Статті в журналах з теми "Fiscal policy. Risk sharing. European union"

We discuss the main fiscal policy issues in Europe, focusing on two that are at the core of the current debate. The first is that the government deficit and debt were, from the outset, the key objects of contention in the debate that led to the creation of the Eurozone, and they still are. The second issue is that a currency union implies the loss of a country-specific instrument, a national monetary policy. This puts a higher burden on fiscal policy as a tool to counteract shocks, a burden that might be even heavier now that the European Central Bank has arguably reached the Zero Lower Bound. Two obvious solutions are mutual insurance (or risk-sharing) amongst countries and a centralized stabilization policy. Yet both have been remarkably difficult to come by, especially due to political constraints. We review and discuss the relative merits of several proposals for increased insurance or centralization, or both. We conclude with an early discussion of the implications of the COVID-19 crisis for European fiscal policy reform and an assessment of the current fiscal measures.

This paper examines the European Union’s strategy of governing the economy through financial markets by focusing on the largely unacknowledged role of public development banks, including the multilateral European Investment Bank. It argues that these state-owned financial institutions have moved into a key position in the recent evolution of the European financial system and economic governance. Since the crisis, policy makers have used them to address the intrinsic volatility and excess liquidity of contemporary financial markets, as well as offset the constraints on public investment imposed by institutionalized fiscal austerity. The paper provides evidence for this claim through an analysis of the emergent policy nexus between the Investment Plan for Europe and the Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union. Based on official documents and interview data, it specifically traces the risk-sharing devices for small- and medium-sized enterprise and infrastructure finance set up by development banks within these initiatives. Equipped with public guarantees, they have been instrumental for the promotion of securitization markets and public–private partnerships through increased multilevel collaborations among development banks. The anchor role of such quasi-fiscal state actors in shaping capital markets, the paper concludes, has profound political implications, and therefore warrants further scholarly attention.

After its illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continued military support for separatists in the Donbas, Russia escalated its war against Ukraine in February 2022 with direct ground attacks by Russian military forces on Ukraine's eastern, northern and southern borders, a blockade of Ukraine's coast and aerial attacks throughout the country. Millions of Ukrainians fled, including thousands of international students residing in Ukraine. Countries around the world responded to the resulting refugee crisis with varying policies. Many of Ukraine's neighboring countries enacted model immigration laws and developed various support schemes. Some governments, such as in Poland and the European Union (EU), immediately granted Ukrainian refugees the right to live, work, obtain access to education and receive benefits comparable to those to which their own citizens are entitled and created a generous and protective immigration model that attempts to prevent human trafficking and other forms of exploitation. Other countries geographically removed from the conflict used different models, including some with a private sponsorship component that, despite the best of intentions, may in retrospect be exposing refugees to the dangers of human trafficking and exploitation.<br/> Ukrainian refugees – also referred to as internally displaced persons (IDPs) if still remaining in Ukraine or as parolees if attempting to enter the United States (US) – seeking entry into the United Kingdom (UK) or US are required to find a private sponsor who accepts financial responsibility for them during their stay in their host country. In the UK, private sponsors are paid a monthly stipend, while in the US, private sponsors are not paid but actually contract with the US government to be financially responsible for the persons whom they are sponsoring. By contrast, Ukraine's neighbors, including Poland, with notably less economic and fiscal resources than either the UK or the US, have no private sponsorship requirement.<br/> Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukrainians have been a vulnerable population subjected to human trafficking – a situation exacerbated by Russia's current war against their country. In the first weeks of the war, credible firsthand and in-real-time reports by Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking attorneys and human rights advocates quickly emerged that describe Ukrainian women refugees utilizing online dating platforms, social media sites and online chat rooms to find private sponsors in the UK and the US. While this government policy requiring private sponsorship appeared to be a prudent means for vetting refugees, burden-sharing and shifting the hosting costs away from taxpayers and governments' ledgers, the policy has unintended consequences. Refugee and human trafficking experts state that the private sponsorship requirement compels Ukrainian refugees, 90-plus percent of whom are women and children, to 'market' themselves – often online – to potential private sponsors in the UK and US, thereby exposing themselves to human traffickers. This policy has potentially – albeit unintentionally – increased, exacerbated and even facilitated the human trafficking of Ukrainian refugees, an already vulnerable population experiencing a precariously heightened risk for physical, sexual and economic exploitation due to their growing desperation for physical safety.<br/> This article, written from the practitioners' perspective, discusses how the private sponsorship requirement for Ukrainian refugees is potentially increasing the risk of human trafficking for an already at-risk population, unnecessarily jeopardizing their safety and further stripping them of their human dignity. The unintended consequences of private sponsorship demonstrate that such a requirement in a wartime scenario is ill-conceived, inappropriate and dangerous public policy and, dare it be said, potentially exploitative.

Governments in Europe responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by expanding their welfare systems to protect health, jobs, and incomes. The varied initiatives embody the principle of solidarity and demonstrate how welfare programs serve as a form of collective insurance against risk. But the twin health and economic crises also exposed gaps in coverage for many, including migrants and gig economy workers. Fiscal austerity, enforced by the European Union, has long constrained efforts to close those gaps.

Over the past two decades, international bond markets have become the chief disciplinarian of fiscal policy, displacing the International Monetary Fund and the European Union in this role. This trend culminated in the wake of the global financial crisis, as countries that had indulged in moral hazard and fiscal profligacy during the Great Moderation were vulnerable to a sharp rise in sovereign risk premium and in some cases to loss of market access. The article compares the response of new governments in Hungary and United Kingdom to restore policy credibility. A major lesson is that governments that adopt a rules-based fiscal framework, including fiscal watchdogs and transparency norms, are far more successful in anchoring fiscal expectations and in achieving fiscal sovereignty than those that do not.

The aim of the article is to identify the main components of government overall liabilities based on the Fiscal Risk Matrix classification introduced by the World Bank in 1999, and to estimate the amount and structure of these liabilities in European Union countries (EU Fiscal Risk Matrix). The climate liabilities definition and methodology included in the EU Fiscal Risk Matrix is also a novelty of the research. The study covered EU member states in the period 2018–2019, taking into account available data from the Eurostat database. On this basis, the EU Fiscal Risk Matrix was developed with the estimated structure of the burden of government liabilities for individual countries and the EU as a whole. The article used statistical and comparative analysis. The major conclusion of our research involves the proposal to implement a unified European methodology of government overall liabilities classification based on the EU Fiscal Risk Matrix to assess the fiscal debt burden and transparency of fiscal policy.

The aim of the article is to identify the main components of government overall liabilities based on the Fiscal Risk Matrix classification introduced by the World Bank in 1999, and to estimate the amount and structure of these liabilities in European Union countries (EU Fiscal Risk Matrix). The climate liabilities definition and methodology included in the EU Fiscal Risk Matrix is also a novelty of the research. The study covered EU member states in the period 2018–2019, taking into account available data from the Eurostat database. On this basis, the EU Fiscal Risk Matrix was developed with the estimated structure of the burden of government liabilities for individual countries and the EU as a whole. The article used statistical and comparative analysis. The major conclusion of our research involves the proposal to implement a unified European methodology of government overall liabilities classification based on the EU Fiscal Risk Matrix to assess the fiscal debt burden and transparency of fiscal policy.

AbstractWhat is the impact of Greece's fiscal meltdown on the effectiveness of Europe's response? Using Perrow's normal accidents theory, I argue that efforts to reduce the likelihood of a Greek default activated conflicting centripetal and centrifugal modes of governance. Greater centralisation in decision-making at the European Union level improves policy effectiveness because it addresses problems of contagion but it simultaneously raises the risk of overall failure by increasing diagnosis, coordination and compliance costs. Three episodes are explored: the first bailout in May 2010, the mid-term fiscal strategy in June–July 2011 and the second bailout in February 2012. Implications are drawn for theories of delegation, intergovernmentalism and the future of EU crisis management.

This paper aims at studying the legal aspects of the European Union (EU)’s fiscal policy, analyzing the statute of fiscal responsibility legal framework, the different measures undertaken in the last years with respect to European trends in fiscal governance and their implications for challenges in public finance sustainability. The research started from the presupposition that there is a lack of mechanisms capable of enforcing the area of public finance sustainability, and the implication of the events that created the economic conjuncture of recent years reveals that the solidity of public finances has reached an impasse and needs to be enhanced. The analyzed documents from the area of fiscal responsibility show formal respect for the legislative framework aimed at consolidating public finance sustainability and accentuate the need to use fiscal laws, independent institutions and mechanisms that put constraints on policymakers and determine them to spend more efficiently, invest more wisely, and obtain better results regarding public finance sustainability. We conclude that future policymaking processes need to consider the consolidation of independent fiscal institutions founded by Fiscal Responsibility Law framework, completed by fiscal rules and, therefore, need to redesign the fiscal risk management process.

Purpose Recent empirical studies by Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou and Filis (2013), Brogaard and Detzel (2015) and Christou et al. (2017) present evidence, which supports the notion that a rise in economic policy uncertainty (EPU) will lead to a decline in stock prices. The purpose of this paper is to examine US categorical policy uncertainty on stock returns while controlling for implied volatility and downside risk. In addition to the domestic impacts of policy uncertainty, this paper also presents evidence that changes in US policy uncertainty promptly propagates to the global stock markets. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a GED-GARCH (1, 1) model to estimate changes of uncertainties in US monetary, fiscal and trade policies on stock returns for the sample period of January 1990–December 2018. Robustness test is conducted by using different set of data and modeling techniques. Findings This paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, testing of US aggregate data while controlling for downside risk and implied volatility, consistently, shows that responses of stock prices to US policy uncertainty changes, not only display a negative effect in the current period but also have at least a one-month time-lag. The evidence supports the uncertainty premium hypothesis. Second, extending the test to global data reveals that US policy uncertainty changes have a negative impact on markets in Europe, China and Japan. Third, testing the data in sectoral stock markets mainly displays statistically significant results with a negative sign. Fourth, the evidence consistently shows that changes in policy uncertainty present an inverse relation to the stock returns, regardless of whether uncertainty is moving upward or downward. Research limitations/implications The current research is limited to the markets in the USA, eurozone, China and Japan. This study can be extended to additional countries, such as emerging markets. Practical implications This paper provides a model that uses categorical policy uncertainty approach to explain stock price changes. The parametric estimates provide insightful information in advising investors for making portfolio decision. Social implications The estimated coefficients of changes in monetary policy uncertainty, fiscal policy uncertainty and trade policy uncertainty are informative in assisting policymakers to formulate effective financial policies. Originality/value This study extends the existing risk premium model in several directions. First, it separates the financial risk factors from the EPU innovations; second, instead of using EPU, this study investigates the effects from monetary policy, fiscal policy and trade policy uncertainties; third, in additional to an examination of the effects of US categorical policy uncertainties on its own markets, this study also investigates the spillover effects to global major markets; fourth, besides the aggregate stock markets, this study estimates the effects of US policy uncertainty innovations on the sectoral stock returns.

The euro crisis has significantly influenced Europe's progress, but many experts continue to doubt the European Monetary Union's long-term viability. Those without independent monetary policy will be unable to support their economies through currency devaluation if an economic crisis occurs. Countries that are not experiencing a situation would also be affected. Overall, the EMU benefits individual countries while also benefiting the entire EU. Each nation has distinct benefits from utilizing the euro, notably during the financial crisis. A monetary union without a fiscal union would be a catastrophe, but a severe enough problem would motivate European countries to move closer together. The European Central Bank has also implemented a massive bond-buying program to keep borrowing rates low. The eurozone has been able to respond to the consequences of the coronavirus outbreak reasonably rapidly. The research conclusion of this paper indicates that during the euro's implementation, countries' cooperation and development should be bolstered, the issue of benefit-sharing should be thoroughly investigated, an exchange and cooperation mechanism between countries should be established under the unified currency system, and a community of interests should be established.

The euro crisis has significantly influenced Europe's progress, but many experts continue to doubt the European Monetary Union's long-term viability. Those without independent monetary policy will be unable to support their economies through currency devaluation if an economic crisis occurs. Countries that are not experiencing a situation would also be affected. Overall, the EMU benefits individual countries while also benefiting the entire EU. Each nation has distinct benefits from utilizing the euro, notably during the financial crisis. A monetary union without a fiscal union would be a catastrophe, but a severe enough problem would motivate European countries to move closer together. The European Central Bank has also implemented a massive bond-buying program to keep borrowing rates low. The eurozone has been able to respond to the consequences of the coronavirus outbreak reasonably rapidly. The research conclusion of this paper indicates that during the euro's implementation, countries' cooperation and development should be bolstered, the issue of benefit-sharing should be thoroughly investigated, an exchange and cooperation mechanism between countries should be established under the unified currency system, and a community of interests should be established.

To handle the sovereign debt crisis in general and macroeconomic imbalances in particular the leading EU institutions and the Troika (European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund) adopted two broad approaches: The short-term approach is based on enhancing the Stability and Growth Pact and to impose fiscal austerity on crisis countries. The medium- to long-term strategy consists of internal devaluation via reducing wage costs. Both approaches were combined with structural adjustment programs in the spirit of the Washington Consensus. The Troika?s policy implies an asymmetric adjustment process burdening only crisis countries. It led to the shrinking of demand and output in crisis countries comparable to the Great Depression and brought the European Monetary Union to the edge of deflation. These polices must be judged as mislead increasing the risk of Japanese disease with more than one lost decade.

The recent progress of genomics research is providing unprecedented insight into human genetic variance, susceptibility to disease and risk stratification. Current trends predict that a massive amount of genomic data will be produced in the upcoming years which, when coupled with the fast-paced development of the field, will create new social, ethical, and legal challenges. In the complex legislative environment of the European Union, genomic data sharing policies will have to weigh the benefits of scientific discovery against the ethical risks posed by the act of sharing sensitive data. In this complex, interconnected environment, blockchain provides a unique and novel solution to accountability, traceability, and transparency issues regarding genomic data sharing. Implementing a distributed ledger technology-based database could empower both patients and citizens to responsibly use genomic data pertaining to them because it allows for a higher degree of control over the recipients of their data and their uses. The blockchain technology will engage both data owners and policymakers to address the multiple issues of genomic data sharing and allow us to redefine the way we look at genomics.

Now that time has passed since the introduction of the euro as a commercial currency, it is possible to assess many arguments made in the abstract during the 1990s about European monetary union. This article shows that the euro zone still falls short as an optimal currency area in most respects. In particular, it undertakes an empirical analysis of the labour market and finds no progress toward flexibility or integration. These results challenge assertions of ‘endogenous currency area’ proponents that the euro area would become optimal ‘after the fact’, and that labour markets would serve as the principal avenue of adjustment. Instead, a ‘rigidity trap’ has developed in the euro area, consisting of relatively tight monetary policy, forced fiscal consolidation, and a risk of deflation in some economies. These conditions have compounded the difficulties of structural adjustment in European labour markets.

Under the Trump administration, a transatlantic trade conflict has been escalating step by step. First, it was about tariffs on steel and aluminium, then about retaliation for the French digital tax, which is suspended until the end of the year. Most recently, the US administration threatened the European Union with tariffs on cars and car parts because of Canadian seafood being subject to lower import duties. As simulations with NiGEM show, a further escalation of the transatlantic trade conflict has the potential to slow down economic growth significantly in the countries involved. This is a considerable risk given the fact that the countries have to cope with the enormous negative effects of the pandemic shock. Furthermore, the damage caused by the trade conflict depends on the extent to which the affected countries use fiscal policy to stabilise their economies.

The present article aims to look at the current monetary measures deployed by ECB to address the economic context of below expectations economic growth and inflation, taking into account the expression of monetary policy via the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme. This tool is used to push financial liquidity into the economies of the European Union, in a banking system affected by the crisis and which has been shown to be still at risk by the latest stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority. The article points out why monetary measures are important to support the economic recovery in Europe, in an interventional context of monetary and fiscal policies of governing authorities, appealing to economic models to explain how the policies contribute to economic growth and development. The methodology used by the article is economic analysis and rationale, cost-benefit analysis, statistics of money market and banking industry indicators, etc. The conclusion emerging from this article is that the Asset Purchase Programme of ECB led in a certain degree to an improvement in the macro-economic environment on yields and on its transmission channels into the financial system and into economies.

Research question: This paper investigates the impact that specific audit quality dimensions have upon European Union Banks’ income smoothing behavior. Motivation: Although previous studies have investigated the characteristics of audit quality, little is known about the audit quality in the banking sector. Excessive risk taking and business complexity may further impair auditors’ work and an audit’s outcome may be conditioned upon banks’ risk. Idea: We examine whether auditors’ independence influences bank managers’ decision to smooth income and whether this attribute depends on bank risk and systemic importance. We investigate the association between auditors’ industry specialization and auditors’ tenure with the level of Loan Loss Provisions Data: We use a sample of 133 banks from 26 European Union countries for the period 2006-2013. Tools: Similar to previous research, we use ordinary least squares analysis to test the results. Findings: Empirical findings provide evidence that the auditors’ industry expertise limits management’s discretion of high-risk banks to a greater extent relative to low risk banks. In contrast, our results imply that banks that retain the same auditor for a consecutive fiscal year are more likely to engage in income smoothing through LLPs. Furthermore, our study examines whether audit quality dimensions have different outcomes on income smoothing decisions between globally systemically important banks (GSIBs) and the rest of banks. Our results provide evidence that the impact of industry specialization and auditor tenure on EU banks accounting policy decisions differs between GSIBs and non-GSIBs. Contribution: Our analysis contributes in the existing body of research by focusing on the impact of audit quality on managements’ accounting discretion and the influence of banks’ special attributes on the audit process.

Despite a formal 'no-bailout clause; we estimate significant net present value transfers from the European Union to Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, ranging from roughly 0.5% (Ireland) to a whopping 43% (Greece) of2010 output during the Eurozone crisis. We propose a model to analyze and understand bailouts in a monetary union, and the large observed differences across countries. We characterize bailout size and likelihood as a function of the economic fundamentals (economic activity, debt-to-gdp ratio, default costs). Our model embeds a 'Southern view' of the crisis (transfers did not help) and a 'Northern view' (transfers weaken fiscal discipline). While a stronger no-bailout commitment reduces risk-shifting, it may not be optimal from the perspective of the creditor country, even ex-ante, if it increases the risk of immediate insolvency for high debt countries. Hence, the model provides a potential justification for the often decried policy of 'kicking the can down the road.' Mapping the model to the estimated transfers, we find that the main purpose of the outsized Greek bailout was to prevent an exit from the eurozone and possible contagion. Bailouts to avoid sovereign default were comparatively modest.

The New EU Directive on Environmental Liability provides for the system of liability for damage to the environment provoked by human activity. The Directive further provides for direct application of polluter-pays principles, the concept of environmental damage and a variety of preventive and remedial actions. The underlying principle of the Directive is the establishment of financial liability of the operators whose actions provoke environmental damage or the danger of occurrence of the environmental damage, all with the aim to stimulate such operators to adopt appropriate measures and procedures to diminish of environmental risks and therefore decrease their disposure to the environmental liability. Directive is applicable to the operators of the ?regulated activities?, which includes the majority of industries. Directive is relating only to the future environmental damages occurred after its entry in force. Directive adopts strict liability for the operators of the activities dangerous to the environment applicable to any and all environmental damage, whereas for the operators of all other activities the fault-based liability applies and only in respect to the environmental damage of the ecosystem. Operators are not liable for damage provoked by third party, damage occurred regardless of the implementation of the appropriate protection procedures or damage in case of a force majeure event. Also, operators can waive responsibility invoking the so-called ?state of art defense?, i.e. arguing that the harmful action was considered environmental friendly by the time of its occurrence. Another waiver from the responsibility, the so-called permit defense is possible in case whereof environmental damage is provoked by the action which was made in accordance with the issued permit/state authorization. Directive obliges the operators to inform relevant authorities of environmental damage risks which occur due to the operators? activities, as well as to undertake appropriate measures of control, limitation, security, removal of harmful effects and risk/damage management. Directive defines the preventive measures as the measures instituted in response to an event, action or failure to act which created the threat of environmental damage, which measures aim to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such environmental damage. Directive further defines remedial measures as measures or combination of measures, including risk/damage management and provisional measures, with the aim to revoke, rehabilitate or replace damaged natural resources. Directive recommends to the Member States to encourage the operators to contract appropriate insurances and other financial cover from liability. Bearing in mind the development of environmental liability issue, it is uncertain whether and how will the insurance companies build new insurance policies in alternative to the classical insurance from civil responsibility which is only in small part applicable to the environmental damages. The same can be said for the financial market itself, knowing that the entire success of the Directive depends on the financial capacities of the operators to assume the liabilities introduced by the Directive. Pursuant to the Directive, companies shall have to bear themselves the risks of removal of consequences of environmental damage. We are of opinion that a respectable company cannot afford non-cooperation with the authorities, otherwise it risks refusal of work permits, investigations and inspections, refusal of state loans and other benefits. In the aim of prevention of environmental damage, the company management would need to develop internal rules and regulations on environmental protection and environmental policy of the company. Although we admit that Directive creates some preconditions for efficient and uniform implementation of the environmental protection and the achievement of sustainable development within the EU, we believe that Directive can help the prevention of environmental damage only in combination with corresponding fiscal and administrative privilege given to the companies willing to introduce and apply preventive environmental measures.

This study presents empirical evidence about the determinants of long-term government bond yields for 19 economies of the European Monetary Union (EMU) over the period 1995–2018 within a multivariate panel framework. The fixed effects estimators reveal that the relationship between public debt to the GDP ratio and yields is non-linear. We observe a threshold, which is determined to be at the area 90% of the ratio of public debt to GDP. Beyond that, area government borrowing costs increase as the public debt rises. Furthermore, we find evidence that a GDP decline and the downgrades of sovereign ratings increase the costs of government borrowing. In contrast, the operation of independent fiscal institutions helps to reduce government’s debt risk premium. Finally, liquidity in the Euro area plays a significant role on yields determination. The results remain robust when the dynamic instrumental variable fixed effect (FE-2SLS) and dynamic panel least square dummy variable corrected (LSDVC) estimators are employed. Empirical findings suggest important policy implications for the ongoing Covid-19 crisis for the EMU.

The recently re-branded and highly digitalised Bolivian Tax Office, Servicio de Impuestos Nacionales (SIN), works to consolidate various socio-economic groups, such as the Aymara bourgeoisie (wealthy traders who identify as all or part indigenous), into a new middle class. SIN’s motivations to do so are bound up in broader international financial logics where the development of an archetypal European middle class – the so-called backbone of society – is considered key to a healthy tax profile. The efforts to forge a new middle class involves the deliberate projection of SIN as an accountable, effective, and ‘modern’ organisation, with the aim of promoting a broader fiscal culture that embodies these same characteristics; targeted education of the populace about taxpaying as an ethical act in line with highland indigenous values; and, policy-making that encourages income tax over VAT (value-added tax). However, these new middle classes experience the temporality and individualising effects of SIN’s system as incompatible with the money flows and values of their own economic lives. Specific areas of contention include the rhythms of incomes and the ethics of risk- and profit-sharing. In exploring this incompatibility, I argue that fiscal systems are key to the production and imaginations of middle-classness, both as they succeed and fail.

This paper traces the historical developments of accounting regulations in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and uses institutional theory to identify factors affecting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption as the national accounting standards in these countries. We find that the extent of convergence with IFRS in Algeria is higher compared to Morocco and Tunisia. This has been mostly due to greater foreign investor flows from Western countries in Algeria during the last decade, the dominant position of international Big-4 audit firms, and strong trade relationship of Algeria with the European Union (EU) compared with Morocco and Tunisia. We discuss the main challenges faced by these three countries in converging toward IFRS. These are underdeveloped equity markets, switching from French fiscal-oriented accounting systems to Anglo-Saxon accounting systems, and are characterized by lack of knowledge of principles-based IFRS by local professional accountants. Moreover, the convergence with IFRS in these countries is confronted by the prevailing small and medium-sized firms in the economic environment, difficulty in fair-value measurement in these settings, and the cost of convergence for companies. Our study has policy implications for those countries sharing similarities with these settings and have undertaken steps to implement IFRS.

Depopulation is a problem felt in many regions of the European Union, mainly affecting inland and rural areas. In many cases, these areas are characterized by economic, social, and infrastructural marginalization. Their rehabilitation is desirable in view of a better balance of social and infrastructural management. This said, there are no proven solutions for depopulation that can be applied to all territories in the same way. On the contrary, if we examine progress in the fields of ITC and digitization, we can gather interesting suggestions on how to deal with this issue. This essay intends to analyze these aspects and to examine ways to strengthen, through programs and instruments of the sharing economy, the competitiveness and potential attraction of geographical areas considered marginal and that risk demographic collapse.

Since the migrant surge in 2015, social inclusion has become a crucial issue to be addressed effectively by the European Union, given that 39% of the population born outside of the EU member states faces the risk of poverty or social exclusion. Adding to that, the COVID-19 pandemic has severely affected migrant households worldwide, rendering migrant integration an urgent matter for national governments. Discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and radicalization are all societal threats emerging in periods of massive migrant flows and need appropriate policy measures to be employed in migrant host countries to tackle them. This paper suggests the integration of a multiple criteria decision analysis method, namely PROMETHEE, for policy making with regard to migrant social exclusion. In light of previous research findings and the recent release of the Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020, the authors argue that the method proposed could help policy makers to evaluate the effectiveness of the implemented policies, spot the discrepancies between policies and policy outcomes, and motivate knowledge sharing among the EU member states. The findings include a ten-year comparative list of the EU member states (2010–2019) driven by social inclusion indicators for the foreign-born (non-EU-born) population. The results are rather sensitive to changes in the data utilized but they provide an overall comparative picture of social inclusion policy effectiveness in the EU during the past decade.

Резиме: Дужничка криза у земљама Европске монетарне уније истакла је значај вођења одговорне фискалне политике, посебно у оквиру питања одрживости јавног дуга и солвентности земаља чланица. Општа правила за контролу нивоа јавног дуга, уведена у ЕУ, предвиђају обавезујуће мјере за све чланице када њихов јавни дуг пређе границу од 60% БДП-а, као и правила о максималном износу удјела дефицита у БДП-у. Интензитет дужничке кризе одређен је повјерењем инвеститора које зависи од економских фундамената, али и процјене да ли ће влада досљедно измиривати своје обавезе. Циљ истраживања јесте да утврдимо да ли је однос дуга према БДП-у позитивно корелисан са кретањем каматних стопа на државне обвезнице и да одредимо степен њихове повезаности. На узорку од 17 земаља чланица ЕМУ и временским интервалима преткризног и кризног периода, корелационом и регресионом анализом указујемо на узрочно-посљедичну повезаност наведених индикатора и њихов утицај на солвентност земље. Резултати показују да се у случају кризе јавног дуга услијед повећања каматних стопа на дугорочне државне обвезнице, значајно повећава удио јавног дуга у БДП-у што води расту ризика неплаћања дуга и посљедично несолвентности земаља чланица. Фискални аспект интеграције БиХ, посматрани кроз призму фискалних критеријума ЕУ, показују минимална одступања од референтних вриједности. Међутим, имајући у виду да кретање нивоа јавног дуга, те његово сервисирање, директно зависе од степена повећања/смањења БДП-а, извоза и расположивог прихода за сервисирање дуга, одлуке о даљем задужи- вању морају бити повезане са производним пројектима или финансирањем пројеката који ће допринијети даљем привредном расту и расту конку- рентности.Summary: The debt crisis in the European Monetary Union, emphasized the importance of keeping a responsible fiscal policy, especially in the context of issues of public debt sustainability and solvency of the member countries. Common rules for control of the public debt was introduced in the EU provide for mandatory measures for all Member States when their public debt exceeds the limit of 60% of GDP, as well as rules on the maximum amount of deficit percentage of GDP. The intensity of the debt crisis is determined by the confidence of investors, which depends on economic fundamentals as well as assessing whether the government will consistently meet their obligations. The aim of the research is to determine whether the ratio of debt to GDP positively correlated to movements in interest rates on government bonds and to determine the degree of their coherence. In a sample of 17 EMU member countries and time periods pre-crisis and crisis period, correlation and regression analysis indicate a causal connection between these indicators and their impact on the solvency of the country. Results show that in the event of a crisis in public debt due to the increase in interest rates on long-term government bonds, significantly increasing the share of public debt in GDP, which increases the risk of non-payment of debt and consequent insolvency of member states. Fiscal aspect of integration of BiH observed through the prism of fiscal criteria of the EU show a minimum deviation from the reference value, however, given that the movement of the public debt servicing is directly dependent on the degree of increase/decrease of GDP, exports and disposable income to service the debt, decisions on further borrowing must be associated with manufacturing projects or production projects that will contribute to further economic growth and competitiveness.

Globalization processes around the world affect the activities of economic entities, which in turn leads to changes in their accounting and taxation systems. The article is devoted to the study of the peculiarities of the application of the simplified system of accounting and taxation of agrarian businesses of small businesses in order to identify problematic aspects and areas of state support for their functioning in the context of European integration. A study of the main aspects of the Association Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, on the other hand, in terms of accounting and taxation. It is determined that the implementation of domestic legislation to the regulations of the European Union (directives) is tangible for both businesses and individuals. Analytical data on the activities of small busi-nesses in Ukraine, including agricultural enterprises, are presented. The results of the analysis show a decrease in the number of small enterprises for the period 2015-2019. At the same time, the volumes of produced and sold products of small businesses and micro-enterprises are growing, which testifies to the importance of the activities of these businesses. It is determined that the conditions of production and economic activity of business entities are accompanied by constant changes in current legislation, which causes uncertainty in their position in the competitive environment, leads to the risk of transactions and increased tax burden, and as a result – business closure or withdrawal in the shadows. "The current systems of taxation of small businesses are studied and their advantages and disadvantages are identified. The main criteria for assigning business entities to the group of small businesses in the agricultural sector, taking into account the Tax and Commercial Codes of Ukraine, as well as the provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On Accounting and Financial Reporting in Ukraine". The system of taxation and accounting of small agricultural enterprises is studied. It was found that the current situation in agriculture indicates the shortcomings and lack of efficiency of the tax system, which requires scientific and methodological support for a consistent and stable tax policy for this category of taxpayers, the use of tax incentives for small businesses, improving the simplified taxation of small businesses . Examining the organization of accounting for small businesses in the context of European integration, the framework of the feasibility of changes in the accounting system. It is noted that a certain problem is the inconsistency of financial and tax accounting for the formation of a harmonized information product for different groups of users. The opinion is expressed that the fiscal orientation of accounting should be reoriented to the needs of the management system and high-quality information support of stakeholders, including foreign investors. It is noted that the legislation on ac-counting and taxation systems, opening and registration of small and micro enterprises needs to be changed. In order to properly support the development of small business, it is proposed to create favorable conditions for taxation and a clear accounting system: providing information and financial support for the process of business organization and the transition to international accounting standards; organization of the system of training of entrepreneurs and retraining of accountants; streamlining mechanisms to protect the rights of small businesses.

<p><strong>Abstract.</strong> Land degradation has increasingly been recognised as a serious environmental problem throughout the whole world. Six major threats may be identified that place soil fertility at risk, namely, soil erosion, loss of organic matter, soil biodiversity, soil compaction, soil salinity, and soil pollution. Several of those risks could be effectively identified, analysed, visualised and consequently limited by approaches originating from the geospatial domain.</p><p>The China – European Union research and innovation project “SIEUSOIL” (SIno-EU Soil Observatory for Intelligent Land Use Management), funded between 2019 and 2022, as well as the European Big Data flagship research and innovation project “DataBio” (Data-Driven Bioeconomy), funded between 2017 and 2019, aim at the above mentioned challenges of land degradation from innovative geospatial perspectives.</p><p>Such innovative approaches include local geological, geomorphological, climate, yield maps as well as global soil maps provided commonly by the European Commission (Directorate General Joint Research Centre) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Among the data inputs there are farm machinery tracking and interpreted satellite images. The second level of activities consists of selected standards and specification of ontologies for the integration and sharing of soil related data, facilitating their reuse and understanding. The resulting ontology and other selected models provide the basis for the integration, publication, and querying of the source datasets using Linked data as a federated layer. Besides offering an integrated view of the datasets, this layer also enables new insights through the discovery of links.</p><p>From the cartographic perspective, several visualization techniques are deployed; from static maps to interactive visualisations. The main focus of visualization techniques is therefore given to the interactivity through utilizing the concept of Multiple Coordinated Views (also known as visual analytics tools) and dynamic queries to emphasize the impact of changes of various phenomena in space and time. For instance, see Figure 1 on monitoring of machinery fleet movement and especially its spatiotemporal changes that can bring new insights into the consequences of human decisions from many areas. Economic reasons are related to economic evidence for a farmer, including fuel consumption, efficiency of trajectory, etc. to revenue authority or subsidies management. On the other hand, ecologic motivations aim to decrease of environmental burden caused e.g. by high CO₂ emissions due to a lack of movement optimisation, water pollution by nitrogen due to excessive fertilisation, etc.</p><p>The outcomes of the above mentioned research are intended as a feedback to (inter)national policies within the environmental domain including the Montreal Protocol (on substances that deplete the Ozone Layer), European Common Agricultural Policy, Nitrates Directive, Air Quality Framework Directive, Water Framework Directive, the Chinese Water Pollution Prevention Law, etc.</p>

In my postgraduate formation during the last years of the 80’s, we had close to thirty hospital beds in a pavilion called “sépticas” (1). In Colombia, where abortion was completely penalized, the pavilion was mostly filled with women with insecure, complicated abortions. The focus we received was technical: management of intensive care; performance of hysterectomies, colostomies, bowel resection, etc. In those times, some nurses were nuns and limited themselves to interrogating the patients to get them to “confess” what they had done to themselves in order to abort. It always disturbed me that the women who left alive, left without any advice or contraceptive method. Having asked a professor of mine, he responded with disdain: “This is a third level hospital, those things are done by nurses of the first level”. Seeing so much pain and death, I decided to talk to patients, and I began to understand their decision. I still remember so many deaths with sadness, but one case in particular pains me: it was a woman close to being fifty who arrived with a uterine perforation in a state of advanced sepsis. Despite the surgery and the intensive care, she passed away. I had talked to her, and she told me she was a widow, had two adult kids and had aborted because of “embarrassment towards them” because they were going to find out that she had an active sexual life. A few days after her passing, the pathology professor called me, surprised, to tell me that the uterus we had sent for pathological examination showed no pregnancy. She was a woman in a perimenopausal state with a pregnancy exam that gave a false positive due to the high levels of FSH/LH typical of her age. SHE WAS NOT PREGNANT!!! She didn’t have menstruation because she was premenopausal and a false positive led her to an unsafe abortion. Of course, the injuries caused in the attempted abortion caused the fatal conclusion, but the real underlying cause was the social taboo in respect to sexuality. I had to watch many adolescents and young women leave the hospital alive, but without a uterus, sometime without ovaries and with colostomies, to be looked down on by a society that blamed them for deciding to not be mothers. I had to see situation of women that arrived with their intestines protruding from their vaginas because of unsafe abortions. I saw women, who in their despair, self-inflicted injuries attempting to abort with elements such as stick, branches, onion wedges, alum bars and clothing hooks among others. Among so many deaths, it was hard not having at least one woman per day in the morgue due to an unsafe abortion. During those time, healthcare was not handled from the biopsychosocial, but only from the technical (2); nonetheless, in the academic evaluations that were performed, when asked about the definition of health, we had to recite the text from the International Organization of Health that included these three aspects. How contradictory! To give response to the health need of women and guarantee their right when I was already a professor, I began an obstetric contraceptive service in that third level hospital. There was resistance from the directors, but fortunately I was able to acquire international donations for the institution, which facilitated its acceptance. I decided to undertake a teaching career with the hope of being able to sensitize health professionals towards an integral focus of health and illness. When the International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD) was held in Cairo in 1994, I had already spent various years in teaching, and when I read their Action Program, I found a name for what I was working on: Sexual and Reproductive Rights. I began to incorporate the tools given by this document into my professional and teaching life. I was able to sensitize people at my countries Health Ministry, and we worked together moving it to an approach of human rights in areas of sexual and reproductive health (SRH). This new viewpoint, in addition to being integral, sought to give answers to old problems like maternal mortality, adolescent pregnancy, low contraceptive prevalence, unplanned or unwanted pregnancy or violence against women. With other sensitized people, we began with these SRH issues to permeate the Colombian Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, some universities, and university hospitals. We are still fighting in a country that despite many difficulties has improved its indicators of SRH. With the experience of having labored in all sphere of these topics, we manage to create, with a handful of colleagues and friend at the Universidad El Bosque, a Master’s Program in Sexual and Reproductive Health, open to all professions, in which we broke several paradigms. A program was initiated in which the qualitative and quantitative investigation had the same weight, and some alumni of the program are now in positions of leadership in governmental and international institutions, replicating integral models. In the Latin American Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecology (FLASOG, English acronym) and in the International Federation of Obstetrics and Gynecology (FIGO), I was able to apply my experience for many years in the SRH committees of these association to benefit women and girls in the regional and global environments. When I think of who has inspired me in these fights, I should highlight the great feminist who have taught me and been with me in so many fights. I cannot mention them all, but I have admired the story of the life of Margaret Sanger with her persistence and visionary outlook. She fought throughout her whole life to help the women of the 20th century to be able to obtain the right to decide when and whether or not they wanted to have children (3). Of current feminist, I have had the privilege of sharing experiences with Carmen Barroso, Giselle Carino, Debora Diniz and Alejandra Meglioli, leaders of the International Planned Parenthood Federation – Western Hemisphere Region (IPPF-RHO). From my country, I want to mention my countrywoman Florence Thomas, psychologist, columnist, writer and Colombo-French feminist. She is one of the most influential and important voices in the movement for women rights in Colombia and the region. She arrived from France in the 1960’s, in the years of counterculture, the Beatles, hippies, Simone de Beauvoir, and Jean-Paul Sartre, a time in which capitalism and consumer culture began to be criticized (4). It was then when they began to talk about the female body, female sexuality and when the contraceptive pill arrived like a total revolution for women. Upon its arrival in 1967, she experimented a shock because she had just assisted in a revolution and only found a country of mothers, not women (5). That was the only destiny for a woman, to be quiet and submissive. Then she realized that this could not continue, speaking of “revolutionary vanguards” in such a patriarchal environment. In 1986 with the North American and European feminism waves and with her academic team, they created the group “Mujer y Sociedad de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia”, incubator of great initiatives and achievements for the country (6). She has led great changes with her courage, the strength of her arguments, and a simultaneously passionate and agreeable discourse. Among her multiple books, I highlight “Conversaciones con Violeta” (7), motivated by the disdain towards feminism of some young women. She writes it as a dialogue with an imaginary daughter in which, in an intimate manner, she reconstructs the history of women throughout the centuries and gives new light of the fundamental role of feminism in the life of modern women. Another book that shows her bravery is “Había que decirlo” (8), in which she narrates the experience of her own abortion at age twenty-two in sixty’s France. My work experience in the IPPF-RHO has allowed me to meet leaders of all ages in diverse countries of the region, who with great mysticism and dedication, voluntarily, work to achieve a more equal and just society. I have been particularly impressed by the appropriation of the concept of sexual and reproductive rights by young people, and this has given me great hope for the future of the planet. We continue to have an incomplete agenda of the action plan of the ICPD of Cairo but seeing how the youth bravely confront the challenges motivates me to continue ahead and give my years of experience in an intergenerational work. In their policies and programs, the IPPF-RHO evidences great commitment for the rights and the SRH of adolescent, that are consistent with what the organization promotes, for example, 20% of the places for decision making are in hands of the young. Member organizations, that base their labor on volunteers, are true incubators of youth that will make that unassailable and necessary change of generations. In contrast to what many of us experienced, working in this complicated agenda of sexual and reproductive health without theoretical bases, today we see committed people with a solid formation to replace us. In the college of medicine at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the College of Nursing at the Universidad El Bosque, the new generations are more motivated and empowered, with great desire to change the strict underlying structures. Our great worry is the onslaught of the ultra-right, a lot of times better organized than us who do support rights, that supports anti-rights group and are truly pro-life (9). Faced with this scenario, we should organize ourselves better, giving battle to guarantee the rights of women in the local, regional, and global level, aggregating the efforts of all pro-right organizations. We are now committed to the Objectives of Sustainable Development (10), understood as those that satisfy the necessities of the current generation without jeopardizing the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own necessities. This new agenda is based on: - The unfinished work of the Millennium Development Goals - Pending commitments (international environmental conventions) - The emergent topics of the three dimensions of sustainable development: social, economic, and environmental. We now have 17 objectives of sustainable development and 169 goals (11). These goals mention “universal access to reproductive health” many times. In objective 3 of this list is included guaranteeing, before the year 2030, “universal access to sexual and reproductive health services, including those of family planning, information, and education.” Likewise, objective 5, “obtain gender equality and empower all women and girls”, establishes the goal of “assuring the universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights in conformity with the action program of the International Conference on Population and Development, the Action Platform of Beijing”. It cannot be forgotten that the term universal access to sexual and reproductive health includes universal access to abortion and contraception. Currently, 830 women die every day through preventable maternal causes; of these deaths, 99% occur in developing countries, more than half in fragile environments and in humanitarian contexts (12). 216 million women cannot access modern contraception methods and the majority live in the nine poorest countries in the world and in a cultural environment proper to the decades of the seventies (13). This number only includes women from 15 to 49 years in any marital state, that is to say, the number that takes all women into account is much greater. Achieving the proposed objectives would entail preventing 67 million unwanted pregnancies and reducing maternal deaths by two thirds. We currently have a high, unsatisfied demand for modern contraceptives, with extremely low use of reversible, long term methods (intrauterine devices and subdermal implants) which are the most effect ones with best adherence (14). There is not a single objective among the 17 Objectives of Sustainable Development where contraception does not have a prominent role: from the first one that refers to ending poverty, going through the fifth one about gender equality, the tenth of inequality reduction among countries and within the same country, until the sixteenth related with peace and justice. If we want to change the world, we should procure universal access to contraception without myths or barriers. We have the moral obligation of achieving the irradiation of extreme poverty and advancing the construction of more equal, just, and happy societies. In emergency contraception (EC), we are very far from reaching expectations. If in reversible, long-term methods we have low prevalence, in EC the situation gets worse. Not all faculties in the region look at this topic, and where it is looked at, there is no homogeneity in content, not even within the same country. There are still myths about their real action mechanisms. There are countries, like Honduras, where it is prohibited and there is no specific medicine, the same case as in Haiti. Where it is available, access is dismal, particularly among girls, adolescents, youth, migrants, afro-descendent, and indigenous. The multiple barriers for the effective use of emergency contraceptives must be knocked down, and to work toward that we have to destroy myths and erroneous perceptions, taboos and cultural norms; achieve changes in laws and restrictive rules within countries, achieve access without barriers to the EC; work in union with other sectors; train health personnel and the community. It is necessary to transform the attitude of health personal to a service above personal opinion. Reflecting on what has occurred after the ICPD in Cairo, their Action Program changed how we look at the dynamics of population from an emphasis on demographics to a focus on the people and human rights. The governments agreed that, in this new focus, success was the empowerment of women and the possibility of choice through expanded access to education, health, services, and employment among others. Nonetheless, there have been unequal advances and inequality persists in our region, all the goals were not met, the sexual and reproductive goals continue beyond the reach of many women (15). There is a long road ahead until women and girls of the world can claim their rights and liberty of deciding. Globally, maternal deaths have been reduced, there is more qualified assistance of births, more contraception prevalence, integral sexuality education, and access to SRH services for adolescents are now recognized rights with great advances, and additionally there have been concrete gains in terms of more favorable legal frameworks, particularly in our region; nonetheless, although it’s true that the access condition have improved, the restrictive laws of the region expose the most vulnerable women to insecure abortions. There are great challenges for governments to recognize SRH and the DSR as integral parts of health systems, there is an ample agenda against women. In that sense, access to SRH is threatened and oppressed, it requires multi-sector mobilization and litigation strategies, investigation and support for the support of women’s rights as a multi-sector agenda. Looking forward, we must make an effort to work more with youth to advance not only the Action Program of the ICPD, but also all social movements. They are one of the most vulnerable groups, and the biggest catalyzers for change. The young population still faces many challenges, especially women and girls; young girls are in particularly high risk due to lack of friendly and confidential services related with sexual and reproductive health, gender violence, and lack of access to services. In addition, access to abortion must be improved; it is the responsibility of states to guarantee the quality and security of this access. In our region there still exist countries with completely restrictive frameworks. New technologies facilitate self-care (16), which will allow expansion of universal access, but governments cannot detach themselves from their responsibility. Self-care is expanding in the world and can be strategic for reaching the most vulnerable populations. There are new challenges for the same problems, that require a re-interpretation of the measures necessary to guaranty the DSR of all people, in particular women, girls, and in general, marginalized and vulnerable populations. It is necessary to take into account migrations, climate change, the impact of digital media, the resurgence of hate discourse, oppression, violence, xenophobia, homo/transphobia, and other emergent problems, as SRH should be seen within a framework of justice, not isolated. We should demand accountability of the 179 governments that participate in the ICPD 25 years ago and the 193 countries that signed the Sustainable Development Objectives. They should reaffirm their commitments and expand their agenda to topics not considered at that time. Our region has given the world an example with the Agreement of Montevideo, that becomes a blueprint for achieving the action plan of the CIPD and we should not allow retreat. This agreement puts people at the center, especially women, and includes the topic of abortion, inviting the state to consider the possibility of legalizing it, which opens the doors for all governments of the world to recognize that women have the right to choose on maternity. This agreement is much more inclusive: Considering that the gaps in health continue to abound in the region and the average statistics hide the high levels of maternal mortality, of sexually transmitted diseases, of infection by HIV/AIDS, and the unsatisfied demand for contraception in the population that lives in poverty and rural areas, among indigenous communities, and afro-descendants and groups in conditions of vulnerability like women, adolescents and incapacitated people, it is agreed: 33- To promote, protect, and guarantee the health and the sexual and reproductive rights that contribute to the complete fulfillment of people and social justice in a society free of any form of discrimination and violence. 37- Guarantee universal access to quality sexual and reproductive health services, taking into consideration the specific needs of men and women, adolescents and young, LGBT people, older people and people with incapacity, paying particular attention to people in a condition of vulnerability and people who live in rural and remote zone, promoting citizen participation in the completing of these commitments. 42- To guarantee, in cases in which abortion is legal or decriminalized in the national legislation, the existence of safe and quality abortion for non-desired or non-accepted pregnancies and instigate the other States to consider the possibility of modifying public laws, norms, strategies, and public policy on the voluntary interruption of pregnancy to save the life and health of pregnant adolescent women, improving their quality of life and decreasing the number of abortions (17).

AbstractWe explore the distribution of public–private partnerships (PPPs) among the European Union countries, with a special focus on fiscal rules and budgetary constraints while controlling for empirically identified drivers. While offering the opportunity to increase innovation and efficiency in the public sector infrastructure, PPPs allow governments to relax their budget and borrowing constraints. We find that the state of public finances influences the government’s choice of PPPs and makes them more appealing for reasons other than efficiency. Stringent numerical rules on the budget balance also foster government’s opportunism in the choice of PPPs. On the other hand, high levels of public debt increase the country risk, and discourage private investors from PPP contracts. The results highlight the importance of restoring PPP investment choices based on efficiency criteria and adapt fiscal rules to shield public investment while stabilizing private expectations by means of credible trajectories of debt reduction. The findings contribute to the debate on the role of fiscal rules in fiscal policy and of PPPs in infrastructure financing.

Ugo Troiano of the University of Michigan reviews “The Global Debt Crisis: Haunting U. S. and European Federalism”, by Paul E. Peterson and Daniel J. Nadler. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Eleven papers, previously presented at a conference held at Harvard University in August 2012, and revised prior to publication, examine the structural flaws in federal systems of government across the globe that have led to economic and political turmoil and present solutions to preserve and restore federal systems that meet the needs of struggling communities. Papers discuss federalism's emerging fiscal crisis; competitive federalism under pressure; whether market discipline can survive in the U.S. federation; putting a price on teacher pensions; structural flaws in the design of public pension plans; past and present high-risk investments by states and localities; between centralization and federalism in the European Union; German federalism at the crossroads; Spanish federalism in crisis; regional identity and fiscal constraints in Spanish federalism; and the resilience of Canadian federalism. Peterson is Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Government and Director of the Program on Education Policy and Governance at Harvard University, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Nadler is a PhD candidate at Harvard University.”

Abstract Recent European Union (EU) initiatives and legislation have considerably increased public access to clinical trials data (CTD). These developments are generally much welcomed for the enhancement of science, trust, and open innovation. However, they also raise many questions and concerns, not least at the interface between CTD transparency and other areas of evolving EU law on the protection of trade secrets, IPRs, and privacy. This article focuses on privacy issues and on the interrelation between developments in transparency and the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR). More specifically, this article examines: (1) the origins and rationales of EU transparency regulations, including the incidents and concerns that have shaped them; (2) the features and implications of the GDPR which are relevant in the context of clinical trials; and (3) the risk for tensions between the GDPR and the policy goals of CTD transparency, as well as implications for data sharing and open innovation. Ultimately, we elaborate on factors that should be carefully considered and addressed to reap the full benefits of CTD transparency.

The EU’s latest decision on adopting the recovery fund was revolutionary, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It would also dominate the EU’s economic governance of the decade of the 2020s. This article is an attempt to evaluate whether the EU’s recovery fund was the right policy answers to the post-COVID-19 EU economy or not, and explore its meanings and implications for European integration. This article argues that COVID-19 hit the EU at a time of health and social precariousness, and proved the conventional economic governance unsustainable. Necessities for game-changing in the post-COVID-19 economic governance were justified on both practical and moral grounds. Judging with these yardsticks, the EU’s recovery fund was evaluated as a welcomed paradigm shift in both the ideology and methodology of its economic governance. Beyond a contemporary economic rescue package, the recovery fund implied laying the cornerstone of completing a fiscal union in the Eurozone, for enhancing institutional functions of the European Commission, and for rediscovering the nature of European integration as the rescuer of national states, through the newly-forming consensus between Eurosceptic nationalists and pro-EU integrationists. This article reminds us that the COVID-19 crisis was a crucial opportunity for EU leadership to legitimize the EU’s existence in the post-Brexit era. If well implemented, the recovery fund could usher in a new chapter of European integration. If it fails, European integration would be at risk of further fragmentation and entrench into an ever-stronger anti-EU populism.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss whether fair value accounting fits for long-term equity investments, which are considered key to retool economies according to sustainability criteria. In doing so, the paper focuses on the European Union and addresses the European Commission’s (2018a) concern that current accounting rules are unfit for achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development goals and the targets of the Paris Agreement on climate change.Design/methodology/approachThe paper grounds in a wide literature review on the effects of fair value accounting on investors’ asset allocation strategies. By critically integrating literature on the notion of long-term investment with theories and possible accounting approaches, the paper provides implications for a revision of the current measurement system for long-term equity investments.FindingsThe literature review supports the view that fair value accounting has played a role in discouraging equity investments over time, thus leaving economies with poorer risk-sharing and weaker long-term investments. The paper contributes to the debate on alternative measurement systems by suggesting possible solutions in relation to controversies arising from empirical evidence.Originality/valueReorienting economies according to sustainability criteria represents an urgent issue which requires prompt and policy-oriented responses. Accordingly, this paper offers insights and guidelines that can help policymakers revise current accounting rules for long-term equity investments in line with sustainable development objectives.

Abstract Background Protecting people against financial hardship associated with using health care, is crucial for achieving universal health coverage. Despite the significant improvement happening in the last two decades, household out-of-pocket payments in Poland account for 23% of current spending on health, which is more than in many European Union countries. This implies an incased risk of financial hardship for Polish households. Methods The aim of this study was to assess the extent to which people in Poland experience financial hardship when they use health services. The analysis draws on household budget survey data collected annually by the Central Statistical Office of Poland between 2005 and 2014. It focuses on two indicators of financial protection: catastrophic health spending and impoverishing health spending. The study is a part of WHO country-based studies generating new evidence on financial protection in European health systems. Results In 2014, 8.6% of Polish households experienced catastrophic health spending, while 3.8% of households were impoverished or further impoverished due to health spending. Financial hardship is heavily concentrated among the poorest households for whom the incidence of catastrophic spending is 30%. Outpatient medicines are the largest single driver of catastrophic health spending across all consumption quintiles except the richest. For the richest households, payments for medical products and dental care are the main causes of financial hardship. Although financial protection improved between 2005 and 2014, the improvement among the poorest was marginal. Conclusions Policy attention should focus on protecting households against high spending on outpatient medicines, e.g. revising patient cost-sharing for prescribed medicines and strengthen regulation for over-the-counter medicines. The protection mechanisms should be targeted at low-income households (people living on social benefits, disability or survivor's pensioners). Key messages Financial protection is fairly weak in Poland compared to many European Union countries. Out-of-pocket payments for medicines (prescribed and over-the-counter) are the main cause of financial hardship for Polish households.

AbstractThe 2010–2012 euro crisis prompted a wave of institutional reforms in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and one of the most remarkable changes was the creation of a permanent bailout facility for troubled sovereigns. The birth of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 was preceded by harsh debates, reflecting a conflict between a German view of country-level responsibility and French-Italian calls for more risk sharing. These tensions have remained ever since, which was also highlighted by conflicts regarding the ESMs overhaul at the end of 2019. Concerns of Italy then drew attention to the fact that a wide range of issues prevented the community from finalizing the post-crisis structure of the eurozone. This paper focuses on the evolution of the EMU financial assistance framework up until the latest efforts for its reform. We analyse the impact of related policy announcements on changes in sovereign bond yields of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (i.e. the most vulnerable countries during the euro crisis). Our findings show that news on bailout arrangements significantly contributed to a contemporaneous moderation of periphery bond yields, especially in the case of shorter maturities. This result hints at the role of common facilities in supporting financial stability. To enhance this feature, a ‘package approach’ (i.e. multiple reforms together, as stressed by Italy) may well need to be considered. Such a broad perspective can help strengthen the euro area once the acute threat of the coronavirus pandemic is averted.

Abstract This paper discusses the role and usage of traditional and non-traditional consumer data in the retail financial markets of the European Union in the context of the economic theories, policies, and law within which they work. Across Europe there is no common practice of using the credit data of consumers, which can be exploited for several purposes. Traditionally, they are used by the lending industry as a risk-management tool to underwrite borrowing decisions or price risks, but they can also be used as a practice of creditworthiness assessment. In some Member States, consumer data are part of a broader information centralisation system for the prudential supervision of banks and the financial system as a whole. Within this already complex picture, emerging technologies and the processing of new generations of personal data are starting to give way to new business models that can transform retail financial markets (Fintechs). Whatever the function the data perform, their source, type, breath, and depth differ greatly from country to country. Unlike for the harmonisation of EU rules on credit to consumers for the creation of the internal market, the underlying consumer data infrastructure remains fragmented at national level, failing to achieve univocal, common, or defined policy objectives under a harmonised legal framework. Likewise, the establishment of the Banking Union and the prudential supervision of the Euro-area demand standardisation and convergence of the data used to measure debt levels, arrears, and delinquencies. The many functions and different usages of credit data suggest that the policy goals to be achieved should inform the design and structure of the databases, as well as the role, legal, and institutional framework of the organisations managing the data system (the Data Brokers). This is also because fundamental rights and consumer protection concerns arise from the dissemination and sharing of traditional and non-traditional data, as well as from their expanding uses. This is an area of the EU internal market that demands the attention of the EU legislator without further delays.

Abstract Background Increasingly, hospitals and research institutes are developing technical solutions for sharing patient data in a privacy preserving manner. Two of these technical solutions are homomorphic encryption and distributed ledger technology. Homomorphic encryption allows computations to be performed on data without this data ever being decrypted. Therefore, homomorphic encryption represents a potential solution for conducting feasibility studies on cohorts of sensitive patient data stored in distributed locations. Distributed ledger technology provides a permanent record on all transfers and processing of patient data, allowing data custodians to audit access. A significant portion of the current literature has examined how these technologies might comply with data protection and research ethics frameworks. In the Swiss context, these instruments include the Federal Act on Data Protection and the Human Research Act. There are also institutional frameworks that govern the processing of health related and genetic data at different universities and hospitals. Given Switzerland’s geographical proximity to European Union (EU) member states, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) may impose additional obligations. Methods To conduct this assessment, we carried out a series of qualitative interviews with key stakeholders at Swiss hospitals and research institutions. These included legal and clinical data management staff, as well as clinical and research ethics experts. These interviews were carried out with two series of vignettes that focused on data discovery using homomorphic encryption and data erasure from a distributed ledger platform. Results For our first set of vignettes, interviewees were prepared to allow data discovery requests if patients had provided general consent or ethics committee approval, depending on the types of data made available. Our interviewees highlighted the importance of protecting against the risk of reidentification given different types of data. For our second set, there was disagreement amongst interviewees on whether they would delete patient data locally, or delete data linked to a ledger with cryptographic hashes. Our interviewees were also willing to delete data locally or on the ledger, subject to local legislation. Conclusion Our findings can help guide the deployment of these technologies, as well as determine ethics and legal requirements for such technologies.

After narrowing in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and remaining broadly unchanged in recent years, global imbalances increased moderately in 2015, amid a reconfiguration of current accounts and exchange rates. Shifts in 2015 were driven primarily by the uneven strength of the recovery in advanced economies, the redistributive effects of the sharp fall in commodity prices, and tighter external financing conditions for emerging markets (EMs). A relatively stronger U.S. outlook led to a further appreciation of the USD and a depreciation of the yen and the euro. The sharp decline in commodity prices, reflecting both supply shocks and concerns about rebalancing and growth in China, brought about a significant redistribution of income from commodity exporters to importers, and a weakening of commodity exporters’ currencies. Meanwhile, heightened global risk aversion, contributed to softer capital inflows and depreciation pressures in many EMs. This moderate widening of current account imbalances was largely driven by systemic economies. Surpluses in Japan, the euro area and China grew, supported by improved terms of trade and currency depreciation, while the current account deficit in the U.S. widened amid the steep appreciation of the USD. These widening imbalances were only partially offset by narrowing surpluses in large oil exporters and smaller deficits in vulnerable EMs and some euro area debtor countries. Similarly, excess imbalances expanded in 2015. External positions in the U.S. and Japan moved from being broadly in line with fundamentals to being “moderately weaker” and “moderately stronger”, respectively. This was partly offset by a further narrowing of excess deficits in vulnerable EMs and euro area debtor countries. Meanwhile, excess surpluses persisted among the larger surplus countries, some of which remain “substantially stronger” than fundamentals (Germany, Korea). Currency movements since end-2015 helped to partially reverse the trends observed last year, although market volatility following the result of the U.K. referendum to leave the European Union have led to a strengthening of the USD and yen along with a weakening of the sterling, euro, and EM currencies. The implications for external assessments going forward, especially for the U.K. and the euro area, remains uncertain and will likely depend on how the transition is managed and on what new arrangements are adopted. With output below potential in most countries, and limited policy space in many, balancing internal and external objectives will require careful policy calibration. In general, a more balanced policy mix that avoids excessive reliance on policies with significant demanddiverting effects is necessary, with greater emphasis on demand-supportive measures and structural reforms. Surplus countries with fiscal space have a greater role to play in supporting global demand while reducing external imbalances. Global collective policy action, especially if downside risks materialize, would also help address global demand weakness while mitigating its effects on external imbalances.

PurposeThe authors’ aim is to establish the variance of youth welfare citizenship regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and to revisit the applicability of the regime approach to the emerging welfare regimes (EWRs).Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis follows the descriptive case study strategy aiming to discover diversity of youth welfare citizenship patterns. The case selection is made within the CEE country group, which includes countries in Central Europe, the Baltics, Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe, all sharing the communist past. The subdivision of these countries in reference to the welfare states can be made via the European Union (EU) membership based on the assumption that EU social policy frameworks and recommendations have an important effect on domestic policies. We included countries which are in the EU, i.e., with a similar political and economic transition path. There were three waves of accession to the EU in CEE countries. In the first wave (2004), all the Baltic countries, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia joined. In the second wave (2007), Romania and Bulgaria joined. Finally, Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Altogether 11 CEE countries are the EU members today, the remaining CEE countries are non-EU members and thus are excluded from the current research. Those countries which are part of the EU share similarities in social and economic reforms during the pre-accession period and after in order to reach a comparatively similar system with other member states. So, in terms of casing strategy these six countries can be named as emerging welfare regimes (EWRs) evolving transformations across different public policy areas. Handpicking of six countries out of 11 relies on the assumption that the Anglo-Saxon welfare system characteristics are more evident in the Baltic countries (Aidukaite, 2019; Aidukaite et al., 2020; Ainsaar et al., 2020; Rajevska and Rajevska, 2020) and Slovenia, while in Bulgaria and Croatia certain outcomes reflect the Bismarckian principles of social security (Hrast and Rakar, 2020; Stoilova and Krasteva, 2020; Dobrotić, 2020). This brings important variety into our analysis logic. Last but not least, we juxtapose six CEE EWR countries under analysis with six mature welfare regime countries representing different welfare regime types. Those mature welfare regime countries (Finland, Sweden, France, Germany, Italy, UK) are not an explicit object of the study but help to put analysed CEE EWR cases into larger context and thus, reflect upon theoretical claims of the welfare regime literature.FindingsThe authors can confirm that the EWR countries can be rather well explained by the welfare citizenship typology and complement the existing knowledge on youth welfare regime typology clusters in the Western Europe. Estonia is clustered close to the Nordic countries, whereas Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia and Slovenia are close to the Bismarckian welfare model despite rather flexible, non-restricted educational path, universal child and student support. Bulgaria is an outlier; however, it is clustered together with mature Mediterranean welfare regimes. Former intact welfare regime clusters are becoming more diverse. The authors’ findings confirm that there is no any intact cluster of the “post-communist” welfare regime and Eastern European countries are today “on move”.Research limitations/implicationsAltogether 11 CEE countries are the EU members today. The remaining CEE countries are non-EU members and thus are excluded from the current research. Those countries which are part of the EU share similarities in social and economic reforms during the pre-accession period and after in order to reach a comparatively similar system with other member states. At least one CEE country was chosen based on existing theoretical knowledge on the welfare regime typology (Anglo Saxon, Beveridgean, Bismarckian) for the Post-communist country groups.Practical implicationsIn the social citizenship dimension we dropped social assistance schemes and tax-relief indices and included poverty risk and housing measures. Youth poverty together with housing showed rather clear distinction between familialized and individualised countries and thus, made the typology stronger. In the economic dimension the preliminary picture was much fuzzier, mainly due to the comprehensive education in the region and intervention of the EU in domestic ALMPs (and VET) reforms. The authors added a new indicator (pro-youth orientation of ALMP) in order better to capture youth-sensitivity of policy.Social implicationsThe authors included a working poverty measure (in-work poverty rate) in order to reflect labour market insecurity as an increasing concern. Yet, the analysis results were still mixed and new indicators did not help locating the regime types.Originality/valueIn order to improve the validity of the youth welfare citizenship regime economic dimension, Chevalier's (2020) model may also be worth revisiting. The authors argue that this dichotomy is not sufficient, because inclusive type can have orientation towards general skills or occupational skills (i.e. monitored or enabling citizenship clusters), which is currently ignored. Chevalier (2020) furthermore associates inclusive economic citizenship with “coordinated market economies” (referring to Hall and Soskice, 2001), which seems hardly hold validity in the Nordic and at least some CEE countries.

For the past twenty years, academics and other social commentators have, by and large, shared the view that the phase of modernity through which we are currently passing is defined by two interrelated catalysts of change: the physical movement of people and the virtual movement of information around the globe. As we enter the second decade of the new millennium, it is certainly a timely moment to reflect upon the ways in which the prognoses of the scholars and scientists writing in the late twentieth century have come to pass, especially since—during the time this special issue has been in press—the revolutions that are gathering pace in the Arab world appear to be realising the theoretical prediction that the ever-increasing “flows” of people and information would ultimately bring about the end of the nation-state and herald an era of transnationalism (Appadurai, Urry). For writers like Arjun Appadurai, moreover, the concept of diaspora was key to grasping how this new world order would take shape, and how it would operate: Diasporic public spheres, diverse amongst themselves, are the crucibles of a postnational political order. The engines of their discourse are mass media (both interactive and expressive) and the movement of refugees, activists, students, laborers. It may be that the emergent postnational order proves not to be a system of homogeneous units (as with the current system of nation-states) but a system based on relations between heterogeneous units (some social movements, some interest groups, some professional bodies, some non-governmental organizations, some armed constabularies, some judicial bodies) ... In the short run, as we can see already, it is likely to be a world of increased incivility and violence. In the longer run, free from the constraints of the nation form, we may find that cultural freedom and sustainable justice in the world do not presuppose the uniform and general existence of the nation-state. This unsettling possibility could be the most exciting dividend of living in modernity at large. (23) In this editorial, we would like to return to the “here and now” of the late 1990s in which theorists like Arjun Appaduri, Ulrich Beck, John Urry, Zygmunt Bauman, Robert Robertson and others were “imagining” the consequences of both globalisation and glocalisation for the twenty-first century in order that we may better assess what is, indeed, coming to pass. While most of their prognoses for this “second modernity” have proven remarkably accurate, it is their—self-confessed—inability to forecast either the nature or the extent of the digital revolution that most vividly captures the distance between the mid-1990s and now; and it is precisely the consequences of this extraordinary technological revolution on the twin concepts of “glocality” and “diaspora” that the research featured in this special issue seeks to capture. Glocal Imaginaries Appadurai’s endeavours to show how globalisation was rapidly making itself felt as a “structure of feeling” (Williams in Appadurai 189) as well as a material “fact” was also implicit in our conceptualisation of the conference, “Glocal Imaginaries: Writing/Migration/Place,” which gave rise to this special issue. This conference, which was the culmination of the AHRC-funded project “Moving Manchester: Literature/Migration/Place (2006-10)”, constituted a unique opportunity to gain an international, cross-disciplinary perspective on urgent and topical debates concerning mobility and migration in the early twenty-first century and the strand “Networked Diasporas” was one of the best represented on the program. Attracting papers on broadcast media as well as the new digital technologies, the strand was strikingly international in terms of the speakers’ countries of origin, as is this special issue which brings together research from six European countries, Australia and the Indian subcontinent. The “case-studies” represented in these articles may therefore be seen to constitute something of a “state-of-the-art” snapshot of how Appadurai’s “glocal imaginary” is being lived out across the globe in the early years of the twenty-first century. In this respect, the collection proves that his hunch with regards to the signal importance of the “mass-media” in redefining our spatial and temporal coordinates of being and belonging was correct: The third and final factor to be addressed here is the role of the mass-media, especially in its electronic forms, in creating new sorts of disjuncture between spatial and virtual neighborhoods. This disjuncture has both utopian and dystopian potentials, and there is no easy way to tell how these may play themselves out in the future of the production of locality. (194) The articles collected here certainly do serve as testament to the “bewildering plethora of changes in ... media environments” (195) that Appadurai envisaged, and yet it can clearly also be argued that this agent of glocalisation has not yet brought about the demise of the nation-state in the way (or at the speed) that many commentators predicted. Digital Diasporas in a Transnational World Reviewing the work of the leading social science theorists working in the field during the late 1990s, it quickly becomes evident that: (a) the belief that globalisation presented a threat to the nation-state was widely held; and (b) that the “jury” was undecided as to whether this would prove a good or bad thing in the years to come. While the commentators concerned did their best to complexify both their analysis of the present and their view of the future, it is interesting to observe, in retrospect, how the rhetoric of both utopia and dystopia invaded their discourse in almost equal measure. We have already seen how Appadurai, in his 1996 publication, Modernity at Large, looks beyond the “increased incivility and violence” of the “short term” to a world “free from the constraints of the nation form,” while Roger Bromley, following Agamben and Deleuze as well as Appadurai, typifies a generation of literary and cultural critics who have paid tribute to the way in which the arts (and, in particular, storytelling) have enabled subjects to break free from their national (af)filiations (Pearce, Devolving 17) and discover new “de-territorialised” (Deleuze and Guattari) modes of being and belonging. Alongside this “hope,” however, the forces and agents of globalisation were also regarded with a good deal of suspicion and fear, as is evidenced in Ulrich Beck’s What is Globalization? In his overview of the theorists who were then perceived to be leading the debate, Beck draws distinctions between what was perceived to be the “engine” of globalisation (31), but is clearly most exercised by the manner in which the transformation has taken shape: Without a revolution, without even any change in laws or constitutions, an attack has been launched “in the normal course of business”, as it were, upon the material lifelines of modern national societies. First, the transnational corporations are to export jobs to parts of the world where labour costs and workplace obligations are lowest. Second, the computer-generation of worldwide proximity enables them to break down and disperse goods and services, and produce them through a division of labour in different parts of the world, so that national and corporate labels inevitably become illusory. (3; italics in the original) Beck’s concern is clearly that all these changes have taken place without the nation-states of the world being directly involved in any way: transnational corporations began to take advantage of the new “mobility” available to them without having to secure the agreement of any government (“Companies can produce in one country, pay taxes in another and demand state infrastructural spending in yet another”; 4-5); the export of the labour market through the use of digital communications (stereotypically, call centres in India) was similarly unregulated; and the world economy, as a consequence, was in the process of becoming detached from the processes of either production or consumption (“capitalism without labour”; 5-7). Vis-à-vis the dystopian endgame of this effective “bypassing” of the nation-state, Beck is especially troubled about the fate of the human rights legislation that nation-states around the world have developed, with immense effort and over time (e.g. employment law, trade unions, universal welfare provision) and cites Zygmunt Bauman’s caution that globalisation will, at worst, result in widespread “global wealth” and “local poverty” (31). Further, he ends his book with a fully apocalyptic vision, “the Brazilianization of Europe” (161-3), which unapologetically calls upon the conventions of science fiction to imagine a worst-case scenario for a Europe without nations. While fourteen or fifteen years is evidently not enough time to put Beck’s prognosis to the test, most readers would probably agree that we are still some way away from such a Europe. Although the material wealth and presence of the transnational corporations strikes a chord, especially if we include the world banks and finance organisations in their number, the financial crisis that has rocked the world for the past three years, along with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the ascendancy of Al-Qaida (all things yet to happen when Beck was writing in 1997), has arguably resulted in the nations of Europe reinforcing their (respective and collective) legal, fiscal, and political might through rigorous new policing of their physical borders and regulation of their citizens through “austerity measures” of an order not seen since World War Two. In other words, while the processes of globalisation have clearly been instrumental in creating the financial crisis that Europe is presently grappling with and does, indeed, expose the extent to which the world economy now operates outside the control of the nation-state, the nation-state still exists very palpably for all its citizens (whether permanent or migrant) as an agent of control, welfare, and social justice. This may, indeed, cause us to conclude that Bauman’s vision of a world in which globalisation would make itself felt very differently for some groups than others came closest to what is taking shape: true, the transnationals have seized significant political and economic power from the nation-state, but this has not meant the end of the nation-state; rather, the change is being experienced as a re-trenching of whatever power the nation-state still has (and this, of course, is considerable) over its citizens in their “local”, everyday lives (Bauman 55). If we now turn to the portrait of Europe painted by the articles that constitute this special issue, we see further evidence of transglobal processes and practices operating in a realm oblivious to local (including national) concerns. While our authors are generally more concerned with the flows of information and “identity” than business or finance (Appaduri’s “ethnoscapes,” “technoscapes,” and “ideoscapes”: 33-7), there is the same impression that this “circulation” (Latour) is effectively bypassing the state at one level (the virtual), whilst remaining very materially bound by it at another. In other words, and following Bauman, we would suggest that it is quite possible for contemporary subjects to be both the agents and subjects of globalisation: a paradox that, as we shall go on to demonstrate, is given particularly vivid expression in the case of diasporic and/or migrant peoples who may be able to bypass the state in the manufacture of their “virtual” identities/communities) but who (Cohen) remain very much its subjects (or, indeed, “non-subjects”) when attempting movement in the material realm. Two of the articles in the collection (Leurs & Ponzanesi and Marcheva) deal directly with the exponential growth of “digital diasporas” (sometimes referred to as “e-diasporas”) since the inception of Facebook in 2004, and both provide specific illustrations of the way in which the nation-state both has, and has not, been transcended. First, it quickly becomes clear that for the (largely) “youthful” (Leurs & Ponzanesi) participants of nationally inscribed networking sites (e.g. “discovernikkei” (Japan), “Hyves” (Netherlands), “Bulgarians in the UK” (Bulgaria)), shared national identity is a means and not an end. In other words, although the participants of these sites might share in and actively produce a fond and nostalgic image of their “homeland” (Marcheva), they are rarely concerned with it as a material or political entity and an expression of their national identities is rapidly supplemented by the sharing of other (global) identity markers. Leurs & Ponzanesi invoke Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “rhizome” to describe the way in which social networkers “weave” a “rhizomatic path” to identity, gradually accumulating a hybrid set of affiliations. Indeed, the extent to which the “nation” disappears on such sites can be remarkable as was also observed in our investigation of the digital storytelling site, “Capture Wales” (BBC) (Pearce, "Writing"). Although this BBC site was set up to capture the voices of the Welsh nation in the early twenty-first century through a collection of (largely) autobiographical stories, very few of the participants mention either Wales or their “Welshness” in the stories that they tell. Further, where the “home” nation is (re)imagined, it is generally in an idealised, or highly personalised, form (e.g. stories about one’s own family) or through a sharing of (perceived and actual) cultural idiosyncrasies (Marcheva on “You know you’re a Bulgarian when …”) rather than an engagement with the nation-state per se. As Leurs & Ponzanesi observe: “We can see how the importance of the nation-state gets obscured as diasporic youth, through cultural hybridisation of youth culture and ethnic ties initiate subcultures and offer resistance to mainstream cultural forms.” Both the articles just discussed also note the shading of the “national” into the “transnational” on the social networking sites they discuss, and “transnationalism”—in the sense of many different nations and their diasporas being united through a common interest or cause—is also a focus of Pikner’s article on “collective actions” in Europe (notably, “EuroMayDay” and “My Estonia”) and Harb’s highly topical account of the role of both broadcast media (principally, Al-Jazeera) and social media in the revolutions and uprisings currently sweeping through the Arab world (spring 2011). On this point, it should be noted that Harb identifies this as the moment when Facebook’s erstwhile predominantly social function was displaced by a manifestly political one. From this we must conclude that both transnationalism and social media sites can be put to very different ends: while young people in relatively privileged democratic countries might embrace transnationalism as an expression of their desire to “rise above” national politics, the youth of the Arab world have engaged it as a means of generating solidarity for nationalist insurgency and liberation. Another instance of “g/local” digital solidarity exceeding national borders is to be found in Johanna Sumiala’s article on the circulatory power of the Internet in the Kauhajoki school shooting which took place Finland in 2008. As well as using the Internet to “stage manage” his rampage, the Kauhajoki shooter (whose name the author chose to withhold for ethical reasons) was subsequently found to have been a member of numerous Web-based “hate groups”, many of them originating in the United States and, as a consequence, may be understood to have committed his crime on behalf of a transnational community: what Sumiala has defined as a “networked community of destruction.” It must also be noted, however, that the school shootings were experienced as a very local tragedy in Finland itself and, although the shooter may have been psychically located in a transnational hyper-reality when he undertook the killings, it is his nation-state that has had to deal with the trauma and shame in the long term. Woodward and Brown & Rutherford, meanwhile, show that it remains the tendency of public broadcast media to uphold the raison d’être of the nation-state at the same time as embracing change. Woodward’s feature article (which reports on the AHRC-sponsored “Tuning In” project which has researched the BBC World Service) shows how the representation of national and diasporic “voices” from around the world, either in opposition to or in dialogue with the BBC’s own reporting, is key to the way in which the Commission has changed and modernised in recent times; however, she is also clear that many of the objectives that defined the service in its early days—such as its commitment to a distinctly “English” brand of education—still remain. Similarly, Brown & Rutherford’s article on the innovative Australian ABC children’s television series, My Place (which has combined traditional broadcasting with online, interactive websites) may be seen to be positively promoting the Australian nation by making visible its commitment to multiculturalism. Both articles nevertheless reveal the extent to which these public service broadcasters have recognised the need to respond to their nations’ changing demographics and, in particular, the fact that “diaspora” is a concept that refers not only to their English and Australian audiences abroad but also to their now manifestly multicultural audiences at home. When it comes to commercial satellite television, however, the relationship between broadcasting and national and global politics is rather harder to pin down. Subramanian exposes a complex interplay of national and global interests through her analysis of the Malayalee “reality television” series, Idea Star Singer. Exported globally to the Indian diaspora, the show is shamelessly exploitative in the way in which it combines residual and emergent ideologies (i.e. nostalgia for a traditional Keralayan way of life vs aspirational “western lifestyles”) in pursuit of its (massive) audience ratings. Further, while the ISS series is ostensibly a g/local phenomenon (the export of Kerala to the rest of the world rather than “India” per se), Subramanian passionately laments all the progressive national initiatives (most notably, the campaign for “women’s rights”) that the show is happy to ignore: an illustration of one of the negative consequences of globalisation predicted by Beck (31) noted at the start of this editorial. Harb, meanwhile, reflects upon a rather different set of political concerns with regards to commercial satellite broadcasting in her account of the role of Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya in the recent (2011) Arab revolutions. Despite Al-Jazeera’s reputation for “two-sided” news coverage, recent events have exposed its complicity with the Qatari government; further, the uprisings have revealed the speed with which social media—in particular Facebook and Twitter—are replacing broadcast media. It is now possible for “the people” to bypass both governments and news corporations (public and private) in relaying the news. Taken together, then, what our articles would seem to indicate is that, while the power of the nation-state has notionally been transcended via a range of new networking practices, this has yet to undermine its material power in any guaranteed way (witness recent counter-insurgencies in Libya, Bahrain, and Syria).True, the Internet may be used to facilitate transnational “actions” against the nation-state (individual or collective) through a variety of non-violent or violent actions, but nation-states around the world, and especially in Western Europe, are currently wielding immense power over their subjects through aggressive “austerity measures” which have the capacity to severely compromise the freedom and agency of the citizens concerned through widespread unemployment and cuts in social welfare provision. This said, several of our articles provide evidence that Appadurai’s more utopian prognoses are also taking shape. Alongside the troubling possibility that globalisation, and the technologies that support it, is effectively eroding “difference” (be this national or individual), there are the ever-increasing (and widely reported) instances of how digital technology is actively supporting local communities and actions around the world in ways that bypass the state. These range from the relatively modest collective action, “My Estonia”, featured in Pikner’s article, to the ways in which the Libyan diaspora in Manchester have made use of social media to publicise and support public protests in Tripoli (Harb). In other words, there is compelling material evidence that the heterogeneity that Appadurai predicted and hoped for has come to pass through the people’s active participation in (and partial ownership of) media practices. Citizens are now able to “interfere” in the representation of their lives as never before and, through the digital revolution, communicate with one another in ways that circumvent state-controlled broadcasting. We are therefore pleased to present the articles that follow as a lively, interdisciplinary and international “state-of-the-art” commentary on how the ongoing revolution in media and communication is responding to, and bringing into being, the processes and practices of globalisation predicted by Appadurai, Beck, Bauman, and others in the 1990s. The articles also speak to the changing nature of the world’s “diasporas” during this fifteen year time frame (1996-2011) and, we trust, will activate further debate (following Cohen) on the conceptual tensions that now manifestly exist between “virtual” and “material” diasporas and also between the “transnational” diasporas whose objective is to transcend the nation-state altogether and those that deploy social media for specifically local or national/ist ends. Acknowledgements With thanks to the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK) for their generous funding of the “Moving Manchester” project (2006-10). Special thanks to Dr Kate Horsley (Lancaster University) for her invaluable assistance as ‘Web Editor’ in the production of this special issue (we could not have managed without you!) and also to Gail Ferguson (our copy-editor) for her expertise in the preparation of the final typescript. References Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996. Bauman, Zygmunt. Globalization. Cambridge: Polity, 1998. Beck, Ulrich. What is Globalization? Trans. Patrick Camiller. Cambridge: Polity, 2000 (1997). Bromley, Roger. Narratives for a New Belonging: Diasporic Cultural Fictions. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000. Cohen, Robin. Global Diasporas. 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2008. Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. Pearce, Lynne, ed. Devolving Identities: Feminist Readings in Home and Belonging. London: Ashgate, 2000. Pearce, Lynne. “‘Writing’ and ‘Region’ in the Twenty-First Century: Epistemological Reflections on Regionally Located Art and Literature in the Wake of the Digital Revolution.” European Journal of Cultural Studies 13.1 (2010): 27-41. Robertson, Robert. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992. Urry, John. Sociology beyond Societies. London: Routledge, 1999. Williams, Raymond. Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France. Berkeley: U of California P, 1982.

IntroductionBritish initiatives to manage both the number of arrivals of asylum seekers and the experiences of those who arrive have burgeoned in recent years. The budget dedicated to asylum seeker management increased from £357 million in 1998-1999 to £1.71 billion in 2004-2005, making the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) the second largest concern of the Home Office behind the Prison Service in 2005 (Back et al). The IND was replaced in April 2007 by the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), whose expenditure exceeded £2 billion in 2007-2008 (BIA). Perhaps as a consequence the number of asylum seekers applying to the UK has fallen dramatically, illustrating the continuing influence of exclusionary state policies despite the globalisation and transnationalisation of migrant flows (UNHCR; Koser).One of the difficulties with the study of asylum seekers is the persistent risk that, by employing the term ‘asylum seeker’, research conducted into their experiences will contribute towards the exclusion of a marginalised and abject group of people, precisely by employing a term that emphasises the suspended recognition of a community (Nyers). The ‘asylum seeker’ is a figure defined in law in order to facilitate government-level avoidance of humanitarian obligations by emphasising the non-refugeeness of asylum claimants (Tyler). This group is identified as supplicant to the state, positioning the state itself as a legitimate arbiter. It is in this sense that asylum seekers suffer a degree of cruel optimism (Berlant) – wishing to be recognised as a refugee while nevertheless subject to state-defined discourses, whatever the outcome. The term ‘forced migrant’ is little better, conveying a de-humanising and disabling lack of agency (Turton), while the terms ‘undocumented migrant’, ‘irregular migrant’ and ‘illegal migrant’ all imply a failure to conform to respectable, desirable and legitimate forms of migration.Another consequence of these co-opted and politically subjugating forms of language is their production of simple imagined geographies of migration that position the foreigner as strange, unfamiliar and incapable of communication across this divide. Such imaginings precipitate their own responses, most clearly expressed in the blunt, intrusive uses of space and time in migration governance (Lahav and Guiraudon; Cohen; Guild; Gronendijk). Various institutions exist in Britain that function to actually produce the imagined differences between migrants and citizens, from the two huge, airport-like ‘Asylum Screening Units’ in Liverpool and London where asylum seekers can lodge their claims, to the 12 ‘Removal Centres’ within which soon-to-be deported asylum seekers are incarcerated and the 17 ‘Hearing Centres’ at which British judges preside over the precise legal status of asylum applicants.Less attention, however, has been given to the tension between mobility and stillness in asylum contexts. Asylum seeker management is characterised by a complex combination of enforced stillness and enforced mobility of asylum seeking bodies, and resistance can also be understood in these terms. This research draws upon 37 interviews with asylum seekers, asylum activists, and government employees in the UK conducted between 2005 and 2007 (see Gill) and distils three characteristics of stillness. First, an association between stillness and safety is clearly evident, exacerbated by the fear that the state may force asylum seekers to move at any time. Second, stillness of asylum seekers in a physical, literal sense is intimately related to their psychological condition, underscoring the affectual properties of stillness. Third, the desire to be still, and to be safe, precipitates various political strategies that seek to secure stillness, meaning that stillness functions as more than an aspiration, becoming also a key political metric in the struggle between the included and excluded. In these multiple and contradictory ways stillness is a key factor that structures asylum seekers’ experiences of migration. Governing through Mobility The British state utilises both stillness and mobility in the governance of asylum seeking bodies. On the one hand, asylum seekers’ personal freedoms are routinely curtailed both through their incarceration and through the requirements imposed upon them by the state in terms of ‘signing in’ at local police stations, even when they are not incarcerated, throughout the time that they are awaiting a decision on their claim for asylum (Cwerner). This requirement, which consists of attending a police station to confirm the continuing compliance of the asylum seeker, can vary in frequency, from once every month to once every few days.On the other hand, the British state employs a range of strategies of mobility that serve to deprive asylum seeking communities of geographical stillness and, consequently, also often undermines their psychological stability. First, the seizure of asylum seekers and transportation to a Removal Centre can be sudden and traumatic, and incarceration in this manner is becoming increasingly common (Bacon; Home Office). In extreme cases, very little or no warning is given to asylum seekers who are taken into detention, and so-called ‘dawn raids’ have been organised in order to exploit an element of surprise in the introduction of asylum seekers to detention (Burnett). A second source of forced mobility associated with Removal Centres is the transfer of detainees from one Removal Centre to another for a variety of reasons, from the practical constraints imposed by the capacities of various centres, to differences in the conditions of centres themselves, which are used to form a reward and sanction mechanism among the detainee population (Hayter; Granville-Chapman). Intra-detention estate transfers have increased in scope and significance in recent years: in 2004/5, the most recent financial year for which figures are available, the British government spent over £6.5 million simply moving detainees from one secure facility to another within the UK (Hansard, 2005; 2006).Outside incarceration, a third source of spatial disruption of asylum seekers in the UK concerns their relationship with accommodation providers. Housing is provided to asylum seekers as they await a decision on their claim, but this housing is provided on a ‘no-choice’ basis, meaning that asylum seekers who are not prepared to travel to the accommodation that is allocated to them will forfeit their right to accommodation (Schuster). In other words, accommodation is contingent upon asylum seekers’ willingness to be mobile, producing a direct trade-off between the attractions of accommodation and stillness. The rationale for this “dispersal policy”, is to draw asylum seekers away from London, where the majority of asylum seekers chose to reside before 2000. The maintenance of a diverse portfolio of housing across the UK is resource intensive, with the re-negotiation of housing contracts worth over a £1 billion a constant concern (Noble et al). As these contracts are renegotiated, asylum seekers are expected to move in response to the varying affordability of housing around the country. In parallel to the system of deportee movements within the detention estate therefore, a comparable system of movement of asylum seekers around the UK in response to urban and regional housing market conditions also operates. Stillness as SanctuaryIn all three cases, the psychological stress that movement of asylum seekers can cause is significant. Within detention, according to a series of government reports into the conditions of removal centres, one of the recurring difficulties facing incarcerated asylum seekers is incomprehension of their legal status (e.g. HMIP 2002; 2008). This, coupled with very short warning of impending movements, results in widespread anxiety among detained asylum seekers that they may be deported or transferred imminently. Outside detention, the fear of snatch squads of police officers, or alternatively the fear of hate crimes against asylum seekers (Tyler), render movement in the public realm a dangerous practice in the eyes of many marginalised migrants. The degree of uncertainty and the mental and emotional demands of relocation introduced through forced mobility can have a damaging psychological effect upon an already vulnerable population. Expressing his frustration at this particular implication of the movement of detainees, one activist who had provided sanctuary to over 20 asylum seekers in his community outlined some of the consequences of onward movement.The number of times I’ve had to write panic letters saying you know you cannot move this person to the other end of the country because it destabilises them in terms of their mental health and it is abusive. […] Their solicitors are here, they’re in process, in legal process, they’ve got a community, they’ve got friends, they may even have a partner or a child here and they would still move them.The association between governance, mobility and trepidation highlights one characteristic of stillness in the asylum seeking field: in contra-distinction to the risk associated with movement, to be still is very often to be safe. Given the necessity to flee violence in origin countries and the tendency for destination country governments to require constant re-positioning, often backed-up with the threat of force, stillness comes to be viewed as offering a sort of sanctuary. Indeed, the Independent Asylum Commission charity that has conducted a series of reviews of asylum seekers’ treatment in the UK (Hobson et al.), has recently suggested dispensing with the term ‘asylum’ in favour of ‘sanctuary’ precisely because of the positive associations with security and stability that the latter provides. To be in one place for a sustained period allows networks of human trust and reciprocity to develop which can form the basis of supportive community relationships. Another activist who had accompanied many asylum seekers through the legal process spoke passionately about the functions that communities can serve in asylum seekers’ lives.So you actually become substitute family […] I think it’s what helps people in the midst of trauma when the future is uncertain […] to find a community which values them, which accepts them, which listens to them, where they can begin to find a place and touch a creative life again which they may not have had for years: it’s enormously important.There is a danger in romanticising the benefits of community (Joseph). Indeed, much of the racism and xenophobia directed towards asylum seekers has been the result of local community hostilities towards different national and ethnic groups (Boswell). For many asylum seekers, however, the reciprocal relations found in communities are crucially important to their well-being. What is more, the inclusion of asylum seekers into communities is one of the most effective anti-state and anti-deportation strategies available to activists and asylum seekers alike (Tyler), because it arrests the process of anonymising and cordoning asylum seekers as an homogenous group, providing instead a chance for individuals to cast off this label in favour of more ‘humane’ characteristics: families, learning, friendship, love.Strategies for StillnessFor this reason, the pursuit of stillness among asylum seekers is both a human and political response to their situations – stillness becomes a metric in the struggle between abject migrants and the state. Crucial to this political function is the complex relationship between stillness and social visibility: if an asylum seeker can command their own stillness then they can also have greater influence over their public profile, either in order to develop it or to become less conspicuous.Tyler argues that asylum seekers are what she calls a ‘hypervisible’ social group, referring to the high profile association between a fictional, dehumanised asylum seeking figure and a range of defamatory characteristics circulated by the popular printed press. Stillness can be used to strategically reduce this imposed form of hypervisibility, and to raise awareness of real asylum seeker stories and situations. This is achieved by building community coalitions, which require physically and socially settled asylum seeking families and communities. Asylum advocacy groups and local community support networks work together in the UK in order to generate a genuine public profile of asylum seekers by utilising local and national newspapers, staging public demonstrations, delivering speeches, attending rallies and garnering support among local organisations through art exhibitions, performances and debates. Some activist networks specialise explicitly in supporting asylum seekers in these endeavours, and sympathetic networks of journalists, lawyers, doctors and radio producers combine their expertise with varying degrees of success.These sorts of strategies can produce strong loyalties between local communities and the asylum seekers in their midst, precisely because, through their co-presence, asylum seekers cease to be merely asylum seekers, but become active and valued members of communities. One activist who had helped to organise the protection of an asylum seeker in a church described some of the preparations that had been made for the arrival of immigration task forces in her middle class parish.There were all sorts of things we practiced: if they did break through the door what would we do? We set up a telephone tree so that each person would phone two or three people. We had I don’t know how many cars outside. We arranged a safe house, where we would hide her. We practiced getting her out of the room into a car […] We were expecting them to come at any time. We always had people at the back […] guarding, looking at strangers who might be around and [name] was never, ever allowed to be on her own without a whole group of people completely surrounding her so she could feel safe and we would feel safe. Securing stillness here becomes more than simply an operation to secure geographic fixity: it is a symbolic struggle between state and community, crystallising in specific tactics of spatial and temporal arrangement. It reflects the fear of further forced movement, the abiding association between stillness and safety, and the complex relationship between community visibility and an ability to remain still.There are, nevertheless, drawbacks to these tactics that suggest a very different relationship between stillness and visibility. Juries can be alienated by loud tactics of activism, meaning that asylum seekers can damage their chances of a sympathetic legal hearing if they have had too high a profile. Furthermore, many asylum seekers do not have the benefits of such a dedicated community. An alternative way in which stillness becomes political is through its ability to render invisible the abject body. Invisibility is taken to mean the decision to ‘go underground’, miss the appointments at local police stations and attempt to anticipate the movements of immigration removal enforcement teams. Perversely, although this is a strategy for stillness at the national or regional scale, mobile strategies are often employed at finer scales in order to achieve this objective. Asylum seekers sometimes endure extremely precarious and difficult conditions of housing and subsistence moving from house to house regularly or sleeping and living in cars in order to avoid detection by authorities.This strategy is difficult because it involves a high degree of uncertainty, stress and reliance upon the goodwill of others. One police officer outlined the situation facing many ‘invisible’ asylum seekers as one of poverty and desperation:Immigration haven’t got a clue where they are, they just can’t find them because they’re sofa surfing, that’s living in peoples coffee shops … I see them in the coffee shop and they come up and they’re bloody starving! Despite the difficulties associated with this form of invisibility, it is estimated that this strategy is becoming increasingly common in the UK. In 2006 the Red Cross estimated that there were some 36 000 refused and destitute asylum seekers in England, up from 25 000 the previous year, and reported that their organisation was having to provide induction tours of soup kitchens and night shelters in order to alleviate the conditions of many claimants in these situations (Taylor and Muir). Conclusion The case of asylum seekers in the UK illustrates the multiple, contradictory and splintered character of stillness. While some forms of governance impose stillness upon asylum seeking bodies, in the form of incarceration and ‘signing in’ requirements, other forms of governance impose mobility either within detention or outside it. Consequently stillness figures in the responses of asylum seeking communities in various ways. Given the unwelcome within-country movement of asylum seekers, and adding to this the initial fact of their forced migration from their home countries, the condition of stillness becomes desirable, promising to bring with it stability and safety. These promises contrast the psychological disruption that further mobility, and even the threat of further mobility, can bring about. This illustrates the affectual qualities both of movement and of stillness in the asylum-seeking context. Literal stillness is associated with social and emotional stability that complicates the distinction between real and emotional spaces. While this is certainly not the case uniformly – incarceration and inhibited personal liberties have opposite consequences – the promises of stillness in terms of stability and sanctuary are clearly significant because this desirability leads asylum advocates and asylum seekers to execute a range of political strategies that seek to ensure stillness, either through enhanced or reduced forms of social visibility.The association of mobility with freedom that typifies much of the literature surrounding mobility needs closer inspection. At least in some situations, asylum seekers pursue geographical stillness for the political and psychological benefits it can offer, while mobility is both employed as a subjugating strategy by states and is itself actively resisted by those who constitute its targets.ReferencesBack, Les, Bernadette Farrell and Erin Vandermaas. A Humane Service for Global Citizens. London: South London Citizens, 2005.Bacon, Christine. The Evolution of Immigration Detention in the UK: The Involvement of Private Prison Companies. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2005.Berlant, Lauren. “Cruel Optimism.” differences : A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 17.3 (2006): 20—36.Border and Immigration Agency. Business Plan for Transition Year April 2007 – March 2008: Fair, Effective, Transparent and Trusted. London: Home Office, 2007.Boswell, Christina. “Burden-Sharing in the European Union: Lessons from the German and UK Experience.” Journal of Refugee Studies 16.3 (2003): 316—35.Burnett, Jon. Dawn Raids. PAFRAS Briefing Paper Number 4. Leeds: Positive Action for Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 2008. ‹http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/apr/uk-patras-briefing-paper-4-%2Ddawn-raids.pdf›.Cohen, Steve. “The Local State of Immigration Controls.” Critical Social Policy 22 (2002): 518—43.Cwerner, Saulo. “Faster, Faster and Faster: The Time Politics of Asylum in the UK.” Time and Society 13 (2004): 71—88.Gill, Nick. 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