Дисертації з теми "Game theory mechanism"
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Zhang, Qi. "Applied game theory and optimal mechanism design." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2014. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/370438/.
Повний текст джерелаRivera, Thomas. "Essays on Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Financial Economics." Thesis, Jouy-en Josas, HEC, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020EHEC0001.
Повний текст джерелаThis thesis develops and utilizes tools in game theory and mechanism design to study multiple applications in economics and finance. The first chapter studies the problem of implementing communication equilibria of strategic games when players communicate with an impartial mediator through a network. I characterize necessary and sufficient conditions on the network structure such that any communication equilibrium of any game can be implemented on that network. The next chapter studies a model of supply chain congestion whereby capacity constraints lead to very inefficient Nash equilibria and I show how the use of correlsted equilibria can substantially resolve those inefficiencies. The final two chapters study related issues in the design of bank capital requirements. In Chapter 3, I characterize optimal bank capital requirements when banks have private information about the value of their existing assets. I show how the implementation of capital requirements can eliminate the bank’s cost of raising capital by revealing their information to the market and conditions under which doing soi s optimal. In Chapter 4, I show how when the bank’s private information is about the riskiness of its assets instead, then any risk sensitive capital requirement will lead banks to optimally misreport their risk whenever investors are sufficiently risk averse, highlighting important robustness concerns
Giannakopoulos, Ioannis. "Duality theory for optimal mechanism design." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:90e1fdec-8803-4306-8985-5106c457f34d.
Повний текст джерелаNath, Swaprava. "Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing." Thesis, Indian Institute of Science, 2013. http://etd.iisc.ernet.in/handle/2005/2497.
Повний текст джерелаWilbur, Dameon Stuart. "Sharing surplus : an analysis of mechanism design /." view abstract or download file of text, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1232409861&sid=7&Fmt=2&clientId=11238&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Повний текст джерелаTypescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-107). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
Rogers, William James. "Cross-Layer Game Theoretic Mechanism for Tactical Mobile Networks." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/24767.
Повний текст джерелаMaster of Science
Chen, J.-H. "An automated negotiation mechanism based on co-evolutionary processes and game theory." Thesis, Coventry University, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.427568.
Повний текст джерелаKucuksenel, Serkan Ledyard John O. Ledyard John O. "Incentives and institutions : essays in mechanism design and game theory with applications /." Diss., Pasadena, Calif. : California Institute of Technology, 2009. http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-04232009-163542.
Повний текст джерелаYang, Tsung-Han. "Essays on Applied Game Theory and Public Economics." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82963.
Повний текст джерелаPh. D.
Schlake, Farimehr. "Optimal Consumer-Centric Delay-Efficient Security Management in Multi-Agent Networks: A Game and Mechanism Design Theoretic Approach." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77362.
Повний текст джерелаPh. D.
Seregina, Tatiana. "Applications of game theory to distributed routing and delay tolerant networking." Thesis, Toulouse, INSA, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014ISAT0028/document.
Повний текст джерелаThis thesis focuses on the issues related to the selfish behavior of the agents in the communication networks. We are particularly interested in two situations in which these issues arise and we address game-theoretical framework to study them.The first situation relates to communication networks using a distributed routing based on autonomous agents. Compared to a centralized routing, this type of routing offers significant advantages in terms of scalability, ease of deployment or robustness to failures and environmental disturbances. We investigate the convergence properties of the sequential best-response dynamics in a routing game over parallel links. The game involves a finite number of routing agents each of which decides how much flow to route on each of the links with the objective of minimizing its own costs. For some particular cases (e.g., two players), the convergence of the best-response dynamics can be proved by showing that this game has a potential function. For other cases, a potential function has remained elusive. We propose the use of non-linear spectral radius of the Jacobian of the best-response dynamics as an alternative approach to proving its convergence.The second situation occurs in Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) that have been the subject of intensive research over the past decade. DTN has an idea to support communication in environments where connectivity is intermittent and where communication delays can be very long. We focus on game-theoretic models for DTNs. First, we propose an incentive mechanism to persuade selfish mobile nodes to participate in relaying messages, and investigate the influence of the information given by the source (number of existing copies of the message, age of these copies) to the relays on the rewards proposed. For static information polices, that is the same type of information given to all the relays, it is shown that the expected reward paid by the source is independent of the policy. However, the source can reduce the reward by dynamically adapting the type of information based on the meeting times with the relays. For the particular cases, we give some structural results of the optimal adaptive policy. Next, we consider the model where the source proposes a fixed reward. The mobile relays can decide to accept or not the packet and then to drop the packet in the future. This game can be modelled as a partially-observable stochastic game. For two relays, we have shown that the optimal policies for the relays relates to the threshold type
Lin, Jason. "Analysis of Blockchain-based Smart Contracts for Peer-to-Peer Solar Electricity Transactive Markets." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/87563.
Повний текст джерелаMS
García, Vélez Javier Humberto. "Mechanism design o reverse game theory : una propuesta para la asignación eficiente de obras públicas de infraestructura en el Perú." Bachelor's thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2015. http://tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/handle/123456789/6702.
Повний текст джерелаTesis
Shen, Fei. "Resource Allocation for Multiple Access and Broadcast Channels under Quality of Service Requirements Based on Strategy Proof Pricing." Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2015. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-163077.
Повний текст джерелаAufgrund der hohen Nachfrage nach Datenrate und wegen der Knappheit an Ressourcen in Funknetzen ist die effiziente Allokation von Leistung ein wichtiges Thema in den heutigen Mehrnutzer-Kommunikationssystemen. Die Spieltheorie bietet Methoden, um egoistische und soziale Konfliktsituationen zu analysieren. Das vorgeschlagene System befasst sich mit der Erfüllung der auf Signal-zu-Rausch-und-Interferenz-Verhältnis (SINR) basierenden Quality-of-Service (QoS)-Anforderungen aller Nutzer mittels effizienter Leistungsallokation, anstatt die Übertragungsrate zu maximieren. Es wird ein Framework entworfen, um die Leistungsallokation mittels universellen Pricing-Mechanismen umzusetzen. In der Dissertation werden zentralisierte und verteilte Leistungsallokationsalgorithmen unter Verwendung verschiedener Pricing-Ansätze diskutiert. Die Nutzer in Funksystemen handeln rational im spieltheoretischen Sinne, indem sie ihre eigenen Nutzenfunktionen maximieren. Die mobilen Endgeräte, die dasselbe Spektrum nutzen, haben den Anreiz durch bewusste Fehlinterpretation ihrer privaten Informationen das eigene Ergebnis zu verbessern. Daher ist es wichtig, die Funktionalität des Systems zu überwachen und durch Optimierung des Pricings und Priorisierungsgewichte zu beeinflussen. Für den zentralisierten Ressourcenallokationsansatz werden der allgemeine Mehrfachzugriffskanal (Multiple Access Channel, MAC) und der Broadcastkanal (BC) mit linearen bzw. nichtlinearen Empfängern untersucht. Die Preise, die resultierenden Kostenterme und die optimale Leistungsallokation, mit der die QoS-Anforderungen in der zulässigen Ratenregion erfüllt werden, werden in geschlossener Form hergeleitet. Lineare und nichtlineare Pricing-Ansätze werden separat diskutiert. Das unendlich oft wiederholte Spiel wird vorgeschlagen, um Spieler vom Betrügen durch Übermittlung falscher Kanalinformationen abzuhalten. Für die verteilten Ressourcenvergabe wird das nichtkooperative Spiel in Normalform verwendet und formuliert. Die Nutzer wählen ihre Sendeleistung zur Maximierung ihrer eigenen Nutzenfunktion. Individuelle Preise werden eingeführt und so angepasst, dass die QoS-Anforderungen mit der Leistungsallokation im eindeutigen Nash-Gleichgewicht erfüllt werden. Verschiedene Arten des Nutzerverhaltens werden bezüglich der Täuschung ihrer Nutzenfunktion analysiert, und ein Strategy-Proof-Mechanismus mit Strafen wird entwickelt. Die Ergebnisse für den MAC sind anwendbar auf heterogene Netzwerke, wobei zwei neuartige Ansätze zur Kompensation bereitgestellt werden, die den hybriden Zugang zu Femtozell-Netzwerken motivieren. Mithilfe des Stackelberg-Spiels wird gezeigt, dass die vorgeschlagenen Ansätze in einer Win-Win-Situation resultieren
Furuhata, Masabumi. "E-market mechanism design for supply chain management." View thesis, 2009. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/45409.
Повний текст джерелаA thesis presented to the University of Western Sydney, College of Health and Science, School of Computing and Mathematics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Docteur de L'Université de Toulouse, Faculté d'Informatique, under a cotutelle agreement. Includes bibliographies.
Gui, Luyi. "Managing and optimizing decentralized networks with resource sharing." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/47707.
Повний текст джерелаJarman, Ben. "Essays in optimal auction design." University of Sydney, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/4627.
Повний текст джерелаAuctions are an ancient economic institution. Since Vickrey (1961), the development of auction theory has lead to an extremely detailed description of the often desirable characteristics of these simple selling procedures, in the process explaining their enduring popularity. Given the pervasiveness of auctions, the question of how a seller should engineer the rules of these mechanisms to maximize her own profits is a central issue in the organization of markets. The seminal paper of Myerson (1981) shows that when facing buyers with Independent Private Values (IPVs) a standard auction with a specifically selected reserve price (or prices) is optimal, that is, maximizes a seller's expected profits among all conceivable selling mechanisms. In this model, it is assumed that the buyers have perfect information as to the existence of gains from trade. We shall argue that the consequences of this assumption for the design of the optimal auction are not well understood, which motivates our analysis. The three essays of this thesis relax the `known seller valuation' assumption by examining the optimal auction program when the seller (and principal) holds private information representing her reservation value for the good. In the first essay we provide an original technique for comparing ex ante expected profits across mechanisms for a seller facing N>1 potential buyers when all traders hold private information. Our technique addresses mechanisms that cannot be ranked point-by-point through their allocation rules using the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. We find conditions such that the seller's expected profits increase in the slope of each buyer's allocation probability function. This provides new intuition for the fact that a principal does not benefit from holding private information under risk neutrality. Monopoly pricing induces steep probability functions so the seller/principal benefits from announcing a fixed price, and implicitly her private information. An application is presented for the well known k double auction of the bilateral trade literature. In the second and third essays of this thesis, we extend the above framework to allow for informational externalities. Specifically, we allow for the situation in which the seller's private information represents a common value component in buyers' valuations. Thus the seller's private information (say regarding the quality of the good) is of interest to bidders independently of any strategic effects. In recent work Cai, Riley and Ye (2007) have demonstrated that a seller who holds private information about the quality of a good faces an extra consideration in designing an auction; the reserve price signals information to bidders. In a separating equilibrium signalling is costly in the sense that reserves are higher than would be optimal under complete information. We examine the returns to the seller in an English auction from using different types of secret reserve regimes. We find that immediate disclosure of a reserve is preferable to announcement after the auction in the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the winning bidder. Sale occurs less often during the auction for a given reserve price strategy under secret reserve regimes, which increases the incentive for the seller to report more favourable information though the reserve price offer. Separating equilibria involving later announcement therefore generate even lower expected profits to the seller (signalling is more costly) than under immediate disclosure. In the third essay we compare the benchmark signalling equilibrium of immediate disclosure to a screening regime which we call the Right of Refusal. In this extreme form of a secret reserve the seller never announces the reserve price, she simply accepts or rejects the auction price. We find that the Right of Refusal dominates immediate disclosure if the seller's valuation is a sufficient statistic for the private information of interest. Thus a seller with market-relevant private preference information can benefit from not exercising monopoly price setting power. The result also provides conditions under which a competitive screening equilibrium is more efficient than a signalling mechanism. Broadly speaking, screening is better when the common value aspect in the preferences of the informed and uninformed parties are `aligned', and potential gains from trade to the uninformed party are significant. We believe this conclusion to be of particular interest to the design of privatization schemes.
Heymann, Benjamin. "Mathematical contributions for the optimization and regulation of electricity production." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016SACLX052/document.
Повний текст джерелаWe present our contribution on the optimization and regulation of electricity produc- tion.The first part deals with a microgrid Energy Management System (EMS). We formulate the EMS program as a continuous time optimal control problem and then solve this problem by dynamic programming using BocopHJB, a solver developed for this application. We show that an extension of this formulation to a stochastic setting is possible. The last section of this part introduces the adaptative weights dynamic programming algorithm, an algorithm for optimization problems with different time scales. We use the algorithm to integrate the battery aging in the EMS.The second part is dedicated to network markets, and in particular wholesale electricity markets. We introduce a mechanism to deal with the market power exercised by electricity producers, and thus increase the consumer welfare. Then we study some mathematical properties of the agents’ optimization problems (producers and system operator). In the last chapter, we present some pure Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness results for a class of Bayesian games to which some networks markets belong. In addition we introduce an algorithm to compute the equilibrium for some specific cases.We provide some additional information on BocopHJB (the numerical solver developed and used in the first part of the thesis) in the appendix
Liu, Zhixin. "Capacity allocation and rescheduling in supply chains." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1187883767.
Повний текст джерелаCrosby, Garth Valentine. "Trust Based Security Mechanisms for Wireless Sensor Networks." FIU Digital Commons, 2007. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/61.
Повний текст джерелаЯковлева, П. М., та P. M. Yakovleva. "Влияние принципов поведенческой экономики на формирование предложения в условиях тендерных закупок : магистерская диссертация". Master's thesis, б. и, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10995/100714.
Повний текст джерелаIn terms of tender purchases, it is important to take into account the influence of many factors when choosing a bidder's price proposal strategy, which go beyond the classical economy. The aim of the master's thesis is to develop a model for forecasting the price offer of bidders. The paper discusses the concept of forecasting the price offer, the influence of factors on the participant in tender purchases and the principles of behavioral economics. The sources used were scientific research and methodological literature, regulatory legal acts and statistical data of various electronic trading platforms in the public domain. In the master's thesis, a model for predicting the price offer of a bidder was developed based on the Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, which takes into account the influence of relevant factors, which allows you to adjust the bidder's behavior tactics for each bidding step and maximize the utility of the offer in terms of the principles of behavioral economics.
Barua, B. (Bidushi). "Incentivizing user participation in cooperative content delivery for wireless networks." Doctoral thesis, Oulun yliopisto, 2018. http://urn.fi/urn:isbn:9789526218953.
Повний текст джерелаTiivistelmä Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on kehittää menetelmiä yhteistyössä tapahtuvaan sisällön jakamiseen (cooperative content delivery, CCD) sekä siihen liittyviä kannustinmekanismeja viidennen sukupolven (5G) ja sen jälkeisille matkaviestinverkoille. CCD:n käyttö hyödyntämällä älylaitteessa olevia useita ilmarajapintoja on tehokas ratkaisu välttää langattomien verkkojen ruuhkautumista. CCD-menetelmissä laiteen ilmarajapintoja käytetään älykkäästi datan jakamiseen käyttäjäryhmälle, kun käyttäjät ovat lähellä toisiaan. 5G-verkkojen vaatimukset korkeammalle kapasiteetille, luotettavuudelle ja energiatehokkuudelle ovat motivoineet CCD-menetelmien kehitystyötä. Erityisen tärkeää CCD-menetelmien tehokkuudelle on kannustinmekanismien kehittäminen mahdollistamaan yhteistyö mobiilikäyttäjien välillä. Väitöskirjatyön ensimmäinen osuus käsittelee ideaalista tilannetta luotettavalle ja virheettömälle sisällön jakamiselle hyödyntämällä solukkoverkkoa ja lyhyen kantaman linkkejä. Tässä osuudessa päätuloksena on kehitetty käyttäjien valinnalle menetelmiä, jotka huomioivat linkin laadun solukkoverkon ilmarajapinnassa. Ehdotetut menetelmät tuovat operaattorille säästöjä taajuusresurssien käytön osalta ja käyttäjät saavuttavat korkeampia laskevan siirtotien datanopeuksia. Työn toinen osuus tutkii todenmukaisempaa CCD-tilannetta, jossa alhaisen datanopeuden linkkien käyttäjät voivat olla pullonkaula CCD:n suorituskyvylle. Päätulos tässä on uusi käyttäjien valintamenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon linkkien laadun sekä solukkoverkossa että lyhyen kantaman linkeissä. Lisäksi esitellään eri taajuuksien yhdistämistä hyödyntävä kannustinmenetelmä, joka ottaa huomioon itsekkäiden käyttäjien aiheuttamat ongelmat. Ehdotettu mekanismi maksimoi yksittäisen käyttäjän ja verkon hyödyt ja saavuttaa tasapainotilan käyttäjien yksipuolista itsekkyyttä vastaan. Väitöskirjan kolmannessa osuudessa tutkitaan haitallisen valikoitumisen mahdollisuutta CCD:ssä. Operaattorilla oletetaan olevan epätäydellistä tietoa käyttäjien halukkuudesta osallistua yhteistyöhön CCD:ssä. Tämän osuuden päätulos on esitellä sopimuksiin perustuvia kannustinmenetelmiä, joiden avulla operaattori voi motivoida käyttäjiä paljastamaan heidän todellinen tahtotilansa osallistua yhteistyöhön. Ehdotetut menetelmä kannustavat käyttäjiä heidän todellisen tahtotilan perusteella ja parantavat järjestelmän suorituskykyä operaattorin ja käyttäjien saavuttamien hyötyjen osalta
Antos, Dimitrios. "Deploying Affect-Inspired Mechanisms to Enhance Agent Decision-Making and Communication." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10107.
Повний текст джерелаEngineering and Applied Sciences
Oliveira, Atol Fortin de. "Leilões para publicidade na Internet." Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/45/45134/tde-23012013-011946/.
Повний текст джерелаIn this project we present three Internet sponsored search advertising models, and mechanisms related to each model, analyzing properties such as stability, optimality, strategy-proof, and time consumption. We start presenting one of the first articles on the problem of sponsored search advertising. Next, we present other two models. The first one allows exclusivity advertising. The second model allows a wider variety of options for both the auctioneer and the bidders, including minimum selling prices and maximum buying prices.
De, Pais Paiva Santos Catarina. "Insights into the mechanisms of TAFA4 : a key player in modulating injury-induced mechanical pain." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020AIXM0241.
Повний текст джерелаChronic pain denotes a major worldwide medical problem with current therapies being ineffective and often displaying adverse side effects. Recently, our group identified the secreted neuropeptide TAFA4 as a novel candidate for treating chronic pain. Specifically, we showed that TAFA4 is highly expressed in a subpopulation of dorsal root ganglion neurons called C-low threshold mechanoreceptors, that project into the inner laminaII (LIIi) of the dorsal horn of the spinal cord. TAFA4 reverses injury-induced mechanical hypersensitivity after inflammation, and nerve injury, and increases the frequency of spontaneous inhibitory postsynaptic currents in LIIi. Here, we show that TAFA4 reverses inflammatory, neuropathic and postoperative-induced mechanical hypersensitivity, and that the analgesic effect of TAFA4 is mediated via the low density lipoprotein receptor-related protein (LRP1), which, when removed from the cell surface using its antagonist receptor associated protein, blocks the effect of TAFA4. Also, we identified a subpopulation of inhibitory interneurons in LIIi (LIIi-IhIN) that display an increase of the A-type transient potassium current and decrease of outward h-current after spared nerve injury. Bath application of TAFA4 modulates and reverses these currents, and this effect can be negated by blocking LRP1. Our findings highlight TAFA4 as a new powerful painkiller, in addition to contributing to the understanding of the Gate Control Theory of Pain, through the identification of a novel spinal cord circuit mediating a cross talk between C-LTMRs, LRP1 and a subset of LIIi-IhIN that modulate injury-induced loss of inhibition and the establishment of pain
Xu, Xiaozhou. "Mécanisme de collaboration dans la collaboration logistique horizontale." Phd thesis, Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris, 2013. http://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/pastel-00957302.
Повний текст джерелаIngram, David. "Using systems theory to do philosophy : one approach, and some suggested terminology : a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy in the University of Canterbury /." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Philosophy and Religious Studies, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/1022.
Повний текст джерелаBodê, Tiago. "Games científicos: bases epistemológicas e princípios de design didático." Universidade de São Paulo, 2017. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/48/48134/tde-20032018-151424/.
Повний текст джерелаThe traditional Teaching model is based on a banking education, primarily informative, discouraging and decontextualized of its historical moment, which is characterized by information of easy access and communication in global sphere. In this panorama, research shows that students have been performing poorly in science. Therefore, there is a need for studies that take into account this educational reality in order to propose innovative teaching strategies. In this scenario, digital games present great potentiality, as they are attractive, contribute to cognitive development and can foster the development of scientific precepts. The big problem is that, despite attracting legions of players, commercial digital games generally do not present major pedagogical concerns as they are not developed for this purpose. Although digital educational games are thought of, they present characteristics antagonistic to the commercial ones, since they are usually constituted of an excessive information framework, without much concern with immersive aspects. Thus, in an attempt to correlate science with the epistemological aspects present in digital educational games and with the immersive aspects present in commercial digital games, The objective of this work is the development of a typology and the creation of an analysis matrix for games with potential for educational use. In the theoretical stage of the project, we developed the foundation of the matrix, based on three constituent elements: Educational Reference, based on the Didactic Anthropological Theory (TAD); Immersion, based on Flow Theory; And playful Mechanics. Subsequently, we verified the applicability of typology and matrix in game analysis and interactions between players and game situations. It is important to highlight that the research was developed with high school students of a Public School of the State of São Paulo. Among the results obtained, there is a correlation between immersive and praxeological aspects of gaming platforms.
du, Puy Elmsäter Jenny, and Hanna Jensen. "Gamification : En kvalitativ studie om motivationsskapande genom spelmekanismer." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-434072.
Повний текст джерелаGamification is the application of game mechanics in non-game contexts to create motivation to accomplish tasks. This thesis sought to delve deeper into how it is applied and developed, with a focus on how game mechanics affect intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In the study gamification consultants were interviewed for their experience in the field and a Self-Determination Theory (SDT) view was applied in the analysis of their answers. The results show that the development of a gamification system has two independent variables from which several dependable variables spring. To determine the mechanics that should be used the time horizon has to be determined as well as player type. Thus, the decision of how or if to gamify a situation is long and complex in its application, but the determination of which type of motivation to induce is a first step to concretize how to gamify a system.
Kiedanski, Diego. "Mechanisms and architectures to encourage the massive and efficient use of local renewable energy." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020IPPAT036.
Повний текст джерелаTo meet carbon reduction goals in Europe but worldwide too, a large number of renewable distributed energy resources (DER) still need to be deployed.Aiming at mobilizing private capitals, several plans have been developed to put end-customers at the heart of the energy transition, hoping to accelerate the adoption of green energy by increasing its attractiveness and profitability.Some of the proposed models include the creation of local energy markets where households can sell their energy to their neighbors at a higher price than what the government would be willing to pay (but lower than what other customers normally pay), shared investment models in which consumers own a carbon-free power plant such as a wind turbine or a solar farm and they obtain dividends from its production to collective auto-consumption models in which several families are ‘hidden’ behind the same smart meter, allowing them to optimize their aggregated consumption profile and therefore maximizing the value of their DER.One of the main objectives of the thesis is to understand these different incentives as they will play a crucial role in tackling climate change if correctly implemented. To do so, we design a framework ‘local energy trading’ that encompasses a large number of incentives.In the context of local energy trading, we study the interactions of prosumers (consumers with generation capabilities) located in the same Low Voltage network, possibly behind the same feeder. These prosumers will still be connected to the main power grid and they will have the option, as they do today, to buy and sell to/from their utility company at a fixed price (a flat rate or a Time-of-Use, for example). For these agents to fully benefit from the advantages of local energy trading, we shall assume that they own appliances (such as batteries) that, without changing their perceived energy demand, can enable them to change their net energy demand as seen from outside their homes. Modeling prosumers as rational utility maximizers, they will schedule their battery to decrease the cost associated with their net energy demand (as their perceived demand remains unchanged).In the first part of the thesis, we investigate competitive models in which prosumers sell their surplus to their neighbors via a local energy market. We analyze different strategies that players could use to participate in these markets and their impact on the normal operation of the power grid and the Distribution System Operator. In this regard, it is shown that sequential markets can pose a problem to the system and a new market mechanism that exploits domain knowledge is proposed to increase the efficiency of the local trades.In the second part of the thesis, we delve into incentives that can be implemented through cooperation. In this regard, we use cooperative game theory to model the shared investment into energy storage and photovoltaic panels (PV) by a group of prosumers. For the studied model we show that a stable solution (in the core of the game) exists in which all participants cooperate and we provide an efficient algorithm to find it. Furthermore, we also show that cooperation is stable for participants that already own batteries and PVs but prefer to operate them in coordination to increase their value, effectively implementing collective auto-consumption.Finally, we demonstrate how to integrate both models: the shared investment and the cooperative control of existing resources into a single cooperative framework which also enjoys the existence of stable outcomes. For this later model, we propose to decouple the return over investments (ROI) obtained between the ROI produced by the investment in hardware and the ROI obtained by cooperation itself. By doing so, we can offer the former profit to external investors to raise the required capital (although nothing forbids the member of the coalition to contribute) and the latter to the actual consumers
Graziano, Alberto da Conceição Liberto. "Caracterização biomecânica do remate em suspensão com corrida no andebol-uma abordagem cinemática, dinâmica e electromiográfica." Phd thesis, Instituições portuguesas -- UP-Universidade do Porto -- -Faculdade de Ciências do Desporto e de Educação Física, 2002. http://dited.bn.pt:80/29621.
Повний текст джерелаHorta, José Luis. "Innovative paradigms and architecture for future distribution electricity networks supporting the energy transition." Thesis, Paris, ENST, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018ENST0022/document.
Повний текст джерелаFuture electricity distribution grids will host an important and growing share of variable renewable energy sources and local storage resources. Moreover, they will face new load structures due for example to the growth of the electric vehicle market. These trends raise the need for new distribution grid architecture and operation paradigms to keep the grid stable and to ensure quality of supply. In addition, these new paradigms will enable the provision of advanced new services. In this thesis we propose a novel architecture capable of fostering collaboration among wholesale market actors, distribution system operators and end customers, to leverage flexible distributed energy resources while respecting distribution system constrains. The architecture is designed for providing innovative residential demand side management services, with a special focus on services enabled by self-consumption at the household and neighborhood level. Following these general objectives, the thesis provides three main contributions. First, based on internet of things and blockchain technology, we propose the building blocks for future distribution grid energy management architectures. Then, focusing on the services enabled by such architectures, we propose hour-ahead markets for the local exchange of renewable energy among households together with dynamic phase allocation mechanism to improve the quality of electricity supply. Finally, we propose a real time control mechanism for the adjustment of market decisions to satisfy distribution system operator constraints
Guedrib, Ben Abderrahmen Mouna. "Impact des mécanismes internes de gouvernance sur le risque fiscal : une étude menée dans le contexte tunisien." Phd thesis, Université de Franche-Comté, 2013. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00876893.
Повний текст джерелаWan-ChunCheng and 鄭婉君. "Game Theory Based Recommendation Mechanism for Taxi-Sharing." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/80609996809757959039.
Повний текст джерела國立成功大學
資訊工程學系碩博士班
101
The taxicab becomes one of the most important public transportations in many big cities. Customers always suffer from waiting a long time for taxis. Similarly, the taxi drivers spend much time on cruising on the road for finding passengers. Therefore, we present a recommendation mechanism for both taxis and passengers. When taxis and passengers have requests for recommendation, the server provides them with paths and locations. The first aim of our model is to respectively recommend taxis and passengers for picking up passengers quickly and finding taxis easily. The second purpose is providing taxi-sharing service for passengers who want to save the payment. In our method, we analyze the historical Global Positioning System (GPS) trajectories generated by 10,357 taxis during 110 days and present the service region with time-dependent R-Tree. We formulate the problem of choosing the paths among the taxis in the same region by using non-cooperative game theory, and find out the solution of this game which is known as Nash equilibrium. When a taxi is occupied and the on-board passengers who want taxi-sharing service, the taxi checks the proper passengers for sharing periodically. In order to verify the proposed recommendation mechanism, the simulation of SUMO, MOVE, and TraCI are adopted to fit our model. The results show that our method can find taxis and passengers efficiently. In addition, applying our method can reduce the payment of passengers and increase the taxi revenue by taxi-sharing.
(9192782), Prajwal Balasubramani. "Feasibility of Game Theory and Mechanism Design Techniques to Understand Game Balance." Thesis, 2020.
Знайти повний текст джерелаWeng, Mu-Lung, and 翁木龍. "Incentive Mechanism Using Game Theory for Wireless Multi-hop Networks." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/40913620855696556368.
Повний текст джерела國立中山大學
資訊工程學系研究所
102
Due to the low cost, easy deployment, wireless multi-hop networks have attracted many researchers’ attention in recent years. In wireless multi-hop network, the nodes are willing to forward packets for other nodes, so as to packets can successfully reach the destination. Therefore, cooperation between nodes is a critical factor in multi-hop networks. In order to encourage nodes to cooperate in networks, two approaches that refer to game theory are proposed. The first approach is incentive mechanism for packet forwarding. We design a Stag Hunt payoff matrix that is different to traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma model. Our model stimulates nodes to forward more packets to get more profits. It also compensates idle time to increase boarder nodes’ gains to guarantees the existence of boarder nodes. The second approach is an interactive strategy, which is called as Adaptive-Cooperator to refine the two equilibrium points of the Stag Hunt game. This strategy is an active cooperator; however, it may as well punish uncooperative nodes, making them impossible to obtain gains by free-rider. Then, we make some analyses by game and evolutionary game theory to deduct the correctness of our approach. According to the simulation result, the approaches we proposed are proved effective. To apply our model to wireless multi-hop network, all nodes can tend to cooperate and get fair treatment.
Niu, Binglai. "Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism." Master's thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10048/1265.
Повний текст джерелаSignal and Image Processing
Wang, Tzu-Ming, and 王子銘. "A Novel P2P Sharing Mechanism based on Social Network and Game Theory." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14668294867785174465.
Повний текст джерела淡江大學
電機工程學系碩士班
100
In recent years, with the emergence of P2P technology, there are many of the applications for P2P technology has emerged and how to effectively inhibit the free-riders is a hot issue. According to statistics, most of the P2P applications used Gnutella protocol and BitTorrent protocol. BitTorrent uses the Choking algorithm to isolate free-riders, but Choking algorithm is simply giving free-riders choke. Gnutella uses the EigenTrust algorithm to combat free-riders. However according to the actuality, EigenTrust algorithm is not a consummated algorithm. Therefore, both of Choking algorithm and EigenTrust algorithm have a bed effect. A research was conducted in 2005, there are nearly 85 percent of Gnutella network users are free-riders from all users. Furthermore, there is only 1 percent of users voluntary to share new files. Due to the resource in the P2P applications are like public goods that everyone can use it for free. It makes most of the users were not sharing their own resource, to cause tragedy of the commons and inefficiency. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism on the basis of game theory; it promotes the peers to spontaneous sharing their own resource. We also use social network to promote users to share their resource, to maintain a long-term cooperation between users, and also use user''s relationship of social network to exclude free-riders. To deploy the mechanism to the architecture, the system will give users counters by considering bandwidth, computing power and electricity of each user. These counters will be stored in server and managed by server. In addition, the sharing model of the system can be divided into live media streaming sharing and file sharing. In live media streaming sharing, users can participate in the auction and using their counters to bid the tickets of high-quality live media streaming. In file sharing, users have to pay counters for every unit download bandwidth. In other words, users need to use the counters to bid or buy service from server. Therefore, the mechanism can promotes the peers to spontaneous sharing their own resource if they need some resources from server.
Yeh, Ming-Hsien, and 葉明憲. "Applying Game Theory to Credit Guarantee Mechanism on supply Chain Sourcing Model." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16897360582394180196.
Повний текст джерела國立臺灣大學
商學研究所
99
Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) have been a major force in Taiwan.They not only play the part as a bridge between larger enterprises and the suppliers but also refrain the industrial supply chain from controlled by single monopolists. Employment opportunities are also created by SME for the society. Moreover, most of Taiwanese large enterprises were evolved from SME which demonstrated the importance of existence of SMEs in the local business environment. In short, SMEs are essential foundations for the economic development in Taiwan. However, due to low transparency of financial information and unhealthy financial/accounting system, for reduce the risk of loaning, SMEs are required to provide collateralization as grantee when applying for financial support. While few supports from the governmental side, this requirements turn out to be a barrier for small scale SMEs who are unable to provide such proof. As a result, this study is aimed to discuss the Credit Guarantee when the violation of contract between large enterprises and bank occurs, providing collateralization of upstream SMEs as well as the expected return after the loan of bank, in order to reduce the risk of loaning and increase the wiliness of loaning, in hope to achieve the win-win situation for suppliers and bank. A leader-follower game is introduced in this paper, with the upstream suppliers as a follower, downstream suppliers as a leader. Both sides of the suppliers are seeking for profit maximization and build up supply chain purchase model. Backward calculation starts from obtaining the optimal decision and profit maximization result which lead to the sensitivity analysis on important factors as well as the conclusion. The result is projected to provide reference and solutions to the loaning decision marking process for all parties in the financial supply chain.
Kucuksenel, Serkan. "Incentives and Institutions: Essays in Mechanism Design and Game Theory with Applications." Thesis, 2009. https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/1484/1/Kucuksenel_Thesis.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаIn the first part of this dissertation we study the problem of designing desirable mechanisms for economic environments with different types of informational and consumption externalities. We first study the mechanism design problem for the class of Bayesian environments where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations but also on the welfare of other individuals. For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient mechanisms and examine their properties. This set of mechanisms is compelling since interim efficient mechanisms are the best in the sense that there is no other mechanism which generates unanimous improvement. For public good environments, we show that these mechanisms produce the public good closer to the efficient level of production as the degree of altruism in the preferences increases. For private good environments, we show that altruistic agents trade more often than selfish agents.
We next consider mechanism design problem for matching markets where externalities are present. We present mechanisms that implement the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. We present a sequential mechanism implementing the core without any restrictions on the preferences. We also show that simple two-stage mechanisms cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium without strong assumptions on agents' preferences.
In the final part of the dissertation we focus on another matching market, one-to-one assignment games with money. We present an alternative way to characterize the core as the fixed points of a certain mapping. We also introduce the first algorithm that finds all core outcomes in assignment games. The lattice property of the stable payoffs, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski's fixed point theorem. We show that there is a polarization of interests in the core by using our formulation.
Yi-LingShen and 沈怡伶. "Dynamic Allocation Mechanism Based on the Game Theory for Parallel Intrusion Detection Systems." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/15156747902001609201.
Повний текст джерела國立成功大學
電腦與通信工程研究所
98
An Intrusion detection system (IDS) is a network security tool that can check packets passing through it. However, with the rapid development of Internet, network bandwidth has steadily increased. So a major issue with IDS is an overly high volume of traffic where the NIDS is unable to process all data resulting in “dropped” traffic. Scaling NIDS to high speed networks can be achieved by using multiple NIDS operating in parallel. We propose a Dynamic Parallel Intrusion Detection System (DPIDS) with dynamic allocation and a load balancing mechanism to handle the increased load. For improving performance of using multiple IDS, we introduce a taskmaster, which is the core of the DPIDS. The taskmaster oversees division and allocation of responsibility and performs packet control, pre-filtering, and state management. This taskmaster uses active analysis to achieve intelligent assignment of work distribution using game theory contrasting against the passive distribution methods proposed by previous works. The active mechanism improves division of labor by dynamically loading the slave IDSs and can account for sudden increases in traffic or slave IDS crashes. In addition, this mechanism also allows for different grades of IDSs to work in tandem within the DPIDS architecture. The overall system is designed as session-oriented signature-based IDS, which provides stateful analysis to aggregate related events for detection by a single Slave IDS. Our experimental results show that DPIDS maintains stable loading as a function of the taskmaster. This feature allows better performance of the overall system as a result of more efficient use of IDS capacity.
Wong, Wei-Chun, and 翁瑋駿. "A Novel Bilateral Incentive Mechanism based on Social Relation and Evolutionary Game Theory." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69172062292293399564.
Повний текст джерела淡江大學
電機工程學系碩士班
104
P2P file-sharing system has been developed rapidly over the past years. P2P file-sharing mechanisms such as Gnutella, BitTorrent and Private Tracker have been used popularly. However the free-rider and malicious node problem hinders the efficient utilization of P2P networks. Hence this paper makes improvements on the original BitTorrent by proposing a novel bilateral incentive mechanism (NBIM) to restrain free riders and malicious nodes simultaneously. The impact of proposed mechanism on free-riders and malicious nodes is analyzed using Peersim. The simulated results prove that the proposed mechanism can restrain average 31 percent behavioral capability of free riders and average 41 percent behavioral capability of malicious nodes to improve the performance of the P2P network.
Lucier, Brendan. "The Power of Uncertainty: Algorithmic Mechanism Design in Settings of Incomplete Information." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/31843.
Повний текст джерелаKrishnappa, Chinmayi. "Unit-demand auctions : bridging theory and practice." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4829.
Повний текст джерелаtext
Shelke, Sunil Sitaram. "A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction." Thesis, 2011. http://etd.iisc.ernet.in/handle/2005/2361.
Повний текст джерелаNik-Khah, Edward M. "Designs on the mechanism economics and the FCC spectrum auctions /." 2005. http://etd.nd.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-12152005-211506/.
Повний текст джерелаChen, Li-Xian, and 陳立先. "Effects of Digital Game-Based Learning on Problem-Solving Process based on Self-Regulation Theory and Scaffold Presentation Mechanism." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/9mz6k4.
Повний текст джерела國立交通大學
資訊科學與工程研究所
106
Contemporary trends in education and research have emphasized active learning. However, how to allow learners to maintain learners’ autonomy and continue problem-solving are the key factors has not been meticulously explored. Using digital games as a learning guidance tool can support and reinforce problem-solving ability, attention and concentration, learning effectiveness and learning motivation. In recent years, digital game-based learning (DGBL) has gradually become an important role in various work and learning fields. Gaming concepts and mechanisms stimulate learners’ interest, maintain motivation and produce creativity and then learners willingly overcome unnecessary obstacles. This helps learners to develop cognitive skills and acquire new knowledge. However, the problem that learners often “stuck at the level” caused by the imbalance between challenges and skills is the educators and researchers are eager to improve. DGBL environments have a variety of digital assistance tools that can guide learners and let them pursuit active failure. In the past, the scaffolding tools were mostly designed from the instructors' perspective. In order to design scaffolding tool for learners' needs, this study used eye movement data to analyze how learners observed the DGBL environment. In addition, the digital games’ rule systems generate immediate feedback after learners act. How to make good use of the feedback and reward mechanisms in the games is even more important. Therefore, our goal is to maintain the learners’ continuous active learning by combining the appropriate game learning designs and analyze learners’ cognitive and problem-solving process. This study used three quasi-experimental designs based on self-regulation theory, scaffold theory, the eye movement measurement, rhythm game and Sudoku game to explore how learners self-regulate their problem-solving process. In the first study, we utilized eye tracking movement to analyze how learners perceived a new Sudoku game learning environment and how the attention was diverted between various information. The second study used a rhythm game with difficulty level design to explore how learners can achieve continuous learning through the process of self-regulation, complete stage goals and maintain the flow experience when facing the obstacles. Based on the results of two studies, the third study was designed the scaffold with auxiliary functions to analyze how learners use the restricted resources (different scaffold presentation and reward mechanisms) to solve problems and create their own problem strategies. Results from experiments involving elementary, senior high and junior school students suggest that (a) the learners will solve the problem faster, if they understand the rules clearly at the beginning; (b) flow state was continuously influenced by self-regulation over time; (c) active failure enables learners to continue advanced learning in game-based digital learning; (d) experiences toward the end of gaming sessions had an influence on learners' continuous learning willingness; (e) providing a hidden scaffolds in rule-based environment allows learners to create new problem-solving strategies. We applied two scaffolding presented principles to the teaching scene and received positive feedback from the students.
Garg, Dinesh. "Design Of Innovative Mechanisms For Contemporary Game Theoretic Problems In Electronic Commerce." Thesis, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2005/360.
Повний текст джерелаShew, James. "Guidance Under Uncertainty: Employing a Mediator Framework in Bilateral Incomplete-Information Negotiations." Thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4017.
Повний текст джерелаShen, Fei. "Resource Allocation for Multiple Access and Broadcast Channels under Quality of Service Requirements Based on Strategy Proof Pricing." Doctoral thesis, 2014. https://tud.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A28586.
Повний текст джерелаAufgrund der hohen Nachfrage nach Datenrate und wegen der Knappheit an Ressourcen in Funknetzen ist die effiziente Allokation von Leistung ein wichtiges Thema in den heutigen Mehrnutzer-Kommunikationssystemen. Die Spieltheorie bietet Methoden, um egoistische und soziale Konfliktsituationen zu analysieren. Das vorgeschlagene System befasst sich mit der Erfüllung der auf Signal-zu-Rausch-und-Interferenz-Verhältnis (SINR) basierenden Quality-of-Service (QoS)-Anforderungen aller Nutzer mittels effizienter Leistungsallokation, anstatt die Übertragungsrate zu maximieren. Es wird ein Framework entworfen, um die Leistungsallokation mittels universellen Pricing-Mechanismen umzusetzen. In der Dissertation werden zentralisierte und verteilte Leistungsallokationsalgorithmen unter Verwendung verschiedener Pricing-Ansätze diskutiert. Die Nutzer in Funksystemen handeln rational im spieltheoretischen Sinne, indem sie ihre eigenen Nutzenfunktionen maximieren. Die mobilen Endgeräte, die dasselbe Spektrum nutzen, haben den Anreiz durch bewusste Fehlinterpretation ihrer privaten Informationen das eigene Ergebnis zu verbessern. Daher ist es wichtig, die Funktionalität des Systems zu überwachen und durch Optimierung des Pricings und Priorisierungsgewichte zu beeinflussen. Für den zentralisierten Ressourcenallokationsansatz werden der allgemeine Mehrfachzugriffskanal (Multiple Access Channel, MAC) und der Broadcastkanal (BC) mit linearen bzw. nichtlinearen Empfängern untersucht. Die Preise, die resultierenden Kostenterme und die optimale Leistungsallokation, mit der die QoS-Anforderungen in der zulässigen Ratenregion erfüllt werden, werden in geschlossener Form hergeleitet. Lineare und nichtlineare Pricing-Ansätze werden separat diskutiert. Das unendlich oft wiederholte Spiel wird vorgeschlagen, um Spieler vom Betrügen durch Übermittlung falscher Kanalinformationen abzuhalten. Für die verteilten Ressourcenvergabe wird das nichtkooperative Spiel in Normalform verwendet und formuliert. Die Nutzer wählen ihre Sendeleistung zur Maximierung ihrer eigenen Nutzenfunktion. Individuelle Preise werden eingeführt und so angepasst, dass die QoS-Anforderungen mit der Leistungsallokation im eindeutigen Nash-Gleichgewicht erfüllt werden. Verschiedene Arten des Nutzerverhaltens werden bezüglich der Täuschung ihrer Nutzenfunktion analysiert, und ein Strategy-Proof-Mechanismus mit Strafen wird entwickelt. Die Ergebnisse für den MAC sind anwendbar auf heterogene Netzwerke, wobei zwei neuartige Ansätze zur Kompensation bereitgestellt werden, die den hybriden Zugang zu Femtozell-Netzwerken motivieren. Mithilfe des Stackelberg-Spiels wird gezeigt, dass die vorgeschlagenen Ansätze in einer Win-Win-Situation resultieren.