Web Survey on Sexual Assault Among College Students." Journal of Interpersonal Violence 34, no. 23-24 (September 12, 2019): 4838–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260519871526.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Many colleges and universities conduct web-based campus climate surveys to understand the prevalence and nature of sexual assault among their students. When designing and fielding a web survey to measure a sensitive topic like sexual assault, methodological decisions, including the length of the field period and the use or amount of an incentive, can affect the representativeness of the respondent sample leading to biased or imprecise estimates. This study uses data from the Campus Climate Survey Validation Study (CCSVS) to assess how the interaction between field period length and survey incentive amount affects nonresponse, sample representativeness, and the precision of survey estimates. Research suggests that using robust incentives gives potential survey respondents a reason to complete the survey beyond their intrinsic motivation to do so. Likewise, extending the field period gives more time to people who may be less intrinsically motivated to complete the survey. Both serve to increase sample size and representativeness, minimize bias, and improve estimate precision. Schools, however, sometimes lack the time and/or resources for both a robust incentive and a lengthy field period, and this study examines the extent to which the potential negative impacts of not using one can be mitigated by the presence of the other. Findings indicate that target response rates can be achieved using a smaller incentive if the field period is lengthy but, even with a lengthy field period, the use of a smaller incentive can result in biased estimates due to a lack of representativeness. Conversely, when a robust incentive is used and weights are developed to adjust for nonresponse, a shorter field period will not have a significant impact on point estimates, but the estimates will be less precise due to fewer respondents participating in the survey.
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Mohammad, Ryan, Helmi Zus Rizal, and Gede Satria Pujanggo, PG. "EFEK INSENTIF PERPAJAKAN BERDASARKAN DASAR PENGENAAN PAJAK DAN TARIF PAJAK TERHADAP EKONOMI SECARA MAKRO : STUDI KASUS INDONESIA." Scientax 2, no. 2 (April 27, 2021): 179–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.52869/st.v2i2.91.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Due to National Economy Recovery program, the Indonesian Government had conducted severalTax Incentive Policies to escalate economic growth faster. However, we have not found any studyto measure the policies' effect on macroeconomic indicators. In this paper, we attempt to find theimpact of Tax Incentive Policies that had been implemented for the end of the year of 2018. Ourpurpose is solely to find general understanding and knowledge about Tax Incentive Policies' effecton Macroeconomy. Based on the examination test using The Impulse Response Function method,we discovered that Tax Incentive Policies positively impact Investment, gross domestic product, and unemployment.Specifically, Tax Incentive Policies based on Tax Rates have a better positive impact than TaxIncentive Policies based on Tax Base. However, those impact only relatively sustains in a short period.
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Seuken, Sven, Jie Tang, and David Parkes. "Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 24, no. 1 (July 4, 2010): 860–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7629.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In distributed work systems, individual users perform work for other users. A significant challenge in these systems is to provide proper incentives for users to contribute as much work as they consume, even when monitoring is not possible. We formalize the problem of designing "incentive-compatible accounting mechanisms" that measure the net contributions of users, despite relying on voluntary reports. We introduce the Drop-Edge Mechanism that removes any incentive for a user to manipulate via misreports about work contributed or consumed. We prove that Drop-Edge provides a good approximation to a user's net contribution, and is accurate in the limit as the number of users grows. We demonstrate very good welfare properties in simulation compared to an existing, manipulable mechanism. In closing, we show the power of sybil attacks in accounting mechanisms and discuss our ongoing work, including a real-world implementation and evaluation of the Drop-Edge Mechanism in a BitTorrent client.
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Brigido, Williamson Johnny Hatzinakis, José Fábio De Oliveira, Paulo Evelton Lemos De Sousa, and João Carlos Felix Souza. "Using PLS Path Modelling in Education System: A Model to Measure the Academic Performance Score." European Journal of Teaching and Education 3, no. 3 (December 20, 2021): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/ejte.v3i3.643.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Partial Least Square (PLS) was used the path modelling. Latent variables such as staff, institution (administration, number of enrolments, quality of laboratories, rooms, etc.), incentive applied for research and Academic Performance Score (APS) were proposed. The indicators available on Brazilian universities were chosen for this article, they were tested and duly validated, as well as the reliability of these items and the variables represented by them. The result was the model explains satisfactorily well the Academic Performance Score (APS) with a R2 of 70.6%, with the Institution contributing the most to the model, for approximately 35.4%. Next, the incentive to research contributes 29.2%. In addition, the hypotheses generated in this article, except one, adequately support the model.
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Li, Qianqian, Yong Jae Shin, and Unyong Pyo. "Impacts of CEO Incentives and Power on Employee Wages." International Academy of Global Business and Trade 18, no. 6 (December 31, 2022): 33–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.20294/jgbt.2022.18.6.33.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose - This study investigates the impact of CEO incentive compensation and power on employee wages. While CEO compensation negatively affects employee wages, powerful CEOs may care for employees, and their compensation can have positive impacts on employee wages.
Design/Methodology/Approach - Using data from US capital markets during 1992 - 2017, we employ pay-performance sensitivity to measure incentive compensation and CEO pay slices to proxy CEO power. We also examined the potential interaction effects between CEO compensation and CEO power. We conduct a Heckman two-step analysis to address potential sample bias and two-stage regression to address potential endogeneity.
Findings - While incentive compensation negatively affects employee wages, CEO power positively affects employee wages. When examining the interaction effect between incentive compensation and CEO power, we note that the incentive effect is negative on employee wages only when the CEO is less powerful. However, when the CEO is more powerful, the incentive effect is positive on employee wages.
Research Implications - When firms grant incentive compensation to CEOs for firm performance, they must also consider CEO power. Our results imply that CEO incentive compensation has a positive impact on employee wages when a CEO becomes more powerful. More incentive compensation to less-powerful CEOs could suppress employee wages and hurt firm performance in the long run.
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Holman, Joseph, Roberto Salvatori, Elliot K. Fishman, and Pamela T. Johnson. "Caveat regarding CMS Merit-based Incentive Payment Systems incidental adrenal nodule measure." Abdominal Radiology 44, no. 3 (December 6, 2018): 1152–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00261-018-1834-3.
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Weaver, A. Charlotta, Nita Kulkarni, and Rachel Cyrus. "What’s in it for me? Incentive compensation in hospital medicine." Journal of Hospital Administration 7, no. 2 (March 14, 2018): 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/jha.v7n2p18.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Objective: Though salary models vary, a portion of physician compensation is often provided as a bonus, or incentive payment, based on clinical productivity measured by the relative value unit (RVU). However, many hospitalists are involved in activities beyond clinical work, either administrative or educational, that may be difficult to measure and recognize in bonus payments. Furthermore, the changing nature of physician and hospital reimbursement necessitates a focus on quality measures not incentivized in the traditional RVU model.Methods: The authors describe a compensation model in an academic hospital medicine program that was initially developed in 2010 and modified in 2013. The model incents clinical productivity and adherence to quality metrics while also promoting nonclinical academic and administrative activities.Results: Implementation of this compensation model impacted the division’s quality goals by increasing completion of discharge summaries, reconciliation of discharge medications, and placement of follow-up appointment orders upon discharge. The impact on clinical and academic productivity is less clear.Conclusions: A compensation model that accounts for academic productivity and quality goals along with clinical productivity may be useful in incentivizing hospitalists in both academic and community-based hospital medicine practices. Future work should focus on whether such a model can be used effectively to address additional targets such as reducing readmissions and preventing hospital-acquired conditions.
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Singgih, Moses Laksono, and Bhakti Yudha P. "Pengukuran Produktivitas Personel dalam Penentuan Pemberian Insentif Karyawan di Perusahaan Pembangkit Listrik." Jurnal Teknik Industri 8, no. 1 (February 26, 2008): 60–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/jtiumm.vol8.no1.60-66.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The measurement of productivity employer was crucial for the development of a organization and company. This was influenced for the company's working. One of the electricity's source company wanted to know how the achievements of employer's productivity are. This research is focused to maintaining department which concerned with three level division, they were specialist, supervisor, staff or technician crew. This research have done by using Will, can, May approach as the way to measure of the productivity's measurement. To conduct this research, it must be known the criterion of each elements, it used brainstorming with the company, and also the literature's reference. Another method which was used in this research is the priority each Will, Can, and May elements used Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and fuzzy method to found single value which can form the productivity each employer as the achievement every elements of Will, can, and May. The result of this research showed that the productivity's achievement in middle and high scale from 43 employers who have measured their productivity. From the result of productivity's approach which have done was to know how are incentives which have got as the result of productivity each employer, and the result of incentive giving which have formulated gave the higher incentive's value than before. The result of giving more motivate the productivity of employer and the incentive's measurement didn't decrease the company from the benefit of allocation which is old incentive's giving and it is not look the stagnancy's nominal.
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Li, Qianqian, and Unyong Pyo. "Impacts of Top Five Executives’ Compensation on Employee Wages." International Journal of Financial Research 12, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v12n1p242.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper studies the impacts of incentive compensation to top five executives on employee wages. We employ pay-performance sensitivity to measure executive incentive compensation. Using the sample during 1992 – 2017, we find that executive compensation has negative impacts on employee wages. In addition, we examine the impacts of executive incentive compensation on employee wages in different industries and find that the impacts are more severe in technology firms than in non-technology firms. Finally, we show that the executives with higher incentive compensation are more likely to suppress employee wages in financially safe firms. Our results suggest that while top management teams are compensated as a team on average, they are compensated as isolated individuals on other aspects. Furthermore, firm performance may not always improve in the long run by granting high incentive compensation to top executives.
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Heisey-Grove, Dawn M., Hilary K. Wall, and Janet S. Wright. "Electronic clinical quality measure reporting challenges: findings from the Medicare EHR Incentive Program’s Controlling High Blood Pressure Measure." Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 25, no. 2 (May 19, 2017): 127–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jamia/ocx049.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract Objective To identify physician and practice characteristics associated with high clinical and technical performance on the electronic clinical quality measure (eCQM) that calculates the proportion of patients with hypertension who have controlled blood pressure. Materials and Methods The study included 268 602 physicians participating in the Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program between 2011 and 2014. Independent variables included delivery reform participation and physician, practice level, and area characteristics. Successful technical performance was a reported eCQM with non-zero values in both the numerator and denominator. Successful clinical performance was a reported eCQM value of ≥70% hypertension control. Results Physicians with longer experience using certified health information technology, participants in delivery reform programs, and specialists that traditionally manage hypertension were 5%–15% more likely to achieve 70% control. Physicians in smaller and rural practices and a subset of physicians unlikely to primarily manage hypertension were more likely to submit measures with a zero value in either the numerator or denominator. Discussion More physicians are using eCQMs to track and report their quality improvement efforts. This research presents the first examination of national eCQM data to identify physician and practice-level characteristics associated with performance. Conclusion With careful selection of measures relevant to the clinician’s specialty, complete data entry, and support for continuous quality improvement, health care professionals can excel technically and clinically. As care delivery transitions from fee-for-service to quality- and value-based models, high performers may realize financial gains and better patient outcomes. These analyses suggest patterns that may inform steps to improve performance.
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Yu, Zhimin (Jimmy). "Financial Report Readability and Accounting Conservatism." Journal of Risk and Financial Management 15, no. 10 (October 11, 2022): 454. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15100454.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Accounting conservatism could affect the quantitative information on a financial statement. In this paper, the author focuses on qualitative information on financial statements. The author investigates the association between financial report readability and accounting conservatism and uses the FOG index to measure financial report readability. By using management discussion and analysis (MD&A) from 1996 to 2019, the author finds that financial report readability is positively associated with accounting conservatism. Additionally, the author separates the samples into high-compensation incentive and low-compensation incentive subsamples. The results show that the above association is stronger in the high-compensation incentive samples than in the low-compensation incentive samples. This result implies that accounting conservatism could mitigate managerial opportunism in the qualitative disclosure setting.
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Tomich, Georgia Miranda, Danielle Corrêa França, Marco Túlio Costa Diniz, Raquel Rodrigues Britto, Rosana Ferreira Sampaio, and Verônica Franco Parreira. "Effects of breathing exercises on breathing pattern and thoracoabdominal motion after gastroplasty." Jornal Brasileiro de Pneumologia 36, no. 2 (April 2010): 197–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s1806-37132010000200007.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
OBJECTIVE: To evaluate breathing pattern and thoracoabdominal motion during breathing exercises. METHODS: Twenty-four patients with class II or III obesity (18 women; 6 men) were studied on the second postoperative day after gastroplasty. The mean age was 37 ± 11 years, and the mean BMI was 44 ± 3 kg/m². Diaphragmatic breathing, incentive spirometry with a flow-oriented device and incentive spirometry with a volume-oriented device were performed in random order. Respiratory inductive plethysmography was used in order to measure respiratory variables and thoracoabdominal motion. RESULTS: Comparisons among the three exercises showed significant differences: tidal volume was higher during incentive spirometry (with the flow-oriented device or with the volume-oriented device) than during diaphragmatic breathing; the respiratory rate was lower during incentive spirometry with the volume-oriented device than during incentive spirometry with the flow-oriented device; and minute ventilation was higher during incentive spirometry (with the flow-oriented device or with the volume-oriented device) than during diaphragmatic breathing. Rib cage motion did not vary during breathing exercises, although there was an increase in thoracoabdominal asynchrony, especially during incentive spirometry with the flow-oriented device. CONCLUSIONS: Among the breathing exercises evaluated, incentive spirometry with the volume-oriented device provided the best results, because it allowed slower, deeper inhalation.
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Gayathiri, T., and D. Anandhi. "Efficacy of Incentive Spirometry in Expiratory Muscle Training Following Abdominal Surgery." Biomedical and Pharmacology Journal 14, no. 1 (March 30, 2021): 335–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.13005/bpj/2131.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
BACKGROUND: Incentive spirometry is a device which helps in the improvement of lung function after abdominal surgery. It motivates the patients by giving visual feedback about their lung volumes. It is one of the less expensive and user-friendlydevices. Incentive spirometry facilitates the patients to take slow deep breath and there by producing a sustained maximal inspiration (SMI) that mainly helps in the prevention of atelectasis. But it is a common practice for physiotherapists to teach the patients to do expiratory exercise by reversing the incentive spirometer. The simplest way to measure the maximal inspiratory and expiratory pressures is by respiratory pressure meter in cmH2o. OBJECTIVE: To find out the efficacy of incentive spirometer in improving the expiratory muscle strength following abdominal surgery. METHODOLOGY: Quasi-Experimental study. PROCEDURE: 30 subjects were conveniently selected based on inclusion and exclusion criteria and allotted to group A (n=15) and group B (n= 15). Both groups were trained for inspiratory muscle and group A was also trained for expiratory muscle using incentive spirometry. OUTCOME MEASURES: Maximal inspiratory pressure (MIP), Maximal expiratory pressure (MEP). RESULT: This study shows that the mean MIP value have improved from 2nd to 7th postoperative day, but it is not statistically significant (P>0.05). The mean MEP values shows statistically significant (P<0.05) improvement from second to 7th postoperative day in group A when compared to group B. CONCLUSION:This study concludes that there is significant improvement in the expiratory muscle strength along with inspiratory muscle strength by training with the Incentive spirometry in the upside down and upright positions respectively.
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Choi, Jongwoon (Willie), Gary W. Hecht, and William B. Tayler. "Lost in Translation: The Effects of Incentive Compensation on Strategy Surrogation." Accounting Review 87, no. 4 (July 1, 2012): 1135–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10273.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
ABSTRACT To facilitate managers' decision-making, firms develop strategic performance measurement systems that translate strategy into performance measures. Ideally, managers see measures for what they are—imperfect proxies for intangible strategic constructs. However, managers may fail to fully appreciate the fact that measures are merely representations of the strategic constructs, and act as though the measures are the construct of interest—a phenomenon we label surrogation. In this paper, we investigate whether and how the use of strategically linked performance measures for compensation purposes affects managers' propensity to exhibit surrogation. In accordance with the attribute substitution framework (Kahneman and Frederick 2002), we predict incentive compensation exacerbates surrogation, and that this effect is more prevalent when managers are compensated on a single measure of a strategic construct than when managers are compensated on multiple measures of a strategic construct. Via two experiments, we find support for these hypotheses. Our paper contributes to the literature on strategic performance measurement systems by highlighting the tendency of managers to use measures as surrogates for strategy. More generally, we identify a by-product of contracting on imperfect performance measures not previously considered in extant literature, and establish when consideration of costs of this by-product are likely to be critical.
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Wan, Yujie, Minglan Fu, Lvqiang Chen, Debao Chen, Jiekun Li, Wei Zhou, and Mengxue Liu. "Research on Dynamic Task Allocation Algorithm to Improve User Participation in the Witkey Mode." Advances in Multimedia 2022 (April 23, 2022): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5301768.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The task allocation process in the Witkey mode is dynamic and open, in which Witkey is a rational person. Due to Witkey's individual rationality, in order to make the result of task allocation stable, task allocation must reach the Nash equilibrium. However, the Nash equilibrium point does not necessarily have the highest total system revenue. In order to make the task allocation result stable and have a high total system revenue, this paper proposes an incentive measure based on integral ranking to improve user participation. When Witkey adopts the best response strategy to select task, the order of participating in the selection will affect the individual income of Witkey to a certain extent. The higher the order, the greater the probability of obtaining higher system income. Based on this idea, a dynamic task allocation algorithm with complex tasks in the Witkey mode is proposed by combining incentive measures with best response strategy and reasonable benefit allocation strategy. The finally simulation results verified the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, and the impact of incentive measures on the total revenue of the system was also examined.
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Wang, Zhi, Qinghua Zhang, and Li-An Zhou. "Career Incentives of City Leaders and Urban Spatial Expansion in China." Review of Economics and Statistics 102, no. 5 (December 2020): 897–911. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00862.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the critical role that politics play in shaping the spatial dimension of China's urbanization and the related welfare implications. Utilizing a large data set of residential land transactions matched with city leaders in 200 Chinese cities from 2000 through 2011, the empirical analysis finds that a 1 standard deviation increase in the career-incentive measure leads to 9 additional kilometers of outward expansion, a 23% increase relative to the sample average. It also finds some suggestive evidence pointing to the distortionary impacts of overly strong incentives of city leaders on spatial expansion, consistent with the theory.