Статті в журналах з теми "Former rebel combatants"

Abstract Why might former rebel combatants ever revert to fighting? The purpose of this research note is to inform the scholarly community on rebel incentives to remobilize for violence, a topic which has been underexplored in the literature, using evidence from an ongoing conflict: the case of volunteer ex-combatants in the Syrian civil war. In late 2014 to early 2015, we conducted surveys with 196 ex-fighters who served with different rebel group brigades linked to the Free Syrian Army as well as moderate Islamist and jihadist groups. Interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, Turkey, a common destination for combatants exiting the battlefield in rebel-held territory in northern Syria. We find that ex-fighters who are ideologically committed to the defeat of the Assad regime and/or the establishment of an Islamic state are most likely to want to return to combat. However, rebel group organizational deficiencies and strategies keep many highly motivated fighters away. Our results illustrate how rebel fighters might quickly remobilize when disciplined, well-organized rebel groups emerge on the scene, as evidenced by the rapid ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS).

What sustains commitment to rebel fighting during civil war? Using original survey data from the ongoing conflict in Syria, we examine whether self-ascribed rebel fighters, former fighters, civilians, and refugees can be clearly differentiated based on commitment to rebellion. We ask whether such groups are better characterized as a broadly holistic fighting community or a heterogeneous mix of actors with different levels of support for violence. Using a well-balanced sample of over 300 active and former rebel fighters, civilians from within the conflict zone, and externally displaced refugees, we observe that fighting commitment is greater among active combatants compared to other cohorts. To understand why, we examine underexplored psychological mechanisms and find that individuals with higher risk tolerance, optimism bias, and identity fusion with rebel forces display greater dedication to fighting. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding who participates in civil war violence and why.

The International Criminal Court’s interventions have prompted debate about the wisdom of criminally prosecuting combatants while attempting to build peace in conflict-ridden societies. Previous research fails to distinguish between different types of trials. Using a large-N dataset of three types of criminal trials undertaken during internal conflict – domestic security trials of rebels, domestic human rights trials of state agents, and international war crimes trials of both – this article tests a theory of the compellent effect of criminal prosecution on conflict termination. We find that, even when accounting for endogeneity, rebel trials are associated with a higher probability of conflict termination, while trials of state agents are weakly associated with conflict persistence. We argue that the former compel the opposition to discontinue fighting, while the latter signal to rebels a lack of government resolve. We also find that the effect of international trials, which at times appear weakly associated with conflict termination, is endogenous to international intervention more generally.

Appetitive aggression – a rewarding perception of the perpetration of violence – seems to be an adaptation common to adverse conditions. Children raised within armed groups may develop attitudes and values that favour harming others when socialized within a combat force. Combatants who joined an armed force early in their lives should, therefore, perceive aggression in a more appetitive way than those who were recruited later. We interviewed 95 former members of armed groups operating in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Those combatants that were having higher levels of appetitive aggression were those who joined a rebel force earlier in life. Surprisingly, neither the amount of military training nor the amount of time spent in the forces had a significant effect on the level of appetitive aggression. Our results show that when civil socialization is replaced by socialization within an armed group early in life, self-regulation of appetitive aggression may become deficient, leading to a higher propensity towards cruelty.

The integration of rebel combatants into regular forces is often a political negation for power. Several examples from the past show how such pursuits have brought about mutinies and communal violence and pushed the countries back to instability. Current literatures do not provide success stories from which crucial elements of rebel-military programs can be extracted for implementation in future programs. The thesis statement presented by the study is that conflicting parties need to invent options for mutual gain, which can be achieved using flexibility and standard criteria when all other means to achieve an agreement fail. In this regard, Nepal’s rebel-military integration process presents a unique case where former Maoist militias were integrated into the Nepali Army as individuals and after fulfilling the toned-down institutional criteria requirements. Using a qualitative design, the study of the rebel-military integration program in Nepal identified the areas within the program that adopted adequate flexibility and criteria fulfillment, and explored how those potentially led to the successful integration of ex-Maoist combatants into the Nepali Army. In order to analyze this information, secondary data such as the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), 2006, integration program documents, journal and news articles, and organizational reports were reviewed. For the cross-validation of information, Key Personnel Interviews were conducted with program executives and Nepali Army representative, and Focus Group Discussions were conducted with regular as well Signposting in abstract and in paragraphs in the paper: It is a good idea to give a structural overview of your key arguments in the paper, for example, Part I deals with… Part II deals with.. The data analysis involved a qualitative exploratory approach in order to analyze the causal variables as discussed in the preceding research design section. The different sources of data allowed data-triangulation in order to better explore which elements of the program applied criteria and flexibility and to what degree, as well as how they impacted the integration process. The details are discussed in the subsequent sections-

Abstract In this article, we examine exceptional circumstances in which men who father children born as the result of conflict-related sexual violence assume full or partial responsibility for their child's well-being. Children ‘born of war’ are increasingly recognized as a particular victim group in relevant international policy frameworks. Their social status falls somewhere between the victimization of their mother and perpetration of their father. Given the circumstances of their birth, they often experience social rejection and loss of identity with a long-term impact on their well-being. Previous scholarship has primarily documented the challenges faced by their mothers as caregivers and as victims of wartime sexual violence. A discussion on fathers to children ‘born of war’ is absent, attributable not only to their perpetrator status, but also to the assumption that their identity is unknown or that a relationship between father and child is undesired. The article demonstrates this is not always the case. Based on research in northern Uganda between 2016 and 2019 which included interviews and focus group discussions with former male combatants in the rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army, we explore how some fathers seek to maintain a relationship with children born as the result of ‘forced marriage’ and assume partial or full responsibility for their well-being and care.

Advocates of wartime international criminal tribunals (ICTs) hope that such tribunals can deter combatant atrocities against civilians. Yet, more than twenty-five years after the establishment of the first wartime ICT—the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—wartime ICTs’ role in deterring such violence remains a matter of debate. Insights from criminology, as well as research on civil conflicts and international legal compliance, suggest that ICTs are most likely to deter government and rebel forces from committing atrocities against civilians when all three of the following conditions are present: (1) ICT officials have secured sufficient prosecutorial support, (2) combatant groups rely on support from liberal constituencies, and (3) combatant groups have centralized structures. Case studies of the ICTY's impact on fourteen combatant groups from the Yugoslav conflicts—combined with hundreds of field interviews with war veterans and others—confirm this prediction. The ICTY's record thus sheds important light on how and when contemporary wartime ICTs—including the International Criminal Court—might succeed in deterring combatant atrocities against civilians.

This article draws on original survey data of 10,951 Colombian ex-paramilitaries to study the determinants of victimizers’ support for transitional justice. Understanding ex-combatants’ attitudes toward victims of the conflict and measures of justice is critical to gaining leverage on when transitional justice is likely to prove effective. The data suggest that former fighters’ views of transitional justice are shaped by the intimacy with which they experience transitional justice: whether they are known to, in close proximity, and accepted by the communities they victimized. Their attitudes are also constrained by the norms of justice in which they have been socialized, and by the extent of the risks to them personally: in judicial terms given their own culpability and in security terms given their vulnerability to retribution. The study has important implications for the prospects of successful transitional justice with the FARC rebels and for the consolidation of peace in Colombia.

The Acholi are Nilotic Negroes who are part of the Lwo speaking people who migrated from Bahr-el Ghazal in the Sudan about 1600 AD. A section of the Acholi community under the umbrella of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) waged a civil war against the sitting government of Uganda in 1986. LRA rebels abducted numerous children from Acholi-land and the neighbouring Lango community in northern Uganda regardless of their gender. The female returnees, whether they were recruited willingly or otherwise, are believed to have committed atrocities towards their own Acholi people during the period of insurgency. During their re-integration, these women were culturally challenged, not only for the atrocities they were believed to have committed while in the bush, but because of their status as women who violated their gender role status. The Acholi traditional culture does not approve of female combatants and some of the society members hold strong reservations regarding the new status of these women! They argue that the status of these former combatants who took lives of their own kin and kith is incongruent with Acholi perception of women as life givers, carer-givers and protectors! The article cautions that the stigma that the female returnees experience even after going through the different rituals is an indication that they are not fully reintegrated! Acholi traditional culture was in this case selected because it has been a pioneer through its traditional rituals to reintegrate these women in the Northern Ugandan community. However, it was noted in this article that cultural rituals such as kwero merok cannot fully reintegrate LRA female combatants.

The August 2019 announcement by some top former commanders of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo guerrillas in Colombia that they were resuming armed struggle was a major shock after the peace agreement between the rebels and the Colombian government in 2016. It was the clearest symptom of the current crisis of the peace process. It was not, however, an unforeseeable development. The government had brazenly attacked the content and the spirit of the peace agreement, and the systematic murders of ex-combatants and social leaders remained unpunished. As a result, increasing numbers of ex-combatants had decided to resume armed struggle. To regard these groups as mere criminals underestimates the political content of their statements and overlooks the reasons for this growing phenomenon. An exploration of the causes of the growing FARC-EP dissidences sets the stage for a discussion of the likely scenarios for conflict and peace building in the middle term. El anuncio de algunos ex comandantes de la guerrilla de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo en agosto de 2019 sobre su reanudación de la lucha armada causó gran conmoción después del acuerdo de paz de 2016 entre los rebeldes y el gobierno. Este fue el síntoma más claro de la actual crisis del proceso de paz, pero no se trató de un acontecimiento imprevisible. El gobierno ya había atacado descaradamente el contenido y espíritu los acuerdos, y los asesinatos sistemáticos de excombatientes y líderes sociales seguían impunes. Como resultado, un número cada vez mayor de excombatientes se decidían por reanudar la lucha armada. Considerar a estos grupos como meros delincuentes subestima el contenido político de sus declaraciones y pasa por alto las razones de este fenómeno creciente. Una exploración de las causas de las progresivas disidencias de las FARC-EP sienta las bases para una discusión sobre escenarios probables en torno la construcción tanto de conflictos como de la paz a mediano plazo.

After more than four years of negotiations the Colombian Government and the FARC have reached a historical peace agreement, signed on 26 September 2016 and, in a shocking turn of events, ultimately rejected in an up-or-down referendum held on 2 October 2016. Only 41 days after the plebiscite the two parties have revised the original deal and submitted a new version to the Congress, which approved it on 30 November 2016. The deal, upon which relies the possibility to finally achieve a stable and lasting peace, covers several crucial issues, including what will happen to the FARC rebels once the armed conflict is officially over. The establishment of an effective DDR process is an essential step to ensure that FARC members will meaningfully transition into civilian life and it represents one of the most controversial aspects of the peace agreement. Moving from the assumption that DDR programmes are not stand alone mechanisms, but fall within a broader framework that covers a number of important and intimately entwined aspects, like the issue of accountability and the rights of victims, the present article, after looking at Colombia’s past attempts to reintegrate former combatants, aims at discussing the DDR process envisaged in the current peace deal, highlighting its main strengths and shortcoming.

In the present paper the author continues the study of the challenges faced by Colombia in its struggle to overcome the internal armed conflict, as well as the role of the United States in this process. By 2010 the confrontation between the government forces and the armed rebels had reached a breaking point opening the way to a successful conclusion of the Government of Colombia–FARC peace negotiations and the beginning of the country’s post-conflict reconstruction. The paper thoroughly examines the negotiations process, identifies the key disputed issues and the measures outlined for their resolution, including mechanisms of transitional justice, agrarian reform, programmes for demobilization and reintegration of the former combatants. The results of these talks laid the foundation for the historic Peace Accord of September 26, 2016. However, against all hopes and expectations, the agreement failed to bring an end to the long-standing internal conflict in Colombia. The failure of the national referendum, which was designed to approve the agreement, not only revealed deep divisions in the society, but forced the government to make serious concessions to the opponents of the negotiations with FARC. The author emphasizes the growing erosion of the hard-won consensus in the Colombian society, accompanied by the consolidation of the right-wing conservative camp. In this context the role of external sponsors of the peaceful agreement in general and the United States in particular becomes crucial. The paper presents a comparative analysis of approaches to providing aid to Colombia demonstrated by the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The author concludes that despite substantial differences, for both administrations the ultimate objective was national security of the United States. That was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the US foreign aid to Colombia focused primarily on the fight against the illegal production of and trafficking in drugs, while the issues of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction received less attention. Assessing Colombia’s experience in overcoming the internal conflict and the role of the United States in that process, the author concludes that although prioritization of security issues may have a considerable organizing potential, at the same time it may be detrimental to the process of post-conflict reconstruction in general.

After conflict, many ex-combatant men experience the spoils of war as their rebel groups transition into political parties and elect former members to party seats. However, it is unclear whether these opportunities are reserved only for male ex-combatants. This article considers when and why voters might support former rebel women running for political office. It argues that the election of these women will depend on their roles within rebel groups, as well as their use of violence during conflict. The article presents a novel dataset on the election of former rebel women to rebel parties from 1970 to 2020. The results indicate that women’s roles as combatants and leaders in rebel groups are associated with higher levels of election for rebel women. In contrast, rebel women’s ties to violent tactics such as terrorism and sexual violence during war are associated with a lower level of election for rebel women after conflict. The interactions between rebel women’s roles and ties to violence are tested; the results suggested that, regardless of elite roles, rebel women’s electoral chances are hurt by extreme forms of violence, demonstrating the salience of the negative stigmas attached to violent women. The findings also demonstrate that while many former rebel women are marginalized after war, a select few experience political gains.

Academic perspectives on women in conflict have been consistently moving away from the reductionist narrative of victimhood or deviation from gender norms. Yet, this narrative is still predominant in humanitarian discourses, while it is assumed that women’s participation in peacebuilding derives from their natural proclivities. These narratives, we argue, reinforce the gendered patriarchal post-conflict order as ex-combatant women are pushed into traditional roles through reintegration processes without addressing gendered structural and systemic violence. This article is based on the Colombian case, where a peace agreement in 2016 marked the official end to decades of conflict between FARC-EP rebels and the government. While deep changes were promised, the reality for women ex-combatants has been – despite unprecedented levels of women’s participation – a reordering into traditional roles and a reinforcement of conjugal order rather than a transformative progression towards peacetime emancipation. We argue that, while the government claimed that the economic and political systems were non-negotiable red-lines, there was also another unspoken red-line: that of gender roles. This article argues that addressing the gendered structural roots of conflicts in order to build sustainable peace requires a decisive participation of women, including former rebel combatants whose potential contribution to transformative peacebuilding are often ignored.

Regimes founded in rebellion are, typically, extremely durable. We propose that this stability is founded upon peaceful power sharing between the rebel regime leader and military elites. Amid long and intense fighting, rebel leaders must delegate control to top military commanders because doing so helps them to win battles. After seizing power, power-sharing deals between former combatants are highly credible due to their history of interactions, which mitigates the guardianship dilemma. Elsewhere, a persistent internal security dilemma often undermines power-sharing deals. Using originally collected data on African regimes from 1960 to 2017, we establish that rebel regimes break down seldomly compared with other authoritarian regimes and they experience fewer coups. Regarding the mechanism, rebel regimes more frequently share power with military elites by appointing a Minister of Defense. These Ministers are typically high-ranking members of the rebellion, which reflects the regime’s replacement of the state military with their own.

Aim:To explore the experience of fighters disabled during the Liberian civil war; what they did and what was done to them; and what happened after their demobilization. Methods:Six focus group discussions were organized in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, with 50 invalid veterans aged 10 to 25 at their entrance into the war and eightwomen wounded, although civilians, sampled as in convenience. In addition,sevenkey-informant interviews took place. All encounters were agreeably taped, transcribed and summarized under the items of the discussion guide. Results:Most ex-combatants joined the fighting to protect themselves and their families who were targeted by rebel fighters or joined to revenge the killing of close family members by fighters from all sides including government soldiers. Nearly all the former fighters interviewed expressed their desire to be trained in various areas of life skills. A vast majority of the ex-combatants are living from begging in the streets.Those from factions feel that government cares for former regular soldiers and discriminates those from other warring factions. The lack of housing for ex-combatants with war related infirmities is of paramount concern to them. They feel that the post-war reintegration program did not achieve its objectives. In the communities, they are stigmatized, blamed as the ones who brought suffering to their own people. The key informants are calling for establishment of trust fund for survivors of the civil war who are disabled. Recommendations: Establishment of a trust fund for survivors of the civil war who are disabled; reform of the National Bureau of Veteran Affairs to include the disabled ex-combatants of all former warring factions; erection as planned of the proposed Veterans Hospital; a national census of disabled ex-combatants and war victims.

Abstract In this paper, we focus on the completion of a government reintegration program in Colombia for former non-state armed actors, such as rebel forces and militias, in the post-conflict period. As the members of these groups lay down their arms and return to a peaceful existence, the effectiveness of their transition to ‘normal’ lives can be critical in preventing the re-emergence of conflict and violence. Former combatants face numerous challenges and hardships such as criminal violence, political violence, economic hardship that, if not properly addressed, may increase the likelihood that some of them become involved in criminal work, political violence, or other activities that undermine peace. We develop a theory of the impact of violence and insecurity challenges facing former, non-state armed actors (henceforth, ANSAs). We suggest that the numerous challenges involved in leading a normal life under conditions of abnormal security will likely make successful completion of government reintegration programs more difficult for ANSAs. We also consider and account for the powerful effects of gender and family in the successful completion of a reintegration program. We test our theoretical model on the successful completion of a government reintegration program in Colombia, and test our hypotheses on a large database of ANSAs. We find support for our hypotheses, as well as social factors that greatly influenced the likelihood of successful completion of the Colombian government’s reintegration program.

European historiography on wars has embarked on a study of a matter of crucial significance: the involvement of ordinary individuals as perpetrators of mass casualties. This article aims to provide insights and hypotheses concerning the underlying motives behind such actions, focusing on the unique context of the Spanish Civil War. The data utilized for this study are drawn from a sample of 112 oral interviews conducted with former combatants of the Spanish Civil War, all born between 1905 and 1920. During these interviews, 112 men participated a semi structured discussion. Individual perceptions and variables of interest relevant to acts of violence were subjected to qualitative analysis. Our analysis suggests that instances of aggression often arise because of emotional triggers, alignment with fascist ideological convictions, societal pressures and a sense of duty-driven obedience. Our results refute the notion that ideological factors alone suffice as explanations.

Abstract Under what conditions can faith leaders influence peace in civil wars? The ongoing conflict in Congo, Syria, and Yemen indicate that faith leaders can fuel sectarian divide, but also intervene on the side of peace. Drawing on experiences in Sierra Leone's civil war, this paper highlights the role of faith leaders as moral guarantors of peace processes, with respondent former rebels indicating that without interfaith delegations personally bringing the peace accord to their remote jungle camps, they would not have trusted the UN-led process. Ethnographic analysis and over 60 field interviews with former combatants and religious leaders, presents a model for answering why faith leaders were central in terminating this conflict. Combatant's personal experience with a diverse mixture of Christian, Traditional, and Islamic leaders contributed to high confidence in peace accords, due to interfaith practices deeply embedded within the culture and shows the dispositions, rituals, and interfaith practices that provided the cultural foundations for successful interfaith intervention. The paper ends with generalizations for other interfaith groups seeking to intervene in conflict.

The Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), otherwise known as Mau-Mau revolutionary movement was formed after returnees of the Second World War (1939–1945) ignited the African populace to militarily fight for land and freedom (wiyathi nai thaka). John Walton’s theory of reluctant rebels informs this article theoretically, as it is indeed the political elites who inspired this armed struggle. To do this, they held several meetings in the capital city of Nairobi, drew the war structures from the national level to the sub-location level, especially in the central region of Kenya, and tasked locals with filling in the leadership vacuums that were created. In view of this, the article seeks to unveil the revolutionary history of the Mau-Mau medical Doctor, also known as Major Judge Munene Gachau (born in 1935), whose contribution in the Kenyan war of independence (1952–1960) remains unique. This uniqueness can be attested to by considering various factors. First, he is one of the few surviving leaders who joined the guerrilla forest war while he was relatively young. Normally, the Mau-Mau War Council did not encourage people below the age of 25 to join the rebels in the forest of Mt. Kenya, Aberdare Mountains and/or other places. Nor did they encourage adults past the age of 35 to join as combatants in the forest fight. Second, he is the only known Mau-Mau rebel in Kirinyaga county of Kenya to have gone back to school after the war had ended, traveled abroad, and studied up to a Masters degree level. Third, Munene Gachau belongs in the category that joined the rebels while still relatively educated and eventually got promoted to the rank of Major, upon being confirmed as the Mau-Mau Doctor.

Abstract The former rebel party Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) in Sierra Leone has struggled with a discredited wartime reputation and electoral defeats throughout the post-war period. In spite of this, the party has remained loyal to its wartime revolutionary ideas, symbols and political rhetoric. Why is this the case? In this article, I argue that the answer lies in the premises of party politics in war-torn states and new democracies on the African continent. In a political landscape where brokerage is power, retaining wartime identities can sometimes serve as a valuable source of (potential) patronage. With few other options for access to resources and opportunities, the core of the party membership has clung to its past as a means to both rally electoral support among the marginalized ex-combatant community and to get access to the long-awaited funds that were promised to them in the peace negotiations.

Abstract The revised peace agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC, officially approved by the Congress on 30 November 2016, covers several crucial issues, including the destiny of the FARC rebels in the aftermath of the world’s longest civil war. The establishment of an effective DDR process is an essential step to ensure that FARC's members will meaningfully transition into civilian life and it represents one of the most controversial aspects amongst those addressed during the four years peace negotiations that led to the signature of the current deal. The present article, after providing an overview of the essential features of DDR programmes and the context-specific factors that can either facilitate or hamper their implementation, will first look at Colombia’s past attempts to reintegrate former FARC combatants and then it will discuss the DDR process outlined in the peace deal under implementation, arguing that, in comparison to the previous efforts and at least on paper, it satisfies many of the key requirements for success, in primis being part of a comprehensive transitional justice process.

When we think of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, the first image that is conjured in our mind is of an individual sporting a blue helmet or a blue beret (fig. 1). While simple and uncomplicated, these blue accessories represent an expression and an embodiment resembling that of a warrior, sent to bring peace to conflict-torn communities. UN peacekeeping first conceptually emerged in 1948 in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that ensued following the United Kingdom’s relinquishing of its mandate over Palestine, and the proclamation of the State of Israel. “Forged in the crucible of practical diplomacy” (Rubinstein 16), unarmed military observers were deployed to Palestine to monitor the hostilities and mediate armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), significantly exemplified the diplomatic and observational capabilities of military men, in line with the UN Charter’s objectives of international peace and security, setting henceforth a basic archetype for international peacekeeping. It was only in 1956, however, that peacekeeping formally emerged when armed UN forces deployed to Egypt to supervise the withdrawal of forces occupying the Suez Canal (informally known as the ‘Second Arab-Israeli’ war). Here, the formation of UN peacekeeping represented an international pacifying mechanism comprised of multiple third-party intermediaries whereby peaceful resolution would be achieved by transcending realist instincts of violence for political attainment in favour of applying a less-destructive liberal model of persuasion, compromise, and perseverance (Howard). ‘Blue helmet’ peacekeeping operations continue to be regarded by the UN as an integral subsidiary instrument of its organisation. At present, there are 12 active peacekeeping operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping across the world (United Nations Peacekeeping). Fig. 1: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) sporting blue berets (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-awarded-un-medals-for-south-sudan-peacekeeping-mission) But where did the blue helmets and berets originate from? Rubinstein details a surprisingly mundane account of the origins of the political accessory that is now a widely recognised symbol for UN peacekeepers’ uniforms. Peacekeepers’ uniforms initially emerged from the ad hoc need to distinguish UN troops from those of the armed forces in a distinctive dress during the 1947 UNTSO mission by any means and material readily available, such as armbands and helmets (Henry). The era of early peacekeeping operations also saw ‘observers’ carry UN flags and paint their vehicle white with ‘UN’ written in large black letters in order to distinguish themselves. The blue helmets specifically came to be adorned during the first peacekeeping operation in 1956 during the Suez crisis. At this time, Canada supplied a large number of non-combatant troops whose uniform was the same as the belligerent British forces, party to the conflict. An effort to thus distinguish the peacekeepers was made by spray-painting surplus World War II American plastic helmet-liners, which were available in quantity in Europe, blue (Urquhart; Rubenstein). The two official colours of the UN are ‘light blue’ and ‘white’. The unique light “UN” blue colour, in particular, was approved as the background for the UN flag in the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 167(II), alongside a white emblem depicting a map of the world surrounded by two olive branches. While the UN’s use of the colour was chosen as a “practical effect of identifying the Organization in areas of trouble and conflict, to any and all parties concerned”, the colour blue was also specifically chosen at this time as “an integral part of the visual identity of the organisation” representing “peace in opposition to red, for war” (United Nations). Blue is seen to be placed in antithesis to the colour red across several fields including popular culture, and even within politics, as a way to typically indicate conflict between two warring groups. Within popular culture, for example, many films in the science fiction, fantasy, or horror genres, use a clearly demarcated, dichotomous ‘red vs. blue’ colour scheme in their posters (fig. 2). This is also commonly seen in political campaign posters, for example during the 2021 US presidential election (fig. 3). Fig. 2: Blue and red colour schemes in film posters (left to right: Star Wars: The Force Awakens (2015), Captain Marvel (2019), and The Dead Don’t Die (2019)) Fig. 3: Biden (Democratic party) vs. Trump (Republican party) US presidential election (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/us-election-political-parties-explained-democrats-vs-republicans/12708296) This dichotomy can be traced back to the high Middle Ages between the fourteenth and seventeenth century where the colour blue became a colour associated with “moral implications”, rivalling both the colours black and red which were extremely popular in clothing during the eras of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance (Pastoureau 85). This ‘moral metamorphosis’ in European society was largely influenced by the views of Christian Protestant reformers concerning the social, religious, and artistic use of the colour blue (Pastoureau). A shift in the use of blue and its symbolic connotations may also be seen, for example, in early Christian art and iconography, specifically those deriving from depictions of the Virgin Mary; according to Pastoureau (50), this provides the “clearest illustration of the social, religious, and artistic consequences of blue's new status”. Up until the eighteenth century, the colour blue, specifically ‘sky blue’ or light blue tones resemblant of the “UN” shade of blue, had minimal symbolic or aesthetic value, particularly in European culture and certainly amongst nobility and the upper levels of society. Historically, light blue was typically associated with peasants’ clothing. This was due to the fact that peasants would often dye their clothes using the pigment of the woad herb; however, the woad would poorly penetrate cloth fibres and inevitably fade under the effects of sunlight and soap, thereby resulting in a ‘bland’ colour (Pastoureau). Although the blue hues worn by the nobility and wealthy were typically denser and more solid, a “new fashion” for light blue tones gradually took hold at the courts of the wealthy and the bourgeoisie, inevitably becoming deeply anchored in Western European counties (Pastoureau). Here, the reorganisation of the colour hierarchy and reformulation of blue certainly resembles Pastoureau’s (10) assertion that “any history of colour is, above all, a social history”. Within the humanities, colour represents a social phenomenon and construction. Colour thus provides insights into the ways society assigns meaning to it, “constructs its codes and values, establishes its uses, and determines whether it is acceptable or not” (Pastoureau, 10). In this way, although colour is a naturally occurring phenomenon, it is also a complex cultural construct. That the UN and its subsidiary bodies, including the Department of Peacekeeping, deliberately assigned light blue as its official organisational colour therefore usefully illustrates a significant social process of meaning-making and cultural sociology. The historical transition of light blue’s association from one of poverty in and around the eighteenth century to one of wealth in the nineteenth century may perhaps also be indicative of the next transitional era for light blue in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, representative of the amalgamation or unity between the two classes. Representing the ambitions not only of the organisation, but rather of the 193 member-states, of attaining worldwide peace, light blue may be seen as a colour of peace, as well as one of the people, for the people. This may be traced back, according to Pastoureau, as early as the Middle Ages where the colour blue was seen a colour of ‘peace’. Colours, however, do not solely determine social and cultural relevance in a given historical event. Rather, fabrics and clothing too offer “the richest and most diverse source of artifacts” in understanding history and culture. Artifacts such as UN peacekeepers’ blue berets and helmets necessarily incorporate economic, social, ideological, aesthetic, and symbolic aspects of both colour and material into the one complete uniform (Pastoureau). While the ‘UN blue’ is associated with peace, the beret, on the other hand, has been described as “an ally in the battlefield” (Kliest). The history of the beret is largely rooted in the armed forces – institutions typically associated with conflict and violence – and it continues to be a vital aspect of military uniforms worn by personnel from countries all around the globe. Given that the large majority of UN peacekeeping forces are made up of military personnel, peacekeeping, as both an action and an institution, thus adds a layer of complexity when discussing artifact symbolism. Here, a peacekeeper’s uniform uniquely represents the embodiment of an amalgamation of two traditionally juxtaposing concepts: peace, nurture, and diplomacy (often associated with ‘feminine’ qualities) versus conflict, strength, and discipline (often associated with ‘masculine’ qualities). A peacekeeper’s uniform thus represents the UN’s institutionalisation of “soldiers for peace” (Howard) who are, as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold proclaimed, “the front line of a moral force” (BBC cited in Howard). Aside from its association with the armed forces, the beret has also been used as a fashion symbol by political revolutionaries, such as members of the ‘Black Panther Party’ (BPP) founded in the 1960s during the US Civil Rights Movement, as well as Che Guevara, prominent Leftist figure in the Cuban Revolution (see fig. 4). For, Rosabelle Forzy, CEO of beret and headwear fashion manufacturing company ‘Laulhère’, the beret is “emblematic of non-conformism … worn by people who create, commit, militate, and resist” (Kliest). Fig. 4: Berets worn by political revolutionaries (Left to right: Black Panthers Party (BPP) protesting outside of a New York courthouse (https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2988897/Black-Panther-double-cop-killer-sues-freedom-plays-FLUTE-Murderer-demands-parole-changed-fury-victim-s-widow.html), and portrait of Che Guevara) In a way, the UN’s ‘blue beret’ too bears a ‘non-conformist’ visage as its peacekeepers neither fit categorisations as ‘revolutionaries’ nor as traditional ‘soldiers’. Peacekeepers personify a cultural phenomenon that operates in a complex environment (Rubinstein). While peacekeepers retain their national military (usually camouflage) uniforms during missions, the UN headwear is a symbol of non-conformity in response to sociological preconceptions regarding military culture. In the case of peacekeeping, the implementation and longevity of peacekeepers’ uniforms has occurred through a process of what Rubinstein (50) refers to as ‘cultural’ or ‘symbolic inversion’ wherein traditional notions of military rituals and symbolism have been appropriated or ‘inverted’ and given a new meaning by the UN. In other words, the UN promotes the image of soldiers acting without the use of force in service of peace in order to encode an image of a “world transformed” through the contribution of peacekeeping toward the “elaboration of an image of an international community acting in a neutral, consensual manner” (Rubinstein, 50). Cultural inversion therefore creates a socio-political space wherein normative representations are reconfigured and conditioned as acceptable. Rubinstein argues, however, that the UN’s need to integrate individuals with such diverse backgrounds and perceptions into a collective peacekeeper identity can be problematic. Rubinstein (72) adds that the blue beret is the “most obvious evidence” of an ordinary symbol investing ‘legitimacy’ in peacekeeping through ritual repetition which still holds its cultural relevance to the present day. Arguably, institutional uniforms are symbols which profoundly shape human experience, validating contextual action according to the symbol’s meanings relevant to those wearing it. In this way, uniform symbolism not only allows us to make sense of our daily experiences, but allows us to construct and understand our identities and our interactions with others who are also part of the symbolic culture we are situated in. Consider, for example, a police officer. A police officer’s uniform not only grants them membership to the policing institution but also necessarily grants them certain powers, privileges, and jurisdictions within society which thereby impact on the way they see the world and interact with it. Necessarily, the social and cultural identity one acquires from wearing a specific uniform only effectively functions by “investing differences”, however large or small, into these symbols that “distinguish us from others” (Rubinstein, 74). For example, a policeman’s badge is a signifier that they are, in fact, part of an exclusive group that the majority of the citizenry are not. To this extent, the use of uniforms is not without its controversies or without the capacity to be misused as a tool of discrimination in a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ scenario. Referring to case regarding the beret, for example, in 2000 then US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shineski, announced that the black beret – traditionally worn exclusively by specialised US Army units such as ‘Rangers’ – would become a standardised part of the US Army uniform for all soldiers and would denote a “symbol of unity”. General Shineski’s decision for the new headgear symbolised “the half-million-strong army’s transition to a lighter, more agile force that can respond more rapidly to distant trouble spots” (Borger). This was, however, met with angry backlash particularly from the Rangers who stated that they “were being robbed of a badge of pride” as “the beret is a symbol of excellence … that is not to be worn by everybody” (Borger). Responses to the proposition pointed to the problem of ‘low morale’ that the military faced, which could not be fixed just by “changing hats” (Borger). In this case, the beret was identified and isolated as a tool for coordinating perceptions (Rubinstein, 78). Here, the use of uniforms is as much about being external identifiers and designating a group from another as it is about sustaining a group by means of perpetuating what Rubinstein conceptualises as ‘self-legitimation’. This occurs in order to ensure the survival of a group and is similarly seen as occurring within UN peacekeeping (Joseph & Alex). Within peacekeeping the blue beret is an effective symbol used to perpetuate self-legitimacy across various levels of the UN which construct systems, or a ‘community’, of reinforcement largely rooted on organisational models of virtue and diplomacy. In the broadest sense, the UN promotes “a unique responsibility to set a global standard” in service to creating a unified and pacific world order (Guterres). As an integral instrument of international action, peacekeeping is, by extension, necessarily conditioned and supported by this cultural model whereby the actions of individual peacekeepers are strategically linked to the symbolic capital at the broadest levels of the organisation to manage the organisation’s power and legitimacy. The image of the peacekeeper, however, is fraught with problems and, as such, UN peacekeepers’ uniforms represent discrepancies and contradictions in the UN’s mission and organisational culture, particularly with relation to the UN’s symbolic construction of community and cooperation amongst peacekeepers. Given that peacekeeping troops are made up of individuals from different ethnic, cultural, and professional backgrounds, conditions for cultural interaction become challenging, if not problematic, and may necessarily lead to cross-cultural misunderstandings, miscommunication, and conflict. This applies to the context of peacekeeper deployment to host nations amongst local communities with whom they are also culturally unfamiliar (Rubinstein, "Intervention"). According to Rubinstein ("Intervention", 528), such operations may “create the conditions under which criminal activities or the institution of neo-colonial relationships can emerge”. Moncrief adds to this by also suggesting that a breakdown in conduct and discipline during missions may also contribute to peacekeepers engaging in violence during missions. Consequently, multiple cases of misdemeanour by UN peacekeepers have been reported across the years including peacekeeper involvement in bribery, weapons trading, and gold smuggling (Escobales). One of the most notorious acts of misconduct and violence that continues to be reported in the present day, however, is of peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse against host women and children. Between 2004 and 2016, for example, “the UN received almost 2,000 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse” (Essa). According to former chief of operations at the UN’s Emergency Co-ordination Centre, Andrew Macleod, this figure may be, however, much more disturbing, estimating in general that approximately “60,000 rapes had been carried out by UN staff in the past decade” (Zeffman). An article in the Guardian reported that a 12-year-old girl had been hiding in a bathroom during a house search in a Muslim enclave of the capital, Bangui [in the Central African Republic] … . A man allegedly wearing the blue helmet and vest of the UN peacekeeping forces took her outside and raped her behind a truck. (Smith & Lewis) In the article, the assailant’s uniform (“the blue helmet and vest”) is not only described as literal imagery to contextualise the grave crime that was committed against the child. In evoking the image of the blue helmet and vest, the author highlights the uniform as a symbolic tool of power which was misused to perpetuate harm against the vulnerable civilian ‘other’. In this scenario, like many others, rather than representing peace and hope, the blue helmet (or beret) instead illustrates the contradictions of the UN peacekeeper’s uniform. Here, the uniform has consequently come to be associated as a symbol of violence, fear, and most significantly, betrayal, for the victim(s) of the abuse, as well as for much of the victim’s community. This discrepancy was also highlighted in a speech presented by former Ambassador of the UK Mission to the UN, Matthew Rycroft, who stated that “when a girl looks up to a blue helmet, she should do so not in fear, but in hope”. For many peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly transactional sex, however, they “do not see themselves as abusing women”. This is largely to do with the power and privileges peacekeepers are afforded, such as ‘immunity’ – that is, a peacekeeper is granted immunity from trial or prosecution for criminal misconduct by the host nation’s judicial system. Over the years, scholarly research regarding peacekeepers’ immunity has highlighted a plethora of organisational problems within the UN, including lack of perpetrator accountability, and internal investigation or follow-up. More so, it has undoubtedly “contributed to a culture of individuals committing sexual violence knowing that they will get away with it” (Freedman). When a peacekeeper wears their uniform, they are thus imbued with the power and charged with the responsibility to properly embody and represent the values of the UN; “if [peacekeepers] don’t understand how powerful a position they are in, they will never understand what they do is actually wrong” (Elks). As such, unlike other traditional institutional uniforms, such as that of a soldier or a police officer, a peacekeeper’s uniform stands out as an enigma. One the one hand, peacekeepers channel the peaceful and passive organisational values of the UN by wearing the blue beret or helmet, whilst at the same time, they continue to sport the national military body uniform of their home country. Questions pertaining to the peacekeeper’s uniform arise and require further exploration: how can peacekeepers disassociate from their disciplined military personas and learnt combat skills if they continue to wear military camouflage during peacekeeping missions? Is the addition of the blue beret or helmet enough to reconfigure the body of the peacekeeper from one of violence, masculinity, and offence to that of peace, nurture, and diplomacy? Certainly, a range of factors are pertinent to an understanding of peacekeepers’ behaviour and group culture. But whether these two opposing identities can cohesively create or reconstitute a third identity using the positive skills and attributes of both juxtaposing institutions remains elusive. Nonetheless, the blue beret is a symbol of international hope, not only for vulnerable populations, but also for the world population collectively, as it represents neutral third-party member states working together to rebuild the world through non-combative means. References Borger, Julian. “Elite Forces Fear the Coming of the Egalitarian Beret.” The Guardian 19 Oct. 2000. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/19/julianborger>. Elks, Sonia. “Haitians Say Underaged Girls Were Abused by U.N. Peacekeepers.” Reuters 19 Dec. 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-women-peacekeepers-idUSKBN1YM27W>. Escobales, Roxanne. “UN Peacekeepers 'Traded Gold and Guns with Congolese rebels'.” The Guardian 28 Apr. 2008. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/28/congo.unitednations>. Essa, Azad. “Why Do Some Peacekeepers Rape? The Full Report.” Al Jazeera 10 Aug. 2017. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/8/10/why-do-some-peacekeepers-rape-the-full-report>. 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