Статті в журналах з теми "Feminist jurisprudence"

Щоб переглянути інші типи публікацій з цієї теми, перейдіть за посиланням: Feminist jurisprudence.

Оформте джерело за APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard та іншими стилями

Оберіть тип джерела:

Ознайомтеся з топ-50 статей у журналах для дослідження на тему "Feminist jurisprudence".

Біля кожної праці в переліку літератури доступна кнопка «Додати до бібліографії». Скористайтеся нею – і ми автоматично оформимо бібліографічне посилання на обрану працю в потрібному вам стилі цитування: APA, MLA, «Гарвард», «Чикаго», «Ванкувер» тощо.

Також ви можете завантажити повний текст наукової публікації у форматі «.pdf» та прочитати онлайн анотацію до роботи, якщо відповідні параметри наявні в метаданих.

Переглядайте статті в журналах для різних дисциплін та оформлюйте правильно вашу бібліографію.

1

Rifkin, Janet, and Patricia Smith. "Feminist Jurisprudence." Contemporary Sociology 23, no. 5 (September 1994): 713. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2074316.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
2

Whitman, Christina Brooks, Susan Estrich, Frances Olsen, Robin West, Martha Minow, Deborah L. Rhode, Vicki Schultz, Regina Austin, and Patricia Williams. "Feminist Jurisprudence." Feminist Studies 17, no. 3 (1991): 493. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3178287.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
3

Richards, Janet Radcliffe. "Why Feminist Epistemology Isn't (And the Implications for Feminist Jurisprudence)." Legal Theory 1, no. 4 (December 1995): 365–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325200000185.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Twenty years ago, when feminism was younger and greener, crides who thought the movement was sinking into a quagmire of unscientific irrationality had a relatively easy time in making out their case. In the first place, many feminists were themselves claiming to have rejected both science and reason, along with morality and all other such male devices for the oppression of women. And, furthermore, this position was a relatively easy one for the skeptical outsider to attack. Unless feminists could say such things as that the present treatment of women was morally wrong, or prevailing ideas about their nature false or unfounded, or traditional reasoning about their position confused or fallacious, it was difficult to see on what basis they could rest the feminist case. And, of course, as they did say such things, all the time, it was obvious that any systematic attempt to reject ethics and rationality was systematically undercut by feminists' own arguments.
4

Naffine, Ngaire. "In praise of legal feminism." Legal Studies 22, no. 1 (March 2002): 71–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2002.tb00580.x.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
This paper reflects on the achievements of feminism within the legal academy. Rather than offer an encyclopaedic account of feminist legal scholarship, it seeks instead to define, in broad terms, the aims, the spirit and the methods of legal feminism, identifying the commonalities among feminist scholars. It suggests that it is the critical study of law as ‘a form of life’, to borrow from Wittgenstein, which perhaps best characterises the shared endeavour of legal feminists. The paper identifies the major intellectual and political difficulties encountered, and also engendered, by feminists in the course of their work, and it assesses the impact of feminism on mainstream jurisprudence.
5

Bhattarai, Lokendra Hari. "An Outline of Feminism Jurisprudence: Phases and Approaches from Nepalese Perspectives." KMC Research Journal 4, no. 4 (December 31, 2020): 113–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/kmcrj.v4i4.46472.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Jurisprudence is a science of law. Whereas feminism jurisprudence is a philosophy of law based on political, economic and social equality of sexes. It began in 1960s and feminists believe that law is not neutral or impartial. They blame male written history which has created in a bias way it is an off-shoot of critical legal studies. There are some of the schools of feminist jurisprudence. They are as liberal feminism, radical feminism, postmodern feminism, black feminism, lesbian feminism, queer feminism, Marxist feminism. All of the feminists have the same agenda of establishing equal opportunitiesand equal rights for women in all sectors. After the promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, judicial body played vital role to eliminate gender discrimination. The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 was more progressive than the constitution of Nepal 1990s in the issues of women’s empowerment, reproductive freedom, equality and property entitlement. The Constitution of Nepal 2015 enlarges women’s issues and has guaranteed several rights than the previous constitutions. The judicial bodies with constitutional mechanism are playing an effective role for the protection, promotion of women's rights in Nepal.
6

Auchmuty, Rosemary. "Sourcebook on feminist jurisprudence." Feminist Legal Studies 6, no. 1 (March 1998): 135–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02684875.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
7

Musgrave, L. Ryan. "Liberal Feminism, from Law to Art: The Impact of Feminist Jurisprudence on Feminist Aesthetics." Hypatia 18, no. 4 (2003): 214–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2003.tb01419.x.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
This essay explores how early approaches in feminist aesthetics drew on concepts honed in the field of feminist legal theory, especially conceptions of oppression and equality. I argue that by importing these feminist legal concepts, many early feminist accounts of how art is political depended largely on a distinctly liberal version of politics. I offer a critique of liberal feminist aesthetics, indicating ways recent work in the field also turns toward critical feminist aesthetics as an alternative.
8

Villmoare, Adelaide H. "Feminist Jurisprudence and Political Vision." Law & Social Inquiry 24, no. 02 (1999): 443–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1999.tb00136.x.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
9

Setiawan, Heri, Steven Ouddy, and Mutiara Girindra Pratiwi. "Gender Equality Issues in Optical Feminist Jurisprudence and Implementation in Indonesian." FIAT JUSTISIA:Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 12, no. 4 (December 31, 2018): 355. http://dx.doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v12no4.1386.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Gender meaning of fundamentally different from biological sex. Biological sex is a gift; we are born as a man or a woman. However, the path that makes us masculine or feminine is a combination of the building blocks of basic biological and biological interpretation by our culture. From the tiny baby to reach old age, we learn and practice specific ways that have been determined by the community for us to be men and women. Gender is a set of roles as well as costumes and masks at the theater, convey to others that we are feminine or masculine. Device specific behaviors include appearance, dress, attitude, personality, work inside and outside the household, sexuality, family responsibilities and so together polish "gender roles" us. If someone mentions or asks about gender, then what is meant is gender in the context of language approach. This term became very commonly used in the last few decades. Feminist jurisprudence is a legal philosophy that is based on gender equality in politics, economic and social. Feminist jurisprudence unpacks and explain how the law plays a role to legalize the status of women in subordination to men, in other words, the law as a means to preserve the status quo, namely the dominance of men over women. Moreover, feminist jurisprudence is also trying to make a change/transformation changing the status of women by changing laws and its approach and its stance on gender cases be more fair and balanced. This is an emancipatory project woman in law. Keywords: Gender; Feminist Jurisprudence; justice; men and women.
10

Musgrave, L. Ryan. "Liberal Feminism, from Law to Art: The Impact of Feminist Jurisprudence on Feminist Aesthetics." Hypatia 18, no. 4 (2003): 214–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hyp.2003.0087.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
11

Musgrave, L. Ryan. "Liberal Feminism, from Law to Art: The Impact of Feminist Jurisprudence on Feminist Aesthetics." Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 18, no. 4 (October 2003): 214–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/hyp.2003.18.4.214.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
12

Davion, Victoria. "SO WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE? FEMINIST ETHICS AND FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE." Journal of Social Philosophy 27, no. 3 (December 1996): 101–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00255.x.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
13

Littleton, Christine A., and Catharine A. MacKinnon. "Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes." Stanford Law Review 41, no. 3 (February 1989): 751. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1228884.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
14

Scoular, J. "Book Review: Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence." Feminist Theory 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2000): 123–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/146470010000100111.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
15

MARSHALL, JILL. "FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: KEEPING THE SUBJECT ALIVE." Feminist Legal Studies 14, no. 1 (March 23, 2006): 27–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10691-006-9013-2.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
16

Arrigo, Bruce A. "Deconstructing jurisprudence: An experiential feminist critique." Journal of Human Justice 4, no. 1 (September 1992): 13–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02619280.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
17

Behuniak-Long, Susan. "Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the Power or Maternal Legal Thinking." Review of Politics 54, no. 3 (1992): 417–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500018246.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman on the United States Supreme Court, has been criticized by some for failing to bring a woman's perspective to the Court, and by others for acting too much like the stereotypical woman who cannot make up her mind. Both criticisms overlook the possibility that O'Connor's impact as a female is derived from the fact that she is promulgating a very specific jurisprudence—that of the feminine. However, it is in employing this jurisprudence that she undermines the potential for both a feminist jurisprudence and for a cohesive conservative bloc on the Court.
18

Gupta, Pallavi. "Feminist Jurisprudence in India with Reference to Individual Freedom of Women vis-a-vis State's Duty to Protect Them." International Journal of Civic Engagement and Social Change 1, no. 2 (April 2014): 54–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijcesc.2014040104.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
In the history of mankind ‘equality' and ‘freedom' evaded women in comparison to men. Women always suffered subordinate status and were assigned a purely functional role in every society or civilisation of the world. Over the period this unequal status of women being offensive to human dignity and human rights steered to develop feminist jurisprudence. This research paper reflects the perspective of feminist jurisprudence with reference to individual freedom of women, its expansion under other various issues and State's / employer's duty to protect women's individual freedom and to empower them. This research paper exclusively deals with that feminist jurisprudence which has been developed by judicial decisions in India.
19

Binion, Gayle. "Our Lives before the Law: Constructing a Feminist Jurisprudence. By Judith A. Baer. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 276p. $55.00 cloth, $18.95 paper." American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 199–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401212015.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
It is a daunting assignment to review a book after it has garnered a major award bestowed by the organization that publishes this journal. Judith Baer's Our Lives before the Law not only is a very worthy recipient of the 2000 Victoria Schuck Award for the best book on women in politics but also is an erudite and wide-ranging critique of feminist thought with the goal of "forc[ing] feminists to confront mainstream discourse and mainstream discourse to confront feminism" (p. 175). This goal is in the service of Baer's desire to construct a new jurisprudence of sexual equality, one that avoids the pitfalls Baer perceives as inherent in the efforts of others to date.
20

Olson, Susan M. "Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Debate.Leslie Friedman Goldstein." Journal of Politics 56, no. 2 (May 1994): 531–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2132160.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
21

Bouclin, Suzanne. "Women in Prison Movies as Feminist Jurisprudence." Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 21, no. 1 (January 2009): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cjwl.21.1.19.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
22

Scales, Ann C. "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay." Yale Law Journal 95, no. 7 (June 1986): 1373. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/796562.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
23

Shahin, Farah. "Islamic Feminism and Hegemonic Discourses on Faith and Gender in Islam." International Journal of Islam in Asia 1, no. 1 (December 17, 2020): 27–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25899996-01010003.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Abstract Islamic feminism is characterised by a debate, a practice enunciated within the Islamic values and frame. Muslim women brought their experiences to the forefront and challenged the traditional and post-classical interpretation of the Qurʾan and Sunna. They claimed interpretations of the religious text as totally biased and based on men’s experience, questions that are male-centric, and the overall influence of the patriarchal society and culture. According to Islamic feminists, Islam has guaranteed women’s rights since its inception, confirming the notion of egalitarian ethics within Islam. However, the original message of Islam has been hindered by the hegemonic interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence; a product of existing patriarchy in the long passage of Islamic history for over several centuries. The rights of women as prescribed in Islam are not in practice anymore, even the demand for women’s rights is seen by many as going against the basic principle of Islam. Islamic feminists give their justifications from the Qurʾan and Hadith, and they called for re-opening the door of ijtihād (reasoning). This paper captures the significant works of feminist discourses and analyses different perspectives by the Islamic feminists who challenged the dominant discourses in Islam. It deals with the dominant discourse of Islamic feminists such as feminist hermeneutics of the Qurʾan, and includes a discussion on how feminist hermeneutics or new gender-sensitive interpretation of the Qurʾan tries to assert gender equality in the Qurʾan. There are two ways in which Muslims read patriarchy in the Qurʾan: first from the verses and the other from the different treatment of the Qurʾan on issues including marriages, divorce, inheritances, and witness. Islamic feminists reject anti-women elements, present in the Muslim umma and consider them as unethical and against Islam.
24

Jackson, Emily. "Catharine MacKinnon and Feminist Jurisprudence: A Critical Appraisal." Journal of Law and Society 19, no. 2 (1992): 195. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1410220.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
25

Goodwin, Michele. "The Body Politic: Representation and Reproductive Feminist Jurisprudence." Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 48, no. 1 (September 1, 2022): 3–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/720667.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
26

Genovese, Ann. "Occasions and Events: Australian Feminist Jurisprudence at 25." Australian Feminist Law Journal 41, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2015.1045111.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
27

Buckley, Melina. "Women’s Court of Canada Act and Rules." Oñati Socio-legal Series 8, no. 9 (December 31, 2018): 1259–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-0996.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
This paper explores the issue of how a feminist court could operate through the device of a model statute and rules for the Women’s Court of Canada. The Women’s Court of Canada is a feminist legal project bringing together academics, activists, and litigators to "rewrite" Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms equality jurisprudence. Over the course of more than a decade, the members of this virtual 'court' have reconsidered leading equality rights decisions, rendering alternative judgments with the aim of articulating fresh conceptions of substantive equality in judgment form. Here, the author takes a step away from the substance of equality rights law to focus on legal institutions and procedure. El presente artículo profundiza en la cuestión de cómo podría funcionar un tribunal feminista mediante unos estatutos tipo y unas normas para el Tribunal de Mujeres de Canadá. El Tribunal de Mujeres de Canadá es un proyecto jurídico feminista que reúne a académicas, activistas y abogadas, quienes "reescriben" la jurisprudencia sobre igualdad de la Carta Canadiense de los Derechos y las Libertades. Durante más de una década, los miembros de este "tribunal" virtual han cuestionado sentencias con el objetivo de articular concepciones nuevas de igualdad sustantiva en forma de sentencia. La autora de este artículo se distancia de lo sustantivo de las leyes sobre derecho a la igualdad y se centra en las instituciones jurídicas y el procedimiento.
28

Coray, Erica. "Research Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law." Journal of International Economic Law 24, no. 2 (May 4, 2021): 497–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgab022.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
ABSTRACT This review analyzes the efficacy of the collection in engaging with international law through the lens of feminist jurisprudence. The editors have compiled a diverse collection that applies feminist thought to varying topics of international law, including economic topics that do not obviously lend themselves to feminist engagement, that demonstrates the benefits of such analysis. The handbook effectively illustrates the potential for feminist thought to apply broadly to international law topics and provides a path forward for continued engagement with feminist theories in international law.
29

Charlesworth, Hilary, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright. "Feminist Approaches to International Law." American Journal of International Law 85, no. 4 (October 1991): 613–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2203269.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
The development of feminist jurisprudence in recent years has made a rich and fruitful contribution to legal theory. Few areas of domestic law have avoided the scrutiny of feminist writers, who have exposed the gender bias of apparently neutral systems of rules. A central feature of many western theories about law is that the law is an autonomous entity, distinct from the society it regulates. A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic system, for example, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, and is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and objectivity. These attributes are held to give the law its special authority. More radical theories have challenged this abstract rationalism, arguing that legal analysis cannot be separated from the political, economic, historical and cultural context in which people live. Some theorists argue that the law functions as a system of beliefs that make social, political and economic inequalities appear natural. Feminist jurisprudence builds on certain aspects of this critical strain in legal thought. It is much more focused and concrete, however, and derives its theoretical force from immediate experience of the role of the legal system in creating and perpetuating the unequal position of women.
30

Gonzalez, Marc Tizoc, Saru Matambanadzo, and Sheila I. Vélez Martínez. "Latina and Latino Critical Legal Theory: LatCrit Theory, Praxis and Community." Revista Direito e Práxis 12, no. 2 (April 2021): 1316–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/2179-8966/2021/59628.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Abstract LatCrit theory is a relatively recent genre of critical “outsider jurisprudence” – a category of contemporary scholarship including critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, critical race theory, critical race feminism, Asian American legal scholarship and queer theory. This paper overviews LatCrit’s foundational propositions, key contributions, and ongoing efforts to cultivate new generations of ethical advocates who can systemically analyze the sociolegal conditions that engender injustice and intervene strategically to help create enduring sociolegal, and cultural, change. The paper organizes this conversation highlighting Latcrit’s theory, community and praxis.
31

Suzanne, Gibson. "Continental drift: The question of context in feminist jurisprudence." Law and Critique 1, no. 1-2 (March 1990): 173–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02439612.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
32

Réaume, Denise. "Turning Feminist Judgments into Jurisprudence: The Women’s Court of Canada on Substantive Equality." Oñati Socio-legal Series 8, no. 9 (December 31, 2018): 1307–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-0994.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
The Women’s Court of Canada project is unique in having chosen to focus its rewriting efforts in a specific area of law – constitutional equality cases. This strategy permits an assessment of the WCC jurisprudence to see if it yields a competing ‘theory’ of equality rights that might be used to systematically critique the real jurisprudence and perhaps produce lines of argument capable of redirecting the real law. This effort reveals the pervasive importance of attention to and representation of context to bringing to life the abstract commitments of an account of substantive equality. While not a new discovery, this demonstration of the work context can do across an array of linked cases is illuminating. El proyecto del Tribunal de Mujeres de Canadá (WCC, por su nombre en inglés, Women’s Court of Canada) es único en el sentido de que se ha centrado en reescribir, sobre todo, sentencias de un área específica del derecho – casos de igualdad constitucional –. Esta estrategia permite una valoración de la jurisprudencia del WCC para ver si brinda una "teoría" alternativa de derechos de igualdad que se pueda usar para producir argumentaciones capaces de redirigir el derecho real. Este esfuerzo revela la importancia general de la atención al contexto, y la representación de éste, a la hora de dotar de vida los compromisos abstractos de igualdad sustantiva. Si bien no se trata de una novedad, es esclarecedora esta demostración de lo que el contexto de trabajo puede hacer en un número de casos relacionados.
33

Irshai, Ronit. "Public and Private Rulings in Jewish Law (Halakhah): Flexibility, Concealment, and Feminist Jurisprudence." Journal of Law, Religion and State 3, no. 1 (November 24, 2014): 25–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22124810-00301002.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Jewish law includes two parallel systems of halakhic ruling: public and private. There is often a significant gap between what halakhic authorities proclaim publicly and what they are willing to say, on the same topic, in private. The ability to deviate from the original ruling in order to solve concrete problems answers one of the central demands of feminist critics of the law. It enables flexibility and creativity on the part of the decisor and avoids the characteristic pitfalls of the generalized nature of the law, which, according to feminist critics, affect primarily women. On the face of it, halakhah works in this flexible mode. However, the selective concealment mechanism built into the halakhic system prevents this benefit from being felt, primarily by disadvantaged populations. In its absence Jewish law may be capable, at least in principle, of instituting a halakhic model which responds to inherent problems within the two parallel systems of halakhah as well as to feminist sensibilities.
34

Nesiah, Vasuki. "Decolonial CIL: TWAIL, Feminism, and an Insurgent Jurisprudence." AJIL Unbound 112 (2018): 313–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aju.2018.82.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
In advancing a Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) analysis of customary international law (CIL) and its dominant doctrinal conceits, B.S. Chimni shows how the jurisprudence of custom has been co-constitutive with colonization and capitalism. He contends that CIL's most fundamental assumption—the “supposed distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘material’ sources of CIL”—privileges Western states while legitimizing CIL as a neutral and universal body of law. In dialogue with Chimni, this essay extends the conversation in two directions. First, I show that there are important resonances between Chimni's deconstruction of the distinction between “formal” and “material” sources of CIL, and a feminist critique of the public/private distinction in international law. Chimni describes his approach as postmodern. I argue that its analysis of the conceptual architecture of the dominant doctrine and its systematic exclusions is also, at its core, a feminist approach to international law. Second, and inspired by Chimni's critique, I explore insurgent jurisprudential traditions that challenge the hierarchies, inequalities, and biases in received doctrine regarding the sources of CIL. Chimni's decolonial approach acknowledges CIL's imperial past, and prepares the ground for democratizing and pluralizing sources by paying attention to a so-called opinio juris communis that incorporates the interests of those critical of, or oppressed by, the dominant world order. Building on this ground, I draw on the Panchsheel principles, first nations’ conceptions of sovereignty and citizenship, and practices of fugitive freedom by maroon communities to begin to supply content and form to a counterrepertoire of custom.
35

Brush, Lisa D. "The Curious Courtship of Feminist Jurisprudence and Feminist State Theory: Smart on the Power of Law." Law & Social Inquiry 19, no. 04 (1994): 1059–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1994.tb00948.x.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
36

Natalis, Aga. "REFORMASI HUKUM DALAM RANGKA MEWUJUDKAN KEADILAN BAGI PEREMPUAN: TELAAH FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE." CREPIDO 2, no. 1 (May 26, 2020): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/crepido.2.1.11-23.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Negara harus bertindak untuk mewujudkan instrumen hukum dalam rangka memajukan keadilan gender dan pemberdayaan perempuan, namun pada kenyataannya masih terjadi penyimpangan terhadap prinsip tersebut, karena instrumen hukum cenderung melanggengkan dominasi laki-laki terhadap perempuan. Tujuan penulisan artikel ini adalah untuk mengetahui dan menganalisis mengenai konsep hukum yang berkeadilan bagi perempuan dan upaya mewujudkan reformasi hukum melalui pendekatan feminist jurisprudence. Konsep hukum yang berkeadilan bagi perempuan, bahwa hukum harus menjamin perempuan untuk berhak hidup bermartabat dan bebas tanpa rasa takut, yang dapat terwujud dengan menerapkan tipe hukum responsif. Tipe hukum responsif mengakui adanya pluralisme hukum yang berdampak pada luasnya kesempatan bagi perempuan untuk berpartisipasi dalam proses pembuatan hukum. Upaya mewujudkan reformasi hukum melalui pendekatan feminist jurisprudence dimulai dengan persepsi bahwa hukum yang dibentuk berdasarkan nilai maskulin, menunjukkan sejumlah keterbatasan atau keterkaitan pada realitas nilai-nilai sosial. Hukum yang demikian harus dilakukan reformasi guna mewujudkan hukum yang berkeadilan bagi perempuan.
37

Brandser, Kristin J. "In Defence of ‘Murderous Mothers’: Feminist Jurisprudence in Frances Trollope'sJessie Phillips." Journal of Victorian Culture 5, no. 2 (January 2000): 179–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jvc.2000.5.2.179.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
38

Setiawan, Heri, Steven Ouddy, and Mutiara Girindra Pratiwi. "ISU KESETARAAN GENDER DALAM OPTIK FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE DAN IMPLEMENTASINYA DI INDONESIA." Jurisprudentie : Jurusan Ilmu Hukum Fakultas Syariah dan Hukum 5, no. 2 (December 31, 2018): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.24252/jurisprudentie.v5i2.6285.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
39

Arrigo, Bruce A. "An Experientially-Informed Feminist Jurisprudence: Rape and the Move toward Praxis." Humanity & Society 17, no. 1 (February 1993): 28–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016059769301700103.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
40

Mihic, S. J. "Neoliberalism and the jurisprudence of privacy: An experiment in feminist theorizing." Feminist Theory 9, no. 2 (August 1, 2008): 165–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1464700108090409.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
41

Schleef, Debra. "Lessons From East Germany: a Comparison of Feminist and Socialist Jurisprudence." Social & Legal Studies 5, no. 2 (June 1996): 219–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096466399600500205.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
42

Haney, Lynne A. "Feminist State Theory: Applications to Jurisprudence, Criminology, and the Welfare State." Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (August 2000): 641–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.641.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
43

Varisco, Daniel Martin. "“Sexual ethics and Islam: feminist reflections on Qur’an, Hadith, and jurisprudence”." Contemporary Islam 1, no. 1 (March 29, 2007): 107–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11562-007-0009-8.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
44

Silvers, Laury. "Kecia Ali:Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on Qur'an, Hadith, and Jurisprudence." Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 4, no. 3 (October 2008): 134–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/mew.2008.4.3.134.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
45

Matlala, Rorisang. "Notes: Introducing feminist legal theory as a basis for South African judicial jurisprudence: Insights from S v Tshabalala." South African Law Journal 139, no. 2 (2022): 274–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.47348/salj/v139/i2a2.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
In S v Tshabalala, the Constitutional Court considered an appeal about whether accused persons who were present at a rape scene, but who did not participate in the crime and who neither aided nor abetted the perpetrators, could be found guilty of rape. The court decided this question in the affirmative by developing the commonlaw doctrine of common purpose and extending its application to rape cases. The court said that it did so to remove obstacles caused by patriarchal elements of the common law found in criminal law. The most interesting aspect of the judgment is that the court used feminism as a starting point for understanding the plight of women in rape cases. It affirmed its solidarity with women facing sexual violence and introduced feminist legal theory as a viable jurisprudential consideration in the adjudication of sexual crimes. This note considers the judgment and its implications for South Africa.
46

Wardatun, Atun, and Bianca J. Smith. "Woman-Initiated Divorce and Feminist Fiqh in Indonesia: Narrating Male Acts of Nushūz in Marriage." Ulumuna 24, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 266–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v24i2.416.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
This article examines the issue of woman-initiated divorce (cerai gugat) for the controversial reason in Indonesian Islam known as nushūz suami or a husband’s disobedience in marriage. In contrast to the Indonesian Compilation of Islamic Law which applies nushūz (disobedience) to wives only, our arguments draw on feminist jurisprudence (fiqh) to show how nushūz also applies to husbands who do not fulfill marital obligations. A husband’s nushūz is overlooked by classical scholars and Indonesian Islamic Law alike, yet when understood in a Qur’anic feminist context, it gives a depth of understanding about women’s choice to divorce as part of a wider gender justice process and the ‘gendering’ of divorce. Based on women’s post-divorce narratives about nushūz, we propose a feminist fiqh understanding of gender equality situated in tawḥīd as a concept with the potential to form egalitarian-inspired persons (muslimah reformis) and ‘essential’ and ‘true’ justice (keadilan hakiki), through reading religious texts and producing knowledge and policies that include women’s experiences and voices along with those of men’s (mubādalah).
47

EDWARDS, ALICE. "The ‘Feminizing’ of Torture under International Human Rights Law." Leiden Journal of International Law 19, no. 2 (June 2006): 349–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156506003359.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
International human rights law has been the subject of much scrutiny by feminist scholars over the past two decades, principally because of the way in which it is seen as privileging the realities of men's lives while ignoring or marginalizing those of women. The international prohibition on torture is identified by feminist writers as a classic example of this ‘male’-gendered nature of human rights law. This article explores the extent to which key feminist critiques of the 1980s and 1990s are now reflected in the commentary and jurisprudence on torture of various international human rights bodies. It asks: have the critiques of international human rights law been satisfied by interpretations applied by international and regional bodies to this so-called ‘male’ right? It concludes by offering both caution and counsel – it cautions against the potentiality of new interpretations simply replacing old gender-based stereotypes with new ones and counsels international decision-makers to focus on the individual or personalized characteristics and circumstances of each claim, of which sex/gender may be but one factor.
48

White, Jessica, and Patricia Easteal. "Feminist Jurisprudence, the Australian Legal System and Intimate Partner Sexual Violence: Fiction over Fact." Laws 5, no. 1 (March 2, 2016): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/laws5010011.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
49

Carleton, Francis. "Women in the workplace and sex discrimination law: A feminist analysis of federal jurisprudence." Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 13, no. 2 (1993): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.1993.9970666.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
50

Rothchild, Jonathan. "Law, Religion, and Culture: The Function of System in Niklas Luhmann and Kathryn Tanner." Journal of Law and Religion 24, no. 2 (2008): 475–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0748081400001685.

Повний текст джерела
Стилі APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO та ін.
Анотація:
Since the founding of the Journal of Law and Religion, burgeoning numbers of distinctively interdisciplinary approaches have appeared in the study of law including feminist jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, critical and postmodern legal studies, and law and religion. These approaches enrich the theoretical and practical dimensions of law. Nevertheless, in response to such conversations, the legal academy has been buffeted by disciplinary impulses toward marginalization, tribalism, and balkanization. These impulses can attenuate the prospects for interdisciplinary conversations by simplifying plural realities and multifarious foci into dichotomies (“us” and “them”) or totalities (“us”).They reflect the conceptual challenges of the complexity of culture, which, according to theologian David Tracy, includes “a diminishment of belief in the possibility of authentic civic discussion in the community.” This diminishment of belief in discussion on a broader civic level has also contributed to facile assumptions about the unlikelihood of interdisciplinary conversations between law and religion.

До бібліографії