Дисертації з теми "Financial Fraud. Corporate Governance. Agency Theory"
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Magnanelli, Barbara Sveva. "The role Of Corporate Governance in financial statement frauds." Doctoral thesis, Luiss Guido Carli, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11385/200890.
Повний текст джерелаCetin, Nergiz, and Emmeli Boström. "Understanding Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector through Multiple -Theory : - A study of SFSA disciplinary cases towards financial organizations." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-179521.
Повний текст джерелаChidziva, Bernard. "The Role of Corporate Governance in Preventing Bank Failures in Zimbabwe." ScholarWorks, 2016. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/3145.
Повний текст джерелаBettington, Jacqueline J. "How does director financial literacy influence financial monitoring?" Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2021. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/213554/1/Jacqueline_Bettington_Thesis.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаTayo-Tiwo, Aderonke Alberta. "Nigerian Banks' Compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/5788.
Повний текст джерелаBaric, Zeljka. "The Role of Internal Audits within Financial Institutions in Sweden." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-302317.
Повний текст джерелаIskandar, Samer. "Cracks in the temple of global finance : governance, regulation, technology and the future of demutualized exchanges." Thesis, Paris 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA010047/document.
Повний текст джерелаThis dissertation consists of three articles, examining the performance of demutualized securities exchanges from 2000 to 2011, in view of changes in governance and regulation. The first part is an empirical study of the influence of each type of shareholder (financial investor, broker, strategic or widely-held shares). The results show that fragmented owner ship is correlated with lower performance and investment managers’ presence with higher performance; strategic investors are on balance detrimental to shareholder value. The second article looks at the same exchanges individually, through case studies. The findings of the first article are validated.However,a closer look at strategic investors shows three outcomes : when they consist of founders, they increase shareholder value; when they are employed managers,they decrease it; and when the strategic investor is a competitor, the target company’s performance becomes more volatile. The third article looks at the combination of technology and regulation.Through mean comparisons and a difference-in-differences approach, this section shows that recent market deregulation has allowed high-tech start-ups to challenge the dominance of the established exchanges, just like previous coincidences of regulatory and technological change resulted in significant market up heavals: the disappearance of London’s jobbers following Big Bang and the Eurocurrency market displacing New York as a major center for dollar borrowing and lending. This dissertation introduces two new concepts: “quasi-agent principals”(shareholders who destroy value in their investment as a result of their conflicts of interest) and the “adjuvant effect” (when the combined effect of regulation and technology is a multiple of the effects of each)
Bonhoure, Emilie. "Paris-Listed Firms at the Turn of the 20th Century : Did Modern Corporate Finance Theories Already Work?" Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020TOU10002.
Повний текст джерелаThis thesis offers to explore several modern corporate finance theories in a historical context. The rationale behind is to assess whether the findings recently suggested about topics like corporate dividend policies, agency issues, or firm financing, and tested on very modern corporations could be applicable to an earlier and different context. To do so, we examine the companies listed on Paris stock markets at the turn of the 20th century.First focusing on the general agency framework, we examine whether this model could be atplay within pre-WWI companies. We do find that this was the case. Specific features highlighted by recent studies about earlier corporations indeed provide support for the fact that the today-called “agency” issues were already critical to them. Further, contemporary authors did identify these issues as particularly salient for companies but also for the investors potentially willing to participate in their emergence. In this general context of high asymmetry of information and of resulting critical “agency” conflicts, the financing of innovation and thus the contribution of financial markets to growth are questioned. In particular, we show that the innovative firms of the time (the ones operating in 2nd-IR sectors) benefitted from a mixed support from Paris stock markets. Measuring potential favourable financing conditions by a higher Tobin’s Q, we find that 2nd-IR companies did benefit from a sort of help from these markets in financing their growth. On the contrary, measuring it by the dividend yield provides a less clear result.The firms already financed had to compensate their shareholders for the risk they took. They thus had to pay dividends out. The last parts of this thesis examine the dividend policies implemented by Paris-listed firms at the turn of the 20th century. Focusing first on the ones actually implemented, we provide further support for the agency explanation of dividends, notably showing that these dividends were mostly paid to decrease one specific type of agency costs, speculative monitoring ones. Second, we compare these actual payout policies with the ones fixed in a statutory rule of profit allocation, which committed to the distribution of a certain percentage of profits to shareholders. Doing so could help to assess whether firm controllers strictly followed this statutory rule and did not take advantage of the potential and allowed deviations from it to extract as many benefits as they could at the expense of outsiders and minority shareholders. We show that they did allocate a percentage of profits consistent with the one expected in average by all shareholders. Although several interpretations could be made of this result, it could be explained by the fact the statutory rule was a good way to mitigate conflicts between firm controllers and outsiders
Freitas, Volnei Adriano de. "O conselheiro do rei: a função de auditoria interna na governança corporativa de bancos no Brasil." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/14765.
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This study has as its theme the role of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) in the corporate governance system (CGS) in financial institutions, or simply banks, operating in Brazil. The FAI is an evaluation mechanism of procedures, policies and processes that acts from the operating environment of an organization. Based on this, the objective of this study was to investigate why and how the FAI was incorporated into the SGC and the consequences generated for both. The qualitative study, of exploratory and descriptive nature, used a multitheoretical approach, applying the agency theory and institutional theory. By this approach we tried to use the relationship between the need for monitoring to achieve organizational efficiency and the structural impact of the pressures of the external environment in defining the role and positioning of the FAI in the GSC. A semi-structured interview, used as data collection method, was applied to ten audit employees of five large banks, besides three people connected to the Board of Directors on banks. The study made the following findings: i) the FAI was incorporated into the SGC because the complexity derived from the evolution of the banking business made it difficult to monitoring banks by the principal and the regulator; ii) three factors worked in an interrelated way as drivers of this merger: the evolution of the banking business, the regulation and the convergence of assumptions and practices; and iii) the organizational repositioning resulted in consequences on the scope of the FAI work, the intensification of conflicts for the maintenance of independence, the perception of FAI value by CGS and the training process for internal auditors. The study had as main contributions to the CGS: the revelation of the potential of FAI to generate inputs to monitoring, by acting as its extension in the complex banking operating environment; and the proposed use of FAI as resources to generate inputs to strategic decisions. For FAI, the study suggests that, to be consolidated as governance mechanism, it needs to qualify its staff and develop methodologically to deliver consistent information to decision-making by GSC.
Este estudo tem como tema o papel da Função de Auditoria Interna (FAI) no sistema de governança corporativa (SGC) de instituições financeiras, ou simplesmente bancos, atuando no Brasil. A FAI é um mecanismo de avaliação de políticas, procedimentos e processos que age a partir do ambiente operacional de uma organização. Baseando-se nisso, o objetivo do trabalho foi investigar porquê e como a FAI foi incorporada ao SGC, e as consequências geradas para ambos. O estudo qualitativo, de natureza exploratória e descritiva, utilizou uma abordagem multiteórica, aplicando a teoria da agência e a teoria institucional. Pela abordagem buscou-se utilizar a relação entre à necessidade de monitoramento para atingir a eficiência organizacional e o impacto estruturante das pressões do ambiente externo na definição do papel e do posicionamento da FAI no SGC. A entrevista semiestruturada, utilizada como método de coleta de dados, foi aplicada a dez funcionários de auditoria de cinco bancos de grande porte, além de três indivíduos ligados ao Conselho de Administração em bancos. O estudo apresentou as seguintes conclusões: i) a FAI foi incorporada ao SGC porque a complexidade derivada da evolução do negócio bancário dificultou o monitoramento dos bancos por parte do principal e do regulador; ii) três fatores atuaram de forma inter-relacionada como direcionadores dessa incorporação: a própria evolução do negócio bancário, a regulação e a convergência de premissas e práticas; e iii) o reposicionamento organizacional resultou em consequências quanto ao escopo do trabalho da FAI, à intensificação dos conflitos para a manutenção da independência, à percepção de valor agregado pela FAI ao SGC e ao processo de capacitação dos auditores internos. O estudo apresentou como principais contribuições ao SGC: a revelação do potencial da FAI para gerar insumos para o monitoramento ao atuar como sua extensão no complexo ambiente operacional bancário; e a proposta de utilização da FAI como recursos para gerar insumos às decisões estratégicas. Quanto à FAI, o estudo sugere que, para que se consolide como mecanismo de governança, necessita qualificar seu quadro funcional e se desenvolver metodologicamente para entregar informações condizentes à tomada de decisão pelo SGC.
Facchini, Edmundo Mazzoleni. "Gestão, governança e mercado de capitais: perspectivas das empresas mineiras e gaúchas." Universidade do Vale do Rio do Sinos, 2009. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/2777.
Повний текст джерелаNenhuma
O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o mercado de capitais, a governança corporativa e as disposições das empresas mineiras e gaúchas, de médio e grande porte, a abrir o capital. Para tanto, utilizaremos o modelo logit sobre os bancos de dados originais de duas relevantes pesquisas: FIEMG et al. (2007) e FIERGS et al. (2008). Em especial, buscaremos determinar se as práticas de governança corporativa, adotadas pelas empresas, aumentam sua disposição em abrir o capital. Chegamos à conclusão de que a adoção de práticas de governança corporativa pelas empresas de capital fechado não é suficiente para determinar quais são as empresas com maior disposição à abertura de capital. No entanto, verificamos que a variável grau de compartilhamento de poder, elemento determinante de governança corporativa, encontra-se extremamente relacionada com esta disposição.
The goal of this study is to analyze the stock markets, the corporative governance and the likelihood of mining industries of Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, of medium and large dimension, of opening capital. For such, we will use the logit model of the original data bank from two relevant researches; FIEMG et al (2007) and FIERGS et al (2008). In special, we will attempt to determine if practicing corporative governance, adopted by these firms, increases its likelihood in opening capital. We have come upon the conclusion that adopting corporative governance by firms of closed capital is not sufficient to determine which industries are more susceptible to opening capital. However, we have verified that the degree of power sharing, determining element in corporative governance, finds itself extremely related to this likelihood.
Feijoca, Daniela David de Moura Rodrigues. "The price of honour: the corporate governance of Banco Espirito Santo." Master's thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/16752.
Повний текст джерелаWeiden, Nina. "Venture capitalist governance in Germany : an exploratory analysis of its extent and financial performance /." 2007. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016094938&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
Повний текст джерелаTizazu, Anteneh Eshetu. "Corporate governance, antecedents and performance implications in the Ethiopian non-financial share companies : a contingency perspective." Thesis, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/23524.
Повний текст джерелаBusiness Management
DBL
Hoag, Matthew L. "Is All Goodwill Created Equal? An Analysis of the Association Between Agency Conflicts, Board Monitoring, and Goodwill in U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions." 2010. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/806.
Повний текст джерелаAlagha, Hani S. "Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Performance of Listed Companies Including Islamic Financial Institutions in the United Arab Emirates." Thesis, 2016. https://vuir.vu.edu.au/30150/.
Повний текст джерелаCarneiro, Priscilla Maria do Espírito Santo. "O uso da política de compensação e outros mecanismos de mitigação do conflito de agência: o caso Portugal ventures." Master's thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/6972.
Повний текст джерелаThe goal of this paper is (i) to assess if and how compensation is used as a mechanism to mitigate the agency conflict between Portugal Ventures (the fourth largest venture capital operator in Portugal) and entrepreneurs of the companies analyzed, and (ii) to examine whether other mechanisms (e.g., the syndication and the staging of the investment, voting and veto rights, the right to hold board seats, special rights over dividends, liquidation rights, redemption (put) rights) would also be used. Our main findings were: (i) Veto right is the more transversal and most used mechanism by Portugal Ventures (and syndicate partners), as opposed to liquidation rights and special rights over dividends. (ii) Recent (i.e. with less than six years old) and early stage financings tend to concentrate a larger number of cases with evidence of the use of mechanisms to mitigate the agency conflict. (iii) The use of the compensation policy seems irrelevant. In the few cases where the compensation of the entrepreneur goes further than a salary / fixed monthly fee, emphasis is given to the bonus plans and the ratchet, being practically insignificant the use of stock options.
Bhomoyi, Mzwamadoda Nelson. "The relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange." Diss., 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/25849.
Повний текст джерелаUkubaluleka okanye ukungabaluleki kokuhlawula izahlulo bekusoloko kusisihloko sengxoxo kumashumi asibhozo eminyaka edluleyo. Injongo ephambili yesi sifundo yayikukufumanisa ulwalamano phakathi komgaqo nkqubo wezahlulelo neengxaki zobumeli (ubuarhente) beenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho nezidweliswe kwiJohannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Izisekelo zesi sifundo nguMgaqo Nkqubo Wezahlulo (Dividend Policy) neNgcingane Yobumeli (Agency Theory). Iqela lesibini ledatha yeenkampani ezidwelisiweyo kwiminyaka ye-2005– 2016 yafunyanwa kwiqula leedatha elaziwa ngokuba yi-IRESS database. Idatha yahlalutywa ngokusebenzisa isixhobo sohlalutyo iEViews version 9. Iziphumo zadiza ukuba ubukho babanini kwiziko loshishino buyazisombulula iingxaki zonxibelelwano olungalingani kakuhle kwaye kuyasicutha isidingo sokuhlawula izahlulo. Kwakhona, iziphumo zadiza ukuba ama-54.69% eenkampani ezidweliswe kwiJSE, phantsi kodidi lweenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho, enza izigqibo zezahlulo. Iziphumo zaphinda zadiza ukuba intlawulo yezahlulo ihambelana kakuhle neenqobo zeROE neLEV, kanti azihambelani neenqobo zeINST, ezeDIRS kunye nekuthiwa ziFOREIGN. Ezi ziphumo zangqina ukuba kukho iingxaki zobumeli/ubuarhente kwiinkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho
Bonnete le go se be bonnete ga ditefelo tša letseno e bile hlogo ya ditherišano tše dintši mo mo dingwagasome tše seswai tša go feta. Nepo ya motheo ya thuto ye ke go ela kamano gare ga pholisi le mathata a dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša Matlotlo tšeo di lego lenaneong la Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Pholisi ya Ditseno le Teori ya Etšensi ke motheo wa thuto ye. Datha ya magareng ya dikhamphani tša mašeleng tšeo di lego lenaneong la paka ya 2005–2016 e be e hwetšagala go tšwa go lenaneo la datha la IRESS. Datha e sekasekilwe go šomišwa EViews version 9. Dipoelo di utullotše gore go ba gona ga bong ka gare ga sehlongwa go rarolla mathata a tshedimošo ya go se lekalekane, le go fokotša nyakego ya go lefa mašokotšo. Dipoelo le tšona di tšweleditše go re diperesente tše 54.69 tša dikhamphani tšeo di lego lenaneong la JSE ka fase ga ditirelo tša sekgao sa go phethagatša diphetho tša mašokotšo. Dipoelo di tšwetša pele go utulla go re ditekanyetšo tša ditefelo tša mašokotšo du sepelelana gabotse le ROE le LEV, le go sepelelana gannyane le INST, DIRS le FOREIGN. Dipoelo di netefatša go ba gona ga mathata a Etšensi ao a ngwadilwego lenaneong la dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša mašeleng
Abstracts in English, Zulu, Sepedi
Business Management
M. Com. (Business Management)
Cidre, Andreia Vitória Castanho Morais. "Como sobreviver após a fraude financeira." Master's thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1822/24787.
Повний текст джерелаExistem poucos dados estatísticos sobre situações de fraude no mundo. Na Europa esta temática é escassa se não mesmo nula. As empresas que manipulam as suas contas e se vêm publicamente expostas e discribilizadas perante accionistas, investidores e consumidores têm pouca margem para recuperar as perdas em que incorrem. Cabe aos analistas e ao mercado procurar uma solução possível para aqueles que ultrapassaram a barreira institucional. Estudos diversos sugerem que a grande aposta destas empresas passa pela reestruturação do sistema de controlo interno nomeadamente pela substituição dos membros executivos por entidades exteriores à empresa e pela aplicação de mecanismos de governação possíveis de ser valorizados pelos investidores após o acto de fraude. Com a presente dissertação pretendo analisar se a aplicação desses mecanismos de controlo será suficiente para recuperar a credibilidade financeira das empresas e para a sua reinserção no mercado de acordo com os Modelos Institucionais de Supervisão Financeira na Europa. Através de uma amostra de 44 empresas devidamente identificadas nos Mercados de Valores Mobiliários Europeus e alvo de multas por ilegalidades cometidas a nível financeiro, verifiquei que as mesmas tinham uma governação pobre nos anos anteriores ao ano de fraude. A gestão das empresas cabia apenas a elementos internos, as reuniões de auditoria eram escassas ou nulas, a existência de membros externos do conselho de administração era quase inexistente. No entanto e recorridos 3 anos após o ano de fraude os resultados comprovam que as deficiências internas, os problemas de agência, o pouco alcance das leis corporativas, o regime de propriedade concentrada, os benefícios privados de controlo e o domínio das famílias no comando das empresas são apenas alguns dos obstáculos a ultrapassar num continente agarrado a tradições e jogos de poder que só poderá vencer quando abrir as suas portas ao mercado globalizante.
Worldwide statistical data on corporate fraud is scarce. In Europe this subject is under researched if not neglected at all. Companies that manipulate their accounts and face public exposure and discredit from shareholders, investors and consumers do not have much margin to salvage incurred losses. Analysts and the market have the responsibility to find possible solutions for those who crossed over the institutional barrier. Several studies suggest that these companies prioritise their internal control system, namely by replacing executive decision makers with external entities and by applying corporate governance mechanisms that are themselves prone to be valued by investors following the fraudulent act. This dissertation aims to analyse if the application of these mechanisms is enough to regain financial credibility and as such re-insert companies back into the market in line with the European Institutional Models for Financial Supervision. Using a sample of 44 companies listed on European Stock Markets that were fined for illegal financial actions, this study reveals that those firms had poor governance structures in the years prior to the fraud act. Their management duties were covered by internal staff only, auditing meetings were rare or inexistent, external directors were hardly appointed. Nevertheless, and 3 years after the fraud year, the results confirm that the internal governance inefficiencies of these firms, the agency problems, the narrowness of the corporate laws, the concentrated ownership, the private benefits of control and the leadership taken by families in the company are some of the obstacles that need to be challenged in a continent still tied to traditions and power games that will only be overruled if it opens its doors to the globalised market.