Готові списки джерел за темами / Government-Opposition Dynamics

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Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Government-Opposition Dynamics"

Автор: Grafiati
Опубліковано: 11 березня 2023

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Статті в журналах з теми "Government-Opposition Dynamics"

1

Treib, Oliver. "Party Politics, National Interests and Government—Opposition Dynamics." European Union Politics 11, no. 1 (February 24, 2010): 119–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116509353690.

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2

Gemenis, Kostas, and Roula Nezi. "Government–Opposition Dynamics during the Economic Crisis in Greece." Journal of Legislative Studies 21, no. 1 (August 20, 2014): 14–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2014.939562.

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3

Baron, David P. "Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments." American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (September 1998): 593–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585483.

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Анотація:
This article presents a dynamic theory of parliamentary governments that incorporates attributes of the institutional system in a country, exogenous events that shape parliamentary and electoral opportunities, and the strategies of the government and the opposition as structured by institutions and preferences. The dynamics are investigated in an infinitely repeated game in which events in the form of shocks to income or government resources occur and the government responds with a legislative proposal that is subject to a confidence or censure procedure and may lead to government continuation, reorganization, or dissolution. With a majority confidence procedure, governments are stable, and if parties are politically patient, voting cohesion within the government is high. A censure motion initiated by the opposition can result in voluntary dissolution of government, and the approach of required elections increases the likelihood of dissolution. If the events represent fluctuations in aggregate income, governnment dissolution occurs in good times for the government leader and bad times for the other parties.
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4

Buckles, Grant T. "Internal Opposition Dynamics and Restraints on Authoritarian Control." British Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 11, 2017): 883–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000126.

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Autocrats rely on co-optation to limit opposition mobilization and remain in power. Yet not all opposition parties that pose a threat to their regime are successfully co-opted. This article provides a formal model to show that reliance on activists influences whether an opposition leader receives and accepts co-optation offers from an autocrat. Activists strengthen a party’s mobilization efforts, yet become disaffected when their leader acquiesces to the regime. This dynamic undermines the co-optation of parties with a strong activist base, particularly those with unitary leadership. Activists have less influence over elite negotiations in parties with divided leadership, which can promote collusion with the regime. The results ultimately suggest that party activism can erode authoritarian control, but may encourage wasteful conflicts with the government.
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5

RINGE, NILS. "Government-opposition dynamics in the European Union: The Santer Commission resignation crisis." European Journal of Political Research 44, no. 5 (August 2005): 671–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00243.x.

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6

Murillo, María Victoria. "Recovering Political Dynamics: Teachers' Unions and the Decentralization of Education in Argentina and Mexico." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 41, no. 1 (1999): 31–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/166226.

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Анотація:
This article compares union-government relations in Mexico and Argentina when education was decentralized in the early 1990s. The Mexican union accepted decentralization after obtaining concessions from the government that placated its opposition; but the Argentine teachers’ unions militantly resisted the reforms, only to see government officials ignore their demands. These cases illustrate the significance of partisan identities, union fragmentation, and leadership competition in the interaction of public sector unions and government officials.
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7

Peña, Alejandro Milcíades, and Thomas Richard Davies. "RESPONDING TO THE STREET: GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO MASS PROTESTS IN DEMOCRACIES*." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 22, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 177–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/1086-671x-22-2-177.

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Анотація:
This article proposes two models that address the neglected relationship between protests, government countermovement strategies, and democratic politics. By contrasting centrifugal and centripetal dynamics triggered by government responses to mass protest, the models theorize the link between government counterframes and opposition politics in democracies. The strategies deployed by the Argentine and Brazilian governments during the cycle of mass protests that erupted in these countries in 2012–13 are used in illustration. The counterframing models developed in this article shed new light on the role of government responses in the dynamics of contentious politics, with potential for application to other contentious episodes and political contexts.
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8

Hix, Simon, and Abdul Noury. "Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures." Political Science Research and Methods 4, no. 2 (June 17, 2015): 249–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.9.

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Анотація:
This study uses roll-call voting data from 16 legislatures to investigate how the institutional context of politics—such as whether a country is a parliamentary or presidential regime, or has a single-party, coalition or minority government—shapes coalition formation and voting behavior in parliaments. It uses a geometric scaling metric to estimate the “revealed space” in each of these legislatures and a vote-by-vote statistical analysis to identify how much of this space can be explained by government-opposition dynamics as opposed to parties’ (left-right) policy positions. Government-opposition interests, rather than parties’ policy positions, are found to be the main drivers of voting behavior in most institutional contexts. In contrast, issue-by-issue coalition building along a single policy dimension is only found under certain restrictive institutional constraints: presidential regimes with coalition governments or parliamentary systems with minority governments. Put another way, voting in most legislatures is more like Westminster than Washington.
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9

Sunarto, Sunarto. "The Dynamics of Relationship Between Legislative and Executive in Post Reformation Era: A Critical Thinking for Amendment of the 1945 Constitution." Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review 4, no. 1 (January 15, 2019): 138–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v4i1.17455.

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Анотація:
Amendment of the 1945 Constitution brought significant shifting on the Indonesian government. Before amendment, the government was dominated by the enormous power of President (executive heavy). The amendment strengthens the DPR’s power realizing the checks and balances between DPR and President. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution also brought the purification of presidential system. These two things make the dynamics of relationship between the DPR and the President. In post amendments, the government is characterized by an increasing controlling function of DPR. But the combination of presidential system and the multi-party still brings problem related to government instability. Relationship between the DPR and the President was strongly influenced by the presence of opposition parties, which in the previous was regarded as “a taboo” in Indonesian democracy. On the other hand, the elected president also became a strong magnet to get the support of political parties in DPR. Therefore, certain parties that previously became the government’s opposition crossed and supported government. Thus, the presumption that the elected President would find difficulties in implementing his policies because of the lack of support in the DPR was not proven.
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10

So, Florence. "More spotlight, more problems? Westminster parliamentary systems and leadership replacement in large opposition parties." Party Politics 24, no. 5 (November 21, 2016): 588–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816678885.

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Анотація:
In this article, I argue that Westminster parliamentary systems encourage large opposition parties to replace their leaders between elections. Parliamentary system structures how parties compete over legislative outcomes. In Westminster systems, the government’s dominance in the legislative process promotes an adversarial government–opposition relationship. Subsequently, large opposition parties’ electoral prospects are tied to their ability to discredit the government’s policy agenda. Since this responsibility falls to party leaders, leaders of large opposition parties directly affect their parties’ electoral prospects, and parties are more motivated to replace those who are ineffective in damaging the government’s credibility. Therefore, leaders of large opposition parties in Westminster systems carry a higher risk of replacement than their counterparts in other parliamentary systems. I construct an original data set on party leadership turnover in 14 established parliamentary democracies. Results from Cox proportional hazard models support my claim and suggest that institution influences intraparty dynamics.
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Більше джерел

Дисертації з теми "Government-Opposition Dynamics"

1

Høyland, Bjørn Kåre. "Government - opposition dynamics in the European Parliament." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.415900.

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Книги з теми "Government-Opposition Dynamics"

1

Bulut, Alper T., and T. Murat Yildirim. Political Stability and Agenda Dynamics: Government, Opposition and Policy Agendas in Turkey. Springer International Publishing AG, 2019.

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2

Moury, Catherine, and Elisabetta De Giorgi. Great Recession, Great Cooperation?: Government-Opposition Dynamics in Southern European Countries During the Financial Crisis. Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.

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3

Kraetzschmar, Hendrik Jan. Dynamics of Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious Politics in Times of Change. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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4

Kraetzschmar, Hendrik Jan. Dynamics of Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious Politics in Times of Change. Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.

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5

Kraetzschmar, Hendrik Jan. Dynamics of Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious Politics in Times of Change. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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6

Kraetzschmar, Hendrik Jan. Dynamics of Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious Politics in Times of Change. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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7

Dynamics of Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious Politics in Times of Change. Taylor & Francis Group, 2012.

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8

Kraetzschmar, Hendrik Jan. Dynamics of Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious Politics in Times of Change. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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9

Pfaff, Steven. Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution of 1989. Duke University Press, 2006.

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10

Pfaff, Steven. Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution Of 1989. Duke University Press, 2006.

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Частини книг з теми "Government-Opposition Dynamics"

1

Chaqués-Bonafont, Laura, Anna M. Palau, and Frank R. Baumgartner. "The Content of the Government-Opposition Game." In Agenda Dynamics in Spain, 87–111. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137328793_4.

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2

Gemenis, Kostas, and Roula Nezi. "Government–Opposition Dynamics during the Economic Crisis in Greece." In Government-Opposition in Southern European Countries during the Economic Crisis, 14–34. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315683829-2.

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3

Palau, Anna M., Luz MuÑoz MÁrquez, and Laura ChaquÉs-Bonafont. "Government–Opposition Dynamics in Spain under the Pressure of Economic Collapse and the Debt Crisis." In Government-Opposition in Southern European Countries during the Economic Crisis, 75–95. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315683829-5.

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4

Carty, R. Kenneth. "Competition in Dominant Party Systems." In The Government Party, 112–28. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192858481.003.0008.

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Анотація:
The dynamics of competition in party systems characterized by one party dominance reflects both the trajectory of the dominant party’s support—in most cases one of long-term decline—and the range and structure of the opposition parties. The evidence suggests that dominance is compatible with quite different electoral systems. If the electoral system neither fosters nor inhibits dominance, it does have an impact on the internal structure and life of the dominant party. Although dominance favours centrism, opposition can take distinctive forms. In the two oldest nation-building systems, it came from the ill-defined right, in two state-building systems from a more ideological left, and in developing India it was scattered across the spectrum until one opposition party emerged in an attempt to redefine the nature of national politics. In all cases, dominance ensures that intraparty conflict in the government party defines much of the real competition in the system.
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5

Dubois, Laurent, and Richard Lee Turits. "Revolution and Intervention in Cuba and the Dominican Republic." In Freedom Roots, 227–80. University of North Carolina Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469653600.003.0007.

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Анотація:
This chapter examines the tragic dialectic between Caribbean governments seeking to implement socioeconomic change in the 1960s and U.S. opposition and intervention in response. The chapter explores, first, how after the 1950s Cuban insurrection triumphed, a radicalizing dynamic unfolded between popular support for deep socioeconomic changes, leadership eager to implement those changes, and U.S. economic and armed intervention to stop them (including the Bay of Pigs invasion). U.S. opposition began in a serious way following Cuba’s sweeping agrarian reform, which came at the expense of vast U.S. sugar and ranching interests. U.S. economic warfare pushed the Castro dictatorship to develop trade and eventually build an alliance with the Soviet Union. Second, the chapter illuminates the dynamics of reform, revolution, and intervention in the neighbouring Dominican Republic. There, Juan Bosch’s reformist and nationalist social democratic government was overthrown by a military coup backed by conservative elites. The coup leaders had reason to expect and soon received U.S. government recognition, despite the overthrow of a liberal democratic government and Bosch’s relatively modest agrarian and other reforms. When Dominicans took to the streets to restore Bosch to office, a U.S. military invasion of the island quashed their effort.
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6

Alsharekh, Alanoud. "Youth, Protest, and the New Elite." In The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf, 165–90. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190877385.003.0010.

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This chapter provides a critical analysis of the youth-led protests that shook Kuwaiti politics in 2011 and 2012 and threatened for a time to flare out of control. Alanoud Alsharekh analyzes the multiple roots of youth dissatisfaction with the political and economic status quo in Kuwait and explores the intersection of youth-led demands for change with the broader pressure points that led Kuwait from one political crisis to another after 2006. Alsharekh documents how both the Kuwaiti government and the established political opposition failed to capitalize on the emergence of the politically-active new youth movement. The rise of youth-led groups that break the mold of established political systems has implications for all other GCC states and Iran. Alsharekh’s concluding observations on the difficulties in assimilating the region’s youthful population into existing power-sharing mechanisms – as well as labor market structures – holds great comparative significance for future stability and sustainable growth.
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7

Sorace, Miriam. "European Parliament." In The Politics of Legislative Debates, 304–28. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0016.

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Анотація:
The European Parliament is an extraordinary legislature due to its multinational nature, and its mixed internal legislative organization. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are subject to mixed incentives: they have to heed both national and European Party Groups’ (EPGs) leaderships, but also have significant opportunities for individual floor access. The chapter uses speech counts from 1999 to 2019, scraped from the EP official website. The analysis finds that frontbench domination of speeches is not constant and has weakened over time. Changes in internal procedure appear to be an important explanatory factor, while member states’ electoral systems do not seem to play a role in explaining frontbench domination patterns. The study also finds that EU-level government–opposition dynamics do not play a role, while ideological extremism does explain speechmaking patterns. In terms of individual level determinants of legislative speech, senior MEPs are granted more floor time, while there is no difference between male and female MEPs in their debate participation rates.
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8

Neville, Kate J. "Fracking in the Yukon." In Fueling Resistance, 107–37. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197535585.003.0005.

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Presenting the book’s second empirical case study, this chapter examines resistance to fracking in Canada’s Yukon territory, considering the transnational political economy dynamics of local energy negotiations. By tracing local responses to fracking, the chapter reveals the ways in which finance, ownership, and trade provoke and activate insider/outsider narratives and reignite long-standing political conflicts in the North, mobilizing communities across issue areas. This chapter documents the creative methods used by organizers to forward claims as they linked fracking to concerns over liquefied natural gas backup power generation, the contested Peel Watershed, and trust in government. It also examines how similar discourses are wielded by both project proponents and opponents, especially of local control and belonging. Through the mechanisms of identity activation, scale shift, and brokerage, the chapter reveals how both project support and opposition can be articulated and adapted, including through alliance-building that connects sites and communities across space and time.
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9

Arato, Andrew, and Jean L. Cohen. "Populism as Mobilization and as a Party." In Populism and Civil Society, 53–106. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197526583.003.0002.

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This chapter articulates the impact of the populist logic on the type of movements and parties formed. It analyses the dynamics and impact of populist mobilization on competitive party systems in constitutional democracies. It argues that key elements of populist logic—the pars pro toto conception of political representation, the friend–enemy conception of politics, the anti-establishment/anti-elite posture even when in power, and the anti–status quo orientation of populist parties—foster factionalism, severe affective political polarization, the movementization of parties and the evisceration of democratic norms and institutions. Populists create a specific type of catch-all movement-party—one that blurs the distinct logics of social movements and political parties with deleterious effects on political competition. Populist logic prevents populists in government from deescalating their demands; from abandoning their movement style rhetoric, tactics, or posturing; from renouncing outbidding; and from ceasing to demonize the opposition. This makes compromise impossible and responsible governance very unlikely.
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10

Chinigò, Davide. "Manoeuvering Land Registration: Decentralization of Land Administration in Siraro." In Everyday Practices of State Building in Ethiopia, 71–114. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192869654.003.0003.

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Анотація:
Abstract This chapter discusses the implementation of a national programme of rural land registration in Siraro, Oromia region, that was introduced in the mid 2000s. Motivated by concerns over increasing the productivity of smallholder agriculture, the capitalization of land, and the uncapping of land rental markets, the programme was implemented as part of an ambitious set of policy reforms providing for the decentralization of service delivery and resource management from central to local government. Empirically the chapter discusses the set of practices and tactics of manoeuvring land registration, which local government officials and farmers performed to tackle insecurity, conflict, uncertainty, and the ensuing threat of dispossession that came with the programme. The chapter discusses the ways in which Oromo farmers, against a long and controversial history of exploitative land relations, reconstituted material and symbolic values to the land after land registration threatened their socio-economic reproduction. Land registration generated dynamics of social differentiation, with a minority of entrepreneurial and politically connected farmers making the most from the land rights’ formalization, while others experienced social and economic marginalization. An important outcome was the politicization of an Oromo identity in opposition to what was perceived as a top-down, centralizing state policy.
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