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Статті в журналах з теми "Financial Fraud. Corporate Governance. Agency Theory"
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Magnanelli, Barbara Sveva, Luca Pirolo, and Luigi Nasta. "Preventing financial statement frauds through better corporate governance." Corporate Ownership and Control 14, no. 3 (2017): 271–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv14i3c2art1.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Acting within the agency theory theoretical framework, the paper focuses on the role of the corporate governance as a system to monitor and predict the fraud occurrence and magnitude. Specifically, the study examines the impact of the quality of the corporate governance of the firms, for which a fraud was detected, on the fraud occurrence and magnitude. We posit that fraudulent behaviours, by those who can take advantage of information asymmetry and gain personal benefits from them, can occur when strong agency problems emerge and a weak governance exists. Thus, the financial statement fraud can be seen as the result of high agency problems and high conflicts of interests not solved by the company. Starting from a sample of 101 listed companies, for which a fraud was detected, using a principal component analysis, we develop a corporate governance index, which measures the quality of the governance system of the firms. To test the hypothesis, we run a multinomial logistic regression on a cross-sectional analysis, controlling the results with a matched sample of firms that did not experienced any fraud. Empirical evidences seem to confirm the existence of a negative relationship between the quality of the corporate governance system of a firm and both the financial statement fraud occurrence and magnitude, indicating the governance system of the firm as a fraud deterrent for any amount of financial statement fraud. These findings are even stronger for firms characterized by the presence of a blockholder. This study contributes to the governance literature by focusing on the corporate governance quality and its impact on financial statement frauds. Moreover, the analysis suggests that a good level of governance can help companies to mitigate the agency problems and to detect fraudulent behaviours, thus our empirical evidence can guide regulators in developing regulations to avoid the fraud occurrence.
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Shi, Wei, Brian L. Connelly, and Robert E. Hoskisson. "External corporate governance and financial fraud: cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions." Strategic Management Journal 38, no. 6 (October 27, 2016): 1268–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.2560.
Повний текст джерела
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Suhartono, Sugi. "ANALISIS PENGARUH FRAUD DIAMOND DAN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DALAM MENDETEKSI KEMUNGKINAN TERJADINYA FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL STATEMENT." Jurnal Bina Akuntansi 7, no. 2 (July 3, 2020): 175–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.52859/jba.v7i2.93.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the financial statements there is a possibility of misstatements in the presentation of company’s financial statements relating to errors or fraud made or caused by managers in the company. Misrepresentation in financial statements causes a decrease in the level of trust of users of financial statements and can harm stakeholders. The theories underlying this research include agency theory, fraud diamond, and good corporate governance. The research sample consisted of 46 manufacturing companies listed on the Stock Exchange in the period 2015-2017. Sampling is done by purposive sampling method. Hypothesis testing uses analysis of descriptive statistics, pooling test, independent sample t-test and logistic regression analysis. The results of this study indicate that financial stability, nature of industry, rationalization, and capability have a positive effect on the possibility of fraudulent financial statements. Whereas female on board has a negative effect on the possibility of fraudulent financial statements. But external pressure, personal financial need, effective monitoring and independent board of commissioners are not proven to have effect on the possibility of fraudulent financial statements.
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Flayyih, Hakeem Hammood, and Wided Khiari. "An empirical study to detect agency problems in listed corporations: The emerging market study." Journal of Governance and Regulation 12, no. 1, special issue (2023): 208–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgrv12i1siart1.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The aim of this paper is to shed the light on the concepts of agency theory by measuring one of the problems that arise from it, which is represented by earnings management (EM) practices. The research problem is demonstrated by the failure of some Iraqi banks and their subsequent placement under the supervision of the Central Bank of Iraq, which was attributed, in part, to the inadequacy of the agency model in protecting stakeholders in shareholding institutions, as well as EM, pushed professional institutions to adopt the corporate governance model as a method to regulate the problem of accounting information asymmetry between the parties to the agency. We are using the Beneish M-score model and the financial analysis equations in the Beneish model for bank data for both the income statement and the financial position to do so. The sample includes 30 Iraqi banks listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2017, with the goal of inferring agency problems through EM practices. The results show that there are problems for the agency in the research sample banks throughout the research periods, and the percentages of those problems vary from one year to another. Apart from detecting agency problems, the art of financial ratios that have been used can be useful for auditors in conducting financial analyses, and thus they can be used as tools to detect fraud, given those agency problems resulting from profit manipulation are only aspects of fraud in the financial statements.
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Al Matari, Ebrahim Mohammed, and Mahfoudh Hussein Mgammal. "The moderating effect of internal audit on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance among Saudi Arabia listed companies." Contaduría y Administración 64, no. 4 (April 30, 2019): 143. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2020.2316.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p>This study primarily aimed to assess the internal audit function’s ability to detect and self-report fraud. The paper investigated the moderating role of internal audit on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance (ROA) and the direct effect of corporate governance characteristics and internal audit characteristics on corporate governance of firms listed in the stock market of Saudi Arabia. one hundred and eighty-eight observations obtained from forty-seven Saudi financial firms were used in this study for the years 2014-2017. The study used the FGLS regression to test the variables relationships and to test the moderating effects of internal auditor on the corporate governance characteristics and corporate performance. The obtained empirical results supported a significant positive relationship between non-executive board, audit committee size, audit committee independence and internal audit profession, and corporate performance. Negative significant findings were also observed between the board size, internal audit size and internal audit education, and corporate performance. As for the moderating effects, the results supported a significant moderating role of internal audit size on the size of the board and its relationship with corporate performance. This study extends past studies dedicated to testing the agency theory and resource dependence theory as underpinning theories in examining the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. The study is expected to contribute to conceptual and theoretical studies by highlighting issues concerning corporate governance practice in Saudi listed firms. The study focused on the internal audit committee characteristics, corporate governance characteristics and the corporate governance best practices that practitioners can utilized when it comes to the role of internal audit committee.</p>
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Febby and Sugi Suhartono. "DETERMINAN PEMILIHAN KANTOR AKUNTAN PUBLIK (KAP)." Jurnal Akuntansi 9, no. 2 (August 15, 2020): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.46806/ja.v9i2.758.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract
In the process of maximizing the value of the company, a conflict of interest between the manager and the shareholders often arises, which is often called an agency problem. This happens because managers prioritize the opposite interests, ownership does not like the personal interests of managers because what managers do will add costs to the company so that it will cause a decrease in corporate profits. Therefore, companies need a corporate monitoring function through external auditors that are used by company managers to reduce agency problems that arise in the company and reduce fraud in the presentation of the company's financial statements. Therefore, this study discusses the factors that can influence the decisions of public accounting firms such as institutional share ownership, managerial stock ownership, largest shareholding, company size, independent commissioners and leverage. The sample in this study consisted of 135 manufacturing companies. Sampling was done by purposive sampling method. The analytical method used is logistic regression analysis using SPSS 20. The conclusion from the results of the analysis in this study is that the largest shareholding has a positive interest in the selection of a public accounting firm.
Keywords: Selection of Public Accounting Firm, Independent Commissioner, Institutional Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Largest Share Ownership, Company Size, Leverage.
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Astuti, Sri, Marita Marita, and Sucahyo Heriningsih. "Analysis Factor Triggers Fraud And Corporate Governance On Indications of Fraudulent Financial Reporting Using the Pentagon Fraud Theory Approach." Eksis: Jurnal Riset Ekonomi dan Bisnis 14, no. 1 (September 30, 2019): 47–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.26533/eksis.v14i1.448.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study examines the correlation between fraud triggering factors using the Pentagon fraud theory approach and the role of corporate governance on the indication that companies conduct financial statement fraud. The trigger factors for fraud in the Pentagon fraud theory are pressure, opportunity, rationalization, competence and arrogance. The fraud studied in this study is financial report fraud. The financial statements are prepared and accounted for by management. The population in this study are all banking companies listed on the Stock Exchange in 2015-2018. Observation data consisting of 92 companies. The analysis tool used is correlation analysis. Based on the results of testing, the variable that correlates significantly with the indication of the company committing fraud is pressure and corporate governance. Financial statements are a measure of management's performance, so there is pressure from management to deliver their performance information properly. Good corporate governance (GCG) is one of the pillars of the market economic system, closely related to trust in both the companies that implement it and the business climate in a country. Governance mechanisms describe the organizational culture that builds employee ethics and motivates them to uphold ethical values. Inefficiencies in corporate governance will raise the risk of financial report fraud.
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Yuvin, Vicky, and Partogian Sormin. "PENGARUH FRAUD PENTAGON DAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD BENEISH MODEL." Jurnal Kontemporer Akuntansi 2, no. 1 (March 23, 2022): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/jka.v2i1.18124.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This study aims to obtain evidence related to the effect of fraud pentagon theory and corporate governance on financial statement fraud. This study is conducted by selecting a sample of a manufacturing company which is listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in year 2014 – 2018. The samples obtained are 450 data. The independent variable in this study is the fraud pentagon which are consist of pressure, opportunity, rationalization, competence, arrogance also corporate governance variables. This study uses multiple linear regression analysis and is processed by using IBM SPSS 22 software. The result of this study partially indicates that pressure, opportunity, rationalization, arrogance and corporate governance variables have no positive effect on financial statement fraud. While the competence variabel has a positive effect on financial statement fraud.
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Lidyah, Rika. "Islamic Corporate Governance, Islamicityfinancial Performance Index And Fraudat Islamic Bank." Jurnal Akuntansi 22, no. 3 (November 7, 2018): 437. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/ja.v22i3.398.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This research empirically tested the factors of fraud occurrence in sharia banks based on fraud triangle theory, which is motivation, opportunity and rationalization must be fulfilled for the occurrence of fraud. This research develops indicators as a proxy of motivation, opportunity and rationalization. Factors tested in this research is the Islamic Corporate Governance to fraud with the Islamicity Financial Performance Index as a mediator in sharia banks 2012-2016.This research using quantitative method with secondary data. Data are obtained from annual reports published by Islamic banks. The test is done by path analysis and processed using SPSS. The result of research shows that Islamic Corporate Governance has no effect to Islamicity Performance Index, Islamic Income Ratio, Profit Sharing Ratio and Islamic Investment Ratio (Islamicity Financial Performance Index) influence to Fraud, Islamic Corporate Governance has no effect to Fraud, and Islamic Income Ratio, Profit Sharing Ratio and Islamic Investment Ratio (Islamicity Financial Performance Index) does not mediate the influence of Islamic Corporate Governance to Fraud on Islamic Bank or it can be said that there is no mediation. This research shows that factors based on fraud triangle are effective for use in explaining fraud.
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Haque, Faizul, and Thankom G. Arun. "Corporate governance and financial performance: an emerging economy perspective." Investment Management and Financial Innovations 13, no. 3 (September 23, 2016): 228–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.13(3-1).2016.09.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This paper investigates the influence of firm-level corporate governance on financial performance of the listed firms in Bangladesh. Agency theory suggests that better corporate governance reduces expropriation costs, which, in turn, enhances investors’ confidence in the firm’s future cash flow and growth prospects, leading to higher firm valuation. Likewise, a decrease in private benefits is likely to cause an improved operating performance. This paper uses a questionnaire survey-based corporate governance index (CGI), comprising of the three dimensions – shareholder rights, independence and responsibilities of the board and management, and financial reporting and disclosures. The study results partly confirm the prediction of the agency theory, with a statistically significant positive relationship between a firm’s corporate governance quality and its valuation, even though the relationship between firm level corporate governance and operating performance seems inconclusive. Keywords: corporate governance index, agency theory, financial performance, Bangladesh. JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38, O16
Дисертації з теми "Financial Fraud. Corporate Governance. Agency Theory"
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Magnanelli, Barbara Sveva. "The role Of Corporate Governance in financial statement frauds." Doctoral thesis, Luiss Guido Carli, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11385/200890.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Literature review. Theoretical framework and hypotheses: agency theory and conflict of interests, financial statement fraud and corporate governance. Sample and data. Methodology. Results. Conclusions and limitations.
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Cetin, Nergiz, and Emmeli Boström. "Understanding Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector through Multiple -Theory : - A study of SFSA disciplinary cases towards financial organizations." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-179521.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose: Understand different needs for accountability and governance among financial firms,based on environmental and structural factors. Design/methodology/approach: By using disciplinary reports published by SFSA the interpretation of corporate governance regulation will be studied. Findings: The study identified important corporate governance factors which can be explained and understood by analyzing through the multiple-theory. Complex environmental aspects, such as regulations and multiple stakeholders, demands for extensive internal and external controls. However, the aspect of knowledge does not seem to be fully explained by previous studies. Originality/value: The result could be a contribution to further discussions on how regulations can develop. Moreover, the result can add empirical data to further develop the multiple-theory.
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Chidziva, Bernard. "The Role of Corporate Governance in Preventing Bank Failures in Zimbabwe." ScholarWorks, 2016. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/3145.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The 2008-2009 global financial crisis resulting in some banks collapsing has raised questions about the corporate governance of financial institutions. Some bank managers lack an understanding of the role of corporate governance in preventing bank failures. In this multiple case study, data were collected through interviews and triangulated with annual reports to explore the strategies some bank managers need to improve their understanding of the role of corporate governance in preventing bank failures in Zimbabwe. The 7 study participants were purposefully recruited from a larger population of 19 bank managers responsible for corporate governance and compliance operating in Zimbabwe between 2009 and 2015. This study was grounded in the concept of corporate governance using the agency theory. The central research question explored strategies bank managers can employ to improve their understanding of the role of corporate governance in preventing bank failures in Zimbabwe. The transcribed interviews were coded to generate themes and validated through member checking. Four themes emerged from the research: the need for improvement on compliance to corporate governance policies and regulations, recruitment of qualified and competent directors who should be independent non executive in majority, risk management and internal control, and training, education, and awareness of best practices. This study may have a positive social impact in that a stable and profitable banking environment creates and sustains employment and results in an improvement in the individuals' standard of living.
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Bettington, Jacqueline J. "How does director financial literacy influence financial monitoring?" Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2021. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/213554/1/Jacqueline_Bettington_Thesis.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
There is a paucity of evidence into why boards such as Centro fail despite meeting normative financial governance standards. Drawing on Agency and organisational behavioural theories this mixed-method study involved developing and applying in the field a psychometrically robust measure of director financial literacy (DFL) and interviewing directors to investigate how they develop and apply this capability to financial monitoring. Findings verified that, generally, directors lack the requisite baseline DFL for financial monitoring and challenged the prevailing view that skill-based board diversity is a critical antecedent for effective board performance. Importantly, this study identifies practical strategies for strengthening DFL.
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Tayo-Tiwo, Aderonke Alberta. "Nigerian Banks' Compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/5788.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Frequent incidences of bank failures in Nigeria resulting in enormous losses of investments and jobs have raised questions about the level of banks' compliance with the code of corporate governance. This single exploratory case study shifted attention from the banks to the regulators of banks in Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), to find out the problems they may be encountering in getting the banks to be fully compliant. Purposeful sampling was used to select 25 senior participants who were directly involved with the monitoring of banks from CBN. The agency theory served as the conceptual framework. The sources of data were semistructured interviews and focus group interviews. The use of member checking and triangulation improved the credibility of the data. Thematic analysis was used in data analysis. Findings showed that the CBN might have identified the shortcomings in their supervision processes and have put measures in place to ensure full compliance. Some of the measures included recruitment of skilled IT personnel to conduct monthly e-examinations of the books of banks, application of steep penalties for noncompliance, the reduction of percentage holding by investors, and continuous training of the staff. Full implementation and continuous evaluation of these measures should make the issue of bank distresses and the attendant loss of depositors' funds and means of livelihood outdated. This will result in positive social change by increasing public confidence in the banks resulting in a growth in the economic activities, more job creation, and greater wealth creation for shareholders.
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Baric, Zeljka. "The Role of Internal Audits within Financial Institutions in Sweden." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-302317.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Corporate governance is a highly discussed topic in financial circles. Recent corporate failures have triggered regulatory reforms where the internal audit was given a stronger position. However, this regulatory evolution also brought challenges to internal audit activity. The growing demands and pressure from stakeholders have placed internal auditors in a difficult position of having to serve several stakeholders and sometimes inconsistent ones with different agendas. That is why the aim of this thesis was to examine how regulations have impacted the internal audit within financial institutions with a special focus on internal auditors’ relations with their stakeholders. In order to achieve the aims of this study, qualitative interviews were conducted as they were considered most suitable in order to uncover a deeper meaning and significance regarding the topic. The findings in this study indicate that internal auditing activity within financial institutions faces a multitude of challenges. Beyond having to deal with traditional duties, these institutions now have to incorporate mandatory audits from regulators within their scope of practise as well. This steers them in a direction where they have to satisfy the needs of yet another stakeholder.
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Iskandar, Samer. "Cracks in the temple of global finance : governance, regulation, technology and the future of demutualized exchanges." Thesis, Paris 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA010047/document.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Cette thèse, sous forme de trois articles, tente d’expliquer le déclin des bourses organisées au profit de nouvelles plateformes de transaction, à la lumière des récents changements de gouvernance et réglementaires. Les deux premiers articles évaluent l’influence de quatre types d’actionnariat (flottant, courtiers, investisseurs financiers et actionnaires stratégiques) sur la performance de l’entreprise. Il existe une corrélation positive de la performance avec l’actionnariat institutionnel,et négative avec le flottant et avec les investisseurs stratégiques. Le deuxième article –six études de cas– valide ces résultats. L’analyse plus détaillée des actionnaires stratégiques montre que ceux-ci créent de la valeur quand ils sont fondateurs; la détruisent quand ils sont des dirigeants salariés; et augmentent la volatilité des performances de l’entreprise dans les cas de prise de contrôle avortée par un concurrent.Le troisième article analyse l’effet conjugué des changements réglementaires et technologiques. A travers une approche par comparaisons de moyennes, il apparait que les marchés exposés à la déréglementation souffrent plus de la concurrence des plateformes électroniques que les autres bourses.Cette thèse introduit deux nouveaux concepts: le «principal quasi-agent» (un actionnaire qui réduit la valeur de son investissement en raison de ses conflits d’intérêt) et l’«effet adjuvant» (ou comment la réglementation démultiplie les effets concurrentiels permis par les avancées technologiques)This dissertation consists of three articles, examining the performance of demutualized securities exchanges from 2000 to 2011, in view of changes in governance and regulation. The first part is an empirical study of the influence of each type of shareholder (financial investor, broker, strategic or widely-held shares). The results show that fragmented owner ship is correlated with lower performance and investment managers’ presence with higher performance; strategic investors are on balance detrimental to shareholder value. The second article looks at the same exchanges individually, through case studies. The findings of the first article are validated.However,a closer look at strategic investors shows three outcomes : when they consist of founders, they increase shareholder value; when they are employed managers,they decrease it; and when the strategic investor is a competitor, the target company’s performance becomes more volatile. The third article looks at the combination of technology and regulation.Through mean comparisons and a difference-in-differences approach, this section shows that recent market deregulation has allowed high-tech start-ups to challenge the dominance of the established exchanges, just like previous coincidences of regulatory and technological change resulted in significant market up heavals: the disappearance of London’s jobbers following Big Bang and the Eurocurrency market displacing New York as a major center for dollar borrowing and lending. This dissertation introduces two new concepts: “quasi-agent principals”(shareholders who destroy value in their investment as a result of their conflicts of interest) and the “adjuvant effect” (when the combined effect of regulation and technology is a multiple of the effects of each)
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Bonhoure, Emilie. "Paris-Listed Firms at the Turn of the 20th Century : Did Modern Corporate Finance Theories Already Work?" Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020TOU10002.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Dans cette thèse, nous nous proposons d’examiner plusieurs théories modernes de financed’entreprise. L’objectif est d’étudier les résultats suggérés par les études récentes sur des sujets tels que les politiques de dividendes, les problèmes d’agence, ou encore le financement des entreprises, et testés sur des organisations modernes. Dans cette optique, nous étudions plus particulièrement les firmes qui étaient cotées à Paris au début du XXème siècle.Tout d’abord, nous avons concentré cette étude sur le contexte général de la théorie d’agence, et tenté d’examiner si ce modèle pouvait être appliqué aux firmes de la période précédant la première guerre mondiale. Nous montrons ainsi que c’était le cas. Certains éléments mis en lumière par des études récentes sur ces firmes montrent que ce qui est aujourd’hui appelé « problèmes d’agence » constituait déjà un risque majeur pour elles. De surcroît, les écrits contemporains de ces entreprises du début du XXème siècle ou avant avaient parfaitement identifié ces problèmes comme étant majeurs pour elles mais aussi pour les investisseurs potentiels prêts à participer à leur financement. Dans ce contexte général d’asymétrie d’information et des « problèmes d’agence » potentiellement sévères en résultant, nous nous interrogeons également sur le financement de l’innovation et donc sur la contribution des marchés financiers à leur croissance. Nous montrons que les firmes innovantes de l’époque (soit les firmes de la 2nde Révolution Industrielle) bénéficiaient d’un soutien mitigé de la part des marchés-actions parisiens. Si l’on mesure ce soutien potentiel par le Q de Tobin, ces entreprises de la 2nde RI bénéficiaient de conditions avantageuses quant à leur financement. Au contraire, s’il est mesuré par le taux de dividende, ce soutien est beaucoup moins clair.Les entreprises ayant déjà trouvé un financement devaient ensuite rémunérer leurs actionnaires : elles devaient en particulier leur distribuer des dividendes. Les dernières parties de cette thèse étudient ainsi les politiques de dividendes mises en place par les firmes de la place de Paris au début du XXème siècle. Nous étudions d’abord les politiques de dividendes effectivement mises en place et montrons que ces dividendes étaient payés dans le but de diminuer les coûts d’agence, et en particulier dans le but de réduire les coûts de speculative monitoring. Dans un deuxième temps, nous comparons ces politiques réelles à celles fixées dans le cadre d’une règle statutaire de distribution des profits, qui déterminait l’allocation d’un certain montant de ces profits aux actionnaires. Cette comparaison pourrait permettre d’estimer si et à quel point ceux qui « contrôlaient » la firme suivaient strictement cette règle, et s’ils n’utilisaient pas les exceptions possibles à celle-ci pour en extraire des bénéfices privés au détriment des actionnaires extérieurs et minoritaires. Nous montrons qu’ils allouaient une part des profits cohérente avec celle qui était attendue en moyenne par tous les actionnaires. Si plusieurs interprétations de ce phénomène sont possibles, une explication pourrait résider dans le fait que la règle statutaire constituait un bon moyen de limiter les conflits entre ceux des actionnaires qui contrôlaient la firme et les autresThis thesis offers to explore several modern corporate finance theories in a historical context. The rationale behind is to assess whether the findings recently suggested about topics like corporate dividend policies, agency issues, or firm financing, and tested on very modern corporations could be applicable to an earlier and different context. To do so, we examine the companies listed on Paris stock markets at the turn of the 20th century.First focusing on the general agency framework, we examine whether this model could be atplay within pre-WWI companies. We do find that this was the case. Specific features highlighted by recent studies about earlier corporations indeed provide support for the fact that the today-called “agency” issues were already critical to them. Further, contemporary authors did identify these issues as particularly salient for companies but also for the investors potentially willing to participate in their emergence. In this general context of high asymmetry of information and of resulting critical “agency” conflicts, the financing of innovation and thus the contribution of financial markets to growth are questioned. In particular, we show that the innovative firms of the time (the ones operating in 2nd-IR sectors) benefitted from a mixed support from Paris stock markets. Measuring potential favourable financing conditions by a higher Tobin’s Q, we find that 2nd-IR companies did benefit from a sort of help from these markets in financing their growth. On the contrary, measuring it by the dividend yield provides a less clear result.The firms already financed had to compensate their shareholders for the risk they took. They thus had to pay dividends out. The last parts of this thesis examine the dividend policies implemented by Paris-listed firms at the turn of the 20th century. Focusing first on the ones actually implemented, we provide further support for the agency explanation of dividends, notably showing that these dividends were mostly paid to decrease one specific type of agency costs, speculative monitoring ones. Second, we compare these actual payout policies with the ones fixed in a statutory rule of profit allocation, which committed to the distribution of a certain percentage of profits to shareholders. Doing so could help to assess whether firm controllers strictly followed this statutory rule and did not take advantage of the potential and allowed deviations from it to extract as many benefits as they could at the expense of outsiders and minority shareholders. We show that they did allocate a percentage of profits consistent with the one expected in average by all shareholders. Although several interpretations could be made of this result, it could be explained by the fact the statutory rule was a good way to mitigate conflicts between firm controllers and outsiders
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Freitas, Volnei Adriano de. "O conselheiro do rei: a função de auditoria interna na governança corporativa de bancos no Brasil." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/14765.
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This study has as its theme the role of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) in the corporate governance system (CGS) in financial institutions, or simply banks, operating in Brazil. The FAI is an evaluation mechanism of procedures, policies and processes that acts from the operating environment of an organization. Based on this, the objective of this study was to investigate why and how the FAI was incorporated into the SGC and the consequences generated for both. The qualitative study, of exploratory and descriptive nature, used a multitheoretical approach, applying the agency theory and institutional theory. By this approach we tried to use the relationship between the need for monitoring to achieve organizational efficiency and the structural impact of the pressures of the external environment in defining the role and positioning of the FAI in the GSC. A semi-structured interview, used as data collection method, was applied to ten audit employees of five large banks, besides three people connected to the Board of Directors on banks. The study made the following findings: i) the FAI was incorporated into the SGC because the complexity derived from the evolution of the banking business made it difficult to monitoring banks by the principal and the regulator; ii) three factors worked in an interrelated way as drivers of this merger: the evolution of the banking business, the regulation and the convergence of assumptions and practices; and iii) the organizational repositioning resulted in consequences on the scope of the FAI work, the intensification of conflicts for the maintenance of independence, the perception of FAI value by CGS and the training process for internal auditors. The study had as main contributions to the CGS: the revelation of the potential of FAI to generate inputs to monitoring, by acting as its extension in the complex banking operating environment; and the proposed use of FAI as resources to generate inputs to strategic decisions. For FAI, the study suggests that, to be consolidated as governance mechanism, it needs to qualify its staff and develop methodologically to deliver consistent information to decision-making by GSC.
Este estudo tem como tema o papel da Função de Auditoria Interna (FAI) no sistema de governança corporativa (SGC) de instituições financeiras, ou simplesmente bancos, atuando no Brasil. A FAI é um mecanismo de avaliação de políticas, procedimentos e processos que age a partir do ambiente operacional de uma organização. Baseando-se nisso, o objetivo do trabalho foi investigar porquê e como a FAI foi incorporada ao SGC, e as consequências geradas para ambos. O estudo qualitativo, de natureza exploratória e descritiva, utilizou uma abordagem multiteórica, aplicando a teoria da agência e a teoria institucional. Pela abordagem buscou-se utilizar a relação entre à necessidade de monitoramento para atingir a eficiência organizacional e o impacto estruturante das pressões do ambiente externo na definição do papel e do posicionamento da FAI no SGC. A entrevista semiestruturada, utilizada como método de coleta de dados, foi aplicada a dez funcionários de auditoria de cinco bancos de grande porte, além de três indivíduos ligados ao Conselho de Administração em bancos. O estudo apresentou as seguintes conclusões: i) a FAI foi incorporada ao SGC porque a complexidade derivada da evolução do negócio bancário dificultou o monitoramento dos bancos por parte do principal e do regulador; ii) três fatores atuaram de forma inter-relacionada como direcionadores dessa incorporação: a própria evolução do negócio bancário, a regulação e a convergência de premissas e práticas; e iii) o reposicionamento organizacional resultou em consequências quanto ao escopo do trabalho da FAI, à intensificação dos conflitos para a manutenção da independência, à percepção de valor agregado pela FAI ao SGC e ao processo de capacitação dos auditores internos. O estudo apresentou como principais contribuições ao SGC: a revelação do potencial da FAI para gerar insumos para o monitoramento ao atuar como sua extensão no complexo ambiente operacional bancário; e a proposta de utilização da FAI como recursos para gerar insumos às decisões estratégicas. Quanto à FAI, o estudo sugere que, para que se consolide como mecanismo de governança, necessita qualificar seu quadro funcional e se desenvolver metodologicamente para entregar informações condizentes à tomada de decisão pelo SGC.
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Facchini, Edmundo Mazzoleni. "Gestão, governança e mercado de capitais: perspectivas das empresas mineiras e gaúchas." Universidade do Vale do Rio do Sinos, 2009. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/2777.
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O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o mercado de capitais, a governança corporativa e as disposições das empresas mineiras e gaúchas, de médio e grande porte, a abrir o capital. Para tanto, utilizaremos o modelo logit sobre os bancos de dados originais de duas relevantes pesquisas: FIEMG et al. (2007) e FIERGS et al. (2008). Em especial, buscaremos determinar se as práticas de governança corporativa, adotadas pelas empresas, aumentam sua disposição em abrir o capital. Chegamos à conclusão de que a adoção de práticas de governança corporativa pelas empresas de capital fechado não é suficiente para determinar quais são as empresas com maior disposição à abertura de capital. No entanto, verificamos que a variável grau de compartilhamento de poder, elemento determinante de governança corporativa, encontra-se extremamente relacionada com esta disposição.
The goal of this study is to analyze the stock markets, the corporative governance and the likelihood of mining industries of Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, of medium and large dimension, of opening capital. For such, we will use the logit model of the original data bank from two relevant researches; FIEMG et al (2007) and FIERGS et al (2008). In special, we will attempt to determine if practicing corporative governance, adopted by these firms, increases its likelihood in opening capital. We have come upon the conclusion that adopting corporative governance by firms of closed capital is not sufficient to determine which industries are more susceptible to opening capital. However, we have verified that the degree of power sharing, determining element in corporative governance, finds itself extremely related to this likelihood.
Книги з теми "Financial Fraud. Corporate Governance. Agency Theory"
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Hvostova, Irina, Aleksey Makarov, and Aleksandr Larin. Non-financial factors in the formation of the company's financial policy: composition, structure, relationships. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1080130.
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When implementing the financial policy of the Corporation, the object of attention of owners and managers is increasingly becoming non-financial indicators of the development of modern companies, such as corporate governance characteristics, socio-economic and environmental indicators. Without denying the need to calculate and analyze financial and economic criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of financial policy, the authors of the monograph describe and systematize the composition and structure of non-financial factors of financial policy, based on the theory of Agency relations and the concept of sustainable development. Along with the theoretical analysis of non-financial factors of financial policy formation, the monograph presents the results of their empirical analysis for emerging markets, as well as an empirical analysis of trends in the use of non-financial indicators in modern corporate Finance research. It is intended for a wide range of readers, including researchers, practitioners, postgraduates, applicants and students studying in the fields of "Economics", "Management".
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Ferrarini, Guido, and Maria Cristina Ungureanu. Executive Remuneration. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.21.
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This chapter examines current trends in the regulation and practice of executive remuneration, particularly emphasizing incentives like stock options and long-term pay. It first outlines the main problems of executive pay from the perspective of agency costs theory, banking theory, and corporate social responsibility. It then discusses the main policy issues relating to executive pay, from design problems and remuneration governance to disclosure of pay policies and amounts, and prudential regulation of pay structure at banks. It considers the regulation of pay governance and disclosure, with special reference to EU law, comparative law, and international practice. It explores the rise of shareholder engagement in listed companies across the Atlantic and the impact of say on pay rules on shareholder activism. Finally, it analyzes the implications of international principles and standards, the Dodd-Frank Act, and CRD IV for the regulation of the pay structure at banks and other financial institutions.
Частини книг з теми "Financial Fraud. Corporate Governance. Agency Theory"
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Sadek, Daing Maruak, Zakaria Abas, Khilmy Abd Rahim, Azyyati Anuar, and Mas Aida Abd Rahim. "The Practices of Corporate Governance and Shariah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions." In Accounting, Finance, Sustainability, Governance & Fraud: Theory and Application, 131–47. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1880-5_9.
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Juhari, Zuria, and Corina Joseph. "The Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Financial Structure Decision." In Accounting, Finance, Sustainability, Governance & Fraud: Theory and Application, 77–90. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1880-5_6.
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Gurkan, Cicek. "Banks’ Interactions with Listed Non-Financial Firms as a Determinant of Corporate Governance in Banking: An Agency Theory Analysis." In CSR, Sustainability, Ethics & Governance, 21–35. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70007-6_2.
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Chen, Fu Hsiang, Der-Jang Chi, and Jia-Yi Zhu. "Application of Random Forest, Rough Set Theory, Decision Tree and Neural Network to Detect Financial Statement Fraud – Taking Corporate Governance into Consideration." In Intelligent Computing Theory, 221–34. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-09333-8_24.
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Haron, Razali, Anwar Hasan Abdullah Othman, Naji Mansour Nomran, and Maizaitulaidawati Md Husin. "Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in an Emerging Market." In Handbook of Research on Accounting and Financial Studies, 208–26. IGI Global, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-2136-6.ch010.
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This study examines the corporate governance mechanisms and how they affect firm performance in Malaysia. After the financial crisis in 1997/98, the CG issues have been the most debated, discussed, and researched in the attempt to improve the CG structure accommodating every economy regardless of the economic landscapes. Using a rich and huge data on Malaysian firms for 16 observation years, this study found that the MCCG has been of a closely referred blueprint by firms in Malaysia to improve firms' performance. Certain CG mechanisms do have significant impact on firm performance. Firms seem to operate in a large board size indicating a positive relationship with performance and board independence. CEO duality is negatively related, in support of separation of roles, complementing the result of board independence and ownership structure as positively related to performance. Agency theory seems to be the dominant theory influencing the CG structure of firms in Malaysia.
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Ben Rejeb, Wajdi. "Empirical Evidence on Corporate Governance Impact on CSR Disclosure in Developing Economies." In Corporate Social Responsibility, 878–99. IGI Global, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-6192-7.ch044.
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This chapter investigates the influence of the board composition and leadership on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure. The empirical study of 68 Tunisian listed companies and 100 Egyptian listed companies reveals that board independence, foreign directorship, female directorship and state directorship, influence positively CSR disclosure. However, these findings indicate that CEO duality has a negative impact on CSR disclosure. Overall, the findings are consistent with the agency theory as well as the stakeholders theory and suggest that CSR disclosure seems to result from the willingness to meet shareholders' expectations in terms of transparency and voluntary disclosure of non-financial information.
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Masmoudi Mardessi, Sana, and Yosra Makni Makni Fourati. "The Audit Committee as Component of Corporate Governance." In Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance, 188–215. IGI Global, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-4852-3.ch009.
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Recently, numerous financial scandals (WorldCom, Enron, Parmalat, eToys) have shown that plentiful companies produce manipulated financial information. Consequently, regulators have prescribed corporate governance structures to protect investors and to avoid fraudulent financial reporting which are likely to control managers and limit their opportunistic behavior. Thus, there has been much debate over the extent to which corporate governance is playing a crucial role in increasing financial reporting quality from the theoretical perspective of agency theory, signaling theory, and stakeholder theory. This chapter aims at scrutinizing the internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance mainly the audit committee in the Dutch context. Firstly, the authors expose the numerous corporate governance mechanisms. Secondly, they focus on the audit committee as the main component of corporate governance, and they present the theoretical background, the role, and the characteristics of audit committee. Eventually, they exhibit the regulatory background of the Dutch context of the audit committee.
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Fallatah, Yaser Ahmed, Abul Hassan Farooqi, and Salah Al Shalhoob. "Chapter 23 A Perspective of the Shari’ah Compliant Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia and Agency Structures." In Research in Corporate and Shari’ah Governance in the Muslim World: Theory and Practice, 287–303. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78973-007-420191031.
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Arslan, Muhammad. "Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance Evidence From Non-Financial Listed Firms." In Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance, 143–70. IGI Global, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-4852-3.ch007.
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In modern organizations, there is a separation between ownership and control of the firm. On the lenses of agency theory, this study statistically examines the relationship between ownership structure (i.e., ownership concentration and owner identity) and firm performance of non-financial listed firms of Pakistan by taking firm-level control variables of size, age, liquidity, financial leverage, and growth of the firm. Secondary data is collected from annual reports of 65 non-financial listed firms for the year 2008 to 2012. The least-square dummy variable model followed by the random effect model has been employed to statistically determining the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. The results of the least square dummy variable model reveal that the ownership concentration has a significant positive impact on firm performance. The owner identity (such as dispersed, family, institutional, and government ownership) has a significant causal effect on firm performance as indicated from t and p values.
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Rehman, Ali. "With the Mediation of Internal Audit, Can Artificial Intelligence Eliminate and Mitigate Fraud?" In Handbook of Research on the Significance of Forensic Accounting Techniques in Corporate Governance, 232–57. IGI Global, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-8754-6.ch012.
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The purpose of this study is to determine artificial intelligence (AI)-supported Omani publicly listed organisations' attitudes towards fraud elimination and mitigation (FEM) concerns from the lens of agency theory with internal audit (IAF) serving as the mediator. A descriptive cross-sectional survey was conducted by involving Omani publicly listed companies as the unit of analysis. Data were gathered using an internet-based tool and analysed via PLS-SEM and SPSS. For results, AI displayed an insignificant but direct impact on FEM, whereas IAF exhibited a significant and direct effect on FEM. Apparently, AI exerted a significant and direct impact on IAF, while IAF mediated the correlation between AI and FEM. This study serves as a guidance to regulators, professional bodies, and organisations in amending their codes of corporate governance and organisational policies by initiating AI as a governance agent working for the principal, as well as operating towards eradicating fraud and fraudulent practices.